Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManilaEN BANCG.R. No. L-9878 December 24, 1914THE UNITED STATES,plaintiff-appellee,vs.FRANK TUPASI MOLINA,defendant-appellant.Julio Borbon Villamor for appellant.Office of the Solicitor-General Corpus for appellee.JOHNSON,J.:On the 6th day of February, 1914, the prosecuting attorney of the Province of Ilocos Sur filed a complaint against the defendant charging him with the crime of perjury, alleged to have been committed as follows:The said Frank Tupasi Molina, the above-named defendant, did on September 10, 1912, in the municipality of Tayum of the Province of Ilocos Sur, P. I., for the purpose of gaining admission, as in fact he did, owing to the deceit he practiced, as will be hereinafter related, to the examinations for the municipal police service in the Province of Ilocos Sur, which were held in the municipality of Vigan, said province, on or about January 18, 1913, willfully, unlawfully, and criminally take a false oath by affirming and asserting in an oath that he knew to be false, in an examination application which he himself filled out and signed, that prior to the said date, to wit, September 10, 1912, he had never been indicted, tried, or sentenced for the violation of any law, ordinance, or regulation in any court, when he knew at the time he took that oath and signed his examination application, as he knows at the present time, that he had been twice indicted for disturbing the public peace, and forinjurias graves, and sentenced to pay a fine and undergo imprisonment therefor, by the justice of the peace court of Tayum and the Court.The defendant made the false declaration previously mentioned after he had sworn before Lucas Magno, notary public, authorized by law to administer oaths, that he would state the truth; and said false declaration made under the oath taken by the defendant, as above stated, concerned a fact of such importance that without it he would not have been admitted to said examinations prescribed for the municipal police service. In violation of the law. (Sec. 3, Act No. 1697.)After hearing the evidence adduced during the trial of the cause, the Honorable Francisco Santamaria, judge, found the defendant guilty of the crime charged, and sentenced him to be imprisoned for a period of two months and to pay a fine of P100, in case of insolvency to suffer subsidiary imprisonment in accordance with the provisions of the law, and to pay the costs. The defendant was further sentenced to be disqualified from holding any public office or from giving testimony in any court in the Philippine Islands until such time as the sentence against him is reversed. From that sentence the defendant appealed to this court and made the following assignments of error:1. The trial court erred in holding section 3 of Act No. 1697 to be applicable in this case.2. The trial court manifestly erred in sentencing the appellant for violation of section 3 of Act No. 1697, when the prosecution did not present any evidence demonstrating that he had willfully and corruptly sworn or taken an oath.3. The trial court erred in not sustaining the defense set up by the appellant Tupasi with reference to the construction he placed upon the fifth question of Exhibit A of the prosecution.4. The trial court erred also in holding that the words "which he does not believe to be true," used in Act No. 1697, are equivalent to the term "knowingly," used in section 31 of Act No. 1761.5. The trial court erred in not acquitting the defendant.It appears from the record that on the 10th day of September, 1912, the defendant signed a petition to be permitted to take the examination for the position of municipal policeman. Said petition was signed by the defendant and sworn to by him before a notary public. Said petition contained a number of questions which the applicant was required to answer. Among other questions we find that No. 5 was as follows:Have you ever been indicted, tried, or sentenced in any court for violation of any law, ordinance, or regulations, or have you ever been tried or sentenced for violation of regulations of the Army, Navy, of the Constabulary, in any court martial of the Army or of the Constabulary, or in any other court?To said question the defendant answered: "No, sir; I cannot remember any."During the trial of the cause the prosecuting attorney presented Exhibits B, C, and D.Exhibit B shows that one Francisco Tupasi and others, on the 8th day of February, 1911, had been arrested by an order of the justice of the peace of the municipality of Tayum, Province of Ilocos Sur, and charged with disturbing the public peace, were found guilty, and sentenced, on the 20th day of February, 1911, to be imprisoned for a period of fifteen days, and each to pay a fine of 25pesetas, and to pay the costs.Exhibit C shows that Francisco Tupasi, on the 18th day of May, 1911, had been arrested and taken before the justice of the peace of the municipality of Tayum, Province of Ilocos Sur, charged with the crime of "injurias graves," and was sentenced on the 22d day of May, 1911, to be imprisoned for a period of fifteen days and to pay a fine of 75pesetasand the costs.Exhibit D is the certificate of the clerk of the Court of First Instance of the Province of Ilocos Sur and shows that the Honorable Dionisio Chanco, on the 26th day of April, 1911, in an appealed case for disturbing the public peace, sentenced the said Francisco Tupasi and others to pay a fine of 60pesetas, in case of insolvency to suffer subsidiary imprisonment, and to pay the costs.Exhibit A was the sworn petition presented by the defendant for permission to take the examination. Said petition was signed by Frank Tupasi y Molina. It was shown during the trial of the cause, by the admission of the defendant himself, that he was the same person accused and sentenced in Exhibits B, C, and D. It was argued that the defendant signed said application in the name of "Frank Tupasi y Molina" when he had theretofore been known as "Francisco Tupasi," for the purpose of avoiding identity. The defendant said that "Francisco" was the same as "Frank" and that he had adopted the name of "Frank" instead of "Francisco." The answers to the questions in said application were made in English.With reference to the first assignment of error, that the lower court committed an error in applying section 3 of Act No. 1697 to the facts in the present case, it may be said that said article provides that:Any person who, having taken an oath before a competent tribunal, officer, or person, in any case in which a law of the Philippine Islands authorizes an oath to be administered, that he will testify, declare, depose, or certify truly, or that any written testimony, declaration, deposition or certificate by him subscribed is true, willfully and contrary to such oath states or subscribes any material matter which he does not believe to be true, is guilty or perjury, and shall be punished, etc.Act No. 2169 of the Philippine Legislature, which is an Act to provide for the reorganization, government, and inspection of municipal police of the municipalities or provinces and subprovinces organized under Act No. 83, provides for the reorganization of the municipal police of the municipalities or provinces and subprovinces organized under Act No. 83.Said Act further provides that, subject to the approval of the Secretary of Commerce and Police, the Director of Constabulary shall prepare general regulations for the good government, discipline, and inspection of the municipal police, "compliance wherewith shall be obligatory for all members of the organization."Said Act further provides for an examining board for the municipal police. It further provides that, subject to the approval of the Secretary of Commerce and Police, the Director of Constabulary shall prepare an examination manual, prescribing, at the same time, suitable rules for the conduct of the examination.Said Act (No. 2169) also provides for the time and place for holding said examinations.Section 9 of said Act provides that: "To be eligible for examination, a candidate shall have the following requirements: . . . (6) Have no criminal record."In accordance with the requirements of said law, the Director of Constabulary prepared an examination manual, prescribing at the same time rules for conducting examinations, which examination manual was approved by the Secretary of Commerce and Police, and thereby was given the force of law. Said manual prescribed a form in blank, known as "Municipal Form No. 11," which form each applicant was required to fill, in order to be permitted to take said examination. Said application required the applicant to swear to the facts stated therein. We have, therefore, a law which authorizes the administration of an oath in the present case.Of course, the regulations adopted under legislative authority by a particular department must be in harmony with the provisions of the law, and for the sole purpose of carrying into effect its general provisions. By such regulations, of course, the law itself can not be extended. So long, however, as the regulations relate solely to carrying into effect the provisions of the law, they are valid. A violation of a regulation prescribed by an executive officer of the Government in conformity with and based upon a statute authorizing such regulation, constitutes an offense and renders the offender liable to punishment in accordance with the provisions of law. (United Statesvs.Bailey, 9 Pet., 238, 252, 254, 256; Cahavs.United States, 152 U. S., 211, 218; United Statesvs.Eaton, 144 U. S., 677.)In the very nature of things in many cases it becomes impracticable for the legislative department of the Government to provide general regulations for the various and varying details for the management of a particular department of the Government. It therefore becomes convenient for the legislative department of the Government, by law, in a most general way, to provide for the conduct, control, and management of the work of the particular department of the Government; to authorize certain persons, in charge of the management, control, and direction of the particular department, to adopt certain rules and regulations providing for the detail of the management and control of such department. Such regulations have uniformly been held to have the force of law, whenever they are found to be in consonance and in harmony with the general purposes and objects of the law. Many illustrations might be given. For instance, the Civil Service Board is given authority to examine applicants for various positions within the Government service. The law generally provides the conditions in a most general way, authorizing the chief of such Bureau to provide rules and regulations for the management of the conduct of examinations, etc. The law provides that the Collector of Customs shall examine persons who become applicant to act as captains of ships for the coastwise trade, providing at the same time that the Collector of Customs shall establish rules and regulations for such examinations. Such regulations, once established and found to be in conformity with the general purposes of the law, are just as binding upon all of the parties, as if the regulations had been written in the original law itself. (United Statesvs.Grimaud, 220 U. S., 506; Williamsonvs.United States, 207 U. S., 425; United Statesvs.United Verde Copper Co., 196 U. S., 207.)1awphil.netBy reference to Exhibit A, the application made and sworn to by the defendant, we find that the oath was taken before a notary public, a person qualified to administer an oath, in accordance with the provisions of law.The defendant, in support of his first assignment of error, argues that the purpose of Act No. 1697 was not intended to cover cases like the present. He argues that said Act was an Actonlyauthorizing the appointment of commissioners, to make official investigations, fixing their