158390307 Cases Prejudicial Question Part I

8/12/2019 158390307 Cases Prejudicial Question Part I

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Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURT

Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-22579 February 23, 1968

ROLANDO LANDICHO,petitioner,vs.HON. LORENZO RELOVA, in his capacity as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Batangas, Branch I, andPEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,respondents.

Jose W. Diokno for petitioner.Office of the Solicitor General for respondents.

FERNANDO, J .:

In this petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction, the question before the Court is whetheror not the existence of a civil suit for the annulment of marriage at the instance of the second wife against petitioner,

with the latter in turn filing a third party complaint against the first spouse for the annulment of the first marriage,constitutes a prejudicial question in a pending suit for bigamy against him. Respondent, Judge Relova answered inthe negative. We sustain him.

The pertinent facts as set forth in the petition follow.

FACTS: On February 27, 1963, petitioner was charged with the offense, of bigamy. It was alleged in the informationthat petitioner "being then lawfully married to Elvira Makatangay, which marriage has not been legally dissolved, didthen and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously contract a second marriage with Fe Lourdes Pasia."

On March 15, 1963, an action was filed before the Court of First Instance ofBatangas, likewise presided plaintiff

respondent Judge Fe Lourdes Pasia, seeking to declare her marriage to petitioner as null and void ab initio becauseof the alleged use of force, threats and intimidation allegedly employed by petitioner and because of its allegedlybigamous character.

On June 15, 1963, petitioner as defendant in said case, filed a third-party complaint, against the third-party defendantElvira Makatangay, the first spouse, praying that his marriage with the said third-party defendant be declared null andvoid, on the ground that by means of threats, force and intimidation, she compelled him to appear and contractmarriage with her before the Justice of the Peace of Makati, Rizal.

Thereafter, on October 7, 1963, petitioner moved to suspend the hearing of the criminal case pending thedecision on the question of the validity of the two marriages involved in the pending civil suit. Respondent Judge onNovember 19, 1963 denied the motion for lack of merit. Then came a motion for reconsideration to set aside theabove order, which was likewise denied on March 2, 1964. Hence this petition, filed on March 13, 1964.

In a resolution of this Court of March 17, 1964, respondent Judge was required to answer within ten (10) days,with a preliminary injunction being issued to restrain him from further proceeding with the prosecution of the bigamycase. In the meanwhile, before the answer was filed there was an amended petition for certiorari, the amendmentconsisting solely in the inclusion of the People of the Philippines as another respondent. This Court admitted suchamended petition in a resolution of April 3, 1964.

Then came the answer to the amended petition on May 14 of that year where the statement of facts as abovedetailed was admitted, with the qualifications that the bigamy charge was filed upon the complaint of the first spouseElvira Makatangay. It alleged as one of its special and affirmative defenses that the mere fact that "there are actionsto annul the marriages entered into by the accused in a bigamy case does not mean that 'prejudicial questions are


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automatically raised in said civil actions as to warrant the suspension of the criminal case for bigamy."1

The answerstressed that even on the assumption that the first marriage was null and void on the ground alleged by petitioner, thefact would not be material to the outcome of the criminal case. It continued, referring to Viada, that "parties to themarriage should not be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, for this must be submitted to the judgment ofcompetent courts and only when the nullity of a marriage is so declared can it be held as void, and so long as there isno such declaration the presumption is that the marriage exists. Therefore, according to Viada, he who contracts asecond marriage before the judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage incurs the penalty provided for in this

Article. . . ."

2

This defense is in accordance with the principle implicit in authoritative decisions of this Court. In Merced v.Diez,

3what was in issue was the validity of the second marriage, "which must be determined before hand in the civil

action before the criminal action can proceed." According to the opinion of Justice Labrador: "We have a situationwhere the issue of the validity of the second marriage can be determined or must first be determined in the civil actionbefore the criminal action for bigamy can be prosecuted. The question of the validity of the second marriage is,therefore, a prejudicial question because determination of the validity of the second marriage is determinable in thecivil action and must precede the criminal action for bigamy." It was the conclusion of this Court then that forpetitioner Merced to be found guilty of bigamy, the second marriage which he contracted "must first be declaredvalid." Its validity having been questioned in the civil action, there must be a decision in such a case "before theprosecution for bigamy can proceed."

To the same effect is the doctrine announced in Zapanta v. Mendoza.4As explained in the opinion of Justice

Dizon: "We have heretofore defined a prejudicial question as that which arises in a case, the resolution of which is alogical antecedent of the issue involved therein, and the cognizance of which pertains to another tribunal. . . . Theprejudicial question we further said must be determinative of the case before the court, and jurisdiction to try thesame must be lodged in another court. . . . These requisites are present in the case at bar. Should the question forannulment of the second marriage pending in the Court of First Instance of Pampanga prosper on the ground that,according to the evidence, petitioner's consent thereto was obtained by means of duress, force and intimidation, it isobvious that his act was involuntary and can not be the basis of his conviction for the crime of bigamy with which hewas charged in the Court of First Instance of Bulacan. Thus the issue involved in the action for the annulment of thesecond marriage is determinative of petitioner's guilt or innocence of the crime of bigamy. . . ."

The situation in this case is markedly different. At the time the petitioner was indicted for bigamy on February27, 1963, the fact that two marriage ceremonies had been contracted appeared to be indisputable. Then on March15, 1963, it was the second spouse, not petitioner who filed an action for nullity on the ground of force, threats andintimidation. It was sometime later, on June 15, 1963, to be precise, when petitioner, as defendant in the civil action,filed a third-party complaint against the first spouse alleging that his marriage with her should be declared null and

void on the ground of force, threats and intimidation. As was correctly stressed in the answer of respondent Judgerelying on Viada, parties to a marriage should not be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, only competentcourts having such authority. Prior to such declaration of nullity, the validity of the first marriage is beyond question. Aparty who contracts a second marriage then assumes the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy.

Such was the situation of petitioner. There is no occasion to indulge in the probability that the third-partycomplaint against the first wife brought almost five months after the prosecution for bigamy was started could havebeen inspired by the thought that he could thus give color to a defense based on an alleged prejudicial question. Theabove judicial decisions as well as the opinion of Viada preclude a finding that respondent Judge abused, much lessgravely abused, his discretion in failing to suspend the hearing as sought by petitioner.

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorariis denied and the writ of preliminary injunction issued dissolved. Withcosts.1wph1.t

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar, Sanchez, Castro and Angeles, JJ.,concur.

RULING!!!

((**The mere fact that there are actions to annul the marriages entered into by the accused in abigamy case does not mean that "prejudicial questions" are automatically raised in civil actions asto warrant the suspension of the case. In order that the case of annulment of marriage beconsidered a prejudicial question to the bigamy case against the accused, it must be shown that


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the petitioner's consent to such marriage must be the one that was obtained by means of duress,force and intimidation to show that his act in the second marriage must be involuntary and cannotbe the basis of his conviction for the crime of bigamy. The situation in the present case is markedlydifferent. At the time the petitioner was indicted for bigamy on February 27, 1963, the fact that twomarriage ceremonies had been contracted appeared to be indisputable. And it was the secondspouse, not the petitioner who filed the action for nullity on the ground of force, threats andintimidation. And it was only on June 15, 1963, that petitioner, as defendant in the civil action, filed

a third-party complaint against the first spouse alleging that his marriage with her should bedeclared null and void on the ground of force, threats and intimidation. Assuming that the firstmarriage was null and void on the ground alleged by petitioner, the fact would not be material to theoutcome of the case. Parties to the marriage should not be permitted to judge for themselves itsnullity, for the same must be submitted to the judgment of the competent courts and only when thenullity of the marriage is so declared can it be held as void, and so long as there is no suchdeclaration the presumption is that the marriage exists. Therefore, he who contracts a secondmarriage before the judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage assumes the risk of beingprosecuted for bigamy. The lower court therefore, has not abused much less gravely abused, itsdiscretion in failing to suspend the hearing as sought by petitioner.

