119 KO Proliferation and Terrorism Impacts

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Proliferation/TerrorismWilliam Huang

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Wewt

Wewt ................................................................................................................................................................................................... ...... ...1

Prolif Now Kinshasa .................................................................................................................................................................................3

Prolif Bad Frontline .....................................................................................................................................................................................4Prolif Bad Frontline .....................................................................................................................................................................................5Prolif Bad Frontline .....................................................................................................................................................................................7

Prolif Bad Frontline .....................................................................................................................................................................................8

Prolif Bad Frontline ...................................................................................................................................................................................10

Prolif Bad Frontline ............................................................................................................................................................ .......................11

Ext. Miscalculation Inevitable ...................................................................................................................................................................12



Ext. Military Pre-emption .....................................................................................................................................................................15

AT: Small Arms Races ...............................................................................................................................................................................16

Safety Problems ...................................................................................................................................................................... ...... ...... ...17

Safety Problems .........................................................................................................................................................................................18

Safety Problems .........................................................................................................................................................................................19Safety Problems .........................................................................................................................................................................................20

Safety Problems .........................................................................................................................................................................................21

Safety Problems .........................................................................................................................................................................................22

Safety Problems .........................................................................................................................................................................................23

Safety Problems .........................................................................................................................................................................................24Prolif Good Frontline .............................................................................................................................................................................. ...25

Prolif Good Frontline .............................................................................................................................................................................. ...26






Prolif Good Frontline .............................................................................................................................................................................. ...32Ext. Deterrence ........................................................................................................................................................................... ...... ...... ...34

Ext. Deterrence ........................................................................................................................................................................... ...... ...... ...35

AT: Small States Cant Deter Big States ....................................................................................................................................................36

AT: Small States Cant Deter Big States ....................................................................................................................................................37

AT: Small States Reckless ..........................................................................................................................................................................38

AT: Small States Reckless ..........................................................................................................................................................................39

AT: New Prolif Wont Be Opaque .............................................................................................................................................. ...... ...... ...40

AT: New Prolif Wont Be Opaque .............................................................................................................................................. ...... ...... ...41AT: Preemption ..........................................................................................................................................................................................42

AT: Preemption ..........................................................................................................................................................................................43

AT: Time to learn .................................................................................................................................................................................... ...44

AT: ProlifArms Races ................................................................................................................................................................. ...... ...45




AT: Crazy Leaders ...................................................................................................................................................................... ...... ...... ...49

AT: Crazy Leaders ...................................................................................................................................................................... ...... ...... ...50

AT: Crazy Leaders ...................................................................................................................................................................... ...... ...... ...51AT: Crazy Leaders ...................................................................................................................................................................... ...... ...... ...53

AT: Crazy Leaders ...................................................................................................................................................................... ...... ...... ...54

AT: Crazy Leaders ...................................................................................................................................................................... ...... ...... ...55

AT: Military Control Bad ...........................................................................................................................................................................56

AT: Military Control Bad ...........................................................................................................................................................................57

AT: Blackmail ............................................................................................................................................................................................58

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DDI 08Kernoff/OlneyAT: Prolif Escalation / Miscalculation ..................................................................................................................................................59

AT: Prolif Escalation / Miscalculation ..................................................................................................................................................60

AT: Nuclear Multipolarity bad / Hostile Pairs ...........................................................................................................................................62AT: Terrorists Steal .....................................................................................................................................................................................63

AT: Terrorists Steal .....................................................................................................................................................................................65

AT: Just Waltz Advocates ...........................................................................................................................................................................66Flawed Logic .............................................................................................................................................................................................67

Terrorism Frontline ........................................................................................................................................................................... ...... ...68




Ext. No Nukes ............................................................................................................................................................................................72

Ext. No Attack Self-interest ....................................................................................................................................................................73Ext. No Attack Self-interest ....................................................................................................................................................................74

AT: Russia ..................................................................................................................................................................................................75

AT: Other Explanations ..............................................................................................................................................................................76

WOOT! PROLIF GOOD!

Notes: The terrorism good frontline is sweet and also can be used to answer their prolif leads to terrorismargs and vice versa, I didnt want to reproduce the cards twice.

The frontlines are good but show definitely be highlighted down.

KILL TURNER!

Prolif good only way to solve east asian nuclear war

Layne 98 search Charles Olneys cites

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Prolif Now Kinshasa

The Kinshasa reactor is leaking nukes, making terrorist smuggling inevitable.

Peter Crail, Research Assistant at Center for Nonproliferation Studies, and Johan Bergenas, ResearchAssistant at Center for Nonproliferation Studies, 2007, "Uranium Smuggling Allegations Raise QuestionsConcerning Nuclear Security In The Democratic Republic Of Congo," WMD Insights, April,http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/other/wmdi070403a.htm

Given the details that have unfolded thus far regarding the current allegations of uranium smuggling from the DRC, there is reason to

question whether the arrested individuals were, in fact, involved in illicit uranium procurement activities. However, these cases do call

attention to the continued risk posed by imperfect controls over nuclear material in the DRC. The fact that Congolese officials could

not readily determine whether uranium fuel rods were missing from the Kinshasa Center for Nuclear Studies suggests that nuclear

accounting measures at the site are less than optimal. Although it is difficult to imagine a scenario in which the theft from the facility

of uranium fuel enriched to less than 20 percent might contribute to the development of a nuclear weapon, irradiated spent fuel is a

radioactive material potentially usable in a dirty bomb. The illicit acquisition of uranium ore could also provide countries seeking

nuclear weapons that are subject to monitoring by the IAEA with a source of uranium that might elude the agencys inspection systemPrevious uranium procurement activities, however, have been focused on the acquisition of milled uranium, rather than natural

uranium ore. [17]

Although IAEA assistance has facilitated improvements in nuclear safety and security in the DRC since the end of the countrys civil

war in 2003, the DRC is facing the dual challenge of needing new capacity to meet internationally recognized nuclear security

standards, at a time when further development of its nuclear regulatory infrastructure is receiving a low priority domestically. Given

the nature of the agreements with Brinkley Mining, it appears that the British firm may be in a position to assist in building that

capacity. In addition, continued participation in IAEA initiatives, cooperation with the U.S. Department of Energy with regard to the

return of spent fuel, and obtaining international assistance to help Kinshasa implement UN Security Council Resolution 1540(requiring all states to adopt effective measures to protect nuclear materials) are all steps that can help alleviate some of the recurring

concerns regarding the security of the DRCs nuclear resources. [18]

Terrorists are already going in to steal uranium from the Kinshasa reactor.

