101 Boholm Twenty Years of Risk Perception

7/27/2019 101 Boholm Twenty Years of Risk Perception

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/101-boholm-twenty-years-of-risk-perception 1/29

1. Introduction

In the social sciences, comparative cross-national or cross-cultural research may beundertaken for several inte rrelated reasons (for overviews of the research eld in socialpsychology and psychology, see for example Triandis and Berry 1980; Kagitcibasi andBerry 1989; Kohn, 1989a, 1989b; Berry et al. 1992; Miller-Loessi 1995; Hantrais andMangen, 1996; Schooler 1996). Investigating systematic variation is a crucial elementin theoretical development, and by subjecting new samples to replications of earlierstudies it is possible to test the generality of the ndings. It has been argued that such

tests are instrumental in rening and substantiating theories. But comparisons acrossnational or cultural boundaries are not without their complications. If cross-nationalsimilarities are indeed encountered how might we tell whether they result from commonprocesses or structures or from specic historical, sociological or psychological circum-stances? There are similarities in conduct, ideas and institutions between societies, butthis does not signify that their meanings, or the processes which order them, are thesame. Quite to the contrary; there is a mass of ethnographic evidence, from all kindsof society, to prove that human social existence is culturally variable.

Actions and understandings about risks, in just the same way as other experientialphenomena, are informed by socially and culturally structured conceptions and evalu-ations about the world, what it looks like, what it should be or should not be. Perceptionsof events and phenomena ar e conditioned by values which vary according to local bod ies

Journal of R isk Research 1 (2), 135–163 (1998)

Comparative studies o f risk perception:

a review of twenty years of research*

ÅSA BOHOLMCenter for Risk Research, Stockholm School of Economics and CEFOS, Gothenburg University, Sweden

Abstract

This paper critically reviews a number of cross-national studies of perceptions of risks

which have been conducted in accordance with the ‘psychometric paradigm’ developed

by the Oregon research group in the 1970s. It considers attempts to study risk percep-

tion comparatively, from other theoretical and methodological perspectives, anddiscusses various issues that are highlighted in a comparative framework, relating to

distinctions between ‘objective’ and ‘perceived’ risk, the role of communication and the

media, the political system and various societal determinants such as marginality, gender

and ethnicity. One of the main conclusions is that comparative studies of risk percep-

tion need to be further rened, both methodologically and theoretically.

1366-9877 © 1998 E & FN Spon

*This report has been funded by the European Commission Nuclear Fission Safety research programme underContr act No. F14PCT954016 (DG12-WSME). I wish to thank Professor Lennar t Sjöberg, Center for R isk Research,Stockholm School of Economics, the anonymous re viewers of Journal of R isk Research for valuable suggestions andPatr ick Crozier for ed iting services.



of assumptions, conventions and practices. Human societies constitute ‘ultra-complex’systems, in that humans do not merely respond to the ‘physical’ impact of measurableand quantiable aspects of events. Information about events, what is recorded andreported, in what way and by whom, is crucial to human life, as is the way that infor-mation is socially processed and morally valued – whether it is trusted or probed,

esteemed or contested (Rappaport, 1996).It follows from the specicity and variability of human social existence tha t it shouldnot simply be presumed that scores and rat ings on ident ical instruments have the samemeanings in different contexts. The question of whether , and if so to what degree, socialand psychological phenomena are comparable and equivalent across nations andcultures, presents considerable methodological problems (Berry, 1980).

To compare two phenomena, they must share some features in common; and to comparethem to some advantage, they should usually differ on some feature. That is, it must bepossible to place two phenomena on a single dimension in order to judge them validly inrelation to each other; and for the comparative judgement to be of value they should notbe identical in all respects. (Berry, 1980 p. 8)

Berry’s words of warning that much more is required than to collect data in two coun-tries and then compare the resu lts, remind us how impera tive it is that the methodology,and the design in accordance with which research is conducted, are sound if cross-national research is to be successful. Otherwise methodological inconsistencies maybring about divergent results which stem from the design, rather than being validindicators of processes or structures intrinsic to the object of study. That a study needs

to be initially designed as comparat ive, in order to a llow comparisons, might appear tobe a truism. Nevertheless, a common problem when earlier studies are replicated isthat this requirement is not met. If the collection of data is not accomplished underequivalent circumstances or through the use of equivalent measures, the comparativevalue of the results will be seriously compromised. Theoretical concepts and denitionsmust also be equivalent between one national study and another, and of course thescales adopted for measurement, and for comparison needs to be the same (Berryet al., 1992, pp. 237–8).

Given that these preconditions for sound comparative research have been met

the next difculty will be encountered in the interpretation of the results. If wesucceed in demonstrating valid cross-national differences and similarities, how mightsuch results be understood? How do we select which, from among myriad nationaldifferences, should be adopted as the analytical variables pertinent to us? As Kohn(1989a, p. 23) has succinctly pu t it, it is far from easy to translate an ent ire nat ion intovariables.

Although cross-national research is costly in terms of time and money, and raisesserious methodological and interpretative problems, there are strong arguments in itsfavour (see Kohn, 1989b). By taking into account inconsistencies and differences, incon-spicuous in a study of a single nation, but which might become more noticeable in acomparative exercise, cross-national research can oblige a discipline to revise previousassumptions abou t re lationships. One such example is represented by the studies acrosscountries – in Poland, Japan and the USA – of relationships between feelings of distressand ‘occupational self-direction’, by which is meant the degree of inuence and self-control an individual has over his own work tasks as well as the overall situation atwork (Kohn, 1989b; Schooler, 1996).

136 Boholm



There has been an increasing recognition of the value of studies, across nationsand across cultures, of risk perception (Cvetcovich and Earle, 1991; Rosa et al., 1995).Motivated by a number of diverging aims, orientations and research interests, the studiesproduced so far present a hete rogeneous picture. Cross-na tional research has been insti-gated because it has been recognized that little was indeed known about the way in

which the public in other countries understood r isks, besides the U nited States, wheremost empirical studies of risk perception had been conducted. Cross-national studiesof risk perception have been gu ided by explorative as well as more theoretical aims:

1. To learn more about the way specic societal categories or groups perceive risks:for instance, women as opposed to men; experts rather than laymen; variousoccupational categories; people with different educational background; andethnic minorities (for example Bastide et al., 1989; Nyland 1993; Flynn et al.,1994; Sjöberg et al., 1996).

2. To test the generality of resu lts by the use of a psychometric paradigm regardingthe qualitative dimensions of risk perception (Englander et al., 1986; Teigenet al., 1988; Keown, 1989; Goszczynska et al., 1991; Kleinhesselink and Rosa,1991, 1994).

3. To evaluate the proposition by proponents of cultural theory, to the effect thatrisk is culturally construed, so that what people fear, and why, is determined bybroader values (Rohrmann, 1994).

This article reviews and evaluates a selection of published studies that in variousways concern risk perception from a comparative and cross-national perspective. The

aim has not been to make a complete inventory; rathe r, by making a comparat ive, crit-ical evaluation of themes of research, problematization and results, to try to identifyndings and ideas as a gu ide to fu ture cross-national, comparative studies of risk percep-tion. The studies selected are conned to published articles and reports, and theselection has been made through a strategy of ‘snowballing’: references in the litera-ture on risk perception have been examined, relevant articles have been traced andnew searches have then been made from the new references in a continuous process.Databases in sociology and psychology, such as SOCIOFILE and PSYCHLIT, werealso consulted. An appendix summarizes the main results of 17 studies with regard to

methodology, size and characteristics of the samples and what risk factors have beenassessed.

2. The psychometric paradigm – the background

Research by cognitive psychologists has demonstrated that when laypersons make esti-mates of risk they do not merely calculate in accordance with statistical, (probabilistic)information. Other considerations affect uncertain events as well; under experimentalconditions, people tend to construe the world in terms of causal or rule-governedschemata rather than by means of probabilistic calculations. Heuristic cognitive devicesare resorted to – mental guidelines with regard to which knowledge about any risk isreadily accessible, and the manner and style in which the knowledge is represented –that do not fully explore the information concerning decision alternatives (Tversky andKahnemann, 1973). As dened by cognitive psychologists the ‘availability heuristic’relates to what people remember, and not to what actually has taken place. It is a cogni-tive scheme for processing information, and not an imprint of the material world upon

R isk perception 137



the mind. People might, or might not, recall what they experience directly, or indirectlythrough channels of communication and the transmission of information.

In the 1970s, with a view to investigating the psychological and cognitive dimensionsof the estimation of risks, research centres emerged in a few places in Eu rope and theUnited States. Research was initiated by the Decision Research Group in Oregon to

explore how laypersons rate and perceive risk. When subjects were asked to estimatethe actual number of deaths due to a range of hazards, including natural disasters,diseases, crime and trafc, it was found that they had a tendency to overestimate unusualand spectacular cases, such as botulism, tornadoes, and oods, and underestimatecommon ones, such as cancer, strokes and heart diseases (Lichtenstein et al., 1978).These ndings were interpre ted in the light of what cognitive psychologists had discov-ered about the role of heuristic schemes in decision-making: hazards that are moredramatic and spectacular may be more easily remembered and their higher cognitive‘availability’ may thu s explain the tendency among subjects to overrate the risks of such

hazards (Lichtenstein et al., 1978).An assumption that was made early on in psychometric research into perception of risks, was that the way hazards are semantically classied, the mental models usedto structure information, and estimates of probabilities constitute interdependentcognitive activities. Interest in various qualitative attributes such as the immediacy of an adverse effect, choices available, knowledge, familiarity and control of a hazard,initiated fu rther questions about risk pe rception (Lowrance 1976; von Winter feldt andEdwards 1984). In a study by Fischhoff et al. (1978), subjects were asked to rate 30hazards on nine seven-point scales indicating qualitat ive characteristics of risks: whether

they were voluntary, chronic, catastrophic, common, fatal, immediate, ascertainable,controllable, or novel. Factor analysis of these ratings ident ied two factors: the ‘dread’of the risk – how uncontrollable, potentially catastrophic, dangerous to future genera-tions, and involuntary – and the ‘knowledge’ of the risk – for example how chronic,unknown to those exposed, delayed, and new. This study was extended fu rther in 1979by Slovic and his associates (Slovic et al., 1980), who developed a questionnaire listing90 activities, substances and technologies, and to which 175 college students weresubjected. All kinds of risks were included from trampolines, hand guns, nuclear reac-tors, chemical substances, smoking, aviation, trafc, drugs, and home appliances. The

subjects were asked to rate the ‘risk’ of each item for ‘society at large’ on a scaleextending from 0 (not risky) to 100 (extremely risky). The explicit ta sk for the respon-dent was to estimate how lethal the risk was in each case for society. Risk was denedas ‘risk of dying’ from the hazard.

