1 MH-6: Toward Total War- 1863. 2 The Civil War (1863) - Toward Total War: Strategic Overview By...
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Transcript of 1 MH-6: Toward Total War- 1863. 2 The Civil War (1863) - Toward Total War: Strategic Overview By...
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MH-6: Toward Total War- 1863
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The Civil War (1863) - Toward Total War:Strategic Overview
• By 1863: Both sides move toward Total War:– Both field huge Armies of volunteers & conscripts;– Both mobilize their economies & entire populations;
• Gradually above $$$ & population seen as legit targets
• North: destroys South’s agro, factories, rail, mills;– Anything viewed as potential support for war
• NTL – One single Battle cannot end the war– No “Napoleon Austerlitz” is possible– Nothing in Europe approached US Civil War to date
• Not even Frederick the Great’s or Napoleon’s Battles
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Strategic Overview-2• 1863: Both sides passed Europe in Total War scale:
– Total resources of North vs. Total resources of South– In long run then – who was most likely to win & why?
• Caveat: Total War requires total commitment – For North: political will to stay the course:
• Also dependent on perceived progress toward that goal
• (It still does!)
• At 1863’s start - Rebel victory seemed still possible– South’s battle wins: (Fredericksburg, Holly Springs):– Battle victories encouraged South & depressed North
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Strategic Overview-3• But by July 1863 to end of war-
– A turning point finally emerged – Decisive victories in 1 major battle & 2 key campaigns:
• 1. Gettysburg
• 2. Vicksburg
• 3. Chattanooga
• Tactical victories would have major strategic impact– (for now at start of 1863 – still in the future)– NTL both sides sought to win the decisive battle:– Both pursue the elusive dream of Napoleon’s Austerlitz
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Battle Map Overview- 1863:
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Austerlitz Chimera*
• Term’s meaning & historical background:– *Greek mythology (fire breathing lion headed sheep)
• Modern term: *unattainable dream or illusive myth
• Napoleon’s tactical battle victory – Battle of Austerlitz-1805 with decisive strategic result
– Tactical victory destroys 3rd Coalition (strategic)
– Illusive dream of generals throughout Military History
• Factors against decisive Civil War battlefield victory:– Weapons Technology that favored defense
– Terrain limiting effective employment of cavalry
– Leadership make-up shaped amateur tactics & strategy
– Main reason: very rare opportunities & huge size of Armies
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Chancellorsville - Phase I
• Hooker vs. Lee (& Jackson)– Cmdrs’ Strength & weakness:
– Hooker: good organizer & planner- restored Union morale
• But also ambitious & overconfident - until chaos of battle…
– Lee (& Jackson): no change
• Force dispositions (Map):– Hooker: 120K
– Lee: 60K
Force Dispositions
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Chancellorsville - Phase I Strategy & Tactics
• Hooker’s Objectives & Tactical Concept:– BG Meig advocates tactical concept:
• Conduct bold, rapid turn of Rebel Left Flank:
• Tactical aim: crush Lee between 2 halves
• Anvil & hammer battle strategy
– Hooker embraced Meig’s tactical concept• Believes it has potential strategic impact
• Operational & Strategic Objectives: – Destroy Lee’s Army – Force South’s surrender in the East
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Chancellorsville - Phase ITactical Battle Plan
• Plans & preparation (Battle Map Plan):– Hooker takes ½ of Force &
turns Lee’s LF– Sedgwick crosses
Rappahannock to fix Lee’s front:
• Attack Lee’s center & take Fredericksburg
• Hooker then sends Union cavalry to raid Lee’s LOC to Richmond– (That would turn out to be
a big mistake)
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Chancellorsville - Phase ITactical Deployment
• Hooker’s Deployment:– 1st stage: Sedgwick crosses
Rappahannock – Tactical Aim: fix Lee’s attention at
Fredericksburg
• Rebel scouts report move to Lee – Hooker moves 25 miles NW to
Kelley’s Ford – Stuart reports Hooker’s move over
Rapidan
• Union cavalry conduct lackluster raid-Lee’s LOC
– Hooker remains ignorant of Lee’s movements- why?
