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British Politics and Policy

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British Politics and Policy at LSE ecollections

British Politics and Policy at LSE ecollections bring together key articles rom the blog on specic themes so they can

be downloaded and read as a short series. We hope these will orm a useul resource or academics, students and those

interested in particular issues that are covered more extensively online. We welcome comments and suggestions as to

themes or uture ecollections.

The 2011 London Riots

British Politics and Policy at LSE ran in-depth coverage o the riots that took place in London and other major urban

centres in England in the summer o 2011, and their atermath. This ecollection is a select sample o some o the mostinteresting posts rom that series and provides an opportunity to rethink and re-engage with commentary and analysis that

was being written as events were still unolding. Access to the ull spectrum o articles is available online.

The articles contained herein give the views o the author(s), and not the position o the British Politics and Policy at LSE

blog, nor o the London School o Economics.

Table o Contents

The vulnerability o the British state deeper lessons rom the urban riots

Patrick Dunleavy

David Cameron may fnally have ound community spirit amongst the riot clean-up, but recent events spell the end or his

Big Society antasy

Amy Mollett

The crude moralism that characterises looters and rioters as scum is evidence that space or political debate about the

causes o things is becoming dangerously limited

Mary Evans

The long-standing tension between police and politicians needs to be dealt with now. We cannot keep politics out o the

police, and we should not seek to

Tim Newburn

Research shows that governments trying to impose cuts above 2 per cent o GDP have been met with a major surge in

social instability

Hans-Joachim Voth & Jacopo Ponticelli

Punitive reactions by ministers and the judiciary seek to deter uture riots. But i such measures undermine the perceived

airness and legitimacy o the criminal justice system and worsen police-community relations, they could prove counter-

productive

Chris Gilson

The riots and the Occupy movement are both protests against, and a rejection o, an economy that is no longer working

or most ordinary citizens

Rodney Barker

British Politics and Policy

Climate Change and Environmental Policy

http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/politicsandpolicy/http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/politicsandpolicy/http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/politicsandpolicy/category/london-riots-2011/http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/politicsandpolicy/category/london-riots-2011/http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/politicsandpolicy/http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/politicsandpolicy/

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Patrick Dunleavyargues that MPs and government ministers need to take some deeper-lying lessons o the

riots to heart. Governance is difcult and needs to be taken seriously. All o modern society relies on the

eective operations o the state, with the consent o the governed. Once the state is eneebled or consent is

withdrawn, by any signifcant group, the costs and risks o governing rise at an exponential rate.

What was David Cameron thinking on the plane back rom Italy to chair the COBRA (emergency cabinet oce brieng)

meeting on stopping London burning? How did Boris Johnson while away the hours beore returning so late and so

reluctantly rom Vancouver? How did Nick Clegg eel as his planned Birmingham walk-about ended in conusion,

surrounded by angry citizens inviting him to get lost? Lets hope that all o them mused and refected on the vulnerability

o the British state to sudden shocks and unexpected crises.

Ater the phone-hacking scandal kept Parliament in London or two unexpected extra days in July, now the Commons willmeet again in the deadest o all political months to do that most dicult o all things trying to jam the (evil) genie back

in the bottle ater someone, somehow, let it out. There has already been discussion o the circumstances that triggered

the whole crisis last weekend, but the lesson-drawing must go ar wider than that.

For a Conservative party that had been out o power since 1997, the return to government was always going to

be dicult. But it was hugely compounded in in 2010 by the culture that developed amongst the resurgent Tories,

contemptuous o the Brown government as it became mired in economic crisis and the prime minister lost touch with the

electorate. Senior civil servants have told me repeatedly that what astonished them about Conservative ministers coming

into oce was their combined condence and complacency. The Tories had convinced themselves that governance was

easy, both ideologically because they wanted a smaller state and minimal public services, and in personal practice. Liberal

Democrat ministers were more nervous and earnest theyd never done this beore but later bought into the Tory ethos

as i in catch-up mode.

Far-reaching decisions were made in a relaxed, almost recklessly condent way. Everything in the coalition agreement

between the two parties began to be implemented in a no-questions-asked manner what was written must get done.

The Number 10 political machine was staed with inexperienced olk, who let ministers wander o and do almost what

they liked, beore waking up months too late to some o the implications. The government decided to reorganize the

whole NHS almost casually and with little debate.

Ministers roze public sector pay or two years, because it helped x the books, and then publicly pilloried every high paid

public servant. There was no consideration that perhaps the government would need allies on their side. The Chancellor

and Chie Secretary enorced unsustainable cuts o up to 40 per cent in departmental budgets over our years, including

radical surgery on the police budget. Ministers tripled student ees and scrapped the Educational Maintenance Allowance,

which millions o teenagers at school and college had come to rely on. When those aected protested, ministers smiledknowingly they knew that special interests would wail and moan, but these things were do-able. The government

would ace down its critics and resolution, political lan, would win the day.

In her excellent and entertaining book The March of Folly, the historian Barbara Tuchman dwelt on the quality o

wooden-headedness in political leaders the capacity to rack up political ascos in the ace o (lots o) advice to the

contrary. The recent collapse o public order across London, and its threatened or near collapse in every major city o the

country, will be an object lesson or political science students or years to come in how close a government can come to

creating a crisis out o almost nothing through inattention and neglect o the complexity o governance.

This is not the rst time that the potential ragility o the British state has been suddenly exposed on a new fank. Margaret

Thatchers government was amously rocked by riots in 31 British cities, sparking the Heseltine-led ght-back against her

hard-line policies which eventually scuppered her nine years later, ollowing a second wave o poll tax riots. In 2000 the

Blair government was suddenly beached out o nowhere, helplessly failing or a week in the ace o a nationwide protestover uel prices that almost caused garages to run out o uel.

