Introduction The issue relates to the validity of section 44-47 of the Terrorism Act 2000. The Court dismissed the appellants’ application for judicial review. Also, the Court of Appeal made no order on the appellants’ claims against the Commissioner and dismissed the claims against the Security of State. Except the Court of the Justice of the European Communities, The House of Lords and other courts dismissed the appeals.

Facts A protest against an arms fair, took place outside in London on 9 Sep 2003. While riding his bicycle nearby, Mr. Gilian, who was Phd student and had intended to attend the protest, was stopped and searched by two officers. The officers found nothing incriminating after searching him and his rucksack. A copy of the Stop and Search Form “5090” was given to him, recording that he was stopped and searched under section 44 of the Act. The search was said to be for ‘Articles concerned in terrorism’.

Ms Quinton, a freelance journalist, was in the protest on the same day to record the protest. She wore a photographer’s jacket and was carrying a video camera when stopped by an officer near the Centre. Ms Quniton explained that she was a journalist and produced her press passes when asked why she had appeared out of some bushes.

After searching her, the officer found nothing incriminating and gave her a copy of the Form 5090 recording that the object and grounds of the search were POTA, a reference to the Act and that the search lasted five minutes. Ms Quinton however estimated that it lasted for thirty.

Judgement Firstly, the court rejected the appellant's submissioin that the word 'expedient' in Section 44(3) of the Act means necessary as the two words having different meanings and the parliament choosing the first one instead of the second as he found that Parliamnet did appreciate the significance of the power it was conferring, providing a series of constraints.

Asistant Commissioners and a senior Home Office civil servant 's witness statements had two effects. Firstly, it advised Lord Bingham that potential terrorism targets are not limited to Central London and thus the authorization was not excessive which included suburbs

of outer London. Secondly, together with the fact that renewal was authorized by s46(7) of the Act, the statements decide that the succession of authorization from February 2001 until September 2003 was not a mere routine exercise.

Next, in determining whether the search of a person constituted a lack of respect for private life as expressed in the Convention. He held that the ordinary search and instrusion of a person hardly reached the level of seriousness to engage the operation of the Convention.

He also held that the proper exercise of the power as conferred could be regarded as anything other than proportionate. He also found that the authorization was a proportionate one, weighting up that the threat of terrorism against the shortlived invasion of privacy and theoretical deprivation of liberty.

Although he did not rule out the possibility that the proper use of the power to stop and search may infringe the Convention rights to free expression and free assembly, he finds it hard to conceive of such circumstances.

Finally, the appellant final submission concerned the expressions prescribed by law and in accordance with law as found in the Convention. He stated that law in this context meant the Act as well as the authorization and confirmation.

He considered whether the authorization was sufficiently accessible and sufficiently precise to enable the individual to foresee the consequences and if so, whether the process is nonetheless arbitrary. By relying on the principle in Malone v United Kingdom that foreseeability cannot mean that an individual should be able to foresee when the authorities are likely to intercept … so that he can adapt his conduct accordingly.

Lord Hope held that a system that is to be effective has to be flexible. Lord Bingham held that the Act and Code A were both public documents and clearly describes and sets out the structure of law within which the power must be exercised.

Related to arbitary power, the Lord focused on discrimination. However, Lord Bingham, found this issue an ‘impossible contention on the facts by refering to R(European Roma Rights Cenre) v Immigration Officer at Prague Airport

(United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees intervening) (Roma).He pointed out that terrorism is often linked to groups of similar racial and ethnic background. In testing whether the action was discriminatory, the Roma case stood for the principle that each individual should be treated as such and not a sterotyped member of the group. In reference to this case, Lord Hope held that a perosn’s racial or ethnuic background may be a first indication to the officer, but a further selection process must take place before the power is exercised. Therefore, it is posibel to exrcise power on person s of Asian orignin in such a way that is not discriminatory.

In conclusion, by relying on Roma case, he states that selectively targeting of those regarded by the police as most likely to be terrorist is legitimate although it may lead to an abuse use of power.

Lord Scott held that the statutory authority of the Act would validate any discrimination to the degree as required by the use of stop and search powers as conferred by section s45(1) of the Act.

Comment It is hard to achieve a balnce between effective anti-terrorism law and human rights but it is definitely a sensitive issue. This judgement not only binds on all lower courts, but also it clear indicates to the general public on where society stands on issues of human rights and discriminations. Those groups who are most vulnerable to arbitrary and discriminatory abuse need to feel that their rights will be enforced and upheld by the jduical system. This judgement, I believe, could potentially increase feelings of victimization for particular ethnic group.