))

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S u n d a y , A u g u s t 1 2 , 2 0 1 2

LANDICHO VS RELOVA Case Digest

LANDICHO V. RELOVA

Facts:On February 27, 1963, petitioner was charged before the Court of First Instance of Batangas, Branch I,

presided over by respondent Judge, with the offense, of bigamy. It was alleged in the information that petitioner"being then lawfully married to Elvira Makatangay, which marriage has not been legally dissolved, did then and therewilfully, unlawfully and feloniously contract a second marriage with Fe Lourdes Pasia." On March 15, 1963, an actionwas filed before the Court of First Instance of Batangas, likewise presided plaintiff respondent Judge Fe LourdesPasia, seeking to declare her marriage to petitioner as null and void ab initio because of the alleged use of force,threats and intimidation allegedly employed by petitioner and because of its allegedly bigamous character. On June15, 1963, petitioner as defendant in said case, filed a third-party complaint, against the third-party defendantElvira Makatangay, the first spouse, praying that his marriage with the said third-party defendant be declared null andvoid, on the ground that by means of threats, force and intimidation, she compelled him to appear and contractmarriage with her before the Justice of the Peace of Makati, Rizal.

Issue:Whether or not the civil case filed is a prejudicial question.

Ruling:Where the first wife filed a criminal action for bigamy against the husband, and later the second wife filed a

civil case for annulment of the marriage on the ground of force and intimidation, and the husband later files a civilcase for annulment of marriage against the first wife, the civil cases are not prejudicial questions in the determinationof his criminal liability for bigamy, since his consent to the second marriage is not in issue. "The mere fact that thereare actions to annul the marriages entered into by accused in a bigamy case does not mean that "prejudicial

questions" are automatically raised in civil actions as to warrant the suspension of the criminal case. In order that thecase of annulment of marriage be considered a prejudicial question to the bigamy case against the accused, it mustbe shown that petitioner's consent to such marriage must be the one that was obtained by means of duress, forceand intimidation to show that his act in the second marriage must be involuntary and cannot be the basis of hisconviction for the crime of bigamy.

The situation in the present case is markedly different. At the time the petitioner was indicted for bigamy, thefact that two marriage ceremonies had been contracted appeared to be indisputable. And it was the second spouse,not the petitioner who filed the action for nullity on the ground of force, threats and intimidation. And it was only laterthat petitioner as defendant in the civil action, filed a third party complaint against the first spouse alleging that hismarriage with her should be declared null and void on the ground of force, threats and intimidation. Assuming the firstmarriage was null and void on the ground alleged by petitioner, that fact would not be material to the outcome of the


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criminal case. Parties to the marriage should not be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, for the same must besubmitted to the judgment of a competent court and only when the nullity of the marriage is so declared can it be heldas void, and so long as there is no such declaration, the presumption is that the marriage exists.

Therefore, he who contracts a second marriage before the judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriageassumes the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy."

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURTManila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-16874 February 27, 1961

DIOSDADO S. MENDIOLA, DOMINGO B. JOLA, TEODORO G. DE LA CRUZ, and HERMOGENESCONCEPCION, JR.,petitioners,

vs.HON. HIGINO MACADAEG, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Manila, PABLO ROMAN, RAMON RACELIS,ARMANDO ABAD, JR., JUAN J. BUENAFE, LUCIANO BUENAFE, HELMUTH HOLLNSTEINER, CONSUELO S.PEREZ, MELCHOR TUAZON, JR., MARIA TERESA CONUI, and VICENTE R. DE LEON,respondents.

Laurel Law Offices for petitioners.Norberto S. Quisumbing for respondents.

BARRERA, J.:

This is a petition for certiorari,prohibition, and/ormandamusfiled by the City Fiscal of Manila, together with DiosdadoMendiola, Domingo Jola, and Teodoro C. de la Cruz, minority stockholders of the Republic Savings Bank, seeking tonullify the preliminary writ of injunction issued in Civil Case No. 41454 of the Court of First Instance of Manila,restraining the petitioner City Fiscal from proceeding with his investigation of a complaint for falsification of publicand/or commercial documents filed against respondents Pablo Roman, Ramon Racelis, Armando Abad, Jr., Juan J.Buenafe, Luciano Buenafe, Helmuth Hollnsteiner, Consuelo S. Perez, Melchor Tuazon, Jr., Maria Teresa Conui, andVicente R. de Leon.

The antecedents are as follows: .

In a letter-complaint dated March 2, 1959, later amended on May 9, 1959, and filed with the City Fiscal of Manila,

Diosdado S. Mendiola, Domingo B. Jola, and Teodoro S. de la Cruz, minority stockholders of the Republic SavingsBank, accused Pablo Roman, Ramon Racelis Luciano F. Buenafe, Juan J. Buenafe, Maria Teresa Conui, andVicente R. de Leon (officials and employees of the Republic Savings Bank), together with Helmuth Hollnsteiner,

Armando Abad, Jr., Consuelo Salazar-Perez, Melchor Tuazon, Jr., John Doe, Peter Doe, James Doe, Richard Doe,and Mary Doe, of the crime of falsification of public and/or commercial documents under Article 171, paragraphs 2, 3,and 4, and Article 172, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code, in relation to Sections 75, 76, 77, 78, 83, and 87 ofthe Banking Act (Republic Act 337), allegedly committed by the respondents Bank officials and employees, inconnivance with the other respondents, in preparing or causing the preparation of the following documents: .

Deeds of absolute sale.

(1) Four deeds of absolute sale, all dated December 10 1957, by virtue of which Pablo M. Sarangayapurportedly sold and conveyed ownership of the properties separately described therein unto Felizardo

Africa, Honorato Galang, Raul Suarez, and Conrado Enrile, respectively. These deeds were all signed byMelchor Tuazon, Jr. and Peter Doe, as witnesses, and notarized and acknowledged by Armando Abad, Jr.

(2) Four deeds of mortgage, all dated December 11, 1957, allegedly executed by vendee Africa, Galang,Suarez, and Enrile in favor of the Republic Savings Bank, to secure their respective loans of P85,000.00,P210,000.00, P250,000.00, and P200,000.00, incurred to pay the balance of the purchase price of the


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aforementioned properties. Said deeds of mortgage were witnessed by Maria Teresa Conui and John Doe,and notarized and acknowledged by Luciano F. Buenafe.

(3) Four deeds of sale with assumption of mortgage, all dated September 3, 1958, allegedly executed byFelizardo Africa, Honorato Galang, Raul Suarez, and Conrado Enrile, the first two in favor of the BeneficialFinancing Corporation of which Consuelo S. Perez is the President and majority stockholder, and the othertwo in favor of Consuelo Salazar-Perez personally.

Specifically, the charge was that respondents made untruthful statements in the respective narration of facts, bycausing it to appear in said deeds that the alleged vendees Africa, Galang, Suarez, and Enrile took part in the actsand proceedings indicated therein when in fact they did not; that by the unlawful and deliberate preparation,execution, and accomplishment of the aforementioned documents, the Register of Deeds of Rizal was induced toissue the corresponding transfer certificate of title for each of said properties, and the registration thereof in thenames of Africa, Galang, Suarez, and Enrile, and to register the deeds of mortgage allegedly executed by thepurchasers in favor of the Republic Savings Bank, as well as the supposed subsequent sale of the same properties,subject to said mortgages, in favor of Consuelo Salazar-Perez and the Beneficial Financing Corporation (of whichMrs. Perez is the President and majority stockholder); that by virtue of such fraudulent transactions, respondentswere able to cause the unlawful disbursement of the funds of the Republic Savings Bank in the total sum ofP745,000.00 in violation of their trust and which could not have been accomplished without the misrepresentationsand falsifications complained of. This complaint was docketed as I.S. No. 6876 of the City Fiscal's Office.

