1 REPORT OF JOINT AD HOC SUB- COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND ACCOUNTABILITY.

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REPORT OF JOINT AD HOC SUB-REPORT OF JOINT AD HOC SUB-COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND

ACCOUNTABILITYACCOUNTABILITY

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OUR TASKOUR TASK

To consider the report of the consultants and To consider the report of the consultants and to submit findings to the Joint Rules to submit findings to the Joint Rules Committee (JRC)Committee (JRC)

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APPROACHAPPROACH

The Report of the sub-committee documents the discussions & The Report of the sub-committee documents the discussions & conclusions of the sub-committee on every chapter of the conclusions of the sub-committee on every chapter of the consultants’ report.consultants’ report.

PRACTICALLY ORIENTATEDPRACTICALLY ORIENTATED

ELABORATIONELABORATION

Discussions between membersDiscussions between members Inviting submissions Inviting submissions Further researchFurther research

LIMITATIONSLIMITATIONS

Highlight areas requiring attention particularly where Highlight areas requiring attention particularly where consultants’ report lacked consultation and empirical data.consultants’ report lacked consultation and empirical data.

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NOTE:NOTE:

It should be noted at this juncture that the sub-committee It should be noted at this juncture that the sub-committee dealt with both Houses of Parliament simultaneously and that dealt with both Houses of Parliament simultaneously and that all of its recommendations apply equally to both Houses all of its recommendations apply equally to both Houses unless expressly stated.unless expressly stated.

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Summary of the Sub-Committee’s Report Summary of the Sub-Committee’s Report with specific reference to its with specific reference to its

RecommendationsRecommendationsChapter: Accountability, Oversight & the Chapter: Accountability, Oversight & the Constitutional ImperativeConstitutional Imperative

The Role of the National AssemblyThe Role of the National Assembly

SynopsisSynopsis The Chapter of the consultants’ report deals with the The Chapter of the consultants’ report deals with the

constitutional provisions relating to Oversight in constitutional provisions relating to Oversight in particular with clause 55 (2).particular with clause 55 (2).

The concept of ministerial responsibility.The concept of ministerial responsibility. A comparative study is done on the role of the public A comparative study is done on the role of the public

service in countries like the UK, Canada, and Australia. service in countries like the UK, Canada, and Australia. An explanation is given of the term “other organs of An explanation is given of the term “other organs of

state”.state”.

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Accountability, Oversight and the Accountability, Oversight and the Constitutional Imperative (contd)Constitutional Imperative (contd)

Discussions of the sub-committeeDiscussions of the sub-committee

This chapter does not adequately deal with This chapter does not adequately deal with allall of the of the constitutional provisions relating to oversight.constitutional provisions relating to oversight.

Necessary to develop an understanding of the entire Necessary to develop an understanding of the entire Oversight ThemeOversight Theme in the Constitution. in the Constitution.

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Accountability, Oversight & the Accountability, Oversight & the Constitution Imperative (contd)Constitution Imperative (contd)

The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996

Section 199 (8)Section 199 (8)

“To give effect to the principles of transparency and “To give effect to the principles of transparency and accountability, multi-party parliamentary committees accountability, multi-party parliamentary committees must have oversight of all security services in a manner must have oversight of all security services in a manner determined by national legislation or the rules and determined by national legislation or the rules and orders of Parliament”.orders of Parliament”.

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Accountability, Oversight & the Accountability, Oversight & the Constitution Imperative (contd)Constitution Imperative (contd)

Section 238Section 238

““An executive organ of state in any sphere of government An executive organ of state in any sphere of government may-may-

(a)(a) delegate any function that is to be performed in term delegate any function that is to be performed in term s of legislation to any other executive organ of state s of legislation to any other executive organ of state provided that the delegation is consistent with the provided that the delegation is consistent with the legislation in terms of which the function is performed;legislation in terms of which the function is performed;

(b)(b) Perform any function for any other organ of state on Perform any function for any other organ of state on an agency or delegation basis.”an agency or delegation basis.”

