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UNCLASSIFIEDM S # A-855

HISTORY INSTITUT

U . S . A r m y M i l i t a r y H i s t o

English Copy

HISTORY^ OF_Tj IE_ATj :gMiPT O N HITLER'S LIFE

(20 Jul 1944)

UNCLASSIFIED

HISTORICAL DIVISION

HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY EUROPE

FOREIGN MILITARY STUDIES BRANCH

PROPERTY OF US ML



UNCLASSIFIED

MS # A-855

HISTORY OF THE ATTEMPT ON HITLER'S LIFE

(20 July 1944)

Freiherr Rudolf Christoph von G-ersdorff, G-eneralmajor a. D.

Ed ltor: R . S . Iv eyReviewer: G . C . Vanderstadt

Hi s t o r ic al Di v i s i o nHEADQUARTERS

UNITED STATES ARMY, EUROPE

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MS # A-855

Rudolf-Christopf Freiherr von GersdorffG e n e ralmajor a . . D .Date o f Birth: £ 7 March 1905Place o f Birth: L u e b e n , Silesia

Von Gersdorff joined t h e A r r a y a s a n officercandidate i n 1 924 and w a s commissioned a s a secondlieutenant o f cavalry t w o years later after training

in t h e Infantry S c h o o l , Ohrdruf and t h e Cavalry S c h o o l ,Hannover.

When World War I I broke o u t , von Gersdorff, bynow a captain o f cavalry, was serving a n assignmenta s assistant intelligence officer o n t h e s t a f f o f t h e 14th A r m y . After participating i n t h e Polish Campaign,h e was transferred a s intelligen ce officer t o t h e XIICorps i n position a t Saarbruecken. On 3 0 April 1940he was awarded General Staff Corps Status and a monthlater was transferred a s operations officer t o t h e86th Division, with which division h e took part i n

t h e ' 1 9 4 0 offensive i n P r a n c e .

Promoted major on 1 June 1 9 4 0 , lieutenant colonel i n March 1 9 4 2 , colonel i n July 1943 andGeneralmajor i n March 1 9 4 5 , von G ersdorff s further employment during t h e w a r included assignments a sintelligence officer o f Army Group C e n t e r , i n Russia,from April 1941 - September 1 9 4 3 , a s chief o f s t a f f ,LXXXII C o r p s , o n t h e Channel c o a s t , from Feb - J uly 1944 and a s chief o f s t a f f , Seven th A r m y , in Normandy,Belgium and during t h e retreat through Germany fromJuly 1 944 - May 1 9 4 5 .

On 9 May 1945 t h e G e n e r a l , w a s taken prisoner a tEllboge, near Karlsbad, Czechoslovakia.

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CONTENTS

P a |

I . INTRODUCTION. ................

I I . THE BIRTH OF THE CONSPIRACY ......... 4

III. THE FIRST PRACTICAL STEPS ..........

I V . MY ASSASSINATION ATTEMPT OF 15 MARCH 1 9 43 . . 15

V . THE CONSPIRACY ACQUIRES A BROADER BASIS ... 18

VI. THE OKGAiMl'ZA TION OF THE CONSPIRACY . . ... 21

VII. THE ATTEMPT ................. 4

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I . INTRODUCTION

One o f the essential conditions for t h e success o f the

conspiracy o f 20 July 1944 w a s the maintenance o f absolute

secrecy. Even those persons who played a n active role i n the

development o f t h e conspiracy were not informed o f a l l it s

details. Naturally, t o o , very few written notes \ v e r e made

upon which an exhaustive, documented report could " b e prepared.

For that reason, I will s e t down my own experiences in detail,

while giving only genera l treatment t o informat ion derived

from others.

When, i n 1 9 3 3 , National Socialism came t o power by legal

methods, the army was presented with a fait accompli. T h e

training and s t r u c t u r e , o f t h e Reichswehr had intentionally

b een kept non-political by i t s creators. The only general

who played a political role, von Schleicher, was defeated

by parliamentary methods in his attempt t o gain power. T h e

rest o f the generals held themselves aloof from politics,

adopting the same neutral attitude with which formerly, under

the V / e i m a r regime, they had carried out their militar y duties,

untouched and unmoved by party hatreds and partiality. The

younger memb ers o f the officer corps either adopted this

same attitude or allowed themselves t o be driven through

patriotic feeling, which was skilfully directe d by propaganda



MS # A-855 -2-

into a more or less enthusiastic acceptance o f National

Socialism.

However, the experiences during t h e first years after

th e s e i z u r e , o f power, especial ly during t h e purge o f 3 0 June, * - S\

^9441 . c o u l d only bri n g disillusionment t o m a n y . Those who

were already skeptical o f Nazism or were inwardly opposed

t o it s principles were now driven into the opposition, while

many others began for t h e first time t o think for themselves,

without, however, fully recognizing t h e extent o f t h e menace.