With full knowledge of the filing of this complaint in the respondent City Fiscal's Office, and notwithstanding thesummons issued by this official, the Beneficial Financing Corporation and Consuelo Salazar-Perez, on April 3, 1959,entered into a contract with Top Service, Inc. whereby they promised to sell to the latter the four (4) parcels of land forthe sum of P794,764.30 for the first two parcels, and P597,031.30 for the last two parcels. Subsequently, BeneficialFinancing Corporation conveyed the two parcels of land it obtained from Africa and Galang to Mrs. Perez whothereby became the owner of the four parcels. There-after, respondents filed a motion to quash the criminal complaintand an alternative motion to postpone the investigation on the ground that the nullity of the mortgage contracts is aprejudicial question to the charge for falsification. Evidently to bolster up this theory, Top Service, Inc. subsequentlyinstituted in the Court of First Instance of Pasig (Civil Case No. 5584) an action against Consuelo Salazar-Perezpurportedly "to quiet title" of Mrs. Perez, alleging, among others, the agreement to sell secured in its favor in virtue ofwhich plaintiff averred to have already paid the total amount of P50,000.00 as advance payment, and was toundertake, as it did undertake, to subdivide the parcels of land into small lots, lay out streets and plazas; that it hadalready spent more than P300,000.00 and was expected to spend around P1,000,000.00 more to complete thesubdivision work; that it learned of the filing by the three minority stockholders of the Republic Savings Bank of thecomplaint for falsification involving the parcels subject of their contract; that such proceeding was prejudicial to its

lights, title, and interest under the aforementioned promise to sell. Thus, it was prayed that the court render judgment"to remove such cloud or to quiet the title of the aforesaid real property".

The defendant, Consuelo Salazar-Perez answered the complaint denying the alleged falsification and asserting thevalidity of her title over the said properties.

After the issues in said civil case have thus been apparently joined, the respondents in I.S. No. 6976 of the CityFiscal's Office reiterated their motion to quash or suspend the investigation of the criminal complaint, inviting attentionto the civil action filed in Pasig and insisting that the same is an existing prejudicial civil question that warrants thesuspension of the preliminary investigation. Upon its denial by the investigating fiscal, respondents appealed to theCity Fiscal. Ruling that a decision in Civil Case No. 5584, filed in Pasig, purportedly to quiet title over the propertiesinvolved therein, is not essential to the determination of the criminal liability of the respondents for falsification ascharged in the complaint, the City Fiscal ordered the continuation of the preliminary investigation, setting the same forSeptember 16, 1959, at 1:30 P.M. On the appointed date, but before the actual investigation could take place,

however, the City Fiscal received a writ of preliminary injunction, issued ex-parteby the Court of First Instance ofManila in Civil Case No. 41454,1 enjoining him to refrain from conducting the preliminary investigation of I.S. 6976.Their separate motions to dismiss the case and to dissolve the injunction having been denied, the City Fiscal,together with the complainants in the criminal investigation, filed the instant petition for the purpose heretofore stated,viz, to stated aside the preliminary writ of injunction restraining the City Fiscal from proceeding with his investigation.

The only question to be resolved in this instance is whether the proceedings in I.S. No. 6976 of the City Fiscal's Officemay be stopped or suspended pending the final determination of the question involved in Civil Case No. 5584 of theCourt of First Instance of Rizal (Pasig) or, differently stated, whether Civil Case No. 5584 is a prejudicial civil action tothe falsification ease subject of I.S. No. 6976.


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In the leading case of De Leon v. Mabanag(70 Phil. 202), cited by both parties, this Court, providing the criteria ofwhen a prejudicial civil question exists, stated:

. . .por regla general, el tribunal que entiende de un asunto criminal tiene competencia para decidircuestiones prejudiciales, para solo el efecto de la represion, cuando tales cuestiones aparezcan tanintimamente ligadas al hecho punible que sea racionalmente impossible su separacion. Pero el articulo 4.consagra una excepcion, y es cuando la question prejudicial sea determinante de la culpabilidad o

inocencia del acusado, en cuyo caso el tribunal que conoce de la causa criminal debe suspender esta yhacer que se falle la question prejudicial en juicio civil o administrativo. Esto es exactamente lo que ocurreahoraLa falsification del documento V-1, o mejor dicho, los hechos en que cosisten la misma y susustitucion durante el curso del juicio afectan directamente a la moralidad del recurrente como miembro delforo y es deber de este Tribunal determiner si el mismo es culpable de malas practicas determination queconstituvo en este caso la cuestion prejudicial de caracter administrativo que debe resolverseseparadamente en el expedients administrativo en vista de que determinara a su vez la culpabilidad oinocencia del recurrente en relacion con el proceso criminal por el delito de falsification.. . . La necesidad desuspender la investigacion preliminar que ha iniciado el recurrido asi como la incoacion del proceso criminalpor el delito de falsification del documento V-1 resulta mas patente si se considera que la falsedad deldocumento y su sustitucion se hallan aun sub-judicey si este Tribunal decidiese que el mismo es genuino yno ha sido sustituido y por consiguiente el recurrente no es culpable de malas practicas, tal fallo estaria enpugna con el critirio sustantado por el recurrido."(Emphasis supplied.)

ISSUE: Under the foregoing doctrine, for a civil case to be considered prejudicial to a criminal action as to cause thesuspension of the latter pending its (civil case) final determination, it must appear not only that the said civil caseinvolves the same facts upon which the criminal prosecution would be based, but also that in the resolution of theissues or issues raised in the aforesaid civil action, the guilt or innocence of the accused would necessarily bedetermined.

HELD: In the case at bar, the burden of the criminal complaint (I.S. No. 6976) is that the falsification therein chargedhad caused the fraudulent and illegal disbursements of he funds of the Republic Savings Bank in violation of theBanking Law and of the Revised Penal Code. The validity of the transfers of ownership over the land is but anincident. Consequently, even if the ownership of Consuelo Salazar-Perez is upheld in the case to quiet title, such adecision will not finally conclude that the herein respondents, who are not parties to the said civil action, are innocentof the falsification that enabled them to obtain through fraudulent misrepresentations and false narration of facts inthe public documents, the illegal disbursements of the bank's funds in the way of loans.

Moreover, the civil case is an action between Top Service, Inc. and Consuelo Salazar-Perez alone. Both parties areinterests in the same proposition, the clearing of doubt in the title of Mrs. Perez, In such a situation, who would raisethe question of falsification of the documents relied on by both parties? How could a judgment rendered under suchcircumstances be determinative of the guilt or innocence of the respondents who could not be bound by the decisionwithout their intervention or the intervention of those who charge the falsification? Clearly, the issue in Civil. Case No.5594 does not constitute a prejudicial question that would warrant the suspension of the investigation, sought to beconducted by the petitioner City Fiscal, of the criminal complaint for falsification filed in his office ahead of the civilcase.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby granted, and the preliminary injunction issued by the respondent court (in CivilCase No. 41454) restraining the City Fiscal of Manila from proceeding with the preliminary investigation of I.S. No.6976 dissolved. Costs are taxed against the respondents, petitioners in said Civil Case No. 41454. So ordered.