In addition, during 1976 and 1978, four other samples of respondents, consisting of a) members of the League of Women Voters (n= 76); b) college students (n= 69); c)business people (n= 47); and d) experts on risk assessment (n= 15), were asked to ra tea subset of thirty hazards on the nine seven-point scales of qualitative ‘dimensions’(Slovic et al., 1980). Judgements of many of the qualitative dimensions were stronglycorrelated, and the same two factors were identied as had emerged in the study byFischhoff et al. (1978). In addition, a third factor emerged, relating to ‘magnitude’ of risk, the number of people affected. Hazards considered to be ‘voluntary’ were alsohighly likely to be understood as ‘controllable’ and ‘well known’. Factor analysiscondensed the risk characteristics to two or three higher-order dimensions. Factor 1,labelled Unknown R isk, was primarily determined by whether it was ‘unknown’ to thoseexposed and to science, and to a lesser extent by ‘unfamiliarity’, ‘involuntariness’, and

138 Boholm



the ‘delay of effects’. Factor 2, labelled Dread Risk, tended to be most stronglydetermined by ‘severity of consequences’, ‘dread’, and ‘catastrophic potential’. Risks of nuclear power were judged to be extremely catastrophic, likely to be fatal, dreadful,unknown and unfamiliar. Broadly speaking, nuclear issues occupied a position at oneextreme of the factor axes: this technology was perceived to be as unknown, dreaded,

uncontrollable, catastrophic and having delayed adverse effects on future generations(Slovic et al., 1980).Research, not only by the O regon group (also for example by Vlek and Stallen, 1980;

1981; Otway and von Winterfeldt, 1982), has provided some evidence that risk percep-tion is inuenced by qualitative understandings – meanings – associated with hazardsthat do not derive from computations of stat istical numbers of fatalities. However, howacceptable new technologies are to the general public is not reducible to its cognitivedimensions (von Winterfeldt and Edwards, 1984). Techno logy is socially and politicallyembedded; vested interests of social actors, public debate and dispute regarding risks

and benets, may be expected to inuence the ordinary person’s opinions. For an under-standing of controversies about technology, the perspective therefore needs to bebroadened so that it also includes values and moral considerations, and political, socialand ideological concerns. These point s have been taken further by advocates of cu lturaltheory (see Douglas and Wildavsky, 1982; Rayner and Cantor, 1987; Thompson et al.,1990; Wildavsky and Dake, 1990; Dake, 1991; Douglas, 1992) as well as by otherspursuing ‘constructionist’ approaches to risk perception (Hilgartner, 1992; Short andClarke, 1992; Clarke and Short, 1993, pp. 379–82).

3. Psychometric cross-national studies

3.1. RE PLICATIONS OF EARLIER WORK

Several replications of the original study by Slovic et al. (1980) have been made in othercountries. One aim has been to obta in resu lts comparable to the A merican data. It washoped that, by carrying out research in another country, broader and more substantialtheories of the perception of risks might also be formulated. What has guided thesecomparative attempts has been a mixture of ambitions, rst to test general theory and

secondly to generate a body of exploratory new knowledge of public opinion in distinctcountries. It goes without saying that these two aims do not necessarily overlap. Thelist of 90 hazards, developed in the original American research, has been modied inmost of these replicating studies so as to suit specic national conditions. It has beenassumed beforehand that each country presents its own specic ‘hazard prole’, so thatthe questionnaires have been adapted in the light of these assumptions. Strategies forsampling have a lso diverged, a lthough small, conveniently assembled samples of collegeor u niversity students have been used in most cases. The scales for measu ring the variousqualitative criteria have also varied from investigation to investigation. This lack of standardization needs to be kept in mind when comparisons are made between thepsychometr ic research in different countries (see the R oyal Society Study Group , 1992).Moreover, even if similar ratings of perceived risk are demonstrated across samples,we may not assume that the reasons underlying these similar ratings are the same. Totake one example, the undergoing of radiation therapy might be adjudged risky byart ists, who are possibly less informed abou t its basic principles, as well as by scientistswho are aware of its limitations (Karpowicz-Lazreg and Mullet, 1993).




and the other moderately so. On the criterion of occupation, each of the two regionalgroups was divided into two subgroups: one ‘technical’, including those engaged as engi-nee rs and technicians, and one ‘social’, consisting of teachers, journa lists and physicians.Correlations among the 15 qualitative risk dimensions produced two main factors, thesame as those which had been established in the American and Hungarian studies:

a Dread Risk factor and an Unknown Risk factor. In comparison with previous resultsin other countries, the mean ratings of the estimates of perceived risk magnitude inPoland were closest to American data. Polish ratings with regard to the magnitude of risks for the 27 hazards common to the questionnaires used in all four countries weresomewhat lower than A merican scores, somewhat higher than the Norwegian ones andconsiderably above the mean ratings in Hungary. Risks from warfare, nuclear weapons,alcoholic beverages and ra ilways were ranked h igher in Poland than in the othe r coun-tries. In this study, economic and social hazards – the risks of which had not beenincluded in the questionnaires used in the other countries – were rated higher than

those from industrial activities characteristic of Poland such as coal mines, steel mills,and petrochemical plants. The sub-sample of respondents who lived in a more indus-trialized area gave higher ratings of perceived risk than respondents from themodera tely industrialized region. However, this difference was only true for the ‘social’professions; the samples from technicians did not vary in relation to the area in whichthey resided.

A replication in France by Karpowicz-Lazreg and Mullet (1993) aimed also at inves-tigating the effects of gender and education on the perception of risk. Studentrespondents were divided into four groups differentiated by gender and educational

orientation: ne arts versus science. Women gave higher mean ratings than men withregard to the magnitude of risks. The mean ratings for the French sample were veryclose to the mean ratings in the American study (Slovic et al., 1980). Compared to theresults in Hungary and Norway, the mean ratings exhibited by the French respondentswere considerably higher. Specic differences between the Norwegian and Frenchsamples related to risks associated with violence, high technology, and chemicalsubstances which were all considered more risky in France. There was an extremelyhigh number of major differences between it and the Hu ngarian sample, French ratingsbeing higher in each instance. In France, women gave higher ratings of perceived risk

than men, regardless of background. Students of science feared certain medical tech-niques and toxic substances more. There are marked similarities between Americanresults and the French ones reported in the study by Karpowicz-Lazreg and Mullet(1993). To a large extent American and French subjects seemed to share the samepreoccupations. French concerns regarding nuclear industry were similar to thoseexpressed in American studies.

Similar conclusions were also reached in another cross-national study of risk percep-tion in France and the USA (Poumadere et al., 1995). In this study, perceptions of risksshowed many similarities between the two countries, although the French were muchmore trustful of the competence and efciency of experts and authorities.

So far, we have focused on cross-national research covering European countries,which have generated resu lts which a re comparable to earlier American studies. Therehave also been a few investigations that have been based on samples of Asian subjects.The rst of these was a study by Keown (1989) who found that the mean ratings of the perceptions of the magnitude of risks among Hong Kong students were not signif-icantly higher than corresponding American ratings. However, the ratings of the risks




of specic hazards differed a great deal. In the Hong Kong sample some items, suchas food colouring, heroin, caffeine, space exploration, crime, non-nuclear electricalpower, commercial aviation, food preservatives, railways and bicycles, were ratedconsiderably higher. But, for example, risks from DDT, research into DNA, pesticides,and alcoholic beverages were rated much lower. Factor scores for the subset of 15

hazards revealed, as in the American study, two factors: Unknown Risk and DreadRisk. Keown postulates that perception of risk is likely to vary depending on a widearray of factors: what the media report, what people discuss, what cultural norms arepredominant and what the technical and legal opportunities are for the control andregulation of risk.

The studies referred to have deliberately used questionnaires which have includedquite different sets of risks, and in which the denitions of risk have not been consis-tent. It is far from clear how respondents have understood the standard instruction thatthey should focus on the risk of ‘dying’, and on risk to society as ‘a whole’ or ‘in

genera l’. How do people in Norway, Hu ngary, the USA or H ong Kong, conceive ‘societyas a whole’? Clearly it is wrong simply to assume tha t the construct ‘society in gene ral’,dened as a na tional arena , is uniformly understood in a ll these contexts, and not condi-tioned by specic cultural perceptions. In addition, the particular focus on the risk of ‘dying’ presents difculty. Should dying be a direct or an indirect consequence of aparticular risk? The risk of a hand gun might not primarily be understood as due tothe weapon itself, but to the intentions of the pe rson who might use it. Should the r isk(as an estimation of probability) be understood to derive from an efcient cause, amaterial cause, or an intended cause, of death? A further dilemma is that, although

‘death’ might seem to be a clear-cut and uncontroversial physical condition, mattersconcerning death – its morality, exegesis, and ontology – take us into a eld of humanexistence that is highly determined by cultural conventions, practices and values (seeBloch and Parry, 1982; Huntington and Metcalf, 1979). Furthermore, samples have notbeen comparable. Systematic controls have not been introduced for such variables,among the samples used, as age, gender, education, income and occupation. There hasalso been a considerable time lag between studies so that Slovic’s American study in1979 has served as a point of comparative reference for studies made in other coun-tries decades later. As a result of these objections, it is open to question how valid

comparisons between all the results might be.

3.2. COMPA RATIVE STUD IES

There have also been psychometric cross-national studies of the perception of riskswhich at the outset have been designed to be comparative (Kleinhesselink and Rosa,1991; 1994; Hinman et al., 1993). The means for collecting data were similar, the samplesused had equivalent characteristics, using the same measu rement s, and the studies wereconducted at roughly the same juncture in time. Kleinhesselink and Rosa (1991) aimedat evaluating and testing two alternative perspectives on risk perception: 1) the psycho-metric paradigm which claims that there are pancultural cognitive patterns, and 2) theanthropological suggestion that perceptions of risk are determined by culture, and aretherefore highly variable. They focused on two industrial nations with similar levels of industrialization, but with divergent cu ltural traditions: Japan and the USA. To providesome control with respect to other social characteristics, so as to allow cultural back-ground to act as a variable maximum inuence on the outcome of the responses, the

142 Boholm



4. Explanations for the perceptions of risk in a comparative perspective

One lesson from cross-national research is that the prominence attributed to specicrisks might vary from one country to another. Whereas students in Hungary in 1983worried more about risks arising, for instance from smoking, alcohol, crime and motorvehicles, in the USA, France and Norway concern was stronger about hidden chemi-cals in the environment and in food (herbicides and pesticides), drugs and narcotics.In Brazil, in contra st to Sweden, people thought that, for example, dynamite, reworks,and res in skyscrapers, were big risks (Nyland, 1993). In Hong Kong people worriedabout heroin, crime and chemical substances in food and they regarded bicyclesand trains as quite hazardous means of transport. Data from Japan gave a similar riskprole. Another nding is that the mean ratings regarding the magnitude of risks varyconsiderably from one country to another, American respondents tend to give highmean ratings, as do Bulgarian, Japanese, Hong Kongese, French, Brazilian and Polish

subjects. Low ratings have been encountered among Ru ssians, Hungarians, Romanians,and Swedes. Despite such variation in perceptions of the magnitude of risks, the cor-relations between rank orders of hazards across national samples tend to be quitestrong. Similar rank orde rs have been obtained in Brazil and in Sweden (Nyland, 1993) ,in Bulgaria, Romania and Sweden (Sjöberg et al., 1996), in Norway and the USA, inthe U SA and Poland, in Poland and Norway, and in Poland and Hungary (G oszczynskaet al., 1991).