The N a z i s ' objectives and above a l l their methods o f attaining

them we re a t this time s o outwardly obscure that t h e m a s s , o f

the officer corps could not conceive o f t h e t ru e nature o f

the movement, expecially o f its criminal asp e ct s. Only t h e

most farsighted persons, who were able t o gain partial insight

into t he intenti ons and ideas o f those in high party circles,

could predict the disaster which Hitler and his Movement were

t o bring 1 t o Germany and t o t h e whole world.

Three officers recognized t h e danger and sought t o

exercise some influence on t h e subsequent course o f events.

They v / e r e Generaloberst Freiherr von Hammerstein, former chief

o f t h e Army High Command; Generaloberst B e c k , , a t that t ime

chief o f the General Staff; and Generaloberst Freiherr von

Fritsch, commander in chief o f t h e A r m y i T h e first t w o ,

especially, had already decided t o place themselves in



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active opposi t i o n t o H i t ler and his regime. Thus t h e little

group around Hammerstein and Beck became t h e first cell o f

opposition, gradually developing into the conspiracy o f 2 0

July 1 9 4 4 . '

A t that t i m e , however, t h e movement failed t o gain

greater influence. Hi tler's successes i n the political,

economic, a r i d social spheres tended t o overshadow t h e negative

aspects o f the Nazi program. Various events, the murder o f

Generals v on Schleicher and von Bredow, the deposing o f von

Fritsch, and t h e departure o f Beck, were of significance only

a s they influenced a gradual increas e in the number of those

who joined the opposition. . B u t the time was not ripe for the

a c t o f liberation; the important perso nalities o f t h e

Wehrmacht were not sufficiently concerned with politics, the

majority o f the officer corps lacked orientation.

I n the period from 1938 t o 1940 t h e storm o f events

overshadowed a l l other thoughts and efforts, and any active

opposition a t t hat time would have been considered by t h e mass

o f the German people t o be stupidity and high treason. Ap

parent - s u c c e s s e s i n t h e political and economic fields d e

stroyed the healthy instincts and sound judgment o f the

people and prepared t h e way t o t h e criminal objectives o f the

Nazi leaders. V / e must not forget here t h e great effect o f

propaganda, which had never before in w o rld hi st o ry been



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aoplied with s u c h s k i l l and f o r c e .

I t i s t r u e t h a t again a n d again s o m e individuals tried

t o interfere with developments. For instance, there was t h e

action o f " G - e n e r a l o b e r s t Blaskowitz i n P o l a n d . But such

heroism was swallowed up by t h e rapid course o f e v e n t s ,

especially a s t h e Nazi s employed skilful propaganda either

t o cover up such news o r t o reduce i t t o insignificance .

Germany 1 s victorious military leadership, which appeared

t o t h e world t o h a v e risen t o t h e peak o f f a m e , had actually

fallen t o t h e lowest depths o f i t s century-long history.

Because o f their political naivete and instinctive trust

fulness, t h e military leaders had l e t power slip gradually

from their h a n d s . When Nazism dropped i t s m a s k , t h e Army was

, a t grips with i t s military enemy a n d , driven by a desire t o

defend t h e Fatherland, became t h e witless t o o l o f a criminal

leadership.

I I . T H E BIKTH OF T H E CONSPIRACY

! Reasoning. T h e shattering fact t h a t t h e t o p

political leadership was criminal i n character x v a s recognized

a t first only by a very few w i s e and farseeing m e n . But i t

i s true that those men were immediately ready t o a c c e p t , t h e

full consequences o f their realization.



MS # A-855 -5-

T o the soldiers in t h e field, the fi nal impetus, a t

least i n part, was given by a n abhor ence o f the obje ctives

and me thods o f the Russian campaign, w h e n for t h e first time

the Nazi le ade rs felt t h e mselves s t r o n g ; enough t o put t h eir

cards on t h e table and t o s h o w t h e ir true colors. The ord ers

t o s h o o t ' ra t h er t han t o capture Russ ian commissars and the

partial suspension o f jurisdict ion in of f e nse s against the

Russian civilian population made a mockery o f h uman i t y and

expose d t h e ut t e r b rut ality o f t h e Nazi m i n d . The orders

aroused a storm o f indign ation a t all h ig h e r h e adquarte rs.

While at t e mpts t o alter these policie s were a t first un

successful, i t was felt that t heir e ffect s could be mit ig a t e d

b y changing t h e form o f t h e orde rs or by pre ve n t i n g t h e ir

t r a n s r a i t t a l . In 1 9 4 4 ' the stubborn e f for ts ' o f the military

were successful in ha ving t h e order t o shoot commissars

rescinded.