The vulnerability o the British state deeper lessons rom the urban riots

Published: 10 August 2011

http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/politicsandpolicy/2011/08/09/met-riots-handling/http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/politicsandpolicy/2011/08/09/met-riots-handling/http://www.amazon.co.uk/March-Folly-Barbara-Wertheim-Tuchman/dp/0349106746/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&qid=1312967429&sr=8-1http://www.amazon.co.uk/March-Folly-Barbara-Wertheim-Tuchman/dp/0349106746/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&qid=1312967429&sr=8-1http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/politicsandpolicy/2011/08/09/met-riots-handling/http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/politicsandpolicy/2011/08/09/met-riots-handling/

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What ministers need to realize is that modern government, in Britain more than almost any other western state, runs on

ne margins. Everything that government does everything relies on the active consent o the governed. Decades o

new public management (NPM) policies implemented by Conservative and Labour governments have let us with an

administrative machine that is ne-tuned to run at minimal cost, so long as things go on as expected. But as soon as that

ceases to be true, an NPM state is incredibly ragile it can grind up very switly in the light o new events or which there

is no reserve o slack resources, no deence in depth.

We do not have enough tax inspectors to make people pay tax i they dont want to. We do not remotely have enough

uture tax revenues coming in to back up or bail out the liabilities that UK banks have incurred. We do not have enough

police to maintain order in any o our cities i just enough people gather in the same place bent on looting. We rely on a

whole nexus o ragile social ties to keep the show on the road, some apparently tenuous or intangible, but nonethelessvitally important. We also rely to a high degree on the mission commitedness o many public service occupations.

Writing nearly a year ago now, I pointed out the extent to which Conservative ministers were practicing a orm o

zombie new public management dating rom when they were last in oce in the mid-1990s, and I orecast that

it was doomed to ail. I also argued that every government needs allies and lots o goodwill within the public services,

i they are to get change done, or even keep things running. Since then the NHS reorms have crashed and burned; the

privatisation o UK orests has been reversed; economic growth has ebbed away into the sands; and public order has

spectacularly collapsed.

When Parliament reassembles tomorrow to debate the riots, it is important that MPs o all parties try to renounce

ideological simplicities and grapple in grown-up ways with acutely dicult governance problems. Sheer criminality

is a good description o the riots, but the potential or the sel-same sheer criminality has always been with us. Why

did it happen at this time, on this scale, when it did not happen beore? Once it has happened, on this scale and withadditional scary complications such as the casual arson o cars and buildings, how can the recurrence o uture outbreaks

be prevented? Watching Michael Gove blustering and posturing on BBCs Newsnightprogramme, one sensed that the

Cabinet minister had not even begun to take his responsibilities seriously.

The orthcoming political year is not going to be an easy one or the government. Cuts to police orces are likely to be

rozen, and later quietly abandoned. The cross-public sector pay reeze must end in real wage negotiations again by spring

2012. Public sector trade unions whose members living standards have been slashed by 10 per cent or more will be

looking or a catch-up pay rise, and their members will be almost unanimous in backing them. A spring o discontent

could lock down the economy in the run-up to the Olympics i ministers try to dey the inevitable need or normal wage-

bargaining to be resumed. The economy looks like it will fat-line anyway, and even the Olympics may have negative net

economic eects.

Ministers are living in interesting times. They need to recognize that the British state operates on ne margins and is

acutely vulnerable to a withdrawal o consent, by any group. They need to start listening harder to messages they are

disinclined to hear. They need to build allies across government and across civil society, and to do it quickly beore it

becomes impossible. They need to do more evidence-based, sophisticated policy-making. The alternative is keep 16,000

police up every night o the year to police London- a route that could be very expensive indeed.

About the author

Patrick Dunleavy is Proessor o Political Science and Public Policy at the London School o Economics and Political Science,

where he has worked since 1979.

http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/politicsandpolicy/2010/10/07/what-is-the-cameron-clegg-governance-strategy-their-basic-statecraft-when-the-chips-are-down-in-the-age-of-austerity-zombie-%E2%80%98new-public-management%E2%80%99-is-never-going-to-work/http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/politicsandpolicy/2010/10/07/what-is-the-cameron-clegg-governance-strategy-their-basic-statecraft-when-the-chips-are-down-in-the-age-of-austerity-zombie-%E2%80%98new-public-management%E2%80%99-is-never-going-to-work/http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/politicsandpolicy/2010/10/07/what-is-the-cameron-clegg-governance-strategy-their-basic-statecraft-when-the-chips-are-down-in-the-age-of-austerity-zombie-%E2%80%98new-public-management%E2%80%99-is-never-going-to-work/http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/politicsandpolicy/2010/10/08/more-on-zombie-%E2%80%98new-public-management%E2%80%99-%E2%80%93-solutions-to-avoid-obsolescent-governance-ideas-wrecking-the-coalition-government%E2%80%99s-programme/http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/politicsandpolicy/2010/10/08/more-on-zombie-%E2%80%98new-public-management%E2%80%99-%E2%80%93-solutions-to-avoid-obsolescent-governance-ideas-wrecking-the-coalition-government%E2%80%99s-programme/http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/politicsandpolicy/2010/10/07/what-is-the-cameron-clegg-governance-strategy-their-basic-statecraft-when-the-chips-are-down-in-the-age-of-austerity-zombie-%E2%80%98new-public-management%E2%80%99-is-never-going-to-work/

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Following the looting and vandalism in areas across London during the frst ew days o the riots, hundreds

o people came out to help clear up the mess and put their neighbourhoods back on track. Amy Mollett writes

that this example o Big Society spirit is admirable, but the damage caused by disengaged, angry, and bored

young people shows that the Prime Ministers dream o a Big Society is over.

Hundreds o local residents gathered outside Hackney Town Hall on Tuesday morning in an eort to start cleaning up

the streets ater the extreme vandalism and looting that took place in the Hackney Central area the previous night. Ater

watching with shock and disgust the events o Monday evening, residents came out in support o the local area, wielding

brooms and bin liners. Some lived nearby on the heavily damaged Pembury Estate but many others came rom streets and

areas not aected. Similar acts o kindness and concern happened in other areas o the capital, mostly organised through

the Twitter account @riotcleanup, which now has nearly 90,000 ollowers.Such positive community spirit displayed through the voluntary clean-up operation across London may be characteristic

o David Camerons fagship policy idea, the Big Society. Re-launched or the ourth time in May, the key areas o the

agenda involve community engagement, social action, and helping people to come together to improve their own lives.

