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CHINESE FOREIGN POLICY IN TRANSITION: UNDERSTANDING CHINA'S "PEACEFULDEVELOPMENT"Author(s): XIAOXIONG YISource: The Journal of East Asian Affairs, Vol. 19, No. 1 (Spring/Summer 2005), pp. 74-112Published by: Institute for National Security StrategyStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/23257886 .

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74 THE JOURNAL OF EAST ASIAN AFFAIRS

CHINESE FOREIGN POLICY IN TRANSITION: UNDERSTANDING CHINA S "PEACEFUL

DEVELOPMENT"

XIAOXIONG VI

Marietta College

ABSTRACT

China is now in the process of transforming itself from

a weakling into one of the strong. The view in Beijing, however, is that China still has a considerable distance to travel before

it gets there. As a result, the Chinese leadership's goal, at

least for now, is to pursue economic development. A foreign policy of "heping fazhan (peaceful development)" has therefore

been dovetailed with this goal. Another important task in

China's new foreign policy is to accentuate China's role as

a rising power. In this sense, China's new "peaceful development"

policy is a reflection of Beijing' s willingness to learn to

behave like a great power. The article provides a detailed examination and assessment of the "heping fazhan" policy under China s fourth generation leadership and suggests that

the change-of-guard in the Chinese leadership offers the

possibility, though not the certainty, that China may increasingly fit more comfortably into the international system in the years ahead. On the issue of Taiwan, however, this author believes

China will not hesitate to act, because Beijing' s new leaders

now see the "reunification of the motherland" as a necessary, if dangerous, step in the reemergence of China.

Key Words: Development, Leadership, Regionalism, Multilateralism, Soft Power



CHINESE FOREIGN POLICY IN TRANSITION: UNDERSTANDING CHINA'S "PEACEFUL 75

INTRODUCTION

Ever since Hu Jintao took over as secretary general of

the Chinese Communist Party in November 2002 and assumed

the presidency in March 2003, there has been much speculation as to whether there will be any change in Chinese foreign

policy.1 And ignoring the rhetoric, for the first time since

1949, there also is a real debate among Chinese officials,

scholars, and analysts about the future direction of China's

foreign policy and what will be the most effective diplomatic

strategy that will allow Beijing to consolidate its influence

in Asia and improve its position globally. While the dual leadership of President Hu Jintao and

Premier Wen Jiabao has yet to display visions as grand as

those of the late patriarch Deng Xiaoping, the "fourth generation" Chinese leaders have impressed observers with a plethora of

"xinsiwei" ("new thinking"). This is most obvious in the

foreign policy arena. The new leadership has broken with the

"taoguang yanghui" ("keep a low profile and never take the

lead") diplomatic dictum laid down by Deng and quietly abandoned Jiang Zemin's "duojihua de shijie" ("a multipolar worldview").2 Beijing' s new diplomatic strategy is now centered

on a more multifaceted approach in achieving its objectives and has moved significantly from its previous foreign-policy stance of "petulant moralism"3 to what may be called a more

1 See, for example, Evan S. Medeiros, "China Debates Its 'Peaceful Rise'

Strategy: Is a kinder, gentler Beijing the best route to development?" Yale

Global, June 22, 2004, online at http • //valeglobal. vale, edu/ display. article?id=

4118. and Willy Wo-Lap Lam, "Fresh approach from Hu-Wen team," CNN

World, January 6, 2004, online at http: //edition, cnn. com/2004/WORLD/

asiapcf/east/01 / 06/willv. column/. 2

For a Chinese discussion on Hu-Wen's breaking away from Deng

Xiaoping' s diplomatic dictum, see Zhang Binsen, "China Should Abandon

the Foreign Policy of 'taoguang yanghui'in Chinese Political Science,

May 17, 2003, online at http://www.ccrs.org.cn/2233/ReadNews.asp? NewsID=212 3

Kenneth Lieberthal has characterized the pre-Hu Jintao Chinese foreign




normal or typical foreign-policy position that recognizes

explicitly China's own national interests.4

A new consensus is beginning to emerge among the fourth

generation of Chinese decision makers about the future directions

of China's foreign policy. Furthermore, there are no signs of Chinese acceptance of U. S. leadership in Asian and world

affairs or narrowing of significant differences on the Taiwan

issue. Below the surface of an inexperienced and fragmented

leadership which is full of diffidence and preoccupations, we

can clearly see the contour of the Hu-Wen team's foreign

policy "xinsiwei" as well as continuity and change in their

strategic thinking. To begin with, at the conclusion of the CCP 16th party

convention and the 11th National People's Congress, the fourth

generation Chinese leadership presented a blueprint for China's

long-term national goal to be fulfilled by 2020. Its goal is

to transform the current Chinese society into what is known

as "hexie" society, where the general populace would be able

to enjoy a more abundant and "harmonious" life. China plans to fulfill this end by quadrupling the size of its 2000 gross domestic product by 2020. To achieve this, China is banking on securing China's international environment at a time when

Beijing is focused on sustaining economic development and

political stability. It is true that in order to secure its international environment,

Beijing seems to be convinced that there is no choice but to

policy as a policy based on "petulant moralism," a notion that "we have

been humiliated and taken advantage of by the industrial powers for

last 150 years, you owe us a lot, and you need to recognize the moral

correctness of our stance?and then we can talk about specifics." Cited in

Rose Brady, "A New Face on China's Foreign Policy," Business Week,

August 4, 2003, online at http://www.businessweek.com.pl/magazine/ content/03 31/b3844142.htm. 4

For a Chinese account of the traditional "unfair" world order, see Zhang

Zhaozhong, Xiayige mubiao shishui?[Who Will Be the Next Target?] (Beijing: China Youth Publishing House, 1999).




avoid direct confrontation with Washington. However, Beijing' s

new leaders also see one possible complicating factor: China

cannot commit to any Sino-American cooperation that may

prevent it from carrying out Beijing' s reunification strategy. At the bottom of the Chinese concern lies the possibility of

a U.S.-led intervention in the Taiwan Strait should there be

an armed conflict there. The real challenge for the Hu-Wen

regime, therefore, is to avoid direct conflict with the United

States "at any price," but not to allow the United States to

interfere in Beijing' s reunification plan "at any price"-two

seemingly incompatible goals.5 Should these two seemingly incompatible goals become

truly irreconcilable for China's new leaders then there will

be no possibility of any compromise on Taiwan's independence efforts, be they blatant or step-by-step.6 For reasons to be

discussed later in the article, the new leadership in Beijing is prepared to intervene militarily and, as Wen Jiabao stated

in November 2003, "the Chinese will pay any price," including to accept a setback in their development program of "one

5 In his interview with Leonard Downie Jr. of the Washington Post, on

November 21, 2003, Wen warned, "China will pay any price to safeguard the unity of the motherland." For a complete transcript, see, "interview

with Wen Jiabao," The Washington Post, November 22, 2003, online at

http • //www, washingtonpost. com/ac2/wp-dvn?pagename=article& contentId=A6641-2003Nov22&notFound=true. 6

Yan Xuetong has argued that while "the policy of Hu Jintao's government to 'pay any price to maintain national unity' is not inconsistent with Deng

Xiaoping' s principle of 'one country, two systems,' there has been an

obvious change on Taiwan policy since Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao came to

power. Politically, the image of the Chinese government will be seriously

damaged by overseas anti-Chinese forces that support the independence of

Taiwan, which seeks a formal declaration of independence within four to

five years. This would constitute a threat to China's survival. To address

the threat, in October 2003, Premier Wen came up with the policy that

China will resolutely uphold the reunification of the country without any consideration of the price." Yan Xuetong, "Origins of the Policy to 'Pay

Any Price to Contain Taiwan's Independence'," China Strategy, Vol.

3(July 20, 2004), p. 39-40.




decade or more" if in the end an armed resolution is necessary to prevent Taiwan's independence.7 And if due to this they could not prevent a conflict with the U.S., they appear willing to take the necessary risk.8 As it increases in economic

strength, China is momentarily content to cooperate with the

U.S.-dominated global power structure while maneuvering into a more advantageous position. Such cooperation, however, is very much contingent on the strategic dynamics across the

Taiwan Straits.

The making of Chinese foreign policy, however, cannot

be reduced to a policy toward the United States or focused

only on China's Taiwan "obsession." The view in Beijing in

2005 is that China is on the verge of its second economic

takeoff. Starting with a brief summary of the Hu-Wen dual

leadership's new foreign policy doctrine- "heping fazhan"

("peaceful development"), the article will then provide a

detailed examination of the "heping fazhan" policy under

China's fourth generation leadership. It will conclude with

an assessment of China's "Peaceful Development" strategy.