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Accountability, Oversight & the Accountability, Oversight & the Constitutional Imperative (contd)Constitutional Imperative (contd)

Section 231Section 231

1)1) ““The negotiating and signing of all international The negotiating and signing of all international agreements is the responsibility of the national agreements is the responsibility of the national executive.executive.

2)2) An international agreement binds the Republic only An international agreement binds the Republic only after it has been approved by resolution in both the after it has been approved by resolution in both the National Assembly and the National Council of National Assembly and the National Council of Provinces, unless it is an agreement referred to in Provinces, unless it is an agreement referred to in subsection (3).subsection (3).

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Other important constitutional provisionsOther important constitutional provisions

Ministerial accountabilityMinisterial accountability

Intervention mechanismsIntervention mechanisms

““Super entrenched” clauseSuper entrenched” clause

The Interim & Final ConstitutionsThe Interim & Final Constitutions

A comparison between the Interim Constitution and the 1996 A comparison between the Interim Constitution and the 1996 Constitution would further provide insight into the manner in Constitution would further provide insight into the manner in which issues of oversight had been tweaked during the two which issues of oversight had been tweaked during the two phases of our constitutional evolution.phases of our constitutional evolution.

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ConclusionConclusion

Understanding the full landscape of oversight provisions Understanding the full landscape of oversight provisions together with developing a full appreciation of the spirit together with developing a full appreciation of the spirit & values of the Constitution, is essential.& values of the Constitution, is essential.

Need to develop this understanding both within and Need to develop this understanding both within and without Parliament.without Parliament.

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RecommendationsRecommendations

i.i. Parliament through the Rules Committee compiles a document Parliament through the Rules Committee compiles a document “landscaping” the Constitutional provisions relating to the inter-“landscaping” the Constitutional provisions relating to the inter-relating themes of Oversight, Accountability, Transparency and relating themes of Oversight, Accountability, Transparency and Responsiveness, and outlining international trends. Such a Responsiveness, and outlining international trends. Such a document should also include inputs from key Constitutional document should also include inputs from key Constitutional negotiators either in the form of commissioned research or negotiators either in the form of commissioned research or essays or (preferably) both. essays or (preferably) both.

ii.ii. Following the tabling of the abovementioned document debates, Following the tabling of the abovementioned document debates, workshop and discussions should be programmed and organised workshop and discussions should be programmed and organised within Parliament, first among MPs themselves, and then later on within Parliament, first among MPs themselves, and then later on expanded to include other stakeholders. These debates and expanded to include other stakeholders. These debates and discussion should have as their objective the development of a discussion should have as their objective the development of a broad understanding of the Oversight Role and Function of broad understanding of the Oversight Role and Function of Parliament within our Constitutional democracy.Parliament within our Constitutional democracy.

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Chapter: The Oversight of the NCOPChapter: The Oversight of the NCOP

SynopsisSynopsisThe consultants’ approach in regard to the NCOP is captured The consultants’ approach in regard to the NCOP is captured in the following paragraph:in the following paragraph:“ “ we see oversight in relation to the NCOP as covering the we see oversight in relation to the NCOP as covering the implementation of legislation & the monitoring of inter implementation of legislation & the monitoring of inter governmental relations. The oversight role of the NCOP is governmental relations. The oversight role of the NCOP is however limited in that it is restricted to matters concerning however limited in that it is restricted to matters concerning local & provincial government as well as national local & provincial government as well as national government where this impacts on provincial & local government where this impacts on provincial & local matters _ _ _matters _ _ _

And further:And further:“ “ As a general rule the national executive and organs of As a general rule the national executive and organs of state in the national sphere ought to report and account to state in the national sphere ought to report and account to the National Assembly and its committees only. There are the National Assembly and its committees only. There are exceptions to this for eg. Financial and Fiscal Commission . . exceptions to this for eg. Financial and Fiscal Commission . . . The National Assembly however remains primarily . The National Assembly however remains primarily responsible for oversight of the National Executive….”responsible for oversight of the National Executive….” (p 22 of (p 22 of consultants’ report)consultants’ report)

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The Oversight Role of the NCOP (contd)The Oversight Role of the NCOP (contd)

Deliberations of the sub-committeeDeliberations of the sub-committee

OmissionsOmissions

1)1) Noted that consultants’ report lacks an assessment and Noted that consultants’ report lacks an assessment and evaluation of existing oversight mechanisms. evaluation of existing oversight mechanisms.