National support or the volunteers who spent the day helping to put right the damage in the lives o others certainly

alls under this category. Some media reports live rom the clean-up praised the Big Society in action, claiming that i

everybody pulled together the community would be back on its eet in a short time.

It is unlikely, however, that the commendable clean-up eorts mark a resurgence o support or Camerons idea. The

sparks o big society rhetoric are ignoring what should really be ocused on: that Camerons dream is over and lies in the

ashes o the burned out buildings.

Residents questioned in anger and disbelie why young people were destroying their very own community, their ownlocal shops, barbers, o licenses, and independent businesses. I rioting was a way o showing anger at the police ater

the death o Mark Duggan, then why take it out on their own high streets? But whether their actions were connected to

Duggans death or not, many o those responsible or the damage do not eel that they actually belong to any community

or society. In boroughs where more than hal o youth centres are closing, youth unemployment is rising, and

negative experience with police is repeated through the generations, many children and young adults eel that the

community has nothing to oer them. David Cameron could not have received a clearer message that were not all in this

together.

Once the damage to the streets is repaired Cameron and others should turn their attention to eelings o isolation and

anger. In a recent blog post Tony Travers noted that Haringey Council will need assistance in returning Tottenham to

normal as quickly as possible. This is true, but normal is not good enough. Normal will continue to breed the same eelings

o dispossession, violence, and parallel, antisocial communities. The government needs to go way beyond normal in orderto avoid repeating the scale o recent events.

When it was rst launched, the Big Society was criticised as an austerity measure in disguise, cutting unds to charities and

organisations which carry out essential community unctions, and instead emphasizing the importance o voluntary action,

which costs the government nothing. It should now be obvious that cutting services or young people is part o the larger

problem. Some will ask why the government should reinvest in areas that have been torched and damaged by young

people, and I hope that the deence o reinvestment is just as obvious.

The violence and destruction o the last ew days is not acceptable, but some o it can be explained. The Big Society, i it

ever meant anything to anyone, certainly means a lot less now.

About the author

Amy Mollett joined the LSE Public Policy Group in September 2010 as a Junior Researcher. She is now the managing editor

o the LSE Review o Books. She holds an MSc in Gender and Social Policy rom the London School o Economics and a

BA in English Language and Gender Studies rom the University o Sussex.

David Cameron may fnally have ound community spirit amongstthe riot clean up, but recent events spell the end or his BigSociety antasy

Published: 10 August 2011

http://twitter.com/riotcleanuphttp://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2011/may/23/david-cameron-big-society-projecthttp://www.guardian.co.uk/society/video/2011/jul/31/haringey-youth-club-closures-videohttp://www.thisislondon.co.uk/money/article-23940925-fears-over-grim-youth-unemployment-milestone.dohttp://blogs.lse.ac.uk/politicsandpolicy/2011/08/08/tottenham-riots/http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/lsereviewofbooks/http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/lsereviewofbooks/http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/politicsandpolicy/2011/08/08/tottenham-riots/http://www.thisislondon.co.uk/money/article-23940925-fears-over-grim-youth-unemployment-milestone.dohttp://www.guardian.co.uk/society/video/2011/jul/31/haringey-youth-club-closures-videohttp://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2011/may/23/david-cameron-big-society-projecthttp://twitter.com/riotcleanup

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The riots in London and beyond sparked a renzy o comment that characterised those who rioted and looted

as scum. Mary Evans argues that this strict, emotional, moralism overruled any chance or a meaningul

political debate on the causes o the riots.

Never has the motto o the London School o Economics, Rerum Cognoscere Causas (to know the causes o things)

been more pertinent. But i the things to be understood are the riots o the last ew days, the causes are a bit more

controversial.

Thinking about causes is an idea that seems to be vanishing out o the collective consciousness o many in the media

and politics. There is not much dispute that people should not have to jump or their lives rom burning buildings or

that people should not steal. That is the easy bit. It is doing the dicult thing and being prepared to think about

why these things happened that seems to have vanished. It is not or a lack o suggestions about how the impact ovarious government cuts ( or example o the Educational Maintenance Fund and provision or youth services) will impact

communities. It is that these suggestions are somehow being ruled irrelevant, as i they belonged to a political and moral

universe that has nothing to do with behaviour on the streets.

Reusing the possibility o explanation, let alone understanding, empties politics o everything except a crude orm o

moralism. This moralism can only see the world and its inhabitants as good or evil, the scum who need to be swept

rom the street or the looters who, according to Tory MEP Roger Helmer, should be shot. Suddenly, a whole new kind o

sub-human person is created: a person whose greed or anger or avarice suddenly takes on a uniquely dangerous social

orm. Confating our general ears with political rhetoric that denies legitimacy to eective dissent causes us to neglect

identiying the causes o things and ignore connections and continuities within the social world.

Such an account o the world, in which we can only understand society in moralistic terms takes us towards theeradication o the social in a way that is ar more radical than the mere abolition o society. Without straying too ar into

a consideration o the world views o members o the present government it would appear as i they are all engaged in a

erce battle with any orm o material understanding o the world. David Cameron ound a magic spell that allowed him

to re-create himsel as an ordinary person and with this he did more than simply disguise his privileged origins, he made

these origins not matter. Wealth has been politically both normalised and neutralised.

Since it was decided David Camerons origins do not matter, the connection was broken between considering how

individual circumstance aects individual comprehension. It seemed to ollow that there was no need to ask questions

about the impact o vastly unequal wealth on social values and behavior: both the extent to which people would go to

deend this wealth and the place o those entirely outside any expectation o wealth or even adequate provision.

An absence o adequate provision is precisely what conronts ar too many people in those parts o the UK most aected

by riot. But to emphasise: this is not to identiy poverty (or in the younger generation, the airly certain expectation opoverty) as a single cause o street riots, thet and arson.