One explanation proposed for the different mean ratings concerning the perceptionof the magnitude of risk in various countries, is that the sheer size of a country consti-

tutes an independent explanatory variable (Goszczynska et al., 1991, p. 191). It isarguable that the size of a country brings this effect to bear through interaction withthe ‘availability heuristic’; in a large country, there will be a larger absolute number of accidents so that, when asked to rate the ‘risk’ of various hazards, people will ‘recall’these numbers, and this magnitude will be reected in their ratings. This ‘theory’ givesrise to several problems. What is to be taken as the ‘size’ of a country? Is it area,measured in square kilometres? Or is ‘size’ a combination of the number of inhabi-tants and the area? If we are seeking a crudely materialistic explanation for theperception of risks, should not a country’s infrastructure and geographical features be

taken into account as well? Some nations such as Australia, contain regions that arevirtually uninhabited and others that are densely popu lated. How, in such a case shouldrates of fatalities be measured? In terms of the absolute number of fatal incidents, oras a relative number? And if the second, relative to what?

In he r study of the percept ion of risks in Sweden and Brazil, Nyland (1993) developsan argument along similar lines. The substantial difference between Brazil and Swedenin mean ratings of perceptions of magnitude of risks, as well as in ratings on specicrisks, is understood to derive from actual characteristics of each country’s environment.Thus ‘factual’ risk is seen as the main determinant of ‘perceived’ risk. But what is tobe taken by ‘factual’ risk, and how might it be assessed? Nyland suggests that ‘factual’risk should be dened as ‘annual injury and fatality rates’ (p. 90). That statistics of fatalities measure ‘objective’ levels of risk was an assumption made early in studies onrisk, bu t it has been severely criticized (see R oyal Society Study G roup, 1992, pp. 94–8;Adams, 1995). Numbers of fatalities due to a particular hazard, for example per 1000persons in a given period, do indeed constitu te an objective measure of risk. However,aggregate measures of risks such as annual rates of fatalities cannot be experienced

144 Boholm



directly. ‘Factual’ risk is not a phenomenon but a construct – one that can be repre-sented by statistical gures. But it might also be represented by a condensed andpowerful image, such as American war cemeteries. These, with the endless rows uponrows of graves, or long lists of names of fallen soldiers, speak graphically upon the‘factual’ risk of war. ‘Factual’ risk is mediated by knowledge – such knowledge being

disseminated through many channels – regarding such representations and what theymight ‘mean’.One lesson from cross-national research is that perception of risks is both uniform

and variable; cross-national results contain ‘mixed bags’ of similarities and differences(Kleinhesselink and Rosa, 1991, p. 22). Although humans live in a multifaceted worldthey, to some extent, share similar concerns. Modernization and new informationsystems mean that new technological achievements, lifestyles, modes of thinking andperceiving are rapidly disseminated globally, to an extent hitherto unknown in thehistory of mankind. Depending on a complex interplay of many technological and soci-

etal factors, such as organized safety systems, infrastructure of a society, living andhou sing conditions, trafc, levels of pollu tion, as well as natural, climatic and geographicconditions, people in various parts of the world will be exposed to distinct kinds of danger, and dangers of different orders of magnitude . For example, it is plausible thatmotor trafc is regarded relatively more dangerous in Brazil, Hong Kong and Hungarythan in the United States and Sweden, because trafc conditions are not the same.Trafc is indeed more aggressive and crowded, speed higher, regulations fewer, carsolder and more unsafe, the drivers’ less aware and roads more dangerous in some coun-tries than in others. Such ‘objective’ factors might therefore be reected in the local

perception of risks, which can be expected to vary cross-nationally, due not to culturalconstraints but to ‘objective’ criteria (Kleinhesselink and Rosa, 1991, 1994). The envi-ronment, although objectied, external, and historically given, is socially produced andreproduced over the generations. Why, we might ask, are vehicles and roads of a poorerstandard, and trafc more unsafe, in some countries than in others? This qu estion willgive rise to other questions about authority, morality, equity, rights and duties, justiceand honou r, and a lso to questions about the meanings of symbols and values that sustainand promote one kind of world rather than another.

5. Perceived risk and coverage in the media

With respect to many everyday hazards, people acquire information to a large extentfrom direct personal experience. But other hazards are encountered only indirectly,through statements made by experts and risk management institutions, news media,public agencies, political pressure groups, or informal networks of friends and family.If the availability heuristic is to be taken seriously as a theoret ical framework for under-standing the perception of risk, attention should be directed towards the way varioushazards are socially represented, for example in the media, rather than towards statis-tics regarding rates of accidents.

From Englander et al. (1986) we learn that the observed differences in the percep-tion of risks between American and Hungarian subjects might be conditioned by therole of the news media in each country. They suggested, as a possible explanation, thatfor the signicantly lower level of perceived risk in Hungary was that the news media,controlled by the communist government, gave very little coverage to domestic hazards.For political reasons the regime played down problems inside the count ry. A tentat ive




estimate of coverage in media of the two countries indicated that American newspa-pers included to a greater extent reports of domestic dangers and of causes of deathof all kinds, whereas the Hungarian press, apart from trafc accidents, chiey reporteddeaths occurring outside the count ry. Hungarian news, in Kasperson et al.’s (1988) termi-nology thus ‘attenuated’ risks, and the American press ‘amplied’ them.

Thus, information about hazards obtained through various means may be expectedto be qualitatively processed, evaluated and judged (Kasperson et al., 1988; R enn et al.,1992). Evaluations of risks in the media may be expected to inuence public attitudesand responses as to whether risks are accepted, rejected, modied, tolerated or elimi-nated. The media not only build complex messages about risks and hazards; while somerisks might be amplied others might be attenuated by the presentation in the media.It is worth emphasizing that this model presupposes a distinction between ‘objective’risk and ‘perceived’ risk. The ‘risk object’ is taken for granted as a given objectiedentity, the question being how such objects are perceived through a complex process

of transmission of information through various channels. Another approach is to regardthe ‘risk object’ as a semant ically construed entity, a bundle of meanings bound togetherby associative and distinctive characteristics pertaining to the object (Hilgartner, 1992;and specically with respect to the mass media, Stallings, 1990). The understanding of a ‘risk object’ is an interpretative process, so that we ought to enquire what view itmight be – expert opinion or ofcial statistics – in relation to which the perception of risks are to be ‘amplied’ or ‘attenuated’? (see Clarke and Short, 1993).

Seeking for explanations of cross-national variation in mean ratings of the percep-tion of the magnitude of risks, Teigen et al. (1988) discuss a combination of size of

country and impact from the media. Members of a large society might feel more unpro-tected and subjected to ob jective remote dangers since, in the United States for example,people will be more exposed to a greater number of reports about risks, and also tomore divergent opinions about what is dangerous and what is not. A spate of relevantreports in the media will convey more, and more frequent, messages; the probabilityof information being ambiguous is enhanced, and this might result in estimations of risk becoming exaggerated. This argument presupposes a direct relationship between,on a ‘macro’ level, the total national output of news media and, at a ‘micro’ level whatpeople actually take an interest in. The habits of the media ‘consumer’ cannot be

deduced simply from the sum of information in the media, however.A study by Sjöberg et al. (1996) in Romania and Bulgaria included a detailed analysis

of relevant media output – daily newspapers – in 1985 and 1993. In both countriesreports about risks increased during the period, although in Bulgaria the increase wasconsiderably greater. The mean ratings of the perceptions of magnitude of risks werealso higher in Bulgaria. In 1985, in both countries, the main focus in the media was onhazards in foreign countries, similar to what Englander et al. (1986) had found inHungary. In 1985, the risk most commonly reported in both countries was ‘politicalinstability’, whereas in 1993 the problems most frequently mentioned in Bulgaria were‘accident s’ and in R omania the focus was still on ‘political instability’. Coverage in themedia was analysed in detail and correlated with the scores regarding mean perceivedrisks, and with the rank order of specic hazards. Results were somewhat negat ive; theydid not support the idea that coverage in the media inuences the perception of risks,or at least not directly in the form of a quantitative correlation between assessmentsof levels of risk from various causes, and the coverage that each received in the media.It is only to be expected that the relationship between the media and the perception

146 Boholm



of risks will be complex; the role of the media in society, and their different roles indifferent political and economic systems, must be taken into account, and it cannotsimply be assumed that the media ‘mediate’ risk in an invariant way across all societies(Sjöberg et al., 1996, pp. 67–8).

Furthermore, the media may be expected to have different nationally and tradition-

ally determined ‘interests’; these will inuence the selection of what is newsworthy andalso the manner in which whatever material is selected is presented and evaluated. O f interest in this context is a recent cross-national project that has explored attitudes torisk, nature and environment in the UK, Germany, France, Italy and Portugal (Lévy-Leboyer et al., 1996). The analysis of the content of three daily leading newspapers ineach country has revealed substantial national differences in press coverage. Nuclearpollu tion received almost the same amount o f attent ion in all countries except for It aly,where it was not referred to. In the U K, 20% of all reports in media on environmentalissues dealt with the equilibrium of the fauna. In the othe r countries, neither the equi-

librium of fauna nor that of ora received special attention. The German press wasmore concerned with environmental pollu tion of all kinds, while in Portugal the degra-dation of natural sites was accorded high signicance. Little interest in this issue wasexpressed in the French press, which was more preoccupied with natural events, atmos-pheric conditions and natural calamities. In Italy, it was the degradation of landscapeand buildings, which received the most attention in the press.

In addition, more work needs to be directed towards the way in which people actu-ally use the mass media. News media should not be assumed to operate in the sameway all over the world; there is, for example, considerable cross-national variation in

the frequency of, and the time spent on, reading newspapers, in the contexts in whichthey are read, and what social categories of persons read them (Gu stafsson and Weibull,1996). Peop le do not just absorb the content of the media through systematically readingpage after page of written material. The ordinary reader glances at headlines, skimsover certain articles, reads others more carefully, while some material remains unno-ticed. Visual information in newspapers, advertising and television might be expectedto play a large role in conveying messages about risks, especially when it comes tosynthesizing information into condensed messages that are more readily remembered(Graber, 1996).