THE ARTICULATION OF HU-WEN FOREIGN POLICY: CHINA' S "PEACEFUL DEVELOPMENT"9

Since late 2003, "heping fazhan" ("peaceful development")

7 The Washington Post, "Interview with Wen Jiabao."

8 For an excellent discussion on China's fourth generation leadership's

view on the Taiwan issue, see Jusuf Wanandi, "East Asia and Bumpy Sino-Taiwanese Relations," The Jakarta Post, July 1, 2004, online at

http • / / valeglobal. vale, edu/display. article?id=4112. 9

Although the concept of "peaceful rise" still enjoys strong currency in the

political and academic circles in China, the term itself has been publicly debated by Chinese officials and scholars. Some argued that the use of

"rise" could intimidate other Asian countries. Others opposed the term

"peaceful," fearing that it could encourage pro-independence groups in

Taiwan. Still others opposed the use of the term "rise," arguing that China

is not rising and will not rise given its myriad of economic and social



CHINESE FOREIGN POLICY IN TRANSITION: UNDERSTANDING CHINA'S 'PEACEFUL 79

has been adopted as the motto for the Hu-Wen leadership* s

foreign policy. In an excellent discussion of the Chinese

foreign policy from Deng Xiaoping to Hu Jintao, Pei Yuanying, former Director General of the Department of Policy Planning at the PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Chinese ambassador to India, has identified Deng Xiaoping' s policy as "giving prominence to peace and development as the theme of our times" and Jiang Zemin's as "advocating a just and fair new

international political and economic order, advocating a new

security concept, and promoting the concept of civilization to defend world diversity." As for Hu Jintao's policy position, Ambassador Pei believes that the key signifier is "building up an image of a peace-loving, moderate but resolute, and

responsible major power," i.e., "peaceful development." - "to

overcome the deeply embedded 'victim mentality' in modern Chinese history and to develop a rational mentality as a rising power."10

problems. As a result, in April 2004, during his speech at the Boao

Forum, Hu Jintao used the words "peace" or "peaceful development"

("heping fazhan") eleven times, but did not mention the word "rise" at all.

Then, by using the expression "peaceful development" to replace the term

"peaceful rise" in his speech at the celebration of the birth centenary of

late Deng Xiaoping on August 22, 2004, Hu again stated that "China will

stick to the path of peaceful development." Hu's new articulation has set

the tone on Beijing' s official expression referring to China's new external

strategy. For the subtle change in Chinese analysts' discussion of the two

terms - "jueqi" and "fazhan", see People's Daily, "Deng's legacy still

influences China, rest of world: President Hu," August 23, 2004, p. 1, Xu

Jian, "A Peaceful Rise, China's Strategic Option," CIIS International

Studies (China Institute of International Studies), Vol. 2 (March 2004), p. 1-20, and Song Yimin, "China's Peaceful development," CIIS

International Studies, Vol. 3 (May 2004), p. 13-29. For more on the

debate, also see Medeiros, "China Debates Its 'Peaceful Rise' Strategy," and The Economist, "Peaceful rise," Jun 24, 2004, online at

http://www.economist.com/displavStorv.cfm? story id=2792533. 10

Pei Yuanying, "The Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence and Theory and Practice of China's Diplomacy in the New Era," CIIS International

Studies, Vol. 4 (July 2004), p. 6-18.




Since the end of 2003, "heping fazhan" has helped to

sum up Beijing' s goals of "good neighborliness" and "global

responsibility." The term is used primarily to reassure other

countries that China s rise in military and economic prominence will not be a threat to peace and stability, and that other

nations will benefit from China's growth. Explicit in the

doctrine is the notion that China's economic and military

development is not a zero-sum game and that China presents

opportunities rather than threats." "The contrast in tone between

Beijing and Washington, as Robert Radtke noticed, "couldn't

have been more striking. In short, China's message is, 'We' re here to help,' while the U.S. message is: 'You are either

with us or against us' ."'2

Designed to be a more effective diplomatic strategy, the

doctrine emphasizes the importance of "soft power" by trying to take the menace out of China's rapid growth. It is also

an attempt to break away from the previous Chinese foreign policy, which has been widely seen as passive and opportunistic. It presents "China's development" as part of the overall

development in Asia and in the world.13 In diplomatic practice,

u See, for example, People's Daily, "World Sees Chance as China Pursues

Peaceful Rise," June 25, 2004, online at http: //enelish.people.com.cn/

200404/26/eng20040426 141493. shtml. and "China's Peaceful Rise?A Road Chosen for Rejuvenation of a Great Nation," February 18, 2004, p.7. 12

Robert W. Radtke, "China's 'Peaceful Rise' overshadowing US influ

ence in Asia?" The Christian Science Monitor, December 8, 2003, online

at http■ //www.csmonitor.com/2003/1208/p09s01 -coop.html. 13

Western economists and financial analysts have readily provided Chinese

leaders with supporting evidence. China accounted for 21% of U.S.

export-growth in 2003 and 28% of Germany's, according to a report pub lished by Morgan Stanley in May 2004. China contributed 32% of Japan's

export growth, 36% of South Korea's and 68% of Taiwan's, the report said. "One of the lessons of the past several years is that China's growth has been good for her neighbors," says Donald Straszheim, president of

Straszheim Global in Los Angeles. See Amit Prakash, "China s imports remain strong," Bloomberg News, August 30, 2004, on line at

http: //www.iht. com/bin/print.php?file=536400. html.




the doctrine emphasizes multilateral cooperation through institutions like the Six-Party Beijing Talks and the Shanghai

Cooperation Organization. It also calls for less assertiveness

in border disputes such as those related to the Nansha (Spratly) Islands, Aksai Chin, and Diaoyudao (Senkaku).

In addition, the doctrine seeks to avoid confrontation with

the U.S. One of the motivations behind the doctrine is the

conclusion that the U.S. is not a declining power and that

for the first part of the 21st century, no alliance of powers could "constrain" U.S. actions. The other motivation behind

the doctrine is the realization that trade with America has

been and will be essential for China's economic growth. A

major element of China's "new thinking" is a recent, if

grudging, acceptance that the world is for the moment unipolar and that U.S. preponderance will persist for decades. As a

result, the "peaceful development" strategy seeks to prevent the U.S. from becoming an enemy and also tries to make it

impossible for the U.S. to follow a strategy of containment

vis-a-vis China.

Some China watchers believe that Taiwan is explicitly excluded from the doctrine - "the concept of peaceful rise

leaves Taiwan as a looming contradiction. Taiwan is the

litmus test of China's future role in global affairs."14 Others

argue that "as part of China's aim of avoiding confrontation

with the U.S., the PRC has attempted to portray itself as the

advocate of peace and stability in the Taiwan Straits, and in

contrast to practice in the 1990s, has attempted to gain the

support of the U.S. in restricting Chen Shui-bian's efforts to

further Taiwan independence."15 While the newly articulated policy of "peaceful development"

will have profound implications for Taiwan, the above

14 Medeiros, "China Debates Its 'Peaceful Rise' Strategy."

15 Willy Wo-Lap Lam, "Beijing' s Reaction to East Asia's Changing

Alliances," China Brief, Vol. 4, Issue 15 (July 22, 2004), online at http:// chechnva. iamestown. org/publications details, php? volume id=395

&issue id=3025&article id=2368295.




mentioned analyses are very much off base. On the issue of

Taiwan, Beijing does not see any "looming contradiction"

and its policy aim no longer "avoids confrontation with the

U.S." Instead, not only does Beijing consider Taiwan a

domestic affair, but it also now seems to be convinced that

Washington will never give up Taiwan as its "unsinkable

aircraft carrier" in East Asia and will continue to provide ever more substantial military and diplomatic backing to the

"separatist" Chen Shui-bian government.16 While it is true

that China does not want a military conflict of any scale with the

16 For a Chinese view, see, for example, PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs,

"What is the political intention of the U.S. Congress in passing the so

called Taiwan Relations Act?" November 15, 2002, online at

http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/lizg/3568/tl7797.htm. The official China

News Service (CNS) pointed out in July 2004 that "the focus and empha sis of America's forces have shifted to East Asia, with the eventual goal of

tackling China." The 2004 Operation Summer Pulse?unprecedented large scale series of naval and air exercises held by the U.S. and its allies

throughout the Pacific?is seen by Chinese analysts as the first salvo in the

Pentagon's go-east game plan. Chinese strategists seem to be convinced

that America's apparent efforts to use Taiwan as an "unsinkable aircraft

carrier" serve its overall goal of "maintaining Asia-Pacific stability under

U.S. domination" and that "the U.S. and Taiwan have formed a surrepti tious military alliance." See China Daily, "US drill test of new strategy," July 8,

2004, online at http: / /news, xinhuanet. com/english/2004-Q7/08/con tent 1583464.htm. 17

In his meeting with U.S. National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice in

July 2004, Foreign Minister Li Zhaoxiong has demanded "three stops"? the U.S. "to stop selling advanced arms to Taiwan, stop all official

engagement with Taiwan, and stop offering Taiwan its assistance in gain

ing representation in international organizations where statehood is

required." Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao made the similar remarks during their

separate meetings with the U.S. Senate delegation in August 2004. See

John Ruwitch, "China warns of military clash with Taiwan," Reuters, July

30, 2004, online at http: / /www, reuters. co.uk/news PackageArticle.jhtml?

tvpe=worldNews&storyID=556502&section=news. And Joy Su, "Rice's

China visit restated old policies, lacked new ideas," Taipei Times, July 11,

2004, p.3. Also see Flu Xiao, "PLA vows to crush Taiwan separatism," China Daily, August 2, 2004, p. 1, and China Daily, "US urged to heed Taiwan promises," August 5, 2004, p.l.