It is rather to suggest that political debate is becoming so uriously entrenched in a reusal o the material that what

emerges is a limited, and dangerously limiting, space or political debate and even negotiation. It may be that the present

government has come across those terriying reerences to the conditions o the collapse o capitalism in which growth

cannot be maintained and material misery becomes more widespread. Whether or not this is the case, it might be helpul

to encourage political debates that allow at least the naming (and a discussion o the implications) o the material.

About the author

Mary Evans is a Centennial Proessor at the LSE, based at the Gender Institute. She has written on various aspects o

gender and womens studies and many o those publications have crossed disciplinary lines between the social sciences

and the humanities.

The crude moralism that characterises looters and rioters as scumis evidence that space or political debate about the causes othings is becoming dangerously limited.

Published: 10 August 2011

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Relations between the government and the police urther deteriorated in the atermath o riots. Tim Newburn

argues that, tempting though it might be to see this as a small-scale difculty that will soon pass, in reality it is

symptomatic o a long-standing unresolved tension between police and politics in Britain.

There has been something o a spat over the policing o the recent riots. The Prime Minister argued that the initial

response was too timid and implied that it took government intervention to ratchet up police numbers on the streets

and help restore calm. Sir Hugh Orde, President o the Association o Chie Police Ocers, responded by saying that

the return o leading politicians rom holiday had been an irrelevance and that the subsequently more robust policing

tactics were not a unction o political intererence; they were a unction o the numbers being available to allow the

chie constables to change their tactics.

On the surace, the argument might have appeared to be simply about who could claim credit or the handling o thecrisis. Beneath the surace, however, the bigger argument was about who controls police tactics and, more particularly,

where the reasonable limits o political infuence should lie. This is a long-standing issue in British policing and the act that

it remains so contentious persuades me that it should be the subject o a major ocial inquiry.

Whenever the police nd themselves under pressure rom politicians, one o their rst go-to deences is to argue that

that it is vital that politics is kept out o policing. Quite what this is supposed to mean in reality is ar rom clear.

Indeed, keeping politics out o policing may be precisely the reverse o what we want. Moreover, the events o the last

ew months should have provided the clearest illustration o sheer impossibility o keeping politics out o policing. The

phone-hacking controversy and the role o the Metropolitan Police in that scandal, led quite rightly to sustained political

and public debate about the relationship between the constabulary and the press and, to a lesser degree, about how the

police should be governed and held to account.

In the last week or so the Tottenham riots and the subsequent looting renzies have stimulated considerable political

controversy over a number o subjects, not just police numbers and public order tactics, but also about proposed

government cuts, the introduction o elected police and crime commissioners, and the possibility o importing police chies

rom other countries, to name but a ew. I nothing else this should lead us to acknowledge that policing is necessarily a

matter o politics. Yet the idea persists that the two should not mix.

Much o the conusion in this area stems rom the idea o operational independence - a vague and little understood

principle in British policing. The notion derives on the one hand rom a number o legal judgements most amously by

Lord Dennings 1968 observation that the chie constable is answerable to the law and to the law alone and on

the other rom legislation which makes chie constables responsible or the direction and control o their orces.

This would not be particularly contentious i this idea (which is not dened anywhere in law) were interpreted as meaning

that senior police ocers are ree to use their proessional judgement in individual cases- ree rom political direction- andthen held accountable or those decisions aterward. However, independence in practice tends to be used much more

broadly. The vagueness o the distinction between matters that are operational and those that are questions o policy

has meant that the principle has been used by senior ocers and others as a means o attempting to resist political

infuence much more generally.

Indeed, it is not just the police. Politicians themselves are ar rom immune rom using such arguments. When the Labour

government proposed policing reorms in 2002, which included increasing the powers o the Home Secretary to intervene

directly in orces deemed to be perorming poorly, the Conservative opposition criticised the proposals or threatening

police independence.

Former Labour Home Secretary Charles Clarke has also recently attacked the government on a variety o the matters

already mentioned their proposals to introduce directly elected police and crime commissioners, the idea foated by the

Prime Minister that Bill Bratton, ex-Commissioner o the New York Police Department be appointed to lead the Met, and

attempts to infuence how the police responded to the riots on the grounds that each o these represented political

intererence or encouragement o direct political involvement in operational policing.

The long-standing tension between police and politicians needs tobe dealt with now. We cannot keep politics out o the police, andwe should not seek to.

Published: 17 August 2011

http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2011/aug/11/tories-attack-riot-policinghttp://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-14501236http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/politicsandpolicy/2010/03/18/who-put-politics-into-the-police/http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/politicsandpolicy/2010/03/18/who-put-politics-into-the-police/http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201011/cmselect/cmhaff/511/51106.htmhttp://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201011/cmselect/cmhaff/511/51106.htmhttp://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/1386273/Tories-fight-threat-to-police-independence.htmlhttp://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/1386273/Tories-fight-threat-to-police-independence.htmlhttp://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/1386273/Tories-fight-threat-to-police-independence.htmlhttp://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/1386273/Tories-fight-threat-to-police-independence.htmlhttp://www.thisislondon.co.uk/standard/article-23978231-charles-clarke-bill-bratton-is-not-the-man-to-lead-the-met.dohttp://www.thisislondon.co.uk/standard/article-23978231-charles-clarke-bill-bratton-is-not-the-man-to-lead-the-met.dohttp://www.thisislondon.co.uk/standard/article-23978231-charles-clarke-bill-bratton-is-not-the-man-to-lead-the-met.dohttp://www.thisislondon.co.uk/standard/article-23978231-charles-clarke-bill-bratton-is-not-the-man-to-lead-the-met.dohttp://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/1386273/Tories-fight-threat-to-police-independence.htmlhttp://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/1386273/Tories-fight-threat-to-police-independence.htmlhttp://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201011/cmselect/cmhaff/511/51106.htmhttp://blogs.lse.ac.uk/politicsandpolicy/2010/03/18/who-put-politics-into-the-police/http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-14501236http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2011/aug/11/tories-attack-riot-policing

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There may well be good grounds or attacking each and all o these proposals, but political intererence is not one

o them. The Prime Minister and the Home Secretary should be perectly ree to oer views on how the police should

operate, how they should be governed, and how best they might be managed. That is not to say chie constables should

respond slavishly to such views that would be an unreasonable politicisation o the police indeed constables should be

ree to ignore such views i they eel they have reasonable cause.