Reuters, 3/08/07, Joe Bavier, "Congo scientist planned to export uranium-minister,"http://www.alertnet.org/thenews/newsdesk/L0845529.htm

A government minister in Congo on Thursday accused the country's top nuclear research official, arrested earlier this week, of

belonging to an international network set up to mine and export uranium illegally.

Professor Fortunat Lumu, Commissioner General for Atomic Energy in Democratic Republic of Congo, was arrested this week with

another official after a Kinshasa newspaper reported that uranium had gone missing from an atomic institute in the city.Minister of Scientific Research Sylvanus Mushi, who was recently appointed to Congo's new government, said Lumu and a colleague

had illegally negotiated partnership deals with foreign companies without proper government authorisation.

"It was a group of people coming from all over the world, from Europe, from South Africa, from the Seychelles, who completely

ignored Congolese authority and law with the goal of getting their hands on very sensitive material: uranium and other radioactive

minerals," he told reporters.

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Prolif Bad Frontline

Proliferations causes extinction nuclear arms races and miscalculated nuclear war.

Utgoff, 2002 (Deputy Director of the Strategy Forces, and Resources Division of the Institute for DefenseAnalyses, Victor, Proliferation, Missile Defence, and American Ambitions, Survival, Volume 44, Number 2,Summer)

First, the dynamics of getting to a highly proliferated world could be very dangerous. Proliferating states will feel great pressures to obtain

nuclearweaponsand delivery systemsbefore anypotentialopponent does. Those who succeedin outracing an opponentmay considerpreemptive nuclear war before the opponent becomes capable of nuclear retaliation. Those who lag behind might try to preempt theiropponent's nuclear programme or defeat the opponent using conventional forces. And those who feel threatened but are incapable of building nuclear weapons may still

be able to join in this arms race by building other types of weapons of mass destruction, such as biological weapons. Second, as the world approaches completeproliferation, the hazards posed by nuclear weapons today will be magnified many times over. Fifty or more nations capable of launching nuclear weapons means that

the risk of nuclear accidents that could cause serious damage not only to their own populations and environments, but those of others, is hugely

increased. The chances of such weapons falling into the hands of renegade military units or terrorists is far greater, as is the number of nations carrying outhazardous manufacturing and storage activities. Worse still, in a highly proliferated world there would be more frequent opportunities for the use of nuclear weapons.

And more frequent opportunities means shorter expected times between conflicts in which nuclear weapons get used, unless the probability of use at any opportunity is

actually zero. To be sure, some theorists on nuclear deterrence appear to think that in any confrontation between two states known to have reliable nuclear

capabilities, the probability of nuclear weapons being used is zero .3 These theorists think that such states will be so fearful of escalation to nuclear warthat they would always avoid or terminate confrontations between them, short of even conventional war. They believe this to be true even if the two states have differencultures or leaders with very eccentric personalities. History and human nature, however, suggest that they are almost surely wrong. History includes

instances in which states known to possess nuclear weapons did engage in direct conventional conflict. China and Russia fought battles along theircommon border even after both had nuclear weapons. Moreover, logic suggests that if states with nuclear weapons always avoided conflict with one another, surely

states without nuclear weapons would avoid conflict with states that had them. Again, history provides counter-examples. Egypt attacked Israel in 1973 eventhough it saw Israel as a nuclear power at the time. Argentina invaded the Falkland Islands and fought Britain's efforts to take them back, even though Britain hadnuclear weapons. Those who claim that two states with reliable nuclear capabilities to devastate each other will not engage in conventional conflict risking nuclear war

also assume that any leader from any culture would not choose suicide for his nation. But history provides unhappy examples of states whose leaders were ready to

choose suicide for themselves and their fellow citizens. Hitler tried to impose a 'victory or destruction' policy on his people as Nazi Germany was going down to defeat

4 And Japan's war minister, during debates on how to respond to the American atomic bombing, suggested 'Would it not be wondrous for the whole nation to be

destroyed like a beautiful flower?'5 If leaders are willing to engage in conflict with nuclear-armed nations, use of nuclear weapons in any particular instance may not be

likely, but its probability would still be dangerously significant. In particular, human nature suggests that the threat of retaliation with nuclear weapons

is not a reliable guarantee against a disastrous first use of these weapons. While national leaders and their advisors everywhere are usually talented and experiencedpeople, even their most important decisions cannot be counted on to be the product of well-informed and thorough assessments of all options from all relevant points ofview. This is especially so when the stakes are so large as to defy assessment and there are substantial pressures to act quickly, as could be expected in intense and fast-

moving crises between nuclear-armed states.' Instead, like other human beings, national leaders can be seduced by wishful thinking. They can misinterpret

the words or actions ofopposing leaders. Their advisors may produce answers that they think the leader wants to hear, or coalesce around what they know is aninferior decision because the group urgently needs the confidence or the sharing of responsibility that results from settling on something. (cont)Thus, both history and

human nature suggest that nuclear deterrence can be expected to fail from time to time, and we are fortunate it has not happened yet. But the

threat of nuclear waris not just a matter of a few weapons being used. It could get much worse. Once a conflict reaches the point where nuclearweapons are employed, the stresses felt by the leaderships would rise enormously. These stresses can be expected to further degrade their decision-making. The

pressures to force the enemy to stop fighting or to surrendercould argue for more forceful and decisive military action, which might bethe right thing to do in the circumstances, but maybe not. And the horrors of the carnage already suffered may be: seen as, justification for visiting the most devastating

punishment possible on the enemy.' Again, history demonstrates how intense conflict can lead the combatants to escalate violence to the maximum possible levels. In

the Second World War, early promises not to bomb cities soon gave way to essentially indiscriminate bombing of civilians. The war between Iran and Iraq during the

1980s led to the use of chemical weapons on both sides and exchanges of missiles against each other's cities. And more recently, violence in the Middle East escalated

in a few months from rocks and small arms to heavy weapons on one side, and from police actions to air strikes and armoured attacks on the other. Escalation of

violence is also basic human nature. Once the violence starts, retaliatory exchanges of violent acts can escalate to levels unimagined by the participants beforehand.Intense and blinding anger is a common response to fear or humiliation or abuse. And such anger can lead us to impose on our opponents whatever levels of violence

are readily accessible. In sum, widespread proliferation is likely to lead to an occasional shoot-out with nuclear weapons, and thatsuch shoot-outs will have a substantial probability of escalating to the maximum destruction possible with the weapons at hand. Unless

nuclear proliferation is stopped, we are headed toward a world that will mirror the American Wild West of the, late 1800s. With most, if not all, nations

wearing nuclear 'six-shooters' on their hips, the world may even be a more polite place than it is today, butevery once in a while we will all gather

on a hill to bury the bodies of dead cities or even whole nations

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Proliferation leads to terrorists obtaining nukes.