CHINESE FOREIGN POLICY IN TRANSITION: UNDERSTANDING CHINA'S *PEACEFUL 83

U.S., Beijing recently has made a quiet but important shift

in its Taiwan policy.17 In July 2004, the CCP Central Committee

and the Central Military Commission issued what was believed

to be the first ultimatum to reclaim sovereignty over the island

and discussed a timetable regarding using force to achieve

Taiwan's reunification? "Taiwan must re-enter the Chinese

fold or face military action in the next 20 years."18 What is significant is Beijing now sees that "China's

peaceful development will be affected by the Taiwan issue, so the issue cannot drag on indefinitely," as a long article

in the People's Daily revealed recently, going on to say that:

"while the timetable has been crystallized, the solution of the

Taiwan issue is now set forth by the mainland on its own

initiative. This is a reflection of the adjustment of our Taiwan

policy. This adjustment is well-timed. It conforms to the

present central task of containing 'Taiwan independence' and

runs parallel with the national policies of focusing on peaceful

development and seizing strategic opportunity to develop the

mainland itself first. Our 'timetable for reunification' serves

as a circle drawn for Taiwan separatists - it is like the center

of Buddha's palm, we would like to see whether you dare, and can jump out of it."19 In short, Beijing now is ready to

take the solution of the Taiwan issue into its own hands while

not expecting any support from Washington. It views

"reunification" both as a component of as well as a necessary

step in achieving its goal of "peaceful development."20

18 See Agence France Presse, "PRC Says Ready to Attack Taiwan within

20 Years," July 16, 2004, online at http 1 //taiwansecuritv.org/AFP/2004/ AFP-160704.htm. and Goh Sui Noi, "China attack within 20 years 'possi ble' ," The Straits Times, July 16 2004, online at http: //straitstimes. asial.

com.sgZeveoneastasia/ story/0.4395.261675.00.html. 19

People's Daily, "China sets clear timetable for solving Taiwan issue,"

July 28, 2004, online at http://englishl.people.com.cn/200407/28/

eng20040728 151134.html. 20

As Tang Leijun argues, "Taiwan may not understand that Beijing now

regards reunification as the basis of further economic development, state

power and national security." Tang Leijun, "US, Taiwan military exercises




"peaceful development'' in its implementation

Although few perceptions of the Hu-Wen foreign policy team existed in the international arena before they emerged onto the world stage in March 2003,21 China's new leadership has quickly unveiled a "kinder and gentler" platform with a

series of actions to advance its policy of "peaceful development."

Beijing' s new diplomatic practices have become increasingly

sophisticated, confident, and skillful on a rapidly expanding list of regional and international issues. At least seven policy initiatives in China's new "peaceful development" thrust have

become discernible.

Image Building

For most of the period sincel949, China had been a

largely reactive power and had acted with near total disregard of how its image played both at home and abroad. Beijing

hopes that the world will no longer view China as either a victim in the international arena or an irresponsible and self centered regional power, but rather as a major and respected country which is an active and important member of the

multilateral community, and a constructive and responsible

player. China's new leaders appear to be learning the importance

of image building and clearly see international acceptance as

a way to enhance their domestic legitimacy. At the CCP 16th

power and national security." Tang Leijun, "US, Taiwan military exercises

ominous signals," Asia Times Online, July 29, 2004, online at http: / /

www.atimes.com/atimes/ China/FG29Ad04.html. 21

Following the confirmation of Hu Jintao as president in March 2003, he

has taken the helm of the CCP's Leading Group on Foreign Affairs

(LGFA) - China's top policy - decision organ on foreign and security mat

ters. The five members who belong to the group are Vice-President Zeng

Qinghong, Vice-Premier Wu Yi, State Councilor Tang Jiaxuan, and

Foreign Minister Li Zhaoxing.




Congress, media representatives were given unprecedented access to some of the proceedings. New Chinese leaders were

treating the cameras, particularly those with the logos of

foreign broadcast networks, more as allies than intruders.

Since the summer of 2003, there has been a new campaign to publicize and promote China's foreign policy. Accordingly, more government white papers on controversial foreign policy

topics have been issued-all published on the internet

(www, china, org, cn) - so as to articulate and defend Beijing' s

positions. As Beijing begins to interact more intensely with

the international press, senior Chinese leaders have also started

promoting their country's policies through an ever-increasing number of trips abroad.22

Projecting favorable international images has become an

important part of the "peaceful development" policy. A careful

reading of Chinese policy statements and academic writings reveal the following themes:

1. "peace-loving" - references to the opposition of the use

of force, with the exception of Taiwan

2. "developing country" - references to China as a developing

economy and China's unity with Third World countries

3. "international cooperator" - references to multilateral

cooperation, support of international organizations and

international treaties

4. "independent actor" - references to Chinese foreign policy as being autonomous

22 To promote China's policies through frequent trips abroad began with

Jiang Zemin, Li Peng, and Zhu Rongji, who traveled to most of the conti

nents and especially to other parts of Asia. Their successors are even more

internationally oriented and have spent far more time abroad. According to

People's Daily's statistics, the new members of the Politburo Standing Committee made over 70 overseas trips in the last two years. See People's

Daily, "Ling Dao Ren Huo Dong(Leaders' Activities)," online at http• //

www, people, com, cn/item/ldhd/zbhome. html.




5. "major power" - references to China as an aspiring great

power, China's growing national strength, and rising international status

6. "human rights and democracy" - references to "people

centered" (or "put people first") development and poli cies

From this list, one can see both change and continuity in

the images of China projected by the new leadership. From the

perspective of continuity, the new leadership has continued

though with a very different level of enthusiasm - to project the images of China as an independent actor and a developing

country. Conversely, from the perspective of discontinuity, the Jiang Zemin-era saw the government emphasizing the

image of China as an opponent of hegemony. Now the new

leadership has all but abandoned such an image. Instead it

has focused unprecedented emphasis on the images of China as a peace-loving nation, an international cooperator, a

responsible major power, and an advocate of human rights. These projected images have a real impact on Chinese

foreign policy. For example, China under ex-president

Jiang Zemin and ex-premier Zhu Rongji astounded the world with its economic growth, reflected by a substantial

increase in GDP year after year. However, the current

leadership is making it clear that it has a somewhat different

emphasis. The new leadership has presented itself as a

more "caring" government and advocated what it calls a

concept of "yiren weiben" ("people-centered") development. Instead of blindly focusing on GDP growth, the emphasis is on "put people first" development. And they have

officially made it clear that the "people-centered principle" has practical applications. In foreign policy, for example,

Foreign Minister Li Zhaoxing made strong representations to the U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell in July 2004

regarding the assault on a Chinese tourist at Niagara Falls.

Li, according to the Chinese media, had done so at the




behest of President Hu.23 So "concerned" is the Chinese

leadership over human rights, the Chinese Foreign Ministry announced, that: "President Hu Jintao has instructed Chinese

embassies around the world that they have to do everything

they can to protect Chinese citizens overseas."24

Regional First: "China Is Asia's Today"

China's grand design for its "peaceful development" starts

at the regional level, where Beijing seeks to reassert its

traditional leadership role as a "virtuous leader." Despite its

global aspirations, Beijing is focusing its interests in the Asia

Pacific region; strengthening bilateral diplomacy, developing "constructive partnerships of cooperation," and participating in regional multilateral organizations are three main mechanisms

in China's "regional first" policy. China's long-standing preference has been for bilateral

diplomacy. However, Beijing' s newfound confidence in

promoting bilateral relations with other Asian countries on

the basis of "mutual understanding, mutual accommodation, and mutual adjustment" and a recognition that economic

interests are the driving force in bilateral ties represent a

departure from the ideological alliance and opportunism that

prevailed earlier in Chinese foreign policy. In its bilateral

ties, China now seeks to "chaoyue yishi xingtai yinsu" ("go

beyond ideological considerations") and "chao tuo" ("be detached from concrete events"). In October 2003, Wen Jiabao

23 The tourist, a 37-year-old businesswoman from Tianjin named Zhao

Yan, had been pepper-sprayed and beaten by a US border inspector. 24

PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Li Zhaoxing Talks Over Telephone with U.S. Secretary of State," July 26, 2004, online at http://www.fmprc.

gov, cn/eng/zxxx/t 144064. htm. In principle, attaching value to human life

is important and the Hu-Wen leadership deserves praise for doing so.