When, during the e arly part o f t h e Russian campaig n, the

objective s and me t hods o f t h e S S were gradually made known

t o t h e military commanders, t h e last scruples against

b e t r ayi n g t h e ir count ry's leadership were overcome. The

military commander s h ad jurisdict ion over S S unit s only i n

cases where tactical interests appe ared t o be endangered.

Wh ile f ar-reach in g advant age w as taken o f t h i s , t h e Ar my

h ad absolutely n o influence over acts w h ich occurre d be h ind



M S # A-855 -6-

the military z o n e , where most o f t h e crimes took place. There

remained only one way t o b ring these crimes t o an end and t o

free G ermany and t h e world: that was t h e removal o f Hitler

and his regime.

I t . i s true that Stalingrad had a great psychological

effect on many persons, but i t did not have the decisive effect

on t h e participants in con spiracy o f 20 J uly that has general

ly been assumed. Their decision resulted from a knowledge o f

the cruel methods us ed in Russia, the persecution of the J ews,

t h e atrocities in the concentration camps, and other criminal\

acts foster ed by Nazi pow er politics. The soldiers a t t h e

front kn ew less than anyone about t h i s . That is why t h e

conspiracy originated only with members o f t h e higher commands;

i t i s also why s o many person s now say that they k n e w practical

ly nothing o f t h e crimes. Anyone w ith a n advanced k n ow ledge

o f the situation could s e e that t h e ideas which led t o these

mon strous methods could only have sprun g from the diseased

b rain o f Hitler. While his followers offered variations in

method, the origin o f all crimes was t o be foun d i n H itler

himself. The Fuehrer* s personal power, w hich was raised t o

mystical heights b y his apparent successes and by propaganda,

x v a s great en ough that his significance a s a n individual was

easily recognized. All deliberati ons on t h e part o f the

conspirators led t o the final con clusion that H itler must d i e .



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Although i t was clear t o all that this man deserved

death a thousand times, i t was not easy for a G - e r m a n officer

t o reach a decision. A century o f tradition and training

had exerted too strong a n effect, and this fact was skillfully

exploited t o the last by t h e Nazi leadership. Covered by the

mantle o f patriotism, military spirit, a n a pride o f powe r,

t h e Nazis hitched their wagon t o - t h e A r r a y and its officer

corns.

The conspirators fully realized that t h e existanc e and

unity o f the G - e r m a n Army must not be jeopardized by the

planned coup d 1 e i t a t . A Russian break-through on the Eastern

F r ont would bring chaos t o t h e heart o f Europe; Germany

would be overrun by millions of Slavs and Asiatics. The

Western P o x v e r s could not appreciate this menace a t , t h e t i m e .

Only a sudden powerful stroke and careful leadership by t h e

higher Army headquarters could prevent a violent eruption

within t h e Wehrmacht.

2 . Beginning o f the Conspiracy. I feel certain that

similar i c . e a s aros e and similar conclusions were arrivedo

a t in t h e above-mentioned Beck g z ' o u p . I n civilian circles

i t was chiefly Oberbuergerrae ister Goerdeler o f Lei pzig and

the Prussian minister, Popitz, who saw things clearly and

decided t o reverse their course. One o f the most active

cells i n the conspiracy v / a s t o be found in the staff o f Army



MS # A-855 -8-

G - r o u p Center on t h e Eastern Front, in which I was G 2 f r o m -

1941 t o 1 9 4 3 . I t i s here that we meet von Tresckow, a t that

time a colonel in the General Staff a n d . G 3 o f the Army G r o u p .

A man o f do mi n a t i n g personality, he handled with great energy

both discussion and action. A t first von Tresckow confided

his views only t o the assistant operations officer, Colonel

( G - S C ) Schultze-Buettger (murdered after 2 0 July), t h e intel

ligence officer, Colonel von Kleist, and his special mi ssi o n s

staff officer, 1st Lieutenant ( R e s e r v e ) , von Schlabrendorff.

Then he turned t o m e in early 1 9 4 2 , a s near a s I remember,

with his first request t o prepare the explosive and fuse fo r

the actual attempt.

For reasons o f security, Tresckow gave m e n o indication

o f the scope o f t h e conspiracy or o f t h e extent t o which

preparations would be made. While I can o n ly speak general

ly o f the subject, I assume that i n the year 1942 the fo llo w

ing main centers o f the conspiracy were already in existance:

a . Army Group Center (led by Colonel von Tresckow);

b . Ar my High Command (led by Colonel Stieff);

c . Replacement Army and civilian circles (led by

Generaloberst Beck).