2)2) Division of RevenueDivision of Revenue

3)3) S 154(1) of the Constitution of the Republic of South S 154(1) of the Constitution of the Republic of South AfricaAfrica

“The National and provincial governments by legislative “The National and provincial governments by legislative and other measures must support and strengthen the and other measures must support and strengthen the capacity of municipalities to manage their own affairs to capacity of municipalities to manage their own affairs to exercise their powers and to perform their functions.”exercise their powers and to perform their functions.”

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Oversight Role of the NCOP (contd)Oversight Role of the NCOP (contd)

Premise of the consultants that there be no overlap of oversight Premise of the consultants that there be no overlap of oversight function between the Houses and that the NCOP oversight role is function between the Houses and that the NCOP oversight role is limited, = too starklimited, = too stark

Instead:Instead:

Oversight responsibility rests with Oversight responsibility rests with Parliament.Parliament.

Each House has specific orientation and specific oversight Each House has specific orientation and specific oversight objectives.objectives.

Areas of convergence arise in matters of concurrent powers.Areas of convergence arise in matters of concurrent powers.

Areas of specific focus defy strict categorization.Areas of specific focus defy strict categorization.

Duplication of oversight work does not necessarily translate intoDuplication of oversight work does not necessarily translate into

duplication of corrective action.duplication of corrective action.

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Parliament itself requires some co-operative ethic Parliament itself requires some co-operative ethic whereby there is not any duplication but in fact a whereby there is not any duplication but in fact a complimentary role, played by each House in regard to complimentary role, played by each House in regard to the other. The sub-committee was of the view that there the other. The sub-committee was of the view that there be a more formal relationship creative between be a more formal relationship creative between committees in the two Houses so that any oversight committees in the two Houses so that any oversight work in formally co-ordinated to achieve a work in formally co-ordinated to achieve a complimentary result.complimentary result.

The lack of a formal communication structure between The lack of a formal communication structure between committees of the two Houses was noted.committees of the two Houses was noted.

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RecommendationsRecommendations

The sub-committee recommends that:The sub-committee recommends that:

2.1 The JRC initiate a process aimed at drafting guidelines 2.1 The JRC initiate a process aimed at drafting guidelines for portfolio and select committees to allow for joint for portfolio and select committees to allow for joint planning of oversight work.planning of oversight work.

2.2 A process should be initiated to establish protocols to 2.2 A process should be initiated to establish protocols to ensure structured communication between committees ensure structured communication between committees through streamlining of the committee section, which through streamlining of the committee section, which would allow for more effective and formal would allow for more effective and formal communication between committees of both Houses communication between committees of both Houses that embark on mutual interest oversight work and that embark on mutual interest oversight work and briefing sessions.briefing sessions.

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Building Parliament’s Institutional Building Parliament’s Institutional Oversight CapacityOversight Capacity

GeneralGeneralBuilding the Institutional oversight capabilities of Building the Institutional oversight capabilities of Parliament is a process that will extend well into the next Parliament is a process that will extend well into the next few Parliamentary terms.few Parliamentary terms.

RecommendationRecommendation

1.1 The JRC begins a process aimed at producing a long 1.1 The JRC begins a process aimed at producing a long term institutional Vision and Mission Statement aimed at term institutional Vision and Mission Statement aimed at building Parliament’s oversight capabilities through building Parliament’s oversight capabilities through adequate resourcing and capacity building in adequate resourcing and capacity building in committees, Constituency Offices and within Parliament’s committees, Constituency Offices and within Parliament’s administrative support structures – in particular the administrative support structures – in particular the Committee section where a record-keeping system, and Committee section where a record-keeping system, and tracking mechanisms are required to be established.tracking mechanisms are required to be established.