That is to say, in relation to a particular police operation, chie ocers should be ree not only to ignore political advice but

to have their ocers act in a quite dierent manner. Equally, having done so they must be accountable or their decisions

in the atermath. There should be operational reedom, but also accountability. It is in this sense that operational

independence is so obviously a misnomer.

The Independent Commission into the uture o policing in Northern Ireland set up ater the Good Friday agreement,chaired by Chris Patten, made precisely this point in 1999, stating:

In a democratic society, all public ofcials must be ully accountable to the institutions o that society or the due

perormance o their unctions, and a chie o police cannot be an exception. No public ofcial, including a chie

o police, can be said to be independent. Indeed, given the extraordinary powers conerred on the police, it is

essential that their exercise is subject to the closest and most eective scrutiny possible We strongly preer the

term operational responsibility to the term operational independence.

The Patten Commission raises the possibility that we have too little rather than too much political scrutiny o policing, at

least in some respects. Rather than keeping politics out o policing we need to be thinking much more clearly about how

we go about inserting democratic infuence much more centrally into policing. In recent decades the general drit has been

toward ever greater central control o policing, and an ever-diminishing role or locally-elected representatives. Some reshthinking about how and to what extent local constabularies should be infuenced and held accountable is long overdue.

This is the case not least because the one obvious exception to the general trend toward centralisation the high prole

role o the Mayor o London in the governance o the Met can hardly be said to have been an unmitigated success. The

orce is looking or its second new Commissioner in the space o three years and the orce itsel appears to be stumbling

rom crisis to crisis.

So where do we go rom here? Though they are deeply unashionable, I remain o the view that this is the moment or a

new Royal Commission on the Police. Governance and accountability ought to be the key themes, but unresolved issues

should be addressed: the number and nature o police orces in England and Wales (the current 43 have been largely

unchanged or the past 40 years), the resourcing o policing, and the independence and robustness o the complaints

system.

About the author

Tim Newburn is Proessor o Criminology and Social Policy and Head o the Social Policy Department at the London School

o Economics. His major research interests have ocused on policing and security, youth justice and policy-making and

policy transer.

http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/issues/police/patten/patten99.pdfhttp://blogs.lse.ac.uk/politicsandpolicy/2010/11/12/cuts-to-front-line-policing-poorer-service-complaints/http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/politicsandpolicy/2010/11/12/cuts-to-front-line-policing-poorer-service-complaints/http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/issues/police/patten/patten99.pdf

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Do government cut-backs lead to greater levels o social unrest? Hans-Joachim Voth and Jacopo Ponticelli have

analysed 90 years worth o data or 26 European countries and ound an unambiguous message - the more

governments cut, the greater the levels o social unrest.

Many incidents can lead to an eruption o violence rom the killing o Mark Duggan in London last Saturday to the high-

speed pursuit gone wrong which resulted in the Rodney King riots in LA in 1992. This begs the question: why are urban

areas at some points in time like tinderboxes? Why does it only take one act o police brutality or riots to erupt?

We have analysed this question or 26 European countries or the period 1919-2009 . We looked at instability in

a number o dimensions, rom the relatively mild to the deadly serious demonstrations, riots, general strikes, political

assassinations, and attempts at revolutionary overthrow o the established order. Ninety years o data send an unambiguous

message the more governments cut back spending, the greater the chances o social unrest. O course, not every rioter orlooter in the streets is merely trying to make a public statement against coalition cuts., but the chances o things going wrong

in a spectacular way increase as the scal conditions change. Once cuts go above 2 per cent o GDP, a major surge in the

requency o destabilizing incidents can be expected.

The same is not true or tax increases (the UKs experience with the poll tax not withstanding). While there are cases o unrest

when taxes are raised, the eect is mild, and could even be down to chance. The reason is that most o the time, taxes are

levied on people whose opportunity cost o rioting is high. Cuts, on the other hand, all disproportionately on those or

whom trouble-making is a low-cost aair.

Figure 1 shows our main result. The darker the bars, the larger the budget cuts (as a percentage o GDP) and the higher the

level o unrest. This relationship holds when we add up all indicators o instability (CHAOS), and in each subcategory (CHAOS

is the sum o demonstrations, riots, strikes, assassinations, and attempted revolutions in a single year in each country).When expenditure is increasing, the average country-year unit o observation in our data registers less than 1.5 events. When

expenditure cuts reach 1per cent or more o GDP, this grows to nearly 2 events, a relative increase by almost a third compared

to the periods o budget expansion. As cuts intensiy, the requency o disturbances rises. Once austerity measures involve

expenditure reductions by 5 per cent or more, there are more than 3 events per year and country twice as many as in

times o expenditure increases. Most o the increase in unrest is driven by more riots and more demonstrations.

Figure 1: Unrest

and budget cuts

Research shows that governments trying to impose cuts above 2 percent o GDP have been met with a major surge in social instability

Published: 16 August 2011

http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2011/aug/09/london-riots-mark-duggan-inquesthttp://www.cepr.org/pubs/new-dps/dplist.asp?dpno=8513.asphttp://www.cepr.org/pubs/new-dps/dplist.asp?dpno=8513.asphttp://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2011/aug/09/london-riots-mark-duggan-inquest

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The eect is not simply driven by hard times. When growth dips, unrest becomes more common but austerity makes it

much worse. The pattern we nd still holds when we lter out the eects o the business cycle. Interestingly, the higher

the level o instability, the greater the role o budget cuts. Over the last century, the worst periods o unrest (indicated by

quantiles above .6 in the chart) coincided with budget cuts (Figure 2).