However, if Beijing now is serious about the welfare of Chinese citizens

and if "yiren weiben" means anything, there is a great deal that remains to

be done and Beijing has to "walk the talk."




put forward a "four-point" proposal in furthering China's

bilateral ties: "keeping frequent exchanges of high-level visits;

deepening trade and economic cooperation; setting up effective

cooperation mechanisms; and eliminating barriers hindering the growth in bilateral relations."25

Since the start of the Hu-Wen administration in 2003, China's policies toward Asian neighbors, with the exception of Japan and Taiwan, have become more flexible. China is

on the verge of settling most of its border disputes.26 In recent

years, China has progressively stepped up its involvement in

regional security arrangements. China has deepened its

engagement on regional cooperation and security dialogue with its Southeast Asian neighbors through the ASEAN

Regional Forum (ARF) and the ASEAN+3 and ASEAN+1

processes. The "judicious regionalism" in Chinese foreign

policy has enhanced China's strategic position in the region and increased its influence over the region's political and security

dynamics. A recent example of Beijing' s decision to pursue its

"regional first' policy is China's new policy stance on the

North Korea nuclear crisis. Since the revelation of Pyongyang's enriched-uranium development program in October 2002, China has been under pressure to play an active role in

tackling the intensified nuclear crisis on the Korean Peninsula.

However, for almost ten months, Beijing maintained a seemingly indifferent posture on the issue. In the summer of 2003, the

new Chinese leadership suddenly changed its hitherto passive

position and began to play an "instrumental role" in brokering the six-nation talks. As proved by its efforts in hosting the

Beijing talks, China has adopted, and accepted, the idea of

25 Cited in China Daily, "China-EU links provide mutual benefit,"

November 1, 2003, online at http• //www2.chinadailv.com.cn/chinagate/ doc/2003-11/01/content 277917.htm. 26

The dispute with India is the only one that remains to be settled, but

China's new leadership is taking a proactive position in resolving this last

remaining dispute.




multilateral talks as the fundamental formula for a peaceful solution of the North Korea nuclear crisis. Beijing' s changed attitude on the issue showed China's new position regarding

regional affairs-as one of the major regional powers, China

is ready and capable of playing a decisive role. At the post China-ROK summit press conference on July 7, 2003, when

questioned regarding Beijing' s willingness and ability to play a more active role in inducing Pyongyang to partake in

multilateral talks, Hu made it clear that China "supports multilateral dialogue to peacefully resolve the problem on the

peninsula. And there is effective communications (changtong de qudao) at work between Beijing and Pyongyang."27

Hu's words of confidence were backed up by a series of

bold actions, including suspending crucial oil shipments to

the DPRK, sending high-level envoys to Pyongyang, Seoul,

Moscow, and Washington, and shifting troops around the

Sino-Korean border. China's attempts to get North Korea to

talk with the U.S. to resolve the nuclear crisis represents a

departure from its traditional "buck-passing" approach to the

regional conflict, and a wider transformation in Chinese foreign

policy. China has no intention to "help" the U.S. What Beijing

wants is to draw a comprehensive "Korean Peninsula road

map" and to play a prominent role in Northeast Asia. For

Beijing, the building blocks with which it can assemble a

road map are the following. The first is to press Washington and Pyongyang to agree on "face saving" language that would

provide a framework for future negotiations. Then what China

wants is a U.S. non-aggression assurance provided for North

Korea, co-sponsored by China. The third is a Chinese and

Russian informal or formal security guarantee for North Korea

and fourth, new South Korean and Japanese economic aid

27 Agcnce France-Presse, "South Korea and China Vow to Bring North

Korea to Multilateral Table," July 8, 2003, online at http: //www.nti.org/ db/china/koreachr.htm#2003.




for North Korea. The goals of a Beijing "road map" would

be, in effect, twofold: first, to facilitate the transformation

of North Korea into a large economic development zone for

China's economic development and a stable buffer state for

China's national security, rather than an assembly line for

weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles and second, to reduce the American influence in South Korea and to create

a strategically neutralized Korean Peninsula. From China's

point of view, whether or not the six nations can agree on

how to stop Pyongyang's nuclear program, the talks have

produced at least one breakthrough: the emergence of China

as a more confident major power broker in the region.

Multilateralism (Not Multipolarization)

Traditionally, China has little experience with or faith in

multilateralism. ?China's peripheral involvement in multilateral

mechanisms is indicative of its commitment to sovereignty. Like

many Asian countries, national sovereignty has been sacrosanct

for China, a necessary condition for international order.? For

this reason, Beijing tended to view the world as a collection

of nation-states and did not want to understand the constraints

that multilateral institutions can place on national sovereignty and decision-making.?

As China is expanding the number and depth of its bilateral

relationships, Chinese foreign policy has also come increasingly to stress the importance of not bilateralizing issues that could

more productively be addressed multilaterally. In the past several years, China has moved to build a consensus supportive of its policies internationally and seek remedies through international organizations and cooperation. As James Muldoon

observed, "China's cooperation underscores a permanent shift

in Chinese foreign policy towards multilateralism and a striking self-confidence of Chinese diplomacy."28

28 James P. Muldoon, Jr., "The Impact of 9/11 on Chinese Regional




Here, however, one sees a subtle yet significant difference

between the third and fourth generations of Chinese leaders.

Jiang Zemin had feverishly advocated a foreign policy of

"multilateralism." What Jiang had in mind, however, was

"multipolarization (duojihua)," a term one encountered frequently in official Chinese foreign policy pronouncements during

Jiang's presidency.? For Jiang, duojihua was aimed to

"multipolarize" the American unipolarity and to counter

balance U.S. preponderance, hence a world of multipolarity.29 The new Chinese foreign policy team, however, has quietly

abandoned Jiang's duojihua focus and replaced it with a

standpoint of "multilateralism" (doubian zhuyi), which is

softer than "multipolarization." Such change implies real policy

prescription. "Multipolarity" implies a world order where

countries balance against the prevailing power; whereas the

notion of multilateralism means a kind of foreign policy where

even in a world dominated by a single power, other countries

can still play their role.

Under such a policy line, it is quite remarkable that China

has begun to take a less confrontational and more sophisticated multilateral approach and work hard within the multilateral

frameworks to address its concerns. Beijing not only has

become increasingly involved with regional forums such as

the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and since 2003, worked

hard to reestablish the importance of the Shanghai Cooperation

Organization (SCO),30 and taken a more active role in

Security Cooperation," China Brief, Vol. 4, Issue 12 (June 10, 2004),

online at http://www.iamestown.org/images/pdf/cb 004 012.pdf. 29

In a major year-end piece in December 2001, People's Daily had sum

marized China's most important foreign policy accomplishment in 2001 as

"actively pushing forward global multipolarization." People's Daily, "Yearender: China's Diplomacy Fruitful," December 26, 2001, online at

http://english.people.com. cn/200112/25/ eng20011225 87404.shtml. 30

Since September 11, Washington's priorities have changed in Central

Asia and it has established bilateral agreements with SCO's member

states, which to some extent has diminished the organization's relevance.




international institutions such as the United Nations Security Council, it has also taken a more responsible approach to

weapons control, greatly increased its participation in peacekeeping

operations, tried to engage with the European Union and

NATO-a departure from the previous practice of criticizing American-led alliances - and even begun to promote initiatives

on security issues in forums in which the United States plays a major role.31 As Evan Medeiros and M. Taylor Fravel wrote, "China's active participation in international institutions creates

more chances to elicit cooperation on key issues. Moreover, China now brings more resources and influence to the table.

As the nation's stake in the international community expands and it associates itself with great-power interests, China is

gradually becoming more involved in efforts to combat global

security threats, both traditional and nontraditional."32

To show his serious commitment to an approach of

multilateralism, for example, Hu Jintao became the first Chinese leader to accept an invitation by the G7 to attend

the discussion between the G7 and major developing countries

in 2003. He accepted the invitation his predecessor, Jiang Zemin, refused. As Hu told the leaders of the industrialized

world, "China wants to develop its dialogue with the G7.

