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11 Evaluating Drug Treatment Courts. Michael Rempel
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Transcript of 11 Evaluating Drug Treatment Courts. Michael Rempel
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Evaluating Drug Treatment Courts Lessons from Previous Research
Michael RempelCenter for Court Innovation([email protected])
Taller de Capacitacion para la implementacion de Tribunales de Tratamiento de Adicciones en Mexico, Toluca de Lerdo, Estado de Mexico, November 23-24, 2013,
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Drug Court
Do Drug Courts Work?Positive
Outcomes• Reduced Recidivism
• Reduced Drug Use
• Cost Savings
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Do Drug Courts Work? Recidivism:
Almost 100 evaluations of adult criminal drug courts Most reduce recidivism (about 4 of every 5 programs) Average recidivism reduction = 8-12 percentage points
Drug Use: All evaluations (five) show reductions in drug use Several studies show larger effects on serious drug use
(e.g., heroin or cocaine) than on marijuana use
Cost Savings: Multi-site studies all show savings, mainly from reductions in recidivism and incarceration
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Reduced RecidivismPercent with Criminal Activity:
One Year Prior to 18-Month Interview
53% 50%40%* 36%**
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
Criminal Activity Drug-Related Activity
Drug Court (n = 951)Comparison (n = 523)
+ p < .10 * p < .05 ** p < .01 *** p < .001
Source: Rossman et al. (2011)
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Reduced Drug UsePercent Used Drugs:
One Year Prior to 18-Month Interview
76%
58%
41%**
56%**
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
Any Drug Any Serious Drug
Drug Court (n = 951)Comparison (n = 523)
+ p < .10 * p < .05 ** p < .01 *** p < .001Note: Measures are reported use of eight drugs: alcohol, marijuana, cocaine, heroin, amphetamines, hallucinogens, prescription drugs (illegal use), and methadone (illegal use). "Serious" drugs omit marijuana and light alcohol use (less than four drinks per day for women and less than five for men).
Source: Rossman et al. (2011)
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What’s Wrong with This Story? Almost 100 Recidivism Evaluations:
Average recidivism reduction = 8-12 percentage points But—The precise effect size varies widely:
Some drug courts produced large recidivism reductionsSome drug courts produced small recidivism reductionsSome (about 20%) had no effect or increased recidivism
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Drug Court
Do Drug Courts Work?Positive
Outcomes• Reduced Recidivism
• Reduced Drug Use
• Cost Savings
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Drug Court
Why Do Drug Courts Work?Positive
Outcomes• Reduced Recidivism
• Reduced Drug Use
• Cost Savings
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Why Do Drug Courts Work?Evidence-Based
Principles• Treatment
• Deterrence
• Procedural Justice
• Collaboration
Positive Outcomes
• Reduced Recidivism• Reduced Drug Use• Cost Savings
Target Population
• High-Risk
• High-Leverage
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Target Population1. Risk Level: Likelihood of recidivism at baseline
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Risk Principle Definition: Vary treatment by offender risk level.
High-Risk: Provide intensive treatment. Low-Risk: Treatment can be harmful: Why?
Removes offenders from work and school Surrounds offenders with high-risk peers
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Impact with High-risk OffendersTreatment Effects For High Risk Offenders
-34
-18-15 -14
-6 -5-2 -2
2 3 3 35 6 7 8 8 9 10 10
12 12 12 13 13 1315
21 2224 25
2730
3234
0
10
20
30
40
-10
-20
-30
-40
Prob
abili
ty o
f Rei
n car
cera
tion
Note: Data from Lowenkamp, C. T., and Latessa, E. J. 2002. Evaluation of Ohio’s Community Based Correctional Facilities and Halfway House Programs. Cincinnati, OH: University of Cincinnati. Source for Slide: Latessa (2011)
27 of 35 programs produce positive effects
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Impact with Low-risk Offenders
Note: Data from Lowenkamp, C. T., and Latessa, E. J. 2002. Evaluation of Ohio’s Community Based Correctional Facilities and Halfway House Programs. Cincinnati, OH: University of Cincinnati. Source for Slide: Latessa (2011)
23 of 34 programs produce negative effects
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Program Impact by Risk Level Study of 86 Drug Courts:
Risk Level Effect Size
Low-Risk minus 3%Low- to Moderate-Risk zero (0%)Moderate- to High-Risk 3%High-Risk 9%
Source: Cissner et al. (2013).