Mohamed El Baradei, IAEA Director General, International Atomic Energy Agency, Nuclear Proliferationand the Potential Threat of Nuclear Terrorism 2004 http://www.iaea.org/ NewsCenter/Statements/2004/ebsp2004n013.html

Today, our focus is on nuclear proliferation and the potential threat of nuclear terrorism in Asia and the Pacific and I am pleased at

the opportunity to share with you my perspectives on the challenges we face, and how the IAEA is working to strengthen nuclear

security and the nuclear non-proliferation regime. But I would emphasize at the outset that, while much of our work must begin

locally and regionally, we must not forget to think globally, because ultimately the existence of a nuclear threat anywhere is a threateverywhere, and as a global community, we will win or lose this battle together.

The threat of nuclear terrorism is real and current. Some experts share the view of the Director General of the United Kingdom

Security Service, who said in August 2003: "It will only be a matter of time before a crude version of a [chemical, biological,

radiological or nuclear] attack is launched at a major Western city." To date, the IAEAs own database on illicit trafficking has

recorded, since 1993, approximately 630 confirmed incidents of trafficking in nuclear or other radioactive material. Sixty incidents

were reported in 2003, and it is clear that the total for this year will be even higher.

WMD terrorism against the U.S. ends the world It collapses the economy and triggers nuclear war withRussia, China and North Korea

Jerome Corsi, PhD from Harvard, 2005, Atomic Iran, 176-178

In the span of less than one hour, the nation's largest city will have been virtually wiped off the map. Removal of debris will take several years, and recovery may never fully happen. The

damage to the nation's economy will be measured in the trillions of dollars, and the loss of the country's major financial and business

center may reduce America immediately to a second-class status. The resulting psychological impact will bring paralysis throughout the land for an indefinite period

of time. The president may not be able to communicate with the nation for days, even weeks, as television and radio systems struggle to come back on line. No natural or man-made

disasterin history will compare with the magnitude of damage that has been done to New York City in this one horrible day. The United States retaliates:

'End of the world' scenarios The combination of horror and outrage that will surge upon the nation will demand that the president retaliate for

the incomprehensible damage done by the attack. The problem will be that the president will not immediately know how to respond or against whom. The perpetrators willhave been incinerated by the explosion that destroyed New York City. Unlike 9-11, there will have been no interval during the attack when those hijacked could make phone calls to loved ones

telling them before they died that the hijackers were radical Islamic extremists. There will be no such phone calls when the attack will not have been anticipated until the instant the terroristsdetonate their improvised nuclear device inside the truck parked on a curb at the Empire State Building. Nor will there be any possibility of finding any clues, which either were vaporized

instantly or are now lying physically inaccessible under tons of radioactive rubble. Still, the president, members of Congress, the military, and the public at large

will suspect another attack by our known enemy Islamic terrorists. The first impulse will be to launch a nuclear strike on Mecca, to

destroy the whole religion of Islam. Medina could possibly be added to the target list just to make the point with crystal clarity. Yet what would we gain? The moment Mecca and

Medina were wiped off the map, the Islamic world more than 1 billion human beings in countless different nations would feel

attacked. Nothing would emerge intact after a war between the United States and Islam. The apocalypse would be upon us. Then, too, we

would face an immediate threat from our long-term enemy, the former Soviet Union. Many in the Kremlin would see this as an opportunity to grasp the victory

that had been snatched from them by Ronald Reagan when the Berlin Wall came down. A missile strike by the Russians on a score of

American cities could possibly be pre-emptive. Would the U.S. strategic defense system be so in shock that immediate retaliation

would not be possible? Hardliners in Moscow might argue that there was never a better opportunity to destroy America. In China, our

newer Communist enemies might not care if we could retaliate. With a population already over 1.3 billion people and with their population not concentrated in a few major cities, theChinese might calculate to initiate a nuclear blow on the United States. What if the United States retaliated with a nuclear counterattack upon China? The Chinese

might be able to absorb the blow and recover. The North Koreans might calculate even more recklessly. Why not launch upon America the few

missiles they have that could reach our soil? More confusion and chaos might only advance their position. If Russia, China, and the United Statescould be drawn into attacking one another, North Korea might emerge stronger just because it was overlooked while the great nations focus on attacking one another. So, too, our

supposed allies in Europe might relish the immediate reduction in power suddenly inflicted upon America. Many of the great egos in

Europe have never fully recovered from the disgrace of World War II, when in the last century the Americans a second time in just over two decades had beenforced to come to their rescue. If the French did not start launching nuclear weapons themselves, they might be happy to fan the diplomatic fire

beginning to burn under the Russians and the Chinese. Or the president might decide simply to launch a limited nuclear strike on

Tehran itself. This might be the most rational option in the attempt to retaliate but still communicate restraint. The problem is that a strike on Tehran would add more nuclear devastation to

the world calculation. Muslims around the world would still see the retaliation as an attack on Islam, especially when the United States had no positive proofthat

the destruction of New York City had been triggered by radical Islamic extremists with assistance from Iran. But for the president not to retaliate might be

unacceptable to the American people. So weakened by the loss of New York, Americans would feel vulnerable in every city in the nation. "Who is going to be next?" would bethe question on everyone's mind. For this there would be no effective answer. That the president might think politically at this instant seems almost petty, yet every president is by nature a

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politician. The political party in powerat the time of the attackwould be destroyed unless the president retaliated with a nuclear strike against

somebody. The American people would feel a price had to be paid while the country was still capable of exacting revenge.

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It destroys heg

Lawrence Freedman, Professor of War Studies at King's College, "Great Powers, Vital Interests and NuclearWeapons," Survival, v36 n4, Winter, 1994

The situation, however, is more complicated and more paradoxical than this suggests. Rather than reinforce power politics as usual,

nuclear weapons in fact confirm a tendency towards the fragmentation of the international system in which the erstwhile great powers

play a reduced role. While their credibility in extremis may be as dubious as ever, nuclear guarantees show a remarkable resiliencewithin an established alliance framework. Outside such a framework, however, they have at most a fleeting half-life, especially at a

time when the nuclear powers are taking care to limit their general liabilities when addressing the security concerns of others. Nuclear

powers are reluctant to transfer nuclear capabilities to vulnerable states to enable them to help themselves, although they have no

difficulties in justifying conventional arms transfers on this basis. As nuclear arsenals spread, despite the non-proliferation regime,

more parts of the world move beyond the effective influence of the former great powers, while, at the same time, the possibility of

some dreadful nuclear mishap or deliberate employment increases. Given the uncertain distribution of the effects of any nuclear

detonations, this prospect should encourage a broad view of vital interests. It argues not only for efforts to support the nonproliferation

regime, but also, and as important, that the great powers should get involved before areas of conflict begin to acquire a nuclear

dimension.

