16 Ongoing Discussion of Francis Crick and Christoph Koch (Vol. 2, No. 1): Commentary by Drakon...

7/25/2019 16 Ongoing Discussion of Francis Crick and Christoph Koch (Vol. 2, No. 1): Commentary by Drakon Nikolinakos (At

1/4

This article was downloaded by: [Adelphi University]On: 23 August 2014, At: 00:24Publisher: RoutledgeInforma Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number: 1072954 Registered office: MortimerHouse, 37-41 Mortimer Street, London W1T 3JH, UK

Neuropsychoanalysis: An Interdisciplinary Journalfor Psychoanalysis and the NeurosciencesPublication details, including instructions for authors and subscription information:http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rnpa20

Ongoing Discussion of Francis Crick and ChristophKoch (Vol. 2, No. 1): Commentary by DrakonNikolinakos (Athens)Drakon Derek Nikolinakos

a

aDepartment of Philosophy and History of Science, University of Athens,

Panepistimioupolis, Athens 15771, Greece, e-mail:

Published online: 09 Jan 2014.

To cite this article:Drakon Derek Nikolinakos (2001) Ongoing Discussion of Francis Crick and Christoph Koch (Vol. 2, No.1): Commentary by Drakon Nikolinakos (Athens), Neuropsychoanalysis: An Interdisciplinary Journal for Psychoanalysis and

the Neurosciences, 3:1, 101-103, DOI: 10.1080/15294145.2001.10773341

To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/15294145.2001.10773341

PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE

Taylor & Francis makes every effort to ensure the accuracy of all the information (the Content) contained

in the publications on ourplatform. However, Taylor & Francis, our agents, and our licensors make norepresentations or warranties whatsoever as to the accuracy, completeness, or suitability for any purpose ofthe Content. Any opinions and views expressed in this publication arethe opinions and views of the authors,and are not the views of or endorsed by Taylor & Francis. The accuracy of the Content should not be reliedupon and should be independently verified with primary sources of information. Taylor and Francis shallnot be liable for any losses, actions, claims, proceedings, demands, costs, expenses, damages, and otherliabilities whatsoever or howsoever caused arising directly or indirectly in connection with, in relation to orarising out of the use of the Content.

This article may be used for research, teaching, and private study purposes. Any substantial or systematicreproduction, redistribution, reselling, loan, sub-licensing, systematic supply, or distribution in anyform to anyone is expressly forbidden. Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at http://www.tandfonline.com/page/terms-and-conditions
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/15294145.2001.10773341http://www.tandfonline.com/action/showCitFormats?doi=10.1080/15294145.2001.10773341http://www.tandfonline.com/page/terms-and-conditionshttp://www.tandfonline.com/page/terms-and-conditionshttp://dx.doi.org/10.1080/15294145.2001.10773341http://www.tandfonline.com/action/showCitFormats?doi=10.1080/15294145.2001.10773341http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rnpa20


2/4

Ongoing Discussion Vol. 2,

No 1

lar neurophysiological process underlies dreams, it

must be shown to be temporally coextensive with

dreaming. What is required is that the neurophysiolog

ical process begins when the dream begins,

is

sustained

during the dream and ends when the dream ends. Or,

if the process is hypothesized to stimulate dreams or

to terminate them, it must be temporally congruent

too. It will certainly clarify theory

if

the separate con

tents

of

a single dream are shown to be correlated with

either a single neurophysiological process or several

different ones. It will also move matters along

if

the

debaters acknowledge that they are talking about dif

ferent levels. What needs to be done is not just to

correlate neurophysiology-neurochemistry with

dreaming but to show how neurophysiology-neuro

chemistry determines in an upward fashion specific

content and how specific content relates to memories

and wishes. It would help enormously

if

Hobson

would present a specimen dream and then discuss it

at all levels.

References

Aronson, L. 1970), Functional evolution of the forebrain

in lower vertebrates. In:

Development and Evolution

of

Behavior,

ed. L. Aronson, Tobach, D. Lehrman, and

J Rosenblatt. San Francisco: W. H. Freeman.

Brown, J. 1988),

The Life

of

the Mind.

Hillsdale, NJ: Law

rence Erlbaum.

101

Freud, S. 1891), On Aphasia. New York: International

Universities Press, 1953.

1900), The Interpretation of Dreams. Standard

Edition, 4 5. London: Hogarth Press, 1953.

Hobson, J A., Pace-Schott, C. F., Strickland, R 2000),

Dreaming and brain: Toward a cognitive neuroscience

of conscious states. Behav.

Brain Sci., 23 6 :793-842.

Kaplan-Solms, K., Solms, M. 2000), Clinical Studies n

Neuro-Psychoanalysis. London: Karnac Books.

Llinas, R., Pare, D. 1991),

Of

dreaming and wake

fulness. Neurosci, 44:521-535.

Mancia, M. 1995), One possible function of sleep. Behav.

Brain Res., 69 1-2 :203-206.

Opatow, B. 1993), On the drive rootedness

of

psychoana

lytic ego psychology. n ternat.

