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14. THE IMPACT OF LAND REFORM IN WEST BENGAL : THE

VIEW POINT OF THE CRITICS

Since the inception in the office in 1977 the Left Front Government has claimed

during their rule in West Bengal that they have done too much to the rural poor people.

They demand that their bases are in the rural areas especially to the peasant community.

They claimed that they have done a lot of land reforms and distributed vested land to

rural poor and marginal peasants, registered sharecroppers by the operation barga and

decentralised rural power by the panchayats. These three are the main pillars of their

rural base. Besides that they have taken up by the panchayats to alleviation the rural

poverty programmes, self help training programmes, generated rural employment by land

reforms, vested-land distributed with the help of panchayats, increase the agricultural

wages and more etc.

Now we would discuss in brief the real agricultural scenario in the rural Bengal.

A. Land distribution

The West Bengal Left Front Government carried on repeated propaganda

regarding their ‘success’ in land reform, the statistics put forward tell a different story.

Distribution of vested land :

Congress Government (up to ’67 election) 3.76 lakh acres

United front government (9 months + 13 months) 2.50 lakh acres

In ’77 and after 4.26 lakh acres

Total 10.52 lakh acres

Source : Ajit Narayan Narayan Basu, Paschimbanger Krishi Niti, page-64

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It should be noted that 10.52 lakh acres is only 7.5% of the total agricultural land

of the state. The Left Front Government distributed of vested land is only 4.26 lakh acres,

much less than the previously distributed 6.26 (3.76 + 2.50) lakh acres of land. This

‘success’ also can be attributed to the social pressure of the turbulent last half of the 60s

and 70s, which made the ruling classes panic. (Ref : Economy and Politics of West

Bengal, Ajit Narayan Basu).

Operation Barga is the programme to ‘insure the right of the share croppers’. In

this regard, necessary amendments were made by the then Congress Government led by

the Siddhartha Shankar Roy. The Left Front Government, after assuming power,

implemented the amended act. The change that the front government made was that to

eject a share cropper the landowner would have to substantiate his claim, and not the

share cropper (bargadar). Till now 14.95 lakh of share croppers have been recorded and

usufructory right was conferred to them on 11.06 lakh of the land, which is 7.9% of total

agricultural land (Ref : Economic Review, 2001-02). Moreover, through land reform the

distribution of vest lands to landless and poor peasants and conferring usufructory right to

share croppers constitute only15.4% (vestland distributed 7.5% + operation barga 7.9%)

of total agricultural land (Source : Ajit Narayan Narayan Basu, Paschimbanger Krishi

Niti). It is true that the Left Front do not assess their gains or losses through economical

parameters. On the contrary the Left Front are concerned about the development of

political consciousness against the status-quo.

The West Bengal government’s much advertised and ‘respected’ programme of

vested land distribution accounts for 25.44 lakh of landless and poor peasants. The

amount of land distributed is 0.41 acres per head (Ref : Economic Review 2001-02). This

small plot of land is economically non-viable and of inferior quality in general. Still, the

motive can be best understood through a Government Report. The report stated that “It is

perfectly understandable that if we want to maintain the status-quo we should try to

involve as many people as possible in it so that at least a majority of the population

acquires a stake in the status-quo or the system in question. Keeping this view, it is

perfectly reasonable to distribute small bits of land however uneconomic to land hungry

peasants and / or agricultural labourers so that they never look for any radical

alternative to the present property system and be eager to acquire some property.

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However to call it socialism is a sad travesty of truth” [West Bengal Board of Revenue,

Statistics Cell, Land Reforms in West Bengal : Statistical Report VII (Calcutta : 82)]

Here we would take another example about the vesting of ceiling land, which

surveys made by different eminent researchers and scholars has shown table below :

Table 1 : Vesting of Ceiling-Surplus Land (in lakh acre)

Source : Ghosh 1981, Basu 2000

Since 1953, when the West Bengal Estate Acquisition Act was passed and after

that up to the year 2000, it has found from above data that as much as 44% or 6 lakh

acres was obtained in the five-year period between 1967 and 1972 during two United

Front Governments regime and another 3.5 lakh acres had been acquired earlier in the

Congress rule in this state. So that in the last 20 years of Left Front govt. rule only 1.53

lakh acres were acquired, which amounts to almost a quarter of what was achieved

during the very short United Front regime and almost a half of what was obtained during

the 14 years of Congress rule.

Now we would show how much about the actual redistribution of the vested land

in West Bengal? Below the table shows that if one takes 1977 as the median dividing the

post 1953 period of land reforms, almost 60 per cent of the actual redistribution (6,26,284

out of a total of 10,38,000 acres) was accomplished before that and the rest 40 per cent

afterwards. The yearly rate of redistribution also declined progressively.

Table -2 : Redistribution of Vested Land

Upto 1977 1977-83 1983-91 Upto 1991 Upto 2000

No. of beneficiaries

(households)

984032 472443 537141 1993616 -

Cropped area

redistributed

(acre)

628284 140417 146688 913389 1038000

Source : Sengupta and Gazdar, 1997, Basu, 2000

On the above two tables if we compares we would find that 3.7 lakh acres of land

vested with the state remained undistributed. A Land Reform Tribunal was set up in 2000

for speedy settlement of legal disputes pending for long years in civil courts, but so far it

has cleared only 13,373 acres of land (Mishra and Rawal).

Litigations, of course, are not the sole reason for lakhs of acres remaining

undistributed. In a report submitted to the West Bengal Government at its request in

1953-67 1967-72 1972-80 1980-2000 Up to 2000

3.5 6.0 2.62 1.53 13.65

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1993, Nirmal Mukherjee and Debabrata Bandopadhyaya pointed out that at the end of

1981, vested agricultural land undistributed by court cases amounted to 3.5 lakh acres, of

which only 94,000 acres were distributed during the next 12 years. More over, some

80,000 acres of land had just “vanished”, if official records were to be believed. The

surveyors showed that, together with undistributed land, these “vanished acres” were

“worth at least Rs.34 crore per annum” and panchayats could not easily avoid “the

charge of collusive misappropriation” on these accounts.

Seven years after the publication of the Mukherjee-Bandopadyaya survey, Manas

Ghosh reported in The Statesman (September 25 and 26, 2000) that the Bengal Kisan

Sabha of CPI(M) peasant wing was lording it over some 3 lakh acres of undistributed

vested land and extracting 20 to 25 per cent of the production profits, which amounted to

over Rs.40 crore even in mono-cropped areas.

Whether one believes The Statesman report or not, there is no denying that a huge

quantity of ceiling-surplus land is still kept hidden with collusive arrangements among

landowners, government departments and panchayat officials. Peasant organizations are

flatly denied access to information on this score, while the “Statutory Standing

Committees for land reform” under the block level panchayat bodies function as centres

of corruption and favouritism. The powerful land lobby often prevents pattadars (allottes

of pattas or title deeds) from actually taking possession of the land. Effective

redistribution of such land remains a key item on the agenda of the peasant movement in

the state.

Sunil Sengupta and Harris Gazdar discovered that out of the total cultivable land

in West Bengal, the Khas or vested land has not crossed even 10 per cent till 1977 (Ref :

Agrarian politics and rural development in West Bengal).

Another important issue regarding land distribution in West Bengal is Land

Ceiling. In the state where the number and proportion of marginal farmers are on the rise

(currently 72 per cent in official reckoning), there is no reason to hold the old ceiling

limits. Now in the state the ceiling limits are 17.29 acres for irrigated and 24.12 acres for

unirrigated land. In the intervening years, per acre yields have risen several times. So in

order to maintain the level of egalitarianism, the ceiling limits need to be revised

downward. By this it may creates the benefit of the large underprivileged in rural Bengal.

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It is long pending demands of various peasant organizations in West Bengal to

lowering the land ceilings but on the other hand the Left Front Government is considering

upward revision of ceilings for New Industrial Policy. The upper ceiling has already been

abolished for agricultural operations undertaken by agro-based industries and food-

processing units, and considerably relaxed for urban areas.

B. Skewed-Landownership

During the Left Front regime the land holdings pattern have been changed

enormously. By these changing patterns the middle, poor and marginal peasants have lost

their holdings and on the other hand the jotedars (big land owners) have concentrated

their holdings which we will see the table below :

No. of ownership (in lakh)

Year Below 1 hectare 1-2 hectare 2-4 hectare 4-10 hectare Above 10 hectare

1985-86 42.93 11.75 5.17 0.94 0.01

1990-91 46.39 11.07 4.57 0.97 0.01

1995-96 50.03 11.00 3.82 0.60 0.01

Source : Evaluation Programme, Evaluation Wing, Directorate of Agriculture, Govt. of W.B.

From this table we find that in the last ten years the owners of land below 1

hectare has been increased to 7.10 lakh. On the other hand the land owners of 1-2

hectares have been declined to 75 thousand. 2-4 hectares landowners having decreased to

1.35 lakh and those owing of 4-10 hectares have decreased to 34 thousand. So, in this

period the numbers of marginal peasants have been increased and the middle and

marginal middle peasants have been decreased in numbers. Their decline is not number

but in land holding also. Below the table shows the support in this regard.