Bengzon, Actg. C.J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Paredes and Dizon, JJ.,concur.

Footnotes

1A complaint against the City Fiscal and complainants Mendiola, Jola, and De la Cruz, praying for the

issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction to restrain the City Fiscal from proceeding with the preliminaryinvestigation of I.S. No. 6976, and for the declaration, after trial, that a prejudicial question exists in CivilCase No. 5584 of the Court of First Instance of Rizal.


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Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-53642 April 15, 1988

LEONILO C. DONATO, petitioners,vs.HON. ARTEMON D. LUNA, PRESIDING JUDGE, COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF MANIIA, BRANCH XXXIIHON. JOSE FLAMINIANO, CITY FISCAL OF MANILA; PAZ B. ABAYAN, respondents.

Leopoldo P. Dela Rosa for petitioner.

Emiterio C. Manibog for private respondent.

City Fiscal of Manila for public respondent.

GANCAYCO, J .:

In this petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction, the question for the resolution of the Court iswhether or not a criminal case for bigamy pending before the Court of First Itance of Manila should be suspended inview of a civil case for annulment of marriage pending before the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court on theground that the latter constitutes a prejudicial question. The respondent judge ruled in the negative. We sustain him.

The pertinent facts as set forth in the records follow. On January 23, 1979, the City Fiscal of Manila acting thruAssistant City Fiscal Amado N. Cantor filed an information for bigamy against herein petitioner, Leonilo C. Donatowith the Court of First Instance of Manila, docketed as Criminal Case No. 43554 and assigned to Branch XXXII ofsaid court. The information was filed based on the complaint of private respondent Paz B. Abayan.

On September 28, 1979, before the petitioner's arraignment, private respondent filed with the Juvenile and Domest icRelations Court of Manila a civil action for declaration of nullity of her marriage with petitioner contracted onSeptember 26, 1978, which action was docketed as Civil Case No. E-02627. Said civil case was based on the groundthat private respondent consented to entering into the marriage, which was petitioner Donato's second one, since shehad no previous knowledge that petitioner was already married to a certain Rosalinda R. Maluping on June 30, 1978.Petitioner Donato's answer in the civil case for nullity interposed the defense that his second marriage was void sinceit was solemnized without a marriage license and that force, violence, intimidation and undue influence wereemployed by private respondent to obtain petitioner's consent to the marriage. Prior to the solemnization of thesubsequent or second marriage, petitioner and private respondent had lived together and deported themselves ashusband and wife without the benefit of wedlock for a period of at least five years as evidenced by a joint affidavitexecuted by them on September 26, 1978, for which reason, the requisite marriage license was dispensed withpursuant to Article 76 of the New Civil Code pertaining to marriages of exceptional character.

Prior to the date set for the trial on the merits of Criminal Case No. 43554, petitioner filed a motion to suspend the

proceedings of said case contending that Civil Case No. E-02627 seeking the annulment of his second marriage filedby private respondent raises a prejudicial question which must first be determined or decided before the criminal casecan proceed.

In an order dated April 7, 1980. Hon. Artemon D. Luna denied the motion to suspend the proceedings in CriminalCase No. 43554 for bigamy. Respondent judge's basis for denial is the ruling laid down in the case of Landicho vs.Relova.

1The order further directed that the proceedings in the criminal case can proceed as scheduled.


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A motion for reconsideration was flied by herein petitioner thru counsel citing as one of his grounds for suspension ofproceedings the ruling laid down by this Court in the case of De la Cruz vs. Ejercito

2which was a much later case

than that cited by respondent judge in his order of denial.

The motion for reconsideration of the said order was likewise denied in an order dated April 14, 1980, for lack ofmerit. Hence, the present petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction.

A prejudicial question has been defined to be one which arises in a case, the resolution of which question is a logicalantecedent of the issue involved in said case, and the cognizance of which pertains to another tribunal.

3It is one

based on a fact distinct and separate from the crime but so intimately connected with it that it determines the guilt orinnocence of the accused, and for it to suspend the criminal action, it must appear not only that said case involvesfacts intimately related to those upon which the criminal prosecution would be based but also that in the resolution ofthe issue or issues raised in the civil case, the guilt or innocence of the accused would necessarily be determined.

4A

prejudicial question usually comes into play in a situation where a civil action and a criminal action may proceed,because howsoever the issue raised in the civil action is resolved would be determinativejuris et de jure of the guiltor innocence of the accused in a criminal case.

5

HELD: The requisites of a prejudicial question do not obtain in the case at bar. It must be noted that the issue beforethe Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court touching upon the nullity of the second marriage is not determinative ofpetitioner Donato's guilt or innocence in the crime of bigamy. Furthermore, it was petitioner's second wife, the hereinprivate respondent Paz B. Abayan who filed the complaint for annulment of the second marriage on the ground that

her consent was obtained through deceit.

Petitioner Donato raised the argument that the second marriage should have been declared null and void on theground of force, threats and intimidation allegedly employed against him by private respondent only sometime laterwhen he was required to answer the civil action for anulment of the second marriage. The doctrine elucidated uponby the case ofLandicho vs. Relova

6may be applied to the present case. Said case states that:

**The mere fact that there are actions to annul the marriages entered into by the accused in abigamy case does not mean that "prejudicial questions" are automatically raised in civil actions asto warrant the suspension of the case. In order that the case of annulment of marriage beconsidered a prejudicial question to the bigamy case against the accused, it must be shown thatthe petitioner's consent to such marriage must be the one that was obtained by means of duress,force and intimidation to show that his act in the second marriage must be involuntary and cannotbe the basis of his conviction for the crime of bigamy. The situation in the present case is markedly

different. At the time the petitioner was indicted for bigamy on February 27, 1963, the fact that twomarriage ceremonies had been contracted appeared to be indisputable. And it was the secondspouse, not the petitioner who filed the action for nullity on the ground of force, threats andintimidation. And it was only on June 15, 1963, that petitioner, as defendant in the civil action, fileda third-party complaint against the first spouse alleging that his marriage with her should bedeclared null and void on the ground of force, threats and intimidation. Assuming that the firstmarriage was null and void on the ground alleged by petitioner, the fact would not be material to theoutcome of the case. Parties to the marriage should not be permitted to judge for themselves itsnullity, for the same must be submitted to the judgment of the competent courts and only when thenullity of the marriage is so declared can it be held as void, and so long as there is no suchdeclaration the presumption is that the marriage exists. Therefore, he who contracts a secondmarriage before the judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage assumes the risk of beingprosecuted for bigamy. The lower court therefore, has not abused much less gravely abused, itsdiscretion in failing to suspend the hearing as sought by petitioner.

In the case at bar, petitioner has not even sufficiently shown that his consent to the second marriage has beenobtained by the use of threats, force and intimidation.

Petitioner calls the attention of this Court to the fact that the case of De la Cruz vs. Ejercito is a later case and assuch it should be the one applied to the case at bar. We cannot agree. The situation in the case at bar is markedlydifferent. In the aforecited case it was accused Milagros dela Cruz who was charged with bigamy for havingcontracted a second marriage while a previous one existed. Likewise, Milagros dela Cruz was also the one who filedan action for annulment on the ground of duress, as contra-distinguished from the present case wherein it was privaterespondent Paz B. Abayan, petitioner's second wife, who filed a complaint for annulment of the second marriage onthe ground that her consent was obtained through deceit since she was not aware that petitioner's marriage was still


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subsisting. Moreover, in De la Cruz, a judgment was already rendered in the civil case that the second marriage ofDe la Cruz was null and void, thus determinative of the guilt or innocence of the accused in the criminal case. In thepresent case, there is as yet no such judgment in the civil case.

