11.09.2012 1 Lecture 2 - Internet evolution (part 2) D.Sc. Arto Karila Helsinki Institute for...

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11.09.2012 1 Lecture 2 Lecture 2 - Internet evolution (part 2) - Internet evolution (part 2) D.Sc. Arto Karila Helsinki Institute for Information Technology (HIIT) [email protected] T-110.6120 – Special Course in Future Internet Technologies M.Sc. Mark Ain Helsinki Institute for Information Technology (HIIT) [email protected]

Transcript of 11.09.2012 1 Lecture 2 - Internet evolution (part 2) D.Sc. Arto Karila Helsinki Institute for...

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Lecture 2Lecture 2- Internet evolution (part 2)- Internet evolution (part 2)

D.Sc. Arto Karila

Helsinki Institute for Information Technology (HIIT)

[email protected]

T-110.6120 – Special Course in Future Internet Technologies

M.Sc. Mark Ain

Helsinki Institute for Information Technology (HIIT)

[email protected]

Evolutionary approachesEvolutionary approaches

Architectural

1.DNS (~1982)2.EGP (precursor to BGP, ~1982)3.TCP congestion control (mid-late 1980’s)4.CIDR (~1993)5.NAT (early 1990’s)6.IPv6 (first RFC 1995, Internet standard 1998)7.IPSEC (1995)8.Mobile IP (~1996)9.MPLS (~1996)10.DiffServ / IntServ (~1998)11.HIP (~1999, first RFC 2006)12.BGPSec (mid 2000s)13.DNSSec (~2004, first deployed at root level ~2010)

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Network Address Network Address Translation (NAT) – 4 Translation (NAT) – 4 typestypes Problem: address space exhaustion

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Network Address Network Address Translation (NAT) – 4 Translation (NAT) – 4 typestypes

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Network Address Network Address Translation (NAT) – 4 Translation (NAT) – 4 typestypes

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Network Address Network Address Translation (NAT) – 4 Translation (NAT) – 4 typestypes

NAT is ugly, breaks E2E… but it works.

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IPv6IPv6

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Problem: address space exhaustion IPv6 was born in 1995 after long work There are over 30 IPv6-related RFCs The claimed improvements in IPv6 are:

Large 128-bit address space Stateless address auto-configuration Multicast support Mandatory network layer security (IPSEC) Simplified header processing by routers Efficient mobility (no triangular routing) Extensibility (extension headers) Jumbo packets (up to 4 GB)

IPv6IPv6

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Major operating systems and many ISPs support IPv6

The use of IPv6 is slowly increasing in Europe and North America but more rapidly in Asia

In China, CERNET 2 runs IPv6, interconnecting 25 points of presence in 20 cities with 2.5 and 10 Gbps links

IPv6 really only solves the exhaustion of Internet address space

IPv6IPv6

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Planned Actual

?

IPSecIPSec

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Problem: security IPSec is the IP-layer security solution of

the Internet to be used with IPv4 and IPv6 Authentication Header (AH) only protects

the integrity of an IP packet Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP)

also ensures confidentiality of the data IPSec works within a Security Association

(SA) set up between two IP addresses ISAKMP (Internet Security Association

and Key Management Protocol) is a very complicated framework for SA mgmt

Encapsulating Security Encapsulating Security Payload (IPv4)Payload (IPv4)

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Original IPv4 Header

Security Parameter Index (SPI)

Sequence Number

Coverage of Authentication

UDP/TCP Header

Data

Padding Pad Len Next Hdr

Authentication Data

Coverage ofConfidentiality

ESP Header

ESP Payload

ESP Trailer

Encapsulating Security Encapsulating Security Payload (IPv6) Payload (IPv6)

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ESP Payload

Hop-by-Hop Extensions

Security Parameter Index (SPI)

Sequence Number

Coverage of Authentication

End-to-End Extensions

Data

Padding

Authentication Data

Coverage ofConfidentiality

ESP Header

ESP Trailer

Original IPv6 Header

UDP/TCP Header

Mobile IPv4Mobile IPv4

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Problem: mobility Basic concepts:

Mobile Node (MN) Correspondent Node (CN) Home Agent (HA) Foreign Agent (FA) Care-of-Address (CoA)

The following can be problematic: Firewalls and ingress filtering Triangular routing

Mobility Example:Mobile IP Mobility Example:Mobile IP Triangular RoutingTriangular Routing

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Home Agent

CorrespondentHost

Foreign Agent

Mobile Host

Ingress filtering causes problems for IPv4 (home address as source), IPv6 uses CoA

so not a problem . Solutions:(reverse tunnelling) or

route optimization

Foreign agent left out of MIPv6. No special

support needed withIPv6 autoconfigurationDELAY!

Care-of-Address (CoA)

Source: Professor Sasu Tarkoma

Ingress FilteringIngress Filtering

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Home AgentCorrespondent Host

Packet from mobile host is deemed "topologically incorrect“ (as in source address spoofing)

With ingress filtering, routers drop source addresses that are not consistent with the observed source of the packet

Source: Professor Sasu Tarkoma

Reverse TunnellingReverse Tunnelling

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Home Agent

CorrespondentHost

Router

Mobile Host

DELAY!