Peasants lost of landholdings (in lakh)

Year 1-2 hectare 2-4 hectare 4-10 hectare Above 10 hectare

1985-86 17.53 13.82 8.86 2.00

1990-91 16.94 12.69 4.25 2.02

1995-96 16.24 10.46 3.16 2.03

Source : Shankar Ghosh, Pachimbanger Krishiniti, Krisaker Bhabisytha

On the above table it has been clearly seen that who had the landholdings of 1-2

hectares, they have lost their holdings 1.29 lakh in the last ten years. At the same period

2-4 hectares and 4-10 hectares land owners have lost their lands 3.36 lakh and 1.70 lakh

hectares respectively. So, at that time the marginal-middle and middle peasants have

declined to 2.44 lakh in numbers and they have lost their land ownership 6.35 lakh or 47

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lakh 63 thousand bighas accordingly. These types of peasants have decreased in numbers

and they have lost their holdings. If we compare the above two tables than we would

found that the above 10 hectares landowners have not increased too much but on the

other hand they have become the owners of 23 thousands bighas of agricultural land at

the same period.

Sankar Kumar Bhowmik in his book “Agrarian Transition in West Bengal”

showed that in spite of all the tall claims by Left Front Govt. about record redistribution

of ceiling-surplus land, there has been a drastic increase in landlessness in rural Bengal.

Based on different rounds of National Sample Survey the author compiles data for three

year 1953-54, 1971-72 and 1982 - to indicate the state of affairs in three different periods

viz. before Left Front Govt. took office, before it’s launching of land reform programme

and in the post land reform setting. For a size-class data analysis he uses his own

categorisation of different landholding groups: landless (less than 0.01 acre); marginal

(0.01 – 2.49 acres); small (2.50 – 4.99 acres); medium (5.00 – 9.99 acres); big (10.00 –

14.99 acres) and large (15.00 acres and above). Some important points do emerge from

this analysis.

In 1953-54 about a fifth of the rural households were recorded as ‘landless’ in

West Bengal. This declined significantly to less than a tenth in 1971-72. However, the

figure for 1982 shows a fairly sharp rise in the percentage of the ‘landless’ about 17.21

per cent. If households in the ‘landless’ and ‘marginal’ categories are put together, a

continuous increase in the percentage of households under these categories is observed in

West Bengal. These two categories together constituted nearly 73 per cent, 77 per cent

and 82 per cent of all households respectively in 1953-54, 1971-72 and 1982.

In the case of ‘big’ and ‘large’ categories, the rate of decline in the percentage of

owned are in the period 1971-72 to 1982 has been lower than the rate of decline in the

percentage of households. Though there has been a tendency of decline in the share of

households in these categories, there is also the parallel tendency of fresh land

concentration among the existing households in these categories. Likewise the increase in

the percentage of owned area despite fall in the percentage of households in the 'middle'

category clearly indicates increased concentration of land with them in Bengal in recent

years.

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The skewed land distribution still prevailing after all the land reform measures is

clear from the fact that the big and large categories together comprised 1.37 per cent of

households but they accounted for 13.67 per cent of owned area in 1982. Some other

states under bourgeois-landlord rule could claim greater egalitarianism than the Left-led

West Bengal in terms of land ownership.

Secondly, the changing pattern of operational holdings also reveals similar

features. According to the author, "The largest section of the rural households in West

Bengal belonged to the category of ‘marginal’ farmers and the extent of

`marginalisation' increased over time. While 61.20 per cent of operational holdings

belonged to this category in 1971-72, they increased to 74.32 per cent in 1982.

Distribution of operational holdings is also far from equal. Even in 1982, while about

90% of holdings at the bottom (marginal and small categories) operated about 58% of

area, only 1.77 per cent of holdings at the top (`big' and `large' categories) accounted for

13.71 per cent of area operated. Moreover, 8.07% of households in the middle range

control 28.25 per cent of operated area in Bengal today".

According to latest Govt. report the land ownership pattern in the state yields the

following picture : 11,00,701 small holdings (16.81 per cent of total holdings), 50,03,845

marginal holdings (76.42 per cent), 4,41,936 medium holdings (6.75 per cent) and 1,152

large holdings of over 10 acres (0.2). This also includes 11,05,957 acres of land being

cultivated by 14,97,418 bargadars or sharecroppers (Ref : Economic Review, 2003-04).

LAND QUESTION

BEHIND THE RHETORIC

“It is true that the key slogan of the peasant movement is radical land reforms. But the slogan of radical

land reforms can only be a propaganda slogan in the present structural framework. The effective slogan in

this contest is : land reforms within ceiling limits…..In the changed context of land and production

relations shaped through land reforms, the peasant movement has come to acquire a multifarious and

multidimensional character. But this realization is yet to drawn on our comrades working on the peasant

front. We therefore hear from some quarters demands to lower the ceiling limits with a view to

rejuvenating the peasant movement. At the same time we also hear a few comrades question the very

relevance of the peasant front in the state……”

-From Documents of the 20th

State Conference of the West Bengal Unit of the CPI(M)-

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C. Distort Operation Barga

In the early years of the Left Front rule between 1978 and 1981, ‘Operation

Barga’ was started with much fanfare. The victory in the general elections in 1977 and

the victory in the Panchayat elections in 1978 saw the steady ebbing of interest in Barga

and waste land distribution. Some 8000 “camps” were organized throughout the state,

between October 1978 and June 1982, to register as many as 6,75,000 bargadars

(sharecroppers). But it took no more than about a decade for the whole thing to end with

a whimper.

Under ‘Operation Barga’ about 14 lakh bargadars have been registered who

cultivating only 8 per cent of the land in West Bengal (Ref. Economic Survey 2002-03).

It is learnt from various researches that in no case were sharecropping in more

than 20 per cent of the land. Naturally, 80 per cent of the West Bengal land is free from

the impact of Operation Barga. It must be added here that ‘Operation Barga’ has not

dislodged the landowners or stripped them of their ownership title to their lands. Instead,

avoiding all risks and production cost they enjoy at least 25 per cent of the produce in the

semi-feudal pattern by virtue of being landowners as a parasitic class. It is learnt from

various studies that share-cropping is basically limited to paddy cultivation and a

bargadar earns in a month as much as a contract labourer in a factory; the only difference

being that such factory labourer works as an individual while the labour of a share-

cropper is family-based.

The other important point is that the tenancy law (West Bengal Land Reform Act

1955, as amended subsequently) stipulates that the lessor would get half share only when

he supplies all the inputs, and will get 25 per cent share in all other cases; but the

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Operation Barga did not attempt to enforce this in any way. In real life we find about

half-a-dozen different sharing arrangements, almost always advantageous to the lessor.

A paper “On the future of sharecropping in West Bengal” presented by

Suryakanta Mishra, Minister of West Bengal and Vikas Rawal, an expert on agrarian

economy where they wrote :

“In the recent years, there is a trend of the landowner and sharecropper entering

into a mutual agreement under which ownership right on, say, 25 to 30 per cent of the

sharecropped land is given to the sharecropper. Peasant organizations have been debating

whether this should be accepted….So far, the stand of Kisan Sabha has been not to enter

into or encourage such negotiations because (in that case) all the share croppers will

ultimately get evicted. But with this increased urbanization, the cost of land in the

vicinity of the urban areas and even in municipal urban agglomerations has been

increasing very much. So if even the cost of, say, 10-20 per cent of land is given to the

sharecropper, he will get more return from the interest of the amount than from

cultivating the land. It is clear that the non-involvement of the peasant organizations

weakens the bargaining power of the sharecroppers in this respect.

The percentage of tenanted land in total cultivated area in West Bengal declined

drastically from 18.70 in 1972 to 12.84 in 1982, atleast partly in response to Operation

Barga, and then marginally to 12 in 1992 (NSS data, various rounds). But land lease

operations still remain an important mode of surplus appropriation, with a large section of

big landowners leasing out large chunks of their landholdings, usually to poorer

categories. Thus in the 1992 rabi season, households owning 5 to 10 acres of land operate

only 16.43 percent of total cropped area in the state, although they owned 22.98 per cent.

In the case of house holds in the above 10 acre category, the corresponding figures are

4.38 per cent and 7.62 per cent respectively. This means that, leaving out intra-size

category contracts, approximately 30 per cent of the area owned was leased out in the

former (5-10 acres) category and 43 per cent in the latter (above 10 acres) category. (Ref :

Economy and Politics of West Bengal, Ajit Narayan Basu, 2001).

After large landowners, small and medium absentee landowners together with

rural people engaged in service, trade, independent professions etc. constitute another big

chunk of lessors. From his field survey in 12 villages in four blocks of Medinipur district,

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it is found that lessors whose primary occupation was not-agriculture comprised 43.92

per cent and 58.60 per cent in advanced and backward regions respectively (Bhowmik,

1994). As regards lessees, most of them are poor and marginal. According to estimates of

the statistical cell of the Board of Revenue, Government of West Bengal, the average size

of landholdings under tenurial contracts is 0.97 acres (Khasnabis, EPW, December 31,

1994).

Now it is to be observed on the above data that paradoxical situation in Bengal,

where due to the underlying class structure and a peculiar outcome of the Operation

Barga (agricultural development) means further deterioration in the conditions of poor

peasantry.