Prolif will happen in the Middle East and Asia.


Nuclear proliferation is most likely to occur where external guarantees have come to be doubted, as in the Middle East, or barely exist,

as in South Asia. Acquiring a nuclear capability is a statement of a lack of confidence in all alternative security arrangements. At the

same time, it adds to the security problems of others in the region, in a form that jeopardises the chances of external support. In this

way, it establishes the limits to any collective security system.34 While most acts of proliferation are a response to an established

nuclear threat - Pakistan reacted to India, which had reacted to China, which had reacted to the United States - the consequences forexternal intervention are also part of the calculation. Israel and Pakistan, for example, do not wish to disrupt totally their security

relationships with the United States, including access to conventional weaponry and other forms of assistance, even though they have

decided that they must make provision to confront the most drastic security threats on their own. They therefore attempt to sustainsome ambiguity about their precise nuclear status so as not to cause a rupture with Washington. Ukraine has seen its nuclear legacy

from the old Soviet Union in part as a hedge against Russia, but also as one of its few available bargaining cards in attracting notice

and favours from the West. However, for others, such as Iraq before 1991, North Korea now and eventually, perhaps, Iran, one of the

advantages of a nuclear arsenal may be its role in discouraging Western involvement in local conflicts, thereby hastening Western

disengagement from the security arrangements in many parts of the world. One only needs to contemplate the impact of a completed

Iraqi nuclear programme on Western calculations during the Gulf crisis to appreciate the importance of such a step.

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DDI 08Kernoff/OlneyAsian rearm causes accidental war that draws in India, Pakistan, North Korea, and Russia, triggering globalnuclear conflict

Joseph Cirincione, director of non-proliferation at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, May 2KNuclear Chain Reaction Foreign Affairs


Escalation is rational nationalism and values warp the rational decision calculus.

Chris Gagn, Research Associate, Confidence-Building Measures project, "Nuclear Risk Reduction In SouthAsia: Building on Common Ground," The Stability-Instability Paradox: Nuclear Weapons and Brinksmanshipin South Asia, Report No. 38, June, 2001, http://www.stimson.org/southasia/pdf/NRRMGagne.pdf

Waltz and Hagerty argue that nuclear weapons will serve to keep conflicts limited, even if they do not prevent them, because no

rational actor would risk crossing the nuclear threshold. However, Robert Jervis suggests that escalation could conceivably be arational choice in some instances, motivated by national honor, the desire to harm and weaken those who represent abhorred values,

and the belief that the other will retreat rather than pay the price which can be exacted for victory.8 Furthermore, Jervis points out thatconflicts can take on a dynamic of their own which makes escalation difficult to predict or control:

Although undesired escalation obviously does not occur all the time, the danger is always present. The room for misunderstanding, the

pressure to act before the other side has seized the initiative, the role of unexpected defeats or unanticipated opportunities, all are

sufficiently greatand interactingso that it is rare that decision makers can confidently predict the end-point of the trajectory which

an initial resort to violence starts.9 In theIllogic of American Nuclear Strategy, Jervis acknowledges that nuclear deterrence may

prevent wars, but he asserts that conflicts between nuclear powers will resemble the game of chicken where each side will be

tempted to test the others resolve. Should this game lead to military activities, there is a danger that the situation will get out of

control because the workings of machines and the reaction of humans in times of stress cannot be predicted with high confidence.10

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DDI 08Kernoff/OlneySagan uses organizational theory to reinforce this position by demonstrating the failures of both man and machine in Cold War crises

that could have inadvertently caused a nuclear war.11

Miscalculation is inevitable organizations arent omniscient and focuses on political goals.

Scott Sagan, professor of political science at Stanford University and co-director of Stanford's Center forInternational Security and Cooperation, won three teaching awards for his undergraduate lecture coursesat Stanford, 2003, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate

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Militarization DA other proliferants have military-oriented governments, promoting nuclear preemptionover diplomatic solutions.


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Ext. Miscalculation Inevitable

Miscalculation is inevitable competing interests ensures


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Ext. Military Pre-emption

Militarily controlled organizations cause nuclear preemption because of the structure of the armed forces.


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AT: Small Arms Races

No limited prolif they want weapons but not second strike capabilities.


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Safety Problems

Many safety problemsunderline it yourself


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Safety Problems

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Prolif Good Frontline

Turn a proliferation is crucial to preventing future conflicts and global wars.

Dean Haggerty, lecturer of International Politics at the University of Illinois, The Consequences of NuclearProliferation: Lessons of South Asia. 1998.

Twenty five years have now passed since the last Indo-Pakistani war. During that period, both New Delhi and Islamabad have moved

steadily down the path opaque nuclear weaponization. South Asias long transition to nuclear weapons has seen two crises and several

additional instances of serious tension between India and Pakistan. A quarter-century of peaks and valleys in one of the contemporaryworlds most volatile relationships is enough time to begin drawing some meaningful conclusions about the effects of nuclear

proliferation South Asia, and about how well this empirical evidence matches the two logics that I surveyed and analyzed in Chapter

1. As I noted in this chapter's introduction, the Indo-Pakistani experience with nuclear weapon capabilities lends more support to the

logic of nuclear deterrence than to its competitor, the logic of non-proliferation. All but a handful of proliferation analysts would

expect that South Asia's small, crude nuclear forces; intense, high-stakes political conflicts, history of warfare, and possibly irrational

decision making should add up to a formula for nuclear disaster on the subcontinent. Indeed, for those analysts persuaded by the logic ofnonproliferation, the Indo-Pakistani nuclear security competition could serve as a paradigm for every conceivable calamity that might ensue from the spread of nuclear

weapons to Third World countries. However, contrary to these grim expectations, nuclear weapons evidently deter war in South Asia, much as they did between the

United Slates, the Soviet Union, and China during the Cold War. As in the U.S. Soviet, Sino-U.S., and Sino-Soviet cases, preventative nuclear strikes were early on

considered and rejected, first-strike uncertainty has dampened the "reciprocal fear of surprise attack," and loose nuke fears have gone unrealized.Furthermore, Indian and Pakistani decision makers appear to be no less deterrable than their U.S., Russian, and Chinese counterparts

These two -and-a-half decades of sub continental peace stand in stark contrast to the first twenty-five years of Indo-Pakistani relations

which saw war erupt on three different occasions over Kashmir.

2. Nuclear umbrella fails in Asia other powers doubt the USs security commitment, causing them to testits resolve which escalates to nuclear war.

