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    This document was downloaded on May 12, 2014 at 16:02:16

    Author(s) Wong, Ka-Yoon.

    Title Robust defense against small boat attacks

    Publisher Monterey, California. Naval Postgraduate School

    Issue Date 2010-12

    URL http://hdl.handle.net/10945/4957

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    NAVAL

    POSTGRADUATE

    SCHOOLMONTEREY, CALIFORNIA

    THESIS

    Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited

    ROBUST DEFENSE AGAINST SMALL BOAT ATTACKS

    by

    Ka-Yoon Wong

    December 2010

    Thesis Advisor: Thomas W. Lucas

    Second Reader: Jeffrey E. Kline

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    REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instruction,searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send

    comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, toWashington headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA

    22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188) Washington DC 20503.

    1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank) 2. REPORT DATE

    December 2010

    3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED

    Masters Thesis

    4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE

    Robust Defense Against Small Boat Attacks

    6. AUTHOR Ka-Yoon Wong

    5. FUNDING NUMBERS

    7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)

    Naval Postgraduate SchoolMonterey, CA 93943-5000

    8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION

    REPORT NUMBER

    9. SPONSORING /MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)

    N/A

    10. SPONSORING/MONITORING

    AGENCY REPORT NUMBER

    11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy

    or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government. IRB Protocol number N/A.

    12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENTApproved for public release; distribution is unlimited 12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE: A

    13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words)

    Nearly a decade after the small boat attacks against the USS Cole (in 2000) and M/V Limburg (in 2002) in Yemen,

    small vessels continue to pose a security threat. In part, this is due to the ease of camouflage and the high frequency of

    small vessels operating in proximity to important maritime infrastructure, such as bridges and petrochemical plants,

    and to passenger and military ships. In this study, small boat effectiveness in the interception of attacking speedboatsis analyzed using the stochastic, time-stepped, agent-based simulation tool MANA. Three alternative defender tactics

    of scramble from base, barrier patrol, and random patrol are explored against two possible attacker modus operandi ofsaturation attack and diversionary attack. The probability of at least one attacker reaching the defended asset is the

    primary measure of effectiveness. A full factorial experiment was designed and executed for defenders tasked to

    protect the Port of Los Angeles and the Port of Hong Kong. The findings indicate that the defenders are highly

    susceptible to diversionary attacks regardless of tactics employed, but their effectiveness can be improved by

    retaining sufficient defensive assets in preparation for a potential follow on attack. The study highlights the limits onpatrol boat effectiveness to intercept small high speed vessels which lead to the nullification of any numericaladvantage the defender may have when faced with a saturation attack. Anticipating the heading of the attacker is a

    critical factor for a successful engagement.

    15. NUMBER OF

    PAGES65

    14. SUBJECT TERMSMaritime Security, Critical Infrastructure Protection, Small Boat Attacks, Simulation, Optimization

    16. PRICE CODE

    17. SECURITY

    CLASSIFICATION OF

    REPORT

    Unclassified

    18. SECURITY

    CLASSIFICATION OF THIS

    PAGE

    Unclassified

    19. SECURITY

    CLASSIFICATION OF

    ABSTRACT

    Unclassified

    20. LIMITATION OF

    ABSTRACT

    UUNSN 7540-01-280-5500 Standard Form 298 (Rev. 2-89)

    Prescribed by ANSI Std. 239-18

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    Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited

    ROBUST DEFENSE AGAINST SMALL BOAT ATTACKS

    Ka-Yoon WongDefence Science and Technology Agency, Singapore

    B.Eng (Hons), Nanyang Technological University, 2003

    Submitted in partial fulfillment of therequirements for the degree of

    MASTER OF SCIENCE IN OPERATIONS RESEARCH

    from the

    NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL

    December 2010

    Author: Ka-Yoon Wong

    Approved by: Thomas W. Lucas

    Thesis Advisor

    Jeffrey E. Kline

    Second Reader

    Robert F. Dell

    Chairman, Department of Operations Research

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    ABSTRACT

    Nearly a decade after the small boat attacks against the USS Cole (in 2000) and M/V

    Limburg (in 2002) in Yemen, small vessels continue to pose a security threat. In part, this

    is due to the ease of camouflage and the high frequency of small vessels operating in

    proximity to important maritime infrastructure, such as bridges and petrochemical plants,

    and to passenger and military ships. In this study, small boat effectiveness in the

    interception of attacking speedboats is analyzed using the stochastic, time-stepped, agent-

    based simulation tool MANA. Three alternative defender tactics of scramble from base,

    barrier patrol, and random patrol are explored against two possible attacker modus

    operandi of saturation attack and diversionary attack. The probability of at least one

    attacker reaching the defended asset is the primary measure of effectiveness. A full

    factorial experiment was designed and executed for defenders tasked to protect the Port

    of Los Angeles and the Port of Hong Kong. The findings indicate that the defenders are

    highly susceptible to diversionary attacks regardless of tactics employed, but their

    effectiveness can be improved by retaining sufficient defensive assets in preparation for a

    potential follow on attack. The study highlights the limits on patrol boat effectiveness to

    intercept small high-speed vessels which lead to the nullification of any numerical

    advantage the defender may have when faced with a saturation attack. Anticipating the

    heading of the attacker is a critical factor for a successful engagement.

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    TABLE OF CONTENTS

    I. INTRODUCTION........................................................................................................1 A. CLEAR AND PRESENT DANGER ..............................................................1

    B. RESEARCH DIRECTION .............................................................................2

    C. THESIS FLOW................................................................................................2

    II. BACKGROUND AND MOTIVATION ....................................................................3

    A. PRIOR ANALYSIS .........................................................................................3

    B. MODEL OVERVIEW.....................................................................................3C. VARIABLES AND TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS ..............................5

    D. RESULTS OF THE PRIOR ANALYSIS ......................................................5E. IMPLICATIONS OF THE FINDINGS.........................................................8

    F. DEEPER DISCUSSION..................................................................................8

    1. Deployment Position............................................................................8

    2. Probability of Detection.......................................................................9G. MOTIVATION ..............................................................................................10

    III. DETAILED SCENARIO AND MODELING .........................................................13A. SCENARIO AND MAPS ..............................................................................13

    1. Current Security Strategies to Determine Intent............................13

    B. THREAT DEFINITION ...............................................................................161. Possible Attacker Modus Operandi .................................................16

    2. Threat as Modeled in MANA............................................................16C. DEFENDER CONOPS..................................................................................18

    1. Possible Defender Response Tactics.................................................18

    2. Rules of Engagement .........................................................................21

    3. Kinematic Analysis of Interception...............................