powers, for the payment of witness fees, and for the punishment of perjury in official investigations. The same question was presented to this court in the case of United Statesvs.Concepcion (13 Phil. Rep., 424). In that case the court decided against the contention of the defendant in the present case. It is true that the title of said Act (No. 1697) does not seem to indicate that said law contained a provision punishing the crime of perjury generally. Reading the title alone, it would seem to be a law punishing the crime of perjury in particular cases. The law (Act No. 1697) is a general law. It is not a private or local law. In the United States the constitutions in the different States generally provide that the title of a law shall indicate the general purpose of the law. There seems to be no provision in the Philippine Islands that the title of a general law shall contain a statement of the subject matter of the law. Section 5 of the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902, provides:That noprivateorlocalbill which may be enacted into law shall embrace more than one subject, and that subject shall be expressed in the title of the bill.We held in the case of United Statesvs.Concepcion,supra, that said Act of Congress did not apply to general laws, and that said section 3 was a provision punishing the crime of perjury generally. (U. S.vs.De Chaves, 14 Phil. Rep., 565; U. S.vs.Estraa, 16 Phil. Rep., 520; U. S.vs.Fonseca, 20 Phil. Rep., 191.)In the case of United Statesvs.Dumlao (R. G., No. 8721, not reported) this court held the defendant guilty of the crime of perjury, under facts exactly analogous to those in this case, under the provisions of section 3 of Act No. 1697. We find no reason, either in law or in the argument of the appellant in the present case, to modify or reverse our conclusions in that case (No. 8721).With reference to the second assignment of error, the appellant alleged that the lower court committed an error in finding that he had committed the crime of perjury voluntarily and corruptly. There is nothing in the record which shows that he did not present to the proper authorities Exhibit A voluntarily. It is difficult to understand, in view of the fact that the defendant had theretofore been convicted of two different offenses and in one of them by two courts, how he could, within a few months thereafter, make a sworn statement that he "did not have a criminal record," unless he answered said question No. 5 in the manner indicated in said application for the express purpose of deceiving the authority to which said application was presented.With reference to the third assignment of error, it may be said that the language of question No. 5 seems to be perfectly clear. The defendant admitted that he could read and understand Spanish. It is to be noted that at the very beginning of said application there are three paragraphs devoted to instructions to the applicant, which he should have read and no doubt did. Said instructions were sufficient to indicate to the defendant that if there were any questions which he did not fully understand, he should have acquired a full understanding of the same before answering them. If there was any fault in understanding said question No. 5, it was wholly due to his own negligence.With reference to the fourth assignment of error, the appellant contends that the lower court committed an error in holding that the phrase "which he does not believe to be true," found in section 3 of Act No. 1697, is equivalent to the word "knowingly," used in other laws. The lower court cited the case of U. S.vs.Tin Masa (17 Phil. Rep., 463) in support of his conclusion. Said section 3, in effect, provides that any person who takes an oath before a competent tribunal, officer or person, in any case in which a law of the Philippine Islands authorizes an oath, that he will testify, etc., or that any written testimony, declaration, etc., by him subscribed is true, and thereafter willfully and contrary to such oath states or subscribes any material matter, "which he does not believe to be true," is guilty of perjury. Under said section, three things are necessary, in order to constitute the crime of perjury:1. The person must have taken an oath, in a case where the law authorizes an oath, before a competent person, or a person authorized to administer an oath;2. That the person who has taken the oath will testify, declare, dispose, or certify truly, or that any written testimony, declaration, deposition or certificate by him subscribed is true;3. That he willfully and contrary to such oath states or subscribes any material matter, "which he does not believe to betrue."It is difficult to understand how a person can state, under oath, that a fact is true or subscribe a document, asserting that the same is true, which he does not believe to be true. If, under his oath, he declares that said facts are true, we must conclude that he believed that they were true. If, as a matter of fact, they were not true, and he had full knowledge of the fact that they were not true, then his declaration that they were true would certainly be a sworn statement that a certain fact was true which he did not believe to be true and, therefore, he must have made a false statement knowingly. Without attempting to show or assert that the phrase "which he does not believe to be true" is equivalent to the word "knowingly," as the lower court held, we are of the opinion that whoever makes a statement or subscribes a document, under the circumstances mentioned in said section 3, which is false and which he, at the time he makes the same does not believe to be true, is guilty of the crime of perjury. In other words, under the circumstances mentioned in said section, if one swears positively that a fact is true, which he does not believe to be true, and it turns out that it is false, he is guilty of the crime of perjury. No one should swear positively that a fact is true or subscribe a document asserting that the facts stated therein are true, unless he at least believes that they are true at the time he takes such oath or subscribes such document. It can scarcely be believed that the defendant in the present case believed that the answer to said question No. 5 was true. He must have signed or answered said question not only believing that it was not true, but, as a matter of fact, signed the same knowing that the answer was false.With reference to the fifth assignment of error, we are of the opinion that the evidence adduced during the trial of the cause clearly shows that the defendant is guilty of the crime charged and therefore the sentence of the lower court should be and is hereby affirmed with costs.Arellano, C.J., Torres, Carson and Araullo, JJ., concur.Separate OpinionsMORELAND,J.,dissenting:I dissent. The case of United Statesvs.George (228 U. S., 14), is decisive of this, holding that an indictment for perjury can not be based on an affidavit not authorized or required by any law of the United States. There is no law of the Philippine Islands which authorizes or requires the affidavit which is the basis of the charge of perjury in this case. (U. S.vs.Panlilio, 28 Phil. Rep., 608.)#Separate OpinionsMORELAND,J.,dissenting:I dissent. The case of United Statesvs.George (228 U. S., 14), is decisive of this, holding that an indictment for perjury can not be based on an affidavit not authorized or required by any law of the United States. There is no law of the Philippine Islands which authorizes or requires the affidavit which is the basis of the charge of perjury in this case. (U. S.vs.Panlilio, 28 Phil. Rep., 608.)

Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManilaEN BANCG.R. No. 101279 August 6, 1992PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF SERVICE EXPORTERS, INC.,petitioner,vs.HON. RUBEN D. TORRES, as Secretary of the Department of Labor & Employment, and JOSE N. SARMIENTO, as Administrator of the PHILIPPINE OVERSEAS EMPLOYMENT ADMINISTRATION,respondents.De Guzman, Meneses & Associates for petitioner.GRIO-AQUINO,J.:This petition for prohibition with temporary restraining order was filed by the Philippine Association of Service Exporters (PASEI, for short), to prohibit and enjoin the Secretary of the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) and the Administrator of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (or POEA) from enforcing and implementing DOLE Department Order No. 16, Series of 1991 and POEA Memorandum Circulars Nos. 30 and 37, Series of 1991, temporarily suspending the recruitment by private employment agencies of Filipino domestic helpers for Hong Kong and vesting in the DOLE, through the facilities of the POEA, the task of processing and deploying such workers.PASEI is the largest national organization of private employment and recruitment agencies duly licensed and authorized by the POEA, to engaged in the business of obtaining overseas employment for Filipino landbased workers, including domestic helpers.On June 1, 1991, as a result of published stories regarding the abuses suffered by Filipino housemaids employed in Hong Kong, DOLE Secretary Ruben D. Torres issued Department Order No. 16, Series of 1991, temporarily suspending the recruitment by private employment agencies of "Filipino domestic helpers going to Hong Kong" (p. 30,Rollo). The DOLE itself, through the POEA took over the business of deploying such Hong Kong-bound workers.In view of the need to establish mechanisms that willenhance the protection for Filipino domestic helpers going to Hong Kong,the recruitment of the same by private employment agencies ishereby temporarily suspendedeffective 1 July 1991. As such, the DOLE through the facilities of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration shall take over the processing and deployment of household workers bound for Hong Kong, subject to guidelines to be issued for said purpose.In support of this policy, all DOLE Regional Directors and the Bureau of Local Employment's regional offices are likewise directed to coordinate with the POEA in maintaining a manpower pool of prospective domestic helpers to Hong Kong on a regional basis.For compliance. (Emphasis ours; p. 30,Rollo.)Pursuant to the above DOLE circular, the POEA issued Memorandum Circular No. 30, Series of 1991, dated July 10, 1991, providing GUIDELINES on the Government processing and deployment of Filipino domestic helpers to Hong Kong and the accreditation of Hong Kong recruitment agencies intending to hire Filipino domestic helpers.Subject: Guidelines on the Temporary Government Processing and Deployment of Domestic Helpers to Hong Kong.Pursuant to Department Order No. 16, series of 1991 and in order to operationalize the temporary government processing and deployment of domestic helpers (DHs) to Hong Kong resulting from the temporary suspension of recruitment by private employment agencies for said skill and host market, the following guidelines and mechanisms shall govern the implementation of said policy.I. Creation of a joint POEA-OWWA Household Workers Placement Unit (HWPU)An ad hoc, one stop Household Workers Placement Unit [or HWPU] under the supervision of the POEA shall take charge of the various operations involved in the Hong Kong-DH industry segment:The HWPU shall have the following functions in coordination with appropriate units and other entities concerned:1. Negotiations with and Accreditation of Hong Kong Recruitment Agencies2. Manpower Pooling3. Worker Training and Briefing4. Processing and Deployment5. Welfare ProgramsII. Documentary Requirements and Other Conditions for Accreditation of Hong Kong Recruitment Agencies or PrincipalsRecruitment agencies in Hong Kong intending to hire Filipino DHs for their employers may negotiate with the HWPU in Manila directly or through the Philippine Labor Attache's Office in Hong Kong.xxx xxx xxxX. Interim ArrangementAll contracts stamped in Hong Kong as of June 30 shall continue