Christopher Layne, fellow of the Center For Science and International Affairs at Harvard, "Minimal Realismin East Asia," The National Interest, Spring, 1996

Extended nuclear deterrence has always been a difficult strategy to implement successfully because deterring an attack on one's allies

is harder than deterring an attack on oneself. This is doubly true when the potential aggressor is a nuclear power because, as Charles

de Gaulle reasoned well, rational states will not risk suicide to save their allies. For both protector and protected, extended nucleardeterrence raises constant and ultimately insoluble dilemmas of credibility and reassurance.

The conditions that contributed to successful extended nuclear deterrence in Cold War Europe do not exist in post-Cold War East Asia

Unlike the situation that prevailed in Europe between 1948 and 1990 -- which was fundamentally stable and static -- East Asia is a

volatile region in which all the major players -- Japan, China, Korea, Russia, Vietnam -- are candidates to become involved in large-

scale war. There is no clear and inviolable status quo. The lines of demarcation between spheres of influence are already blurred and

may well become more so as Chinese and Japanese influence expand simultaneously, increasing the number and unpredictability of

regional rivalries. The status of Taiwan, tension along the 38th Parallel in Korea, conflicting claims to ownership of the Spratly

Islands, and the Sino-Japanese territorial dispute over the Senkaku Islands are only a few of the flash-points that could ignite a greatpower war in East Asia. Washington will clearly exercise far less control over the policies of East Asian powers than it exercised over

America's European allies during the Cold War. Hence, the risk of being chain-ganged into a nuclear conflict are much higher for the

United States in post-Cold War East Asia if it maintains or extends nuclear guarantees to any of the region's major states.

Even more important, post-Cold War East Asia simply does not have the same degree of strategic importance to the United States as

did Europe during the Cold War. Would the United States risk a nuclear confrontation to defend Taiwan, the Spratlys, or Senkaku?

Knowing that they would not constitute the same kind of threat to U.S. interests that the Soviet Union did, future revisionist EastAsian powers would probably be more willing to discount America's credibility and test its resolve. The presence of American forces

in the region may indeed have the perverse effect of failing to preserve peace while simultaneously ensuring the United States wouldbe drawn automatically into a future East Asian war. They could constitute the wrong sort of tripwire, tripping us rather than deterring

them. Notwithstanding current conventional wisdom, the United States should encourage East Asian states -- including Japan -- toresolve their own security dilemmas, even if it means acquiring great power, including nuclear, military capabilities.

Reconfiguring American security policies anywhere in the world in ways that, in effect, encourage nuclear proliferation is widely seen

as irresponsible and risky. This is not necessarily the case. Nuclear proliferation and extended deterrence are generally believed to be

flip sides of the same coin, in the sense that providing the latter is seen to discourage the former. Nearly all maximalists are

simultaneously proliferation pessimists (believing that any proliferation will have negative security implications) and extended nuclear

deterrence optimists (believing that extended nuclear deterrence "works"). But this formulation comes apart from both ends in East

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DDI 08Kernoff/OlneyAsia: Potential nuclear powers in the region are unlikely to act irresponsibly and, as suggested above, the U.S. nuclear umbrella is of

uncertain credibility in post-Cold War circumstances in which the Soviet Union no longer exists and strains in the U.S.-Japanese

relationship are manifest.


Prolif stops gigantic conventional wars

David Karl, Ph.D. International Relations at the University of Southern California, "Proliferation Pessimismand Emerging Nuclear Powers," International Security, Winter, 1996/1997, JSTOR

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These would trump the effects of a nuclear war and make World War II look minuscule.

Andrew Hanam, International Relations Department at San Francisco State University, Armed ForcesSociety, vol 23 Issue 1, Fall 1996

A zero-nuclear weapons world would tend to level the military playing field. It could also reinvite a series of large conventional wars

with enhanced killing power, relying on today's conventional technologies that might dwarf World War II levels since the pacee of

wars may suddenly seem more palatable to some. The one or two nuclear events that destroy a location are indeed a holocaust butconstitute a smaller scale phenomenon more likely to create peace rather than further war in its aftermath. The nuclear demonstration

effect, as Paula Fleming has shown, is a self-limiting character, and will serve to remind states to probe cautiously in foreign affairs

and quickly retreat when in doubt. Certain geographical locations may be sacrificed in the nuclear age, but general war would be

avoided. The key difference is that limited use of nuclear weapons will not destroy the prevailing distribution of war across the

international system. General conventional war in a nuclear-free world could successively award global hegemonic leadership to the

bold, the vigilant, the desperate, the prepared and most determined. It would raise the temperature of the international security

thermometer just as nuclear weapons have cooled them. Japan, and the entire West, have benefited from the presence of American

nuclear power held in reserve.

Prolif is inevitable.

Channing Lukhefar, Associate Defense Analyst, CATO institute. 7/14/91. CATO Foreign Policy Briefs.

More than 20 years of experience with the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty has demonstrated that the international arms market win

find a way to circumvent even the most elaborate controls and restrictions. Moreover. A fundamental shift in the world arms trade is

gradually taking place. The Soviet Union and the United States are slowly but inexorably being eclipsed by China and other nations as

the primary purveyors of basic missile technology. That shift makes the market even less sensitive to the types of penalties any formal

or informal international control regime can impose. Barring the emergence of new world despotism," no international agency orcoalition will be effective in baiting the spread of nuclear and missile technology.

Such a conclusion will surely be unpalatable to those officials and policy experts who long for the creation of a New World Order

presided over by a revitalized United Nations. But ballistic missile proliferation is and will continue to be a such a troublesome reality.

In such a threatening international environment, the responsibility for protecting the American people from missile attacks rests with

the US government. The virtual inevitability of proliferation also demands that the United States seriously pursue the development anddeployment of antiballistic missile (ABM) systems.

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Their huge nuclear war scenarios ARE the link states wouldnt use nukes for fear of total destruction even small nuke wars are out of question.


Whenever there is a possibility of a nuclear detonation, a vital interest is created. Whatever the prior security commitments or stakes in

a particular conflict, few events would rock national, regional or global society more than even one nuclear detonation. While a war

involving small nuclear powers need not necessarily raise such apocalyptical scenarios as those developed for a superpower war, with

the spectre of a true end to history, the concept of a 'small' nuclear war has yet to be developed. Any nuclear use still moves us into thearea of unimaginable catastrophe. Nuclear fallout does not recognise international borders. Chernobyl still bears eloquent testimony to

the vulnerability of innocent locations to nuclear detonations. The disproportionate character of nuclear explosions guarantees some

deterrent effect whenever there is the slightest chance of the employment of nuclear weapons. For this reason, the presence of nuclear

weapons has been considered beneficial in consolidating a territorial status quo. Nuclear weapons provide an ultimate guarantee of

security against external aggression and thus, in principle, can potentially protect the most vital interests in the most hostile

environments, while avoiding dependence upon allies.