News media are not digested in isolation by individuals. What people have read inthe papers or seen on televison tends to be discussed at work, with the family, andamong friends and neighbours, and it might be wondered how these informal exchangesinuence the impact of coverage by the media. Messages are circulated in socialcontexts, and studies in social memory indicate that people’s capacity to retrieveinformat ion, and to recollect experiences depends to a large extent on social structures.Memory is not merely a psychological process of information retrieval but an activesocial and discursive process that constructs relevancy and meaning within the contextof a social fabric (Middleton and Edwards, 1990; Fentress and Wickham, 1992;Halbwachs 1992 [1952 and 1941]; Harré and Gillett 1994). It is from this theoreticalperspective that social anthropologist Françoise Zonabend (1993) conducted an im-por tant and novel study of the perception of risks at La Hague, the site of a vast nuclearindustrial complex on the north-west French coast. This work, which adopts qualitativeresearch methods and interpretations, focuses on spontaneous discourse, emotionaland intellectual ways of dealing with nuclear risks, and their cultural symbolization byinhabitants and employees at La Hague.




of security’ which ‘a society as a whole procures to its members’. Bastide et al. (1989)base this idea on Durkheim’s (1951 [orig. 1897]) classic theory of suicide as a socialfact, according to which lack of social control and rules of conduct in a society makeindividuals disoriented and poo rly integrated. In a state of anomie, due to a vu lnerableand insecure social position, which might be triggered off by divorce, poverty, illness,

or unemployment, individuals can experience a sense of hopelessness which gives riseto a tendency to overestimate risks. In those cases in which studies of the perceptionof risks have included respondents with marginal social status, living in extremely poorconditions, their ratings with regard to perceived risks have indeed tended to be veryhigh. In studies by Nyland (1994), and by Sjöberg et al. (1996), slum dwellers in SaoPaolo and Bucharest (but not in Soa) both rated highly when it came to the perceivedmagnitude of risks. Poverty might therefore be considered to be a determinant withrespect to the perception of risks. If one must struggle for survival, and be subjectedto constant threats on a daily basis, perhaps this might also increase one’s general

perception of risks at a more abstract level (Nyland, 1994, p. 90).American studies of the perception of risks among ethnic minorities also point in thesame way. In their valuable review of this eld of research, Vaughan and Nordenstam(1991) conclude that for many environmental risks, there are signicant differences in

judgement cor relating with ethn icity, gender, socio-economic status, and education.Concerning technological risks, the literature repor ts signicant ly higher concern amongethnic minorities about nuclear power and nuclear waste. In America, a vast majorityamong ethnic minorities are unsupportive of this technology, and a greater proportionthan among whites want the phasing out of the operation of existing plants (Gallup,

1979; 1986). Results indicating the higher perception of risks by ethnic minoritiesshou ld take into account the physical conditions of the neighbourhoods in which manyof them live. To a larger extent than white A mericans, ethnic minorities live in urbancommunities characterized by polluted air and by solid waste. Poverty was been foundto be the primary demographic variable associated with high perceptions of risks,and this relationship was independent of the actual levels of pollu tion in a community(Cutter, 1981). It does appear that poor economy, bad housing, and instability in aneighbourhood, have more explanatory value than ethnicity in the variable levels of perception of risks between social categories. In America, minorities on low income

live in older, poorly built houses, and closer to hazardous chemical or toxic waste sites.Ethnic minorities are also more at risk at work, which is often in industry, agriculture,and mining, characterized by poor working conditions, higher exposure to chemicals,insufcient ventilation, dust and toxic materials. All these circumstances are likely tocontribute to an increase in sensitivity and a likelihood of perceiving life as inherentlyrisky (Vaughan and Nordenstam, 1991).

However, theoretical and methodological doubts have been raised (see Vaughan andNordenstam, 1991, pp. 53–4) about ethnicity as a determinant in the perception of risks.Members of ethnic minorities have often been lumped together as ‘non-white’, andthere is need for a much greate r differentiation. Status, economic and educational, tendsto be conated with ethnicity, on the grounds that ethnic minorities do tend to havelower education, lower income and lower socio-economic status. Because such factorsare often not controlled for, it is far from proven that ‘ethnicity’ explains variation inthe perception of risks between Anglo-Americans and minorities. The heterogeneitywithin ethnic categories should also be taken into account (different levels of educa-tion, income and so on). Underprivileged people of colour also experience greater




exposure to drugs, violence, and environmental pollution, and run a higher risk of mortality than the more well-to-do white part of the population (see also Flynn et al.,1994).

Studies that have used respondents different iated according to occupation have cometo the conclusion that occupation partly determines perception of risks (Goszczynska

et al., 1991; Nyland 1993; Sjöberg et al., 1996). In two studies, one comparing Braziland Sweden (Nyland, 1993), and the other comparing Romania and Bulgaria (Sjöberget al., 1996), samples of nurses in all four countries yielded high ratings regarding theperception of risks. In all four countries, low ratings regarding the perception of riskswere obtained for engineers and manual workers.

6.2. GE NDER A ND THE PER CEPTION OF RISKS

Among recurrent ndings (by for example Teigen et al., 1988; Bastide et al.,

Kleinhesselink and Rosa, 1991, 1994; Karpowicz-Lazreg and Mullet, 1993; Flynn et al.,1994; Sjöberg et al., 1996; see also Royal Society Study Group, 1992, p. 109) there aredifferences in sensitivity to risks among women in contrast to men. A recent overviewof American research into this topic concludes that women tend to express higherconcern over risks from technology and threats to the environment. This tendency isparticularly strong with regard to nuclear technologies, and concerning pollution andrisks to health from local facilities (Davidson and Freudenburg, 1996). Such an effectwith r espect to gender has been noticed with regard to ratings of risk: rst the perceivedmagnitude of risks; secondly hazards from specic items, women being more sensi-

tive to technological hazards; and thirdly the or dering in which hazards are p laced qual-itatively.

An American study (Flynn et al., 1994) explored the effects of ethnicity and genderon percept ions of environmental r isks to health. Int rigu ingly, mean ratings among whitemen were considerably lower than those among the three other categories: non-whitemen, white women and non-white women. Non-white men and women showed onlyone statistically signicant difference: when it came to percept ions of the pe rsonal risks,men rated lower as regards to ‘stress’. When the low-scoring white men were treatedas a special sub-sample, and examined with respect to societal characteristics, it was

found that they were generally better educated, had higher incomes, were politicallymore conservative, and were also more likely to express greater trust in government,author ity and industry than the other categories of respondent. The cross-nat ional studyof the perception of risks in Bulgaria and Romania by Sjöberg et al. (1996) came tosimilar conclusions: women were more sensitive to risks than (some) men. In theBulgarian sample, there was only a small difference between men and women – bothmen and women regarded their environment as being highly insecure. However, inRomania, there was a substantial difference be tween men and women; generally, womenrated risks to be greater than did men. For both samples, the three variables (gender,country and group) interacted. These results suggest that the effects of gender varycross-nationally.

The study by Kleinhesselink and Rosa (1994) reports signicant general differencesrelating to gender when it comes to technological risks. Women in both the Americanand the Japanese samples perceived more risks as ‘dreaded’ and ‘catastrophic’, whilemen to a higher extent perceived risks as ‘uncontrollable’, ‘newer’, and ‘lacking scien-tic knowledge’. American women dreaded social (crime and guns) and medical hazards

150 Boholm



more than did men. Japanese men were more likely to perceive some risks as ‘invol-untary’, but for Americans the pattern was reversed, with women being more likely toperceive risks as ‘involuntary’. In this respect, Japanese women were more likeAmerican men, and American women were more like Japanese men. Both Japanesemen and American women were less likely to consider that individuals have knowl-

edge about risks. Japanese men focused on lack of knowledge on medical risks, andon some non-nuclear technologies (dams and fossil-fuel electrical power), whileAmerican women thought that individuals lack knowledge about environmental risksand nuclear technology. Irrespective of nationality, men were more likely than womento perceive risks to be ‘newer’. There were no differences relating to gender with respectto self-efcacy. There was a noticeable interaction between gender and culture, sinceJapanese men showed signicantly higher vulnerability to risks, but the opposite wastrue of the American sample. For the involuntary dimension, a puzzling reversal of genders appeared: Japanese men, and American women, viewed more risks as being

‘involuntary’. A higher sense of vulnerability to risks and higher political fatalism, maycontribute to a feeling that more risks are ‘involuntary’. These results point to anintriguing ‘cross-cultural, cross-gender reversal’, which suggests tha t the effects of genderon the perception of risks bring into play a subtle interaction between factors that areculturally and socially specic.

Why should women perceive risks as being higher? A biological explanation, refutedby Flynn et al. (1994), suggests that, since women bear children, and tend to bear themain responsibility for raising them, they will be more concerned about health andsafety. Women also tend to be physically more vulnerable, and therefore might

be expected to be more sensitive to hazards in general. Explanations drawing on com-binations of ‘biology’ and social experience should be considered. In American society,women in general have less familiarity with science, and might therefore distrusttechnology, which is understood as alien and ‘male-dominated’ (see Davidson andFreudenburg, 1996 for an evaluation of theory in this eld). Resu lts from the researchreferred to do not suppor t a biological explanation for differences in the perception of risks between men and women; biological factors should be expected to apply acrosssocial stratication, and over ethnic and national boundaries. In the study by Flynnet al. (1994), it was not the responses of women that stood out as ‘peculiar’, but those

of white men with power, and with good income and education, whose ratings in thisrespect were very low. White men control, manage and benet from the wor ld, whichthey also see as less risky. Further research therefore needs to be focused on ‘the roleof power, status, alienation, trust, and other sociopolitical factors’ (Flynn et al., 1994,p. 1107).

6.3. WORLD VIEWS AND GE NERAL VALUES

Few attempts have been made to test cultural theory cross-nationally. One reason forthis might be that what various schools of thought among cultural theorists actuallypropose is vague and ambiguous, so that it does not translate very readily into a rigorousdesign for measuring data (for a critique of cultural theory, though from divergingpoints of view, see Boholm, 1996; and Sjöberg, 1995; 1996). According to cu ltural theory,the perception of risks is culturally construed, from general orientations or worldviews, hence national boundaries and distinct world views will not coincide. Peoplehave different perceptions of risks, not primarily because they belong to particular




nationalities but because they have separate world views (on cultural theory, seeDouglas and Wildavsky, 1982; Rayner and Cantor, 1987; Thompson et al., 1990;Wildavsky and Dake, 1990; Dake, 1991; Douglas, 1992).