– Calvary off conducting?__________
• Hooker halts advance & forms defensive line in Wilderness
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Chancellorsville - Phase IExecution & Tactical Results
• Tactical opportunity unfolds:– JEB Stuart reports Union’s RF as: “?__________”
– Lee decides to seize opportunity presented
• Tactical Results:– Hooker surrenders tactical initiative to Lee– Lee plans with Jackson to exploit it
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Chancellorsville - Phase IIStrategy & Tactics
• Lee’s Strategic, Operational, & Tactical Objectives:– Tactical: Hit Hooker’s RF & roll up Union line;– Operational: Destroy Army of the Potomac;– Strategic: Open Washington to potential future attack;– Political: Push Union toward negotiated settlement;
• Just the reverse of Hooker’s Objectives
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Chancellorsville - Phase IIBattle Execution Plan
• Plans & preparation:– Jackson (w/28K) marches
across Union front undetected
– Lee (w/14K) demonstrates to fix Union center:
• Convince Hooker of Lee’s intent: frontal assault
• Reinforce Hooker’s desire to surprise Lee
– Early (w/10K) to hold heights of Fredericksburg
• (Against half of Union’s Army of Potomac)
Chancellorsville - Phase II Battle Execution
• Jackson is late but totally surprises Union RF under Howard’s command– Roll up and through Union RF
– Jackson & Lee continue to press Union as darkness falls
• Jackson conducts eve Recon & is hit by NC ?_______ fire:– Mistook, along with A.P. Hill,
for Union cavalry & is ambushed & wounded seriously
– Stuart takes Jackson’s corps- but unclear of Jackson’s plan
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Chancellorsville - Phase II Battle Execution-2• Meanwhile, Sedgwick rolls over Early
– Poses serious threat to Lee’s rear
• Lee counterattacks & forces Sedgwick to retreat– Hooker remains inert (“2000 yard stare”)
• Hooker then goes immediately on defensive:– Surrenders Hazel Grove high ground to Lee’s arty
• Commands Chancellorsville & surrounding area
– Hooker is wounded (shell shocked) & decides to withdraw• Over strong objections of his corps commanders
• Lee intent on Hooker’s destruction– Unable to prevent Hooker’s escape
– Demonstrates risks he is willing to take• Frontal assaults against fortified position- Again!
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Chancellorsville - Phase IITactical, Operational, & Strategic Results
• Lee held Battlefield – (tactical victory), but:– Glory very costly – 13K casualties (20%)– Union casualties: 17K (out of 120K):
• Higher casualties less a problem for Union – why?
– Attrition rate ?______________________________
• Lee failed to destroy Hooker’s Army – (His Operational Aim)– Strategic situation in Virginia remains unchanged– Austerlitz Chimera remains just that: an illusive dream
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Vicksburg Campaign
• Background & Overview (Map):– Overland campaign (Nov-Dec 1862) failed
• Holly Springs (Van Dorn cut Grant’s LOC)• Several dozen miles of RR LOC torn up by Bedford Forrest• Chickasaw Bluffs (Sherman roughly repulsed)
• Commanders’ strengths & weaknesses– Grant: Gritty, determined, good solid leader– Pemberton: mediocre, naïve, & indecisive
• Force dispositions:– Union: 44K => 70K (later reinforcements by Hallack)– Confederate: 31K
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Vicksburg Campaign II – Strategy & Tactics
• Union Strategic, Operational, & Tactical Objectives:– Sever South’s East-West communication;– Open Mississippi to Union control & commerce;– Capture & eliminate Vicksburg command
• Plans & preparation:– Various schemes tried & thwarted (Jan-Apr ’63);– Grant later called them: “make-work” efforts #2-5
(Map)*