Prolif promotes alliances.


Thus, a non-nuclear power that is concerned about the intentions of a nuclear power and is unable to rely on international disarmamen

or a weapons programme of its own is put in a dilemma. It must seek accommodation either in the form of appeasement - an attempt

to respect the vital interests of the potentially hostile nuclear power without compromising its own interests - or alliance - an attempt

to convince a potentially friendly nuclear power of a coincidence of vital interests.

The more restrictive the prevailing definitions of vital interests the more tolerable appeasement becomes, for there should be fewer

occasions when there are substantial conflicts. Alliance, however, becomes more difficult when the definition of vital interests

narrows, for alliance is more likely to be seen by the nuclear power as extending vital interests unnecessarily. The two approaches can

be pursued simultaneously. Thus, Western Europe was anxious to convince the Americans of the need for NATO, while at the same

time trying to avoid provoking the Soviet Union. The degree to which non-nuclear states have followed appeasement strategies hasbeen influenced by the credibility of nuclear threats and their vulnerability to alternative forms of economic and military pressure. The

most interesting example of appeasement to an undeclared nuclear power is probably that of the Arab states to Israel. There is some

evidence that the policies of Arab states have been steadily modified out of recognition of Israel's capacity to use its nuclear weapons

if faced with a threat to its existence.8

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Posses are necessary to prevent regional wars from escalating.

Richard Haass, Director of Foreign Policy Studies at Brookings, Fall, 1995(Foreign Policy by Posse. TheNational Interest. Lexis)

There are, however, important advantages. The United States has the inherent capacity to create posses where and when it chooses.

They do not require much in the way of prior investment. Coalitions of the willing bring with them some of the advantages that derive

from collective effort (resources, specialization, diplomatic co-support) without the need for consensus or prearranged authority. Theyalso enjoy some measure of international legitimacy. More than anything else, though, posses or coalitions of the willing (and able)

constitute an approach to international engagement that reflects the basic personality and characteristics of the post-Cold War world.

This is a time in history when there are: multiple great powers involved in relationships that resist clear definition and range from the

cooperative to the competitive; a growing number of small and medium, sovereign entities; proliferating regional and international

bodies, as well as non-governmental organizations; an increasing diffusion of power in all forms; and new sorts of problems (or old

problems on a new scale) for which institutions do not yet exist. What is needed as a result is an approach to foreign policy that is

inherently flexible, one able to respond to unforeseen situations in unprecedented ways. The posse approach thus offers a valuable

supplement to a world in which regional and international institutions are limited to what they can usefully contribute. Moreover,

posses come with the further advantage that they can become more structured and institutionalized if the need and consensus to movein that direction exists. The supplier groups already mentioned reflect this potential, as does the G-7, which over the years has evolved

into a quasi-institution for helping to manage a diverse set of political and military, as well as economic, challenges. It may prove

possible to adapt or expand the role of other regional or international institutions. Until then, posses can selectively draw on the

available assets and resources of such organizations.

Allies are critical to winning the war on terror.

Barry R. Posen, Professor of Political Science in the Security Studies Program at the Massachusetts Instituteof Technology, Winter, 2002 (The Threat of Terrorism. International Security. Lexis)

Allies are essential for success in the war on terrorism, which helps to explain the determination of President George W. Bush andhis administration to build a broad coalition. Bin Laden had training camps and bases in Afghanistan, but in other countries al-Qaeda's

presence has been more shadowy. Wherever this organization takes root, it must be fought. But it will not always be necessary or

possible for the United States to do the fighting. Allied military and police forces are more appropriate instruments to apprehendterrorists operating within their national borders than are U.S. forces. They have information that the United States may not have, and

they know the territory and people better. The odds of finding the adversary and avoiding collateral damage increase to the extent that

the "host" nation-state does the hard work. Moreover, host states can deal better politically with any collateral damage -- that is,

accidental destruction of civilian life and property. Much of the war will look a lot like conventional law enforcement by the

governments of cooperative countries. Efforts must also be made to weaken terrorist organizations by attacking their infrastructure;

both cooperative and clandestine methods can be used to deny these groups access to funds and materiel.

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WMD terrorism against the U.S. ends the world It collapses the economy and triggers nuclear war withRussia, China and North Korea

Jerome Corsi, PhD from Harvard, 2005, Atomic Iran, 176-178

In the span of less than one hour, the nation's largest city will have been virtually wiped off the map. Removal of debris will take several years, and recovery may never fully happen. The

damage to the nation's economy will be measured in the trillions of dollars, and the loss of the country's major financial and business

center may reduce America immediately to a second-class status. The resulting psychological impact will bring paralysis throughout the land for an indefinite period

of time. The president may not be able to communicate with the nation for days, even weeks, as television and radio systems struggle to come back on line. No natural or man-made

disasterin history will compare with the magnitude of damage that has been done to New York City in this one horrible day. The United States retaliates:

'End of the world' scenarios The combination of horror and outrage that will surge upon the nation will demand that the president retaliate for

the incomprehensible damage done by the attack. The problem will be that the president will not immediately know how to respond or against whom. The perpetrators willhave been incinerated by the explosion that destroyed New York City. Unlike 9-11, there will have been no interval during the attack when those hijacked could make phone calls to loved ones

telling them before they died that the hijackers were radical Islamic extremists. There will be no such phone calls when the attack will not have been anticipated until the instant the terrorists

detonate their improvised nuclear device inside the truck parked on a curb at the Empire State Building. Nor will there be any possibility of finding any clues, which either were vaporized

instantly or are now lying physically inaccessible under tons of radioactive rubble. Still, the president, members of Congress, the military, and the public at large

will suspect another attack by our known enemy Islamic terrorists. The first impulse will be to launch a nuclear strike on Mecca, to

destroy the whole religion of Islam. Medina could possibly be added to the target list just to make the point with crystal clarity. Yet what would we gain? The moment Mecca andMedina were wiped off the map, the Islamic world more than 1 billion human beings in countless different nations would feel

attacked. Nothing would emerge intact after a war between the United States and Islam. The apocalypse would be upon us. Then, too, we

would face an immediate threat from our long-term enemy, the former Soviet Union. Many in the Kremlin would see this as an opportunity to grasp the victory

that had been snatched from them by Ronald Reagan when the Berlin Wall came down. A missile strike by the Russians on a score of