One study of the perception of risks which combines cross-national comparisonswith comparisons of ‘sub-groups’ (social categories) within a single country, is partly

informed by this theore tical perspective (R ohrmann, 1994). H is study focuses on differ-ences between, what is called, four ‘societal groups/cultural orientations’, designatedas ‘technological’, ‘ecological’, ‘monetarian’ and ‘feminist’, in each of three countries:Germany, New Zealand, and Australia. He provides no information on the way inwhich respondents were recruited, or what criteria were used for sampling, in eachcountry. The structure of judgements regarding risks, with respect to a number of hazards, on a wide range of evaluative criteria, was analysed by means of LISRELmodelling of causal relationships between cognitive elements and characteristics of social categories. The acceptance of risks was found to be determined by the perceived

‘magnitude’ of a risk and by considerations of ‘benet’. Concern about impactson ‘health’ carried more weight than ‘probability of dying’. Attitudes such as con-cern about the environment, negative evaluations of technology, and ‘post-material’orientations with regard to values, had considerable inuence. The cross-nationalcomparisons revealed differences between the Australian and German respondents:the Australians were more accepting when it came to risks regarding sport, or thosefrom ‘unhealthy’ private habits, rated lower with regard to risks from ‘conventional’technologies. Occupations exposed to risks of the pollution of the environment, andlarge-scale technology such as nuclear energy, were given more negative evaluations in

Au stralia. The resu lts from Australia and New Zealand were fairly similar, apart fromslight discrepancies regarding earthquakes, a hazard much more familiar to NewZealanders.

Respondents with ‘ecological’ and ‘feminist’ orientations evaluated risks much higherin connection with most sources of risks. Feelings of anxiety were also higher amongthose categories, while judgements on benet and of the acceptance of risks were lower.Respondents with ‘technological’ orientation yielded the lowest ratings, seeing morebenets and being more ready to accept the attendant risks. The judgements of the‘mone tarian’ group fell in between the extremes encountered among, respectively, the

‘technologists’ and ‘feminists/ecologists’. The largest differences between categoriesappeared in relation to the item ‘living near a nuclear plant, or chemical industry’.However, this pattern of differences in the perception of risks between the four cate-gories (technological, monetarian, ecological and feminist) was reversed in ratings onrisks from ‘consumption’ – smoking, tranquillisers, and overeating. Here, it was ratherthe engineers and students of technology who provided the lowest ratings of accep-tance, while respondents with ‘ecological’ and ‘feminist’ orientations were more toleran t.There was little difference in sensitivity to risks between Australia, New Zealand andGermany. Differences between categories were stronger in G ermany than in Au stralia,indicating that polarization in categories is lower in Australia. The results lend supportto the idea that societal categories with particular professional, cultural and politicalorientations differ considerably in their judgement of, and evaluation of, risks. In addi-tion to differentiat ion between ‘cu ltural orienta tions’ or ‘world views’, the study revealedvariation across nationa l boundar ies. The resu lts are said to support the approach advo-cated by cu ltural theory to issues regarding risk. Since very little information is providedon the way these four ‘societal’ categories were dened, and how they theoretically

152 Boholm



relate to the so-called ‘grid-group’ structure on which cultural theory is u ltimately based,it is hard to assess the validity of Rohrmann’s conclusion.

Most comparative studies on the perception of risks have focused on long lists of issues relating to risks. Another attempt to study the perception of risks cross-nation-ally gave attention instead to a single issue. It was conducted in 1986–87 in Australia,

England, France, Germany and the Netherlands, regarding attitudes to nuclear powerin the light of the accident at Chernobyl (Eiser et al., 1990). Using the theory of cogni-tive dissonance (Festinger, 1957), to the effect that people will strive to reduceinconsistencies between contradictory cognitions, this study aimed at examining atti-tudes to nuclear power and the Chernobyl accident. In all ve countries the rateregarding the seriousness of the accident related to attitudes on othe r topics related tonuclear ssion. Variations in patterns of decision-making were related to the degree of anxiety and attention evoked by the accident. Generally, there was a strong relation-ship between more pro-nuclear attitudes and more right-wing political leanings. The

results suggest that differences in attitude on nuclear issues form part of systems of values and of ideologies, the scope of which are much broader.

7. Conclusions

Having surveyed the evidence for or against various determinants of the perception of risks, I will end with a few reections. What comparative studies on the perception of risks have in common is that they tend to subscribe to the p sychometr ic paradigm; thatapart, however, they form a heterogeneous eld of research, with little agreement on

basic theoretical issues, and low consensus on problems in their research or on method-ology. This is scarcely to be wondered at, since we are dealing with a new eld of research to which have been attracted scholars from many disciplines, each adheringto its own academic tradition. Hence, as a matter of urgency, we should be system-atizing results and theoret ical frameworks, thus genera ting new research which will leadto more powerful statements about the perceptions of risks as social and psychologicalphenomena.

One lesson, slightly disconcerting perhaps, is that successful cross-national compar-isons of perceptions of risks are far from straightforward. Although the collection of

data in two or more countries, comparing the resu lts, and conjecturing about plausible‘explanations’, may present no special problem, even so such interpre tations tend to beproblematic. A recurrent theme emphasized in the literature is that there are ‘objec-tive’ risks and dangers in societies, and it is assumed that people, being ‘realists’, areaware of these conditions; hence this awareness is expected to be reected in ratingsderived from questionnaires which they ll out. Social scientists proffer such common-sense interpretations; but they will be of limited value, since they are brought intoaccount as post hoc explanations of resu lts that have not been informed by prior theory.

As researchers in the eld of the perception of risks, we should be striving to bringto the fore any remaining unresolved problems encountered in the course of obtainingour results, not merely to assert that any particular nding is precisely what we mighthave expected, taking into account supercial characteristics of the society in question.As an instance of this, to ‘discover’ that Hong Kongese perceive high risks in riding abicycle through city trafc, and then to ‘explain’ that nding by the ‘objective’ charac-teristics of trafc in that same city (Keown, 1989), tells us little about the perceptionof risks. In the light of one of the cornerstones of anthropological theory abou t human




154 Boholm

A p p e n d i x

S t u d y

C o u n t r y

S

a m p l e , s i z e a n d

D e s i g n

R i s k d i m e n s i o n s

R e s u l t s

c

h a r a c t e r i s t i c s

E n g l a n d e r ,

F a r a g o ,

S l o v i c a n d

H u n g a r y

c

o l l e g e s t u d e n t s

r e p l i c a t i o

n

r i s k m a g n i t u d e :

l

L o w m e a n s c o r e s o n r i s k m a g n i t u d e a s

F i s c h h o f f ( 1 9 8 6 )

t

w o s a m p l e s

9 0 h a z a r d s

c o m p a r e d t o A m e r i c a n s c o r e s

n = 3 0 , n = 2 9

q u e s t i o n n a i r e s

l

M o r e c o n c e r n w i t h f a i l u r e o f m a c h i n e s a n d

n i n e q u a l i t a t i v e

t h e i r o p e r a t o r s

p s y c h o m e t r i c

d i m e n s i o n s :

l

R i s k p e r c e p t i o n i s i n u e n c e d b y m e d i a

3 0 h a z a r d s

r e p o r t i n g ; i n c o m p a r i s o n

w i t h t h e A m e r i c a n

m e d i a a n

a l y s i s

p r e s s ,

t h e H u n g a r i a n n e w s m e d i a w h i c h w a s

u n d e r c e n s o r s h i p r e p o r t e

d v e r y l i t t l e o n

d o m e s t i c h a z a r d s

T e i g e n ,

B r u n a n d S l o v i c ( 1 9 8 8 )

N o r w a y

s

t u d e n t s

r e p l i c a t i o

n


l

H i g h e r m e a n s c o r e s o n r i s k m a g n i t u d e t h a n

s

e v e r a l s a m p l e s

9 0 h a z a r d s

i n H u n g a r y b u t l o w e r t h

a n i n t h e U S A

n = 3 5 , n = 2 3 , n = 6 4


l

L e s s c o n c e r n w i t h c h e m i c a l s u b s t a n c e s i n

a g r i c u l t u r e ,

i n f o o d a n d p r e s c r i p t i o n d r u g s


n i n e q u a l i t a t i v e

l

T e s t o f i n d i v i d u a l f e a r r e v e a l e d g e n d e r


d i f f e r e n c e , w o m e n r e p o r

t i n g m o r e f e a r

3 0 h a z a r d s

l

F a t a l R i s k r a t h e r t h a n D

r e a d R i s k a n d

I n v o l u n t a r y / U n c o n t r o l l a b l e R i s k r a t h e r

i n d i v i d u a l f e a r

t h a n U n k n o w n R i s k h a d

m o r e e f f e c t o n

q u a l i t a t i v e d i m e n s i o n s

G o s z c z y n s k a ,

T y s z k a a n d S l o v i c

P o l a n d

p

r o f e s s i o n s

r e p l i c a t i o

n


l

R i s k m a g n i t u d e c l o s e t o

A m e r i c a n r e s u l t s

( 1 9 9 1 )

t

e c h n i c i a n s , t e a c h e r s ,

4 0 h a z a r d s

b u t l o w e r w h e n o n l y t h e

r i s k s c o m m o n i n

j o u r n a l i s t s , a n d


b o t h e s t i m a t e s w e r e c o n s i d e r e d

p

h y s i c i a n s

f t e e n q u a l i t a t i v e

l

W a r f a r e , n u c l e a r w e a p o n s , a l c o h o l a n d

n = 1 4 0



r a i l r o a d s r a t e d h i g h

t

w o g e o g r a p h i c a l

4 0 h a z a r d s

l

S u b j e c t s o f s o c i a l p r o f e s s i o n s l i v i n g i n m o r e

a

r e a s

h i g h l y i n d u s t r i a l i z e d a r e a h a d h i g h e r l e v e l

o f p e r c e i v e d r i s k ,

t h e r e w a s n o s u c h

d i f f e r e n c e f o r t e c h n i c i a n s

K a r p o w i c z - L a z r e g a n d

M u l l e t

F r a n c e

u

n i v e r s i t y s t u d e n t s ,

r e p l i c a t i o

n


l

M e a n r a t i n g v e r y c l o s e t

o A m e r i c a n s c o r e s

( 1 9 9 3 )

s

c i e n c e a n d n e a r t s

9 0 h a z a r d s

l

S i m i l a r c o n c e r n s


l

W o m e n g a v e h i g h e r r a t i n g s t h a n m e n

n = 1 0 7





S t u d y

C o u n t r y

S


D e s i g n


R e s u l t s

c


M e c h i t o v a n d R e b r i k (

1 9 9 0 )

R u s s i a

n = 2 4 , r e s e a r c h e r s



l

V e r y l o w s c o r e s o n r i s k

m a g n i t u d e

n = 2 4 , s t u d e n t s i n

7 5 h a z a r d s

l

C o m p a r e d t o A m e r i c a n

c o r r e s p o n d i n g

t

e c h n o l o g y

r a n k c o r r e l a t i o n s

d a t a ,

h a n d g u n s , t e r r o r i s m

, c r i m e , n u c l e a r

r a n k i n g : 1 3 r i s k s

w a r a n d a s b s t o s w e r e r a t e d m u c h l o w e r

f a c t o r a n

a l y s i s

o n f o u r

d i m e n s i o n s

K e o w n ( 1 9 8 9 )