China's leaders would like to utilize the opportunities to meet

with the heads of state of the G7 and establish friendly,

personal relationships with them."33

31 For example, ARF, where the US and Japan are said to have a dominate

role. At the 2003 ASEAN summit, Chinese Foreign Minister Li Zhaoxing

proposed to form a conference to increase communication among Asian

militaries, under ARF. Then, in November 2004, China hosted the first

ARF Security Policy Conference (ASPC) in Beijing. Senior defense offi cials from 24 states, including North Korea, attended the Beijing confer

ence. 32

Evan S. Medeiros and M. Taylor Fravel, "China's New Diplomacy,"

Foreign Affairs, November/ December 2003, online at http://www. for

eign affairs, org/20031101 faessav82604/evan-s-medeiros-m-tavlor-fravel/

china-s-new-diplomacv. html. 33

Cited in Yu Yongding, "G20 and China: A Chinese Perspective," paper




"Soft Power" as the "Customer of Choice"

As a policy of multilateralism with a new regionalism dimension has become evident in China's foreign policy, it

has been underpinned by a parallel shift in emphasis on China's "soft power." From a Chinese view, even if its stature in the world has risen considerably, its military prowess still

lags far behind that of the United States and its political clout

clearly cannot match that wielded by Washington. The new Chinese leadership seems to have learned that although China

today is a "rising" great power, it remains an incomplete

power in a rapidly changing world where soft sources of

power are becoming increasingly important, and until China

can close the gap between its hard and soft power, China's

future as a "complete" great power will remain uncertain. As a result, Beijing now hopes that China's rising economic

power will result in increasing China's cultural clout and

political influence, especially when the vast Chinese market

becomes a testing ground and launching pad for new innovative

markets worldwide. With "things Chinese" becoming a la mode internationally, China is banking on its "soft power"

increasing accordingly. As Chen Guangzhao of the People's Liberal Daily writes, "The legitimacy of China's peaceful rise derives from its soft power. Soft power reflects China' s economic strength and its international influence. The rise of 'soft power in turn will promote the development of

China's 'hard power' ,"34

In China's case, soft power tends to suggest a respect

presented at the Conference on G-20 Architecture in 2020, Int' 1

Development Research Centre, Ottawa, February 29, 2004, online at

http: //64.233.161.104/search?q=cacheI gX6SEX Vlt 1M J: www, cigionline. c a/v.2/conf docs/g20.Ottawa. vongding.pdf+%22the + G7+summit%

22+hu+Jintao&hl=en.

online at http: //english. pladailv. com, cn/english/pladailv/2004/03/09/ 20040309001023 ChinaMilitarv News.html.




of, or fascination with China's recent economic success - and

an accrual of clout as a result. As David Hale and Lyric

Hughes Hale wrote, "Thanks to dramatic progress in technology,

transportation, and communications systems, China will wield

far more power in the global economy the next time it peaks than it did on the eve of Europe's Industrial Revolution-••

Beijing now has 'soft power' and growing diplomatic clout

to buttress its economic and political strength. China is also

better prepared to be a world leader, because its new elite

is not isolated from the Western world, as were preceding Chinese leaders."35

For Beijing, 2003 was a banner year for China's "soft

power" diplomacy. As Robert Marquand noticed, "The year 2003 has been marked by a steady Chinese expansion in Asia

and abroad not only of economic clout, but of something akin to 'soft power'

- a concept often associated with the US

superpower's influence, due to its size, culture, and other

nonmilitary verities. Take the unprecedented reception granted in Paris to China's new leader, Hu Jintao. The Eiffel tower

is lit a flaming red at night, and the famed Champs-Elysees was the site of a 54-float China parade led by the longest

dragon in the world. It was the first time the French have

given over their two best known venues to honor another

single state. But it is not just the French that are currently

ga-ga over things Chinese. Much of the corridor talk at the

Davos Economic Forum in Switzerland focused on China's

global economic dynamics. The soft power attractiveness of

China cannot help but change the world, especially in Asia.

Beijing has moved adroitly on nearly every part of the Asian

chessboard to improve relations."36

35 David Hale and Lyric Hughes Hale, "China Takes Off," Foreign Affairs,

November/December 2003, online at http: / /www, theodora. com/wfb2003

/china/china takes off.html. 36

Robert Marquand, "China's banner year felt abroad," Christian Science

Monitor, January 27, 2004, online at http • / /www, csmonitor. com/2004/

0127/ p06s01-woap.html.




Indeed, Beijing has made the clearest strides in its own

Asian backyard with "smile diplomacy," calling for "more

confidence, greater cooperation." Beijing reached out to

Southeast Asian nations, offering the ASEAN states a special

relationship with China and agreed on a declaration for a code

of conduct for the South China Sea and joined ASEAN's Treaty of Amity and Cooperation.

In addition, China has conceded trade surpluses to its

Asian neighbors in line with the principle of "give more, take

less." These trade surpluses are funneling economic growth to the smaller countries, thus confirming China as the heart

of the Asian economy today. In Thailand, Prime Minister

Thaksin Shinawatra is considering building a pipeline across

the southern Isthmus of Kra that would give China quicker access to Middle East oil. In Malaysia, where exports of gas,

palm oil and mid-range electronics to China have soared, the

new Prime Minister, Abdullah Badawi, chose to make his

first overseas visit to China, accompanied by an entourage of 800 business executives. One of China's most successful

moments came in fall 2003 at the Asia-Pacific Economic

Cooperation summit in Bangkok. Hu Jintao's message of

Asian solidarity and Chinese investment in the region and

his call for a free-market zone in Southeast Asia by 2010

caught the Japanese so off-guard that Tokyo immediately called for Japan's first ASEAN mini-summit in December to

create Japan's own bilateral free-trade ties. As Vietnamese

leaders' current economic reforms are inspired by China's,

Beijing is also trying hard to become a "brotherly example" to Hanoi, just as it had been culturally in the past.

Utilizing its diplomatic "soft power," motorized by trade, economic cooperation, and people-to-people exchanges,37 China

37 Tourism professionals across Europe and Asia are gearing up to wel

come a new generation of Chinese travelers. The number of travelers out

bound from China reached 16 million in the first seven months of 2004,

soaring 63.7 percent from the same period in 2003. In 2003, the number of




in the last couple of years not only recorded success with

countries in Europe, Southeast, South, and Central Asia, but

also with a country like Australia, America's staunchest ally in the region. Such a "turnabout," according to Paul Dibb, former Australian deputy defense secretary, "has important political implications for Australia. We are the closest U.S.

ally in the region and its second most important ally in the

world, after Britain. But China is becoming of immense economic importance to Australia. It is now our second

largest export market and is set to become our biggest trade

partner by the end of this decade. Australia and China now

talk about building up a bilateral 'strategic partnership.' On

the surface, that seems primarily to be about providing secure

and stable resource and energy supplies for China. But the

subterranean agenda may be that Beijing requires Canberra

to have more of a realpolitik approach to the changing geopolitical map of Asia, and the inevitable rise of China to

power. In fact, Canberra is already working with Beijing' s

"subterranean agenda." In August 2004, Australian Foreign Minister Alexander Downer, during his China visit, praised

Beijing' s "pragmatism" and after talks with Wen Jiabao,

Chinese traveling abroad surpassed that of Japan, making it the largest in

Asia. See Xinhua News Agency, "Chinese Outbound Travel Soars

63.7%," September 17, 2004, online at http• //www.china.org.cn/eng

lish/2004/Sep/107371. htm. As the Chinese economy continues to grow, the number of Chinese tourists heading overseas is expected to grow to

100 million by 2020. Hotels, restaurants and shops in Europe and Asia are

rolling out the red carpet for the influx of Chinese tourists with their huge

spending clout. Patricia Tartour of French tour operator Maison de la

Chine sums it up: "Our industry is really aware of this new market and

waiting for them as if they were Santa Claus." For a detailed report, see

The Straits Times, "Europe learns to say ni hao," September 1, 2004, online at http: //www, straitstimes.com/asia/story/0.4386.270331.00.html. 38

Paul Dibb, "On Taiwan, the status quo remains our best bet," The

Australian, August 27, 2004, online at http://www.theaustralian. news.com.au/.




suggested that "in any war over Taiwan the ANZUS treaty does not automatically trigger Australia's involvement."39

"Downer," says Paul Kelly of The Australian, "just told the

truth. It was a blunder over Taiwan because it was made

public-that meant it disturbed the Americans, provoked the

Taiwanese and left the Chinese more complacent about

extracting concessions from Australia. If Australia were ever

to exercise its own autonomy to say 'no' under ANZUS, then that moment would arise in relation to Taiwan. That

such a pro-American foreign minister as Downer ruminates

this way proves the point. This is a powerful recognition that

China is becoming more important to Australia. The trend

will continue."40

"From the mines of Newman in Australia - an outpost of

3,000 in a corner of the outback otherwise dotted with

eucalyptus and kangaroos-to the prized forests of Myanmar," Jane Perlez writes, "China's rapid growth is sucking up resources and pulling the region's varied economies in its

wake. For now, China's presence mostly translates into money, and the doors it opens-•• But more and more, China is

leveraging its economic clout to support its political preferences.

