1942-5-7 CA-32 Chester After Action Report Coral Sea

8/13/2019 1942-5-7 CA-32 Chester After Action Report Coral Sea

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A16-3(032) U.S.S. CHESTER 10/Ail

15 May 1942

From: The Commanding Officer.

To: The Commander-in-Chief, U.S. PACIFIC FLEET.

Via: The Commander Cruisers, Pacific Fleet.

(Commander Task Force 17).

Subject: Report of Action, Coral Sea.

Reference: (a) Art. 712, U.S. Navy Regulations, 1920.

Enclosures: (A) Track Chart of U.S.S. Chesterduring Air Attack. (B) Executive Officer's Statement.

(C) Photographs taken by the U.S.S. Chesterduring the Air Attaok.

1. I have the honor to report that the Chesterwas in action, as a unit of Task Foroe

SEVENTEEN, against the Japanese in the Coral Sea, approximate position - Latitude 14

46' South, Longitude 155 14' East, at 2212 on the morning of May 7, 1942, G.C.T.

2. In the interest of lucidity local zone time will be used hereafter in this report.

3. NARRATIVE.

This sequence as outlined is as it was received and recorded on various Chesterbattle

stations.

0800 -ChesterRADAR was secured and in stand-by status on orders of

Officer in Tactical Command.

0810 - RADAR contact on airplanes at 350 True.

0816 - RADAR screen cleared.

0828 - Report from Yorktownthat scouts had located 2 enemy carriers, 4

cruisers, and 3 destroyers.

0842 - Enemy was reported 120 miles distance.
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0848 - Enemy force was reported to be on true bearing 028, distance 175

miles.

--1--

0850 - Carrier signaled that she was launching her entire striking force.

0900 - Planes began leaving the deck of the Yorktown.

0901 - Relative bearing of enemy was reported to be 225, distance 175

miles.

0928 - Carriers completed launching force of 80 planes consisting of 21

TBDs, 13 F4Fs, and 46 SPDs. Each carrier launched a force of 40

planes. The Yorktownlaunched 9 TBDs and 31 SPDs. The

Lexingtonlaunched 13 F4Fs, 15 SPDs, and 12 TBDs.

Tactical command was transferred to theLexington.

0933 - Aircraft were reported at 10 True, distance 39 miles.

0942 -Chesterwent to General Quarters (Torpedo Defense).

0952 - Aircraft reported at 215 Relative and 255 Relative.

1012 - 1 enemy aircraft shot down at 030 True. Reported at first to be a

fighter but from the amount of smoke present it appeared to be a

larger plane.

1031 - Aircraft reported at 122 Relative, distance 25 miles.

Aircraft reported at 125 Relative, distance 35 miles.

Aircraft reported at 080 True, distance 40 miles.

Our course - 080.

1036 - Aircraft reported 039 True, distance 25 miles. Our course - 080.


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1056 - Many planes were reported 020 True, distance 39 miles.

1104 - Aircraft at 275 Relative, distance 25 miles. Our course 080. This

group of planes were reported to be torpedo planes.

1106 -ChesterRADAR in operation.

--2--

1112 - Carrier planes sighted enemy torpedo planes and proceeded to the

attack.

1113to -

1133

Torpedo attack. Plane crashed nearLexingtonat beginning ofattack. Several torpedo planes attacked theLexington. A second

group of enemy torpedo planes attacked the Yorktown. Torpedoes

were released, in some instances, from as high as 150 to 200 feet.

The center plane of a formation of 3 attacking the Yorktownreleased

its torpedo and suddenly the entire fuselage was enveloped in flames.

The plane continued on its course for a hundred yards or so and then

veered downward sharply, plunging into the water near the port bow

of the Yorktownor ahead of it. A second torpedo plane, to the right

and ahead of the one above, released its torpedo, began trailing

smoke, proceeded several hundred yards, winged over to starboard

and crashed on the port quarter of the Yorktown. A torpedo plane in

the formation attacking theLexingtonbegan to smoke violently and

crashed ahead or slightly on the starboard bow of theLexington.

1113

plus -

Chesteropened fire on torpedo planes attacking Yorktown. Fire

continued as targets presented themselves until the end of action at

1133.

1117 - Two torpedo planes attacking the Chesterfrom the starboard side.

One was shot down prior to release of its torpedo. The second

torpedo plane was shot down just after releasing its torpedo and

crashed just forward of the starboard beam. The torpedo passed 50

to 75 yards astern of the Chester. 1 torpedo plane passed ahead of

the Chesteron way to Yorktownand was shot down by Chester20

millimeter and 1.1" fire.


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1123 - Bomber shot down on starboard bow.

1124 - Torpedo plane shot down on Port beam.

1133 - End of attack.

--3--

1405 - 7LexingtonTBDs came in on starboard bow. 7 were reported by

lookouts and identified. Yorktownand a destroyer on the

Yorktown's port quarter opened fire on this formation. Plane

formation broke up and circled to the right.

4. ESTIMATE OF NUMBER AND TYPES OF PLANES IN ATTACKING GROUP.

Number Type Attacked on

31 Torpedo Type 97 2 waves of 6 and 1 of 5 on

Lexington.

2 waves of 6 on Yorktown.

2 planes on Chester.

20 plus Dive Bombers, Type 99 and

some Fighter Bombers similar to

Army 97 Light Bombers.

3 attacks of 4 or 5 planes on

Yorktown, plus the number that

attackedLexington.

15-20 Fighters, Type 99 or 97. Support

attack and attempted strafing.

1 Twin-engine Bomber reported

but not confirmed.