The connect i o n b e t \ ? e e n Beck and T r e s c k o ' w resulted from

the fact that Schultze-Buettger had for many years been

Beck's adjutant. Pr om Beck, connecting threads ran t o t h e



MS # A-855 -9-

civilian group headed by Goerdeler and Popitz. Tresckow took

advantage o f official communications t o maintain Ms contact

with t h e Army High Command. A t the s a m e t i m e , there was

already i n existence the germ o f an organization t o deal with

the reforming o f . t h e government and wit h the realization o f

specific milit ary a i m s . I d o not know whet her discussions

were opened a t that time wit h t h e Western Powers. All o f

this planning was only outlined t o us " b y Tresckow, who

continually proved himself t o " b e t h e most active and fanatical

fighter. I believe today that Tresckow, a t this initial stage

in t h e conspiracy (by \ « / h i c h time h e had already made up his

mind on definite action), desired t o present Germany and t h e

Wehrmacht with a fait accompli through t h e removal o f Hitler,

Goering, and Himmler. In view o f what h e knew t o be the

attitude o f nearly all the Army leaders, T r e s c k o x v probably

assumed that after t h e death o f Hitler the course o f events

could be s o directed that t h e other object ives could be

reached.

III. THE FI RST PRACT I CAL STEPS'

A t any event, w e h e circle around Tresckow ad

a l r e a d y , made up our minds in 1942 t o kill Hitler and i f

possible t o remove Goering and Himmler a t the same t i m e . At

other places different plans were being considered, a s , for



MS # A-885 -10-

example, the proposal t o kidnap Hitler and then t o force a

change in the t op military a n d political leadership. However,

i t was always clear t o Tresckow that such a half-way measure

would only lead t o civil t f a r , and that only the shock o f the

death o f the "mystic Fue hrer" t o the entire German people

would make i t possible for t h e coup d'etat t o proceed

according to p l a n .

Immense difficulties appeared in considering plans for

the attempt:

1 . How would i t b e possible t o come into contact

with Hitler?

2 . Y / h a t weapons o r methods could be used in order

t o make certain t h e attainment o f the desired end?

I t was clear from the beginning that the attempt had

t o be made in such a manner a s t o assure absolute certainty

o f success, since an unsuccessful attempt would destroy the

entire enterprise. And i t was axiomatic that the attempt

must be carried o u t a s soon a s possible, since time only

brought a further deterioration i n the political and economic

position of Germany. Moreover, with the passing o f each day

there was an ever increasing danger that t h e conspiracy might

be discovered.

Many ideas were developed and discarded. One plan was

t o have a reliable unit imprison Hitler during his visit to



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the h eadquarters o f - A r r a y Group Center in Smolensk and then

t o eliminat e h i m . For this purpose t here was a suitable

unit a t hand in t h e ne wly est ablis h e d Cavalry Regiment

"Center," and a suitabl e leader i n its commander, Major

Freiherr von Boeselager (later kill e d on t h e Eastern Front).

An assassinat io n by pistol-was ruled out because there was

n o assurance that Hitl e r would be hit; besides, i t was

ge nerally be l i e v e d that Hitler always wore a bulletproof

vest. Tresckow finall y decide d on a bombing attempt.

Reque st i ng me t o prepare t h e e xplosive and fuses, he s e t

up the fol l owi ng requireme nts:

' A n , explosi ve about the s i z e o f a book or bundle

o f documents, with sufficient force t o destroy a small house

and its occupants;

£ A time fuse which would function wi t h absolute

certainty but without any audible ticking.

As G 2 o f t h e army g r o u p , I h ad under me a - counter-

int elligence unit ( commanded by Colone l Herrlit z, later

a p risoner o f t h e Americans), Se ction I I o f wh ich (commanded

by Colone l Hetzel) \ ? a s re sponsibl e for such equipment. I n

t h eir storeroom, whi ch was managed by a Lieutenant Buch holz,

I looked over all available types o f e xplosives and fuses.

I decided on Engli sh plastic explosive, an Eng l ish magne t ic

mine, and an Engl i sh chemical f u s e . These devices h ad be en



MS # A-855 -12-

dropped by enemy aircraft over Germany for use in sabotage by

agents and foreign workers , and had been systematically

collected by u s . None o f t h e available German devices \ 7 e r e

suitable, being either too large or too conspicuous. I took

the English apparatus with m e , with t h e statement that I

wanted t o show i t t o t h e commander in c h i e f .

Tresckow made many tests with these devices. The p o v r e r

o f the explosive s eemed quite satisfactory, although natural

ly i t was impossible t o make tests with living beings. T h e

fuse \ v a s especially suitable because o f its rod form and its

simple operation (crushing o f a foil capsule). There were

fuses v < r i t h a time delay o f 1 0 , 3 0 , 1 2 0 , and 3 6 0 minutes.