Psycho-Anal.,

74:437-456.

1997), The real unconscious: Psychoanalysis as a

theory of consciousness.

Amer. Psychoanal. Assn.,

45:866-890.

Salthe, S., Ed. 1985),

Evolving Hierarchical Systems.

New

York: Columbia University Press.

1996), Development and Evolution. Cambridge,

MA: MIT Press.

Smolin, L. 1997), The Life of the Cosmos. New York:

Oxford University Press.

Solms, M. 1997), What is consciousness?

Amer. Psy

choanal. Assn., 45:681-703.

Wigner, E. P. 1964), Events, laws of nature, and invariance

principles.

Science, 145:995-999.

Western Drive

Ardsley,

NY

10502

e-mail: [email protected]

Ongoing Discussion

of

Francis Crick and Christoph Koch Vol. 2, No 1 :

Commentary

by Drakon Nikolinakos Athens)

The Target Article

The main point I would like to raise concerns the pres

ence

of

a plurality

of

metaphysical commitments in the

target article. These commitments seem to arisebecause

of the different ways in which the term correlation and

its cognates may be used. I will briefly describe some

of

these in order to show what these commitments are.

Thismayplace us in a betterposition to appreciate some

of

the problems that characterize the search for the neu

ral correlates

of

consciousness.

Drakon Derek Nikolinakos, Ph.D. is Assistant Professor in the De

partment of Philosophy and History

of

Science at the University of Ath

ens, Greece.

It is possible to use the term in a neutral manner

to indicate coinstantiation and covariation

of

two

kinds

of

states/properties e.g., mental and physical).

In its neutral use, the term need not commit us to a

specific kind

of

relation between the two kinds. But

once we depart from this neutral position the relation

of

correlation may be fleshed out in a variety

of

direc

tions some

of

which are: causal interactionism, pre

established harmony, occasionalism, the double

aspect theory, epiphenomenalism, the identity theory,

and emergentism Kim, 1996). The first option is typi

cally associated with Cartesian dualism; this cannot

be a viable option for the authors since one

of

them

has rejected it in the past Crick, 1994). The options

of

preestablished harmony and occasionalism are also


3/4

102

not viable alternatives since they both involve God s

intervention; such a solution is incompatible with the

naturalistic framework within which the authors de

velop their views. Epiphenomenalism could be an op

tion, but I am not sure whether the authors would be

prepared to adopt it; however, Jackendoff (2000)

thinks otherwise. That leaves us with double-aspect

theory, identity theory, and emergentism.

Double-aspect theory does not seem to be an op

tion since it is at odds with any expression

of the

reductionist program. The authors seem to gravitate

toward the final two positions, those

of

the identity

theory, which is traditionally the most dominant ex

pression

of

reductionism, and emergentism. Their

commitment to reductionism is expressed with the

claim that the hard problem of consciousness is un

likely to yield to a purely logical or philosophical at

tack. Rather, it needs to be approached in a

reductionist, scientific manner (p. 10). This ap

proach, along with the identity theory that is typically

associated with it, has been defended in the past by

one of the authors (Crick, 1994). The relation between

mental and physical states or properties is, according

to this theory, one

of

identity. Claims of the nothing

but variety are typically understood

as

identity

claims.

However, the authors also seem to be committed

to an alternative position, that of emergentism. They

maintain

we

are not implying (and have never done

so) that consciousness can be found at the level of

individual neurons but that consciousness emerges out

of the firing behavior

of

a specific and identifiable

subset

of

all neurons (p. 3). According to one

reading of the doctrine of emergentism, mental phe

nomena arise out of physical phenomena and there is

no further explanation that may be provided

of

this

fact. If this thesis is accepted, however, there is no

role that science can play since no further explanation

is available about the consciousness-brain relation.

There are also two other related emergentist theses.

According to the one, mental phenomena are irreduc

ible to the physical processes from which they emerge

and according to the other, mental properties cannot

be predicted from the knowledge of

the physical basis

that supports them. These theses, however, are at odds

with the reductionist program (Beckermann, Flohr,

and Kim, 1992). It appears that the current popularity

of emergentism goes hand in hand with the criticisms

leveled against reductionism during the past few de

cades (Kim, 1998).

Another version of emergentism, the superve

nience thesis (Kim, 1996), could be the one that the

Drakon Nikolinakos

authors would like to defend since it emphasizes the

dependence of the mental on, and its determination by,

the physical. However, the defenders and opponents of

this position perceive it as a view that is at odds with

reductionism. Perhaps a different reading of the super

venience thesis, a causalist one, according to which

there is a causal relation between mental and physical

states, would be more appealing. The authors often

express themselves along these lines. They claim that

there could be a certain subset of neurons that is r e-

sponsible for generating conscious experience, and

that qualia are most probably caused by the activity

of a small fraction of all the neurons in the brain. All

these expressions point toward a causal relationship

between mental and physical states. However, this

reading of the supervenience thesis is also in opposi

tion to reductionism and the identity theory.