KEY TAKS:

TAMING THE TENANTS

“…Some sharecroppers tend to confuse their cultivation rights with ownership rights and thus they

refuse to hand over the due share of crops to the owners. This is an opportunist tendency, which is

harmful for the peasant movement and detrimental to the cause of broad peasant unity. Fighting out

this opportunism is a key task of the movement. This tendency is witnessed particularly in those

areas where the land owners do not reside in the concerned villages and activities of the peasant

movement remain oblivious of their responsibilities in this regard. We must wage a sustained

struggle against this trend…”

-From Documents of the 20th

State Conference of the West Bengal Unit of the CPI(M)-

130

D. Reverse Sale of Barga Land

One can’t deny market forces for long. That seems to be the case with the Left

Front Government. It has drafted a Bill – West Bengal Land Reforms (Amendment) Bill

2006 – which facilitates selling of barga lands and also land acquisition, which is a U-

turn from the days of Operation Barga.

Selling off barga land was unthinkable till the late seventies. For, the government

then had established the right of the bargadars (tillers) after a prolonged peasant

movement since the sixties. The right to till land was treated at par with ownership rights.

The provision became the bedrock of Left support in villages because the bargadars felt

that landowners could not evict them from land at will.

But with the demand for land rising, the same government is formalising the sale

of barga land. Under the provisions of the Bill, a landowner can enter into an agreement

with the bargadar, by making him the owner of half of the land he tills. This incentive

will enable the landowner to free the other half from the tiller. The bargadar gives up his

tilling rights and ceases to be bargadar. This arrangement will allow both to sell their

lands without any strings attached.

The draft Bill provides that the tiller “by execution of a mutual agreement,

surrender the right of cultivation in respect of 50 per cent of the land cultivated by him as

a bargadar, if the owner of the land conveys the right and title in respect of the remaining

50 per cent of such land under the same mutual agreement to such bargadar” (Ref :

Times of India, 21.11.2006).

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E. Recent Trends

A disturbing feature of the very recent past has been the rapid increase in

landlessness among rural households, despite the continuing process of vested land

distribution to pattadars. National Sample Survey data indicate that the proportion of

landless rural households in West Bengal increased from 39.6 per cent in 1987-88 to 41.6

per cent in 1993-94, to as much as 49.8 per cent in 1999-2000. In other words, by the end

of the decade, nearly half of the rural households in West Bengal were landless. Of

course, this occurred along with a substantial diversification of rural employment to non-

agricultural activities (Ref : Human Development Report-2004).

There have been recent reports of increasing land alienation by pattadars and of

eviction of bargadars, thus suggesting that the benefits of the land reform have been

relatively short-lived at least for some rural households.

A Recent study sponsored by the State Institute of Panchyats and Rural

Development, Chakraborti et al found that, on average, 13 per cent of the pattadars who

received land had lost it and around 14 per cent bargadars have been evicted from their

barga land by 2001. Below the table shows the extent of land alienation of pattadars and

eviction of bargadars district wise in West Bengal.

Per cent of pattadars

who have lost possession

of land

Per cent of

bargadars who have

been evicted

Darjeeling 14.71 16

Jalpaiguri 16.72 31.6

Koch Behar 12.33 30.9

Uttar Dinajpur 22.35 31.49

Dakshin Dinajpur 19.17 30.73

Malda 10.41 5.66

Murshidabad 15.87 19.06

Birbhum 16.62 9.83

Bardhaman 11.93 14.5

Nadia 11.27 9.74

North 24 Parganas 16.99 16.65

Hugli 14.63 10.48

Bankura 15.45 11.09

Pururlia 16.11 6.7

Medinipur 5.62 15.9

Haora 9.34 15.9

South 24 Parganas 22.07 10.31

Total West Bengal 13.23 14.37

Source : Chakraborti et al (2003, pages 53 and 57)

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The district-wise changes in rural employment according to the latest census it is

found that, the most striking feature is the very high proportion of non-agricultural

workers in the rural areas of a number of districts. In five districts (Haora, Darjeeling,

Jalpaiguri, North and South 24-Parganas) more than half the rural workforce is engaged

in non-agricultural activity. The average for the state in 2001 was more than 40 per cent

of total rural workers being engaged in non-agriculture, which is well beyond the national

average and is one of the highest such ratios in India. Furthermore, this increase in non-

agricultural work has been very rapid in the past decade, increasing by more than 12

percentage points for all of rural West Bengal (Ref : Census of India-2001).

F. Condition of the peasant in rural Bengal

Agrarian economy in West Bengal continues to be a small peasant economy, but

in fact, rural Bengal at the turn of the century is marked by a queer coexistence of two

opposite trends: (i) continued and renewed centrality of subsistence and supplementary

farming and (ii) growing monetisation and diversification of the non-agricultural

economy.

Mishra and Rawal pointed out in their paper, “…About 72 per cent of the

producers in rural West Bengal produce primarily for their subsistence and not for the

market.” In addtion to this subsistence farming by small cultivators, one also witnesses

among wage workers, the spread of what we have called supplementary farming. A large

section of wage earners in agricultural and/or other jobs try and arrange for producing at

least part of the rice required for consumption on own or leased-in land. According to the

Rural Labour Enquiry, 1993-94, almost half of rural labour households in West Bengal

possessed small amounts of land – as against less than 6% in Punjab, less than 15% in

Haryana and less than 25% in Kerala and Tamil Nadu. Such otherwise irrational and

unviable farming can actually take place because the producer deprives himself and

perhaps, his family members too, of the wages due to them. This is his survival strategy,

particularly for the slack seasons when jobs are difficult to come by, and grain prices are

particularly high.

Side by side with subsistence and supplementary farming, we notice a growing

diversification of the rural economy manifested in the proliferation of off-farm

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employment and sideline occupations. According to preliminary reports of the latest

(2001) Census, there is a large exodus of workforce from cultivation to “household

industries,” small rural industries, salaried jobs, professions etc. so much so that for the

first time in history, the proportion of main workers engaged in cultivation (cultivators

and labourers taken together) has come down to 43 per cent.

-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Sources: National Sample Survey Organisation (2005 and 2005b)

Prof. A. Naranmoorthy, in his article “State of Indian Farmers” published in the

“Economic & Political Weekly” dated 11th

Feb. 2006 has presented a detailed feature of

this situation. The data presented by the author on the above table from the NSSO sources

(National Sample Survey Organisation) indicates that between July 2002 and June 2003

the average annual income of a peasant in West Bengal was Rs.8,844/- and the average

annual expenditure incurred by him was 8,429/-. From this we can say that the Net

Annual Income of a peasant from Agriculture is Rs. 415/- only. On the other hand the

average annual family expenses of a peasant stands at Rs.32,016/- and total annual

income from all sources was Rs.24,948/-. More than 50 per cent of the peasants are debt

ridden and the average debt of a peasant is Rs.5,237/-.

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We can cite some additional evidence of the State of the peasantry. In West

Bengal (as per the total number of peasants of 2001 census) the average land per peasant

is 0.95 hectare i.e. approx. 7 bighas. The total number of labour days needed to cultivate

these lands and the economic risk and investment involved becomes quite a large amount

compared to the net annual income of Rs.415/-. We can say without pretence that the

income can be considered negligible. Yet the peasant clings on to the land as it provides

him the food security throughout the year.

As this net annual income is the average income it is but obvious that the peasants

who cultivate their land twice, their income will be slightly more and those producing

crops thrice in a year in the same land will have comparatively more income. As per the

Government record, 30 per cent of the agricultural land in cultivated only once a year.

Thus the net income of the peasants owing this 30 per cent land is almost negligible and

their fate can be easily concluded.

But considering another aspect, the small amount of land owned by a farmer has

proved to be a blessing in disguise. It has forced a peasant to seek non-agricultural work.

In the Narayanmoorthy’s data (as provided by NSSO) the income and expenditure

account of a peasant reveals that if we add the gross income to the total income from

agriculture, only 35 per cent of the total income is contributed by the agricultural sector

and the remaining 65 per cent is contributed by the non-agricultural sector. And if we

consider the net income from agricultural sector it represents a meager portion of the total

income. But Naranmoorthy has not clearly stated whether the price of foodgrains

consumed by a peasant family has been included in the family’s expenditure or not.

But under any circumstances the average income of a peasant from non-

agricultural sources can not be less than 65 per cent. The poor and marginal peasants i.e.

who have 1 bigha or 1/2 bigha of land (and till Nov. 2005 according to Government

report the pattas has been distributed among the 28.17 lakh landless peasants and its total

land is 4.46 lakh hectares) earns mainly from non-agricultural sector. So, on the above

data it found in West Bengal that more than 80 per cent of the earnings of peasants (i.e.

poor and marginal) coming from non-agricultural sectors.

As per 2001 census report the number of recorded cultivators in West Bengal is

58,44,933. If among of them 28,17,197 are patta holders and 15,30,757 are registered

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bargadars (Total 43,47,936), then we can say that 75 per cent of the total cultivators (as

per government record) are not peasants because less than 30 per cent of their earnings

are coming from non-agricultural sectors.