Experiments showed that t h e surrou nding air temperature

affected the time delay; a t less than room temperature t h e

time delay could be increased by a s much a s 100 per c e n t .

I have gone into detail here because an as sassination

attempt made by m e on 1 5 i l a r c h 1943, giving every promise

o f success, failed becaus e t h e time delay x v a s t o o great, and

because the attempt o f 20 July 1944 was carried out with the

s a m e apparatus and yielded such disappointing results.

Tresckow required more and more material for his research

and i t was not easy t o think up new explanations t o satisfy

the officers o f t h e counterintelligence unit. I was fully

aware o f the danger in which I , above all others, would be



MS # A-855 -13-

placed in case t h e assassination attempt failed. Once he h ad

convinced himself o f their effectiveness, Tresckow manufactured

several " b o m b s .

T h e first assassination attempt was carried out by

Tresckow on the occasion o f Hitler 1 s visit t o the Army G - r o u p

headquarters in Smolensk. Tresckow personally brought Hitler

from the airfield and had planned t o place a bomb i n the side

pocket o f the automobile, next t o the place Hitler was t o

occupy. But i t was n o t possible t o " plant the bomb i n . advance

s i n c e , although Hitler himself traveled by train, he always

had his personal car and driver sent on a h e a d . He never s a t

in anyone else's automobile. Even though, t o avoid attention,

Hitler had only a few S3 men present, t h e attempt failed

becaus e o f their ceaseles s vigilance. I t proved impossible

for Tresckow t o approach t h e car unwatched.

Several subsequent attempts were undertaken but most o f

them were dis rupted in their early stages. A t that t i m e ,

Tresckow was trying either t o carry out the assassination

personally or t o have i t carried out in t h e Fuehrer's

headquarters on t h e occasion o f t h e so-called "situation

conference." During a report on Army Group Center, either

Tresckow or one o f us was t o ignite t h e bomb in a brief case

or in t h e pocket o f a garment. T h e advantage here was that

wi th good fortune Goering or Himmler, or both, might also



MS # A-855 -14-

be caught by the explosion. The disadvantage was that

several others who could not be warned would also be endan

g e r e d . However, Tresckow, w h o always carried t h e affair

forward with the greatest energy, felt that t h e death o f a .

few innocent persons would be justified by the fact that

Germany and the world would be freed o f . t h e greatest

criminals in history.

Through his acquaintanceship wi th Hitler1 s

chief

adjutant, General Schmundt, who also headed the Army

Personnel Office in t h e winter o f 1942-1943, Tresckow

succeeded in getting certain trusted people into important

staff positions without Schmundt's learning anything about

the enterprise. T h u s , for example, Colonel ( G S G ) Schultze-

Buettger was placed a s G 3 on the staff o f Army Group S o u t h .

A trusted member o f t h e conspiracy, 1st Lieutenant Stahlberg,

was already available there a s Field Marshal von Manstein 1 s

assistant staff officer. On the occasion o f one o f Hitler 1 s

visits t o Army Group South, Schultze-Buettger attempted t o

carry through the assassination attempt but was unsuccessful.

I have n o knowledge o f why the attempt failed. But I would,

like t o emphasize again how extremely difficult i t was t o

approach Hitler and t o strike the blow without the danger

o f premature discovery.



MS # A-855 -15-

I V . MX' ASSASSINATION ATTEMPT OF 15 MARCH 1943

A r r a y Group Center - h a d prepared in t h e armory I n Berlin

a n exhibition o f captured Russian a r r a s and equipment, war

pictures, models, etc., and a few days prior t o 1 5 March 1943

General Schmundt gave put the information that Hitler would

personally open the exhibition on the occasion o f Heroe's

Memorial Day. Since Goering'and Himmler, a s commanders o f

their respective organizations, were always present a t this

celebrat ion, this was a n opportunity which might never

repeat itself. Upon Tresckow's request, I declared myself

ready t o make t h e assassination attempt. Inasmuch a s my own

staff division had organized the exhibit, i t was not difficult

to have myself sent t o Berlin. Field Marshal von K l u g e . sent

Field Marshal Model a s his re presentative.

In the last hour two new problems a r o s e . First, Field

Marshal von Kluge, who a t that time was not yet a party t o

the plot, wanted his wife t o take part in t h e ceremony, a n d ,

second, a t t h e moment the only available fuse had a time

delay o f less than ten minutes. The former problem was

solved when Tresckow ta lked t h e Field Marshal out o f his

Intention. T h e latter was solved by arr anging for 1st

Lieutenant von Schlabrendorff t o be sent after m e in a

special airplane and t o give m e the required material in

D



j i r

MS # A-855 ' -16-

the H o t e l Eden on the night before the ceremony. Together

with Fie ld Marshal Model, I was f l o w n t o Be r l in \ v h e r e I

lear ne d fr om General Schmundt that, after Hitl er's address

in the glass-roof e d court o f the a r s e n a l , , he wou ld spend

about half an hour g o i n g ' through the exhibit (accompanied by '( J e e r i n g , H immler, Doenitz, and several aides) and wou ld then

carry out the traditiona l review o f the guard ho n o r battalion.