American cities could possibly be pre-emptive. Would the U.S. strategic defense system be so in shock that immediate retaliation

would not be possible? Hardliners in Moscow might argue that there was never a better opportunity to destroy America. In China, our

newer Communist enemies might not care if we could retaliate. With a population already over 1.3 billion people and with their population not concentrated in a few major cities, the

Chinese might calculate to initiate a nuclear blow on the United States. What if the United States retaliated with a nuclear counterattack upon China? The Chinesemight be able to absorb the blow and recover. The North Koreans might calculate even more recklessly. Why not launch upon America the few

missiles they have that could reach our soil? More confusion and chaos might only advance their position. If Russia, China, and the United States

could be drawn into attacking one another, North Korea might emerge stronger just because it was overlooked while the great nations focus on attacking one another. So, too, our

supposed allies in Europe might relish the immediate reduction in power suddenly inflicted upon America. Many of the great egos in

Europe have never fully recovered from the disgrace of World War II, when in the last century the Americans a second time in just over two decades had beenforced to come to their rescue. If the French did not start launching nuclear weapons themselves, they might be happy to fan the diplomatic fire

beginning to burn under the Russians and the Chinese. Or the president might decide simply to launch a limited nuclear strike on

Tehran itself. This might be the most rational option in the attempt to retaliate but still communicate restraint. The problem is that a strike on Tehran would add more nuclear devastation tothe world calculation. Muslims around the world would still see the retaliation as an attack on Islam, especially when the United States had no positive proofthat

the destruction of New York City had been triggered by radical Islamic extremists with assistance from Iran. But for the president not to retaliate might be

unacceptable to the American people. So weakened by the loss of New York, Americans would feel vulnerable in every city in the nation. "Who is going to be next?" would bethe question on everyone's mind. For this there would be no effective answer. That the president might think politically at this instant seems almost petty, yet every president is by nature a

politician. The political party in powerat the time of the attackwould be destroyed unless the president retaliated with a nuclear strike against

somebody. The American people would feel a price had to be paid while the country was still capable of exacting revenge.

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Prolif is key to basing.


The unnatural character of a nuclear guarantee, with its suicidal implications, has provided a central theme for all debates on nuclear

strategy. This has made it extremely difficult to prescribe any nuclear use as a rational act of policy, at least once decisive and truly

disarming first strikes were no longer judged to be feasible. Attempts to get round this involved designing nuclear strikes that weresufficiently precise in their effects to shock or disable the enemy without provoking a full-scale retaliation. Those with confidence in

deterrence tended to get impatient with these debates because policy-makers in Moscow or Washington did not seem disposed to

discount the smallest risk of a nuclear catastrophe. This analysis culminated in the notion of 'existential deterrence'.27

While these issues excited considerable controversy in elite and academic circles, questions of deployment sparked the most

substantial political controversies - even in domestic debate. As noted above, there is an association between overseas bases and vital

interests. This association became even closer in the nuclear age, as fundamental questions were raised over the processes through

which a war might spread geographically, over who might be involved and in what circumstances. A superpower nuclear base

conveyed to the host country that it was one for which ultimate risks might just be run. Within the host country, deployment was

controversial because of the degree of accommodation of the guarantor's interests that was required and the nature of the politicalcontrol to be exercised over the use of the nuclear weapons. In NATO, the readiness to accept such weapons came, over time, to be

seen as a crucial test of a willingness to bear the responsibilities of alliance. Those whose presumed hostile intent or menacing

capabilities provided the pretext for forward basing were indignant at the aspersions thus cast, as well as the new threat that they faced

as a result.

Forward basing in Japan key to logistical support for key military operations throughout the Pacific andreassures all allies.

Global Security, 2005 (U.S. Army in Japan. http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/agency/army/usarj.htm)

The strategic geographic location of Japan provides the U.S. an excellent location for forward-basing, enabling power projectionforces in the event of contingencies. Combined with the current agreements the U.S. has with Japan for basing rights for both air and

sea forces, the U.S. Army in Japan is capable of a greatly expanded logistical support role throughout the Pacific theater. Japan

occupies a key strategic location in the Pacific, which is vitally important to the U.S. both economically and militarily. U.S. forwardpresence in Japan is vital to ensuring access to this strategic location. The U.S. Army's forward presence in Japan enables it to meet

U.S. bilateral engagement responsibilities under the Mutual Security Treaty and the Defense Guidelines to defend Japan from outside

aggression in wartime, and to provide deterrence and stability in peacetime. It also demonstrates the U.S. commitment to other allies

and friends in the Pacific. Being in Japan, approximately 5,000 nautical miles closer to potential trouble spots than the West Coast of

the U.S., means USARJ & 9th TSC can respond to crises and support regional contingencies as a strategically located base and stagingarea.

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Asian rearm causes accidental war that draws in India, Pakistan, North Korea, and Russia, triggering globalnuclear conflict

Joseph Cirincione, director of non-proliferation at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, May 2KNuclear Chain Reaction Foreign Affairs


For all these reasons, nuclear non-proliferation remains an important

Western policy objective. The spread of nuclear weapons, in terms of politicalcontrol as much as absolute numbers, encourages strategic disengagement

and thus a loss of influence in regions where important, if not quite

vital, interests are involved. More seriously, if nuclear weapons are detonated,

through accident or design, then the consequences will be profound

and more than enough to be considered a vital interest. Thus, proliferation

feeds on and then reinforces an existing tendency to reduce the security links

between the declared nuclear powers and those parts of their 'far abroads'

that are not covered by a well-established alliance. Yet as this process

continues, and simply because of the impossibility of containing the effects

of nuclear detonations, the overall stake in the prevention of conflicts grows

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DDI 08Kernoff/Olneyto the point where a vital interest is created that is as substantial as any

which went before, even though it is a very different kind of vital interest.

It has been argued that the declared nuclear powers can use their residual

nuclear capability to underpin their general efforts to promote a more orderly

world, but this may be too optimistic about regional patterns and Western

influence.39 A case can in principle be made for a concert of establishednuclear powers enforcing basic international law, but this is a theoretical

construct and not a practical one given the ambiguity of many breaches of

international law, the differential interests of and the remaining divisionsbetween the nuclear powers and the sheer irrelevance of external nuclear

arsenals to many localised conflicts.40 Unless a clear link can be forged

between threats to international peace and security and possible nuclear

responses, there are likely to be few pay-offs for international order.

Prolif would be slow but inevitable.

Kenneth Waltz, Emeritus Professor of Political Science at UC Berkeley and Adjunct Senior Research Scholar

at Columbia University, past President of the American Political Science Association, and a Fellow of theAmerican Academy of Arts and Sciences, 2003, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate

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Ext. Deterrence

Prolif deters war the incentive is too low, states act with more care, and nukes provide adequate security.

