12 21 11 RCA Roberts Oppos to Mtn for New Trial 2064 22176 60838

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Code 1180 OR\G\NAL
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF THE STATE ot NEVADA
7 IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF WASHOE
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2 P,O, Box 1900 Reno,Nevada 89505
3 775 334-2290
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ORIGINAL IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF WASHOE
6 ZACHARY BARKER COUGHLIN,
RESPONDENT.
11 CERTIFIED COPY OF DOCKET
12 September 14, 2011: Criminal Complaint filed charging Defendant with Petit
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Larceny,
September 14,2011: Arrest Report and Declaration of Probable Cause
October 10,2011: Notice of Setting Bench Trial date of November 14, 2011.
17 October 18,2011: Notice of Availability of Discovery and Request for Reciprocal
18 Discovery,
19 October26, 2011: Application and Affidavit for Appointment of Legal Defender.
October26, 2011: Motion to Continue November 14, 2011, trial date.
21 October27, 2011: Order Denying Appointment of Legal Defender.
22 October27,2011: Order Denying Motion to Continue November 14, 2011, trial date.
23 November 3, 2011: Motion for Reconsideration, Motion to Vacate or Set Aside
24 (under Rule 59 and or 60) Order Denying Right to Counsel and Motion to Dismiss,
November 15,2011: Notice of Setting Bench Trial date of November 30, 2011.
26 November29, 2011: Subpoena Duces Tecum filed by Defendant Coughlin,
RENO MUNICIPALCOUR1
November 30, 2011: Notice of Appearance, Motion for Continuance, Etc,
November 30, 2011: Trial was held in this matter. Present on behalf of the City was
--=[ 1 ]=-- 00002
(71 ) J3 -21 1)
Pam Roberts and Defendant appeared pro per. The Court found the defendant guilty of Petit
Larceny, a violation of RMC 08.10.040. The Defendant was sentenced as follows:
Three Hundred and fine.
November 30, 2011: Judgment of Conviction and Court Order
November 30,2011: Order For Summary Punishment of Contempt Committed in the
Immediate View and Presence of the Court.
December 13, 2011: Notice of Appeal, Motion to Vacate and or Set Aside, JCRCP
59, JCRCP 60, Motion for Reconsideration; Motion for Recusal.
December 13, 2011: Record Request by Defendant Coughlin.
December 13, 2011: Record Request by Defendant Coughlin.
December 14, 2011: Financial Inquiry Application and Motion to Proceed Informa
Pauperis.
December 15, 2011: Order denying Defendant's Motion to Proceed In Forma
Pauperis, Motion for Publication of Transcript at Public Expense, Motion to Vacate andlor Set
Aside, Motion for Reconsideration and Motion for Recusal.
December 15, 2011: Notice of Denial of Service filed by Reno City Attorney.
December 16, 2011: Defendant Coughlin's Supplemental to Notice of Appeal,
Motion to Vacate and or Set Aside, JCRCP 59, JCRCP 60, Motion for Reconsideration;
Motion for Recusal; Motion to Strike.
December 16, 2011: Defendant Coughlin's Notice of Denial of Service; Opposition
City of Reno's Notice of Denial of Service; Request for Clarification Regarding Deadline for
Filing Motion for new Trial, Other tolling Motions, etc., Application for Deferral or Waiver of
court Fees and Cost.
December 16, 2011: Court Order ordering Defendant Coughlin from communicating
via e-mail with Judge Howard and court staff.
December 16, 2011: Defendant Coughlin'S Notice of Denial of Service; Opposition
City of Reno's Notice of Denial of Service; Request for Clarification Regarding Deadline for
--=[ 2 ]=-- 00003
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1 Filing Motion For New Trial, Other Tolling Motions, etc; APPLICATION FOR DEFERRAL
2 OR WAIVER OF COURT FEES AND COSTS.
3 December 16, 2011:
4 Motion to Vacate and or Set Aside, JCRCP 59, JCRCP 60, Motion for Reconsideration;
Motion for Recusal; Motion to Strike. 6
December 19,2011: Defendant Coughlin's Notice of Denial of Service; Opposition 7
City of Reno's Notice of Denial of Service; Request for Clarification Regarding Deadline for 8
Filing Motion For New Trial, Other Tolling Motions, etc; APPLICATION FOR DEFERRAL 9
OR WAIVER OF COURT FEES AND COST.
December21,2011: Reno City Attorney's Opposition to Motion for New Trial.
Defendant Coughlin's Supplemental To Notice of Appeal,
11 Dated this 22nd day of December, 20 II.
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I, CASSANDRA JACKSON, Interim Court Administrator of the Reno Municipal
Court, do hereby certity that the attached documents include full, true and correct copies of all
papers relating to Case Number llCR22176, including a Certified Copy of Docket. Further,
said documents have been transmitted to and filed with the clerk of the Washoe County
District Court. d
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN BEFORE ME day of Dece er, 2011.
""0 MUNICIl'AL COURT
p 0. EIo 19110 Ren , 1\V 8951 (775) 31-1-12'111
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1 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
2 Pursuant to NRCP 5(b), I certify that I am an employee of the Reno Municipal Court, 3
Reno, Nevada, and that on this date I served a true and correct copy of the foregoing
document, CERTIFIED COPY OF DOCKET on the party(ies) set forth below: 5
./' Placing said document in a sealed envelope placed for collecting and mailing 6 in the United States mail, at Reno, Nevada, postage prepaid, following ordinary
7 business practices.
Facsimile (FAX). 8
Reno/Carson Messenger Service. 9 Federal Express or other overnight delivery.
10 ..,/ Inner-office mail following ordinary business practices.
11 Personal Delivery.
12
13 City Attorney's Office Mr. Zachary Barker Coughlin P.O. Box 1900 817 N. Virginia Street, #2 14 Reno, Nevada 89509 Reno, Nevada 89501
15 Dated this day of December, 2011.
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Rrno, NVII\I (7J ) JJ.j...22!Jl1 28
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RENO 27 M\OOCIPALCO\\1\'f P. O. BoJ. 1900
_NY"", 28 (71S)J34..t2fO
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Case No. 09CR362 I 9 r: I L l:"e D Dept. 4
A Dtc ?, . M ' . 81' lIniCID I
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CITY OF RENO,
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, , " Pursuant to NRS 177.105, \ 77.115,178.488, and 178.498, this Court orders at Bail or Bond
i , on Appeal is: i
(X) GRANTED and set in the amount of $ 360.00 , with the condition that II I
e Defendant: i '
( ) comply with all Counseling requirements
( ) comply with the Parenting Class requirement
( ) other: _________________ +_ ( ) DENIED for the following reason(s):
( ) violent nature/seriousness of the instant offense
( ) prior criminal history
( ) lack of connection to the community
( ) lack of jurisdiction on appeal
( ) other :.--______ _________ ---+_
KENNETHR. Department Four
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IN THE AiIPAL COURT OF THE CITj RENO COUNTY OF WASHOE, STATE OF NEVADA ONE SOUTH SIERRA STREET, RENO, NV 89505
Mailhlg: P.O. Box 1900, Reno, NV 89505 PHONE (775)334-2290 FAX (775)334-3824
CITY OF RENO, PLAINTIFF VS.
DEFENDANT: COUGHLIN, ZACHARY BARKER Court Case#: 11 CR 22176 21 DOB: __ Status: OPEN Agency#: RSICPIICII0627 Accident#: Booking#: 15953 Language: ENGLISH
Offense Dt: 09/09120 II Arrest Dt: 09/0912011
Plea: 1011012011 - NOT GUILTY
DEFENDANT:-COUGHLlN, ZACHARY BA'''R;;;K'''E'''Rc--
Print Date: 10110/2011 Data Date: 10/1012011 Page I of2 00010
• .1 Balance: _} Completed I'!!""
FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH THE CONDITIONS OF BAIL AS DESCRIBED IN THIS ORDER WILL RESULT IN THE ISSUANCE OF A FAILURE TO COMPLY WARRANT OR IMMEDIATE ARREST AND INCARCERATION FOR CONTEMPT OF COURT ANDIOR BAIL REVOCATION. FOR FURTHER INFORMATION, CONTACT THE SENTENCE COMPLIANCE WINDOW LOCATED ON THE FIRST FLOOR OF THE RENO MUNICIPAL COURT, ONE SOUTH SIERRA ST, RENO, NV (775) 334-2290.
THE DEFENDANT SHALL APPEAR AS ORDERED FOR ALL REVIEWS AND SHALL COOPERATE FULLY WITH THE I \ +. <\ BAILIFFSIMARSHALS AND ALL COURT STAFFt4 \'ilf"''' l'-<'o/,vlV{h b';f r ""'-U <Vic '" I t(c/ISi\L .. ______ (,! \.{\'\cM. - 0C) '\\!" "''\t-iCf' U i-< v..-,I"j / ' no" v "'J
THE DEFENDANT SHALL ATTEND ALL REVIEWS, COURil" APEARANCES AND COuItT-ORDERljD PROGRAM 0J0! Til p ANEJi " -Al,COHOL AND DRUG FRE!j;) 0'\0+ :J N IJ./Y\""J.; P\"'r\!.. iM.f'hy,-S "=''f$c}-I \1(.. \ ".-\..0 \.4;./, ". \:: c;:..... \""v."."," IV\-.> '("{< " .... vv!"h\ I\{tJl..Y (I\j\ v\.'l.v. THE DEFENDANT SHALL KNOW HISIHER COURT DATE AND MAINTAIN CONTACT WITH HISIHER ATTORNEY.