1.2 Parliament adopts a policy requiring each new 1.2 Parliament adopts a policy requiring each new Parliament to assess and review its oversight capabilities Parliament to assess and review its oversight capabilities at least once during its five-year lifespan.at least once during its five-year lifespan.

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Building Parliament’s Institutional Building Parliament’s Institutional Oversight Capacity (contd)Oversight Capacity (contd)

Capacity and Resources for CommitteesCapacity and Resources for Committees

The following proposals were made in the consultants’ The following proposals were made in the consultants’ report toward developing committees of Parliament:report toward developing committees of Parliament:

““Beefing up the existing parliamentary research capacity Beefing up the existing parliamentary research capacity to undertake management and programme audits;to undertake management and programme audits;

Establishing a specialised agency for this purpose. For Establishing a specialised agency for this purpose. For instance in the UK the Auditor-General scrutinizes instance in the UK the Auditor-General scrutinizes accounts to see whether moneys have been spent as accounts to see whether moneys have been spent as allocated; andallocated; and

Increasing the duties of the Auditor-General’s Office. Increasing the duties of the Auditor-General’s Office. (page 47)(page 47)

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Sub Committee DeliberationsSub Committee Deliberations

Capacity and Resources – vitalCapacity and Resources – vital

Acquisition of Independently gathered information is Acquisition of Independently gathered information is essential to enable effective oversight.essential to enable effective oversight.

Long term planning required. (long term vision & Long term planning required. (long term vision & mission)mission)

Parliament to begin by devising effective links with Parliament to begin by devising effective links with bodies engaged in oversight work of their own. eg Public bodies engaged in oversight work of their own. eg Public Service Commission submission.Service Commission submission.

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Institutions supporting DemocracyInstitutions supporting Democracy

Establishing a Standing Committee dedicated to the work of ISDEstablishing a Standing Committee dedicated to the work of ISD

The consultants propose the establishment of a Standing The consultants propose the establishment of a Standing Committee on Constitutional Institutions in Parliament, as well as a Committee on Constitutional Institutions in Parliament, as well as a revised budgetary allocation process for Chapter 9 bodies.revised budgetary allocation process for Chapter 9 bodies.

Deliberation of Sub-CommitteesDeliberation of Sub-Committees

Practical problems Practical problems

Consultants’ recommendation not supported.Consultants’ recommendation not supported.

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Recommendation:Recommendation:

The matters of independence of the ISD, the more co-The matters of independence of the ISD, the more co-ordinated interaction between Parliament and the ISD, ordinated interaction between Parliament and the ISD, the effectiveness of the oversight roles of the ISD, their the effectiveness of the oversight roles of the ISD, their budgetary procedures and their accountability to budgetary procedures and their accountability to Parliament, be the subject of a more extensive Parliament, be the subject of a more extensive consultation process that should involve all role-players. consultation process that should involve all role-players. This kind of process we believe should be initiated by This kind of process we believe should be initiated by Parliament and that it would be for Parliament to decide Parliament and that it would be for Parliament to decide how best to engage in this process.how best to engage in this process.

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Developing an Institutional MemoryDeveloping an Institutional Memory

Expertise acquired during the first two terms to be Expertise acquired during the first two terms to be harnessed harnessed

Sub-Committee recommends that:Sub-Committee recommends that:

Parliament, urgently takes measures to develop a Best Parliament, urgently takes measures to develop a Best Practice Guide to capture inter-alia the best oversightPractice Guide to capture inter-alia the best oversight practices of committees and the experiencespractices of committees and the experiences of of chairpersons of various Select and Portfolio committees.chairpersons of various Select and Portfolio committees.