If I am reading the authors correctly, then, there

seems to be a variety of metaphysical commitments

in their article, which suggests that there is a need for

some clarifications. It should also be noted that, if

the real metaphysical commitments of the authors are

expressed with reductionism and the identity theory,

they do not keep such good metaphysical company

with Freud. The reason is that Freud, as indicated in

the passage quoted on p 4 of the target article, appears

to adhere to a much more metaphysically neutral posi

tion. According to this position, there is coinstantia

tion and covariation between neural and mental states/

properties. Since no further attempt is being made to

elaborate why and how this correlation between the

two sets takes place, the position remains metaphysi

cally neutral.

The following statement is confusing: primates

are not directly aware of the neural activity in cortical

area VI, the primary visual cortex (p. 3). It is not

clear what sense to make of the phrase directly aware

of neural activity since no one claims that there is

such awareness except in some rare cases (e.g., when

due to an abnormality

of

blood vessels in the visual

cortex the subject may hear himself seeing when his

eyes are open). It could be said that in such cases one

has auditory awareness

of

cortical activity in the visual

cortex. However, I doubt that this is what the authors

have in mind.

The authors, following Jackendoff s adoption of

Marr s analysis of the visual system s shape detection,

suggest that we are directly conscious of an enriched

2-

1

/2D sketch and not of a 3D model. For example,

when

we

look at a person s face we are directly con

scious of the shape, color, movement, and so on, of


4/4

Ongoing Discussion Vol. 2, No 1

the front of her face, but we are not directly conscious

of

the back of her head.

However, the 2 lf2D sketch is not the content of

a visual conscious state. As Marr 1982, p 279)

pointed out, the existence of the 2 lf2D sketch is some

thing of

which we are not certain. It is a representation

whose existence is postulated by the theory in order to

explain how the visual system processes information it

obtains from the environment. In addition, it should

also be kept in mind that, as the authors indicate,

Ma rr s proposal only concerned the detection of

shape. Therefore,

if

the proposal that we are conscious

of an enriched

2 lf2D

sketch is to have any research

value, it will have to be articulated more fully.

Observations on the

Other

Commentaries

Humphrey considers ambiguous pictures, such

as

the

Necker cube and the duck-rabbit pictures. He claims

that the sensory part remains the same while there is

a sh ift in perceptual content; for example, on e may

first see it as a duck, and then one may see it as a

rabbit. It is not clear that the sensory part remains the

same.

If

we pay close attention to what we do in these

circumstances, it appears that there is a slight shift of

the gaze with every alteration

of

perceptual content.

That is, in order to obtain a shift from the one percep

tual content to the other, the focus of visual attention

must shift to another point on the picture. It seems

that in order to see the duck, the gaze has to shift

toward the beak part of the picture on the left, and in

order to see the rabbit the gaze has to shift toward the

right part of the picture where the rabbit s mouth is;

something analogous seems to occur with the Necker

cube picture. I take this to suggest that there is a slight

shift in the sensory aspect of the experience when

watching these pictures and that this is caused by the

different images that are projected on the retina. This

is a claim that can be tested experimentally.

1 3

Epiphenomenalism

Epiphenomenalism appears to have become a rather

popular metaphysical option since an increasing num

ber of researchers adopt it with ease. Jackendoff s

reading of the target article, as well as his own theory,

are developed along these lines 2000). T he central

claim of this position is that the real wor k is done

by the neural correlates

of

consciousness and that the

mental properties

of

the brain are inert since they have

no causal powers. However, even if we assume that

this position is coherent, it may not be so appealing if

we consider the cost. By giving up the notion of mental

causation we have given up, among other things, a

fundamental way of looking a t ourselves, th at is, as

agents who are largely responsible for their actions.

Since this seems to be a rather heavy price to pay, it

may be more advisable to try to retain the notion of

mental causation within a metaphysical framework

that would support it. There are many such approaches

which, their respective merits aside, do try to explain

mental causation rather than brush it aside.

References

Beckermann, A., Flohr, H., Kim, J., Eds. 1992), Emer-

gence or Reduction? Essays on the Prospects Nonre-

ductive Physicalism.

Berlin: Walter de Gruyter.

Crick,

F

1994),

The Astonishing Hypothesis: The Scientific

Searchfor the Soul. New York: Charles Scribner s Sons.

Jackendorf, R 2000), Commentary. This Journal 2 1 :

17-20.

Kim, J 1996),

Philosophy

Mind.

Boulder, CO: West

view Press.

1998),

Mind

a Physical World.

Cambridge, MA:

MIT Press.

Marr, D 1982), Vision. New York: W H Freeman.

Department

Philosophy and

History

Science

University

Athens

Panepistimioupolis

Athens 15771

Greece

e mail: [email protected]

16 Ongoing Discussion of Francis Crick and Christoph Koch (Vol. 2, No. 1): Commentary by Drakon...

Documents

Transcript of 16 Ongoing Discussion of Francis Crick and Christoph Koch (Vol. 2, No. 1): Commentary by Drakon...