PRIOR TO CHANGING HISIHER ADDRESS OR PHONE NUMBER, THE DEFENDANT SHALL NOTIFlY THE COURT OF SUCH CHANGE.
OBEY ALL LAWS,
/J /J) THE HONORABLE WILLIAM GARDNER / / "'.if'. A .Jf/% / JU D G E'SSI GN A TU R E:== ============ -J======D ATE :================== ___ _
Vou are ordered by the Court to arrive drug/alcohol free and on time for all Court hearings and Court related progams. Failure to appear in Court will result in the issuance of a warrant for your arrest. Any violation of this instant order may result in contempt proceedings and the filing of additional criminal charges. In accordance with NRS 22,010, it is a misdemeanor for any person to fail, refuse or neglect to comply with the terms of any order issued by the Municipal Cour Ju<!ge, This orill remain in effect until the Court issues another order superseding it. I / J
I UNDERSTAND AND PROMISE TO OBEY THIS ORDER. DEFENDANT,:' __ ,/.If::.C::...-':.:::. __________ _____ 11 /;
DATE:, __ __ . ____ TIME: ____ _
I, THE SWORN INTPRETER HAVE FULLY INTERPRETED THIS ORDEVTo THE DEFENDANT: DATE:, ______ TIME: _ ___ _
RECEIVED BY DEPUTY: ___ -E' ____ ----------DATE:,------ TIME: ____ _
ISSUED BY MARSHAL: K DATE:! l) I J.() J 1/ TIME: DEFENDANT: COUGHLIN, ZACHARY BARKEt< Defendant [nitials:
Agency#: ICII0627 Print Date: 10/1012011
COURT CASE #: 11 CR 22176 21 Data Date: 10110/2011 Page 2 of 2
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•• FILED
DEPT. NO.4
IN THE MUNICIPAL COURT OF THE CITY OF RENO -, !.
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF WASHOE BY ..¢At-
OEifUTY
DISCOVERY AND REQUEST FOR
Ir-----------------_______ I
Please call the Criminal Division at 334-2050 to arrange for preparation of discovery in
this case. After your call requesting preparation of discovery, it will be available for pickup at
the Reno City Attorney's Office, Monday - Thursday 10:00 a.m. to 3:00 p.m. All potential
witnesses for the City's case in chief are named in the discovery (which includes a copy of the
police report), and pursuant to NRS 174.234-235 no other "witness list" need be or will be
provided.
The City hereby requests that the Defendant provide discovery and notice of defense
witnesses pursuant to NRS 174.234 and 174.235.
DATED this l?>fI1 day of October, 2011.
Deputy City Attorney
25 A copy of this Notice has been sent to Zachary Coughlin at 121 River Rock Street, Reno,
26 Nevada 89501 on October 011.
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Reno, NY 89505
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RENO MUNICIPAL COURT APPLICATION AND AFFIDAVIT FOR APPOINTMENT OF LEGAL DEFENDER
FILED RENO MW/fCIP/;I COURT CORTE MUNICIPAL DE RENO SOUCITUD Y DECLARACION JURADA PARA ASIGNACION DE DEFENSOR LEGAL
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2011 OCT 26 AM II: 38 k 7J. ----JJN U
I declare that I am an indigent person without financial means to employ an attorney and that all 01 the facts, figures, answers and statements contained in this application are true and correct. Yo declaro ser una persona indigente y carezeo de recursos econ6mieos pera contratar los servieios de un abcgado y dec/aro que;a informacion, cifras, respuestas y declaraciones contenidas en esta solicitud son verdaderas y co"ects. _ } . . . <: ¥'lj/17 N)-"2 0o.
1. Do you receive any form of public assistance such as food stamps or public housing? ;/ Yes [1 No [ 1 Recibe ustad alguna forma de ayuda financiera del gobiemo tal como cupones pera comida, 0 vivienda ptib/? Si [J No [ J
J 1 __ )
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3.
4.
If yes, please specify "m /l /7 I '=:1 ' '. Si la respuesta es afirmativa, especifique ' ;
What proof of this assistance do you have? Que prueba puade usted presentar de esla ayuda?
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Are you currently serving a sentence in a jail or prison? Actualmente esta usted cump/iendo una sentencia en una carcel 0 prision?
Vest 1 Nof.{ Sir ] No[ ]
If yes, list charges, case numbers and time to serve. Si la respuesta es afirmativa, indique los cargos, el ntimero del caso y cuanto tiempo Ie queda por cumplir.
How many people are in your household (live with you)? Cuantas personas viven en su residencia (viven con usted)?
What is the total weekly fami income for everyone living in your household? Cuant6 es el ingreso lotal semanal familiar de lodos los que viven en su residencia?
What is the total monthly family income for everyone living in your household? Cuanlo es el ingreso tolal mensual familiar de todos los que viven en su residencia?
$ ,,\1_'(1.: Ii Z c?() $ _- $,--- $,----
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COUNTY OF WASHOE, STATE OF NEVADA
CITY OF RENO,
COURT DATE: November 14,2011 @ 1:00 p.m. Department Four - Courtroom B
An Application for appointment of a Legal Defender having been filed with this Court,
and having been reviewed by this Court, therefore;
This Court does hereby DENY said appointment for the reason that if convicted of this
charge, the standard sentence carries no jail time.
It is so ORDERED.
DATED this 27'hday of October, 2011 / / If? If ,F) :J-'L KENNETH R. HOWARD, JUDGE
00015
TRANSMISSION OK
TXlRX NO RECIPIENT ADDRESS DESTINATION ID ST. TIME TIME USE PAGES SENT RESULT
********************$ ••• TX REPORT ••• *********************
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COUNTY OF WASHOE, ST ATE OF NEV ADA
CITY OF RENO,
ORDER DENYING LEGAL DEFENDER
COURT DATE: November 14,2011 @ 1 :00 p.m. Department Four - Courtroom B
An Application for appointment of a Legal Defender having been filed with this Court,
and having been reviewed by this COllrt, therefore;
This COUl1 docs hereby DENY said appointment lelr the reason that if cOllvictcd of this
charge, the standard sentence carries llO jail time.
It is so ORDERED.
DATED this 27' h
day of October, 2011 / ' /,?, 0 ;/" 1/ l ! """'-.i,{. -" I ,,~, .i'j,,- -(J '"-..,)1111), .Ah'-', ,lIP
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
Pursuant to NRCP 5 (b) , I certify that I am an employee of the
Reno Municipal Court, Reno, Nevada, and that on this date I served
a true and correct copy of the foregoing document, ORDER DENYING
MOTION TO CONTINUE TRIAL DATE AND APPOINTMENT OF LEGAL DEFENDER on
the party (ies) set forth below:
x
X
Placing said document in a sealed envelope placed for collecting and mailing in the United States mail, at Reno, Nevada, postage prepaid , following ordinary business practices.
Facsimile (FAX).
Personal Delivery.
Reno, NV 89505
Reno, NV 89501
mc:C!
00017
State; · Plaintiff
2ill j rlOI! _ '2 -D ~' I I • ;, UYl/USJ L;: 56 ,- . ... v.. Reno Municipal Court Case
Case: REV2011-
;,~~~~;:, ~~~~:~ge Kenneth How3'd
I. ~ Moti6n for Reconsideration, Motion to Vacate or Set Aside (under Rule 59 and or 60) Orde Denying Right to Counsel, Motion to Dismiss
Trevino v. State 555 SW.2d 750 Formerly 110k641.2(4), 110k641 .2 Tex.Crim.App.,1977 Criminal defendants in misdemeanor cases are entitled to counsel if there exists a possibility that imprisonment may be imposed.
Judge Gardner refused to tell the undersigned the last names of the four attorneys who might be appointed counsel. Accused has a right to know that, its important to check qualifICations and experience. Further, Judge Gardner touted their abilities by mentioning some, or all, of them were former prosecutors. The NFL doesn1 hire to many offensive coordinators to coach defense. I feel the same about criminal defense.
The arrest did not occur in the presence of the police officer. There was no consent to search. Officer made statements conditioning whether arrest woul~ be made upon whether consent to search was given, there are other impermissible acts but I am not going to get into unless absolutely necessary. APPOINTMENT OF AN ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANT [IF CRIME CHARGED CARRIES A POSSIBLE JAIL SENTENCE] N OTE: the Court Intends to suspend the sentence. ETERMINATION OF EUGIBILITYD Any defendant charged with a public offense who is an indigent may, by oral statement to the district judge, justice of the peace, municipal judge or master, request the appointment of an attorney to represent him. NRS 171.188, means of employing an attorney; and (b) facts with some particularity, definiteness and certainty concerning the defendant's financial disability." whether the defendant is eligible and whether counsel should be appointed. In addition to the requirements set forth in specific definition of indigency in its Administrative Docket 411 Order of January 4,2008, which can be found Section 1 - CRIMINAL Chapter 4 - MISDEMEANORS 4-6
at http://www.nevadaJudiciary.us/index.php/vlewdocumentsandforms/ func-startdown/70/, and is commonly referred to as the Indigent Defense Order. The definition is a follows: A person will be deemed 'indigent' who is unable, without substantial hardship to himself or his dependents, to obtain competent, qualified legal counsel on his or her own. 'Substantial hardship' is presumptively determined to include all defendants who receive public assistance, such as Food Stamps, Temporary Assistance for needy Families, Medicaid, Disability insurance, reside in public housing, or earn less than 200 percent of the Federal Poverty Guidelines. A defendant is presumed to have a substantial hardship if he or she is currently serving a sentence in a correctional institution or housed in a mental health facility. Defendants not falling below the presumptive threshold will be subjected to a more rigorous screening process to determine if their particular circumstances, including seriousness of charges being faced, monthly expenses, and local private counsel rates, would result in a substantial hardship were they to seek to retain private counsel. llle current federal poverty guidelines are renected in the table below:
httns-//writer zoho com/editor im 11/1/2011 00018
The current federal poverty gUidelines are reflected in the table below: 2009 POVERTY GUIDELINES FOR THE 48 CONTIGUOUS STATES AND THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA Persons in family Poverty guideline 1 ................................................ $10,830 2 ...... .. .. ...................................... 14,570 3 .......... .. .................................... 18,310 4 .. .. ............................................ 22,050 5 ................................................ 25,790 6 ............ .... ................................ 29,530 7 ................................................ 33,270 8 ................................................ 37,010 For families with more than 8 persons, add $3,740 for each additional person.