Schmundt inf or m e d me in the strictest confiden ce that

the official time o f the ceremo n y had Just been change d by

several hours. I n g iving me this information, Schmundt had

no idea that he was c ontr ibu ting t o the possible success of

an a s sa s s ina tion attempt. This incident was indicative of

the security measures that were ne c e s sa r y t o protect the

h e ad of the state.

After in v e s tiga tin g the layout o f the arsenal, I c onclu d e d

that the actual attempt could only be made durin g the time

that Hitl e r 1 s party was going th r ou gh the exhibition. Con

struction wor k in preparation for the ceremony was still in

progress in the glass-roofed courtyard. The speaker 1 s

r o s tr um s tood off by itself, maki ng it impossib le to plant

a bomb there secretly. Moreover, in that p os ition there

wou ld have been littl e opportunity to set off the fuse. That

the tour th r ou gh the exhibit wou ld last a t least twenty min

utes was a fact of decisive importance, since in the unheated



1 . 1 3 # A-855 -17-

rooms o f t h e arsenal t h e temperature was only a few degrees

above zero and I was therefore forced t o calculate on the

basis o f a fuse time o f 15-20 m inutes. I was also mindful

o f t h e great height o f t h e rooms, which meant that t h e explosion

would n o t be appreciably confined and that consequentl y its

effect would be reduced.

Tresckow had asked me t o use any favorable opportunity

which promised absolute success. Since all elements involved

i n the conspiracy were t o b e forewarned once i t was determined

that the actual assassination would take place, I was t o Inform

Schlabren dorff o f t h e state o f affairs o n the evening preceding

the attempt. I told him that I intended t o s e t off a bomb in

each o f r n y coat pockets during the time that Hitler passed

through the exhibit, but stressed that I was dependent upon

the above-mentioned conditions t o assure my su c cess.

I was never a bl e t o learn whether or not this warning

was passed o n . A s Hitler, together with Goering, Himmler,

Doenltz, von Bock, and three or four a ides, entered the room,

General S c h r n u n d t came up and told m e . t h a t there were n o more

than eight minutes available for the t o u z n o f t h e exhibition.

T h e possibility o f assassination was g o n e , since even a t

normal room temperature t he fuse would have required ten

minutes t o s e t of f t h e bomb. This last-minute change o f

schedule, indicative o f t h e extreme precautions that Hitler



MS 4 A-855 -18-

t o o k , was responsible for saving his life once again. Tresckow,

who had been waiting by a radio i n Smolensk, knew that i t had

been impossible t o carry out t h e plan.

V . .THE C O N SPIRACY ACQUIRES A BROADER BASIS

Before flying t o Berlin, I had asked Tresckow t o tell

m e whether the coup . d 1 etat could be successfully carried out

once Hitler had been assassinated. Since I did not expect t o

surv ive, I wanted t o know i f r a y a c t \ y o u l d be justified in the

eyes o f history. A t that time Tresckow told m e t h at an

organi zati on already existed and would g o into action imme

diately; that arrangements had already been made with t h e

Western Powers; and that t h e enterprise was the only chance

t o s a v e G - e r m a n y from complete destruction. Other than t h i s ,

I knew only that Tresckow w a s in close contact with various

branch chiefs i n th e A r r a y High Command (Including General

Heusinger, Operations Branch; Colonel Stieff, Organization

Branch; and General Pellgiebel, Chief Signal Officer).

During t he course o f 1943 th e existi ng organization was

gradually and caut iously placed upon a broader basis. In t h e

summer o f 1943 Tresckow was successful i n gaining th e complete

support o f Field Marshal von Kluge. But i t was only after

difficult inner struggles and l ong conversations w i t h all o f

us that t h e Field Marshal finally reached his decision. After



MS # A-855 -19-

pledglng himself wholeheartedly t o the cause, von Kluge

held discussions with Beck, Halder, Hoeppner, von Witzleben,

and ot h e rs. H e received numerous letters from Goerdeler and

P opitz ' b e g g i n g him t o t a l c e action, t o overt hrow the regime,

and t o assume leadership himself. A t that time Field Marshal

von Kluge was among those considered for t h e new head o f

s t a t e .