Kenneth Waltz, Emeritus Professor of Political Science at UC Berkeley and Adjunct Senior Research Scholarat Columbia University, past President of the American Political Science Association, and a Fellow of theAmerican Academy of Arts and Sciences, 2003, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate

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Ext. Deterrence

Prolif is crucial to deterring possibilities of war.


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AT: Small States Cant Deter Big States

Small states can deter big ones even minimal damage from nukes is unacceptable.


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AT: Small States Cant Deter Big States

Small states are safe closer concerns are preserved by each side.


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AT: Small States Reckless

States with less nuclear weapons have less incentive to use nukes personally threatens their survival.


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AT: Small States Reckless

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AT: New Prolif Wont Be Opaque

1. The opacity of new proliferants will prevent accidents because of small and closely help arsenals, asproven by India, Pakistan, and Israel.

Devin Haggerty, Lecturer of International Politics at the University of Illinois, 1998. The Consequences ofNuclear Proliferation: Lessons from South Asia, pg. 9.

OPACITY AND LOOSE NUKES. Regarding the domestic control of nuclear force, opacitv is a safety enhancer. One of its chief

characteristics is the limited circle of decision-makers and the tight control thev exercise over nuclear forces and planning The

obsessive secrecy with which the Indian, Israeli, and Pakistani nuclear establishments oversee their respective nuclear weapons

programs should logically reduce the chances of accidental or unauthorized use of nuclear weapons. There is no reason to believe thatwider decision-making circles or more open debate would improve an opaque nuclear proliferant's ability to devise the command and

control arrangements necessary to prevent accidental nuclear detonations, Opaque nuclear-scientific establishments are composed of

the best and the brightest scientists available. They are well aware of the dangers of accidents and have the same, if not better, access

to information on accident -proofing as would any larger indigenous, group of technical personnel. Indeed, accidents should be less

likely where nuclear forces are small, especially where the weapons remain unassembled or stored separately from their delivery

systems As regards unauthorized nuclear use, it is also logical to expect that under nuclear opacity renegade military officers or

terrorists would be hamstrung, not assisted by their limited access to nuclear plans and programs and that a wider decision-makingcircle would increase the risk of weapons failing into the wrong hands. Here, too, the maintenance of small or unassembled nuclearweapon svstems would likely thwart, rather than promote, the designs of unauthorized users.

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AT: New Prolif Wont Be Opaque

2. Empirically, new proliferants choose to be opaque.


Why do second generation proliferants maintain opaque instead of overt nuclear postures? It is easy to understand why a country at

the beginning stages of nuclear research and development would want its program shrouded in secrecy. Such countries are typically

embroiled in acute security competitions; in which there may be a premium on being the first to master nuclear weapon technology.Openly advertising that one is seeking nuclear capabilities might spur the other side to do the same, thereby negating any strategic

advantage, Conversely, if a country were lagging behind an adversary, the first steps toward nuclear capabilities, if taken too openly,

might promote a preventive strike against its nascent nuclear facilities, like the one launched by Israel against Iraq in 1981 It is harder

to understand why a nuclear weapon-capable country would continue to conceal its nuclear status. One would think that, having

achieved a certain proficiency, countries would then go openly nuclear so as to receive the full benefits of deterrence. This is not the

case, though; every new nuclear nation since the 1960s has chosen to maintain its opacity long after developing nuclear capabilities.

The most important reason for this pattern is the steady legitimating of the global nonproliferation norm since the signing of the NPT

in 1968. When China went nuclear in 1964, the only obstacle it faced was the possibility of preventive strikes or sabotage by its

nuclear armed adversaries. When Pakistan took the same course from the mid-1970s on, it too faced the possibility of absorbing apreventive strike, but also, and perhaps more daunting, Islamabad ran up against a variety of international norms and national laws

intended to inhibit more countries from going nuclear. These included the NPT itself and an array of U.S. laws that threatened an aid

cutoff if Pakistan persisted in its attempts to develop nuclear weapons.

3. New proliferants will be opaque many reasons.


Other sources of opacity. Several other factors may influence the evolution of opaque rather than transparent nuclear postures. Opacityis a way to signal a countrys nuclear capabilities and flex some deterrent muscle without antagonizing adversaries into like response

and spurring a destabilizing and expensive nuclear arms race. In this context, Indias peaceful nuclear explosion, followed by its

refusal to deploy nuclear weapons, may have been meant to send a message of rough nuclear equivalence to China without drivingPakistan into its own pursuit of nuclear weapons. If this was in fact New Delhis strategy, it obviously failed. In addition, opacity is

much less expensive than a transparent nuclear posture. Which for the first generation nuclear weapon states involved developing

redundant and diverse nuclear forces to ensure the survivability of second-strike weapons. Finally, opacity preserves the flexibility tha

future policymakers may need to denuclearize if security conditions changed, without losing face or suffering domestic discontent

owing to the popularity of an open nuclear stance. Whatever the relative influence of these factors- and it differs across cases- the mos

compelling reason for opacity seems to be the belief that it provides deterrent security while avoiding the steep international costs of

deployments.

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AT: Preemption

1. No risk- uncertainty prevents a preemptive attack due to fear of a second strike.

Bradley Thayer, Fellow for the Center of Science and International Affairs @ Harvard, 1995 [SecurityStudies, Autumn]

The system level. Concerning the first of the three dangers captured by the systemic level of analysis, the incentive for preventive war

may be mitigated by two factors. First, there is a tradeoff between knowledge of the program and the threat that it poses. When the

program is most vulnerable, knowledge about it is likely to be ambiguous. As time passes, knowledge grows, but becomes lessvulnerable to preventative war because the risk of retaliation for a preventive attack increases. Philip Zelikow notes, 'As a state's

nuclear...capability becomes more threatening, it becomes less vulnerable to military action by an outside power. Second, the

uncertainty of the success of either counterforce or counter control attack dampens the incentives for a preventive attack. Waltz is right

to argue that uncertainty about the course that a nuclear war might follow, along with certainty that destruction could be immense,

strong inhibits the use of nuclear weapons (Spread, 108). The attacking state could never be certain that it would escape unacceptable

damage in retaliation. The defender must manipulate the attackers fear that some the defenders arsenal will survive into order to

deter a premeditated attack until the defenders arsenal grows and becomes survivable.

2. Pre-emption fails occupation is the only way to permanently prevent prolif and no one wants to occupy


3. Intelligence for preemptive strikes is not available to new proliferators.

Lavoy, assistant professor of national security @ Naval Post Grad School, 1995 [summer, Security Studies]

Consider the inability of the United States to detect, much less destroy with conv

119 KO Proliferation and Terrorism Impacts

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