Further. I have just been evicted from my home. as such. my ability to defend myself and prepare for a Trial on November 14th. 2011 has been severly compromised and would work an undue hardship on me. especially to the extent these charges. for which I am innocent. would impact my reputation and job prospects.
Page 2 of3
I do probably make uner $10,830, depeding upon from when to when its measure. I am indigent, have barely any money to my name. DISQUAUFICATION The public defender must be appointed unless disqualified. disqualified to represent more than one co-defendant and he may be disqualified for other reasons, but such conflict of interest or disqualification must be brought to the attention of the court before a private counsel may be appointed by the court. The court must state the reasons for the disqualification on the record. 7.115. those fees is set forth in
Rule 6: Continuances No continuance shall be granted, including a stipulated continuance, except for good cause. A motion or stipulation for continuance must state the reason therefore and whether or not any continuance has previously been sought or granted. I have not sought a continuance for any other hearing in this matter, and further, I may have had a right to counsel at the arraignment which was not met. Additionally, the bailiff at the arraignment was threatening, retaliatory, and hostile when I asked about my right to counsel and the video the Judge made of himself advising litigants of their rights was somewhat frightening and coercive in that it basically said "it is never a good idea to represent yourself'. This is unjust, especially in the context of this Court's Order denying my right to have counsel appointed where jail time is a possibility, regardless of how the court intends to treat the matter, statutorily, on paper, its a possibility. The police shouldn't arrest so many people baselessly, and shouldn't resort to illegal, coercive and unjust tactics, especially if the tax base does not allow the court to uphold the procedural and substantive protections required by the laws of our land. Cut corners somewhere else.
Past-request questianing ar interragatlOn, Interrogation by police after assertion of right to counsel at arraigrunent or similar proceeding, waiver, see 625, 89 L.Ed.2d 631 Invocation of right, muteness at preliminary hearing, court-ordered appointment of counsel, subsequent interrogation, see 2079, 173 L.Ed.2d 955 Invocation of light to counsel, subsequent police-initiated conversation, impeachment, see 293
Post-request responses to further interrogation, clarity of initial request for counsel, see Smith v. Illinois, U.S.Ill.l984, 105 S.C!. 490, 469 U.S. 91, 83 L.Ed.2d 488
I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of Nevada that the foregoing is true and correct. Dated November 2.2011
httns-llwriter zoho com/editor im 1113/2011 00019
'k7."E~'~ IZ 1 Ri er ock St. Reno, 89501 775338 SUS
[email protected]
Page 3 of3
Please do not call me, or attempt "house rules" phone notice, phone situation is in flux due to Casey Baker. Esq.'s antics. The court may email me, Casey Baker, Esq. may not serve me anything vi;) email. Licensed in Nevada
httnS-//writer mho com/editor im 11/1/2011 00020
IN THE .NI~IPAL COURT OF THE CITftF RENO COUNTY OF WASHOE, STATE OF NEV A~
ONE SOUTH SIERRA STREET, RENO, NV 89505 Mailing: P.O. Box 1900, Reno, NV 89505 PHONE (775)334-2290 FA (77.5'/3:34182" /..:;
VS.
DEFENDANT: COUGHLIN, ZACHARY BARKER Court Case#: II CR 22176 21 Agency#: RSICPIICll0627
Offense Dt: 0910912011 Arrest Dt: 0910912011
DOB: 09/27/1976 Accident#:
'--~A-g-en-c-y#O:-""IC=Il"'067.2"'7;-----'-- '----------;c""o"'UR""'f CASE #: 11 CR 22176"11'"'
Print Date: 1111512011 Data Date: 11115/2011 Page 1 of2 00021
NextProofDt: Balance: Completed Dt:
FAlLURE TO COMPLY WIlli THE CONDITIONS OF BAlL AS DESCRIBED IN lliIS ORDER WILL RESULT IN THE ISSUANCE OF A FAlLURE TO COMPLY WARRANT OR IMMEDIATE ARREST AND INCARCERATION FOR CONTEMPT OF COURT ANDIOR BAlL REVOCATION. FOR FURTHER INFORMATION, CONTACT THE SENTENCE COMPLIANCE WINDOW LOCATED ON THE FIRST FLOOR OF THE RENO MUNICIPAL COURT, ONE SOUlli SIERRA ST, RENO, NV (775) 334-2290.
THE DEFENDANT SHALL APPEAR AS ORDERED FOR ALL REVIEWS AND SHALL COOPERATE FULLY WIlli THE BAlLIFFSIMARSHALS AND ALL COURT STAFF.
THE DEFENDANT SHALL ATTEND ALL REVIEWS, COURT APPEARANCES AND COURT-ORDERED PROGRAMS ON TIME AND ALCOHOL AND DRUG FREE.
THE DEFENDANT SHALL KNOW mSIHER COURT DATE AND MAlNTAlN CONTACT WIlli mSIHER ATTORNEY.
PRIOR TO CHANGING HISIHER ADDRESS OR PHONE NUMBER, THE DEFENDANT SHALL NOTIFIY THE COURT OF SUCH CHANGE.
OBEY ALL LAWS.
Ii'). ~ R~ INFORMATION: 3 city witnesses appeared for bench trial
ADDITIONAL CASE INFORMATION: DEFENDANT WAS IN CUSTODY AT TIME AND DATE OF BENCH TRIAL; DEFENDANT WAS TRANSPORTED BUT NOT BROUGHT INTO COURT
1111412011 ADDITIONAL CASE INFORMATION: BAIL FORFEITURE CANCELLED 10/10/2011 ADDmONAL CASE INFORMATION: DEFENDANT DID NOT WANT A COURT APPOINTED ATTORNEY.
THE HONORABLE
y.jk~I! _() I( J5~{ JUDGE'S SIGNATURE: DATE:
You are ordered by the Court to arrive drug/alcohol free and on time for all Court hearings and Court related progams. Failure to appear in Court will result in the issuance of a warrant for your arrest. Any violation of this instant order may result in contempt proceedings and the filing of additional criminal charges. In accordance with NRS 22.010, it is a misdemeanor for any person to fail, refuse or neglect to comply with the terms of any order issued by the Municipal Court Judge. This order will remain in effect until the Court issues another order superseding it.
I UNDERSTAND AND PROMISE TO OBEY THIS ORDER. DEFENDANT:
I. THE SWORN INTPRETER HAVE FULLY INTERPRETED THIS ORDER TO THE DEFENDANT:
RECEIVED BY DEPUTY:
ISSUED BY MARSHAL:
Data Date: 11/1512011 Page 2 of2 00022
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• CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
Pursuant to NRCP 5(b), I certify that I am an employee of the
a true and correct copy of the foregoing document, NOTICE SETTING
HEARING on the party(ies) set forth below:
x
X
Placing said document in a sealed envelope placed for collecting and mailing in the United States mail, at Reno, Nevada, postage prepaid, following ordinary business practices.
Facsimile (FAX).
Personal Delivery.
Zachary Barker Coughlin 121 River Rock SI. Reno, NV 89501
DATEcz:et~"Y of N"vemhe, 2011
00023
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\ .) • CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
Pursuant to NRCP 5(b), I certify that I am an employee of the
a true and correct copy of the foregoing document, ORDER NOTICE
SETTING HEARING on the party(ies) set forth below:
x
X
Placing said document in a sealed envelope placed for collecting and mailing in the United States mail, at Reno, Nevada, postage prepaid, following ordinary business practices.
Facsimile (FAX).
Personal Delivery.
Zachary Barker Coughlin 817 NVirginia St #2 Reno, NV 89501
r.d ~ day of November 2011
00024
THE CITY OF RENO, Plaintiff;
Vs.