Pursuant to the doctrine discussed in Landicho vs. Relova, petitioner Donato cannot apply the rule on prejudicialquestions since a case for annulment of marriage can be considered as a prejudicial question to the bigamy caseagainst the accused only if it is proved that the petitioner's consent to such marriage was obtained by means of

duress, violence and intimidation in order to establish that his act in the subsequent marriage was an involuntary oneand as such the same cannot be the basis for conviction. The preceding elements do not exist in the case at bar.

Obviously, petitioner merely raised the issue of prejudicial question to evade the prosecution of the criminal case. Therecords reveal that prior to petitioner's second marriage on September 26, 1978, he had been living with privaterespondent Paz B. Abayan as husband and wife for more than five years without the benefit of marriage. Thus,petitioner's averments that his consent was obtained by private respondent through force, violence, intimidation andundue influence in entering a subsequent marriage is belled by the fact that both petitioner and private respondentexecuted an affidavit which stated that they had lived together as husband and wife without benefit of marriage forfive years, one month and one day until their marital union was formally ratified by the second marriage and that itwas private respondent who eventually filed the civil action for nullity.

Another event which militates against petitioner's contentions is the fact hat it was only when Civil Case No. E-02627was filed on September 28, 1979, or more than the lapse of one year from the solemnization of the second marriage

that petitioner came up with the story that his consent to the marriage was secured through the use of force, violence,intimidation and undue influence. Petitioner also continued to live with private respondent until November 1978, whenthe latter left their abode upon learning that Leonilo Donato was already previously married.

In the light of the preceding factual circumstances, it can be seen that the respondent Judge did not err in his earlierorder. There is no pivotal issue that must be pre-emptively resolved in Civil Case No. E-02627 before proceedings inthe criminal action for bigamy can be undertaken.

Accordingly, there being no prejudicial question shown to exit the order of denial issued by the respondent judgedated April 14, 1980 should be sustained.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. We make nopronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.


Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 112381 March 20, 1995

ISABELO APA, MANUEL APA and LEONILO JACALAN, petitioners,vs.HON. RUMOLDO R. FERNANDEZ, HON. CELSO V. ESPINOSA, and SPS. FELIXBERTO TIGOL, JR. andROSITA TAGHOY TIGOL, respondents.

MENDOZA, J .:


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This is a special civil action of certiorari to set aside orders of respondent Judge Rumoldo R. Fernandez of theRegional Trial Court, Branch 54, at Lapu-Lapu City, denying petitioners oral motion for the suspension of theirarraignment in Criminal Case No. 012489, entitled: "People of the Philippines v. Isabelo Apa; Manuel Apa andLeonilo Jacalan," as well as their motion for reconsideration.

Criminal Case No. 012489 is a prosecution for violation of P.D. 772 otherwise known as the Anti-Squatting Law. Theinformation alleges:

That on February 1990, or prior thereto, in Agus, Lapulapu City, Philippines and within thejurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused [herein

petitioners Isabelo Apa, Manuel Apa and Dionisio Jacalan], conspiring, confederating and mutuallyhelping with one another, without the knowledge and consent of the owner, ROSITA TIGOL, didthen and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously take advantage of the absence or tolerance of thesaid owner by occupying or possessing a portion of her real property, Lot No. 3635-B of OponCadastre, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 13250, situated in Agus Lapulapu City,whereon they constructed their respective residential houses against the will of Rosita Tigol, whichacts of the said accused have deprived the latter of the use of a portion of her land, to her damageand prejudice because despite repeated demands the said accused failed and refused, as they stillfail and refuse to vacate the premises above-mentioned.

Petitioners moved for the suspension of their arraignment on the ground that there was a prejudicial question pendingresolution in another case being tried in Branch 27 of the same court. The case, docketed as Civil Case No. 2247-Land entitled "Anselmo Taghoy and Vicente Apa versus Felixberto Tigol, Jr. and Rosita T. Tigol, et al.," concerns theownership of Lot No. 3635-B.

1In that case, petitioners seek a declaration of the nullity of TCT No. 13250 of Rosita T.

Tigol and the partition of the lot in question among them and private respondent Rosita T. Tigol as heirs of Filomenoand Rita Taghoy. The case had been filed in 1990 by petitioners, three years before May 27, 1993 when the criminalcase for squatting was filed against them.

On August 25, 1993, the trial court denied the petitioners' motion and proceeded with their arraignment. Petitioners,therefore, had to enter their plea (not guilty) to the charge.

On September 2, 1993, petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration but their motion was denied by the court in itsorder dated September 21, 1993. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: The only issue in this case is whether the question of ownership of Lot No. 3635-B, which was pending, inCivil Case No. 2247-L, is a prejudicial question justifying suspension of the proceedings in the criminal case againstpetitioners.

HELD: We hold that it is.

A prejudicial question is a question which is based on a fact distinct and separate from the crime but so intimatelyconnected with it that its resolution is determinative of the guilt or innocence of the accused. To justify suspension ofthe criminal action, it must appear not only that the civil case involves facts intimately related to those upon which thecriminal prosecution is based but also that the decision of the issue or issues raised in the civil case would bedecisive of the guilt or innocence of the accused.

2Rule 111, 5 provides:

Sec. 6. Elements of prejudicial question. The two (2) essential elements of a prejudicial

questions are: (a) the civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised inthe criminal action; and (b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminalaction may proceed.

In the criminal case, the question is whether petitioners occupied a piece of land not belonging to them but to privaterespondent and against the latter's will. As already noted, the information alleges that "without the knowledge andconsent of the owner, ROSITA TIGOL" petitioners occupied or took possession of a portion of "herproperty" bybuilding their houses thereon and "deprived [her] of the use of portion of herland to her damage and prejudice.


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Now the ownership of the land in question, known as Lot 3635-B of the Opon cadastre covered by TCT No. 13250, isthe issue in Civil Case 2247-L now pending in Branch 27 of the RTC at Lapulapu City. The resolution, therefore, ofthis question would necessarily be determinative of petitioners criminal liability for squatting.

In fact it appears that on February 23, 1994, the court trying the civil case rendered a decision nullifying TCT No.13250 of private respondent and her husband and declared the lot in question to be owned in common by thespouses and the petitioners as inheritance from their parents Filomeno and Rita Taghoy. While private respondents

claim that the decision in that case is not yet final because they have filed a motion for new trial, the point is thatwhatever may be the ultimate resolution of the question of ownership, such resolution will be determinative of the guiltor innocence of petitioners in the criminal case. Surely, if petitioners are co-owners of the lot in question, they cannotbe found guilty of squatting because they are as much entitled to the use and occupation of the land as are theprivate respondent Rosita T. Tigol and her family.

3

Private respondents argues that even the owner of a piece of a land can be ejected from his property since the onlyissue in such a case is the right to i ts physical possession. Consequently, they contend, he can also be prosecutedunder the Anti-Squatting Law.

The contention misses the case is the essential point that the owner of a piece of land can be ejected only if for somereason, e.g., he has let his property to the plaintiff, he has given up its temporary possession. But in the case at bar,no such agreement is asserted by private respondent. Rather private respondent claims the right to possessionbased on her claim of ownership. Ownership is thus the pivotal question. Since this is the question in the civil case,

the proceedings in the criminal case must in the meantime be suspended.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and respondent judge is ordered to SUSPEND the proceedings in CriminalCase No. 012489 until the question of ownership in Civil Case No. 2247-L has been resolved with finality andthereafter proceed with the trial of the criminal case if the civil case is decided and terminated adversely againstpetitioners. Otherwise he should dismiss the criminal case.