Figure 2: Quantile Regression Plot, Eect o Expenditure Changes (let) and GDP Growth (right) on the number

o incidents

Cuts can have an eect even beore they are implemented. Previous studies analysing high-requency data ound that

unrest peaks beore the implementation o budget measures, and declines thereater. This suggests that there is an

element o negotiations on the street to social unrest, with some success in infuencing policy. In line with this trend,

countries that have more unrest are also more indebted.

What are the implications or the UK? Interestingly, the UK has a higher requency o incidents than the average 3.5 per

year, as compared to 1.5. It has also reacted more strongly to cuts over the last 90 years. While expenditure cuts by one

percentage point o GDP typically increased unrest by 0.4 incidents per year and country, in the UK, the increase was threetimes as large 1.2 incidents per year.

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Unrest can lead governments to change their minds in a hurry. In the summer o 1931, Britain was also in the middle

o implementing many austerity measures. Just as EU governments are doing today, these were designed to keep the

markets trust in the UK governments commitment to a xed exchange rate alive. Back then, it was the gold standard.

Today, its EMU. Amongst the measures implemented were pay cuts o up to 25 per cent or the Royal Navy. In September,

when battleships o the feet arrived in Invergordon, in Scotland, sailors learned o the cuts and mutinied. A week later,

with a bit o help rom the markets in the orm o speculative pressures, the UK had let the gold standard, without even

raising the discount rate to crisis levels.

Nobody knows what the uture will bring. History does not repeat itsel, but, in the words o Mark Twain, it rhymes. I past

experience is anything to go by, the UK should brace itsel or many more incidents like the riots o this week and the

rest o Europe should prepare or reruns o events in Athens.About the authors

Hans-Joachim Voth is ICREA Research Proessor at the Economics Department, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, Barcelona. He

has written extensively on the determinants o long-run growth, the causes o asset price instability, and the infuence o

culture on racial hatred.

Jacopo Ponticelli is a PhD candidate at the Economics Department o Universitat Pompeu Fabra, Barcelona His research

work is on rm dynamics, institutions and economic development.

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Ministers and like-minded judges and magistrates clearly believe that harsh sentences or those convicted in

the recent disorder will create strong disincentives or uture potential rioters. But Chris Gilson points to voices

suggesting a signifcant downside which, when allied with aggressive post-riot policing, may only exacerbate

existing tensions in high-stress urban areas.

From the Prime Minister downwards the government eels that it must demonstrate in that it has restored order ater

the biggest outbreak o social disorder in Britain in the last 30 years. From the outset the government has publicised

strong disincentives or those who might be keen to repeat riotous behaviour. Yet, punitive strategies have already caused

alarm in some cases. The rush to send out a message on law and order has led to some bad sentences that appear

disproportional when set against other oences. In a recent speech on the riots, Ed Miliband warned o the dangers o

ministers adopting knee-jerk gimmicks in order to be seen grappling with the problem.While Ed Miliband preached restraint on Monday, David Cameron spoke o a security and social ghtback going beyond

keeping 16,000 police on the streets o London last week. The measures seem to be twoold: a stronger line on criminal

punishments and additional civil punishments to remove the social benets o those ound guilty o rioting.

Since the riots subsided last week police have been continually raiding houses across London and other English cities,

aggressively stoving in the doors o properties, arresting hundreds o people (1,700 in London alone since the riots) and

recovering large amounts o stolen property. Theresa May has also mooted plans or the police to be able to impose

curews on specic areas to clear the streets.

Soon ater Camerons speech on Monday, Her Majestys Courts and Tribunals Service gave advice that local magistrates

should disregard their normally short sentencing guidelines and instead reer cases to the Crown Courts. The

governments intended message here is loud and clear: i you have participated or beneted rom the riots, we will ndyou, arrest you, and ensure that you go to jail or a signicant period o time.

New civil law punishments are also now in play. Last Friday, Wandsworth Council in London, served one o their Battersea

tenants with an eviction notice not because the tenant hersel had participated in the riots, but because her son

had been charged with (but not convicted) o doing so. In a similar vein, on Monday morning, the Work and Pensions

Secretary, Iain Duncan-Smith told the BBCs Todayprogramme:

We already accept that i people who are receiving benefts do not.., are not prepared to seek work.., [do not] take

the work thats available to them, we take the beneft o them. And i you go to prison we take your beneft o you.

So what were looking at is: For criminal charges, should we take the beneft? And the answer is: Yes.

The post-riot strategies have had some impressive results in terms o the numbers o arrests made, and clearly meet the

Conservatives urgent political need to being seen (ater such an extraordinary lapse) as tough on crime. But there may

also be signicant downsides to these polices, that will surace strongly in the near uture.

Already there is more than anecdotal evidence that the sentences or those convicted o crimes in riot contexts have been

appreciably longer than they otherwise would be or the same oences outside o these events. Preliminary results rom

the Guardian o those sentenced in Magistrate Courts show that most sentences are around 4- to 6 months in prison.

Punitive reactions by ministers and the judiciary seek to deteruture riots. But i such measures undermine the perceived airnessand legitimacy o the criminal justice system and worsen police-community relations, they could prove counter-productive

Published: 17 August 2011

http://www.labour.org.uk/the-national-conversation%5dhttp://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2011/aug/15/london-riots-cash-tills-found-police-raidshttp://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2011/aug/16/uk-riots-police-new-curfew-powershttp://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2011/aug/15/riots-magistrates-sentencinghttp://www.wandsworthguardian.co.uk/news/9193647._First__riot_related_eviction_notice_served/http://www.wandsworthguardian.co.uk/news/9193647._First__riot_related_eviction_notice_served/http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-14527402http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-14527402http://www.wandsworthguardian.co.uk/news/9193647._First__riot_related_eviction_notice_served/http://www.wandsworthguardian.co.uk/news/9193647._First__riot_related_eviction_notice_served/http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2011/aug/15/riots-magistrates-sentencinghttp://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2011/aug/16/uk-riots-police-new-curfew-powershttp://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2011/aug/15/london-riots-cash-tills-found-police-raidshttp://www.labour.org.uk/the-national-conversation%5d

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Source: Guardian Datablog

I we look at sentencing up until now or the type o oenses that the rioters are being convicted o, such as burglary and

the thet or handling o small amounts o stolen goods, the logic o bringing in Crown Courts sentences is clearly to allow

much harsher, more punitive sentencing.