G. Decline in foodgrains production

West Bengal had witnessed a boom in food production in the 1980s, when the

growth rate of foodgrain production jumped to 5.8 per cent a year, this rate slowed down

to 2.13% in the 1990-95 period (Ref :Vikash Rawal and Madhura Swaminathan,

Agricultural Growth in West Bengal, EPW, Oct.3, 1998). This near stagnation in the

growth rate continued in the decade of the 1990s when the annual growth rate registered

was 2.28 per cent as foodgrains production increased from 11.270 million tones in 1990-

91 to 13.815 million tones in 2000-01 (Ref : Statistical Handbook of West Bengal, 2004,

BAES, Govt. of West Bengal). While stagnancy in the growth of foodgrains output has

been continuing, the net cropped area in the state was reduced from 54,63,424 hectares in

1990-91 to 54,17,382 hectares in 2000-01. This trend has been aggravated in the recent

period, as we have seen earlier. According to experts, West Bengal has not yet attained

real food security. It produces 11 per cent surplus rice and 40 per cent surplus vegetables,

but it is 50 per cent deficient in wheat production, 75 per cent deficient in pulse

production and has to buy 60 per cent of its oil seeds requirement from other states (Ref :

The Telegraph, June 28, 2006).

Abhijit Banerjee and et al in the article “Rural Development” observe that it is

therefore no surprise that the growth rate has been slowing : “Cereal production rose by

28 per cent between 1985-86 and 1990-91. In the two successive five-year periods that

followed, this particular growth rate fell to 14 per cent and then 11 per cent. Similarly

the growth rate of total agricultural output fell from a high of 15 and 16 per cent (over

the periods 1985-86 to 1990 -91 and 1990-91 to 1995-96 respectively) to 9 per cent over

the period 1995-96 to 2000-01”.

In West Bengal the main foodgrains production is rice. According to Economic

Review, 2003-04, page-17, the foodgrains production has also declined. The production

of aus rice declined from 8.42 lakh tones in 2001-02 to 7.97 lakh tones in 2002-03 and its

yield rate declined also marginally from 2091 kg./ha. In 2001-02 to 2319 kg./ha. in 2002-

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03. The production of aman rice declined from an all time record of 100.00 lakh tones in

2001-02 to 93.94 lakh tones in 2002-03. In this case also the yield rate declined from

2374 kg./ha. in 2001-02 to 2319 kg./ha. in 2002-03. The yield rate of boro also declined

from 3034 kg./ha. in 2001-02 to 2986 kg./ha. in 2002-03, so that production of boro rice

declined to 41.99 lakh tones in 2002-03 from 44.15 lakh tones in 2001-02.

The other main production in West Bengal is Jute. The production of jute declined

from 88.36 lakh bales in 2001-02 to 85.06 lakh bales in 2002-03. The yield rate of jute

however, declined from 13.56 bales/ha. in 2001-02 to 13.37 bales/ha. in 2002-03. The

area under jute declined from 6.52 lakh hectares in 2001-02 to 6.36 lakh hectares in

2002-03. (Ref : ibid)

Total rice production in 2002-03 declined to 143.89 lakh tones from 152.57 lakh

tones in 2001-02. This was mainly because area under total rice declined from 60.69 lakh

hectres in 2001-02 to 58.42 lakh hectares in 2002-03. The yield rate of total rice declined

to 2463kg./ha. in 2002-03 from 2514kg./ha. in 2001-02. The production of total rice in

2002-03 was significantly higher than the production achieved in 1999-2000 and 2000-01

(Ref. ibid)

Are, Production and Yield Rates of Principal Crops in West Bengal

Crops 1999-2000 2000-2001

A Y P A Y P

Aus Rice 427.15 1938 827.97 393.94 1736 683.95

Aman Rice 4248.94 1992 8463.31 3639.53 1979 7202.76

Boro Rice 1474 3031 4468.40 1401.84 3240 4541.32

Total 6150.42 2237 13759.68 5435.31 2287 12428.03

Crops 2001-2002 2002-03

A Y P A Y P

Aus Rice 402.55 2091 841.83 384.97 2069 796.65

Aman Rice 4211.56 2374 9999.95 4051.08 2319 9393.99

Boro Rice 1454.99 3034 4414.88 1406.08 2986 4198.60

Total Rice 6069.10 2514 15256.66 5842.13 2463 14389.24

A=Area in ‘000 hectares, Y=Yield rate in kg./ha., P=Production in ‘000 tonnes

According to above Govt. report last 5 years the total agricultural land of 1.20

lakh acres has been converted to non-agricultural land in the name of industrialisation.

This total agricultural land has been acquired by Land Acquisition Act of 1894 which was

enforced by British rulers in this state. In these lands the rice production was 11 quintals

per acre and the total production was 13 lakh quintals. This production can met up the

food consumption of 7 lakh population in the state. The State Govt. also declared that in

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near future they would acquire more than 1 lakh acres of agricultural land for

industrialization. As a result the state would face short-fall of foodgrains production and

food security.

Has West Bengal already attained self-sufficiency in food production? The latest

Economic Review (2004-05) placed in the State Assembly proves this claim itself to be

false. According to this report, between Sept. 2003 and Sept. 2004 the West Bengal

Government lifted from the central pool 25 lakh 42 thousand tons of rice which included

2 lakh 90 thousand tons of rice collected by the Food Corporation of India from within

the State. This means that the State made a net import of foodgrains to the tune of 22 lakh

52 thousand tons via the FCI (Food Corporation of India) alone, not counting non-

government imports. In the situation, several thousand acres of land withdrawn from

agriculture would further worsen availability of cheap foodgrains in the State.

H. Role of Panchyats : devolution of power

Now after 30 years of ‘Left Front’ experience in the Panchayats role in rural

Bengal, what we can encounter in the real life experience is just the reverse of the

avowed policies in the dirty form. The first flush of enthusiasm over the Panchayat

system, with the participation of a section of peasantry and the ‘Operation barga’

programme, along with some localized development programmes fizzled out with the

unfolding years. The Panchayats turned out to be the center of vested interests. The

Rice Short-fall by 2007 Bengal is moving from being the rice bowl to the begging bowl. West Bengal is likely to move from

still surplus rice production to not being self-sufficient in rice production by 2007 if it continues its

current rate of agricultural growth. It has been highlighted in a paper for the State Development

Report, commissioned by and since submitted to – the Planning Commission. The research suggests

that India’s largest rice producing state will fail by 2007 (rice accounts for 95 per cent of the state’s

food grain production) because of the slump in agricultural growth in the past decade. The findings

of the report Agriculture in West Bengal: Current Trends and Directions for Future Growth – which

studies states’ agricultural pattern from 1951 onwards are that the rate of production of food grain

fell from 5.15 per cent in the 1980s to 2.39 per cent in the 90’s while rice production slumped from

6.28 per cent to 2.19 per cent over the same period.

The Sunday Statesman, 18th

May, 2003)

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‘Left Front’ uninterruptedly preaches that the twin impact of land reforms and

panchayats has caused a great leap in the production of food crops. But various studies

have clearly shown that it is inputs like HYV seeds, fertilizers, pesticides, tractors,

shallow (mini pumps), submersible pumps, i.e. the implementation of ‘Green

Revolution’ policy, that has been the major cause for the temporary rise in food crops.

Coming to the question of devolution of power, recent studies – including one by

the West Bengal Government itself – have found that the onetime frontrunner now lags

behind some other states. Early this year, Maitreesh Ghatak and Maitreya Ghatak, after

taking note of the “admire[able]…achievements of West Bengal as a pioneering model of

participatory government,” pointed out: “A recent inter-state study by Jain (1999)

covering all the major states put West Bengal not only behind Kerala but Madhya

Pradesh and Karnataka on indicators such as the power to prepare local plans, transfer

of staff, control over staff, transfer of funds…Further more, a committee set up by the

West Bengal government itself has criticised the district level planning process involving

the panchayat system and state bureaucracy for lack of coordination and insufficient

participation of the people, or their elected representatives, at the village level…The state

government bureaucracy hands out district plans to district officials and lower tiers of

panchayats have no say in the allocation of these funds or the implementation of these

projects, unless they are requested to lend a helping hand. The amount of money spent

through this channel is much more than that is directly handled by panchayats. Also,

there is little attempt at coordinating between these two sets of plans at the district level

[Government of West Bengal, p.6],” (Ghatak and Ghatak, 2002).

Why did the Left Front in West Bengal lag so much behind the Left Democratic

Front in Kerala? The authors have come up with several explanations. One is that the

intense political competition the LDF faces vis-à-vis Congress compelled it to score

political points over the rivals by launching the ambitious People’s Plan campaign just

after regaining power in the 1996 elections. More generally, “…redistributing power and

resources away from the state government, where the hold of the LDF is uncertain, to the

local government can be viewed as a rational political move. In West Bengal, given the

Left Front’s secure tenure at the state government level, the need for such radical reform

is much less.” (ibid)

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Here one important valid observation may be discussed. In the last few rounds of

parliamentary and assembly elections the Left Front suffered serious jolts in the rural

areas too, and that might have provided the compulsion which prompted it to introduce

and emphasise mandatory village constituency (gram sansad) meetings. In this meeting

every villager is entitled, and expected, to participate and monitor the various projects

from planning to execution to review stages. But this lofty idea of participatory

decentralization has to operate in a context of growing nexus between the ‘Left Front’

and deep-rooted vested interests, a nexus that is getting strengthened in course of the Left

Front’s prolonged stay in power.

"Ten percent of all villagers must be present at these meetings to form the

quorum, but this is seldom achieved," says Ichhapur Gram Panchayat pradhan Prabhati

Goswami (Ref : The Statesman, 31st March, 2003).