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Target Population1. Risk
2. Leverage: Possible legal consequences for failing
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Impact by Amount of Leverage Impact of Legal Coercion on Retention
(The Brooklyn Treatment Court, N = 2,184)
47%
66%
80%
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
Misdemeanor First Felony Predicate Felony
One-Year Retention Rate
Median Jail Alternative: 6 months in jail
Median Jail Alternative: 1 year in jail
Median Prison Alternative: 3-6 years in prison
Source: Rempel and DeStefano (2001).
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Impact by Amount of Leverage Study of 86 Drug Courts:
Felony vs. Misdemeanor Court Effect Size
Felony Drug Court 12%Misdemeanor or Mixed Drug Court 1%
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Other Population Factors Demographics: Age, sex, and race/ethnicity
Motivation: Offenders who present with greater interest or readiness-to-change at baseline
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Why Do Drug Courts Work?Evidence-Based
Principles• Treatment
• Deterrence
• Procedural Justice
• Collaboration
Positive Outcomes
• Reduced Recidivism• Reduced Drug Use• Cost Savings
Target Population
• High-Risk
• High-Leverage
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Three Treatment Principles1. Risk Principle: Vary treatment by offender risk level.
2. Need Principle: Assess and treat criminogenic needs.
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Huh … “Criminogenic Needs”? What is a “criminogenic“ need? It is a need
that is statistically associated with recidivism. So what? We already know that drug court
participants all need drug treatment
Addiction Crime
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The “Central Eight” Factors1. History of criminal behavior (STATIC)
2. Antisocial personality/temperment (Mostly STATIC)
3. Criminal thinking
4. Antisocial peers
5. Family or marital problems
6. School or work problems
7. Lack of pro-social leisure/recreational activities
8. Substance abuse
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Criminal Thinking The Concept: Thoughts, attitudes, and decision-
making strategies that dispose individuals to crime.
Examples: Legal Cynicism: Negative views of the law and authority External locus of control: Actions cannot lead to success Anger and Impulsivity: Poor decision-making skills Neutralizations (excuses): Blaming the victim; minimizing
harm; blaming the “system”; believing crime is inevitable
Sample Treatments: Thinking for a Change (T4C), Moral Reconation Therapy (MRT), Reasoning and Rehabilitation (R&R), and Interactive Journaling
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What About Other Needs? Non-Criminogenic Needs
Examples: Trauma historyDepression, anxiety, and other mental health disordersPoor parenting skillsLow self-esteemMedical needs
Why Assess: Ethical reasons (they greatly affect individual well-being)These needs can interfere with treatment for criminogenic
needs (trauma especially should be treated simultaneously)
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Three Treatment Principles1. Risk Principle: Vary treatment by offender risk level.
2. Need Principle: Assess and treat criminogenic needs.
3. Responsivity Principle: Use cognitive-behavioral therapy (CBT) and adapt to the specific offender needs.
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Cognitive-Behavioral Therapy Key Elements:
The Present: current people, places, and behaviors Thinking Errors: legal cynicism, external control, sense
of hopelessness, sense of victimization Cognitive Restructuring: effort to change the automatic
thoughts & feelings that lead to (e.g.) crime and drug use Anger: often involves an anger control element Problem-Solving Skills: versus impulsive reactions Multiple Needs: Adaptable to different needs (antisocial
peers, triggers to drug use, triggers to violence, etc.) Education? No!
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Risk-Need-Responsivity Impact Drug Court Effects (Gutierrez and Bourgon 2009)
No RNR principles: 11 of 25 drug courts: +.05 1 RNR principle: 13 of 25 drug courts: +.11 2 RNR principles: 1 of 25 drug courts: +.31 3 RNR principles: 0 of 25 drug courts: ?????