Beijing is pushing for regional political and economic groupings it can dominate. It is dispersing aid and, in ways not seen

before, pressing countries to fall in line on its top foreign

policy priority: its claim over Taiwan."41

In studying Chinese foreign policy today, one should not

underestimate its "soft power" component. As Robert Ross

acknowledged recently, "Over the years, I have looked at

39 Cited in Guo Nei, "Australia backs 'one-China' policy on Taiwan,"

China Daily, August 16, 2004, p. 2. 40

Paul Kelly, "Balancing act required for Beijing," The Australian, August

25, 2004, online at http://www.theaustralian.news.com.au/common/

story page/ 0.5744.10556622%255E12250.00.html. 41

Jane Perlez, "Powered by trade, China gains political strength," International Herald Tribune, August 28, 2004, on line at

http://www.iht.com/bin/print. php?file=536237.html.




China's rising power and I believe that I have discounted its

importance. This is largely because I have considered China's

force-on-force balance with the U.S., and it appears to be

falling behind. There are other force-on-force balances of

power which are more relevant."42

"Petroleum Diplomacy"

Just 10 years ago, as the world's fifth-largest oil producer, China was self-sufficient in oil and was a net exporter. Now,

imports account for more than one-third of Chinese oil

consumption and China is expected to double its need for

imported oil between now and 2010. With 1.3 billion people, a phenomenal rate of economic growth, and an insatiable

consumer demand for cars, China already has overtaken Japan in 2003 as the world's second biggest importer of oil. And

its appetite is huge and growing. As Daniel Yergin of

Cambridge Energy Research puts it, "China has gone from

being a minor player in world commodity markets to being the decisive dynamic factor today. In terms of oil, 40 percent of the entire growth in oil demand since 2000 has been (due to) China."43 By 2025, China is expected to import as much

oil as the U.S. does today.44 China's growth in oil consumption

42 Robert Ross, "The Rise of China and the New Balance of Power in East

Asia," March 3, 2004, online at http• //web.mit.edu/ssp/spring04/ ross.htm. Some high-level American diplomats are warning the Bush

administration that the U.S. is losing its once invulnerable position in

Asia. James Kelly, in an unusually blunt testimony before Congress in

June 2004, listed Beijing' s "aggressive diplomatic moves" and said they were being used to strengthen China's political gains. 43

Cited in NY Newsday, "1.3 billion reasons to worry about oil," August

28, 2004, online at http: //www, newsdav.com/news/opinion/nv. 44

Another study projects that China's energy consumption will equal that

of all the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries combined by the year 2020. See Nandakumar J, "India,

China and energy security," Asia Times Online, February 7, 2004, online

at http://www.atimes. com/atimes/China/FB07Ad0S.html.




is now running close to 8 percent a year, some analysts estimate that China will need to import some 60 percent of

its oil by 2020.45

The gap between China's domestic oil supply and demand

means that Beijing must abandon its traditional goal of energy

self-sufficiency. Though China is planning to maintain production of about 3.1 billion barrels a day, depending only on domestic

oil reserves will not be a long-term practical option.46 Moreover, China's plans for the establishment of a Strategic Petroleum

Reserve to store up to 18 million tons of oil will keep its

energy imports increasing for the future. China's increasing

energy imports are a matter of great concern to both the

Chinese government, which seeks to ensure that China has

the energy resources it needs to sustain economic growth, and Western and Asian leaders, who are worried about the

strategic implications of China's quest for energy security.

Officially, according to Foreign Minister Li Zhaoxing, "The impact of oil resources will not be large enough to

affect China's foreign policy." "Oil and natural gas are strategic resources for China and the country imports a large quantity of oil every year," Li said, "but China has long ago made

preparations to diversify its importation channels."47 The new

leadership, however, also recognizes that "energy issues are central to China's economic security and sustainable development.

Accelerating development has now caused China's extensive

45 See Erica Strecker Downs, China's Quest for Energy Security (Santa

Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, 2000), p. 1. 46

As the world's second largest consumer of petroleum products in 2003, with total demand of 5.56 million barrels per day (bbl/d), China's oil demand is projected by U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA) to

reach 12.8 million bbl/d by 2025, with net imports of 9.4 million bbl/d. See EIA, "China Country Analysis Briefs," July 2004, online at

http: / / www, eia. doe, gov/emeu/cabs/china, html. 47

Xinhua News Agency, "China's foreign policy not to be influenced by oil: Chinese FM," March 6, 2003, online at http://news.xinhuanet.com/

english/2003-Q3/06/content 762454.htm.




shortage of energy, which may worsen before 2020."48

China's expectation of growing future dependence on oil

imports has brought it to acquire interests in exploration and

production in places like Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Russia,

Venezuela, Sudan, Iraq, Iran, Peru, and Indonesia. And energy has undoubtedly become an important factor in the transformation

of relations between China, Russia and energy-rich Central

Asian and Latin American states. Given their closeness and

accessibility through pipelines, Siberia's energy resources start

to be one of the major priorities for China in bilateral ties

with Russia.49 The west-east pipeline, which is to be built

from Kazakhstan to Xinjiang and then to Shanghai, will bring the energy from Kazakhstan to China's east coast. China has

been keen to develop its access to Central Asian energy resources, especially focusing on deepening relations with

Kazakhstan - China's major entry point to access Central Asian

energy. In Moscow, China inked an oil deal worth $150 billion (starting in 2005 for 25 years), and in Astana, Hu

and Kazak President Nursultan Nazarbayev agreed to revitalize

a 3,200-km pipeline project between the two countries and

increase trade from $2 billion to $5 billion over the next two

years. Overall, four policy objectives have become central to

China's energy security - the maximization of domestic output

of oil, diversification of the sources of oil purchased through international markets, investment in overseas oil resources, and construction of the infrastructure to bring this oil to

China.50

In policy terms, China does not want its rapidly rising

48 People's Daily, "Severe energy shortage warned," June 13, 2004, online

at http: //english.peopledailv. com, cn/200406 / 13/eng20040613 146171.html. 49

Russia now is shipping 400,000 barrels per day of crude oil through an

overland pipeline to Daqing in northeast China. 50

For a detailed analysis of China's energy security policy, see Roland

Dannreuther, Asian security and China's energy needs, International

Relations of the Asia-Pacific, Volume 3 (2003), p. 197~219




demand for imported energy to be seen as a cause for alarm.

Instead, China hopes that its increasing involvement in global

energy markets can be seen as an opportunity to enhance

cooperation rather than as a threat. In August 2004, Beijing reacted with unusual restraint to Vietnam's announced plans to begin regular commercial flights to Spratly Island and

indicated its willingness to reach an accommodation on the

issue with Hanoi.51 In September 2004, Hu Jintao and his

Philippine counterpart Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo agreed at

talks in Beijing to launch a three-year joint research project to study the potential for oil deposits in the South China Sea.

