1 Pension Funds & Value-Based Generational Accounting Eduard Ponds 13th international AFIR...
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Transcript of 1 Pension Funds & Value-Based Generational Accounting Eduard Ponds 13th international AFIR...
1
Pension Funds &
Value-Based Generational Accounting
Eduard Ponds
13th international AFIR Colloquium
18-19 september 2003
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Contents
1. Background
2. Method
3. Evaluation two pension deals
4. Conclusions paper
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Background (1)
• Pension Deals in the Netherlands are implicit regarding:
1. What is the promised benefit?
2. Who is bearing the funding risks?
• Dominant stakeholders may have bias to favour themselves at the expense of others
• Implicit pension deals may lead to:– Unfairness– Transfers of value between stakeholders (hidden)
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Background (2)
• Paper Chapman, Gordon & Speed (2001):– Principles financial economics to unravel transfers of value
between stakeholders of a company pension fund– Primarily transfers between shareholders company and
participants pension fund
• Paper Ponds (2003):– Industry pension funds dominant in the Netherlands– Intergenerational risk-sharing– Value of transfers between current and future cohorts
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Aim paper
• Framework to evaluate a DB-plan with intergenerational risk-sharing on two criteria:
1. FAIRNESS• Ex ante fair compensation for risk-taking for all cohorts• Balance between excess return and mismatch risk
2. SUSTAINABILITY• Expost acceptable outcomes for relevant variables
(Contributions, Indexation, Funding Residu)
• Method = Value-based Generational Accounting
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Mismatchrisk and Economic Value
• Pension fund taking more mismatch risk produces no Economic Value
• Taking more mismatchrisk• Higher Expected Returnbut more volatile
Hence :• Lower Contributions: but more volatile• Higher Indexation: but more volatile• Lower Funding ratio: but more volatile
• No change in economic value when better results pension fund variables are adjusted for risk
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Transfers of Value
• Pension Deal– What is the Pension promise?– How much mismatchrisk?– Who is bearing the risk?
• Rules pension deal:– Allocation of excess return and mismatch risk to stakeholders– Balance between return and risk-taking per cohort??– If not, then value transfers
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Value-based Generational Accounting
Unraveling value transfers
1. value per cohort =
Value future benefits -/- value future contributions -/- value current benefits
2. value intergenerational contract =
Value future funding residu -/- value current residue
3. Zero-sum game:
value all cohorts + value contract = 0
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• Actuarial Approach (traditional)– Stream future benefits has to be matched by contributions and
investment returns– More equities:
• Higher return, so lower contribution rate• Neglect of risk
– Value transfers:• Current workers: advantage of higher return• Future workers: disadvantage of bearing the mismatch risk
• Economic approach– Costprice– Discount rate => riskfree rate of return
Evaluation Pension Deals (1): Asset Mix and Contribution Rate
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Settings Pension Deal
1. Asset Mix: moderate risky;
2. Contribution rate:- economic approach = 19.5%
- actuarial approach = 13.4%
3. Indexation: always given
4. Risk allocation: The solvency risk is allocated to the future, i.e to subsequent generations
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Results variants contribution rate
Results after one year
economic actuarial
Contribution rate 19.5% 13.4%Expected Funding ratio 100.9% 100.0%
Transfers of value V[Workers] 0.0% +1.0% V[pensioners] 0.0% 0.0% V[contract] 0.0% -1.0%
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Evaluation Pension Deals (2): mimic Dutch case 1980-2002
Settings pension deal
1. Mix: moderate risky asset mix;
2. Contribution rate:• Base rate: actuarial approach
• Cuts: funding ratio > 100%: amortization period = 10 years
• Charges: funding ratio < 100%: amortization period = 35 years
3. Indexation policy:• Full indexation if funding ratio > 100%
• No indexation if funding ratio < 100%
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Results mimic Dutch case 1980-2002
Transfers of value between stakeholders in Dutch pension funds ____________________________________________________ I nitial funding ratio Stakeholders 90% 100% 110% ____________________________________________________ V[workers] + 0.4% + 1.3% + 2.4% V[Pensioners] - 0.5% - 0.2% 0.0% V[Contract] + 0.1% - 1.1% - 2.4% Sum 0% 0% 0%
____________________________________________________
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Conclusions paper
1. DB plans: Standard-of-living insurance based on intergenerational sharing of mismatchrisk
2. Value-based generational accounting is proposed as a tool to test a Pension Deal for– Fairness– Sustainability
3. Taking more mismatch risk produces no economic value
4. Financial economics clarifies flaws traditional actuarial approach– Rules of thumb– No explicit balance between reward and risk-taking– Hidden and unintended value transfers
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Sidenote
• Complete evaluation pension fund policy also needs welfare analysis.– Net gain measured in euro’s may be negative but in
utility terms positive– Welfare analysis not explored in this paper, it is object
of current research
• The aim of the paper is to demonstrate the relevance of value-based generational accounting.
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Value-based (1)
• Capital market = arbitrage-free:– High expected return is market-compensation for risk-taking– Value Riskfree investment = Value Risky investment
• Economic value = Risk-adjusted discounted value of future outcomes
• Method: • Deflators (UK actuaries)• Risk-neutral valuation (financial economics)
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Generational Accounting (1)
• Public Finance:– method of Generational Accounting in use to judge
sustainability government finance in the long run
• Similarities Public Finance and Pension Funds:– Overlapping cohorts– Closing balance by adjusting tax rate resp. contribution
and/or indexation– Zero-sum game