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Implementation Issues Setting (community-based better than jail/prison)
Risk Level (high-risk focus; separate groups by risk)
Group Size (ideally < 12 per group)
Manualized Curricula (written lesson plans)
Fidelity to Curriculum: Frequent staff training and retraining Regular observation by supervisory staff Regular debriefing/supervision given by supervisory staff
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Why Do Drug Courts Work?Evidence-Based
Principles• Treatment
• Deterrence
• Procedural Justice
• Collaboration
Positive Outcomes
• Reduced Recidivism• Reduced Drug Use• Cost Savings
Target Population
• High-Risk
• High-Leverage
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Deterrence: Elements Leverage: Threat of prison for failing (Anglin et al. 1989; Hiller et al.
1998)
Interim Sanctions (e.g., Marlowe and Kirby 1999; Taxman et al. 1991):
Certainty: Sanction for every infraction Celerity: Imposed soon after the infraction Severity: Serious enough to be undesirable Certainty is more critical than severity (Nagin & Pogarsky 2001)
Positive Incentives: Rewards for progress
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Deterrence: Drug Court Results Leverage:
Target Population: Felony defendants (v. misdemeanor) Additional Policies to Increase Leverage:
Guilty plea at entry (“post-plea” model) Jail alternative set in advance of participation Jail alternative always imposed on those who fail
Sanctions: Apply interim sanctions with greater certainty Make greater use of a formal sanctions schedule
Rewards: Frequent incentives improve outcomes
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Role of Perceptions Greater compliance when:
More staff note consequence of failing More staff note that consequence of failing will be severe More times that participants must promise to comply
Clear reminders given early and often
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What About Supervision? Qualified Impact … Little direct effect of judicial
hearings, drug testing, or probation meetings, but: Supervision matters more with high-risk participants Supervision can facilitate imposing sanctions Supervision—especially appearing regularly before the
judge—can facilitate procedural justice …
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Why Do Drug Courts Work?Evidence-Based
Principles• Treatment
• Deterrence
• Procedural Justice
• Collaboration
Positive Outcomes
• Reduced Recidivism• Reduced Drug Use• Cost Savings
Target Population
• High-Risk
• High-Leverage
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A Simple Definition Procedural justice concerns the perceived
fairness of court procedures and interpersonal treatment while a case is processed.
BUT—Isn’t winning the case the most important thing?
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Procedures v. Outcomes Most people don’t like to lose Procedural justice theory assumes that:
People know they will sometimes lose People will be more likely to accept losing if they:
Perceive the process was fair. Believe they were treated with dignity and respect. Had a chance to be heard.
Source: Tyler (2012).
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Procedural Justice Dimensions Voice: Participants’ side is heard
Respect: Treated with dignity and respect
Neutrality: Decisions unbiased and consistent
Understanding: Participants understand responsibilities, decisions, and reasons for decisions
Helpfulness: Interest in participants’ personal situation and needs for services
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Procedural Justice Findings Compliance: Increases compliance with court
orders and reduces future crime (e.g., Lind et al. 1993; Tyler and Huo 2002)
Procedural v. Distributive: More influential than distributive justice (win or lose) (see Tyler 1990; Tyler and Huo 2002)
Aid to Deterrence: Complements deterrence by reducing perceptions of unfair consequences
Rectifies Inequality: Effect is greater among those with negative views of the criminal justice system
Role of the Judge: Greatest influence on overall perceptions (Abuwala and Farole 2008; Curtis et al., forthcoming; Frazer 2006; Rossman et al. 2011)
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Procedural Justice: Drug Courts
Source: The Multi-Site Adult Drug Court Evaluation (MADCE), see Rossman et al. (2011).
Offender Perceptions of Fairness
2.86
3.24
3.86
3.21
3.26*
3.78***
4.26**
4.11***
1.00 2.00 3.00 4.00 5.00
Perceptions ofDistributive Justice
Perceptions of CourtProcedural Justice
Perceptions ofSupervision Officer
Perceptions of Judge
Comparison (N = 524) Drug Court (N = 1,009)
* p < .05 ** p < .01 *** p < .001
Note: Distributive justice questions were on a 1-4 scale.