SUBPOENA .; \..0, ~ i
~~_ ~S \ ' . ,;; -~ .. and subpoena duces tecum
TN VIOLATION OF please appear and further bring any evidence including medial rei-ate~ toC~ retaliatory threats by walmart staff or lp per~s~o~nn~~e'l------------
THE MUNICIPAl,- COURT OF THE CTTY OF RENO SENDS.GREETTNGS TO: Loss prevent loon manager and John Ellis and ASM "Connie" 7th St. walmart
Janice cashier, Brian Bain store Manager; LP manager, 2nd ST. Walmart
WE COMMAND YOU, that all and singular, business and excuses being set aside, you appear and attend before the MUNICIPAL COURT OF THE CITY OF RENO, WASHOE COUNTY, NEVADA, in the COURTROOM ATONE SOUTH SIERRA, RENO, NEVADA,
011 November 30, '-------------~-------,
2011,at ___ 1_p_m _____________________ ___
, and for failure to attend you may be deemed
2011 29th .November TN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand (his ___ Clay of . __________ ,_.
cassal1~~kson,( co::. ~dministrator
Declaration I'f!ljI'fl:W.tlqltJF PERSONAL SERVICE under penalty of perjury NRS
STATE OF NEVADA
COUNTY OF WASHOE) emailed
J hereby certify rhar J received the within SUBPOENA on the ._~~trJliy ofNOv:'~:'_~ .. _~_? ~~ __ ., and that I faxed to or personally ~erved the san:f~g'l.!l the person hereinafier named by showing himiher the within SUBPOENA and delivering a copy to hun/her on the __ '~ay of November 2 O,lJ:......., in Washoe County, Nevada, to-wn:
Signed: /s/ zach coughlin, signed electroncially
Subscribed and sworn to before me this 2 9tJ:ijay or .. ___ ~'2.ve~:..: ... ,2.E_1.!.. J:.:~~_<:'_::~_ n~~i_~.~:e_c:i d~~~re f fd. Declaration under penalDym~~~~as as sa s
of perjury made NRS df
00025
5
7
8
, , _________________________________ 5
17 - -------------------------------
Tele: 775-338-8118
Fax: 949-667-7402
Attorney for Defendant Coughlin 6
IN THE MUNICIPAL COURT OF THE CITY OF RENO STATE OF NEVADA IN AND FOR
THE COUNTY OF WASHOE
NOTICE FOR
It is important to state again here that the Bailiffwsa threatening and retaliatory w
when the undersigned appeared before Judge Gardner on October 10, 20 II, including 21 making intimidating statements to the undersigned seemingly in a retaliatory fashion
and designed to prevent the undersigned from seeking court appointed representation. 22 The Bailiff's name might have been "Monte" or something similar, however, the
23 records of that interaction are being held under an impermissible rent distraint by an opposing attorney. Obviously, such actions, when combined with the lack of a PD at
24 the arraignment, an arraignment video being shown by the court which contains threatening statements and overly ominous tones when advising litigants against
l5 appearing pro se, the City of RenolReno Municpal Court's alleged practice of only hiring "former prosecutors" to be court appointed counsel, in conjunction with the 26
failure to allow the defendant access to the PC sheet and discovery for over I month, 27 much less 48 hours from the arrest, combine to make a fair trial impossible in this
2lI
00026
matter.
Please note that the undersigned hereby files this Notice of Appearance as counsel of record in this matter.
Reno Municipal Court rules
“Court Rules and Procedures Rule 1: Applicability of Rules A. These rules may
be referred to as the Reno Municipal Court rules and may be abbreviated as
R.M.C.R. These rules are intended to supercede the rules promulgated and made
effective on January 1, 1980 by the Reno Municipal Court. B. Whenever it appears
that a particular situation does not fall within the purview of a rule, or that a literal
application of a rule would cause a hardship or injustice in a case, the court may
make such order as the interests of justice require. Rule 2: Organization of the Court
A. The Municipal Court consists of a number of departments designated by City
Council resolution, each presided over by a judge duly elected or appointed to that
position. Judges pro tem may sit in each department from time to time as authorized
by law. A judge pro tem duly appointed and authorized by the presiding judge of a
particular department to sit in that department shall have the same jurisdiction as the
presiding judge, except that the judge pro tem has jurisdiction only over matters to be
heard on his or her assigned docket. Judges pro tem are not permitted to act on any
motion filed in any case, except those requiring resolution before a case can proceed
on the docket to which the pro tem judge is assigned. B. All cases set for trial or other
post-arraignment proceeding, except a sentencing set by the arraigning judge, shall be
randomly or sequentially assigned to one of the departments. Insofar as is practical,
all cases pertaining to a defendant shall be assigned to the same judge. In the event a
judge must recuse himself or herself, the matter shall be sent to the administrative
judge for reassignment to another department. C. The elected or appointed judges of
each department may act for one another by mutual agreement as circumstances
dictate. D. Each year, the elected or appointed judges shall select one of their number
NOTICE OF APPEARANCE; MOTION FOR CONTINUANCE
Page 2
00027
to act as administrative judge for the upcoming fiscal year. The administrative judge
shall handle all court administrative matters and shall be authorized to speak publicly
for the court on matters of court policy. Rule 3: Authorization to Represent A.
Attorneys representing defendants shall promptly serve written notice of their
appearance with the City Attorney and file the same with the Court. B. An attorney
desiring to withdraw from a case shall file a motion with the court and serve the City
Attorney with the same. The court may rule on the motion or set a hearing. Rule 4:
Motions A. Except for good cause shown, all motions shall be accompanied by
affidavit, and, when appropriate, by points and authorities. All motions must be
served on the opposing party and must be file stamped along with accompanying
proof of service. B. The opposing party may file and serve answering points and
authorities on the moving party within 10 days after service of a motion. C. The
moving party may file and serve reply points and authorities within 5 days thereafter.
D. Upon the expiration of any time period set for response by this rule, either party
may file and serve a written request for submittal of the motion, or the court may
consider the motion submitted. E. An opposition to a motion must state the reason(s)
for objection. F. Motions shall be decided without oral argument unless oral
argument is ordered by the court. Rule 5: Motions by Facsimile A. All rules and
procedures that apply to motions filed in person at the court shall also apply to
motions filed by facsimile, except as otherwise specified in this rule. B. All persons
are eligible to use motion-by-facsimile procedures. C. All motions filed by facsimile
must be accompanied by a cover sheet which must include the person’s name,
address, fax number and telephone number. D. All facsimile motions filed by an
attorney must include the attorney's name, the firm’s name, address, fax number and
telephone number. In addition, the attorney’s state bar number must be conspicuously
displayed on the cover sheet. E. All motions filed by facsimile must be accompanied
by proof of service. Service may be accomplished by facsimile when the receiving
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00028
party is a governmental agency, an attorney, or with the consent of the receiving
party. If service of the motion is accomplished by facsimile the 3-day allowance for
mailing shall not be computed into the time for response. F. A defense attorney filing
a motion in the first instance must also file a proper authorization to represent. G.
Any motion received by the court after 4:30 p.m. or on a non-court day shall be filed
on the following court day. Rule 6: Continuances No continuance shall be granted,
including a stipulated continuance, except for good cause. A motion or stipulation for
continuance must state the reason therefore and whether or not any continuance has
previously been sought or granted. Rule 7: Corporations Except with the permission
of the court, a corporation or other business entity shall not appear in propria persona.
Rule 8: Courtroom Conduct and Attire Proceedings in court should be conducted
with dignity and decorum. All persons appearing in the court must be appropriately
attired. All attorneys must wear appropriate business attire. Rule 9: Appeals to
District Court Except as otherwise provided in NRS 177.015 a defendant in a
criminal action tried before a Municipal Court Judge may appeal from the final
judgment therein to the Second Judicial District Court, at any time within 10 days
from the date that judgment is rendered. Effective January 1, 2000”
MOTION FOR SANCTIONS AND ATTORNEY'S FEES POINTS AND
AUTHORITIES Coughlin/Defendant, Zach Coughlin, Esq., hereby files MOTION
FOR SANCTIONS AND ATTORNEY'S FEES based on the papers on file in this
action, all correspondence between Roberts, Coughlin, Reno City Attorney Roberts,
Hylin, and others, and the points and authorities herein contained. Court-appointed
attorney as subject to liability under 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983. 36 A.L.R. Fed. 594
(Originally published in 1978). Public defenders are not immune from liability under
42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 for alleged conspiracy, with state officials, under color of state
law, to deprive clients of federal rights. Tower v. Glover, 467 U.S. 914, 104 S. Ct.
Page 4
00029
2820, 81 L. Ed. 2d 758 (1984). Public defender may be held liable under § 1983 if he
or she engaged in a conspiracy with officials acting under the color of state law to
deprive a person of a right secured by the Con- stitution. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983. Warren
v. Fischl, 33 F. Supp. 2d 171 (E.D.N.Y. 1999). County public defender acted under
"color of state law" in failing to request indigency hearing on behalf of motorist
convicted and fined for misdemeanor reckless driving, prior to motorist's
incarceration for failure to pay his fine, for purpose of § 1983 action against county
public defender's office, alleging that it had a policy or custom of failing to seek such
indigency hearings; the act of not requesting indigency hearing was administrative,
as it was due to the office's alleged systemic inaction. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983. Powers v.