H o n g K o n g b

u s i n e s s s t u d e n t s

r e p l i c a t i o

n


l

O v e r a l l m e a n r a t i n g s n o t s i g n i c a n t l y

n = 6 5

3 0 h a z a r d s

h i g h e r t h a n c o r r e s p o n d i n

g A m e r i c a n s c o r e s


l

T h r e e a r e a s o f r i s k s w e r e r a t e d h i g h e r :

s i x q u a l i t a t i v e

c r i m e a n d n a r c o t i c s , t r a f c b y r a i l r o a d s



a n d b i c y c l e s a n d f o o d a d

d i t i v e s a n d

1 5 h a z a r d s

p r e s e r v a t i v e s

l

A l c o h o l w a s r a t e d l o w e r

K l e i n h e s s e l i n k a n d R o s a ( 1 9 9 1 )

J a p a n

s

t u d e n t s

c o m p a r a t i v e

s e v e n q u a l i t a t i v e

l

O v e r a l l c o g n i t i v e s t r u c t u

r i n g o f r i s k s w a s

m u c h t h e s a m e f o r b o t h

n a t i o n a l s a m p l e s

K l e i n h e s s e l i n k a n d R o s a ( 1 9 9 4 )

U S A

1

9 8 8 s t u d y

d i m e n s i o n :

l

W h i l e J a p a n e s e s u b j e c t s

r e g a r d e d n u c l e a r

J

a p a n e s e n = 6 9


7 0 h a z a r d s

r i s k s a s ‘ w e l l - k n o w n ’ A m

e r i c a n s u n d e r s t o o d

A

m e r i c a n n = 6 2

t h e m a s l a r g e l y ‘ u n k n o w

n ’

1

9 8 9 f o l l o w u p


l

W o m e n i n b o t h s a m p l e s

u n d e r s t o o d m o r e

u

n i v e r s i t y s t u d e n t s

r i s k s a s ‘ d r e a d e d ’ a n d ‘ c a t a s t r o p h i c ’ w h i l e

(

p s y c h o l o g y &

m e n r e g a r d e d m o r e r i s k s a s ‘ u n c o n t r o l -

s

o c i o l o g y )

l a b l e ’ , ‘ n e w e r ’ a n d ‘ l a c k i n g s c i e n t i c

J

a p a n e s e n = 2 7 3

k n o w l e d g e

A

m e r i c a n s n = 1 5 2

l

J a p a n e s e w o m e n r e s p o n d e d m o r e s i m i l a r l y

t o A m e r i c a n m e n i n t h a t t h e y p e r c e i v e d

m o r e r i s k s a s ‘ v o l u n t a r i l y ’ ; J a p a n e s e m e n

a n d A m e r i c a n w o m e n r e

g a r d e d m o r e r i s k s

‘ i n v o l u n t a r y ’

l

E v i d e n c e f o r c r o s s - g e n d e r , c r o s s - c u l t u r a l

r e v e r s a l s o f u n d e r s t a n d i n

g s

H i n m a n ,

R o s a ,

K l e i n h e

s s e l i n k

J a p a n

r

a n d o m s e l e c t i o n


v e q u a l i t a t i v e

l

A l l n u c l e a r i t e m s w e r e m

o r e d r e a d e d b y

a n d L o w i n g e r ( 1 9 9 3 )

U S A

o

f h o u s e h o l d s


t h e J a p a n e s e r e s p o n d e n t

s t h a n b y t h e

m a i l e d

3 0 h a z a r d s

A m e r i c a n

U

S A n = 7 4 7 ,


l

J a p a n e s e r e s p o n d e n t s c o

n s i d e r t h e n u c l e a r

r

e s p o n s e

i t e m s t o b e b e t t e r ‘ k n o w

n ’ t h a n A m e r i c a n

r

a t e 5 2 . 6 %

c o r r e l a t i o n s

s u b j e c t s



156 Boholm

S t u d y

C o u n t r y

S


D e s i g n


R e s u l t s

c


l

A l l o t h e r e n e r g y t e c h n o l o g i e s a r e

J

a p a n n = 2 9 0 ,

c o n s i d e r e d m o r e ‘ u n k n o w n ’ b y t h e

r

e s p o n s e

J a p a n e s e t h a n b y A m e r i c a n s

r

a t e 2 9 %

l

O v e r a l l J a p a n e s e s u b j e c t s r e g a r d h a z a r d s

a s ‘ o l d e r ’ t h a n A m e r i c a n

s

l

B o t h A m e r i c a n s a n d J a p

a n e s e v e r y m u c h

d r e a d a l l n u c l e a r r i s k s , a

n d f e e l l i t t l e

p e r s o n a l c o n t r o l o v e r t h e m

B a s t i d e ,

M o a t t i , P a g e s

a n d

F r a n c e

s

t a t i s t i c a l l y

p e r s o n a l

r a t e f r e q u e n c y

l

R e s p o n d e n t s w h o o v e r e s t i m a t e d c a u s e s

F a g n a n i ( 1 9 8 9 )

r

e p r e s e n t a t i v e

i n t e r v i e w

s

o f 3 0 m o r t a l i t y

o f d e a t h w e r e m o r e o f t e

n d i v o r c e d ,

h a d

n

a t i o n a l

c a u s e s

l o w i n c o m e , w e r e u n e m p l o y e d ,

d e p r e s s e d ,

s

a m p l e

f a c t o r a n

a l y s i s

o r w o r r i e d a b o u t p o l l u t i o n

n = 1 0 0 0

r a t e 5 2 h a z a r d s

l

R e s p o n d e n t s w h o u n d e r e s t i m a t e d c a u s e s o f

o n a v e - p o i n t

d e a t h w e r e m o r e l i k e l y t o h a v e h i g h e r

s c a l e o f ‘ d a n g e r ’

e d u c a t i o n ,

l i v e i n a b i g c

i t y , o r b e a f a r m e r

i n a v i l l a g e

l

S u b j e c t s w h o o v e r - o r u n d e r e s t i m a t e d r i s k s

o f d e a t h w o u l d d o t h e s a m e w h e n

e s t i m a t i n g t h e ‘ d a n g e r ’ o

f v a r i o u s h a z a r d s

l

W o m e n p e r c e i v e d m o r e

r i s k s a s s o c i a t e d

w i t h t e c h n o l o g y

F l y n n ,

S l o v i c a n d M e r t z ( 1 9 9 4 )

U S A

r

a n d o m s a m p l e


m a g n i t u d e o f

l

M e a n s c o r e s f o r r i s k m a g n i t u d e l o w e r f o r

h e a l t h r i s k :

w h i t e m e n

t

o t a l n = 1 . 5 1 2

t e l e p h o n e

2 5 h a z a r d s

l

N o n - w

h i t e m e n a n d w o m

e n ,

i r r e s p e c t i v e o f

w

h i t e n = 1 . 2 7 5

i n t e r v i e w

s

e t h n i c i t y , g a v e t h e s a m e

m e a n s

n

o n - w h i t e n = 2 1 4


w o r l d v i e w s

l

W h i t e m e n w i t h l o w s c o r e s o n r i s k

t r u s t

m a g n i t u d e w e r e b e t t e r e

d u c a t e d ,

h a d

a t t i t u d e s

h i g h e r i n c o m e , m o r e c o n

s e r v a t i v e p o l i t i c a l

r i s k s i n

o r i e n t a t i o n a n d r e p o r t e d

m o r e t r u s t

e n v i r o n m e n t

i n g o v e r n m e n t a n d i n d u s t r y t h a n a v e r a g e

P o u m a d e r e ,

M a y s ,

S l o v

i c ,

F l y n n

U S A

r

e p r e s e n t a t i v e


m a g n i t u d e o f

l

B o t h p o p u l a t i o n s w e r e q

u i t e s e n s i t i v e t o

a n d J o h n s o n ( 1 9 9 5 )

F r a n c e

s

a m p l e

h e a l t h r i s k s :

h e a l t h r i s k s




S t u d y

C o u n t r y

S


D e s i g n


R e s u l t s

c


t e l e p h o n e

l

B o t h A m e r i c a n s a n d F r e

n c h e x p r e s s e d

U

S A n = 1 . 5

0 0

i n t e r v i e w

s

2 5 h a z a r d s

s t r o n g e s t c o n c e r n a b o u t

n u c l e a r w a s t e ,

F

r a n c e n = 1 . 5

0 0

A I D S , s t r e e t d r u g s a n d c i g a r e t t e s m o k i n g .

w o r l d v i e w s

l

T h e F r e n c h e x p r e s s e d m

u c h m o r e t r u s t i n

t r u s t

e x p e r t s a n d a u t h o r i t i e s a

n d w o r l d v i e w s

a t t i t u d e s

w e r e m u c h l e s s c o n v i n c e

d t h a t t h e y c o u l d

r i s k s i n

t h e m s e l v e s e x e r c i s e c o n t r o l o v e r r i s k s


t o t h e i r h e a l t h

R o h r m a n n ( 1 9 9 4 )

A u s t r a l i a

s

o c i e t a l g r o u p s /


j u d g m e n t s o f 2 4

l

R e s p o n d e n t s w i t h t e c h n o l o g i c a l o r i e n t a t i o n

G e r m a n y

c

u l t u r a l

h a z a r d s

g a v e l o w e s t r i s k r a t i n g s ,

s a w m o r e

N e w

o

r i e n t a t i o n s :

q u e s t i o n n a r i e s

a c c o r d i n g t o 1 1

b e n e t s a n d w e r e m o r e r e a d y t o a c c e p t

Z e a l a n d

t

e c h n o l o g i c a l ,

e v a l u a t i v e c r i t e r i a

r i s k s

m

o n e t a r i a n ,

L I S R E L

l

E c o l o g i c a l a n d f e m i n i s t o r i e n t a t i o n s

e

c o l o g i c a l

m o d e l l i n g

r e p o r t e d h i g h e r a n x i e t y a n d g a v e

a

n d f e m i n i s t

h i g h e r r i s k r a t i n g s f o r m

o s t h a z a r d s

a t t i t u d e s :

l

I n t r a g r o u p d i f f e r e n c e s w

e r e m o r e

G

e r m a n s n = 2 1 7


s u b s t a n t i a l t h a n c r o s s - n a

t i o n a l d i f f e r e n c e s

A

u s t r a l i a n s n = 3 3 9

a n d t e c h n o l o g y

l

R i s k p e r c e p t i o n i s e x p l a i n e d b y w o r l d v i e w

N

e w Z e a l a n d e r s

s o c i a l v a l u e s

r a t h e r t h a n b y n a t i o n a l i d e n t i t y

n = 2 7 8

E i s e r , H a n n o v e r , M a n n

, M o r i n ,

A u s t r a l i a

u



p o l i t i c a l d e c i s i o n

l

T h e r a t i n g s o f s e r i o u s n e s s o f t h e C h e r n o b y l

v a n d e r P l i g t a n d W e b l e y

U K

(

p s y c h o l o g y a n d

m a k i n g

a c c i d e n t r e l a t e d t o a t t i t u

d e s

( 1 9 9 0 )