More recent, Prof. G.K. Lieten in his book “Development, Devolution and

Democracy : Village Discourse in West Bengal” defined his findings in a straight forward

manner. Some of the major points of criticism against Left-led panchayats are identified

in the introductory survey of existing literature. These are then scrutinized in the

subsequent chapters in the light of the author’s empirical findings (in the Memari Block

of Burdwan District, which is the heartland of Green Revolution in West Bengal, and a

Left Front stronghold; and in Ramnagar in the coastal area of Medinipur district, where

the LF is quite weak) as well as supplementary data and observations collected from

sundry sources.

Prof. Lieten projects as a signal achievement of the Left Front which empowered

the underprivileged sections is curbed in another major way. The Front’s iron control

over panchayat members elected on its tickets ensures that the latter, rather than freely

ex-pressing and fighting for their class interests, operate according to Front’s directives.

“General directives, like the hold on more radical land reforms, are not always in the

best interests of the poorest villagers, but the utility of such restrictions, regarded as a

necessary condition for maintaining class peace, is that they earn a stable stay in

power”.

Observers like Neil Webster have described this as “reformism and revisionism

noting a shift from class struggle to institutional management”.

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Decentralisation and devolution of the panchayats, the problem is best summed

up in the following words. “…the early success of the panchayat reforms in West Bengal

has generated some political forces that stand in the way of further, more radical,

reform…A coalition of white-collar employees (School teachers, government employees)

and middle peasants, the so-called rural middle strata, have emerged as an important

power base in the party and resist further devolution of power that a true people’s plan

would entail.”

I. Rural poverty in Bengal

One may accept that agricultural growth in West Bengal under the Left Front

regime has been impressive (!) But the point is that, the measures including “land

reforms”, translate into any drastic reduction in rural poverty? The government says yes

and cites in support figures from the World Bank Report (2000), which are in turn

contested by others. The controversy took an unexpected twist, when it came to be known

that the Asian Development Bank (ADB) has offered to finance and coordinate a fresh,

detailed “participatory poverty assessment” project in West Bengal because the state,

along with a few others, stands below the national average in terms of poverty ratio. In

the mean time, let us cast a quick glance over a few recent estimates of rural poverty in

West Bengal compared to other states and the national average.

Mean per capita consumption Head-count ratio of rural poverty

1958 1963 1968 1973 1978 1983 1988 1992 1958 1963 1968 1973 1978 1983 1988 1992

Fig.1 West Bengal -ٱ- India-∆- Fig. 2 West Bengal -ٱ- India-∆-

Fig. 1 : Rural mean per capital consumption in west Bengal and Fig. Head-count ratio of rural poverty in West Bengal and India,

India, 1958 to 1992. (Source : Ozler and Datt (1996) based on 1958 to 1992. (source : Ozlar and Datt (1996), based on NSS data)

NSS data)

Figures 1 and 2 show that rural mean per capita consumption as well as the head

count ratio of rural poverty rose and fell in West Bengal more or less in tandem with the

rest of the country, showing hardly any sustained special achievement. We have

reproduced these figures from Harris Gazdar and Sunil Sengupta (Ben Rogaly et

al,1999).

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Basing himself on the 50th Round (July 1993 to June 1994) of NSS data, Ranjan

Ray made very detailed estimates of rural and urban poverty. In Table 3 we present some

of his findings, which show that in terms of all the available indices of rural poverty,

West Bengal stood below the national average and fared better than very few states. (Ray,

2000) On the other hand, the Left Front Government’s performance in providing

subsidised foodgrains to the rural poor is admitted to have been worse than that of state

governments run by reactionary parties, such as Andhra Pradesh and Tamil Nadu.

Table-4 : Daily per Capita Net foodgrains consumption (gram)

Year West Bengal India Difference

1951 381 334 +47

1956 353 423 -70

1961 407 451 -44

1966 332 355 -23

1971 406 480 -74

1976 419 479 -60

1981 364 462 -98

1986 359 484 125

1991 397 509 -112

1996 418 468 -50

2000 451 501 -50

Source : Ajit Narayan Basu, Aneek, Special West Bengal number, 2001

Table 3 : Rural Poverty in some Indian States

States Per Capita total monthly expenditure (All Households, in

Rupees)

Per Capita total Monthly

Expenditure (SC/ST House holds, in

Rupees)

Head Count Poverty Rates

All Households SC/ST Households

OPL-1 OPL-2 OPL-3 OPL-4

Andhra Pradesh

306.53 258.87 13.9 23.4 24.6 37.1

Assam 267.70 262.73 43.9 49.5 43.2 52.1

Bihar 230.34 207.26 47.3 57.6 65.3 71.5

Orissa 234.03 205.76 34.9 47.9 49.7 61.8

Punjab 455.85 378.86 8.2 11.9 17.6 24.5

Rajasthan 346.06 307.26 12.4 20.1 22.3 32.7

Uttar Pradesh

293.26 242.96 26.7 33.8 44.2 49.6

West

Bengal

293.06 256.04 31.9 43.8 43.2 54.1

All India 380.27 272.35 25.0 34.4 34.6 44.7

Note : (1) The Poverty rate estimates are expressed in percentage terms(2) While OPL3 corresponds to the per capita case, OPL1 refers to the case where the expenditure deflator incorporates the estimates of economies of household size and of the adult/child relativities. OPL : Official Poverty Line

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And from Table-4, prepared on the basis of yearly economic reviews of the West

Bengal Govt., Govt. of India and Census Reports, we find that the daily per capita

foodgrains consumption in West Bengal continues to fall short of the national average, in

fact the negative difference rose considerably during much of Left Front period.

The exact figure of the BPL (below poverty line) in West Bengal is not available.

But the Left Front Government claims that, only 26 per cent people in this state are the

below poverty line with the help of available data of NSS and World Bank. But according

to the Planning Commission, Government of India, it is over 36 per cent. Left Front

Govt. prepared a Human Development Report in 2004 where they have estimated that the

below poverty line in rural areas are 44.75 per cent.

According to National Council of Applied Economic and Research (NCAER)

survey the poverty line in rural Bengal is 51 per cent. The all India average is 39 per cent.

The annually per capita income in rural Bengal is Rs.3,157/- where the all India average

is Rs.4,485/-. As per poverty measures method introduced by Prof. Amarty Sen, the

poverty rank of rural Bengal is 15th

among the other states. As per capability measures

method the rank of rural Bengal is also same.

J. Amlasol : Starvation in Rural Bengal

The remote village of Amlasol had hit headlines when 5 (five) villagers died in

starvation. Amlasol is located, in Binpur-2 block of Midnapur West District, are

scheduled tribes – mainly ‘Sabar' and ‘Lodha' tribes. The village consists of 85 families

(400-500 of adult population) of which most are agricultural labourers. There is no

regular transport system to this village, so people have to walk far to reach a market,

hospital or other facilities. There is one primary school, which is attended by very few

students, since most children go to work.

Though the news of the death of five persons seemed a startling fact, in fact 20

people had earlier died of starvation in this region (Ref : Liberation, Sept. 2005).

Drinking water is scarce.

The main sources of income of the rural poor in Amlasol, or for that matter in the

whole Banspahari Gram Panchayat, are the traditional: weaving of ropes from Babui

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grass, picking Tendu leaves, and collecting dry wood from the forest. Government

schemes of food for work or relief could never come to their rescue.

Ropes made from Babui grass sell at the rate of a mere Rs.5 per bundle.

Collection of dry wood is the main profession of the people dwelling near to the forest,

who sell it to an agent 18 km away. They also collect Tendu leaves, dry them and then

separate the requisite type of leaves. Bundles of these leaves (Chetai) contain 2000 leaves

each. On an average a workers earns Rs. 25 per day. Some agents buy green leaves as

well, get them processed and then sell them to bidi-manufacturers or to Large-scale

Multi-purpose Cooperative Societies (LAMPS). In three months of the rainy season a

person earns Rs.1000.

So circumstances converged to close all doors of livelihood of these people.

However, despite their distress, there was no trace of the government relief or sponsored

schemes; the Left Front Government had promised to give 100 days' work to the rural

poor during off-season.

This apathy of the government towards the people who have been robbed of their

traditional rights has resulted in malnutrition, food deficiency, illness and starvation,

which over a period cause death.

Many scholars have researched the ‘Sabar' tribe, their alienation, distress and

other problems. Writers like Mahashweta Devi have been trying to draw the

government's attention to this problem. But the government has taken no effective

initiative in this regard. The condition of ‘Lodha' people is similar. Administrative

officials try to separate the tribal people from the general poor saying that ‘they are

culturally backward', implying that the tribals are to blame for their condition, and also

that the poor in general are tolerably better off. But in fact the condition of the rural poor,

including the tribal people, is turning worse in West Midnapur, Bankura and Purulia

districts. Chief Minister Shri Buddhadev Bhattacharya himself had to admit that Amlasol

was no aberration, and that such conditions prevail in several villages of West Bengal and

Governmentt also identified that 4,346 villages in West Bengal are in very much poor

prone areas.

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Yet, despite the scarcity of funds to eradicate poverty, last year the State

Government returned part of the fund allocated for rural development by the Central

Government, only because no planning had been undertaken at the state level.

Apart these, in north Bengal where the tea gardens are closed there the workers

and their family members including children have been died due to starvation. And as per

various non-governmental sources it is not less than 1000.

K. Supporting price : Role of Govt.

One valid question may be asked? Does the Left Front Government protect the

peasants to stop distress sale of product? In a word, the reply is no and the old tradition is

going on. When a peasant goes to market for sale of his commodities he see that the

middlemen in the rural market intentionally keeps the prices lower. And the needy

peasants are bound to sale their commodities to them atonce because they have no

alternative. This is called distress sale.