Hamilton County Public Defender Com'n, 501 F.3d 592 (6th Cir. 2007). Appointed
defense attorney was not immune from action under 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 and § 1985,
either in his own right or derivatively from alleged co-conspirators' absolute
immunity, for conspiracy with judge and prosecutor to impanel all-white jury for
defendants criminal trial and may be regarded as having acted under color of state
law in view of conspiracy alleged with public officals. White v Bloom (1980, CA8
Mo) 621 F2d 276. Attorney's liability for malpractice in connection with defense of
criminal case, 53 A.L.R.3d 731. Negligence, inattention, or professional
incompetence in handling client's affairs as ground or disciplinary action, 96
A.L.R.2d 823. Joe Roberts has indicated to his client, Coughlin, that his superiors at
the WCPD have made him feel uncomfortable doing much in the way of defending
Coughlin, and that doing so with much zeal would adversely affect his opportunities
for advancement at the WCPD and perhaps even his job security. Ineffective
Assistance of Counsel, 5 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 2d 267 Strategies for Enforcing the
Right to Effective Representation, 46 Am. Jur. Trials 571 Avoiding Legal
Malpractice Claims in Litigation, 46 Am. Jur. Trials 325 Prisoners' Rights litigation,
22 Am. Jur. Trials 1 Actions Against Attorneys for Professional Negligence, 14 Am.
Page 5
Ineffective Representation During Pretrial Phase of Criminal Case, 42 Causes of
Action 2d 707. Bines, Remedying Ineffective Representation in Criminal Cases:
Departures from Habeas Corpus. 59 Va L Rev 927 Mallen, The Court-Appointed
Lawyer and Legal Malpractice—Liability or Immunity. 14 Am Crim L Rev 59 Note,
Remedying Ineffective Representation by Public Defenders—An Administrative Al-
ternative to Traditional Civil Actions. 60 Minn L Rev 123 Note, The Right of the
Indigent Client to Sue His Court-Appointed Attorney for Malprac- tice. 33 La L Rev
740. In each of the following cases, a public defender was held not to be immune
from liability for professional malpractice. In Spring v Constantino (1975) 168 Conn
563, 362 A2d 871, an action by a state criminal defendant against a public defender
for malpractice, the court held that an attorney occupying the position of public
defender and assigned to represent an indigent defendant did not enjoy immunity
from liability for professional malpractice. Stating that a public defender is like any
other attorney whose duties as an officer of the court and to an individual client and
whose principled and fearless conduct of the defense are not deterred by the prospect
of liability, the court rejected the contention of the public defender that the doctrine
of judicial immunity should be extended to public defenders on the ground that the
immunity rule is designed to promote principled and fearless decisionmaking by
removing the fear that unsatisfied litigants might bring harassing actions. The court
also rejected the contention that the common-law doctrine of sovereign immunity
which extends to public officials applied to a malpractice action brought against a
public defender, saying that a public defender, in representing an indigent, is not a
public official, since even though the state must insure that indigents are repres-
ented by competent counsel, it could not be argued that the actual conduct of the
defense of an individual is a governmental act. The court also rejected the third
suggested ground of immunity: the statutory immunity of public officers and state
Page 6
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employees. The court said that while it was true that a public defender could be told
when he is to work and within what area, those elements of control were indicia of
the master-servant relationship and incidents of a public defender's employment
which are not within the scope of the attorney-client relationship. Stating that the
independence of the public defender was a key constitutional underpin- ning of the
public defender system, the court said that other than the source of the public de-
fender's compensation, the relationship of public defender and client is the same as
that of privately employed counsel and client. A public defender was held not to be
immune from liability for malpractice, in Reese v Danforth (1979) 486 Pa 479, 406
A2d 735, 6 ALR4th 758, In holding that the public defender was not a public official
entitled to immunity, the court said that the overriding duty of zeal- ous
representation of a client's interest attaches to the role of the public defender and thus
the performance of that duty by the defender was similar to the performance of
privately retained counsel. Stating that the relationship between the county and the
public defender was similar to that between an independent contractor and the party
contracting his services, the court said that while the availability of court-appointed
counsel to represent indigents is indubitably the public business, once the
appointment of a public defender in a given case is made, his state or public function
ceases and thereafter he functions purely as a private attorney concerned with
servicing his client, and his professional relationship with his client takes on all the
obliga- tions and protections attendant upon a private attorney-client relationship
except that the public pays the attorney's fee. The court also rejected the contentions
that not granting immunity to the public defender would hinder the recoupment of
able lawyers to represent indigents, and would inhibit the defender's professional
discretion in declining to press the frivolous, to assign priorities between indigent
litigants, and to make strategic decisions with regard to a particular litigant as to how
his interest may best be advanced. In the following case, a public defender was held
Page 7
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not liable for the malpractice of one of his deputies. A public defender was held not
to be liable solely by virtue of his office, for the malpractice of one of his deputies,
in Sanchez v Murphy (1974, DC Nev) 385 F Supp 1362. Stating that the professional
relationship between court-appointed counsel and indigent criminal defendants
under public defender systems is no different than that between a client and privately
retained counsel, the court went on to say that the relationship of the public defender
and his deputies among themselves was not a partnership relationship, since the
economic justifica- tion for holding one partner liable for the misconduct of another
partner was grounded on the fact that fees for services are shared, whereas each of the
public defender attorneys was com- pensated independently by salary for his own
services. Stating that a deputy public defender is an independent officer, the court
noted that there was substantial authority in support of the rule that in the absence of
statute imposing liability or of negligence on his part in appointing or supervising his
assistants, a public officer is not liable for the default and misfeasance of assistants
appointed by him. Related Annotations are located under the Research References
heading of this Annotation. CUMULATIVE SUPPLEMENT Cases: Plaintiff's
malpractice action against public defender was not precluded by quasi-judicial
immunity. Wilcox v. Brummer, 739 So. 2d 1282 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 3d Dist. 1999).
Public defender attorneys were not entitled to sovereign immunity from legal
malpractice claims brought by former client convicted in criminal case and later
exonerated; attorneys' duty to client arose independently of their state employment.
Johnson v. Halloran, 312 Ill. App. 3d 695, 245 Ill. Dec. 408, 728 N.E.2d 490 (1st
Dist. 2000), appeal allowed, 189 Ill. 2d 688 (2000). The court in Dziubak v Mott
(1993, Minn) 503 NW2d 771 held that a public defender is immune from liability for
malpractice: In contrast, the court in Veneri v Pappano (1993, Pa Super) 622 A2d
977 noted that a public defender is not immune from liability for malpractice.
Attorney's liability for malpractice in connection with defense of criminal case, 53
Page 8
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A.L.R.3d 731; The independence of the public defender is of utmost importance to its
duties to indigent defendants. Crist v. Florida Ass'n of Criminal Defense Lawyers,
Inc., 978 So. 2d 134 (Fla. 2008). Trial court's comments on perceived deficiencies of
public
defender system, made in its order denying defendant's request for 35–day
pretrial continuance of capital murder trial, did not create a conflict of interest
between defendant and public defender which required public defender to withdraw
from the representation. Sup. Ct. Rules, Rule 3.130, Rules of Prof. Con- duct, Rule
1.16(a). Furnish v. Com., 95 S.W.3d 34 (Ky. 2002), as modified, (Dec. 10, 2002). At
the hearing on the Competency Evaluation, Judge Sferrazza could be heard, during a
recess, making an excited utterance wherein he commented that the bill for the
ridiculous, baseless, and clearly motivated by a retaliatory intent request for a
Competency Evaluation made by PD Hylin would not be accepted by the Reno
Justice Court, and that it would be returned to the Public Defender's Office and they
could pay the bill for the Competency Evaluation if they wanted to waster money so
bad. Mr. Roberts, Please provide, in writing an inventory of everything you believe
you have provided me. Further, your flip disregard and non response in relation to my
FOIA requests and other requests, made in writing, asking you to file a Motion to
Dismiss, and other motions is truly troubling and reflects exceedingly poorly on your
level of professional responsibility. In fact, I have commenced an inquiry into
whether you have EVER filed a Motion to Dismiss on behalf of ANY client and,
similarly, whether you, in your long tenure at the WCPD have ever asked for
sanctions of any sort against the Reno City Attorney. In court, at a hearing featuring
Reno City Attorney Roberts, you walked over to Reno City Attorney Roberts's file,
without a hint of consternation from Reno City Attorney Roberts, and rifled through
his file looking for something, yet you deny me access to my file. That sort of
fraternization with the Reno City Attorney's Office (you still have not answered
Page 9
whether Reno City Attorney Roberts was in your retinue at the free trade coffee place
that day I saw you on the street) is inappropriate an reflects poorly on the legal
profession and the WCPD's Office, particularly in the context of your myriad refusals
to file even a single document in my defense, you cohorts forcing me into a
burdensome and insulting Competency Evaluation, your non response to my FOIA
request, the patently retaliatory falsehoods Mr. Hylin attributes to Jessica, your
receptionist, Mr. Bosler's hiring by Reno City Attorney Gammick, and all the other
13th chimes of the clock one hears in the tape from this case. Just a few turns on the
EQ, and this case could be a symphony of transparency. Coughlin further moves for
sanctions against Deputy City Attorney Roberts pursuant to NRS 7.085, for the
attorneys' fees Coughlin has needlessly incurred due to Roberts's cowardly, lethargic,
largesse and reckless uses of this court's processes.
ANALYSIS
If a Reno City Attorney has in his or her possession exculpatory video and audio
evidence, in addition to audio and video evidence which shows material witnesses
not only completely contradicting themselves, but also seeking to dissuade other
material witnesses from testifying, it would be troubling to see that Reno City
Attorney or someone filling in for him as some preliminary hearing to continue to
appear in court and stand behind the Criminal Complaint, all while collecting a
paycheck that is more and more put into rather stark relief in comparison to that
which similarly experienced and educated inviduals garner in the private sector.
Further, if other material witnesses can be seen in audio and video evidence
assaulting and battering an investigator asking questions related to exculpating the
accused in a matter, it would be all the more troubling to see a prosecutor continue to
appear in court advocating orally and filing documents in support of the allegations
of the criminal complaint. It is important to clarify statements made in court today
with respect to whether NRCP Rule 11 sanctions may be levied against a prosecutor.
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Such a proposition was met with general doubt today. However, Nevada law is quite
clear in this regard. Clearly, they can. Contrary to any indication in court today, the
Reno City Attorney does not play with some sort of special safety net the rest of the
attorneys in the state fail to have: Office of Washoe County Dist. Atty. v. Second
Judicial Dist. Court ex rel. County of Washoe, 116 Nev. 629, 5 P.3d 562 (2000) .