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Fine tuning and developing Oversight mechanismsFine tuning and developing Oversight mechanisms

Section 55(2) of the Constitution of the Republic of South AfricaSection 55(2) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa

““The National Assembly must provide for mechanisms-The National Assembly must provide for mechanisms-

a)a) to ensure that all executive organs of state in the national to ensure that all executive organs of state in the national sphere of government are accountable to it; andsphere of government are accountable to it; and

b)b) to maintain oversight of-to maintain oversight of-

i. the exercise of national executive authority, including the i. the exercise of national executive authority, including the implementation of legislation; andimplementation of legislation; and

ii. any organ of state.”ii. any organ of state.”

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Fine tuning and development Oversight Fine tuning and development Oversight mechanismsmechanisms

Section 239 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Section 239 of the Constitution of the Republic of South AfricaAfrica

“ “In the Constitution, unless the context indicates In the Constitution, unless the context indicates otherwise, “organs of state: means-otherwise, “organs of state: means-a) any department of state or administration in the a) any department of state or administration in the national, provincial or local sphere of government; and national, provincial or local sphere of government; and b) any other functionary or institution-b) any other functionary or institution-i. Exercising a power or performing a function in terms i. Exercising a power or performing a function in terms of the Constitution or a provincial constitution; orof the Constitution or a provincial constitution; orii) Exercising a public power or performing a public ii) Exercising a public power or performing a public function in terms of any legislation.”function in terms of any legislation.”

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Fine tuning and development Oversight Fine tuning and development Oversight mechanisms (contd)mechanisms (contd)

Sub-Committees’ DeliberationsSub-Committees’ Deliberations

Parliament must adopt a policy to oversee Parliament must adopt a policy to oversee organs of stateorgans of state

Two broad approaches may be followedTwo broad approaches may be followed

Tracking the path of huge allocations of public ⃟ Tracking the path of huge allocations of public ⃟ money money

Focusing on issues of National Interest⃟ Focusing on issues of National Interest⃟ ..

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1. Parliament commissions an audit of the various bodies 1. Parliament commissions an audit of the various bodies exercising public powers or performing public functions and exercising public powers or performing public functions and which should in addition clearly delineate which line which should in addition clearly delineate which line function departments are responsible for the various organs function departments are responsible for the various organs of state. Portfolio and Select committees within Parliament of state. Portfolio and Select committees within Parliament will consequently assume the necessary oversight will consequently assume the necessary oversight responsibility.responsibility.

2. Parliament through the JRC develops a policy aimed at 2. Parliament through the JRC develops a policy aimed at meeting its constitutional obligations set out in S 55 (2)(b)meeting its constitutional obligations set out in S 55 (2)(b)(ii)(ii)

3. Such policy should consider the necessity for basic 3. Such policy should consider the necessity for basic legislation giving effect to S 55 (2) on issues of oversight legislation giving effect to S 55 (2) on issues of oversight and accountability and dealing especially with organs of and accountability and dealing especially with organs of state directly accountable to Parliament.state directly accountable to Parliament.

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Fine tuning and development Oversight Fine tuning and development Oversight mechanisms (contd)mechanisms (contd)

Oversight Reports of CommitteesOversight Reports of Committees

Time available to committees to conduct oversight work Time available to committees to conduct oversight work is limitedis limited

It is an exception rather than a rule for committees to It is an exception rather than a rule for committees to report to the House on their oversight work.report to the House on their oversight work.

RecommendationRecommendation

The JRC develops a policy allowing for more debates on The JRC develops a policy allowing for more debates on committee oversight reports to be programmed. These committee oversight reports to be programmed. These debates should take the form of MPs raising issues of debates should take the form of MPs raising issues of concern based on the reports tabled and Ministers concern based on the reports tabled and Ministers responding to those issuesresponding to those issues..

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Introducing Oversight mechanismsIntroducing Oversight mechanisms

The sub-committee presents two options for consideration:The sub-committee presents two options for consideration:

OPTION ONEOPTION ONE

Recommendation 7Recommendation 7

Parliament should begin a formal process of evaluating its Parliament should begin a formal process of evaluating its oversight activities as distinct from its legislative role and oversight activities as distinct from its legislative role and developing a manual on Accountability and Oversight for developing a manual on Accountability and Oversight for MPs and Committees, with the intention of constantly MPs and Committees, with the intention of constantly developing and refining a manual.developing and refining a manual.