Since a meet ing o f two field marshals who were bot h

commanding troops a t the front was likely t o arouse suspi

cions i n the mistrustful leaders, von Kluge s e n t m e in t h e

summer o f 1943 t o consult t h e commander o f A r - ? n y G - r o u p South,

Field Marshal von Manst ein, in order t o coordinate their

ideas. Concealing my real mission by a discussion o f propos

als for changes i n top-level organization, I v ? a s t o ascertain

von Manstein 1 s attitude with regard t o t h e proposed coup d ' e t a t ,

Manstein was then being considered for t h e future chief o f the

general s t a f f . Field Marshal von Kluge had authorized m e ,

in case I saw f i t , t o explain the entire conspiracy and t o

present letters from Goerdeler and Popitz which contained

political and economic information. I n long conversations

with von Manstein, I determined that he held the s a m e views

a s von Kluge. H x n v e v e r , h e refused t o commit himself premature

ly since the foreign press had labeled him a s a "dangerous

man" striving for power. In addition, h e refused t o enter



RESTRICTED

MS # A-855 -20-

into any political action and raised doubts about the conduct

o f t h e A r r a y in the event o f a coup d'etat. For those reasons,

I refrained from confiding in hi m all t h e details o f t h e plot.

I f a coup d'etat were effected, h o \ v e v e r , w e were assured t h at

von Manstein would be completely a t our disposal.

During the fall and w int e r, Trescko w t ook a long leave

o f absence i n Berlin and Potsdam before returning t o t h e

Eastern F ront , where h e assumed command o f a regiment and

later became chief o f st aff o f t h e Second A r m y . I n the mean

t ime Lieutenant Colonel ( G S C ) Count Stauffenberg had joined

the conspiracy. After being severely wounded, h e w as employed

on t h e staff o f t h e commander o f t h e Replacement Training

Army. Count Stauffenberg was an eminently qualified general

st aff officer, an outspoken individual, and a devout Catholic,

w h o , o n the basis o f his moral and religious convictions and

his ardent patriotism, had decided on vigorous action. I n

Tresckow, Count Stauffenberg found a man whose ideas coincided

with his o w n . Although a desire for personal glory was alien

t o t h e m , these t w o men were called upon t o play a n important

role in t h e struggle for a better Germany. Both men now

began t o work out the military, and in p art, the political

preparations for what they hoped would lay a h e a d . W o r k i n g -

day and nig h t , orders for a l l headquarters o f the fi el d and

home armies were prepared, handbills and proclamations for



I ' i S # A-855 -21-

the troops and the civilian copulation were drafted,.

and the exact timing o f all the operations was decided.

All preparations were made, in consultation with Field

Marshal von Witzleben, Generals Beck and Hoepnner, and the

civilian grouo.

For some time Tresckow had been in contact with the

Wehrmacht Counterintelligence Office, whose head, Admiral

Canaris, was deeply involved'in the conspiracy. Here

one o f our trusted men, General Oster, had " b e e n employed

for some time a s branch chief. Moreover , the heads

of Sections I and I I (Procurement of Information and

Sabotage), Colonels Hansen and Baron von Freitag-

Loringhoven, were also cooperating n o v . 1 in the organization

of the plot. At that time Baron von Freitag-Loringhoven

procured explosives and fuses o f the same type that I

had provided in Smolensk; and i t was with these that

the assassination attempt o f 20 July 1944 was carried o u t .

VI. TKS ORGANIZATION OF THE CONSPIRACY

During the winter of 1943-1944 the plot Was organized

.approxim ately a s follows:

This information was gathered by combining what I knewthen with what I learned later. (Author)



?IS # A-855 -22-

Fiel d Marshal v on V/itzleben

Generalo berst Hoeppner

G e n eraloberst Halder ( ? )

Colon el (GSC) v on Tresckow

Colonel ( G S C ) Count von S ta uffenberg

Uehrmacht Coun e r i n t e 11 g e nee Of 1 c e

Admiral Canaris

Colonel ( . G S C ) Hansen

Colonel ( G S C ) Baron von Freitag-Loringhov en

C o mmand^ aridEa_s: e r i 1 rpn t

General Zeitzler (chief o f the General Staff) ( ? )

Major ( 1 S C ) S r a e n d

General Heusinger (Operations Branch)

G e n e r a l \ 7 a g n e r (Chief Supply and Administration Officer)

General Stieff (Organization Branch)

L l a j o r (GSC) Klamroth (O rganization Branch)

Colonel (GSC) Freiherr Roenne (Foreign Armies Branch)

General Fellgiebel (Signal Communications)

Y / e _ s tern Front

Field i l a r s h a l v on Kluge (Commander in Chief West) .