The Reno City Attorney absolutely is subject to NRCP 11, and so is any with the
Washoe County Public Defender's Office or the court appointed “four former
prosecutors” the Reno City Attorney and Reno Municipal Court call court
appointed defense attorneys.. "In a case brought by the district attorney to
enforce a Washington child support order in Nevada, the district court imposed
NRCP 11 sanctions against the district attorney for failing to discontinue
enforcement of the support order after the district court's previous ruling that
Washington had continuing exclusive jurisdiction to adjudicate the arrearage
amount. District attorney's office, as a non-party in underlying proceedings to
enforce out-of-state child support order, did not have right to appeal district court's
order imposing Rule 11 sanctions against the office, and thus writ of mandamus was
an available remedy. Office of Washoe County Dist. Atty. v. Second Judicial Dist.
Court ex rel. County of Washoe, 2000, 5 P.3d 562, 116 Nev. 629. District judge
abused his discretion in imposing $2,500 sanctions against city manager and city
attorney for their alleged failure to participate in good faith in settlement conference
and, therefore, petition for writ of mandamus to prevent district court from enforcing
sanctions would be granted; sanctions levied did not fit purported violations at issue.
City of Sparks v. Second Judicial Dist. Court In and For County of Washoe, 1996,
920 P.2d 1014, 112 Nev. 952. In the United States Supreme Court case of Buckley v.
Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 113 S.Ct. 2606, 125 L.Ed.2d 209 (1993), the petitioner
alleged the prosecutors and police conspired to link the boot print at the murder scene
with his print by witness “shopping.” “At the time of this witness shopping the
Page 11
assistant prosecutors were working hand in hand with the sheriff's detectives....” Id. at
272, 113 S.Ct. 2606. The Court held the prosecutors were not entitled to absolute
immunity, stating: A prosecutor's administrative duties and those investigatory
functions that do not relate to an advocate's preparation for the initiation of a
prosecution or for judicial proceedings are not entitled to absolute immunity. Id. at
273, 113 S.Ct. 2606. See Gentile v. County of Suffolk, 926 F.2d 142 (2d Cir. 1991)
(holding that a county district attorney's long practice of ignoring evidence of police
misconduct and sanctioning and covering up wrongdoing could make the county
liable); Claude H. v. County of Oneida, 626 N.Y.S.2d 933 (App. Div. 1995) (holding
that district attorney's command that plaintiff be unlawfully arrested could support
action against county for false imprisonment). Nevada Rules of Professional
Conduct, Rule 3.8. Special Responsibilities of a Prosecutor. " The prosecutor in a
criminal case shall: (a) Refrain from prosecuting a charge that the prosecutor knows
is not supported by probable cause; (b) Make reasonable efforts to assure that the
accused has been advised of the right to, and the procedure for obtaining, counsel and
has been given reasonable opportunity to obtain counsel; (c) Not seek to obtain from
an unrepresented accused a waiver of important pretrial rights, such as the right to a
preliminary hearing; (d) Make timely disclosure to the defense of all evidence or
information known to the prosecutor that tends to negate the guilt of the accused or
mitigates the offense, and, in connection with sentencing, disclose to the defense and
to the tribunal all unprivileged mitigating information known to the prosecutor,
except when the prosecutor is relieved of this responsibility by a protective order of
the tribunal; (e) Not subpoena a lawyer in a grand jury or other criminal proceeding
to present evidence about a past or present client unless the prosecutor reasonably
believes: (1) The information sought is not protected from disclosure by any
applicable privilege; (2) The evidence sought is essential to the successful
completion of an ongoing investigation or prosecution; and (3) There is no other
Page 12
feasible alternative to obtain the information; (f) Except for statements that are
necessary to inform the public of the nature and extent of the prosecutor’s action and
that serve a legitimate law enforcement purpose, refrain from making extrajudicial
comments that have a substantial likelihood of heightening public condemnation of
the accused and exercise reasonable care to prevent investigators, law enforcement
personnel, employees or other persons assisting or associated with the prosecutor in a
criminal case from making an extrajudicial statement that the prosecutor would be
prohibited from making under Rule 3.6 or this Rule." Under Brady v. Maryland, 373
U.S. 83, 87 (1963), “the suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an
accused ... violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to
punishment....”United States v. Shaygan, 661 F.Supp.2d 1289, 1325 (S.D. Fla. 2009)
(judge reserved the right “to impose any further sanctions and/or disciplinary
measures as may be necessary against [the federal prosecutors] after reviewing the
results of the Justice Department’s investigation.”); United States v. Jones, No. CR
07-10289- MLW, 2010 WL 565478 (D.Mass. 2010) (court determined that
imposition of sanctions against AUSA or government for failure to adequately train
AUSA based on failure to disclose plainly material exculpatory evidence were
neither necessary nor appropriate where, since violation disclosure, AUSA, US
Attorney’s Office and DOJ officials took actions such as participating in discovery
training programs, which obviated need for sanctions). As for the Public Defender:
Roy B. Flemming, If You Pay the Piper, Do You Call the Tune? Public Defenders in
America's Criminal Courts, 14 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 393 (1989)'. What Public
Defender? The undersigned was denied one in contravention of the Sixth
Amendment, and it doesn't matter if the state doesn't intent to seek jail time, one is
required where jail time is a possibility. Such a decision would constitute an
"objective" of the representation. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL
CONDUCT Rule 1.2(a); ABA Standards for Criminal Justice, Standard 4-5.2
Page 13
"Control and Direction of the Case" (1992) (specifying that the decisions to be made
by the accused after full consultation with counsel include what pleas to enter,
whether to accept a plea agreement, whether to waive jury trial, whether to testify,
and whether to appeal). The lawyers who characteristically gravitate toward indigent
defense would not, it seems, easily adjust to a practice that involved adhering to a set
of overriding institutional objectives. Neither their training nor their impulses would
typically prepare public defenders to bend to the office's larger goals. In fact, the anti-
authoritarian nature of the work appealed to me as a staff lawyer. I expected to
represent my clients without either intervention or interference from my supervisors.
My clients' objectives were not only important, but the only ones that mattered. I
remain sensitive that by imposing institutional controls that to some extent curb the
rebellious spirit of defenders, the defender office might run the risk of changing both
the nature of defenders' practice and the type of lawyers who choose to join the
office. Clearly, if a criminal defendant has a legitimate and articulable basis for
wanting a Motion to Dismiss filed, it should be filed, even by a Public Defender
whose boss was chosen, in part, by the District Attorney. This is particularly true
where exculpatory audio and video evidence exists, and even more so where
extortion or other police misconduct is evident, such as coercive attempts to garner
consent to search, threats to bad mouth one to a professional licensure body,
excessive force, sexual battery, overcharging in a retaliatory manner in light of an
assertion of Fourth or Fifth Amendment rights, false imprisonment, etc.... By now,
the actions of Michael Nifong, the former District Attorney of Durham County, North
Carolina, that led to his disbarment are well known. See generally Robert P.
Mosteller, The Duke Lacrosse Case, Innocence, and False Identifications: A
Fundamental Failure to “Do Justice”, 76 Fordham L. Rev. 1337 (2007). Some argue
that the situation involving Nifong is an isolated case. Yet prosecutorial overreaching
has been an issue well before this headline-grabbing case came along. A recent report
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issued by the California Commission on the Fair Administration of Justice referred to
a study that reviewed 2,130 California appellate cases in which a claim of
prosecutorial misconduct was raised. Cal. Comm’n on the Fair Admin. of Justice,
Report and Recommendations on Professional Responsibility and Accountability of
Prosecutors and Defense Lawyers (2007), available at
http://www.ccfaj.org/documents/reports/prosecutorial/official/official report on
reporting misconduct.pdf. Of those 2,130 cases, 443 resulted in findings that
prosecutorial misconduct actually occurred. In 53 of the 443 cases, a reversal of
conviction was the result—the rest concluding that the misconduct was harmless
error. Perhaps the most disturbing statistic is that a follow-up study looking at half of
the cases resulting in a reversed conviction concluded that the prosecutor was not
referred to the California State Bar for discipline, which is required under California
law. If there is a positive aspect to the Duke Lacrosse saga, it is that Nifong’s actions
and ultimate disbarment have served to highlight the important issue of prosecutorial
misconduct and the need for effective remedies. Prosecutorial Misconduct and
Wrongful Convictions: Shaping Remedies for a Broken System, 2006 Wis. L. Rev.
399, 403 (2006). Moreover, assuming that the defendant is factually culpable, a
conviction secured through the improper actions of a prosecutor could be
unconstitutional and, thus, subject to reversal. The result is that the innocent are
convicted and the guilty go free, which can only exacerbate the public’s loss of trust
in the integrity of the criminal justice system. PROSECUTORIAL GUIDELINES In
performing their duties to seek justice, prosecutors are bound by constitutional
standards, case law governing trial conduct, and various ethics rules and standards
pertaining to the prosecutorial function. Rule 3.8 of the ABA Model Rules of
Professional Conduct (“Model Rules”) specifically covers the actions and
responsibilities of prosecutors. All state jurisdictions have an ethics rule imposing
special responsibilities on prosecutors, most based on Model Rule 3.8. Prosecutors
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are also guided by standards found in the ABA Standards for Criminal Justice
Prosecution Function and Defense Function (3d ed. 1993) (“ABA Standards”) and
the National District Attorneys Association Prosecution Standards (2d ed. 1991)
(“NDAA Standards”). In assessing the conduct of prosecutors, courts have oftentimes
looked to the ABA Standards for guidance. See, e.g., Miller v. North Carolina, 583
F.2d 701, 706 n.6 (4th Cir. 1978). For years, the U.S. Department of Justice (“DOJ”)
took the position that Assistant United States Attorneys (“AUSAs”) were exempt
from state ethics rules. The McDade Amendment in 1999 laid to rest this argument.