SO ORDERED.

THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 111244. December 15, 1997]

ARTURO ALANO, pet i t ioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, HON. ENRICO A. LANZANAS,Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, National Capital Judicial Region, Manila, Branch 37, andROBERTO CARLOS, respondents.

D E C I S I O N

ROMERO, J.:

Petitioner Arturo Alano has filed this petition for review of the decision[1]

of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP

No. 28150 which affirmed in toto the order of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 37[2]

denying petitionersmotion for the suspension of proceeding of Criminal Case No. 90-84933, entitled People of the Philippines vs. Arturo

Alano as well as his motion for reconsideration.

Criminal Case No. 90-84933 is a prosecution for the crime of estafa. The information[3]

alleges:

That on or about June 10, 1986, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused did then and there wilfully,unlawfully and feloniously defraud Roberto S. Carlos in the following manner, to wit: the said accused, pretending tobe still the owner of a parcel of land with an area of 1,172 square meters, more or less, located at Bicutan, Taguig,Metro Manila, covered by Tax Declaration No. 120-004-00398, well knowing that he had previously sold the same tothe said Roberto S. Carlos for P30,000.00, sold the aforesaid property for the second time to one Erlinda B. Dandoy
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forP87,900.00, thereby depriving the said Roberto S. Carlos of his rightful ownership/possession of the said parcel ofland, to the damage and prejudice of the said Roberto S. Carlos in the aforesaid amount of P30,000.00, Philippinecurrency.

Contrary to law.

Petitioner moved for the suspension of the criminal case on the ground that there was a prejudicial questionpending resolution in another case being tried in the Regional Trial Court, National Capital Region, Pasig, Branch68. The case, docketed as Civil Case No. 55103 and entitled Roberto Carlos and Trinidad M. Carlos v. Arturo

Alano, et al., concerns the nullity of the sale and recovery of possession and damages. In the aforementioned CivilCase, private respondent filed a complaint against the petitioner seeking the annulment of the second sale of saidparcel of land made by the petitioner to a certain Erlinda Dandoy on the premise that the said land was previouslysold to them. In his answer, petitioner contends that he never sold the property to the private respondents and thathis signature appearing in the deed of absolute sale in favor of the latter was a forgery, hence, the alleged sale wasfictitious and inexistent. At this juncture, it is worth mentioning that the civil case was filed on March 1, 1985, fiveyears before June 19, 1990 when the criminal case for estafa was instituted.

On October 3, 1991, the trial court denied the petitioners motion as well as a subsequent motion forreconsideration.

Aggrieved, petitioner filed a petition for certiorariand prohibition before the Court of Appeals seeking thenullification of the assailed order.

On July 26, 1993,[4]

the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for lack of merit, the decretal portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, finding no merit to the petition, the same is hereby DISMISSED, with cost against petitioner.

Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: The only issue in this petition is whether the pendency of Civil Case No. 55103, is a prejudicial questionjustifying the suspension of the proceedings in Criminal Case No. 90-84933 filed against the petitioner.

Petitioner alleges that his signature appearing in the first deed of absolute sale in favor of private respondentwas a forgery, such that there was no second sale covering the said parcel of land. Otherwise stated, if the Court inthe said Civil Case rules that the first sale to herein private respondent was null and void, due to the forgery ofpetitioners signature in the first deed of sale, it follows that the criminal case for estafa would not prosper.

While at first blush there seems to be merit in petitioners claim, we are compelled to affirm the Court ofAppeals findings.

The doctrine of prejudicial question comes into play in a situation where a civil action and a criminal action areboth pending and there exists in the former an issue which must be preemptively resolved before the criminal actionmay proceed, because howsoever the issue raised in the civil action is resolved such resolution would bedeterminative of the guilt or innocence of the accused in the criminal action.

[5]In other words, if both civil and criminal

cases have similar issues or the issue in one is intimately related to the issues raised in the other, then a prejudicialquestion would likely exist, provided the other element or characteristic is satisfied.

[6]

On the basis of the foregoing and a perusal of the facts obtaining in the case at bar, the disposition of the issueraised need not unduly detain us. We have already ruled that a criminal action for estafa (for alleged double sale ofproperty) is a prejudicial question to a civil action for nullity of the alleged deed of sale and the defense of the allegedvendor is the forgery of his signature in the deed.

[7]

Notwithstanding the apparent prejudicial question involved, the Court of Appeals still affirmed the Order of the

trial court denying petitioners motion for the suspension of the proceeding on the ground that petitioner, in thestipulation of facts, had already admitted during the pre-trial order dated October 5, 1990 of the criminal case thevalidity of his signature in the first deed of sale between him and the private respondent, as well as his subsequentacknowledgment of his signature in twenty-three (23) cash vouchers evidencing the payments made by the privaterespondent.

[8]Moreover, it was also noted by the Court of Appeals that petitioner even wrote to the private

respondent offering to refund whatever sum the latter had paid.[9]

In this regard, the pre-trial provision on criminal procedure found in Rule 118 of the Rules of Court provides:

Sec. 2. Pre-trial conference; subjects. x x x. The pre-trial conference shall consider the following:
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(a) Plea bargaining

(b)Stipulation of facts

From the foregoing, there is no question that a stipulation of facts by the parties in a criminal case is recognizedas declarations constituting judicial admissions, hence, binding upon the parties

[10]and by virtue of which the

prosecution dispensed with the introduction of additional evidence and the defense waived the right to contest ordispute the veracity of the statement contained in the exhibit.[11]

Accordingly, the stipulation of facts stated in the pre-trial order amounts to an admission by the petitionerresulting in the waiver of his right to present evidence on his behalf. While it is true that the right to present evidenceis guaranteed under the Constitution,

[12]this right may be waived expressly or impliedly.

[13]

Since the suspension of the criminal case due to a prejudicial question is only a procedural matter, the same issubject to a waiver by virtue of the prior acts of the accused. After all, the doctrine of waiver is made solely for thebenefit and protection of the individual in his private capacity, if it can be dispensed with and relinquished withoutinfringing on any public right and without detriment to the community at large.

[14]

Accordingly, petitioners admission in the stipulation of facts during the pre-trial of the criminal amounts to awaiver of his defense of forgery in the civil case. Hence, we have no reason to nullify such waiver, it being notcontrary to law, public order, public policy, morals or good customs, or prejudicial to a third person with a rightrecognized by law.

[15]Furthermore, it must be emphasized that the pre-trial order was signed by the petitioner

himself. As such, the rule that no proof need be offered as to any facts admitted at a pre-trial hearing applies.

[16]

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the appealed decision of the Court of Appeals dated July 26, 1993 isAFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., (Chairman),Melo, Francisco,andPanganiban, JJ., concur.

FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 148193. January 16, 2003]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, pet i t ioner, vs .RAFAEL JOSE CONSING, JR., respondent.

D E C I S I O N

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

Before us is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking to set aside the May 31, 2001decision

[1]of the Court of Appeals

[2]in CA-G.R. SP No. 63712, which reversed and set aside the January 23, 2001

order[3]

of the Regional Trial Court of Imus, Cavite, Branch 21, in Criminal Case No. 7668-00 denying respondentsmotion for deferment of arraignment.

Sometime in February 1997, respondent Rafael Jose Consing, Jr. and his mother, Cecilia de la

Cruz,[4]represented to Plus Builders, Inc. (PBI) that they are the true and lawful owners of a 42,443 square meter lotsituated in Imus, Cavite and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 687599 in the name of Cecilia de laCruz. They further represented that they acquired said lot, which was previously covered by TCT No. 191408 fromJuanito Tan Teng and Po Willie Yu. Relying on the representations of respondent and his mother, PBI purchased thequestioned lot.