to be processed by POEA until 31 July 1991 under the name of the Philippine agencies concerned. Thereafter, all contracts shall be processed with the HWPU.Recruitment agencies in Hong Kong shall submit to the Philippine Consulate General in Hong kong a list of their accepted applicants in their pool within the last week of July. The last day of acceptance shall be July 31 which shall then be the basis of HWPU in accepting contracts for processing. After the exhaustion of their respective pools the only source of applicants will be the POEA manpower pool.For strict compliance of all concerned. (pp. 31-35,Rollo.)On August 1, 1991, the POEA Administrator also issued Memorandum Circular No. 37, Series of 1991, on the processing of employment contracts of domestic workers for Hong Kong.TO: All Philippine and Hong Kong Agencies engaged in the recruitment of Domestic helpers for Hong KongFurther to Memorandum Circular No. 30, series of 1991 pertaining to the government processing and deployment of domestic helpers (DHs) to Hong Kong,processing of employment contractswhich have been attested by the Hong Kong Commissioner of Labor up to 30 June 1991 shall be processed by the POEA Employment Contracts Processing Branch up to 15 August 1991 only.Effective 16 August 1991, all Hong Kong recruitment agent/s hiring DHs from the Philippines shall recruit under the new scheme which requires prior accreditation which the POEA.Recruitment agencies in Hong Kong may apply for accreditation at the Office of the Labor Attache, Philippine Consulate General where a POEA team is posted until 31 August 1991. Thereafter, those who failed to have themselves accredited in Hong Kong may proceed to the POEA-OWWA Household Workers Placement Unit in Manila for accreditation before their recruitment and processing of DHs shall be allowed.Recruitment agencies in Hong Kong who have some accepted applicants in their pool after the cut-off period shall submit this list of workers upon accreditation. Only those DHs in said list will be allowed processing outside of the HWPU manpower pool.For strict compliance of all concerned. (Emphasis supplied, p. 36,Rollo.)On September 2, 1991, the petitioner, PASEI, filed this petition for prohibition to annul the aforementioned DOLE and POEA circulars and to prohibit their implementation for the following reasons:1. that the respondents acted with grave abuse of discretion and/or in excess of their rule-making authority in issuing said circulars;2. that the assailed DOLE and POEA circulars are contrary to the Constitution, are unreasonable, unfair and oppressive; and3. that the requirements of publication and filing with the Office of the National Administrative Register were not complied with.There is no merit in the first and second grounds of the petition.Article 36 of the Labor Code grants the Labor Secretary the power to restrict and regulate recruitment and placement activities.Art. 36. Regulatory Power. The Secretary of Labor shall have the powerto restrictand regulatethe recruitment and placement activities of all agencies within the coverage of this title [Regulation of Recruitment and Placement Activities] andis hereby authorized to issue orders and promulgate rules and regulations to carry out the objectives and implement the provisions of this title. (Emphasis ours.)On the other hand, the scope of the regulatory authority of the POEA, which was created by Executive Order No. 797 on May 1, 1982 to take over the functions of the Overseas Employment Development Board, the National Seamen Board, and the overseas employment functions of the Bureau of Employment Services, is broad and far-ranging for:1. Among the functions inherited by the POEA from the defunct Bureau of Employment Services was the power and duty:"2. To establish and maintain a registration and/or licensing systemto regulate private sector participation in the recruitment and placement of workers, locally and overseas, . . ." (Art. 15, Labor Code, Emphasis supplied). (p. 13,Rollo.)2. It assumed from the defunct Overseas Employment Development Board the power and duty:3. To recruit and place workers for overseas employment of Filipino contract workers on a government to government arrangement and in such other sectors as policy may dictate . . . (Art. 17, Labor Code.) (p. 13,Rollo.)3. From the National Seamen Board, the POEA took over:2. To regulate and supervise the activities of agents or representatives of shipping companies in the hiring of seamen for overseas employment; and secure the best possible terms of employment for contract seamen workers and secure compliance therewith. (Art. 20, Labor Code.)The vesture of quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial powers in administrative bodies is not unconstitutional, unreasonable and oppressive. It has been necessitated by "the growing complexity of the modern society" (Solid Homes, Inc. vs. Payawal, 177 SCRA 72, 79). More and more administrative bodies are necessary to help in the regulation of society's ramified activities. "Specialized in the particular field assigned to them, they can deal with the problems thereof with more expertise and dispatch than can be expected from the legislature or the courts of justice" (Ibid.).It is noteworthy that the assailed circulars do not prohibit the petitioner from engaging in the recruitment and deployment of Filipino landbased workers for overseas employment. A careful reading of the challenged administrative issuances discloses that the same fall within the "administrative and policing powers expressly or by necessary implication conferred" upon the respondents (People vs. Maceren, 79 SCRA 450). The power to "restrict and regulate conferred by Article 36 of the Labor Code involves a grant of police power (City of Naga vs. Court of Appeals, 24 SCRA 898). To "restrict" means "to confine, limit or stop" (p. 62,Rollo) and whereas the power to "regulate" means "the power to protect, foster, promote, preserve, and control with due regard for the interests, first and foremost, of the public, then of the utility and of its patrons" (Philippine Communications Satellite Corporation vs. Alcuaz, 180 SCRA 218).The Solicitor General, in his Comment, aptly observed:. . . Said Administrative Order [i.e., DOLE Administrative Order No. 16] merely restricted the scope or area of petitioner's business operations by excluding therefrom recruitment and deployment of domestic helpers for Hong Kong till after the establishment of the "mechanisms" that will enhance the protection of Filipino domestic helpers going to Hong Kong. In fine,other than the recruitment and deployment of Filipino domestic helpers for Hongkong, petitioner may still deploy other class of Filipino workerseither for Hongkong and other countries and all other classes of Filipino workers for other countries.Said administrative issuances, intended to curtail, if not to end, rampant violations of the rule against excessive collections of placement and documentation fees, travel fees and other charges committed by private employment agencies recruiting and deploying domestic helpers to Hongkong.[They are reasonable, valid and justified under the general welfare clause of the Constitution, since the recruitment and deployment business, as it is conducted today, is affected with public interest.xxx xxx xxxThe alleged takeover [of the business of recruiting and placing Filipino domestic helpers in Hongkong] is merely a remedial measure, and expires after its purpose shall have been attained. This is evident from the tenor of Administrative Order No. 16 that recruitment of Filipino domestic helpers going to Hongkong by private employment agencies are hereby "temporarily suspendedeffective July 1, 1991."The alleged takeover is limited in scope, being confined to recruitment of domestic helpers going to Hongkong only.xxx xxx xxx. . . the justification for the takeover of the processing and deploying of domestic helpers for Hongkong resulting from the restriction of the scope of petitioner's business is confined solely to the unscrupulous practice of private employment agencies victimizing applicants for employment as domestic helpers for Hongkong and not the whole recruitment business in the Philippines. (pp. 62-65,Rollo.)The questioned circulars are therefore a valid exercise of the police power as delegated to the executive branch of Government.Nevertheless, they are legally invalid, defective and unenforceable for lack of power publication and filing in the Office of the National Administrative Register as required in Article 2 of the Civil Code, Article 5 of the Labor Code and Sections 3(1) and 4, Chapter 2, Book VII of the Administrative Code of 1987 which provide:Art. 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen (15) days following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazatte, unless it is otherwise provided. . . . (Civil Code.)Art. 5. Rules and Regulations. The Department of Labor and other government agencies charged with the administration and enforcement of this Code or any of its parts shall promulgate the necessary implementing rules and regulations. Such rules and regulations shall become effective fifteen (15) daysafter announcement of their adoptionin newspapers of general circulation. (Emphasis supplied, Labor Code, as amended.)Sec. 3. Filing. (1)Every agency shall file with the University of the Philippines Law Center, three (3) certified copies of every rule adopted by it. Rules in force on the date of effectivity of this Code which are not filed within three (3) months shall not thereafter be the basis of any sanction against any party or persons. (Emphasis supplied, Chapter 2, Book VII of the Administrative Code of 1987.)Sec. 4. Effectivity. In addition to other rule-making requirements provided by law not inconsistent with this Book, each rule shall become effective fifteen (15) days from the date of filing as above providedunless a different date is fixed by law, or specified in the rule in cases of imminent danger to public health, safety and welfare, the existence of which must be expressed in a statement accompanying the rule. The agency shall take appropriate measures to make emergency rules known to persons who may be affected by them. (Emphasis supplied, Chapter 2, Book VII of the Administrative Code of 1987).Once, more we advert to our ruling inTaada vs. Tuvera, 146 SCRA 446 that:. . . Administrative rules and regulations must also be published if their purpose is to enforce or implement existing law pursuant also to a valid delegation. (p. 447.)Interpretative regulations and those merely internal in nature, that is, regulating only the personnel of the administrative agency and not the public, need not be published. Neither is publication required of the so-called letters of instructions issued by administrative superiors concerning the rules or guidelines to be followed by their subordinates in the performance of their duties. (p. 448.)We agree that publication must be in full or it is no publication at all since its purpose is to inform the public of the content of the laws. (p. 448.)For lack of proper publication, the administrative circulars in question may not be enforced and implemented.WHEREFORE, the writ of prohibition is GRANTED. The implementation of DOLE Department Order No. 16, Series of 1991, and POEA Memorandum Circulars Nos. 30 and 37, Series of 1991, by the public respondents is hereby SUSPENDED pending compliance with the statutory requirements of publication and filing under the aforementioned laws of the land.SO ORDERED.Narvasa, C.J., Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Medialdea, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Nocon and Bellosillo, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. L-7636[ G.R. No. L-7636, June 27, 1955 ]ASIA STEEL CORPORATION, PETITIONER, VS. WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION COMMISSION AND ISMAEL CARBAJOSA, RESPONDENTS.