The amendment, attached as a rider to an appropriations bill, provides: An attorney
for the Government shall be subject to State laws and rules, and local Federal court
rules, governing attorneys in each State where such attorney engages in that
attorney’s duties, to the same extent and in the same manner as other attorneys in that
State. 28 U.S.C. § 530B(a). The Professional Responsibility Advisory Office within
the DOJ provides advice to AUSAs regarding ethical issues and choice-of-law
matters. EXAMPLES OF PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT “Like the Hydra slain
by Hercules, prosecutorial misconduct has many heads.” United States v. Williams,
504 U.S. 36, 60 (1992) (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also Joy, supra, at 402 (listing
numerous forms of prosecutorial misconduct). This article focuses on five categories:
(1) suppression of evidence, (2) misuse of the media, (3) misconduct involving
witnesses, (4) investigative misconduct, and (5) trial misconduct. Any specific act of
prosecutorial misconduct may fall into more than one category. For example,
knowingly presenting perjured testimony would be misconduct involving a witness,
as well as a violation of the duty to disclose exculpatory evidence. Nifong committed
investigative misconduct in devising the photo array that led to the arrest of the three
lacrosse players. The accuser in the case, Crystal Mangum, had been shown two
photo arrays— one on March 16, 2006 and another on March 21, 2006—that did not
contain any “fillers.” Every single picture, 36 in total, that Mangum looked at was a
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lacrosse player. Mangum was unable to identify any of her alleged attackers. Then,
on March 31, 2006, Nifong suggested to the police that Mangum be shown
photographs of all 46 white members of the team at the same time. See Mosteller,
supra, at 1398. During this procedure, which occurred on April 4, 2006, Mangum, at
the direction of Nifong, was told that the police had reason to believe that all of the
men she was looking at were at the party where she was allegedly raped. Again, the
array contained no “fillers.” In essence, Mangum was told that she could not make a
wrong choice. It was at this time that Mangum identified the players who were later
charged. The direct consequence of this investigative misconduct was the indictment
of three innocent people. Trial Misconduct Prosecutorial misconduct during the
course of trial covers a broad spectrum. For example, a prosecutor may improperly:
introduce evidence, assassinate the character of a defendant, refer to the fact that a
defendant did not talk to the police or take the stand in his or her defense, make
inflammatory statements during closing argument, or attempt to bolster the credibility
of a prosecution witness. See generally, Lawless, supra, §§ 9–10; Gershman,
Misconduct, supra, §§ 10–11. ABA Standard 3-5.8 and NDAA Standard 85.1 govern
the scope of closing arguments. The NDAA Standard simply states: “Closing
arguments should be characterized by fairness, accuracy, rationality, and a reliance
upon the evidence or reasonable inferences drawn therefrom.” NDAA Standard 85.1.
The ABA Standard goes further and specifically states that a prosecutor should not
express his or her personal belief as to the veracity of any evidence or guilt of the
defendant. The ABA Standard also provides that a prosecutor should not appeal to
the prejudices of the jury. See ABA Standard 3- 5.8(b)– (c). Case law is filled with
innumerable instances of improper trial conduct—most of which is deemed harmless.
One prosecutor who repeatedly went over the line according to appellate courts is
Robert H. Macy, the former District Attorney of Oklahoma County, Oklahoma. See
Ken Armstrong, “Cowboy Bob” Ropes Wins—But at Considerable Cost, Chi. Trib.,
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Jan. 10, 1999, at 13. Called a “true patriot” by former Attorney General William Barr
and honored as “America’s prosecutor” by the Oklahoma Senate upon his retirement
in 2001, Macy left behind a string of cases commenting unfavorably on his trial
conduct. Paxton v. Ward, 199 F.3d 1197 (10th Cir. 1999); Washington v. State, 989
P.2d 960 (Okla. Crim. App. 1999); Ochoa v. State, 963 P.2d 583 (Okla. Crim. App.
1998); Torres v. State, 962 P.2d 3 (Okla. Crim. App. 1998); Le v. State, 947 P.2d 535
(Okla. Crim. App. 1997); Duckett v. State, 919 P.2d 7 (Okla. Crim. App. 1995);
Robinson v. State, 900 P.2d 389 (Okla. Crim. App. 1995); Hawkins v. State, 891
P.2d 586 (Okla. Crim. App. 1995); Hooker v. State, 887 P.2d 1351 (Okla. Crim.
App. 1994); Howell v. State, 882 P.2d 1086 (Okla. Crim. App. 1994);
McCarty v. State, 765 P.2d 1215 (Okla. Crim. App. 1985); Cantrell v. State, 697
P.2d 968 (Okla. Crim. App. 1985) (Parks, J., dissenting). The rebukes seem not to
have had any effect on his conduct. Nevada Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.2.
Scope of Representation and Allocation of Authority Between Client and Lawyer. (a)
Subject to paragraphs (c) and (d), a lawyer shall abide by a client’s decision
concerning the objectives of representation and, as required by Rule 1.4, shall consult
with the client as to the means by which they are to be pursued. A lawyer may take
such action on behalf of the client as is impliedly authorized to carry out the
representation. A lawyer shall abide by a client’s decision whether to settle a matter.
In a criminal case, the lawyer shall abide by the client’s decision, after consultation
with the lawyer, as to a plea to be entered, whether to waive jury trial and whether the
client will testify. (b) A lawyer’s representation of a client, including representation
by appointment, does not constitute an endorsement of the client’s political,
economic, social or moral views or activities. (c) A lawyer may limit the scope of the
representation if the limitation is reasonable under the circumstances and the client
gives informed consent. (d) A lawyer shall not counsel a client to engage, or assist a
client, in conduct that the lawyer knows is criminal or fraudulent, but a lawyer may
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discuss the legal consequences of any proposed course of conduct with a client and
may counsel or assist a client to make a good faith effort to determine the validity,
scope, meaning or application of the law. [Added; effective May 1, 2006.] Model
Rule Comparison—2006 Rule 1.2 (formerly Supreme Court Rule 152) is the same as
ABA Model Rule 1.2. Rule 1.3. Diligence. A lawyer shall act with reasonable
diligence and promptness in representing a client. [Added; effective May 1, 2006.]
Model Rule Comparison—2006 Rule 1.3 (formerly Supreme Court Rule 153) is the
same as ABA Model Rule 1.3. Investigative Misconduct Pressure to solve a crime
might lead a prosecutor to get intimately involved in the pre-trial investigation of a
matter. See ABA Standard 3-3.1 (“[T]he prosecutor has an affirmative responsibility
to investigate suspected illegal activity when it is not adequately dealt with by other
agencies.”). REMEDIES To date, prosecutorial misconduct—even the most
egregious—has largely gone unchecked. See Gershman, Misconduct, supra, at vi
(“Relatively few judicial or constitutional sanctions exist to penalize or deter
misconduct; the available sanctions are sparingly used and even when used have not
proved effective.”). In January 1999, the Chicago Tribune published a five-part series
titled: Trial & Error: How Prosecutors Sacrifice Justice to Win. Analyzing thousands
of cases, the newspaper found that since 1963 at least 381 defendants had their
convictions reversed either because prosecutors suppressed exculpatory evidence or
suborned perjury. Alarmingly, of those 381 cases, “not one of those prosecutors was
convicted of a crime. Not one was barred from practicing law. Instead, many saw
their careers advance, becoming judges or district attorneys. One became a
congressman.” Ken Armstrong & Maurice Possley, The Verdict: Dishonor, Chi.
Trib., Jan. 10, 1999, at 1. Criminal Prosecutions The criminal prosecution of a
prosecutor is extremely rare. According to the Chicago Tribune series, “[f]ew
prosecutors nationally have been indicted, and they were acquitted or, at worst,
convicted of a misdemeanor and fined.” Ken Armstrong & Maurice Possley, Break
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Rules, Be Promoted, Chi. Trib., Jan. 14, 1999, at 1 [hereinafter Armstrong & Possley,
Break Rules]. This statistic seems not to have changed in the last nine years.
Subsequent to the Tribune series, two separate cases were brought against
prosecutors for acts committed in their official capacity; neither resulted in
convictions. The first occurred in mid-1999— a case in which three former Illinois
state prosecutors were charged with conspiring to frame a man by the name of
Rolando Cruz for murder. Cruz spent nearly 10 years on Death Row before it became
clear that the prosecution had suppressed evidence that another person had
committed the crime and that prosecutors had conspired with police officers to
introduce a “dream statement” of Cruz’s into evidence at his original trial and two re-
trials. A judge dismissed charges against two of the prosecutors for insufficient
evidence. (One later became an Illinois judge—the other, an AUSA.) A jury
acquitted the third after a 28-day trial. See Andrew Bluth, Prosecutor and 4 Sheriff ’s
Deputies Are Acquitted of Wrongfully Accusing a Man of Murder, N.Y. Times, June
5, 1999, at A9. Rule 1.4. Communication. (a) A lawyer shall: (1) Promptly inform the
client of any decision or circumstance with respect to which the client’s informed
consent is required by these Rules; (2) Reasonably consult with the client about the
means by which the client’s objectives are to be accomplished; (3) Keep the client
reasonably informed about the status of the matter; (4) Promptly comply with
reasonable requests for information; and (5) Consult with the client about any
relevant limitation on the lawyer’s conduct when the lawyer knows that the client
expects assistance not permitted by the Rules of Professional Conduct or other law.