In 2002 the supporting prices (FAQ : Fair Quality Average) of paddy was

declared by Govt. that the thick paddy would be Rs.530/- per quintal and thin paddy

Rs.560/- per quintal respectively. But unfortunately, when the peasants came to the

market for selling their commodities that time no officials were present. Then the

peasants were bound to sale their paddy within Rs.275-350/- per quintal. (Reference:

Shankar Ghosh, Pachimbanger Krishiniti, Krisaker Bhabiysatha). On dated 23rd

November, 2001 the Govt. of West Bengal issued a circular where it was directed that the

rice mill owners would purchase the paddy on behalf of Government. And accordingly

the prices were fixed by Government for thick paddy of Rs.871.90 per quintal and for

thin paddy of Rs.913.60 per quintal. Government decided to acquire up to 6 lakh tones of

rice by this process. But what happened to the fate of peasants? The rice mill owners in

different districts procured the paddy from the needy peasants on lower prices. On the

other hand, the mill owners in collusion with the officials and panchayats managed the

official procurement certificates and by this way they filch crores of government rupees.

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L. Rural Credit

The West Bengal finance minister let us know that Rs.10,000 crores of annual

rural credit is necessary for the peasants of Bengal. But, agricultural loan is available to

the tune of Rs.800 crores. The rest amount of Rs.9200 crores is mainly available through

the rich peasants and private moneylenders. The State government remains a mute

spectator to an annual rate of interest to the tune of 120 per cent to 150 per cent. But, in

this set up, there is also the option of a Reserve Bank of India (RBI)/National

Agricultural Bank and Rural Development (NABARD) direct credit line through credit

co-operatives. The government, supposedly committed to the peasants’ cause, does not

bother about the plight of the peasants.

The plight of the peasants is further aggravated by the increasing price of inputs.

The Left Front Government, from the very beginning is an ardent supporter of a

liberalized economy despite some sporadic protests. On 11.05.1997 “AnandaBazar

Partrika” a Bengali daily reported, the then Chief Minister Jyoti Basu as being in favour

of utilising the scope of a liberalized economy. This had multiple effects on the depleted

economic scenario of Bengal.

The Government has patronised the use of high yielding varieties of seeds,

fertilizers etc. in line with the the principle of the Green Revolution. Consequently the

cost of agricultural inputs has increased because the cost of chemical fertilizers,

pesticides, irrigation has increased many-fold. In only the chemical fertilizers sector the

rate of increase is 78.36 per cent (Reference : Ratan Khasnobis, Paschimbanger

Krishiniti, Page-34, published by Mrittika). All the increases in price of agri-inputs are

attributed to the central government, but what is the Left Front Government’s

contribution in this hike in prices?

The State Government with its ‘limited’ power imposes indirect tax on diesel and

some daily necessary items to add fuel to the fire of the increasing trend in prices. The

peasants, burdened with such huge expenditure for survival are forced to bargain away

their last hope that is their land. Poor peasants and sharecroppers are gradually

dispossessed of their lands. The recent 10th

Finance Commission has indicated that it will

recommend more grants to the States that would carry on the programme of

liberalization.

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M. New Industrial Policy

Now in recent years the Left Front Govt. is acquiring agricultural land from the

peasants in the name of industrialization. On 4th August 2005, the State Assembly

resolved to pass the West Bengal Land Reforms (Amendment) Bill, Section 14(q) (West

Bengal Land reforms Act prohibits ownership of more than 18 acres, including those in

the homestead category, in irrigated areas; the limit is 24 acres in non-irrigated areas)

where Govt. wanted to legalise and encourage the process and accordingly section 14(q)

of the Amendment Bill proposes to lift the ceiling to attract investment in the name of

promoting cash crops, plantations, contract farming, tourism, infrastructure, urban

construction and renewal etc.

The Left Front Govt. is thus thinking of rewriting land reform laws and handing

over arable land to those who ever comes across the world to hunt for thousands of acres

of land with a promise to promote a new and modern West Bengal.

The following table gives an few estimates of the land sanctioned to the investors

for their purposes :

Location Land required (in acres) Investors Proposed construction

Rajarhat (North 24-

pgs.)

850 Hidco &

Bengal

Peerless

Urban construction,

knowledge city etc.

Singur (Hooghly) 1000 Tata Motors Motor Industry

Kharagpur (west

medinipur)

1280 Tata Motors Telcom, Motor spare

parts.

Uluberia (Howrah) 2000 Salim Group Industiral hub

Bhangar (South 24-

pgs.)

5100 Salim Group Urban construction,

knowledge city etc.

Purba Medinapur 15000 Salim Group Chemical Hub

Source : Ananda Bazar Patrika, 26.7.2006)

Now, the most controversial debate is going on in West Bengal for the allotment

of agricultural land to the Salim group and Tata Motors. The two investors have chosen

the agricultural lands in the multi-cropped areas. The 44,000 crores investment promised

by Indonesian Salim group by developing entertainment Park, urban constructions,

knowledge city, hospitals, road constructions etc. for 5,100 acres and 15000 acres for

chemical hub of land have to be handed over to them in Bhangar (South 24-Parganas)

and Purba Medinipur. The Tata Motors demanded 1000 acres of land in Singur

(Hooghly) which is also a multi-cropped area. They would be assembling motor cars. As

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a result a large section of peasants and their families would lose their traditional

livelihoods and homes.The ecological balance will be hampered. The conversion of

agricultural lands to non-agricultural purposes & food security will endanger in the near

future. According to Govt. report since the last 5 years 1.20 lakh acres of agricultural

land has been converted to non-agricultural land and Left Front Govt. now planning to

acquire more than 1 lakh acre of agricultural land for industrialization in the next 5

years.

The Cultivable land of the State in between 1960s and 1990s has lost 5.89 lakh

hectares due to various reason (Ref : Economic Review, 2003-04).

N. Land Acquisition and Peasant Resistance

The present phase of land acquisition in West Bengal started as soon as the

seventh Left Front (LF) Government came to power in May, 2006. In fact, the main

slogan of the Left Front Govt. in the pre-election campaign was industrialization of West

Bengal. So, it was no wonder that the Left Front Government would go all out of fulfil its

election promise by reinvigorating the process of industrialization in a state that was one

of the first to be industrialized in colonial India. The problem started immediately after

the polls with the government’s intention to acquire 1,000 acres of prime agricultural land

in Singur of Hooghly district of setting up of a motor car plant by Tata Motors. When on

25th May, Tata Motors officials visited Singur, the villagers registered their protest

against land acquisition.

On the same day (May, 25) the state industry minister Nirupam Sen announced

that the state government was going to acquire 32,000 acres of land in the districts

surrounding Kolkata as a primary step to set up new industries. He also stated that the

government would acquire land wherever the industrialists would like to set up their

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industrial units (Ref. Ananda Bazar Patrika, 26th

May, 2006). The same newspaper also

quoted the report of the secretary of the state land reforms department as saying that

land lessness was increasing in the state. The number of landless in the state has

increased by 2.5 million in the last five years, amounting to a total of 7.4 million. He also

reported that agricultural land was reduced by 1,20,000 acres during the same period,

an average of 24,000 acres a year. So, it was not unnatural that peasant resistance would

begin to take shape at different places in different ways. But Singur and Nandigram

became the focal point of peasant agitation against agricultural land acquisition.

Resisting Agricultural Land Acquisition : The Singur farmers organized themselves in

a “save agricultural land committee” soon after the May-25 protest. They started with a

demonstration on June 1st in front of the local BDO office and have continued their

agitation in different forms. In all these protests, a significant presence and active

participation of peasant women was noteworthy. On many occasions they formed the

majority among the agitators. Whenever the government officials tried to enter the

villages to serve the notifications to the farmers for acquiring land, the women appeared

with brooms and sticks in their hands after alerting others by blowing conch shells. The

involvement of women in the movement and the intensity of their participation might

only be compared with women’s role in the Tebhaga movement in the late 1940s. The

maximum land of five mouzas namely, Gopalnagar, Bajemelia, Beraberi, Khaserbheri

and Sinherbheri under Singur block is identified for acquisition of Tata Motors. These

areas are inhabited mostly by marginal and small farmers who constitute more than 50

percent of the population. There is also a sizeable section (25-30 per cent) of bargadars

and landless people who mostly belong to the scheduled caste (SC) category. Being

located at a distance of only 40 km from Kolkata, the people of Singur are closely linked

with life in the city. Many of the landowners are engaged in services and business, while

their lands are tilled either by the bargadars or by the landless and marginal peasants

leasing-in those lands. A section of the poor people in Singur also frequents the nearby

town, being employed in factories, shops and small business. Some of the youths have

migrated to cities like Mumbai, Delhi and Bangalore working their principally as

goldsmiths or construction workers. There were several cases of reverse migration when

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people came back to their village after the closing down of the industries where they were

working or finding it more profitable to work on the land than to work in petty industries

or business, drawing a paltry sum in lieu of hard labour. So the people here are quite

aware of the present situation in industry; the only car factory situated in the same

district, i.e, Hindustan Motors is known to have reduced its workforce almost by half

over the years and is still in crisis.