D E C I S I O NBENGZON, J.:Petition to review the order of the Workmen's Compensation Commission approving the award of its referee in favor of the laborer Ismael Carbajosa, against his employer Asia Steel Corporation.It appears that on April 16, 1951, while working in said Corporation's steel factory in Grace Park, Manila, Carbajosa tapped the belt of a running machine to tighten it, but his hand was caught accidentally by the belt, he stumbled down and his two feet were so seriously injured, they had to be amputated at the Chinese General Hospital where he was rushed immediately after the mishap. Hospitalization were paid by the corporation.Thereafter Carbajosa claimed for compensation. The referee, having found that he was employed as apprentice, and that the accident arose out of employment, required the Asia Steel Corporation to indemnify in the total sum of two thousand two hundred forty six pesos and forty centavos (P2,246.40) and to pay the costs.The instant petition for review rests on two major propositions: (1) Ismael Carbajosa was not an employee or laborer and (2) the accident was "occasioned by" his "own fault and negligence".This second issue, however, was not tendered in the Corporation's motion to dismiss, Annex B, filed with Workmen's Compensation Commission, and neither the referee nor the Commission made findings on such question of negligence. Anyway it is no excuse for the employer: it merely reduces the compensation. (Art. 1711 New Civil Code.) Nevertheless, on close examination the contention turn out to be founded on the reasoning thatbeing a strangerin the premises -not an employee- Carbajosa had no right, and therefore was careless, to touch the machines of the factory. (p. 27 Record.)Hence this revision may be limited to the simple question whether the petitioner had given employment to Carbajosa.According to the Commission,"x x x the claimant, a native of Negros Occidental, came to Manila on March 31, 1951, to look for a job. On April 5, 1951, he met an aquaintance, Pablo Sesia, whose aid sought in the matter of securing employment. Sesia, who was employed in the Asia Steel Corporation as a mechanic, promised to take Carbajosa to his employer.Upon previous arrangement with Sesia, therefore, Carbajosa went to respondent's nail factory at Grace Park, Caloocan, Rizal, on April 9, 1951. Sesia introduced the claimant to Mr. Kim, in charge of the factory. During the interview, Kim told the claimant that he, (Kim) would take up the matter with the manager, and Carbajosa would know the manager's decision as soon as he (the claimant) returned. The next morning, the claimant came back to the factory and was told by Kim to begin working as an apprentice. It was further agreed that claimant's wage would be determined upon the arrival of materials which the manager ordered from Japan. The claimant assumed work on the same day, doing odd jobs under the direction of Sesia.It also appears that Kim lived in the factory. Pablo Sesia was also lodging in the factory and permission was secured from Kim in order that the claimant might live in the factory with Sesia.On April 16, 1951, hardly a week since the claimant began working in the factory, while he was tightening the belt of one of the machines, his hand was caught by the running belt. The force of the moving belt caused claimant to lose his balance. He was dragged to the other end of the machine. His feet were smashed by the iron shaft and he was pinned under the machine itself."x x xUnder the laws we are bound to accept these findings; and must disregard petitioner's arguments disputing them[1]. But this does not necessarily dispose of the matter, because ther remains the legal proposition extensively discussed by counsel for petitioner that Kim's acts could not bind the corporation, since only the President, Yu Kong Tiong, was authorized by its by-laws to hire employees for the manufacturing establishment.The Commission found that Yu Kong Tiong was the president of the corporation and Sy Te the manager; but Yu Kong Tiong was permitted actually to manage its affairs, (it being a "family" corporation) by remote control from his office in Manila thru Kim who was "in charge" of the factory in Caloocan. It also declared that Kim was allowed by Yu Kong Tiong to employ Carbajosa as apprentice. (p. 52 Record.)From such circumstances, the conclusion flows inevitably that Carbajosa was, at the time of the occurence, an employee of the petitioning corporation.Of course it is undeniable that as president and manager Yu Kong Tiong could legally employ, by himself, manual laborers to work in the factory[2]. And there is nothing to prevent him from employing Carbajosa, thru his agent Kim, as the latter did. In fact it may even be held that in default of proof establishing Yu Kong Tiong's assent to the employment, inasmuch as Kim the person actually in charge of the factory represented to Carbajosa that he was authorized by the manager to engage his (Carbajosa's) services, there was apparent authority of Kim, sufficiently ample to create the relationship of employer and employee for the purposes of the Workmen's Compensation Law."It may be stated as a general rule that anagent, who with authority express, implied, apparent or actual, employs help for the benefit of his principal's business, therby creates the relationship of employer and employee between such help and his principal." (Schneider, Workmen's Compensation (Permanent Ed.) Vol. I p. 617, citing many cases.)"It has been held: that where a driver, employed to solicit sales of beer and make delivery, was permitted to employ helpers, a helper who was injured while in the performance of his duty was entitled to compensation from brewery; that an expert, hired by a factory owner to supervise the installation of machinery, who hired assistants, paid by the owner, one of such assistants being injured while so engaged was entitled to compensation from the factory owner; that workmen hired by an agent of the company, which took over the logging work of an independent contractor, became the employees of the company." (Schneider, op. cit. p. 619.)Needless to say, the existence of employer-employee relationship is the jurisdictional foundation without which an indemnity is unauthorized. Schneider p. 569-570.) It is often difficult of determination, because purposely made so by employers bent on evading liability under the Compensation Acts. Hence, if the object of the law is to be accomplished with a liberal construction[3], the creation of the relationship should not be adjudged strictly in accordance with technical legal rules, but rather according to the actualities and realities of industrial or business practice. A laborer is told to work for the establishment by the person-in-charge, who in turn represented he had consulted with the manager. If the by-laws of the corporation had provided that no laborer may be hired unless with the written consent of the board of directors, would it be consonant with justice to deny such laborer compensation for injuries, upon the ground of lack of written authority? If so, a loophole has thereby been created in the Workmen's Compensation Law. That is perhaps the reason why apparent authority has been considered enough, what with the principles of estoppel lending persuasive support. (Schneider op. cit. Vol. I p. 623.)A parallel situation arose in Flores et al. v. La Compaia Maritima, 32 O. Gaz. No. 21 pp. 406-407. The heirs of Graciano Paninsoro demanded compensation because he died by reason of injuries received while working on the ship "Albay" belonging to and operated by the Compaia Maritima, a corporation. The facts were;"About the last week of the month of October, 1929, the defendant's boat, Albay, dropped anchor in the port of Cebu where the captain thereof, through a contractor or agent, recruited laborers who were to board the ship for the purpose of unloading her cargo upon arrival at the next port of call, Davao, and loading cargo for various ports of call on her return trip. Among those laborers was the appellant Eusebia Flores' husband, Graciano Paninsoro, who was earning a daily wage of P1.50 including subsistence."The defendant contended on appeal that Paninsoro was not its employee. This Court held,"There is not a least shadow of a doubt that the deceased was a laborer in the legal sense. He had been recruited by order of the captain of the ship and he was engage in a task of unloading the ship's cargo at the time of the accident. There can be no dispute that this kind of work is included in the business in which the appellee is engaged. That the deceased had been recruited or engaged by a contractor is of no moment because the latter, for purposes of the law, was in turn, represented the appellee." (Flores et al. v. La Compaia Maritima, 32 O. Gaz. No. 21 pp. 406-407.)It should be observed in the above litigation that neither the board of directors nor the President nor the manager of the defendant corporation had hired the laborer Paninsoro. It was the captain of the ship, thru an agent, that employed him. Now then, in this case as the person-in-charge of the factory (Kim) hired Carbajosa, the contract of employment should be upheld.There is further circumstance, implying ratification of the employment, that the acting manager of the corporation Atty. Mercado directed the payment by the corporation of Carbajosa's hospital expenses, amounting to P2,000.00. Mercado's explanation that he did it out of pity, was not, and could not be accepted since the Asia Steel Corporation is not a charitable institution.In view of the foregoing, and the petitioner not having questioned the amount of compensation, the order of the Commission, should be , as it is hereby, affirmed with costs. So ordered.Padilla, Montemayor, Reyes, Jugo, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, andReyes, J.B.L., JJ., concur.

[1]Sec. 46 Act No. 3428 as amended by Rep. Act 772. Rule 44 sec.2.[2]Yu Chuckv. Kong Li Po, 46 Phil. 608[3]Vergarav. Pampanga Bus Co. 62 Phil. 820; Franciscov. Consing 62 Phil. 354; Ramosv. Poblete 73 Phil. 241.

Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManilaSECOND DIVISIONG.R. No. L-75038 August 23, 1993ELIAS VILLUGA, RENATO ABISTADO, JILL MENDOZA, ANDRES ABAD, BENJAMIN BRIZUELA, NORLITO LADIA, MARCELO AGUILAN, DAVID ORO, NELIA BRIZUELA, FLORA ESCOBIDO, JUSTILITA CABANIG, and DOMINGO SAGUIT,petitioners,vs.NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION (THIRD DIVISION) and BROAD STREET TAILORING and/or RODOLFO ZAPANTA,respondents.Balguma, Macasaet & Associates for petitioners.Teresita Gandionco Oledan for private respondents.NOCON,J.:A basic factor underlying the exercise of rights and the filing of claims for benefits under the Labor Code and other presidential issuances or labor legislations is the status and nature of one's employment. Whether an employer-employee relationship exist and whether such employment is managerial in character or that of a rank and file employee are primordial considerations before extending labor benefits. Thus, petitioners in this case seek a definitive ruling on the status and nature of their employment with Broad Street Tailoring and pray for the nullification of the resolution dated May 12, 1986 of the National Labor Relations Commissions in NLRC Case No. RB-IV- 21558-78-T affirming the decision of Labor Arbiter Ernilo V. Pealosa dated May 28, 1979, which held eleven of them as independent contractors and the remaining one as employee but of managerial rank.The facts of the case shows that petitioner Elias Villuga was employed as cutter in the tailoring shop owned by private respondent Rodolfo Zapanta and known as Broad Street Tailoring located at Shaw Boulevard, Mandaluyong, Metro Manila. As cutter, he was paid a fixed monthly salary of P840.00 and a monthly transportation allowance of P40.00. In addition to his work as cutter, Villuga was assigned the chore of distributing work to the shop's tailors or sewers when both the shop's manager and assistant manager would be absent. He saw to it that their work conformed with the pattern he had prepared and if not, he had them redone, repaired or resewn.The other petitioners were either ironers, repairmen and sewers. They were paid a fixed amount for every item ironed, repaired or sewn, regardless of the time consumed in accomplishing the task. Petitioners did not fill up any time record since they did not observe regular or fixed hours of work. They were allowed to perform their work at home especially when the volume of work, which depended on the number of job orders, could no longer be coped up with.From February 17 to 22, 1978, petitioner Villuga failed to report for work allegedly due to illness. For not properly notifying his employer, he was considered to have abandoned his work.In a complaint dated March 27, 1978, filed with the Regional Office of the Department of Labor, Villuga claimed that he was refused admittance when he reported for work after his absence, allegedly due to his active participation in the union organized by private respondent's tailors. He further claimed that he was not paid overtime pay, holiday pay, premium pay for work done on rest days and holidays, service incentive leave pay and 13th month pay.Petitioners Renato Abistado, Jill Mendoza, Benjamin Brizuela and David Oro also claimed that they were dismissed from their employment because they joined the Philippine Social Security Labor Union (PSSLU). Petitioners Andres Abad, Norlito Ladia, Marcelo Aguilan, Nelia Brizuela, Flora Escobido, Justilita Cabaneg and Domingo Saguit claimed that they stopped working because private respondents gave them few pieces of work to do after learning of their membership with PSSLU. All the petitioners laid claims under the different labor standard laws which private respondent allegedly violated.On May 28, 1979, Labor Arbiter Ernilo V. Pealosa rendered a decision ordering the dismissal of the complaint for unfair labor practices, illegal dismissal and other money claims except petitioner Villuga's claim for 13th month pay for the years 1976, 1977 and 1980. The dispositive portion of the decision states as follows:WHEREFORE, premises considered, the respondent Broad Street Tailoring and/or Rodolfo Zapanta are hereby ordered to pay complainant Elias Villuga the sum of ONE THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED FORTY-EIGHT PESOS AND SIXTY-SIX CENTAVOS (P1,248.66) representing his 13th month pay for the years 1976, 1977 and 1978. His other claims in this case are hereby denied for lack of merit.The complaint insofar as the other eleven (11) complainants are concerned should be, as it is hereby dismissed for want of jurisdiction.1On appeal, the National Labor Relations Commission affirmed the questioned decision in a resolution dated May 12, 1986, the dispositive portion of which states as follows:WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision appealed from is, as it is hereby AFFIRMED, and the appeal dismissed.2Presiding Commissioner Guillermo C. Medina merely concurred in the result while Commissioner Gabriel M. Gatchalian rendered a dissenting opinion which states as follows:I am for upholding employer-employee relationship as argued by the complainants before the Labor Arbiter and on appeal. The further fact that the proposed decision recognizes complainant's status as piece-rate worker all the more crystallizes employer-employee relationship the benefits prayed for must be granted.3Hence, petitioners filed this instant certioraricase on the following grounds:1. That the respondent National Labor Relations Commission abused its discretion when it ruled that petitioner/complainant, Elias Villuga falls within the category of a managerial employee;2. . . . when it ruled that the herein petitioners were not dismissed by reason of their union activities;3. . . . when it ruled that petitioners Andres Abad, Benjamin Brizuela, Norlito Ladia, Marcelo Aguilan, David Oro, Nelia Brizuela, Flora Escobido, Justilita Cabaneg and Domingo Saguit were not employees of private respondents but were contractors.4. . . . when it ruled that petitioner Elias Villuga is not entitled to overtime pay and services for Sundays and Legal Holidays; and5. . . . when it failed to grant petitioners their respective claims under the provisions of P.D. Nos. 925, 1123 and 851.4Under Rule 1, Section 2(c), Book III of the Implementing Rules of Labor Code, to be a member of a managerial staff, the following elements must concur or co-exist, to wit: (1) that his primary duty consists of the performance of work directly related to management policies; (2) that he customarily and regularly exercises discretion and independent judgment in the performance of his functions; (3) that he regularly and directly assists in the management of the establishment; and (4) that he does not devote his twenty per cent of his time to work other than those described above.Applying the above criteria to petitioner Elias Villuga's case, it is undisputed that his primary work or duty is to cut or prepare patterns for items to be sewn, not to lay down or implement any of the management policies, as there is a manager and an assistant manager who perform said functions. It is true that in the absence of the manager the assistant manager, he distributes and assigns work to employees but such duty, though involving discretion, is occasional and not regular or customary. He had also the authority to order the repair or resewing of defective item but such authority is part and parcel of his function as cutter to see to it that the items cut are sewn correctly lest the defective nature of the workmanship be attributed to his "poor cutting." Elias Villuga does not participate in policy-making. Rather, the functions of his position involve execution of approved and established policies. InFranklin Baker Company of the Philippines v.Trajano,5it was held that employees who do not participate in policy-making but are given ready policies to execute and standard practices to observe are not managerial employees. The test of "supervisory or managerial status" depends on whether a person possesses authority that is not merely routinary or clerical in nature but one that requires use of independent judgment. In other words, the functions of the position are not managerial in nature if they only execute approved and established policies leaving little or no discretion at all whether to implement said policies or not.6Consequently, the exclusion of Villuga from the benefits claimed under Article 87 (overtime pay and premium pay for holiday and rest day work), Article 94, (holiday pay), and Article 95 (service incentive leave pay) of the Labor Code, on the ground that he is a managerial employee is unwarranted. He is definitely a rank and file employee hired to perform the work of the cutter and not hired to perform supervisory or managerial functions. The fact that he is uniformly paid by the month does not exclude him from the benefits of holiday pay as held in the case ofInsular Bank of America Employees Union v.Inciong.7He should therefore be paid in addition to the 13th month pay, his overtime pay, holiday pay, premium pay for holiday and rest day, and service incentive leave pay.As to the dismissal of the charge for unfair labor practices of private respondent consisting of termination of employment of petitioners and acts of discrimination against members of the labor union, the respondent Commission correctly held the absence of evidence that Mr. Zapanta was aware of petitioners' alleged union membership on February 22, 1978 as the notice of union existence in the establishment with proposal for recognition and collective bargaining negotiation was received by management only an March 3, 1978. Indeed, self-serving allegations without concrete proof that the private respondent knew of their membership in the union and accordingly reacted against their membership do not suffice.Nor is private respondent's claim that petitioner Villuga abandoned his work acceptable. For abandonment to constitute a valid cause for dismissal, there must be a deliberate and unjustified refusal of the employee to resume his employment. Mere absence is not sufficient, it must be accompanied by overt acts unerringly pointing to the fact that the employee simply does not want to work anymore.8At any rate, dismissal of an employee due to his prolonged absence without leave by reason of illness duly established by the presentation of a medical certificate is not justified.9In the case at bar, however, considering that petitioner Villuga absented himself for four (4) days without leave and without submitting a medical certificate to support his claim of illness, the imposition of a sanction is justified, but surely, not dismissal, in the light of the fact that this is petitioner's first offense. In lieu of reinstatement, petitioner Villuga should be paid separation pay where reinstatement can no longer be effected in view of the long passage of time or because of the realities of the situation.10But petitioner should not be granted backwages in addition to reinstatement as the same is not just and equitable under the circumstances considering that he was not entirely free from blame.11As to the other eleven petitioners, there is no clear showing that they were dismissed because the circumstances surrounding their dismissal were not even alleged. However, we disagree with the finding of respondent Commission that the eleven petitioners are independent contractors.For an employer-employee relationship to exist, the following elements are generally considered: "(1) the selection and engagement of the employee;(2) the payment of wages; (3) the power of dismissal and (4) the power to control the employee's conduct."12Noting that the herein petitioners were oftentimes allowed to perform their work at home and were paid wages on a piece-rate basis, the respondent Commission apparently found the second and fourth elements lacking and ruled that "there is no employer-employee relationship, for it is clear that respondents are interested only in the result and not in the means and manner and how the result is obtained."Respondent Commission is in error. The mere fact that petitioners were paid on a piece-rate basis is no argument that herein petitioners were not employees. The term "wage" has been broadly defined in Article 97 of the Labor Code as remuneration or earnings, capable of being expressed in terms of money whether fixed or ascertained on a time, task, piece or commissionbasis. . . ." The facts of this case indicate that payment by the piece is just a method of compensation and does not define the essence of therelation.13The petitioners were allowed to perform their work at home does not likewise imply absence of control and supervision. The control test calls merely for the existence of a right to control the manner of doing the work, not the actual exercise of the right.14In determining whether the relationship is that of employer and employee or one of an independent contractor, "each case must be determined on its own facts and all the features of the relationship are to be considered."15Considering that petitioners who are either sewers, repairmen or ironer, have been in the employ of private respondent as early as 1972 or at the latest in 1976, faithfully rendering services which are desirable or necessary for the business of private respondent, and observing management's approved standards set for their respective lines of work as well as the customers' specifications, petitioners should be considered employees, not independent contractors.Independent contractors are those who exercise independent employment, contracting to do a piece of work according to their own methods and without being subjected to control of their employer except as to the result of their work. By the nature of the different phases of work in a tailoring shop where the customers' specifications must be followed to the letter, it is inconceivable that the workers therein would not be subjected to control.InRosario Brothers, Inc.v.Ople,16this Court ruled that tailors and similar workers hired in the tailoring department, although paid weekly wages on piece work basis, are employees not independent contractors. Accordingly, as regular employees, paid on a piece-rate basis, petitioners are not entitled to overtime pay, holiday pay, premium pay for holiday/rest day and service incentive leave pay. Their claim for separation pay should also be defined for lack of evidence that they were in fact dismissed by private respondent. They should be paid, however, their 13th month pay under P.D. 851, since they are employees not independent contractors.WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing reasons, the assailed decision of respondent National Labor Relations Commission is hereby MODIFIED by awarding (a) in favor of petitioner Villuga, overtime pay, holiday pay, premium pay for holiday and rest day, service incentive leave pay and separation pay, in addition to his 13th month pay; and(b) in favor of the rest of the petitioners, their respective 13th month pay.The case is hereby REMANDED to the National Labor Relations Commission for the computation of the claims herein-above mentioned.SO ORDERED.Narvasa C.J., Padilla, Regalado and Puno, JJ., concur.

Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManilaTHIRD DIVISIONG.R. No. L-59229 August 22, 1991HIJOS DE F. ESCAO INC., and PIER 8 ARRASTRE AND STEVEDORING SERVICES, INC.,petitioners,vs.NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, NATIONAL ORGANIZATION OF WORKINGMEN (NOWM) PSSLU-TUCP and ROLANDO VILLALOBOS,respondents.Beltran, Beltran & Beltran for petitioners.Bautista, Santiago & Associates for private respondents.FELICIANO,J.:pPetitioners seek to set aside the Decision of the National Labor Relations Commission ("NLRC") dated 11 November 1981, which affirmed the Decision of the Labor Arbiter dated 28 February 1980.Private respondent National Organization of Workingmen ("NOWM") PSSLU-TUCP is a labor organization that counts among its members a majority of the laborers of petitioner Pier 8 Arrastre & Stevedoring Services, Inc. ("PIER 8 A&S") consisting, among others, of stevedores, dockworkers, sweepers and forklift operators (hereinafter collectively referred to as "the stevedores"). On 31 July 1978, NOWM PSSLU-TUCP and about 300 stevedores filed with the then Ministry of Labor and Employment ("MOLE") a complaint1for unfair labor practice ULP and illegal dismissal against PIER 8 A&S.On 8 September 1978, NOWM PSSLU-TUCP amended its complaint to include the monetary claims of the stevedores for overtime compensation, legal holiday pay, emergency cost of living allowance, 13th month pay, night shift differential pay, and the difference between the salaries they received and that prescribed under the minimum wage law. The complaint was also amended to implead petitioner Hijos de F. Escao, Inc. (Escao) as respondent before the MOLE.2The MOLE Director in the National Capital Region certified for compulsory arbitration only the claims for illegal dismissal and ULP Considering that NOWM PSSLU-TUCP wanted to include as well the other issues it had raised in the amended complaint, it filed a motion for reconsideration. The motion was denied because money claims, according to the MOLE Director, should be brought against Escao and PIER 8 A&S in a separate complaint.On the basis of the position papers submitted by the parties and the annexes attached thereto, the case was considered submitted for resolution. On 28 February 1980, the Labor Arbiter rendered a Decision3with the following dispositive portion:WHEREFORE, consonant with the foregoing premises, the respondents Hijos de F. Escao and Pier 8 Arrastre and Stevedoring Services, Inc. are hereby found guilty of committing acts of unfair labor practice and are ordered to jointly and severally reinstate all of the petitioners named in the amended complaint, with payment of full backwages counted from the time they were illegally dismissed which was on August 10, 1978 up to March 27, 1979, inclusive, when the petitioners admitted having received return to work notice from the respondent but refused to comply in view of the pendency of the present case, based on their individual rate at the time of their dismissal or on the minimum wage then prevailing whichever is more beneficial to them.For purposes of this decision, the Socio-Economic Analyst of this branch is hereby directed to compute the backwages of the individual petitioners as mandated herein, and to submit his report within ten 10 days from receipt hereof which shall form part of this award.SO ORDERED.Petitioners appealed to the NLRC which, however, affirmed the Decision of the Labor Arbiter.The instant Petition for certiorari imputes grave abuse of discretion to the NLRC in upholding the finding of the Labor Arbiter that the stevedores are employees not only of PIER 8 A&S but also of Escao. Petitioners also assail that portion of the Decision which directed them to reinstate the dismissed stevedores with the obligation to pay backwages from 10 August 1978 to 27 March 1979.In his Decision, the Labor Arbiter took the view that PIER 8 A&S was a labor only contractor and held that Escao was the principal employer of the stevedores. For that reason, the Labor Arbiter adjudged the petitioners solidarily liable for payment of backwages to the stevedores as well as for reinstatement.While petitioner PIER 8 A&S does not dispute that the stevedores were its employees, petitioner Escao denies the existence of an employer-employee relationship between it and the stevedores. Escao therefore contends that liability, if any, should attach only to PIER 8 A&S.PIER 8 A&S is a corporation providing Arrastre and stevedoring services to vessels docked at Pier 8 of the Manila North Harbor. Prior to the incorporation of PIER 8 A&S two (2) stevedoring companies had been servicing vessels docking at Pier 8. One of these was the Manila Integrated Services, Inc. MISI which was servicing Escao vessels, then berthing at Pier 8. The other was the San Nicolas Stevedoring and Arrastre Services, Inc. (SNSASI) which was servicing Compania Maritima vessels. Aside, of course, from MISI and SNSASI there were individual contractors known as the "cabos" who were operating in Pier 8.On 11 July 1974, the Philippine Port Authority ("PPA") was created pursuant to the policy of the State to implement an integrated program of port development for the entire country.4Towards this end, the PPA issued Administrative Order No. 1377 specifically adopting the policy of "one pier, one Arrastre and/or stevedoring company." MISI and SNSASI merged to form the Pier 8 Arrastre and Stevedoring Services, Inc.Sometime in June 1978, Escao had transferred berth to Pier 16 with the approval of the PPA. PIER 8 A&S then started to encounter problems; it found its business severely reduced with only Compania Maritima vessels to service. Even if it had wanted to continue servicing the vessels of Escao at Pier 16, that was simply not possible as there was another company exclusively authorized to handle and render Arrastre and stevedoring services at Pier 16.Because of its resulting manpower surplus, PIER 8 A&S altered the work schedule of its stevedores by rotating them. The rotation scheme was resisted by the stevedores, especially those formerly assigned to service Escao vessels. It appears that the employees formerly belonging to MISI continued to service Escao vessels in like manner that those employees formerly belonging to SNSASI continued to service Compania Maritima vessels, although MISI and SNSASI had already merged to form PIER 8 A&S The affected stevedores boycotted Pier 8 leading to their severance from employment by PIER 8 A&S on 10 August 1978. Their refusal to work continued even after they were served with a return-to-work order.The stevedores claim that since they had long been servicing Escao vessels, i.e. from the time Escao was exclusively serviced by MISI until the time MISI was merged with SNSASI to form PIER 8 A&S they should also be considered as employees of Escao. Escao disclaimed any employment relationship with the stevedores. In its Position Paper, Escao alleged that the stevedores are included in the payroll of PIER 8 A&S and that the SSS and Medicare contributions of the stevedores are paid by PIER 8 A&S as well.It is firmly settled that the existence or non-existence of the employer-employee relationship is commonly to be determined by examination of certain factors or aspects of that relationship. These include: (a) the manner of selection and engagement of the putative employee; (b) the mode of payment of wages; (c) the presence or absence of the power of dismissal; and (d) the presence or absence of a power to control the putative employee's conduct.5The Court notes that in finding against PIER 8 A&S and Escao the Labor Arbiter relied solely on the position paper of the parties. The record of the case is bare of evidence tending to support such allegations; what is found in the record instead are the self-serving statements from both parties. It is not clear to the Court from examination of the record which entity paid the salaries of the stevedores. While the stevedores attached to their amended complaint a list of their daily wages set forth opposite their individual names under the heading "Hijos de F. Escao Inc. and/or Pier 8 Arrastre and Stevedoring Services, Inc.6apparently to show that they are paid for their services by either or both of petitioners, they did not submit direct evidence, e.g., copies of payrolls and remittances to the SSS and Medicare, establishing this fact. Further, the stevedores failed to substantiate