(b) A lawyer shall explain a matter to the extent reasonably necessary to permit the
client to make informed decisions regarding the representation. ...Added; effective
May 1, 2006; as amended; effective November 21, 2008.] Model Rule Comparison—
2007 Rule 1.4 (formerly Supreme Court Rule 154) is the same as ABA Model Rule
1.4, except that the 2007 amendments include language in paragraph (c) that was
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previously part of repealed Rule 7.2A(a) through (d) and (f) (formerly Supreme Court
Rule 196.5) which is Nevadaspecific language and has no counterpart in the Model
Rules. Disciplinary Actions Each state bar has a mechanism in place for the
discipline of misconduct by attorneys licensed in that state. Separately, federal courts
may discipline attorneys who appear before them, which may result in the suspension
or disbarment of attorneys from that particular court. See, e.g., In re Kramer, 282
F.3d 721 (9th Cir. 2002). Further, the DOJ’s Office of Professional Responsibility
(“OPR”) has responsibility for investigating allegations of misconduct committed by
AUSAs. It appears that these procedures are rarely effective in dealing with
prosecutorial misconduct. The disciplinary action against Nifong is unusual in that
not only did it result in disbarment, but because it was initiated while charges against
the Duke students were still pending. Recently, the Center for Public Integrity
conducted a study that found only 44 instances of disciplinary actions against
prosecutors since 1970. Of those 44: ? in 7, the court dismissed the complaint or did
not impose punishment; ? in 3, the court remanded the case for further proceedings; ?
in 24, the court assessed the costs of the proceedings against the prosecutor; ? in 20,
the court imposed a public or private reprimand or censure; ? in 1, the prosecutor was
placed on probation; ? in 12, the prosecutor’s license was suspended; ? in 2, the
prosecutor was disbarred. Neil Gordon, Misconduct and Punishment: State
Disciplinary Authorities Investigate Prosecutors Accused of Misconduct (2007),
http://www.publicintegrity.org/pm/default.aspx?act=sidebarsb&aid =39; see
generally Steve Weinberg et al., Ctr. for Pub. Integrity, Harmful Error: Investigating
America’s Local Prosecutors (2003). A follow-up to the Tulia case discussed above
revealed that the prosecutor, whose subornation of perjury and Brady violations led
to the wrongful convictions of scores of people, received two years of probation. See
Disciplinary Actions, 68 Tex. B.J. 753, 758 (2005). The OPR has the authority to
determine whether an AUSA committed “professional misconduct in the exercise of
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Justice Office of Prof’l Responsibility, Analytical Framework (rev. 2005), available
at http://www.usdoj.gov/opr/framework.pdf. Professional misconduct is defined as
the intentional or reckless disregard “of an obligation or standard imposed by law,
applicable rule of professional conduct, or Department regulation or policy.” Id. If the
OPR determines that an AUSA committed professional misconduct, it recommends a
certain sanction to the attorney’s supervisor. Available sanctions range from a written
reprimand to removal. The OPR may also refer the matter to the bar disciplinary
authority in the jurisdiction in which the attorney is licensed. See U.S. Dep’t of
Justice Office of Prof’l Responsibility, Policies & Procedures, available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/opr/ polandproc.htm. In 2001, a General Accounting Office
report concluded that the OPR was ineffective in dealing with prosecutorial
misconduct. See News Advisory, U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on the
Judiciary, GAO Report Finds Significant Problems with Justice Department’s Office
of Professional Responsibility (Feb. 20, 2001), available at
http://www.judiciary.house.gov/legacy/news0220.htm. A recent highly-publicized
case illustrates the problem. Chief Judge Mark Wolf of the U.S. District Court,
District of Massachusetts found “extraordinary misconduct by the Department of
Justice in its investigation and prosecution of members of the Patriarca Family of La
Cosa Nostra.” Ferrara v. United States, 384 F. Supp. 2d 384, 387 (D. Mass. 2005), aff
’d, 456 F.3d 278 (1st Cir. 2006). Chief Judge Wolf found that AUSA “Jeffrey
Auerhahn, violated [his] clearly established constitutional duty to disclose . . . before
trial, important exculpatory information that directly negated [Vincent Ferrara’s and
Pasquale Barone’s] guilt on” murder charges. Id. The suppression of the evidence
was intentional according to Chief Judge Wolf. See id. at 393– 98. The First Circuit
agreed, stating: “[T]he government’s actions in this case . . . paint a grim picture of
blatant misconduct. The record virtually compels the conclusion that this feckless
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course of conduct . . . constituted a deliberate and serious breach of its promise to
provide exculpatory evidence.” Ferrara v. United States, 456 F.3d 278, 293 (1st Cir.
2006) (footnote omitted). The OPR investigated Auerhahn and concluded that he had
acted in reckless disregard of his duty to disclose exculpatory evidence.
I have been evicted and perhaps subject to an illegal lockout and unlawful rent
distraint by an attorney representing my Beverly Hills High School graduate
California Neurosurgeon landlord, who has spent approx $30,000 in attorneys fees
pursuing a summary eviction, and whose attorney is withholding my state issued
indentification, wallet, and all materials necessary to my law practice all in an
unlawful rent distraint prohibited by NRS 40.460 and 40.520. I am pursuing a
continuance of the upcoming hearing/trial, I cannot even access when that hearing is.
I have informed opposing counsel Roberts of some of the issues which will require
extensive discovery, a jury trial, and more time to afford myself a legitimate
opportunity to defend this case. I have not been served any Order responding to my
request for appointment of counsel, as I believe it is required even if the State does
not "intend" to seek jail time, where any incarceration is a possibility, the Sixth
Amendment guarantees it. Please note that my temporary address for now is: Zach
Coughlin, Esq. c/o Silver Dollar Motel 817 N. Virginia St., Unit # 2 Reno, NV 89501
The opposing counsel in the summary eviction matter is withholding my phone as
well and refusing to allow me to access any mail that may remain at the property
from those times when the USPS was processing my official Change of Address.
Email is the best way to get in contact with me during this transition period. For
instance, I am unware whether my Motion for Appointment of Counsel was granted
or not. I called Judge Howard's assistant and requested that she email me the docket
in this case and any pleadings or orders filed, including any order that may have
stemmed form any of my previous motions, as I am not sure how those were ruled
on. I believe my internet based fax service will allow me to receive those materials at
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my number 949 667 7402, though I would prefer email, but I know many
governmental entities prefer to fax such items. I am requesting a jury trial, a
substantial continuance, and the appointment of counsel. I object to the RMC's
practice of refusing to tell litigants who the 4 "house" appointed defenders are upon
questioning. Further, it has become clear that some of these "former prosecutors"
who are now the gang of four "house" defenders, do not even announce to accused
arraignees that they are, in fact, the defender or an attorney or that they may be
representing the arraignees. I am hereby filing a motion in limine regarding any
materials or information gleaned from the unlawful search by the RSIC Officer, who
clearly announced that they would base their probable cause to arrest and conduct a
search incident to arrest upon any failure to consent to a search by the accused.
Further, the alleged conduct did not occur in the Officer's presence, and I believe
there exists authority preventing a minor misdemeanor arrest and transport under
those circumstances. Additionally, more time is needed to conduct discovery in this
matter, especially in light of allegations that Walmart had previously threatened
individuals, including, perhaps, the accused, with retaliatory action, including illicit
abuse of process, for the purported attempts by someone to have the Walmart Return
Policy enforced, and to hold accountable all Walmart employees and managers, some
of whom have over a decade experience in their positions, who curiously "forget"
they Return Policy Walmart holds out to the public when it is convenient to do so,
the same Return Policy that Walmart used to drive out of business so many
competitors. Further, this case is likely to get extremely complicated given the
apparent conflict of interest stemming from the fact that the Walmart in question is
on land owned by the RSIC, which may own or employ the RSIC police, and which
is rented or owned in part by Walmart. I know Opposing Counsel Roberts may
appreciate a continuance as well and the opportunity it would afford her to fulfill her
NRCP 11 duty and other prosecutorial duties to conduct a reasonably diligent inquiry
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into these matters.....”I did obtain a copy of the "discovery" about the second day it
was made available to me from your office in person. At that time, no video evidence
was made available to me. Is there now some video or audio recording to which I
may be provided access? Would you mind just emailing me the names of the
intended witnesses. Do you believe you do not have a duty to make a reasonably
diligent inquiry of either Walmart or RSIC do assess the validity of the matters
mentioned in my last email, ie the retaliatory motive vis a vis Walmart and or the
impermissible search/ 42 USC Sec 1983 police misconduct of the RSIC officers?
Full view||Back to messagesRE: motion for continuance? 11/16/11 Pamela
RobertsTo Zach Coughlin From: Pamela Roberts ([email protected]) Sent: Wed
11/16/11 5:12 PM To: Zach Coughlin ([email protected]) Mr. Coughlin,
you should have already received a notice regarding the availability of discovery and
request for reciprocal discovery. You just need to call ahead at 334-2050 and arrange
to pick it up. You are entitled to copies of all the reports and witness statements and
video we may have on this case. Since I am not calling any additional witnesses that
are not already mentioned in the reports/statements, I am not obligated

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