F r a n c e

s

o c i a l s c i e n c e s )


e c o n o m i c

o n n u c l e a r t o p i c s

G e r m a n y

e x p e c t a t i o n s

l

I n a l l n a t i o n a l s a m p l e s i t w a s a s t r o n g

N e t h e r l a n d s t

o t a l n = 8 4 0

f a c t o r a n

a l y s i s

C h e r n o b y l

c o r r e l a t i o n b e t w e e n p r o n u c l e a r a t t i t u d e s

a c c i d e n t

a n d r i g h t - w i n g p o l i t i c a l v a l u e s

a t t i t u d e s o n

l

V a r i a t i o n w i t h r e s p e c t t o

a t t i t u d e s , r e p o r t e d

n u c l e a r p o w e r

a n x i e t y a n d a t t e n t i o n e v o k e d b y t h e

C h e r n o b y l a c c i d e n t w a s

s t r o n g e r w i t h i n

t h a n b e t w e e n t h e n a t i o n a l s a m p l e s



158 Boholm

S t u d y

C o u n t r y

S


D e s i g n


R e s u l t s

c


N y l a n d ( 1 9 9 3 )

B r a z i l

F

i v e g r o u p s :


m a g n i t u d e o f r i s k :

l

C o n s i d e r a b l y h i g h e r m e a

n s f o r r i s k

S w e d e n

n

u r s e s , u n i v e r s i t y

1 0 0 h a z a r d s

m a g n i t u d e i n B r a z i l a s c o m p a r e d t o

s

t u d e n t s i n


S w e d e n

t

e c h n o l o g y

p e r s o n a l r i s k

l

B r a z i l i a n s l u m d w e l l e r s r e p o r t e d t h e h i g h e s t

u

n s k i l l e d w o r k e r s ,


s o c i e t a l r i s k

m e a n s o f p e r c e i v e d r i s k

a n d e c o n o m y ,

a

n d s l u m d w e l l e r s

d e n i t i o n s o f r i s k

f o l l o w e d b y B r a z i l i a n n u

r s e s

(

i n B r a z i l o n l y ) .

l

S t r i k i n g d i f f e r e n c e s b e t w

e n t h e r a t i n g s o f

t h e d i v e r s e g r o u p s , n u r s e s g i v i n g h i g h

B

r a z i l i a n s n = 1 5 0

r a t i n g s i n b o t h c o u n t r i e s

S

w e d e s n = 1 2 0

l

A l t h o u g h t h e p e r c e i v e d r i s k m a g n i t u d e w a s

m u c h h i g h e r i n B r a z i l t h

e r a n k o r d e r

b e t w e e n t h e h a z a r d s w a s r a t h e r s i m i l a r

l

I n b o t h c o u n t r i e s s o c i e t a

l r i s k w a s r a t e d

h i g h e r t h a n p e r s o n a l r i s k

S j ö b e r g ,

K o l a r o v a ,

R u c

a i ,

B u l g a r i a

S

i x g r o u p s :


m a g n i t u d e o f r i s k :

l

H i g h e r m e a n s f o r r i s k m

a g n i t u d e i n

B e r n s t r ö m a n d F l y g e l h o l m

R o m a n i a

n

u r s e s , t e a c h e r s ,

1 0 0 h a z a r d s

B u l g a r i a a s c o m p a r e d t o

R o m a n i a

( 1 9 9 6 )

u



l

N u r s e s g a v e t h e h i g h e s t

r a t i n g s i n b o t h

i n t e c h n o l o g y a n d

p e r s o n a l r i s k

c o u n t r i e s

e

c o n o m y , u n s k i l l e d


s o c i e t a l r i s k

l

I n t e r a c t i o n b e t w e e n g e n d e r a n d o t h e r

w

o r k e r s , a n d s l u m

r i s k m i t i g a t i o n

v a r i a b l e s s u c h a s c o u n t r y a n d s u b - g r o u p

d

w e l l e r s

a n a l y s i s o f m e d i a

a n d c o m p e n s a t i o n

l

I n B u l g a r i a n s a m p l e , w h

e r e p e r c e p t i o n s

c o n t e n t

p e r s o n a l

w e r e q u i t e h i g h ,

t h e r e w

a s l i t t l e m e a n

R

o m a n i a n s n = 1 9 2

p r o t e c t i o n

d i f f e r e n c e b e t w e e n m e n

a n d w o m e n .

B

u l g a r i a n s n = 2 4 0

a n x i e t y

I n t h e R o m a n i a n s a m p l e

w o m e n g e n e r a l l y

p o l i t i c a l i s s u e s a n d

r a t e d r i s k s a s h i g h e r t h a n m e n

s e n s e o f c o n t r o l

l

A l t h o u g h t h e r e w e r e s o m

e d i f f e r e n c e s t h e

r a n k o r d e r b e t w e e n h a z a r d s i n b o t h

c o u n t r i e s w e r e r a t h e r s i m

i l a r

l

Q u a n t i t a t i v e a n a l y s i s o f m e d i a c o n t e n t i n

b o t h c o u n t r i e s d i d n o t c o r r e l a t e w i t h

t h e m e a n s c o r e s f o r p e r c e i v e d r i s k n o r

w i t h t h e r a n k o r d e r o f h

a z a r d s




S t u d y

C o u n t r y

S


D e s i g n


R e s u l t s

c


L é v y - L e b o y e r , B o n n e s ,

C h a s e ,

F r a n c e

t

e a c h e r s i n t h e


a t t i t u d e s o n

l

S u b s t a n t i a l n a t i o n a l d i f f e

r e n c e s i n p r e s s

F e r r e i r a - M a r q u e s a n d P a w l i k

I t a l y

n

a t u r a l o r h u m a n

e n v i r o n m e n t a l

c o v e r a g e o f e n v i r o n m e n t a l i s s u e s

( 1 9 9 6 )

G e r m a n y

s

c i e n c e s , e n g i n e e r s


i s s u e s

l

P e r c e i v e d r i s k w a s a n i m

p o r t a n t p r e d i c t o r

P o r t u g a l

i n f o r m a t i o n o n

o f c o n c e r n f o r t h e e n v i r o n m e n t i n t h r e e

U K

t

o t a l n = 7 4 2



c o u n t r i e s : U K ,

I t a l y a n d

P o r t u g a l

t r u s t i n m e d i a

l

G e r m a n r e s p o n d e n t s d i f f e r e d f r o m f r o m a l l

a n a l y s i s o f m e d i a

k n o w l e d g e –

o t h e r s i n s e v e r a l r e s p e c t s h a v i n g o t h e r

c o n t e n t

s u b j e c t i v e

e n v i r o n m e n t a l p r e d i c t o r s

a n d o b j e c t i v e

l

H i g h e s t r a n k i n g p r e d i c t o

r f o r r i s k

r i s k p e r c e p t i o n

p e r c e p t i o n i n a l l c o u n t r i e s e x c e p t I t a l y

w a s a t t i t u d e s

l

V a r i o u s d e g r e e s o f e n v i r

o n m e n t a l

c o n c e r n i n e a c h c o u n t r y ; s t r o n g e s t

p r o - e n v i r o n m e n t a l c o n c e

r n i n G e r m a n y ,

f o l l o w e d b y I t a l y a n d P o

r t u g a l , t h e F r e n c h

r a n k i n g l o w e s t



society – the idea that human societies constitute ‘ultra-complex’ systems, dependingon higher-order, conventionalized systems for processing information – we shouldclearly not merely be posing questions about the factual, measurable proper ties of theenvironment or its specic instrumental aspects. Studies of the perception of risksconducted from a cross-national and cross-cultural comparative perspective need to

address questions about the way in which risks are embedded in the social fabric, takinginto account ‘conceptions of morality, equity, justice, and honour; religious doctrine;ideas concerning sovereignty; property, and rights and duties; and aesthetic values andwhat constitu tes quality in life’ (Rappapor t, 1996: 65). If we are to avoid the fallacy of unrestrained empiricism, producing new empirical results accompanied by trivial expla-nations simply for the sake of it (Faucheaux, 1976), bu t be gu ided by relevant front-lineresearch in behavioural and social disciplines, the comparative, explorative studies of the perception of risks should be striving to formu late theore tically well-founded designsfor research which are amenable to more profound interpretations of the results.

Fields for cross-national research into the perception of risks that augur well for thefuture, appear to be the role of ‘background factors’ such as gender and social margin-ality, education and occupation. Broad ‘ideological’ issues, especially those relating tounderstandings of political matte rs and trust in the orders of dominance and authority,might also be predicted to attract increasing attention. One way to proceed method-ologically, and one that I personally would favour, would be by way of intensivequalitative case studies based on strategically chosen data (see for example Vari et al.,1991). Contrasting resu lts from these might well prove illuminat ing, and serve as sourcesfor fertile problem-solving exercises for the future. The role of the media in various

countries, and how they contribute to the way the general public construes risks, maybe expected to become a rapidly growing eld of research yet we need to know moreabou t the ‘objects’ themselves that are understood to give rise to ‘risks’, and how peoplesocially and culturally construe all such troublesome and feared ‘realities’ (Hilgartner,1992; Zonabend, 1993).

References

Adams, J. 1995. R isk . London: UCL Press.Bast ide, S., Moatt i, J-P., Pages, J-P ., and Fagnani, F. (1989) Risk percept ion and the social accept-

ability of technologies: the French case, R isk A nalysis 9, 215–23.Ber ry, J.W. (1980) Int roduction to Methodology, in H.C. Triandis and J.W. Berry (eds) Handbook

of Cross-Cu ltural Psychology, M ethodology, vol. 2. Boston, London: Allyn and Bacon.Berry, J.W., Poortinga, Y.H., Segall, M.H. and Dasen, P.R. (1992) Cross-Cultural Psychology:

Research and A pplications, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Bloch, M. and Parry, J. (eds) (1982) Death and the Regeneration of L ife, Cambridge: Cambridge

University Press.

Boholm, Å. (1996) Risk perception and social anthropology: critique of cultural theory, E thnos61, 4–84.

Clarke, L. and Short , J.F. (1993) Social organization and risk: some current controversies, A nnu al

Review of Sociology 19, 375–99.Cutter, S. (1981) Community concern for pollution: social and environmental inuences, Journal

of Environmental Psychology 13, 105–24.Cvetcovich, G.T. and Earle, T.C. (eds) (1991) Special issue on ‘Risk and Culture’, Journal of

Cross-Cultural Psychology 22.

160 Boholm



Dake, K. (1991) Orientating dispositions in the perceptions of risk: an analysis of contemporaryworldviews and cultural biases, Journal of Cross-Cu ltural Psychology 22, 61–82.

Davidson, D.J. and Freudenburg, W.R. (1996) G ender and environmental risk concerns. A reviewand analysis of available research, Environm ent and Behavior 28, 302–339.