Colonel (GSC) Fink (Supply and Administration)



HS # A-855 -23-

Fiel d Marshal Rommel (Army Group B )

General Seidel (Army Group B )

General von Stuelpnage l (Military Government, France)

General von Falkenhausen (Military Government, Belgium)

Re placement Training

General Olbrich

Colonel ( G - S G ) Count von Stauffenberg

C o l o n e l ( G - S C ) I l e r z von Quirnheim

(There were also reliable officers in various corps

headquarters. Colonel Kodre, fo r example, was w i t h the

XVII Corps headquarters in Vienna)

l i e ado ar e r in the F ie ld

There were reliable officers in nearly all of the

important army and army group staffs.

Be r l in

Count Hell o rf (Police President)

S3 Obergruppenfuehrer Nebe (Reich Criminal Office)

C ivil ia n Circles

Gener al von Haase (Commandant of Berlin)

Oberbuergerrneister Goerdeler

Prussian Mi n is te r P o u i t z ,

D



UNCLASSIF IED

.MS # A-855 -24-

Ambassador von Hassel (Foreign Office)

(Others in political and economic circles).

The above list lays no claim t o completeness. But i t shows

that the organization embraced the compete nt people in

almost the whole o f the military command structure and that

it also ha d a large civilian base. In v i e w of this fact,

v i e can h a r d l y b e charged with lack of preparat ion. In my

personal v iew the r e pr o a ch i s un j us ti fi e d i f o n l y b ecause

of the participation o f men like Beck, Tresckow, and Stauffen-

berg.

VII. T f T E ATTEl'IPT

Reliable eye-witness reports on the actual assassination

attempt of 20 July 1944 are available. I myse lf was a t the .

Wester n Front a s a corps commander but, in accordance with a

discussion \ v i t h Tresckow, I h e l d myself ready for call.

In my own opinion the coup d'etat failed only because the

most important s t e p , the assassination o f Hitler, was unsuccess

ful. The assassin, Count Stauffenberg, flew to Berlin with

the impression that .Hitler wa s dead. An d while the pl ans

were carried out by persons who also b e l i e v e d Hitle r was dead,

all those who k n e w differently fa i l e d to a c t . Therefore,

measures w hich were d ecisive fo r the success o f the c o u t > d'etat

^ C L A S S I F I E D



MS # A-855 . W*' _25_

were not carried out. The " b e s t example was the fact that the

communication system v / a s never t ak en over, since General

Fellgiebel and his chief o f staff, Colonel Hahn, had seen for

themselves " t h a t the assassination attempt had failed. Only

for this reason did the radio remain completely in the hands

o f the Nazi government Even telephone communication b e t w e e n

Berlin and Hitler 1 s headquarters continued without difficulty.

The various outlying headquarte rs (as, for example, a t corps

level) sup-oosedly took their orders . . . f r o m S t a u ff en b erg but,

thinking that the decisive a t t e n r o t would not be carried out,

were uncertain and adopted a waiting attitude. Moreover, there

v / a s almost no forewarning, since Stauffenberg' s decision to

make the attempt had be en sudden. Time and again other

assassination a t t e mp ts had gone wrong or had been postponed

to a more suitable occasion. On the other hand there was

little time to lose because o f the imminent Allied invasion.

I t became necessary t o prove to t he W es t ern Powers, before a

break-through, that there were men in Germany who condemned

the Nazi system and were willing to act in accordance with

their convictions. Hence, i t was understandable that Stauffen

b e r g seized the sudden opportunity for personal contact with

Hitler and attenuated the assassination. Who knew when s u c h '

a chance might occur again? Because of his haste, however,

it had b e e n impossible to \ v a r n , according to prior agreement,

^CLASSIFIED



" U N C L A S S I F I E D

MS # A-855 ' -26-

those conspirators who were also t o take part in the

"situation conference" on 20 July-

In the last analysis, t h e ? / e a k explosive effect of the

bomb, which even a good engineer could probably not have

predicted, was the reason for the failure o f the whole

enterprise. After the unsuccessful attempt o f 20 July, there

were no further opportunities to overthrow the regime. Almost

all o f the conspirators were sentenced t o death or committed

suicide. The survivors, I believe, can be counted on the

fingers of one hand. They owe their lives to stringent

securi ty measures, and t o the silence of t h e spiritual leader

of the whole conspi racy, General von Tresckow. After the

collapse of his life 1 s goal, Tresckow sought and found a

soldier's death on the field o f battle.

In closing, it must be said that the conspiracy of

20 July was the only active effort to overthrow the National

Sociali st government and t o remove the chief criminals. I t

should be emphasized that this only attempt was planned and

executed by members o f the officer corps and that the dominant

role was played by the General Staff, the nobility, and the

large landowners.

1944 US Army WWII German Attempts on Hitler 30p.

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