This option proposes that Parliament first develop its This option proposes that Parliament first develop its oversight processes and conventions in a manner that is oversight processes and conventions in a manner that is captured in a manual to be updated from time to time. captured in a manual to be updated from time to time. Parliament will at a future time be able to assess whether it Parliament will at a future time be able to assess whether it is required for such procedures and practices to be is required for such procedures and practices to be captured in legislation.captured in legislation.

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Introducing Oversight mechanisms (contd)Introducing Oversight mechanisms (contd)

OPTION TWOOPTION TWO

Recommendation 7.1Recommendation 7.1

Parliament should adopt the recommendation as Parliament should adopt the recommendation as proposed by the consultants that an Accountability proposed by the consultants that an Accountability Standards Act be enacted.Standards Act be enacted.

The option proposes that a twin Act complementing the The option proposes that a twin Act complementing the PFMA would spell out what is expected of the Executive PFMA would spell out what is expected of the Executive and administrations and secondly give Parliament clarity and administrations and secondly give Parliament clarity on the standards against which policy and outcomes on the standards against which policy and outcomes must be monitoredmust be monitored

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Bringing Parliament’s Oversight Role to Bringing Parliament’s Oversight Role to Bear on the Budget ProcessBear on the Budget Process

The sub-committee noting that:The sub-committee noting that:

Parliament’s constitutional responsibilities are:Parliament’s constitutional responsibilities are:

Passing legislation (sec 43(a) of the Constitution Act 108 Passing legislation (sec 43(a) of the Constitution Act 108 of 1996)of 1996)

Conducting oversight (inter-alia sec 92(2), 55(2) and the Conducting oversight (inter-alia sec 92(2), 55(2) and the PFMA)PFMA)

Budgeting (sec 77)Budgeting (sec 77)

Amending the budget, (S 77(2))Amending the budget, (S 77(2))

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Bringing Parliament’s Oversight Role to Bringing Parliament’s Oversight Role to Bear on the Budget Process (contd)Bear on the Budget Process (contd)

And that:And that:There is an inextricable link between all of these responsibilitiesThere is an inextricable link between all of these responsibilities

The compilation of the budget is essentially an executive The compilation of the budget is essentially an executive function and Parliament should maintain its integrity and ensure function and Parliament should maintain its integrity and ensure that it does not purport in any way to assume any functions of that it does not purport in any way to assume any functions of the executive.the executive.

Like all stakeholders Parliament should develop an influencing Like all stakeholders Parliament should develop an influencing role for itself during the compilation of the budget.role for itself during the compilation of the budget.

Parliament should draw on its oversight experience to inform and Parliament should draw on its oversight experience to inform and influence the budget.influence the budget.

The greater part of Parliament’s influence should be focused on The greater part of Parliament’s influence should be focused on the compilation stage of the budget and amendments to the the compilation stage of the budget and amendments to the budget should be affected only in extreme and extraordinary budget should be affected only in extreme and extraordinary contingencies. Examples of these could be significant contingencies. Examples of these could be significant incongruence between spending and delivery – where policy and incongruence between spending and delivery – where policy and spending priorities do not match or in the event of extreme spending priorities do not match or in the event of extreme departmental waste or inefficiencies departmental waste or inefficiencies

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Bringing Parliament’s Oversight Role to Bringing Parliament’s Oversight Role to Bear on the Budget Process (contd)Bear on the Budget Process (contd)

Recommendation 8Recommendation 8

The sub-committee noting the inextricable link between The sub-committee noting the inextricable link between effective Parliamentary oversight and Parliament’s role effective Parliamentary oversight and Parliament’s role in the budget process recommends that:in the budget process recommends that:

Parliament develops a formal process to enact Parliament develops a formal process to enact legislation in terms of Section 77(2) of the Constitution.legislation in terms of Section 77(2) of the Constitution.