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Vicksburg Campaign II• Grant conducted various failed
schemes (Jan-Apr 1863):– 1. Overland campaign
• Nov-Dec 1862 – Grant’s LOC cut by Van Dorn
at Holly Springs– Sherman repulsed at Chickasaw
Bluffs… then Grant tries:
– 2. Lake Providence– 3. Canal Bypass– 4. Steele’s Bayou expedition– 5. Yazoo Pass expedition
• 6. Grant finally embarks on serious offensive- April-May, 1863
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Vicksburg Campaign II- Final Deployment
• Operational & tactical Deployment:– As Grant marches
overland on West bank of Mississippi
– Porter steams through Vicksburg’s defense on midnight run
– Then ferries Grant’s forces across lower part of Mississippi to east side of river
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Vicksburg- Final Campaign Engagements & Battle Execution
• Grant stages out of Bruinsburg 30 April 1863– Cuts off Port Hudson to south
• Grant marches on Jackson (to hit rail & supplies);– Reaches Jackson, MS w/3
corps after 2 small battles:
• Attacks Jackson and forces Johnston’s Army North:– Burns Jackson munitions
factory, then turns west
• Defeats Pemberton units on march to Vicksburg:– Series of engagements prior
to reaching outskirts– Champion Hill & Big Black
River are the 2 biggest
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Vicksburg Campaign II- Siege & Capture• First elements of Grant’s
army move into position on 18 May 1863– 19 May: Conducts initial
attacks on Vicksburg defenses
– Strongly repulsed twice
• Begins siege & waits for Pemberton’s surrender– In the meantime he gathers
reinforcements (to 70K) & re-supplies transported by Navy
– After 47 Days, Pemberton surrenders on 4 July 1863
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Vicksburg Campaign II- results
• Tactical, Operational, & Strategic Results:– Tactical Union victory with major Strategic impact– Grant captures: 31K troops,172 guns, 60K rifles– South can not afford to replace this operational loss
• Strategic impact:– South’s operational loss impacts overall troop levels– Grant reopens Mississippi for Union commerce– Severed Arkansas, Texas, LA from Confederacy
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Gettysburg Campaign- prelude• Background & Overview
– Eastern Theater situation:• Crisis facing South• Vicksburg still under siege• Various strategies considered• Lee persuades all to invade North
• Meade vs. Lee:– Both solid professionals– Lee will have serious
lapse in judgment during campaign• Force dispositions
– Hooker (replaced by Meade): 115K– Lee: 76K
• Rebel Deployment:– From Chancellorsville to southern
Pennsylvania (Map):• Via west side of Shenandoah
– Lee assumed Hooker would shadow
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Gettysburg Campaign- Strategy & Tactics• Strategic, Operational, & Tactical Objectives:
– South: force Hooker to follow & relieve pressure on Richmond
• Tactical victory in North would:– Threaten key Northern cities– Press North for peace settlement– Gain diplomatic recognition from Britain
– North: react to and engage Lee’s forces• Destroy Lee’s army and protect Washington & Baltimore
• Plans & preparation:– Originally Lee agreed to Longstreet’s strategy:
• Strategic Offensive & Tactical Defense (or so he thought)
– Reality of the situation drove the tactics: • Meeting engagement for both sides & unplanned for
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Gettysburg Campaign- Invasion of North• By early June Lee deploys north
– Sends 3 corps North to PA (Map)– Spreads out over southern PA– Stuart goes off on his own
• Surprised by Calvary at Brandy Station• Attempts replay of his famous ride
• Lee remains ignorant of Hooker’s close proximity- why?– He asks:“Where is General Stuart?