Source: ONS sentencing statistics

http://www.guardian.co.uk/news/datablog/2011/aug/11/uk-riots-magistrates-court-listhttp://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http:/www.justice.gov.uk/publications/sentencingannual.htmhttp://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http:/www.justice.gov.uk/publications/sentencingannual.htmhttp://www.guardian.co.uk/news/datablog/2011/aug/11/uk-riots-magistrates-court-list

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Source: ONS sentencing statistics

For both types o oence Crown Court sentences are, on average, about six times longer than those in magistrates

courts. Anecdotal evidence shows that the police and CPS are pushing hard or longer sentences and meeting a ready

response. In one example o tough sentencing, a Manchester woman wasjailed or 5 months or receiving a stolen

pair o shorts. In another case two men who posted messages inciting people to riot in Warrington (which did not happen)

were each sentenced to our years in prison at Crown Court.

An important element o justice is that it should be clearly perceived as air and equal or all a core element o legitimacy

may be imperiled i but much harsher punishments are handed out or oences linked in any way (however loosely) to

the disorder. John Cooper QC told BBCs Newsnightprogramme that it is very likely that some o the longer sentences

would be overturned at the Court o Appeal. But in riot-hit localities, the damage to perceived legitimacy may alreadyhave been done, and police-community relations ratcheted downwards accordingly.

David Camerons, Ian Duncan Smiths and other ministers push or benets and social housing to be withdrawn rom

individuals associated with rioting appears to be a orm o collective punishment exacted rom the households o those

involved. Those immediately responsible will go to prison and their amilies may lose their homes and benets. Those

immediately convicted o oences may thus be punished twice, while the lives o other household members could be

damaged without any reason in ways that may also prove legally dubious, coming up against welare law and the

European Convention on Human Rights, which prevents retrospective punishment or crimes.

Divisive policies that risk undermining the perceived impartiality o justice and worsening police-community relations or

short-term or party-political gains are especially unlikely to be helpul or the social cohesion o communities where riots

happened. A Brixton local, Michael Ibitoye, was interviewed by BBC News in Ealing last Friday night, stating:

I believe that opportunitys key. I believe that maybe a lot o us eel that we dont have enough opportunity, and

Im talking opportunity, in a work, study, and just business lie. A lot o people come to me with ideas, and theres

no-one to pass on the message to. You understand? So we need key communication we need someone to be

able to communicate to, to allow opportunities. Otherwise people will go and loot, because thats the opportunity

available to them, even though its a negative opportunity.

http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http:/www.justice.gov.uk/publications/sentencingannual.htmhttp://politicalscrapbook.net/2011/08/manchester-police-riot-sentence/http://www.womensviewsonnews.org/2011/08/post-riot-advice-to-magistrates-may-explain-prison-term-for-gift-of-shorts/http://www.guardian.co.uk/law/2011/aug/11/should-uk-rioters-lose-entitlement-benefitshttp://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-14519560http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-14519560http://www.guardian.co.uk/law/2011/aug/11/should-uk-rioters-lose-entitlement-benefitshttp://www.womensviewsonnews.org/2011/08/post-riot-advice-to-magistrates-may-explain-prison-term-for-gift-of-shorts/http://politicalscrapbook.net/2011/08/manchester-police-riot-sentence/http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http:/www.justice.gov.uk/publications/sentencingannual.htm

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Harsh sentences and police tactics will also risk reinorcing the adversarial relationship that the police already have with

many people within the riot-torn communities. Just as the current outbreak spread rom a single point o tension in

Tottenham, leaving a trail o broken-down ront doors, disproportionate sentences or apparently minor crimes, and

politically inspired collective punishments o whole households could create incentives or uture disorders.

About the author

Chris Gilson joined the LSE PPG in December 2007 as Editor/Researcher. He has undertaken review work or the European

Court o Auditors, and is the managing editor o the LSE EUROPP blog.

http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/

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2011 saw the streets o London dramatically occupied: frst with the riots and looting that struck in August,

and then with the tents o the Occupy LSX encampment. Rodney Barker argues that both orms o street

theatre are a response to the perceived ills o the modern economy.

Two dramatic and apparently utterly contrasting presences burst onto the streets o London and other major cities in the

United Kingdom in the summer and autumn o 2011; each o them a orm o street theatre even i the character o the

two dramas seemed very dierent. In August television and computer screens throbbed with images o rampaging youths

carrying o lap tops, trainers, and small portable booty bundled out through smashed doors and windows. Rioting and

looting destroyed shops and homes in a circle o London inner suburbs and the violence spread to other cities such as

Manchester. Newspapers, with amiliar exaggeration, carried headlines that London was in fames, even though or 99 per

cent o streets lie continued as peaceully as ever.There is little that is new in the riots. City populations have again and again, and not only in Britain, rampaged and

destroyed in a collective and public version o the unthinking and inarticulate rage that, at an individual level, breaks out

as violence in the household or on the motorway. And as always, when public order is in abeyance, minor criminality and

minor criminals take advantage to seize in ull public sight what, in more orderly times, could only be seized covertly and

in the dark.

The shock to the public mind thrust politicians into instant comment, condemnation and analysis, while longer and

slower examination tried to explain what had happened by analysing the social composition o those who were brought

beore the courts, and those who were not. That analysis is continuing, though any data is qualied by the uncertainty as

to how representative those subsequently arrested were o all those who took part in the disorder. It may well have been

easier to charge those who were already known to the police.

But whilst there is still dispute about how many o the looters had previous criminal convictions, the relative poverty,

deprivation, and unemployment o the areas where the looting happened and the people who carried it out, is not in

dispute. The looters were heavily drawn not so much rom, as the Justice Secretary Ken Clarke put it, a eral underclass

as rom the sections o society most wounded by government policy.