In April 1999, PBI discovered that respondent and his mother did not have a valid title over the subject lot. PBIcame to know that Juanito Tan Teng and Po Willie Yu never sold said lot to respondent and his mother and that TCTNo. 191408 upon which TCT No. 687599 was based is not on file with the Register of Deeds.
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In August 1999, PBI was ousted from the possession of the disputed lot by Juanito Tan Teng and Po WillieYu. Despite written and verbal demands, respondent and his mother refused to return the amount of P13,369,641.79alleged to have been initially paid by PBI.

On July 22, 1999, respondent filed with the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 68, an action forInjunctive Relief docketed as Civil Case No. SCA 1759, against PBI, Unicapital Inc, Unicapital Realty Inc., JaimeMartires, Mariano D. Martinez, Cecilia de la Cruz and 20 other John Does.

[5]Respondent sought a declaration that he

was merely an agent of his mother, Cecilia de la Cruz, and therefore was not under any obligation to PBI and to theother defendants on the various transactions involving TCT No. 687599.

On October 13, 1999, PBI filed against respondent and his mother a complaint for Damages and Attachment,docketed as Civil Case No. 99-95381, with Branch 12 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila.

[6]Respondent filed a

motion to dismiss on the ground of forum shopping and pendency of Civil Case No. SCA 1759.[7]

On January 21, 2000, a criminal case for estafa through falsification of public document was filed againstrespondent Rafael Jose Consing, Jr. and his mother with the RTC of Imus, Cavite.

[8]

On April 7, 2000, respondent filed a motion to defer arraignment on the ground of prejudicial question, i.e., thependency of Civil Case Nos. SCA 1759 and 99-95381.

[9]On January 27, 2000, the trial court denied respondents

motion.

A motion for reconsideration thereof was likewise denied on February 27, 2001.[10]

Respondent filed a petition for certiorari with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or writ

of preliminary injunction with the Court of Appeals seeking to enjoin the arraignment and trial of the estafa throughfalsification case.

[11]The Court of Appeals granted respondents prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining

order in a resolution dated March 19, 2001.[12]

On May 31, 2001, a decision was rendered setting aside the January 27, 2000 order of the trial court andpermanently enjoining it from proceeding with the arraignment and trial of the criminal case until the civil cases forInjunctive Relief and for Damages and Attachment shall have been finally decided.

Hence, the People of the Philippines, represented by the Solicitor General, filed the instant petition seeking thereversal of the May 31, 2001 decision of the Court of Appeals.

ISSUE: The issue to be resolved in this petition is whether or not the pendency of Civil Case Nos. SCA 1759and 99-95381, for Injunctive Relief and for Damages and Attachment, is a prejudicial question justifying thesuspension of the proceedings in the criminal case for estafa through falsification of public document, filed against therespondent.

A prejudicial question is defined as that which arises in a case, the resolution of which is a logical antecedent ofthe issue involved therein, and the cognizance of which pertains to another tribunal. The prejudicial question must bedeterminative of the case before the court but the jurisdiction to try and resolve the question must be lodged inanother court or tribunal. It is a question based on a fact distinct and separate from the crime but so intimatelyconnected with it that it determines the guilt or innocence of the accused. For a civil action to be consideredprejudicial to a criminal case as to cause the suspension of the criminal proceedings until the final resolution of thecivil action, the following requisites must be present: (1) the civil case involves facts intimately related to those uponwhich the criminal prosecution would be based; (2) in the resolution of the issue or issues raised in the civil action,the guilt or innocence of the accused would necessarily be determined; and (3) jurisdiction to try said question mustbe lodged in another tribunal.

[13]

If both civil and criminal cases have similar issues or the issue in one is intimately related to the issues raised inthe other, then a prejudicial question would likely exist, provided the other element or characteristic is satisfied. Itmust appear not only that the civil case involves the same facts upon which the criminal prosecution would be based,but also that the resolution of the issues raised in the civil action would be necessarily determinative of the guilt or

innocence of the accused. If the resolution of the issue in the civil action will not determine the criminal responsibilityof the accused in the criminal action based on the same facts, or there is no necessity that the civil case bedetermined first before taking up the criminal case, therefore, the civil case does not involve a prejudicial question.

[14]

HELD: In the case at bar, we find no prejudicial question that would justify the suspension of the proceedings inthe criminal case. The issue in Civil Case No. SCA 1759 for Injunctive Relief is whether or not respondent merelyacted as an agent of his mother, Cecilia de la Cruz; while in Civil Case No. 99-95381, for Damages and Attachment,the question is whether respondent and his mother are liable to pay damages and to return the amount paid by PBIfor the purchase of the disputed lot. Even if respondent is declared merely an agent of his mother in the transactioninvolving the sale of the questioned lot, he cannot be adjudged free from criminal liability. An agent or any personmay be held liable for conspiring to falsify public documents. Hence, the determination of the issue involved in Civil
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Case No. SCA 1759 for Injunctive Relief is irrelevant to the guilt or innocence of the respondent in the criminal casefor estafa through falsification of public document.

Likewise, the resolution of PBIs right to be paid damages and the purchase price of the lot in question will notbe determinative of the culpability of the respondent in the criminal case for even if PBI is held entitled to the return ofthe purchase price plus damages, it does not ipso factofollow that respondent should be held guilty of estafa throughfalsification of public document. Stated differently, a ruling of the court in the civil case that PBI should not be paidthe purchase price plus damages will not necessarily absolve respondent of liability in the criminal case where hisguilt may still be established under penal laws as determined by other evidence.

Moreover, neither is there a prejudicial question if the civil and the criminal action can, according to law, proceedindependently of each other.

[15]Under Rule 111, Section 3 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, in the cases

provided in Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code, the independent civil action may be brought by theoffended party. It shall proceed independently of the criminal action and shall require only a preponderance ofevidence. In no case, however, may the offended party recover damages twice for the same act or omission chargedin the criminal action.

Thus, in Rojas v. People,[16]

the petitioner was accused in a criminal case for violation of Article 319 of the

Revised Penal Code, for executing a new chattel mortgage on personal property in favor of another party withoutconsent of the previous mortgagee. Thereafter, the offended party filed a civil case for termination of managementcontract, one of the causes of action of which consisted of petitioner having executed a chattel mortgage while theprevious chattel mortgage was still valid and subsisting. Petitioner moved that the arraignment and trial of the criminalcase be held in abeyance on the ground that the civil case was a prejudicial question, the resolution of which was

necessary before the criminal proceedings could proceed. The trial court denied the suspension of the criminal caseon the ground that no prejudicial question exist. We affirmed the order of the trial court and ruled that:

the resolution of the liabilityof the defendant in the civil case on the eleventh cause of action based on thefraudulent misrepresentation that the chattel mortgage the defendant executed in favor of the said CMS Estate, Inc.on February 20, 1957, that his D-6 Caterpillar Tractor with Serial No. 9-U-6565 was free from all liens andencumbrances will not determine the criminal liability of the accused in the said Criminal Case No. 56042 forviolation of paragraph 2 of Article 319 of the Revised Penal Code. . . . (i) That, even granting for the sake ofargument, a prejudicial question is involved in this case, the fact remains that both the crime charged in theinformation in the criminal case and the eleventh cause of action in the civil case are based upon fraud, hence boththe civil and criminal cases could proceed independently of the other pursuant to Article 33 of the new Civil Codewhich provides: In cases of defamation, fraud and physical injuries, a civil action for damages, entirely separate anddistinct from the criminal action shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall require only apreponderance of evidence. (j) That, therefore, the act of respondent judge in issuing the orders referred to in the

instant petition was not made with grave abuse of discretion.