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Subcommittee’s recommendationsSubcommittee’s recommendations

Accountability, Oversight and the Constitutional ImperativeAccountability, Oversight and the Constitutional Imperative

1. Parliament through the Rules Committee compiles a document 1. Parliament through the Rules Committee compiles a document “landscaping” the Constitutional provisions relating to the inter-“landscaping” the Constitutional provisions relating to the inter-relating themes of Oversight, Accountability, Transparency and relating themes of Oversight, Accountability, Transparency and Responsiveness, and outlining International trends. Such a Responsiveness, and outlining International trends. Such a document should also include input from Constitutional negotiators document should also include input from Constitutional negotiators either in the form of commissioned research or essays or either in the form of commissioned research or essays or (preferably) both.(preferably) both.

2. Following the tabling of the abovementioned document debates, 2. Following the tabling of the abovementioned document debates, workshops and discussions should be programmed and organised workshops and discussions should be programmed and organised within Parliament, first among MP’s themselves, and then later on within Parliament, first among MP’s themselves, and then later on expanded to include other stakeholders. These debates and expanded to include other stakeholders. These debates and discussion should have as their objective the development of a discussion should have as their objective the development of a broad understanding of the Oversight Role and Function of broad understanding of the Oversight Role and Function of Parliament within our Constitutional democracy. Parliament within our Constitutional democracy.

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Oversight Role of the NCOPOversight Role of the NCOP

1.1. The JRC initiate a process aimed at drafting guidelines The JRC initiate a process aimed at drafting guidelines for Portfolio and Select committees to allow for joint for Portfolio and Select committees to allow for joint planning of oversight workplanning of oversight work

2.2. A process should be initiated to establish protocols to A process should be initiated to establish protocols to ensure structured communication between committees ensure structured communication between committees through streamlining of the Committee Section, which through streamlining of the Committee Section, which would allow for more effective and formal would allow for more effective and formal communication between committees of both Houses communication between committees of both Houses that embark on mutual interest oversight work and that embark on mutual interest oversight work and briefing sessions.briefing sessions.

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Building Parliament’s Institutional Building Parliament’s Institutional Oversight CapacityOversight Capacity

1.1. The JRC begins a process aimed at producing a long term The JRC begins a process aimed at producing a long term institutional Vision and Mission Statement aimed at building institutional Vision and Mission Statement aimed at building Parliament’s oversight capabilities through adequate resourcing Parliament’s oversight capabilities through adequate resourcing and capacity building in committees, Constituency Offices and and capacity building in committees, Constituency Offices and within Parliament’s administrative support structures – in particular within Parliament’s administrative support structures – in particular the Committee Section where a record-keeping system, and the Committee Section where a record-keeping system, and tracking mechanisms are required to be established.tracking mechanisms are required to be established.

2.2. Parliament adopts a policy requiring each new Parliament to assess Parliament adopts a policy requiring each new Parliament to assess and review its Oversight capabilities at least once during its five-and review its Oversight capabilities at least once during its five-year lifespan.year lifespan.

3.3. The matters of independence of the Institutions supporting The matters of independence of the Institutions supporting democracy (ISD), the more co-ordinated interaction between democracy (ISD), the more co-ordinated interaction between Parliament and the ISD, the effectiveness of the oversight roles of Parliament and the ISD, the effectiveness of the oversight roles of the ISD, their budgetary procedures and their accountability to the ISD, their budgetary procedures and their accountability to Parliament, be the subject of a more extensive consultation Parliament, be the subject of a more extensive consultation process that should involve all role-players. This kind of process we process that should involve all role-players. This kind of process we believe should be initiated by Parliament and that it would be for believe should be initiated by Parliament and that it would be for Parliament to decide how best to engage in this process.Parliament to decide how best to engage in this process.

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Developing an Institutional MemoryDeveloping an Institutional Memory

4. Parliament, urgently takes measure to develop a Best 4. Parliament, urgently takes measure to develop a Best Practice Guide to capture inter-alia the best oversight Practice Guide to capture inter-alia the best oversight practices of committees and the experiences of practices of committees and the experiences of chairperson of various Select and Portfolio committees.chairperson of various Select and Portfolio committees.