• Lee learns of Hooker’s proximity from Longstreet’s “scout” (spy) Harrison- what does Lee do?– Orders his widely separated Army to
concentrate at Gettysburg• Meanwhile Lincoln replaces
Hooker with Meade
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Gettysburg- Execution: 1 July 1863• A “meeting” engagement
– Accidental contact soon escalates into major engagement
• Union’s BG Buford’s Calvary holds ground until Reynolds’ 1st Corps arrives just in time
– Enter 2 heavy corps to overwhelm Union line by late pm 1 July
• Union corps forced to retreat through streets of Gettysburg to Cemetery Ridge
• Lee makes two fateful decisions: – 1. Fight general engagement &– 2. Fail to insist that LTG Ewell
take Cemetery Ridge
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Gettysburg- Execution: 2 July 1863• Day 2: Rebel assault begins at
1630 on Union left– Longstreet’s 1st corps with 2
divisions attack en echelon on Union far left as ordered
• Battle is extremely intense to the south at Little Round Top– Col Chamberlain’s 20th Maine
barely holds Union’s far left• Then flanks the Rebel RF which
culminates in a bayonet charge
• On Union right Ewell is:– Ordered to conduct
demonstration – Late but almost breaks Union RF– Seized Union arty batteries
• Lee convinced victory near & plans to try it again tomorrow
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Gettysburg- Execution: 3 July 1863• Day 3: Lee now determined to prevail
at all costs– Plans a repeat of Day 2
(attack both of Meade’s flanks)
• But Union arty hit Culp’s Hill first – So Lee decides on a frontal assault on
Meade’s center right (Hancock’s II)
– Longstreet is ordered to command the assault of 3 mixed divisions
• Pickett’s Charge– Pickett, Pettigrew, & 13K men
march almost a mile on line to their objective of a small copse of trees
– Union II corps wait there entrenched with rifled muskets & arty cannister
– Unmitigated disaster soon follows
Aftermath• Lee reforms his line
& waits for Meade to counter-attack
• After a day Lee withdraws his forces under cover of heavy rains– His escape made
possible in part to Meade’s caution in following at a distance (Calvary)
– Unlike the Battle, Lee’s retreat well planned & executed 30
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Gettysburg- Results
• Tactical, Operational, & Strategic Results:– Major defeat for Lee- who almost lost his entire Army
• 20K veteran casualties not replaceable • 15 generals & numerous regimental & field commanders lost
– To include: Hood & Barksdale & ALL of Pickett's Brigade Cmdrs
– Union tactical victory with great strategic impact• Costly victory (MG Reynolds KIA, Hancock & Sickles WIA)
– Strategic: South ejected from North, never to return
• Major post-battle questions:– Was major opportunity to destroy Lee’s army missed?– Would Lee’s destruction have ended war?
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Chattanooga Campaign- Prelude
• Commanders’ strengths & weaknesses:– Bragg: Good tactician but seemly unable to follow
through • Also not in full command of subordinates
• (Who all like confidence in their Commander)
– Rosecrans: cautious & plodding• Tends toward overconfidence when committed
• Uneven in temperament in a crisis
• Force dispositions:– Bragg : 66K => reinforced: splits into two wings
– Rosecrans: 56K
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Chattanooga CampaignDeployment Overview
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Chattanooga Campaign-Battle of Chickamauga
• Rosecrans is convinced Bragg is retreating– Aggressively pursues– Splits forces into columns
& deploys over Georgia’s mountainous terrain
• Bragg seizes opportunity & attacks 1 Union corps– Feds wage good defense– Rosecrans plugs holes– Then fateful error=>
35
“Rock of Chickamauga”• Major tactical defeat for Union
– Entire right wing of Rosecrans’ line crumbles in disarray– Rosecrans flees the field all the way back to Chattanooga
• MG Thomas rallies Left Wing of Union forces and holds on Snodgrass Hill (“Rock of Chickamauga”)– Then makes orderly withdrawal back to Chattanooga lines
• Bragg begins siege of Chattanooga– Pinches off Union supply LOC– Rosecran’s army being starved into crisis– But Bragg is roundly criticized for not exploiting his victory
• Lincoln turns to Grant-assigned command of all of West– Visits Chattanooga, takes charge, restores “cracker line”– Relieves Rosecrans & replaces with him with Thomas– Reinforces Grant with two corps from Meade
• Deploy 1200 miles by rail
• Grant organizes forces to break out of Bragg’s siege– Relies on his faithful subordinate Sherman