Despite its efforts to diversify its sources, however, China

has become increasingly dependent on Middle East oil. Today, 58% of China's oil imports come from the region. By 2015, the share of Middle East oil will stand on 70%. Though

historically China has had no long-standing strategic interests

in the Middle East, its relationship with the region from where

most of its oil comes is becoming increasingly important.52 With almost 60% of its oil imports coming from the Middle

East, China can no longer afford to sit on the sidelines of

the tumultuous region. China is a relative newcomer to the Middle East; unlike

other great powers, it has never played a major role in the

region. In recent years, however, Beijing has emerged from

its seclusion, forging significant ties with almost all of the

oil-rich states. Trade data for the past few years reveal that

China has increased its exports to the Middle East at a much

51 The Spratly Islands are surrounded by potential gas and oil deposits and

are claimed in their entirety by China, Taiwan, and Vietnam, while por tions are claimed by Malaysia and the Philippines. About 50 islands are

occupied by China, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Vietnam. Brunei is also a claimant but has no outposts. 52

Some Chinese specialists contend that the Asia-Pacific region's depend ence on Middle East oil may exceed 90% by 2010. See Institute for the

Analysis of Global Security, "Energy Security in East Asia," Energy

SecurityiAugust 2004), online at http: //www.iags.org/n0813042.htm#3.




faster rate than other major powers. Between 1998 and 2003, China's exports to the region climbed 38%.53 China's other

way of forming a footprint in the Middle East has been

through providing technology and components for weapons to regimes of the oil-rich states. Beijing has already supplied ballistic missiles to Syria and plied Libya with missile

technology. Iran, now the second largest supplier of China's

oil, has become a particularly important trading partner of

China. But China's main target in the region is Saudi Arabia, China's number-one foreign supplier of crude oil. Sino-Saudi bilateral trade increased from less than $300 million in 1990 to well over $5 billion in 2002, with the Chinese side running a large deficit of almost $1.8 billion. China has also begun to engage in military commerce with Riyadh. In addition to

selling Riyadh 36 intermediate-range ballistic missiles, Beijing has also helped to build two missile bases south of the Saudi

capital, and deployed Chinese security personnel to maintain them. Politically, high-level visits of Chinese leaders to Saudi Arabia have culminated in a pronounced "strategic oil partnership" between Beijing and Riyadh.

China's recent shift from a net oil exporter to a net oil

importer, with the lion's share of its imports coming from one major source? the Middle East, is a matter of great concern to China's new leaders, who regard oil imports as

a strategic vulnerability. While the new leadership does not

necessarily see that a future struggle over vital petroleum resources must be won by force of arms and is searching for

a level-headed and cooperative strategy of energy security for China, Beijing is also concerned about Washington's

attempt to dominate the world's energy sectors. The Gulf

Wars have sent a strong message to China of the danger of

its heavy dependency on Middle East oil and the growing

53 See Nader Habibi, "US pays a price for its politics," Asia Times Online,

August 25, 2004, online at http: //www. atimes. com/atimes/Middle East/

FH25Ak03.html.




influence of the U.S. in that region. In this regard, Beijing views the U.S. as the primary threat to China's energy

security. Whether China's high-profile international energy security

activities are likely to be successful remain to be seen. For

example, it is doubtful whether many of Beijing' s proposed

pipelines will be built and China's overseas oil concessions

probably will not yield enough oil to come close to matching China's needs over the next two decades. Consequently, China

will probably remain reliant on oil from the Middle East and

thus, subject to U.S. power for its energy (in) security. It

is important to note, however, that China's "petroleum

diplomacy" has been a new and significant factor in explaining

Beijing' s strategic engagement with the energy-rich countries

in the former Soviet Union, Central and Southeast Asia, Latin

America, and the Middle East. And China's growing political and strategic alliances with Middle Eastern oil-producing states

could potentially cause some serious tensions between Beijing and Washington.

"Without Reunification There is no Peace" - Preparation for

an Asymmetric War over Taiwan

For now, Beijing' s ambitions are neither global nor

ideological; rather they are national and regional in scope,

focusing on the assertion of sovereignty over Taiwan. The

real issue is whether China is prepared to act on those

ambitions in a way that would elicit a forceful U.S. response.

Washington could hardly object to a peaceful incorporation of Taiwan on terms satisfactory to both the Chinese and

Taiwanese, even though it would significantly increase China's

economic and latent military power. However, will China be

prepared to use force to seek to reclaim Taiwan?

To be sure, by any rational calculation, China-now and

for the foreseeable future - would be foolish to risk war with

the U.S. over the future of Taiwan. Yet, as noted, Beijing




now sees "reunification" as a component of as well as a

necessary step in its "peaceful development" strategy, and

China s nationalism could easily become an enemy of strategic

prudence. Moreover, in a fight over Taiwan, China sees an

important advantage over the U.S. - a Chinese willingness to

sacrifice. The future of Taiwan can never be as important to

the U.S. as it is to China. China is prepared-as was the

case in Korea-to absorb a much higher level of casualties

than would the U.S. According to a March 2004 opinion

poll, conducted by the Social Survey Institute of China, a

government-affiliated public opinion research group, asking 2,150 Chinese from 12 provinces and cities regarding the

issue of Taiwan independence, an overwhelming majority said

they "resolutely" opposed independence for Taiwan and close

to half said they believed in using force to achieve reunification, even at the risk of war with the U.S.54 Consequently, as

Jeffery Record of the U.S. Air War College pointed out, "The Chinese are not afraid to threaten or use force, even in

circumstances in which the objective military balance is

weighted heavily against them, as it was in Korea in 1950

and the Taiwan Strait in 1996. Indeed, the Chinese appear to believe that military weakness requires a superior will to

use force."55

As a result, China's leaders believe that it is possible that America, although technologically superior in almost

every area of military power, can be defeated in a fight over

Taiwan in which China controls the timing. So China is

dedicating considerable resources toward preparing for a

military conflict with the U.S. over Taiwan. In such a conflict, China almost certainly would avoid challenging American

54 Cited in Goh Sui Noi, "Chinese see vote as a front for independence

bid," The Straits Times, March 17, 2004, online at http://straitstimes. asial. com, sg/asia/storv/0.4386.240632-1079560740.00. html. 55

Jeffery Record, "Thinking about China and War," Aerospace Power

Journal, Vol. XV, No. 4 (Winter 2001), online at http://www.airpower. maxwell, af. mil/airchronicles/apj/apjOl / winO 1 / winO 1. html.




military power on its own terms. Beijing has learned from the Gulf Wars that trying to beat the Americans at their own

game is a recipe for disaster. In pursuing an asymmetric war

against the U.S., however, as Lieutenant General Li Jijun, Vice President of the PLA Academy of Military Science,

writes, "the outcome of the war might be quite different the weak will defeat the strong."56 "Foremost in Chinese

strategists' considerations," Larry Wortzel argues, "is the U.S. will not and cannot sustain casualties in pursuit of vital

interests. If China could kill or wound enough American

service personnel, it could effectively deter U.S. forces or force their defeat in the event of a military conflict in East

Asia, including in the defense of Taiwan. Despite overwhelming U.S. military and technological superiority, China is preparing to defeat the U.S. by transforming its weakness into strength and exploiting U.S. vulnerabilities through asymmetric warfare and preemptive strikes."57

There is another consideration in China's preparation for an asymmetrical war with America over Taiwan? in case

Taiwan's pro-independence government provoked a war with the mainland, Beijing seems to be counting on the fact that no other country in the Asia-Pacific region would be likely to offer support to Washington in such a contingency. That includes Australia, South Korea, Japan, and every Southeast

56 Li Jijun, "Notes on Military Theory and Strategy," cited in Michael

Pillsbury, Chinese Views of Future Warfare (Washington, D.C.: National

Defense University Press, 1997), p. 227. 57

Cited in "Report to Congress of the US-China Security Review

Commission?The National Security Implications of the Economic

Relationship between the United States and China," July 2003, online at

http: / / www. usee. gov/researchreports/2000_2003 / reports/ch 1_02. htm. 58

For example, in his National Day speech on August 22, 2004, Singapore Prime Minister Lee FIsien Loong made it clear that Singapore would not

support Taiwan if it provoked a war with Beijing. "Taiwan's integration with China," Lee said, "is inexorable and the cross-strait issue will not be

a permanent problem." See Lawrence Chung, "Taiwan press urges govern ment to take note of comments," The Straits Times, Aug 25, 2004, online




Asian country. And it is unlikely that any of America's

NATO allies-even Britain - would be remotely interested in

sending troops to the other side of the world in a serious

confrontation with China.58

Nationalism: Does an Increasingly Nationalistic Chinese

Public Opinion now also Shape Chinese Foreign Policy?

The Taiwan issue is, fundamentally, an issue of nationalism.

Nationalism has emerged as a rising tide behind China's drive

toward economic development. It has increasingly become

one of the primary driving forces behind Chinese foreign

policy. In recent years, nationalistic feeling appears particularly

strong among Chinese intellectuals and younger generations. Some analysts emphasize an "anti-Western" nationalism

as a legitimating factor for the party and a weapon to be

used to support the state.59 Others see a "wounded" nationalism?citing the painful lessons in China's past that show how a "weak

state and divided nation invites foreign aggression."60 From

this viewpoint, nationalism can create an independent yet "isolated" China. These interpretations are, however, only

part of the story. There are other important forms of nationalism.