The land selected for the Tata Motors’ project is fully irrigated by both canal

water (a Damodar Valley Corporation canal passes through the villages) and

groundwater, having two deep tube wells and 27 mini deep tube wells. The land here is

fertile enough with a yield rate of 2,436 kg. per hectare for rice and 26,604 kg. per

hectare for potato, which is the main cash crop of the area. While the yield rate for rice is

little less than the state average of 2,504 kg. per hectare, the same for potato is higher in

this area than the state average of 24,711 kg. per hectare (Ref : Statistical Handbook and

District Statistical Handbook, 2004, BAES, Govt. of West Bengal). The other main crops

are jute and vegetables that grow in abundance in this area.

Peasant Movement in Singur : The poorer sections of the peasantry, who are the worst

sufferers in the forefront of the movement. The made a front named ‘Save Agricultural

Land Movement’ seeking help from all those coming forward in support of their cause. In

fact, Singur has not only become the rallying ground for all anti-Left Front forces, but it

has also been able to draw the attention and support from different quarters like social

and human rights activists, intellectuals and academicians from Kolkata, as well as those

from other parts of India and abroad.

Peasant Movement in Nandigram : Situated in East Midnapore District, Nandigram is

the multi crops areas has been designated by the Left Front Government as the site of a

15,000 acre agricultural land for Special Economic Zone (SEZ) that is to be given over to

the Salim Group. Farmers and villagers in nandigram rose up in protest in early January

’07 after the local Haldia Development Authority served notice that it was beginning the

process of expropriating land for the proposed SEZ. Villagers blockaded roads and

bridges and clashed with police, who mounted lathi-charges and opened fire with live

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ammunition. (The lathi is a long wooden stick, usually made of bamboo, used as a

weapon). Police have attacked demonstrators, lobbed tear-gas at them, broken into and

ransacked their dwellings, and taken protesters, including young girls, into custody.

The violence climaxed on 14th March, 2007, the several reports say that at least 15

people were reportedly shot dead by police and at least 150 persons were injured in the

shooting and other incidents.

Farmers and villagers had promised they would not leave their agricultural land at

any cost. At last the State Government also declared they are not interested to set up SEZ

in Nandigram.

O. Contract Farming

In the era of globalization, the Left Front Government and the corporate bosses

are pressuring the Bengal peasantry for diversification of their crop-pattern. In this

moment, the State Government appointed the American consultancy firm ‘Mckinsey’ for

their suggestion on the Bengal’s agrarian sector. Mckinsey has already presented their

report to the West Bengal Govt. and in fact suggested that 41 per cent of arable land (65

lakh acres) should be used for diversification from paddy to vegetables and fruits like

potato, pineapple, lichi and mango (Ref : Paschimbanger Krishiniti, Mrittika

publication). Their arguments also the small farm holdings are not economically viable.

The peasants are lacking the resources and their economic status is too low. Hence they

cannot invest in farming. They cannot employ machinery on their tiny holdings. They

cannot use the resources efficiently. It is not possible for them to grow export-oriented

crops. They are not fully absorbed in their farming. They incur heavy losses in their

personal cultivation. Corporate farming is the only alternative for them etc. All are the

harmful suggestions for the peasant community. In India, the other states like

Maharashtra, Andhra Pradesh, Punjab, Haryana etc. had introduced the contract farming

under the pressure of globalization. But the consequences are disastrous. Farmers have

lost their land, the only source of their livelihood and had to commit suicide. The daily

suicide of the Vidharva’s (Maharashtra) farmers is the burning example.

The West Bengal Govt. also preparing for contract farming, they invited many

agro-based industrialists like Ambani, Pepsico and Dabur etc. for their investment in this

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state. Dabur has already started their contract farming in near Siliguri. ‘We have begun

assisting 50 model farms each in north Bengal and the north-east to ensure that the

produce we buy for our Siliguri plant is in line with international norms’, Dabur Foods

CEO has said (Ref : Times of India, 21.11.2006). We know the fate of contract farming in

Bengal is not fortunate. In the colonial times when Neel chhas (cultivation) was

introduced in Bengal by contract farming for the benefit of British merchants, the

starvation began in rural Bengal and more than 10 lakhs of rural people, mostly poor

peasants, died due to starvation.

P. New class in rural Bengal

Important changes in conditions of cultivation (e.g., the spread of bodo paddy

cultivation, multi-cropping, the shift from mainly rain-fed to mainly irrigation-dependent

farming in many areas) and a certain degree of development of productive forces (in

inputs like HYV seeds, machinery, techniques and skills) over the past three decades have

emerged a new jotedar (gramin mahajan) class in rural Bengal.

It is a fact that the old type of jotedars or landlords are very few now-a-days, but

this does not mean the poor and landless peasants have been liberated from feudal type

control, extra-economic exploitation and coercion. It is also a fact that in respect of land

possession the new rich do not match the earlier landlords, yet this new class does not till

the land on its own, and they continue in tandem, both in the supervision of cultivation

and various types of business. They are the suppliers of pump sets, tractors on hire, they

deal in seeds, manures, pesticides, etc., and they own the husking machines and control

the wholesale market of rice and other produce from land. Most of them are close to the

parties in power, many have also turned into leaders of the ruling party.

What is notable is that instead of eliminating feudalism, this new rural rich retain

the features of feudalism. The deception of the poor peasants, through under-payment of

wages; the colossal presence of agricultural labourers without jobs for half of the year;

the leasing out of land or giving out in barga; forcible sale of produce by the peasants

much below the market price; the widespread tentacles of usurers charging high interest

rates; the strong correlation between poverty level of manual labour on the one hand and

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the caste status; etc. — are all pointers to the distorted capitalist penetration retaining

semi-feudal relations.

Let us refer, once again, from Suryakanta Mishra and Vikash Rawal: “As the land

reforms could not be combined with a large-scale provision of formal credit and non-

land inputs, the small and marginal farmers who had obtained land under the land

reform programme were again exposed to the sections of rural society that controls other

forms of capital…Although the old types of moneylending have declined…their place has

been taken up by new types of moneylenders. It is basically a pre-capitalist relation,

though of a new type” (Ref : Agrarian relations in contemporary West Bengal and tasks

for the Left-2002).

Ajit Narayan Basu found that in the last 30 years in West Bengal the numbers of

land owners and share croppers have increased by 16.58 lakh. And many of the owners

themselves do not till land, they supervise the agricultural activities. Such supervising

families are basically engaged as teachers or in services in the government or private

sector (Ref : Pachimbanger Arthaniti O Krishiniti).

It is the top rung of these substantive farmers that constitute the Bengal version of

kulak (rich) class. They often appoint managers to supervise their sprawling operations,

send their sons (rarely, daughters too) for higher education in metropolitan centres and

maintain close relations with dominant political parties. They wield the maximum social

authority and control political power at local levels, providing the funds and materials

(rice, liquor etc.) needed for mobilising votes. They have no qualms about changing

political sides.

According to the latest round of rural investigation conducted by Rural Labour

Enquiry, New Delhi, mahajani loans in West Bengal (loans taken from village

moneylenders) constituted 28.51% of the total rural credit while credit from cooperative

societies accounted for only 7.06% The rest 64.43% were provided with loans by

commercial banks, but as much as 62.19% of this loan was cornered by the above 3 bigha

households which constitute only about 28% of rural households. The below 3 bigha

households, i.e., 72%, had to be content with less than 38% of bank credit. This group,

however, took more than 56% of mahajani loans. Generally speaking, the trend is for the

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poorer families to depend perforce on such loans, often used up on mere subsistence or

exigencies like marriage, shradhha etc.

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“The cost of cultivation has risen several times, so marginal and small farmers are being forced to take

loans from mahajans (moneylenders) or, alternatively, to lease out their lands to rich farmers on seasonal

basis. Distress sale of land is also witnessed. Capitalist concentration of land is taking place.”

-From the Report adopted at the CPI(M)’s Sixth Pandua Zonal Conference, Hooghly District,

December 2001-

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Q. Condition of agricultural labourers

In fact, overwhelming majority of the Indian peasants are either landless or poor,

whose conditions are deplorable and miserable. There are millions of agricultural workers

living in penury. In percentage these peasants and agricultural workers constitute roughly

90 percent of the population engaged in agriculture. In absolute terms they are nearly 600

million or 60 crores in India.

Two decades ago, of every hundred families in rural India, 31 families were

landless. Today, the figure has gone up to 41 families out of every hundred. This is a

huge number, more than the entire population of many countries (Source: Rural Enquiry

Report-2004, Govt. of India).

According to the West Bengal Govt. data, in the Left Front period the number of

landless agricultural workers between 1981 and 1991 rose from 45.9 per cent to 46.4 per

cent. In the whole of the 1970s their number increased by 6 lakh while in the decade 1980

it jumped twice that number i.e.12 lakh. It shows clearly that the lands owned by peasants

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through vest land acquisition is much less than the dispossessed lands of the peasants

who sold out their lands being thrust into economic distress (Ref : Ajit Narayan Basu,

Panchimbanger Arthiniti O Krishiniti).

According to 2001 census, the total numbers of agricultural labourers in West

Bengal are 130 lakh, out of them 74 lakh are completely landless. Even more 20 lakh

agricultural labourers who have 1-2 bighas of agricultural lands they have also spares

their labour in others land for livelihood. This total (74+20)=94 lakh agricultural workers

could hardly managed 150 working days in a year.