Firewalls and ingress filtering no longer a problemTwo-way tunneling leads to

overhead and increased congestion

Firewalls and ingress filtering no longer a problemTwo-way tunneling leads to

overhead and increased congestion

Source: Professor Sasu Tarkoma

Care-of-Address (CoA)

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Mobile IPv6 Route OptimizationMobile IPv6 Route Optimization

Home Agent

CorrespondentHost

Router

Mobile Host

MH sends a binding update to CHwhen it receives a tunnelled packet.

CH sends packets using routing header

First, a Return Routability test to CH. CH sends home test and CoA test packets. When MH receives both,

It sends the BU with the Kbm key.

Secure tunnel (ESP)

Source: Professor Sasu Tarkoma

Differences btw MIPv6 and Differences btw MIPv6 and MIPv4MIPv4 In MIPv6 no FA is needed

(no infrastructure change) Address auto-configuration helps in acquiring

CoA MH uses CoA as the source address in foreign

link, so no problems with ingress filtering Option headers and neighbor discovery of IPv6

protocol are used to perform mobility functions 128-bit IP addresses help deployment of mobile

IP in large environments Route optimization is supported by header

options

11.09.2012 18Source: Professor Sasu Tarkoma

Extension HeadersExtension Headers

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Mobility Header

Upper Layer headers

DataMH

CN to MN MN to CN

MN, HA, and CN for Binding

MH Type in Mobility Header: Binding Update, Binding Ack, Binding Err, Binding refresh

Source: Chittaranjan Hota, Computer Networks II lecture 22.10.2007

(G)MPLS(G)MPLS

Problems: scalable transport, QoS, resource usage, business incentives etc.

(Generalized) Multi-Protocol Label Switching Layer 2.5 protocol High-performance transport of any layer 3 protocol

over any layer 2 data link over any layer 1 medium Routing via short path labels (path switching)

Layer 2 and layer 3 services (e.g. PtP and PtMP VPN) Routing implemented in hardware (i.e. switching);

much faster than IP longest-prefix matching

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(G)MPLS(G)MPLS

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QoSQoS Problem: need better traffic control,

satisfy business incentives, better services etc.

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DiffServDiffServ Differentiated Services (DiffServ, RFC 2474)

redefines the ToS octet of the IPv4 packet or Traffic Class octet of IPv6 as DS

Allows operators to control treatment of packets but does not guarantee any particular level of service or policy adherence across network boundaries.

The first 6 bits of the DS field are used as Differentiated Services Code Point (DSCP) defining the Per-Hop Behavior of the packet

DiffServ is stateless (like IP) and scales Service Profiles can be defined by ISP for

customers and by transit providers for ISPs DiffServ is very easily deployable and could

enable well working VoIP and real-time video Unfortunately, it is not used between

operators11.09.2012 23

IntServIntServ

Integrated Services Unlike DiffServ, IntServ reserves

network resources and attempts to guarantee conditions of network flow end-to-end However, the process is complex,

resource intensive, and requires supportive cooperating routers across all AS’s from source to sink.

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HIPHIP

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Problems: mobility, security, multihoming, IPv4/IPv6 interoperation etc.

Host Identity Protocol (HIP, RFC4423) defines a new global Internet name space

The Host Identity name space decouples the name and locator roles, both of which are currently served by IP addresses

The transport layer now operates on Host Identities instead of IP addresses

The network layer uses IP addresses as pure locators (not as names or identifiers)

HIP ArchitectureHIP Architecture

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HIPHIP

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HIs are self-certifying (public keys) HIP is a fairly simple technique based on

IPSEC ESP and HITs (128-bit HI hashes) HIP is ready for large-scale deployment See http://infrahip.hiit.fi for more info

Base exchangeBase exchange

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Initiator

ResponderI1 HIT

I, HIT

R or NULL

R1 HITI, [HIT

R, puzzle, DH

R, HI

R]

sig

I2 [HITI, HIT

R, solution, DH

I,{HI

I}]

sig

R2 [HITI, HIT

R, authenticator]

sig

ESP protected TCP/UDP, ESP protected TCP/UDP, nono explicit HIP explicit HIP headerheader

ESP protected TCP/UDP, ESP protected TCP/UDP, nono explicit HIP explicit HIP headerheader

User data messagesUser data messages

solve puzzle

verify, authenticate,

replay protection

• Based on SIGMA family of key exchange protocols

standard authenticated Diffie-Hellman key exchange

for session key generation

Select precomputed R1. Prevent DoS. Minimal state kept at

responder!Does not protect against replay

attacks.