Douglas, M. 1992. R isk and Blame, London : Routledge.Douglas, M. and Wildavsky A. (1982) R isk and Cu lture: A n Essay on the Selection of Technological

and Environmental Dangers, Berkeley, University of California Press.Durkheim, E. (1951) [orig. 1897] Suicide, translated by John A. Spalding and George Simpson,

Illinois: The Free Press.Eiser, J.R., Hannover, B., Mann, L., Morin, M., van der Pligt, J. and Webley, P. (1990) Nuclear

attitudes after Chernobyl: a cross-national study, Journal of Environm ental Psychology 10,101–110.

Englander, T., Farago, K., and Slovic, P. A. (1986) Comparative analysis of risk perception inHungary and the United states, Social Behaviour 1, 55–66.

Faucheaux, C. (1976) Cross-cultural research in exper imental social psychology, European Journal

of Social Psychology 6, 269–322.Fischhoff, B., Slovic, P., Lichtenste in, S., Read, S., and Combs, B. (1978) H ow safe is safe enough?A psychometric study of at titudes towards technological risks and benets, Policy Sciences 9,127–52.

Fentress, J. and Wickham, C. (eds) (1992) Social M emory, Oxford: Blackwell.Festinger , L. (1957) A Theory of Cognitive Dissonance, Evanstone , Ill.: R ow, Peterson.Flynn, J., Slovic, P. and Mertz C.-K. (1994) Gender, race and environmental health risks, R isk

A naly sis 14, 1101–8.Gallup O rganization (1979) Nuclear power plants, Gallup Report 167, 8–12.Gallup O rganization (1986) Nuclear power plants, Gallup Report 250, 16–19.

Goszczynska, M., Tyszka, T., and Slovic, P. (1991) R isk percept ion in Poland: a compar ison withthree other countries, Journal of Behavioural Decision M aking 4, 179–93.

Graber , D .A. (1996) Say it with pictures, A nnals of the A merican A cademy of Social Sciences 546,85–96.

Gustafsson, K.-E. and Weibull, L. (1996) European newspaper readership – an overview, in Eu ropeans Read Newspapers, Brussels: ENPA .

Halbwachs, M. (1992) [1952, 1941] On Collective M emory, Chicago: Chicago UniversityPress.

Hant rais, L. and Mangen, S. (eds) (1996) Cross-National Research M ethods in the Social Sciences,London , New York: Pinter.

Harré, R. and G illett , G. (1994) The Discursive M ind , London: Sage.Hilgartner, S. (1992) The social construction of risk objects, in J.F. Short and L. Clarke (eds)

Organizations, Uncertainties and Risk . Bou lder, San Francisco, Oxford: Westview Press, 39–53.Hinman, G .W., Rosa, E.A ., Kleinhesselink, R.R . and Lowinger, T.C. (1993) Percept ions of nuclear

and other risks in Japan and the United States, R isk A naly sis 13, 449–55.Hu ntington, R. and Metcalf, P. (1979) Celebrations of Death: The A nthropology of M ortuary Ritual,

Cambr idge: Cambridge University Press.Kagitcibasi, C. and Berry, J.W. (1989) Cross-cultural psychology: current research and trends,

A nnual R eview of Psychology 40, 493–531.

Karpowicz-Lazreg, C. and Mullet, E. (1993) Societal risk as seen by the French public, R isk A naly sis 13, 253–58.Kasperson, R .E., Renn, O . Slovic, P., Brown, H.S., Emel, J., Goble, R., Kasperson, J.X. and Ratick, S.

(1988) The social amplication of risk: a conceptual framework, Risk Analysis 8, 177–87.Keown, C.F. (1989) R isk perceptions of Hong Kongese vs. Amer icans, R isk A nalysis 9, 401–5.Kleinhesselink, R.R. and Rosa, E.A. (1991) Cognitive representations of risk perceptions:

a comparison of Japan and the United States, Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology 22,11–28.




Kleinhesselink, R.R . and R osa, E.R. (1994) Nuclear t rees in a forest of hazards: a comparison of risk perceptions between American and Japanese university students, in T.C. Lowinger andG.W. Hinman (eds) Nu clear Power at the Crossroads: Challenges and Prospects for the T wenty-

rst Century, International Research Center for Energy and Economic Development:Washington State U niversity, 101–119.

Kohn, M.L. (ed.) (1989a) Cross-National Research M ethods in Sociology, London: Sage.

Kohn, M.L. 1989b. Cross-national research as an analytic strategy, in M.L. Kohn (ed.) Cross-

National R esearch M ethods in Sociology, London : Sage.Lévy-Leboyer, C., Bonnes, M., Chase, J., Ferreira-Marques, J., and Pawlik, K. (1996) Determin-

ants of pro-environmental behaviors: a ve-countries comparison, Eu ropean Psychologist 1,123–29.

Lichtenstein, S., Slovic, P., Fischhoff, B., Layman, M. and Combs, B. (1978) Judged frequencyof lethal events, Journal of Experimental Psychology (Human L earning and M emory) 4,551–78.

Lowrance, W.W. (1976) Of A cceptable Risk: Science and the Determination of Safety, Los Altos,

CA: W. Kaufman.Mechitov, A.I. and Rebr ik, S.B. (1990) Studies of risk and safety in the USSR, in K. Borcherding,O.I. Larichev and Messick D.M. (eds) Contemporary Issues in Decision M aking, pp. 261–70,Amsterdam: Elsevier Science Publishers B.V.

Middleton, D. and Edwards, D. (eds) (1990) Collective Remembering, London: Sage.Miller-Loessi, K. (1995) Comparative Social Psychology. Cross-cultural and cross-national, in

K.S. Cook, G.A. Fine and J.S. House (eds) Sociological Perspectives of Social Psychology ,Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 397–420.

Nyland, L.G . (1993) R isk Perception in Braz il and Sweden, Stockholm: Center for R isk Research.Otway, H.J. and von Winterfeldt, D. (1982) Beyond acceptable risk: on the social acceptabilities

of technologies, Policy Sciences 14, 247–56.Poumadere, M., Mays, C., Slovic, P., Flynn J., and Johnson S. (1995) What lies behind public accep-

tance? Compar ison of US and French percept ions of the nuclear power option, in The Nuclear

Power O ption. Proceedings of an international conference on the nuclear power option organizedby the inte rnat ional atomic energy agency, Vienna September 1994, Vienna, 393–405.

Rappaport, R.A. (1996) Risk and the human environment, A nnals of the A merican A cadem y of

the Political and Social Sciences 545, 64–74.Rayner, S. and Cantor, R . (1987) H ow fair is safe enough. The cultural approach societa l tech-

nology choice, R isk A nalysis 7, 3–9.Renn, O ., Burns, W.J., Kasperson, J.X., Kasperson, R .E., and Slovic, P. (1992) The social ampli-

cation of risk: theoretical foundations and empirical applications, Journal of Social Science

Issues 48, 137–60.Rohrmann, B. (1994) Risk perception of different societal groups: Australian ndings and cross-

national compar ison, Australian Journal of Psychology 46, 150–63.Rosa, G., Renn, O., Jaeger , C. and Webler, T. (1995) R isk as a challenge to cross-cu ltural dialogue.

Paper presented at the XXXII Congress – ‘Dialogues Between Cultu res and Changes in Europeand the Wor ld’ – of the In ternational Institute of Sociology, Trieste 3–7 July 1995.

Royal Society Study Group, (1992) R isk : analysis, perception and management , Report of a RoyalSociety Study G roup, London : The R oyal Society.

Schooler, C. (1996) Cultural and social-structural explanations of cross-national psychologicaldifferences, A nnu al Review of Sociology 22, 323–49.Short, J.F. Jr. and Clarke, L. (eds) (1992) Organizations, Uncertainties and Risk , Boulder, CO:

Westview Press.Sjöberg, L. (1995) Explaining Risk Perception: A n Empirical and Qu antitative Evaluation of

Cu ltural Theory, Stockholm: Centre for R isk Research.Sjöberg, L. (1996) A discussions of the limitations of the psychometric and cultural theory

approaches to r isk percept ion, Radiation Protection Dosimetry 68, 219–25.

162 Boholm



Sjöbe rg, L., Kolarova, D., Ru cai A-A ., Bernström M-L. and Flygelholm H. (1996). Risk Perception

and M edia Reports in Bulgaria and Romania, Stockholm: Center for Risk Research.Sjöbe rg, L. and Winroth, E. (1986) R isk, moral value of actions, and mood, Scandinavian Journal

of Psychology 27, 191–208.Slovic, P., Fischhoff, B. and Lichtenstein, S. (1980) Facts and fears: understanding perceived risk,

in R.C. Schwing and W.A. Alberts Jr. (eds) Societal Risk A ssessment: How Safe is Safe

Enou gh?, New York: Plenum Press.Stallings, R.A. (1990) Media discourse and the social construction of risk, Social Problems 37,

80–95.Teigen, K. H., Brun, W. and Slovic, P. (1988) Societal risks as seen by the Norwegian public,

Journal of Behavioural Decision M aking 1, 111–30.Thompson, M., Ellis, R. and Wildavsky A. (1990) Cultural Theory, Boulder, San Francisco:

Westview Press.Triandis H.C. and Berry, J.W. (1980) Handbook of Cross-Cu ltural Psychology, M ethodology , vol.

2, Boston, London: Allyn and Bacon.

Tversky, A. and Kahnemann, D. (1973) Availability: a heuristic for judging frequency and prob-ability, Cognitive Psychology 5, 207–32.Vari, A., Kemp, R. and Mumpower, J.L. (1991) Public concerns about LLRW facility siting: a

comparat ive study, Journal of Cross-Cu ltural Psychology, 22, 83–102.Vaughan, E . and Nordenstam, B. (1991) The percept ion of environmental risks among ethnically

diverse groups, Journal of Cross-Cu ltural Psychology, 22, 29–60.Vlek, C.J.H. and Stallen, P.J.M., (1980) Rational and personal aspects of risk, A cta Psychologica

45, 273–300.Vlek, C.J.H. and Stallen, P.J.M. (1981) Judging risks and benets in the small and in the large,

Organizational Behaviour and Human Performance 28, 235–71.

Wildavsky, A. and Dake , K. (1990) Theor ies of risk percept ion: who fears what and why, Daedalus112, 41–0.

von Winterfeld, D. and Edwards, W. (1984) Patterns of conict about risky technology, R isk

A nalysis 4, 55–68.af Wåhlberg, A. and Sjöberg, L. (1997) R isk Perception and the M edia. A Review of Research

on M edia Inuence on Public Risk Perception , Stockholm: Center for Risk Research.Zonabend, F. (1993) The Nuclear Peninsula, translated from French by J.A. Underwood,

Cambr idge: Cambridge University Press.


101 Boholm Twenty Years of Risk Perception

Documents

Transcript of 101 Boholm Twenty Years of Risk Perception