In the last 30 years in West Bengal the ratio of landowners and sharecroppers to

agricultural workers has been increased upto 16.58 lakh and at the same time the landless

agricultural workers has increased to 40.79 lakh. Since 1971 to 1991 during the 20 years,

landless agricultural workers and landowners agricultural workers was increased in the

same ratio. But in the last 10 years since 1991 to 2001 landowners agricultural workers

have declined to 2.32 lakh and on the other hand the landless agricultural labourers have

been increased to 22.96 lakh (Ref : Ajit Narayan Basu, Panchimbanger Arthiniti O

Krishiniti).

In the present globalization era, the Bengal peasants are not getting the profit, as a

result they, especially the poor and marginal peasants, are leaving the agricultural lands.

Accordingly the numbers of peasants are declining in this state. As per 2001 census

report since 1991 to 2001 the total numbers of peasants have been decreased 7.94 lakh

(10.46 per cent) and the landless agricultural labourers increased 18.89 lakh (24.63 per

cent) (Reference : Economic Review, 2002-03). In the decade of 90’s when the

liberalization, globalization policies have been implemented the landless agricultural

workers increasing process have accelerated. In the last three census reports the

increasing feature of landless agricultural labourers has given below :

Landless agricultural workers in west Bengal

1981-2001

Year Number

1981 38,92,000

1991 54,82,000 (46.1% of total

agricultural workers)

2001 73,71,000 (56.07% of

total agricultural workers)

Source : Census of India-2001

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The rural poverty is concerned with the problems of landless agricultural

labourers and marginal peasants. Rural poverty starts with the losing of agricultural land.

On the other hand they could get any work most of the days in a year in the fields. Govt.

also could not protect them under the minimum wage rules. Under these circumstances,

the agricultural workers could not get the minimum wages. The minimum wage fixed by

the state Government for the agrarian labourers is Rs.62.10, with some regional

variations. But it in reality remains a dream for agrarian labourers everywhere. Generally

they get Rs.28 to Rs.35 plus 2 kg. of rice, and in some places the wages are as low as

Rs.20 to Rs.25 only. Most of the agrarian labourers hardly (their total number being more

than 70 lakh) are getting jobs for only 100 to 130 days.

The Left rule West Bengal could not make any concrete policy about the wage

rules for agrarian labourers. But the other two left rule states viz. Tripura and Kerala

framed a wage policy for their agricultural labourers. In 1994 the Govt. of West Bengal

framed a status paper for workers but there is no mention about the agricultural labourers

in the state (Reference : Dangerous liaisons? Ben Rogaly, 1999).

As all wage labour is by definition contractual, but atleast a couple of new

features gives our special attention in rural Bengal. One, the labour haat : Workers and

employers from nearby (and also rather distant, but not very far) villages meet in an open

field in the morning and the latter choose and pick the required number of labourers for

the day. Only some – usually a minority – of the workers can sell themselves. Quite often

a worker who leaves home at daybreak comes back at midday empty-handed (he has

spent his pocket money on to-and-fro bus fare unless he is wealthy enough to own a

bicycle) and with empty stomach, only to find his wife and children waiting in anxious

expectation. The labour haat is a crude, primitive form of capitalist labour market,

brought into being by shortage of employment opportunities and developed

communications. It differs from migration in that the latter takes the worker to a distant

place for fortnights/months on end, whereas the labour haat entails daily commutation. In

this market labour power is bought and sold, just like vegetables in the morning haat,

through hard, direct bargaining at a price approximating the ruling market rate. Almost

always (except during short peak seasons) it is a buyers’ market and the sellers, because

they are not organised, gain but little from their enhanced mobility.

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Secondly, phooran, or the system of hiring a group of local workers for a specific

job (say, harvesting the crop on a particular field) against an agreed lumpsum payment, is

growing more and more popular, particularly for harvesting work. The workers strain

themselves to the maximum, just as piece-rate workers in industries do, so that they can

finish the job quickly and take up another shift (or two) the same day. For a few days

their daily earning soars, while the employer gains by reaching the harvest to the market

ahead of other farmers. But the process sidelines the female and the middle-aged

workforce, and quickly drains out the vital energies of the younger ones.

Now let us consider migrations workers come from most parts of the state as well

as from the eastern and southern districts of Bihar, seeking employment in the main

double crop paddy and potato growing district of Bardhman, Hooghly and a few other

districts. The foremost source districts are Bankura, Birbhum, Malda, Murshidabad,

Jalpaiguri, and the North and South Dinajpurs.

The potential as well as the actual use of migrant workers help employers in

destination areas to keep the wage level depressed. In the source areas, on the other hand,

we find it difficult to build stable organisations of agrarian workers because its members

are frequently in the roaming mode (Reference : Dangerous liaisons? Ben Rogaly, 1999).

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R. Privatisation of Education

In the bygone days, the university campuses of West Bengal were plastened with

slogans against commercialization of education. But today the Left Front Government is

implementing commercialization of education, as a part of the liberalization policies.

The Left Front Govt. is also open to the idea of state universities tying up with

reputed foreign institutions. The Chief Minister told, ‘what’s the harm if Calcutta

University or Jadavpur University collaborates with Oxford University on a specific

coruse? (Source : Times of India, 19.01.2005).

The West Bengal Commerce and Industry Minister Mr. Nirupam Sen has

appealed to the NRIs (non resident Indians) and business houses to build up their schools,

thereby justifying private educational institutions right from the primary level. Now, in

Kolkata and the Suburbans, numerous Kindergarten and Montessori schools are coming

up. These spurious institutes are only hankering after money. They charge huge tuition

fees. The Government of West Bengal, though in its Commission in 1992 opined against

these institutions.

The Ashok Mitra Education Commission in reported that there is a “deficiency of

a minimum infrastructure – there are 30 per cent schools with one room, deficiency of

teachers and eminent. More than 30 per cent of schools are run by one or two teachers.

There is a lack of commitment of the teachers. They are engaged in many economic

activities besides education, etc.” The CAG (Comptroller and Auditor General) West

Bengal report 1998-99 also pictured a dismal scenario. It stated that since 1991-92 there

have been no grants for primary school education. The ‘Pratichi Trust’ led by Prof.

Amartya Sen reported on primary education in West Bengal also opined like Ashok Mitra

Commission.

In 1951, the total primary schools in West Bengal was 15,119, in 1981 it

increased to the numbers of 47,940. In the next decade it increased only 6 percent and

during 1991-99 it increased only 3 percent. In 1991-92, the primary school teacher was

1,84,748 but in 1999-2000 the number declined to 1,50,546. (Source : Primary Education

in West Bengal, Anil Acharya).

The total number of average student in West Bengal from class I to class IV is 1

crore. That means the average number of student is 20 lakh. From VI to VII the number

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of average student in per class is 11 lakh. From IX to X the average student is 7 lakh per

class and XI to XII it is only 3 lakh per class. So, it is seen on the above data that the 40

percent of student could not continues their studies after completion of primary

education. Overall, the 15 percent student can admit the higher secondary stage after

completion of primary education. (Source : Primary Education in West Bengal, Anil

Acharya).

Participation in School in West Bengal

(in percent)

(Source : Primary Education in West Bengal, Anil Acharya)

If such is the situation, then without going into details it can be concluded that this

is not a conducive atmosphere for rural education in Bengal. As a result the drop-out

percentage is increasing day to day in rural Bengal.

Age Rural Urban Total

(6-10 years)

Male

82.8 88.2 83.7

Female 80.8 87.9 82.1

(11-14 years)

Male

74.6 78.6 75.4

Female 66.9 74.9 68.7

(6-14 years) Male

79.4 83.8 80.2

Female 75.3 82.0 76.7

Completion of primary School 14.9 16.5 15.4

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S. Rural Health : Following Multinationals Dictates

In recent years, there is a hue and cry over the health system of West Bengal.

Everyday news of maltreatment, death due to wrong diagnosis, ill maintained

government hospitals are on the front pages of newspapers. The West Bengal

Government led by the Left Front pretends that all is normal with inhuman coolness.

The Government of West Bengal has borrowed Rs.701 crores from the World

Bank to revamp the State’s health system. The World Bank has chosen West Bengal as

one of the three states to carry on the pilot project; along with Punjab and Karnataka.

In rural areas in West Bengal, the infrastructure of most of the rural health centres

and hospitals are not sufficient. Acute shortage of staff, doctors and equipments are the

real pictures in the rural Bengal. Even more, there is no primary arrangement for oral

treatment in most of the rural health centres. On the other hand, the rural poor depend on

rural health centres or hospitals for their treatment.

Recently, the Govt. of West Bengal planned that the panchayat presidents look

after the local health centres or hospitals. We know the panchayats have a very small

resource base. But, the above decision is tantamount to the fact that those panchayat-

supervised health centres will soon be privatized and the rural poor people will fall into

the big trouble for their treatment.

The leading newspaper ‘The Telegraph’ on dated 25.02.05 reported that the

Health Department of West Bengal has decided to hand over clinical test facilities at 19

rural hospitals in 13 districts to private organizations as the government will not be able

to fill up vacancies to deal with an acute shortage of staff. The private clinics will be

allowed to use the hospital building and equipment and will be given electricity and

water. In return, they will have to charge rates fixed by the government for tests, said an

official.

Medical Associations in the State have opposed the State Government’s decision

and said that in this way the rural poor people will be in trouble and not get free

treatment.