The rise of China's economic and military clout has fueled

a gradual increase or surfacing of a tide of chauvinism among Chinese that may be cultivated by CCP authorities, but may also be expanded into a force beyond their control. So instead

at http: / /straitstimes. asia 1. com, sg/eveoneastasia/story/0.4395.268983.00. html, and Jason Leow, "Beijing notes Singapore's one-China policy," The

Straits Times, Aug 26, 2004, online at http: / /straitstimes. asial. com, sg/

eveoneastasia/story/0.4395.269237.00.html. Singapore is not the only

country to have issued such a warning. In recent months, Australia and the

Philippines have also said they would not support Taiwan if it provoked a

war with China. 59

See, for example, James Lilley's recent book, China Hands (New York,

NY: Public Affairs, 2004). 60

For this view, see Maris Hsia Chang, Return of the Dragon'- China's

Wounded Nationalism (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 2001).




of suggesting that Chinese nationalism is something manipulated

by the leadership to replace a collapsed ideology, the question is: does an increasingly nationalistic Chinese public opinion now also shape Chinese foreign policy? As Nicholas Kristof

noticed, "For Americans, the *bad guys' in China seem easily identifiable: They are the aging, grim-faced Communist hard

liners in Mao jackets, wagging their trembling fingers at the

world--- But that conclusion is thoroughly misleading.

Increasingly, the real hard-liners toward the West are simply

ordinary people. They wear blue jeans and T-shirts with

risqu? English phrases. They trade gossip about how to get U.S. visas. They read Danielle Steele novels and revere a

man they call Qiao Dan, also known as Michael Jordan. But

many also believe that America is a bully (and) that Beijing should stand up more firmly to Tokyo and Washington alike, that Tibetan monks should be tossed in jail if necessary and

that any move by Taiwan toward independence should result

in a Chinese military attack."61

Moreover, as Dave Sheng wrote, "To understand nationalism

among Chinese, one has to realize there are two distinct

concepts in a Chinese mind: Chinese government, and China. The Chinese attitudes toward the two are very different. We Chinese know about the abuses and incompetence of Chinese

government. After all, we are the ones living through it. On

the other hand, we do believe that there is a thing called

'national interests' and we do care about China. No matter how much the Chinese government wants to play the nationalism

card, it could not do it on its own. Help came from unexpected outside sources, Taiwan and America. It is even more ironic

61 Nicholas D. Kristof, "Nationalism in China becomes wild card as the

country opens up," New York Times, April 22, 2001, online at http: //fac

ulty. moundsparkacademv.org/~mvergin/regional/china/chinese national

ism, doc. 62

Dave Sheng, "Who lost China?-The resurgence of Chinese national

ism," Weekly China Forum, online at http: //weekly, china-forum, org/ CCF95/ccf9537~l.html.




when one realizes that both Taiwan and America were very much admired not so long ago."62 From a Chinese perspective,

Sheng argued, "America's unwillingness to see China's rise

and the possibility that the U.S. will play the Taiwan card

has forced China to pick the most powerful country in the

world as its enemy. It is a scary thought. It is nonetheless

a probability that we Chinese should face and China is gearing

up to it. As a response to the Taiwan problem and American

hostilities, a resurgence in Chinese nationalism is inevitable."63

All this makes nationalism a particularly motivating force

in China, given its potential not just for conferring legitimacy on the government, but also for taking it away. In this regard, the influence of Chinese nationalism on foreign policy decision

making is a complex one that can have both positive and

negative impacts on the very legitimacy of the communist

regime. A Chinese proverb perhaps provides an apt metaphor for the force of nationalism: "Shui neng zai zhou, ye neng fu zhou" ("Water can both sustain and sink a ship").

In foreign policy terms, the current leadership's search for a new unifying ideology, combined with China's growing economic power and its important, if still modest, military establishment, also give nationalism new significance. The

key question here is: can nationalism serve the purpose of

maintaining Chinese unity and advancing its economic course

without underwriting a chauvinistic, domineering attitude

toward others, possibly with expansionist predilections? Situated

in a transitional period, therefore, the current leadership believes what China needs is a "rational" nationalism, in

which the Chinese show their pride and tell the world about

their nation and traditions, not a "popular" nationalism that

can undermine CCP's monopoly on political discourse and

threaten the regime's stability. What the current leaders want

is an application of nationalism as a "soft power" - a tool for

their policy of "peaceful development."

63 Ibid.




CONCLUSION: "PEACEFUL DEVELOPMENT" A RISING POWER' S NATURAL CHOICE

China's relentless economic growth in the 1980s and 1990s heralded its emergence as a great power in world

politics, and as its economy has continued to expand, China now seems poised to become the second-largest economy in

the world. The conventional wisdom is that it would be

foolish - and perhaps dangerous - to neglect the rise of China.

Yet, as Nicholas Kristof warned more than a decade ago, "the international community is not giving adequate consideration to the colossal implications of the rise of a powerful China. It is fashionable these days for people to express wonderment

at how the changes underway in China are breathtaking, but there is very little specific analysis of the economic and

military effects of China's growth. Nor is there much analysis of whether China's attempt to expand its influence reflects

the hostile intentions of an aggressive regime or is simply the natural consequence of rising power."64

This article is an attempt to fill the gap. It provides a

comprehensive look of China's "peaceful development" foreign policy. Looking to the future, the article suggests that the

change-of-guard in the Chinese leadership offers the possibility, though not the certainty, that China may increasingly fit more

comfortably into the international system in the years ahead,

though not without frictions and mishaps. China's new leadership appears to be remaking China's

foreign policy. China has emerged as a more confident power

during Hu-Wen's first two years in office, eschewing the

strident rhetoric of the past in favor of more articulated

diplomacy. Unpretentious and modest, this leadership nonetheless

has adopted a firmer and more proactive diplomatic posture.

64 Nicholas D. Kristof, "The Rise of China," Foreign Affairs, November/

December 1993, online at http://weekly.china-forum.org/ CCF93/

ccf9322-l.html.




"It is not ideological, it is not shrill," as Paul Harris puts it, "and it is not new for China to take a strong position, but

it is something very new for China to take a firm, measured, mature position on Chinese national interests."65 Under the

current leadership, Chinese foreign policy now has a more

discreet orientation, relying on carefully presented argument to promote China's economic and strategic priorities. The

new leadership, like their predecessors, still has strongly held

views, but these views are now phrased in conciliatory terms

designed to produce sympathy and support. As China's new leaders' foreign-policy approach appears

to be more discreet and subtle compared to that of their

predecessors, the current leadership is trying to rebuild China's

international image as a more open, tolerant, and cooperative

power. Fifteen years after Beijing' s bloody crackdown on

protesters in Tiananmen Square and two years after Jiang Zemin's scandalous cover-up of the severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) crisis, China's new leaders seem to have

learned the lesson that the image of a country is its most

valuable asset; it is very difficult to build and very easy to

squander. China is now in the process of transforming itself from

a weakling into one of the strong. The view in Beijing, however, is that China still has a considerable distance to

travel before it gets there. As a result, Chinese leadership's

goal, at least for now, is to pursue economic development. A foreign policy of "peaceful development" has therefore

been dovetailed with this goal. Meanwhile, another important task in China's new foreign policy is to accentuate China's

role as a rising and responsible power in a multilateral world.

While continuing to give emphasis to the traditional "hard

power" tools of statecraft (including military power), the

65 Cited in Agence France-Presse, "China emerges as more confident

regional power with Hu in charge," November 13, 2003, online at

www, newagebd. com/nov2nd03 /141103 /inat. html.




current leaders are also placing increasingly more weight on

the 'soft power' of ideas and economy. In a sense, China'

s new foreign policy is a reflection of Beijing' s willingness to learn to behave like a great power. When all is said and

done, as the Athenians explained to the Melians more than

2,400 years ago: "The strong do what they can and the weak

suffer what they must." It is only natural to assume that

China seeks the power to do what it wants instead of what

it must. But for now, the dictum of Chinese foreign policy is "peaceful development" and China's grand strategy is to

expand its influence quietly. There are many reasons, fundamentally economic, against

China using force to "reunify" with Taiwan. In addition to

the economic considerations, an armed conflict between China

and Taiwan will probably set the rest of Asia against Beijing; China will lose its image of a responsible major power and

its "peaceful rise" will be adversely affected; it will push

Japan to go nuclear, and it will cause an American intervention.

Yet, China has repeatedly promised that it will use military force if Taiwan declares itself an independent country, and

this author believes that we should take Beijing at its word.

On the issue of Taiwan, China will not hesitate to act, not

only because of a growing "popular" nationalism in the

mainland, but more importantly, Beijing' s new leaders now

see the "reunification of the motherland" as a necessary, if

dangerous, step in the reemergence of China.




REFERENCES

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Yan, Xuetong. 2000. Meiguo Baquan yu Zhongguo Anquan [US Hegemony and China's Security], Tianjin: Tianjin

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1. Downs, Erica Strecker. 2000. China's Quest for Energy

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It Means for the United States. New York, NY: Basic

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