5. OBSERVED ENEMY LOSSES - CONFIRMED.

14 Torpedo Planes (4 by Chester). Losses in third attack onLexington


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not observed.

6 Dive Bombers (1 by Chester). Losses inLexingtonattack not

observed.

3 Fighters (light bombers) (1 by Chester).

23 Total.

Total losses were undoubtedly considerably higher than those observed and reported.

--4--

6. DAMAGE SUSTAINED.

None.

7. PERS0NNEL CASUALTIES.

T.J. BIANCHI, Pfc., U.S.M.C. received multiple wounds, moderately serious, about the

eyes, face, and chest. These were caused by an explosion of a 2O-mm shell in hot gun.

Other minor injuries received were due to handling of own guns.

8. ENEMY AERIAL TACTICS.

Torpedo planes dropped torpedoes from as high as 150 to 200 feet and at distances from

1700 to 700 yards.

Dive and glide bombers made attacks of three types:

a. The typical Taroa 35 to 45 glide.

b. A 45 to 50 glide ending with a short 65 to 70 turn over just prior to release and

sharp pull out.

c. About 70 dive from 10,000 feet. This was part of the last attack on the Yorktown.

Several dive bombers after completion of their attack employed diversion tactics of

simulating attacks apparently to cause diversion of fire. At least two glide bombers wereturned away by Chesteranti-aircraft fire long before point of release on Yorktown.

9. ENEMY PLANE CHARACTERISTICS.

The planes apparently were painted for land attacks as many were dark colored, easily

visible while others were silvery. Most of them had long orange or gold bands down the

entire side of the fuselage. Some had broad stripes on under side of wing from inboard

forward to outboard aft. In some cases the rising sun on fuselage blended with the orange or

gold stripe.


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--5--

10. RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS.

A carrier accompanied by three or more cruisers and a commensurate number of destroyers

can be better protected from torpedo planes and dive bombers by disposing the cruisers

equidistantly on a circle not more than 2,000 yards from the carrier with the destroyers

similarly distributed on a 3,000 yard circle from the same center. In addition one or moredestroyers could be advantageously placed on the bearing of the sun to provide early contact

with attacking torpedo planes. It is quite evident that the torpedo plane is the greatest

menace to carriers and maximum fire power must be concentrated to meet this danger.

If the Chesterhad been provided with 16 millimeter moving picture cameras an excellent

pictorial record could have been obtained. Such pictures would prove valuable from a

historical, intelligence and training angle. It is recommended that at least 2 cameras be

provided each combatant vessel.

11. CONDUCT OF PERSONNEL.

The conduct of officers and men of the Chester, in this action, was in the highest tradition.

Having previously been under fire in the action of the MARSHALLS they showed their

veteran spirit and ability. There was no confusion and needless excitement. The batteries

functioned in such a manner, in this emergency, as to make anyone justly proud. Credit must

be given the Engineers Force and others whose battle stations are below decks, for the

excellent performance or their duties under great strain without the knowledge of the action

being carried on by those in more exposed stations.

THOMAS M. SHOCK.

cc: CCD-5.

--6--

U.S.S. CHESTER

ENCLOSURE (B) to CHESTER

Conf. ltr. Al6-3(032) of

May 15, 1942.

May 14, 1942.

From: Executive Officer.

To: Commanding Officer.


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Subject: Battle report; submission of.

Reference: (a) U.S. Navy Regulations, 1920, Art. 948.

1. In accordance with reference (a) the following report of the action of May 8, 1942, fought in

the Coral Sea, is submitted.

2. During the action I was on the starboard wing of the navigating bridge. Details which I noted

in relation to planes approaching, shot down and the like have been included in the

chronological narrative prepared by the Commanding Officer and will not be repeated here.

3. Of so brief, but fierce an action, it is difficult to give other than general impressions. I was

chiefly impressed by the very excellent fire discipline, steadiness, and spirit of the ship's

company. Many of them are youngsters, new to the Service, who were under fire for the first

time. Stiffened by the older hands who did so well at Taroa on February 1, 1942, their spirit

and performance of duty were excellent. I consider that the gunnery performance of the ship

reflects great credit upon Lieutenant-Commander E. L. Schleif, U.S.N., Gunnery Officer,

and his assistants.

4. My own observation of individuals was too restricted to warrant singling out any for special

commendation. All reports reaching me indicate that the performance of the ship's company

throughout was in keeping with the best tradition of the Service and that they can be

depended upon to meet any emergency cooly, calmly and efficiently.

5. Although their part is not spectacular I should like to note the flawless performance of the

Engineering Department. The ship has steamed almost 50,000 miles since December 7,

1941, and has not had a yard overhaul for almost two years. Despite all this her plant has

met all demands and I consider that this reflects great credit upon her Engineering Personnel.

6. As an aftermath to the action I should also like to note the excellent work of the First

Lieutenant (Commander Dugan), Lieutenant (Jg) Kalen, and the deck force, in fueling

destroyers

--1--

at night and especially to their action in delivering 60,000 gallons of fuel to one destroyer inone hour and thirteen minutes while at the same time transferring 468 survivors from the

destroyer to the Chestervia three breeches buoys at the rate of six a minute; this in the face

of approaching darkness and a choppy sea. The work of the Supply and Medical

Departments in caring for our own people and the survivors was also noteworthy.

7. All in all the conduct and performance of duty of all hands during the week of action in the

Coral Sea was uniformly excellent and deserving of high praise.


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R.A. DIERDORFF.

--2--

Last updated: January 30, 2003

Transcribed and formatted by Jerry Holden for the HyperWar Foundation

1942-5-7 CA-32 Chester After Action Report Coral Sea

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