their allegation that the supervisors of Escao had control over them while discharging their (stevedores') duties. On the contrary, their Position Paper submitted to the Labor Arbiter disclosed that the supervisors of Escao "merely supervised" them.The record includes letters written by the National President of NOWM PSSLU-TUC to which the stevedores belong-relating to collective bargaining and other operating matters, were all addressed to the management of PIER 8 A&S indicating that they recognized PIER 8 A&S as their employer. Specifically, in the letter dated 21 May 1977, the stevedores proposed that PIER 8 A&S recognize their union as the sole and exclusive representative of the stevedores for the purpose of collective bargaining. They also sought to submit for collective bargaining with PIER 8 A&S such other labor standard issues as wage increases, 13th month pay and vacation and sick leave pay.7The stevedores, however, now contend that PIER 8 A&S is not an independent contract but a labor only contractor. In their Amended Complaint and Position Paper, the stevedores alleged that:(1) They perform their duties or work assignments under the close supervision of supervisors of respondent Hijos de F. Escao Inc.;(2) The machineries, equipment, tools and other facilities complainants used, while in the performance of their jobs, are owned by respondent Hijos de F. Escao, Inc.;(3) The jobs they were performing from the time they were first employed, until their dismissals, are principal phases of respondent's operations; and(4) The so-called Pier 8 Arrastre & Stevedoring Services, Inc. is a mere middleman; its vital role is purely one of supplying workers to respondent Hijos de F. Escao, Inc. in short, a mere recruiting agent. Plainly, said contractor can be categorized as an agent of respondent Hijos de F. Escao, Inc. as it performs activities directly related to the principal business of said Hijos de F. Escao, Inc.Although the record does not show that the stevedores had submitted any evidence to fortify their claim that PIER 8 A&S is a labor only contractor, the Labor Arbiter simply conceded that claim to be factual. The Labor Arbiter added that the business of PIER 8 A&S is "desirable and indispensable in the business of Hijos de F. Escao and without [the stevedores], its vessels could not be operated."The Court is unable to agree with the conclusion reached by the Labor Arbiter, particularly that portion where the Labor Arbiter supposed stevedoring to be an indispensable part of the business of Escao. Escao is a corporation engaged in inter-island shipping business, being the operator of the Escao Shipping Lines. It was not alleged, nor has it been shown, that Escao orany other shipping companyis also engaged in Arrastre and stevedoring services. Stevedoring is not ordinarily included in the business of transporting goods, it (stevedoring) being a special kind of service which involves the loading unloading of cargo on or from a vessel on port. It consists of the handling of cargo from the hold of the ship to the dock, in case of pier-side unloading, or to a barge, in case of unloading at sea. The loading on a ship of outgoing cargo is also part of stevedoring work.8Arrastre, upon the other hand, involves the handling of cargo deposited on the wharf or between the establishment of the consignee or shipper and the ships tackle.9Considering that a shipping company is not normally or customarily engaged in stevedoring and arrastre activities either for itself or other vessels, it contracts with other companies offering those services. The employees, however, of the stevedoring and/or arrastre company should not be deemed the employees of the shipping company, in the absence of any showing, that the arrastre and/or stevedoring company in fact acted as an agent only of the shipping company. No such showing was made in this case.We turn next to the stevedores' contention that PIER 8 A&S is guilty of ULP. In this respect, the Labor Arbiter had found that:Now comes the issue of unfair labor practice. This Labor Arbiter believes that respondents are guilty as charged. The unfair labor practice acts of the respondents started when they came to know that the petitioners have organized themselves and affiliated with the NOWM Subsequent acts of the respondents like requiring the petitioners to disaffiliate with the NOWM and affiliate with the General Maritime Stevedores Union and later on to Independent Workers Union, requiring them to sign applications for membership therein, they were threatened and coerced, are all acts of unfair labor practices. Thereafter, the petitioners' working schedules were rotated when the respondent Hijos de F. Escao transferred to Pier 16 through the alleged approval of the Philippine Port Authority and later on the said petitioners were left without work, were all in furtherance of such unfair labor practice acts. ...10Both the Constitution and the Labor Code guarantee to the stevedores a right to self-organization. It was unlawful for PIER 8 A&S to deprive them of that right by its undue interference. The Constitution (Article III, Section 7) expressly recognizes the right of employees, whether of the public or the private sector, to form unions. Article 248 of the Labor Code provides:Art. 248.Unfair labor practices of employers. It shall beunlawful for an employer to commit any of the following unfair labor practice:(a) To interfere with, restrain or coerce employees in the exercise of their right to self- organization;(b) To require as a condition of employment that a person or an employee shall not join a labor organization or shall withdraw from one to which he belongs;(c) To contract out services or functions being performed by union members when such will interfere with, restrain or coerce employees in the exercise of their rights to self-organization;(d) To initiate, dominate, assist or otherwise interfere with the formation or administration of any labor organization, including the giving of financial or other support to it or its organizations or supporters;(e) To discriminate in regard to wages, hours of work, and other terms and conditions of employment in order to encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization.xxx xxx xxx(Emphasis supplied.)Not only was PIER 8 A&S guilty of ULP; it was also liable for illegal dismissal. PIER 8 A&S did not obtain prior clearance from the MOLE before it dismissed the stevedores, as required by the law then in force which read:Section 1.Requirement for shutdown or dismissal. No employer may shut down his establishment or dismiss any of his employees with at least one year of service during the last two years, whether the service is broken or continuous, without prior clearance issued therefor in accordance with this Rule. Any provision in a collective bargaining agreement dispensing with the clearance requirement shall be null and void.Section 2.Shutdown or dismissal without clearance. Any shutdown or dismissal without prior clearance shall be conclusively presumed to be a termination of employment without a just cause. The Regional Director shall, in such case, order the immediate reinstatement of the employee and the payment of his wages from the time of the shutdown or dismissal until the time of reinstatement.11B.P. Blg. 130 amended the Labor Code on 4 September 1981 by abolishing the requirement of prior clearance from the MOLE but since the dismissal of the stevedores was effected prior to the promulgation of B.P. Blg. 130, PIER 8 A&S was then bound to comply with the old law. The Court, interpreting Sections 1 and 2 above quoted, has consistently held that a dismissal without said clearance shall be conclusively presumed a termination without just cause.12The record is bare of any evidence that could compel the Court to overturn the factual findings of the Labor Arbiter on this point.WHEREFORE, considering the absence of an employer-employee relationship between Hijos de F. Escao, Inc. and private respondents, the Decision of the Labor Arbiter dated 28 February 1980 in NLRC Case No. RB-IV-2326-79 and the Decision of the NLRC dated 11 November 1981 are hereby MODIFIED so that only Pier 8 Arrastre & Stevedoring Services, Inc. shall be liable for reinstatement and payment of backwages. As so modified, both Decisions are hereby AFFIRMED. No costs.SO ORDERED.Fernan, C.J., Gutierrez, Jr., Bidin and Davide, Jr., JJ., concur.

Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManilaSECOND DIVISIONG.R. No. L-41182-3 April 16, 1988DR. CARLOS L. SEVILLA and LINA O. SEVILLA,petitioners-appellants,vs.THE COURT OF APPEALS, TOURIST WORLD SERVICE, INC., ELISEO S.CANILAO, and SEGUNDINA NOGUERA,respondents-appellees.SARMIENTO ,J.:The petitioners invoke the provisions on human relations of the Civil Code in this appeal by certiorari. The facts are beyond dispute:xxx xxx xxxOn the strength of a contract (Exhibit A for the appellant Exhibit 2 for the appellees) entered into on Oct. 19, 1960 by and between Mrs. Segundina Noguera, party of the first part; the Tourist World Service, Inc., represented by Mr. Eliseo Canilao as party of the second part, and hereinafter referred to as appellants, the Tourist World Service, Inc. leased the premises belonging to the party of the first part at Mabini St., Manila for the former-s use as a branch office. In the said contract the party of the third part held herself solidarily liable with the party of the part for the prompt payment of the monthly rental agreed on. When the branch office was opened, the same was run by the herein appellant Una 0. Sevilla payable to Tourist World Service Inc. by any airline for any fare brought in on the efforts of Mrs. Lina Sevilla, 4% was to go to Lina Sevilla and 3% was to be withheld by the Tourist World Service, Inc.On or about November 24, 1961 (Exhibit 16) the Tourist World Service, Inc. appears to have been informed that Lina Sevilla was connected with a rival firm, the Philippine Travel Bureau, and, since the branch office was anyhow losing, the Tourist World Service considered closing down its office. This was firmed up by two resolutions of the board of directors of Tourist World Service, Inc. dated Dec. 2, 1961 (Exhibits 12 and 13), the first abolishing the office of the manager and vice-president of the Tourist World Service, Inc., Ermita Branch, and the second,authorizing the corporate secretary to receive the properties of the Tourist World Service then located at the said branch office. It further appears that on Jan. 3, 1962, the contract with the appellees for the use of the Branch Office premises was terminated and while the effectivity thereof was Jan. 31, 1962, the appellees no longer used it. As a matter of fact appellants used it since Nov. 1961. Because of this, and to comply with the mandate of the Tourist World Service, the corporate secretary Gabino Canilao went over to the branch office, and, finding the premises locked, and, being unable to contact Lina Sevilla, he padlocked the premises on June 4, 1962 to protect the interests of the Tourist World Service. When neither the appellant Lina Sevilla nor any of her employees could enter the locked premises, a complaint wall filed by the herein appellants against the appellees with a prayer for the issuance of mandatory preliminary injunction. Both appellees answered with counterclaims. For apparent lack of interest of the parties therein, the trial court ordered the dismissal of the case without prejudice.The appellee Segundina Noguera sought reconsideration of the order dismissing her counterclaim which the court a quo, in an order dated June 8, 1963, granted permitting her to present evidence in support of her counterclaim.On June 17,1963, appellant Lina Sevilla refiled her case against the herein appellees and after the issues were joined, the reinstated counterclaim of Segundina Noguera and the new complaint of appellant Lina Sevilla were jointly heard following which the court a quo ordered both cases dismiss for lack of merit, on the basis of which was elevated the instant appeal on the following assignment of errors:I. THE LOWER COURT ERRED EVEN IN APPRECIATING THE NATURE OF PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT MRS. LINA O. SEVILLA'S COMPLAINT.II. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT APPELLANT MRS. LINA 0. SEVILA'S ARRANGEMENT (WITH APPELLEE TOURIST WORLD SERVICE, INC.) WAS ONE MERELY OF EMPLOYER-EMPLOYEE RELATION AND IN FAILING TO HOLD THAT THE SAID ARRANGEMENT WAS ONE OF JOINT BUSINESS VENTURE.III. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT MRS. LINA O. SEVILLA IS ESTOPPED FROM DENYING THAT SHE WAS A MERE EMPLOYEE OF DEFENDANT-APPELLEE TOURIST WORLD SERVICE, INC. EVEN AS AGAINST THE LATTER.IV. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT APPELLEES HAD NO RIGHT TO EVICT APPELLANT MRS. LINA O. SEVILLA FROM THE A. MABINI OFFICE BY TAKING THE LAW INTO THEIR OWN HANDS.V. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT CONSIDERING AT .ALL APPELLEE NOGUERA'S RESPONSIBILITY FOR APPELLANT LINA O. SEVILLA'S FORCIBLE DISPOSSESSION OF THE A. MABINI PREMISES.VI. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT APPELLANT APPELLANT MRS. LINA O. SEVILLA SIGNED MERELY AS GUARANTOR FOR RENTALS.On the foregoing facts and in the light of the errors asigned the issues to be resolved are:1. Whether the appellee Tourist World Service unilaterally disco the telephone line at the branch office on Ermita;2. Whether or not the padlocking of the office by the Tourist World Service was actionable or not; and3. Whether or not the lessee to the office premises belonging to the appellee Noguera was appellees TWS or TWS and the appellant.In this appeal, appealant Lina Sevilla claims that a joint bussiness venture was entered into by and between her and appellee TWS with offices at the Ermita branch office and that she was not an employee of the TWS to the end that her relationship with TWS was one of a joint business venture appellant made declarations showing:1. Appellant Mrs. Lina 0. Sevilla, a prominent figure and wife of an eminent eye, ear and nose specialist as well as a imediately columnist had been in the travel business prior to the establishment of the joint business venture with appellee Tourist World Service, Inc. and appellee Eliseo Canilao, her compadre, she being the godmother of one of his children, with her own clientele, coming mostly from her own social circle (pp. 3-6 tsn. February 16,1965).2. Appellant Mrs. Sevilla was signatory to a lease agreement dated 19 October 1960 (Exh. 'A') covering the premises at A. Mabini St., she expressly warranting and holding [sic] herself 'solidarily' liable with appellee Tourist World Service, Inc. for the prompt payment of the monthly rentals thereof to other appellee Mrs. Noguera (pp. 14-15, tsn. Jan. 18,1964).3. Appellant Mrs. Sevilla did not receive any salary from appellee Tourist World Service, Inc., which had its own, separate office located at the Trade & Commerce Building; nor was she an employee thereof, having no participation in nor connection with said business at the Trade & Commerce Building (pp. 16-18 tsn Id.).4. Appellant Mrs. Sevilla earned commissions for her own passengers, her own bookings her own business (and not for any of the business of appellee Tourist World Service, Inc.) obtained from the airline companies. She shared the 7% commissions given by the airline companies giving appellee Tourist World Service, Lic. 3% thereof aid retaining 4% for herself (pp. 18 tsn.Id.)5. Appellant Mrs. Sevilla likewise shared in the expenses of maintaining the A. Mabini St. office, paying for the salary of an office secretary, Miss Obieta, and other sundry expenses, aside from desicion the office furniture and supplying some of fice furnishings (pp. 15,18 tsn. April 6,1965), appellee Tourist World Service, Inc. shouldering the rental and other expenses in consideration for the 3% split in the co procured by appellant Mrs. Sevilla (p. 35 tsn Feb. 16,1965).6. It was the understanding between them that appellant Mrs. Sevilla would be given the title of branch manager for appearance's sake only (p. 31 tsn. Id.), appellee Eliseo Canilao admit that it was just a title for dignity (p. 36 tsn. June 18, 1965- testimony of appellee Eliseo Canilao pp. 38-39 tsn April 61965-testimony of corporate secretary Gabino Canilao (pp- 2-5, Appellants' Reply Brief)Upon the other hand, appellee TWS contend that the appellant was an employee of the appellee Tourist World Service, Inc. and as such was designated manager.1xxx xxx xxxThe trial court2held for the private respondent on the premise that the private respondent, Tourist World Service, Inc., being the true lessee, it was within its prerogative to terminate the lease and padlock the premises.3It likewise found the petitioner, Lina Sevilla, to be a mere employee of said Tourist World Service, Inc. and as such, she was bound by the acts of her employer.4The respondent Court of Appeal5rendered an affirmance.The petitioners now claim that the respondent Court, in sustaining the lower court, erred. Specifically, they state:ITHE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED ON A QUESTION OF LAW AND GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN HOLDING THAT "THE PADLOCKING OF THE PREMISES BY TOURIST WORLD SERVICE INC. WITHOUT THE KNOWLEDGE AND CONSENT OF THE APPELLANT LINA SEVILLA ... WITHOUT NOTIFYING MRS. LINA O. SEVILLA OR ANY OF HER EMPLOYEES AND WITHOUT INFORMING COUNSEL FOR THE APPELLANT (SEVILIA), WHO IMMEDIATELY BEFORE THE PADLOCKING INCIDENT, WAS IN CONFERENCE WITH THE CORPORATE SECRETARY OF TOURIST WORLD SERVICE (ADMITTEDLY THE PERSON WHO PADLOCKED THE SAID OFFICE), IN THEIR ATTEMP AMICABLY SETTLE THE CONTROVERSY BETWEEN THE APPELLANT (SEVILLA) AND THE TOURIST WORLD SERVICE ... (DID NOT) ENTITLE THE LATTER TO THE RELIEF OF DAMAGES" (ANNEX "A" PP. 7,8 AND ANNEX "B" P. 2) DECISION AGAINST DUE PROCESS WHICH ADHERES TO THE RULE OF LAW.IITHE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED ON A QUESTION OF LAW AND GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN DENYING APPELLANT SEVILLA RELIEF BECAUSE SHE HAD "OFFERED TO WITHDRAW HER COMP PROVIDED THAT ALL CLAIMS AND COUNTERCLAIMS LODGED BY BOTH APPELLEES WERE WITHDRAWN." (ANNEX "A" P. 8)IIITHE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED ON A QUESTION OF LAW AND GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN DENYING-IN FACT NOT PASSING AND RESOLVING-APPELLANT SEVILLAS CAUSE OF ACTION FOUNDED ON ARTICLES 19, 20 AND 21 OF THE CIVIL CODE ON RELATIONS.IVTHE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED ON A QUESTION OF LAW AND GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN DENYING APPEAL APPELLANT SEVILLA RELIEF YET NOT RESOLVING HER CLAIM THAT SHE WAS IN JOINT VENTURE WITH TOURIST WORLD SERVICE INC. OR AT LEAST ITS AGENT COUPLED WITH AN INTEREST WHICH COULD NOT BE TERMINATED OR REVOKED UNILATERALLY BY TOURIST WORLD SERVICE INC.6As a preliminary inquiry, the Court is asked to declare the true nature of the relation between Lina Sevilla and Tourist World Service, Inc. The respondent Court of see fit to rule on the question, the crucial issue, in its opinion being "whether or not the padlocking of the premises by the Tourist World Service, Inc. without the knowledge and consent of the appellant Lina Sevilla entitled the latter to the relief of damages prayed for and whether or not the evidence for the said appellant supports the contention that the appellee Tourist World Service, Inc. unilaterally and without the consent of the appellant disconnected the telephone lines of the Ermita branch office of the appellee Tourist World Service, Inc.7Tourist World Service, Inc., insists, on the other hand, that Lina SEVILLA was a mere employee, being "branch manager" of its Ermita "branch" office and that inferentially, she had no say on the lease executed with the private respondent, Segundina Noguera. The petitioners contend, however, that relation between the between parties was one of joint venture, but concede that"whatever might have been the true relationship between Sevilla and Tourist World Service,"the Rule of Law enjoined Tourist World Service and Canilao from taking the law into their own hands,8in reference to the padlocking now questioned.The Court finds the resolution o