HIP MobilityHIP Mobility

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Mobility is easy – retaining the SA for ESP

HIP in Combining IPv4 and HIP in Combining IPv4 and IPv6 IPv6

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IPv6 access

network

IPv4 access

network

Internet

HIP MN

Music Server

WWW ProxyHIP CN

An early demo seen at L.M. Ericsson Finland (source: Petri Jokela, LMF)

BGPSec and DNSSecBGPSec and DNSSec Problem: security (within two critical

architectural solutions) BGP Security Extensions:

Authentication of inter-AS BGP data via Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) i.e. digital signatures

Does NOT provide confidentiality or guaranteed availability

Provides limited protection against certain mis-origination attacks

Not widely implemented

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BGPSec and DNSSecBGPSec and DNSSec

DNS Security Extensions: Authentication and integrity (of DNS

query results) via digital signatures Does NOT provide confidentiality or

guaranteed availability Protects against e.g. cache poisoning

and other forgeries Not widely implemented

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Key limitations, Key limitations, solutions, underlying solutions, underlying ossificationsossifications

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Limitation(s) Solution(s) Key underlying ossification(s)

 Name-address translation DNS Network vs. human-friendly naming

dichotomy

Scalability, routing inflexibility,

combined addressing and

transport

TCP/IP, MPLS Endpoint-centrism Rigid core protocol stack

Congestion TCP congestion

control

Lack of built-in protocol-independent QoS Rigid core protocol stack

Traffic control BGP, IGPs + EGPs Endpoint-centrism Send-receive communication paradigm

Address space exhaustion CIDR, NAT, DHCP

etc.

IPv4

Mobility, multihoming MIP, HIP Endpoint-centrism Rigid core protocol stack

QoS Diffserv + Intserv Lack of built-in protocol-independent QoS Rigid core protocol stack

Security Various (e.g.

DNSSec, BGPSec,

and many others!)

Endpoint-centrism Send-receive communication paradigm Rigid core protocol stack

Evolutionary approachesEvolutionary approachesApplication-level

1.Scalable content delivery1. DHTs (~2001)2. P2P networks3. CDNs (e.g. Akamai)

2.Security (confidentiality, anonymity, authentication etc.)1. Asymmetric crypto (e.g. RSA ~1977 or ~1973, DH ~1976)2. PGP (~1991)3. SSL/TLS (mid-1990’s, late-1990’s)4. PKI (1990’s)5. VPNs E.g. PPTP (~1999)6. Wireless security e.g. WPA/WPA2/EAP (late 1990’s and

beyond)7. Tor (mid 2000’s)

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Distributed Hash Table Distributed Hash Table (DHT)(DHT) Distributed Hash Table (DHT) is a service for storing and retrieving key-value pairs

There is a large number of peer machines Single machines leaving or joining the

network have little effect on its operation DHTs can be used to build e.g. databases

(new DNS), or content delivery systems BitTorrent is using a DHT The real scalability of DHT is still unproven All of the participating hosts need to be

trusted (at least to some extent)

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DHTDHT

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The principle of Distribute Hash Table (source: Wikipedia)

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Overlay RoutingOverlay Routing In overlay routing the topology is formed

over an underlying (usually IP) network DHTs are examples of overlay routing DHT techniques can be utilized e.g. in

implementing non-hierarchical rendezvous

An example of DHT-based solutions is the Content Addressable Network (CAN)

CAN is based on a d-dimensional Cartesian space, each node having a coordinate zone that it is responsible for

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CANCAN A two-dimensional example

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Chord RingChord Ring Greedy forwarding (cmp w/ ROFL)

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Pastry DHTPastry DHT An example with hexadecimal identifiers

P2P networks & CDNs P2P networks & CDNs

Napster, Gnutella, BitTorrent (also utilizes DHT) etc.

Akamai CDN

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SecuritySecurity

Confidentiality, anonymity, authentication etc.1. Asymmetric crypto (e.g. RSA ~1977 or

~1973, Diffie-Hellman ~1976)2. PGP (~1991)3. SSL/TLS (mid-1990’s, late-1990’s)4. PKI (1990’s)5. VPNs e.g. PPTP (~1999)6. Wireless security e.g. WPA/WPA2/EAP

(late 1990’s and beyond)7. Tor (mid 2000’s)

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Cloud computingCloud computing Computing resources are delivered

via the network “x”aaS i.e. “x” as a service

E.g. software, storage, processing etc. Goal is to achieve resourcefulness

and efficiency via computing economies of scale

Examples: Amazon, Apple, Google etc.

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For next week…For next week…

READ (lecture 3): M. Handley. 2006. Why the Internet only just works.

BT Technology Journal 24, 3 (July 2006), 119-129. DOI=10.1007/s10550-006-0084-z http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10550-006-0084-z

READ (lecture 4): Van Jacobson, Diana K. Smetters, James D. Thornton,

Michael F. Plass, Nicholas H. Briggs, and Rebecca L. Braynard. 2009. Networking named content. In Proceedings of the 5th international conference on Emerging networking experiments and technologies (CoNEXT '09). ACM, New York, NY, USA, 1-12. DOI=10.1145/1658939.1658941 http://doi.acm.org/10.1145/1658939.1658941

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Thank you for your attention!Thank you for your attention!Questions? Comments?Questions? Comments?