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Role of the Judge Offender Perceptions: Perceptions of judge were a
key factor in reducing crime and drug use (Rossman et al. 2011)
Judicial Demeanor: Drug courts produced greater reductions in crime and drug use when the judge was rated as more respectful, fair, attentive, consistent, caring, and knowledgeable (Rossman et al. 2011)
Role of Time: More than 2X greater impact when judges averaged > 3 minutes/hearing (Carey et al. 2012)
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Judicial Interaction Checklist Sample Measures:
Length of judicial status hearing (in minutes) Judge provided praise/reward if compliant Judge imposed sanction if noncompliant Judge asked “probing” questions (> 1-sentence answer) Judge reviewed treatment and other responsibilities Judge repeated benefits of compliance (e.g., graduation) Judge repeated consequences of noncompliance (e.g., jail) Judge expressed an interest in treatment needs
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Why Do Drug Courts Work?Evidence-Based
Principles• Treatment
• Deterrence
• Procedural Justice
• Collaboration
Positive Outcomes
• Reduced Recidivism• Reduced Drug Use• Cost Savings
Target Population
• High-Risk
• High-Leverage
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Collaboration: Practice Key Elements: Weekly team meetings; less
adversarial approach in the courtroom
Findings: Drug courts reduce recidivism more where: Treatment attends team meetings (Carey et al. 2012)
Treatment attends court sessions (Carey et al. 2012)
Treatment communicates with court by e-mail (Carey et al. 2012)
Dedicated prosecutor and defense attorney both attend staffing meetings and court sessions (Cissner et al. 2012)
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How Measure Success?Evidence-Based
Principles• Treatment
• Deterrence
• Procedural Justice
• Collaboration
Positive Outcomes
• Reduced Recidivism• Reduced Drug Use• Cost Savings
Target Population
• High-Risk
• High-Leverage
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Impact Evaluation 101 Follow-up Periods? (1, 2, or 3 years) Outcomes (re-arrest; re-conviction; drug use;
employment status; family relationships) Design (approach to comparison group construction)
Question:Should you track recidivism rates at your drug court if you do not have a comparison group?
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Impact Evaluation: Design Experiment: Study subjects randomly assigned;
those in each condition will be comparable at baseline.
Quasi-Experiment: Naturally occurring comparison group; statistical methods increase comparability. Pre-Post: eligible cases before program opened Contemporaneous: eligible cases not referred or identified
Non-Experiment: Graduates v. dropouts
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Performance Monitoring Volume: # referrals? # participants Background Characteristics: Demographics, drug
type; criminal history; current charges; employment and school status; and risk level (high, medium, low)
Program Outcomes: (1) open (active in the drug court; not yet closed); (2) graduated; and (3) failed
Retention Rate: Indicator that predicts likely impact: 1-Year Rate: (open + graduated) / # enrolled > 1 year ago Benchmarks: 1-year > 60%; 2-year & 3-year > 50%)
Months to Graduation (enrollment date to exit date)
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Additional Data Considerations Identifiers: case-level and person-level ID numbers
Key Dates: Arrest date/court filing date Participation/enrollment date Exit date (graduation/failure date)
Tracking System: 1 row per drug court episode; historical data is saved. Microsoft Excel or Microsoft Access Relational Database
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Review and Reflection Participant Feedback:
Anonymous exit surveys Focus groups led by local University professor
Courtroom Observation: Invite independent observer to evaluate the drug court session
Policy Review: Review all program policies in light of known evidence-based practices
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Why Do Drug Courts Work?Evidence-Based
Principles• Treatment
• Deterrence
• Procedural Justice
• Collaboration
Positive Outcomes
• Reduced Recidivism• Reduced Drug Use• Cost Savings
Target Population
• High-Risk
• High-Leverage
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Research Resources (USA) National Institute of Justice: http
://www.nij.gov/nij/topics/courts/drug-courts/welcome.htm
Research to Practice (R2P) Project: http://www.research2practice.org/index.html
National Association of Drug Court Professionals: General Page: http://www.nadcp.org/
Evidence-Based Standards: http://www.nadcp.org/Standards
Drug Court Clearinghouse at American University: http://www.american.edu/spa/jpo/drug-court-clearinghouse.cfm
Center for Court Innovation: General Drug Court Page: http://www.courtinnovation.org/topic/drug-court
Training and Technical Assistance: http://www.nadcp.org/