In the instant case, Civil Case No. 99-95381, for Damages and Attachment on account of the alleged fraudcommitted by respondent and his mother in selling the disputed lot to PBI is an independent civil action under Article33 of the Civil Code. As such, it will not operate as a prejudicial question that will justify the suspension of thecriminal case at bar.

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the instant petition is GRANTED. The May 31, 2001 decision of theCourt of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 63712 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The permanent injunction issued by theCourt of Appeals is LIFTED and the Regional Trial Court of Imus, Cavite, Branch 21 is ORDERED to proceed withthe arraignment and trial in Criminal Case No. 7668-00.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Vitug, Carpio, andAzcuna, JJ., concur.

x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

D E C I S I O N

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
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This Petition for Review on Certiorariseeks to reverse the (1) Resolution[1]

dated 5 March 2001 of the Court of

Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 63293 entitled, Francisco Magestrado v. Hon. Estrella T. Estrada, in her capacity as the

Presiding Judge of Regional Trial Court, Branch 83 of Quezon City, People of the Philippines and Elena M. Librojo ,

which dismissed petitioner Francisco Magestrados Petition forCertiorari for being the wrong remedy; and

(2) Resolution[2]

dated 3 May 2001 of the same Court denying petitioners motion for reconsideration.

Private respondent Elena M. Librojo filed a criminal complaint[3]

for perjury against petitioner with the Office

of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City, which was docketed as I.S. No. 98-3900.

After the filing of petitioners counter-affidavit and the appended pleadings, the Office of the City Prosecutor

recommended the filing of an information for perjury against petitioner. Thus, Assistant City Prosecutor Josephine

Z. Fernandez filed an information for perjury against petitioner with the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Quezon

City. Pertinent portions of the information are hereby quoted as follows:

That on or about the 27th day of December, 1997, in Quezon City, Philippines, the said

accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously and knowingly make an untruthfulstatement under oath upon a material matter before a competent officer authorized to receive andadminister oath and which the law so require, to wit: the said accused subscribe and swore to an

Affidavit of Loss before Notary Public Erlinda B. Espejo of Quezon City, per Doc. No. 168, PageNo. 35, Book No. CLXXIV of her notarial registry, falsely alleging that he lost Owners DuplicateCertificate of TCT No. N-173163, which document was used in support of a Petition For Issuanceof New Owners Duplicate Copy of Certificate of Title and filed with the Regional Trial Court ofQuezon City, docketed as LRC# Q-10052 (98) on January 28, 1998 and assigned to Branch 99 ofthe said court, to which said Francisco M. Mag[e]strado signed and swore on its verification, perDoc. 413 Page 84 Book No. CLXXV Series of 1998 of Notary Public Erlinda B. Espejo of QuezonCity; the said accused knowing fully well that the allegations in the said affidavit and petition arefalse, the truth of the matter being that the property subject of Transfer Certificate of Title No. N-173163 was mortgaged to complainant Elena M. Librojo as collateral for a loan in the amountof P 758,134.42 and as a consequence of which said title to the property was surrendered by himto the said complainant by virtue of said loan, thus, making untruthful and deliberate assertions of

falsehoods, to the damage and prejudice of the said Elena M. Librojo.[4]

The case was raffled to the MeTC of Quezon City, Branch 43, where it was docketed as Criminal Case No.

90721 entitled, People of thePhilippinesv. Francisco Magestrado.

On 30 June 1999, petitioner filed a motion[5]

for suspension of proceedings based on a prejudicial question.

Petitioner alleged that Civil Case No. Q-98-34349, a case for recovery of a sum of money pending before the

Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 84, and Civil Case No. Q-98- 34308, a case for Cancellation of

Mortgage, Delivery of Title and Damages, pending before the RTC of Quezon City, Branch 77, must be resolved first

before Criminal Case No. 90721 may proceed since the issues in the said civil cases are similar or intimately related

to the issues raised in the criminal action.

On 14 July 1999, MeTC-Branch 43 issued an Order[6]

denying petitioners motion for suspension of

proceedings, thus:

Acting on the Motion for Suspension of Proceedings filed by the [herein petitionerMagestrado], thru counsel, and the Comment and Opposition thereto, the Court after an evaluationof the same, finds the aforesaid motion without merit, hence, is hereby DENIED, it appearing thatthe resolution of the issues raised in the civil actions is not determinative of the guilt or innocence ofthe accused.
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Hence, the trial of this case shall proceed as previously scheduled on July 19 and August2, 1993 at 8:30 in the morning.

On 17 August 1999, a motion[7]

for reconsideration was filed by petitioner but was denied by the MeTC in an

Order[8]

dated 19 October 1999.

Aggrieved, petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari[9]

under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court, with a

prayer for Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction before the RTC of Quezon City, Branch 83, docketed as Civil

Case No. Q-99-39358, on the ground that MeTC Judge Billy J. Apalit committed grave abuse of discretion amounting

to lack or excess of jurisdiction in denying his motion to suspend the proceedings in Criminal Case No. 90721.

On 14 March 2000, RTC-Branch 83 dismissed the petition and denied the prayer for the issuance of a writ of

preliminary injunction, reasoning thus:

Scrutinizing the complaints and answers in the civil cases abovementioned, in relation tothe criminal action for PERJURY, this Court opines and so holds that there is no prejudicialquestion involved as to warrant the suspension of the criminal action to await the outcome of thecivil cases. The civil cases are principally for determination whether or not a loan was obtained bypetitioner and whether or not he executed the deed of real estate mortgage involving the property

covered by TCT No. N-173163, whereas the criminal case is for perjury which imputes uponpetitioner the wrongful execution of an affidavit of loss to support his petition for issuance of a newowners duplicate copy of TCT No. 173163. Whether or not he committed perjury is the issue in thecriminal case which may be resolved independently of the civil cases. Note that the affidavit of losswas executed in support of the petition for issuance of a new owners duplicate copy of TCT No. N-173163 which petition was raffled to Branch 99 of the RTC. x x x.

[10]

Again, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration[11]

but this was denied by RTC- Branch 83 in an

Order[12]

dated 21 December 2000.

Dissatisfied, petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a Petition for Certiorari[13]

under Rule 65 of the Revised

Rules of Court, which was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 63293. Petitioner alleged that RTC Judge Estrella T.

Estrada committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in denying the Petition

for Certiorari in Civil Case No. Q-99-39358, and in effect sustaining the denial by MeTC-Branch 43 of petitioners

motion to suspend the proceedings in Criminal Case No. 90721, as well as his subsequent motion for reconsideration

thereof.

On 5 March 2001, the Court of Appeals dismissed[14]

the Petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 63293 on the ground

that petitioners remedy should have been an appeal from the dismissal by RTC -Branch 83 of his Petition

for Certiorariin Q-99-39358. The Court of Appeals ruled that:

Is this instant Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 the correct and appropriate remedy?

We rule negatively.

The resolution or dismissal in special civil actions, as in the instant petition, may beappealed x x x under Section 10, Rule 44 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure and not by petition

for certiorari under Rule 65 of the same rules. Thus, the said rule provides:

Section 10. Time for filing memoranda on special cases. In certiorari, prohibition,mandamus, quo warranto and habeas corpus cases, the parties shall file in lieu of briefs, theirrespective memoranda within a non-extendible period of thirty (30) days from receipt of the noticeissued by the clerk that all the evidence, oral and documentary, is already attached to the record xx x.

WHEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing premises, the instant Petition forCertiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is hereby DISMISSED.

[15]
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158390307 Cases Prejudicial Question Part I

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