There is no single or simple explanation o what happened, though plenty have been oered: poverty; criminality; gang

culture; insensitive policing and a perception o police discrimination. But by their actions the looters and arsonists, o

whom the greater part were young males, presented themselves as an alienated generation. Although the press talked o

crowds o rioters, those involved were mostly in relatively small groups, hundreds not thousands, and oten airly closely

co-ordinated on mobile phones and via social media. This is rather dierent rom what one would think o as crowd

behaviour. The technology enabled small groups to spread their message ar and wide. There was a toxic combination o a

section o the population which is socially alienated and excluded, but technologically integrated into a virtual society.A government must show itsel to be governing, and any ailure to establish and maintain public order carried a huge

and potentially atal political cost. But it was under pressure not only to respond to the immediate crisis, but to solve the

long term problem o alienated young males who see no moral impediment to looting and arson. Governments abilities

are limited here, and the most obvious measure is to increase social spending in all its dimensions, the very thing that the

current government o the United Kingdom is ideologically and politically prevented rom doing.

The other long term measure, which is a sticking plaster rather than a cure, is to invest in policing in such a way that

such outbreaks are impossible or dicult in the uture, and that too imposes nancial costs which the government is

ideologically committed not to accept. The August days presented grave problems ahead not only or public order but or

the government.

As late summer moved into autumn, the streets o the major cities were again dramatically occupied, but this time in

what seemed an utterly dierent way. Occupy Wall Street, which quickly became Occupy Pretty Well Every Major Financial

Centre, has spread across the northern hemisphere, and tents have blossomed in the square around or next to the

banking and nancial headquarters o cities rom New York to London. We are presented with two kinds o street theatre,

and each is a response to the ills o western economic lie. Some o the looting rioters said they were against capitalism,

but then attacked small amily owned and run local shops.

The riots and the Occupy movement are both protests against,and a rejection o, an economy that is no longer working or mostordinary citizens

Published: 22 November 2011

http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/politicsandpolicy/category/london-riots-2011/http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/politicsandpolicy/2011/08/08/tottenham-riots/http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/politicsandpolicy/2011/08/08/tottenham-riots/http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/politicsandpolicy/2011/09/06/reading-the-riots/http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/politicsandpolicy/2011/09/06/reading-the-riots/http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/politicsandpolicy/2011/08/08/tottenham-riots/http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/politicsandpolicy/2011/08/08/tottenham-riots/http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/politicsandpolicy/category/london-riots-2011/

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The Occupy demonstrators were ar more nuanced. The garden o posters, banners, and maniestos around St Pauls

Cathedral in London certainly contained condemnations o capitalism, but there were also demands or the regulation o

a system that had run totally out o control, not or the destruction o capitalism, but or civilising and moralising it. The

looting and the camping are each a protest against and a stepping away rom an economy which not only isnt working,

but which is condemned as corrupting social lie and inecting the lives o ordinary citizens.

Whilst the police in the United Kingdom were caught unawares by the rioters, the settled presence o the Occupy

demonstrators has given the authorities time to consider how they wish to respond. In London the nancial government,

but not the Church, is seeking to evict the camping demonstrators. In New Yorks Zuccotti Park the police cleared away

the hundreds o members o the public who were demonstrating their rejection o the ways in which the worlds economy

is being run, and run down, and the people who are doing it. But the shutdown in New York may prove no more thana local repression, and has not dispersed the protestors. Occupy is already an international movement, and all the more

dicult or governments to curtail because it doesnt work by ormal organisation, central committee, or any o the

eatures o a conventional party or political association. You cant join Occupy, except by occupying.

Policy action against the occupiers has been slow in coming, but when it arrived it was ar more orceul than anything

done against the looters o August. Why? The riots illustrated alienation. The occupation pointed a nger. Occupy is the

articulate version o the alienation which in the riots and looting was opportunistic private rage.

But whilst there is alienation rom some o the dominating institutions o the contemporary economic world, and

condemnation o the irresponsible looting at the top, what is happening is the very opposite o opting out o society.

Occupy is an expression o citizenship, and a citizenship o action not ormal, hollow enrolment. The only qualication or

being a member, is acting as a member. And in the collective action, o citizens doing what Old Testament prophets did so

well, speaking truth to power, there is a reassertion o equality.

The many discussion groups which take up a prominent part o the occupation make the pavements o London look

and sound like university seminars. Or rather like university seminars where a more perect equality is achieved or aspired

to than in academia. Participants in Occupy do not interrupt, speak at great length nor do they express agreement or

disagreement by voice, but by elaborate hand gestures. The tyranny o the loudest voice is thus replaced by the equality o

participants.

Each o the street politics events announces a challenge to the way things are, the one inarticulate rage at governments

response to the economic crisis, the other calm condemnation o its causes. The call or reorm will not be ended by law

enorcement, merely contained, and avoided.

About the author

Rodney Barker is Emeritus Proessor o Government at LSE and Emeritus Gresham Proessor o Rhetoric, Gresham College,London.

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British Politics and Policy at LSE

British Politics and Policy at LSE is run by a team based in the Public Policy Group at the LSE. The aim o the blog is to:

increase the public understanding o the social sciences in the context o UK government;

acilitate the sharing and exchange o knowledge between experts within and outside universities; and

open up academic research to increase its impact.

The blog hosts contributions rom academics and researchers rom the UK and internationally who work on UK policy issues.

LSE Public Policy GroupThe LSE Public Policy Group (PPG) is a research organisation that provides academic consultancy and analysis and acts as

an interace between academia, the private, public and third sector. Prominent streams o work include researching

academic impact and how research becomes policy; public sector governance in a digital era; complaints and redress

mechanisms in public bodies; and government productivity and innovation.

Contact

Email: Politicsandpolicy@lse.ac.uk

Twitter: @LSEpoliticsblog

Visit our sister blogs:

LSE EUROPP: European Politics and Policy

LSE Review o Books

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