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Fine tuning and development Oversight Fine tuning and development Oversight mechanismsmechanisms

1. Parliament commissions an audit of the various bodies exercising 1. Parliament commissions an audit of the various bodies exercising public powers or performing public functions and which should in public powers or performing public functions and which should in addition clearly delineate which line function departments are addition clearly delineate which line function departments are responsible for the various organs of state. Portfolio and Select responsible for the various organs of state. Portfolio and Select committees within Parliament will consequently assume the committees within Parliament will consequently assume the necessary oversight responsibility.necessary oversight responsibility.

2. Parliament through the JRC develops a policy aimed at meeting its 2. Parliament through the JRC develops a policy aimed at meeting its constitutional obligations set out in S 55 (2)(b)(ii)constitutional obligations set out in S 55 (2)(b)(ii)

3. Such policy should consider the necessity for basic legislation giving 3. Such policy should consider the necessity for basic legislation giving effect to S 55 (2) on issues of oversight and accountability and effect to S 55 (2) on issues of oversight and accountability and dealing especially with organs of state directly accountable to dealing especially with organs of state directly accountable to Parliament.Parliament.

4. The JRC develops a policy allowing for more debates on committee 4. The JRC develops a policy allowing for more debates on committee oversight reports to be programmed. These debates should take the oversight reports to be programmed. These debates should take the form of MP’s raising issues of concern based on the report tabled and form of MP’s raising issues of concern based on the report tabled and Ministers responding to those issues.Ministers responding to those issues.

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Introducing Oversight mechanismsIntroducing Oversight mechanismsOption 1Option 1

Parliament should begin a formal process of evaluating its oversight Parliament should begin a formal process of evaluating its oversight activities as distinct from its legislative role and developing a manual activities as distinct from its legislative role and developing a manual on Accountability and Oversight for MPs and Committees, with the on Accountability and Oversight for MPs and Committees, with the intention of constantly developing and refining a manual.intention of constantly developing and refining a manual.

This option proposes that Parliament first develop its oversight This option proposes that Parliament first develop its oversight processes and conventions in a manner that is captured in a manual to processes and conventions in a manner that is captured in a manual to be updated from time to time. Parliament will at a future time be able be updated from time to time. Parliament will at a future time be able to assess whether it is required for such procedures and practices to be to assess whether it is required for such procedures and practices to be captured in legislation.captured in legislation.

Option 2Option 2

Parliament should adopt the recommendation as proposed by the Parliament should adopt the recommendation as proposed by the consultants that an Accountability Standards Act be enacted.consultants that an Accountability Standards Act be enacted.

This option proposes that a twin Act complementing the PFMA would This option proposes that a twin Act complementing the PFMA would spell out what is expected of the Executive and administrations and spell out what is expected of the Executive and administrations and secondly give Parliament clarity on the standards against which policy secondly give Parliament clarity on the standards against which policy and outcomes must be monitored. and outcomes must be monitored.

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Bringing Parliament’s Oversight Role to Bringing Parliament’s Oversight Role to Bear on the Budget ProcessBear on the Budget Process

1. The sub-committee noting the inextricable link between 1. The sub-committee noting the inextricable link between effective Parliamentary oversight and Parliament’s Role effective Parliamentary oversight and Parliament’s Role in the budget process recommends that:in the budget process recommends that:

Parliament develops a formal process to enact Parliament develops a formal process to enact legislation in terms of S 77(2) of the Constitution.legislation in terms of S 77(2) of the Constitution.

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ConclusionConclusion

First time Parliament is able to assess some issues First time Parliament is able to assess some issues pertinent to its Constitutional obligationspertinent to its Constitutional obligations

Our work adds value to the ongoing work of developing Our work adds value to the ongoing work of developing Parliament worthy of our country and our PeopleParliament worthy of our country and our People

1 REPORT OF JOINT AD HOC SUB- COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND ACCOUNTABILITY.

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Transcript of 1 REPORT OF JOINT AD HOC SUB- COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND ACCOUNTABILITY.