8/12/2019 10Dec Wong Ka-Yoon

1/66

This document was downloaded on May 12, 2014 at 16:02:16

Author(s) Wong, Ka-Yoon.

Title Robust defense against small boat attacks

Publisher Monterey, California. Naval Postgraduate School

Issue Date 2010-12

URL http://hdl.handle.net/10945/4957

8/12/2019 10Dec Wong Ka-Yoon

2/66

NAVAL

POSTGRADUATE

SCHOOLMONTEREY, CALIFORNIA

THESIS

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited

ROBUST DEFENSE AGAINST SMALL BOAT ATTACKS

by

Ka-Yoon Wong

December 2010

Thesis Advisor: Thomas W. Lucas

Second Reader: Jeffrey E. Kline

8/12/2019 10Dec Wong Ka-Yoon

3/66

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

8/12/2019 10Dec Wong Ka-Yoon

4/66

i

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instruction,searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send

comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, toWashington headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA

22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188) Washington DC 20503.

1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank) 2. REPORT DATE

December 2010

3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED

Masters Thesis

4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE

Robust Defense Against Small Boat Attacks

6. AUTHOR Ka-Yoon Wong

5. FUNDING NUMBERS

7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)

Naval Postgraduate SchoolMonterey, CA 93943-5000

8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION

REPORT NUMBER

9. SPONSORING /MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)

N/A

10. SPONSORING/MONITORING

AGENCY REPORT NUMBER

11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy

or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government. IRB Protocol number N/A.

12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENTApproved for public release; distribution is unlimited 12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE: A

13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words)

Nearly a decade after the small boat attacks against the USS Cole (in 2000) and M/V Limburg (in 2002) in Yemen,

small vessels continue to pose a security threat. In part, this is due to the ease of camouflage and the high frequency of

small vessels operating in proximity to important maritime infrastructure, such as bridges and petrochemical plants,

and to passenger and military ships. In this study, small boat effectiveness in the interception of attacking speedboatsis analyzed using the stochastic, time-stepped, agent-based simulation tool MANA. Three alternative defender tactics

of scramble from base, barrier patrol, and random patrol are explored against two possible attacker modus operandi ofsaturation attack and diversionary attack. The probability of at least one attacker reaching the defended asset is the

primary measure of effectiveness. A full factorial experiment was designed and executed for defenders tasked to

protect the Port of Los Angeles and the Port of Hong Kong. The findings indicate that the defenders are highly

susceptible to diversionary attacks regardless of tactics employed, but their effectiveness can be improved by

retaining sufficient defensive assets in preparation for a potential follow on attack. The study highlights the limits onpatrol boat effectiveness to intercept small high speed vessels which lead to the nullification of any numericaladvantage the defender may have when faced with a saturation attack. Anticipating the heading of the attacker is a

critical factor for a successful engagement.

15. NUMBER OF

PAGES65

14. SUBJECT TERMSMaritime Security, Critical Infrastructure Protection, Small Boat Attacks, Simulation, Optimization

16. PRICE CODE

17. SECURITY

CLASSIFICATION OF

REPORT

Unclassified

18. SECURITY

CLASSIFICATION OF THIS

PAGE

Unclassified

19. SECURITY

CLASSIFICATION OF

ABSTRACT

Unclassified

20. LIMITATION OF

ABSTRACT

UUNSN 7540-01-280-5500 Standard Form 298 (Rev. 2-89)

Prescribed by ANSI Std. 239-18

8/12/2019 10Dec Wong Ka-Yoon

5/66

ii

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

8/12/2019 10Dec Wong Ka-Yoon

6/66

iii

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited

ROBUST DEFENSE AGAINST SMALL BOAT ATTACKS

Ka-Yoon WongDefence Science and Technology Agency, Singapore

B.Eng (Hons), Nanyang Technological University, 2003

Submitted in partial fulfillment of therequirements for the degree of

MASTER OF SCIENCE IN OPERATIONS RESEARCH

from the

NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL

December 2010

Author: Ka-Yoon Wong

Approved by: Thomas W. Lucas

Thesis Advisor

Jeffrey E. Kline

Second Reader

Robert F. Dell

Chairman, Department of Operations Research

8/12/2019 10Dec Wong Ka-Yoon

7/66

iv

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

8/12/2019 10Dec Wong Ka-Yoon

8/66

v

ABSTRACT

Nearly a decade after the small boat attacks against the USS Cole (in 2000) and M/V

Limburg (in 2002) in Yemen, small vessels continue to pose a security threat. In part, this

is due to the ease of camouflage and the high frequency of small vessels operating in

proximity to important maritime infrastructure, such as bridges and petrochemical plants,

and to passenger and military ships. In this study, small boat effectiveness in the

interception of attacking speedboats is analyzed using the stochastic, time-stepped, agent-

based simulation tool MANA. Three alternative defender tactics of scramble from base,

barrier patrol, and random patrol are explored against two possible attacker modus

operandi of saturation attack and diversionary attack. The probability of at least one

attacker reaching the defended asset is the primary measure of effectiveness. A full

factorial experiment was designed and executed for defenders tasked to protect the Port

of Los Angeles and the Port of Hong Kong. The findings indicate that the defenders are

highly susceptible to diversionary attacks regardless of tactics employed, but their

effectiveness can be improved by retaining sufficient defensive assets in preparation for a

potential follow on attack. The study highlights the limits on patrol boat effectiveness to

intercept small high-speed vessels which lead to the nullification of any numerical

advantage the defender may have when faced with a saturation attack. Anticipating the

heading of the attacker is a critical factor for a successful engagement.

8/12/2019 10Dec Wong Ka-Yoon

9/66

vi

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

8/12/2019 10Dec Wong Ka-Yoon

10/66

vii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

I. INTRODUCTION........................................................................................................1 A. CLEAR AND PRESENT DANGER ..............................................................1

B. RESEARCH DIRECTION .............................................................................2

C. THESIS FLOW................................................................................................2

II. BACKGROUND AND MOTIVATION ....................................................................3

A. PRIOR ANALYSIS .........................................................................................3

B. MODEL OVERVIEW.....................................................................................3C. VARIABLES AND TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS ..............................5

D. RESULTS OF THE PRIOR ANALYSIS ......................................................5E. IMPLICATIONS OF THE FINDINGS.........................................................8

F. DEEPER DISCUSSION..................................................................................8

1. Deployment Position............................................................................8

2. Probability of Detection.......................................................................9G. MOTIVATION ..............................................................................................10

III. DETAILED SCENARIO AND MODELING .........................................................13A. SCENARIO AND MAPS ..............................................................................13

1. Current Security Strategies to Determine Intent............................13

B. THREAT DEFINITION ...............................................................................161. Possible Attacker Modus Operandi .................................................16

2. Threat as Modeled in MANA............................................................16C. DEFENDER CONOPS..................................................................................18

1. Possible Defender Response Tactics.................................................18

2. Rules of Engagement .........................................................................21

3. Kinematic Analysis of Interception...............................