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Chattanooga Campaign-Force Disposition prior to Grant’s Breakout
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Battle of Missionary Ridge
• Grant’s arrival imbue new spirit in Union forces at Chattanooga– By late Fall ready to attack– 24-25 Nov conduct series of
assaults aimed at break out
• MG Thomas ordered to attack center & hold at bottom of Missionary Ridge– But his troops still smarting
over defeat at Chickamauga
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Battle of Missionary Ridge
• Thomas’ limited attack turns into full frontal assault at Bragg’s center– Union troops fight
their way up ridge– Bragg’s forces flee in
disarray
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Battle of Missionary Ridge- results• Reason for successful Union attack:
– Poor Rebel disposition on ridge• Situated on top of geographic crest
vice military crest (?)*
• Rebel line of fire blocked (how?) while Union troops used terrain
– Rocky terrain and crevices provided ?__________
– Too few Rebels placed at foot of ridge to stop assault• Forced defenders at top to hold fire as friendly troops retreated
• Also Bragg failed to pursue Rosecrans after Chickamauga – Mismanaged siege of Chattanooga & allowed Grant to restore
situation to Union’s favor
• Union tactical victory with strategic impact– Grant secured permanent Union hold on gateway to South
– South’s heartland now open to Union attack
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Assessment• By 1863 - South’s Battle Losses totaled 66K veterans• South tactical losses translated into key strategic defeat
– Losses the South can not replace!– Loss of motivated, combat hardened veterans– Manpower stretched beyond South’s capacity
• NorthNorth: Time was on the Union’s side– Plenty of reserves available - to include willing African Americans– Economic & industrial power finally fully mobilized– Generals get better: Grant, Sherman, Sheridan, Hancock, Reynolds, Buford
• South’s defeat at Gettysburg, Vicksburg, & Chattanooga:– Marked major strategic turning point of the war– Generated crisis of confidence throughout South (historical debate):
• Most say eventual defeat as inevitable• Nobody wanted to be the last to die for lost cause• Result: desertions escalated
• It would soon get much worse as Grant took overall Command– Sherman’s march of Total War to the Sea
Back-up Slides
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Two American Societies at War • Define Total War
– Simply stated: everything is considered a target!
• North’s Grand Strategy by mid-1863?– South’s war economy targeted– Population demoralization- civilian property hit
• Mobilization & various approaches to achieving:– Conscription & its mixed success– Political costs high-
• South: “Rich man’s war and poor man’s fight”
• Results: Draft evasion, riots, unfair burden
• Future Lessons Learned (L/L) for WWI
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War Economy mobilization • South: less effective:
– Highly centralized economic control:• Government runs almost everything (Very inefficient)
– Tax revenue only 5% of that required (1/2 of 1% tax)– Barrow & print $$$ => 9000% inflation & high debt
• North: more effective:– Decentralized economic control:– Private enterprise runs most everything (some corrupt)– Government manages & encourage BZ’s cooperation;– Tax revenue provides 21% of that required– SECTREAS Chase effective manager of North’s $$;– Lincoln promoted Bz cooperation w/Gov. (or else- rail)
44
Western Theater
• Meanwhile – other operations initially conducted in the West had little significant strategic impact on the war
• Grant’s first overland campaign to capture Vicksburg had to be abandoned when his LOCs are attacked by Van Dorn at Holly Springs & Bedford Forrest to the NE– Leaving Sherman unsupported & ultimately repulsed at
Chickasaw Bluffs
• Bragg’s raids into Kentucky & Tennessee end with limited tactical success & little strategic relevance – Culminating in little more than a tactical draw against
Rosecrans at the Battle of Stones River (Murfreesboro)
45
Grant’s Overland Campaign to Vicksburg
• Long LOC (via rail) vulnerable to cavalry raids– Van Dorn’s attack at Holly
Springs– Bedford Forrest to NE
• Grant forced to abandon campaign when LOC cut off– Subsists off land => key
Lessons Learned (LL)
• Sherman left unsupported at Chickasaw Bluffs:– Soundly repulsed by
Vicksburg’s defenders– It’s back to “drawing board”
46
Battle of Stones River (Murfreesboro) • Execution: 31 Dec 1862
– Bragg anticipates Rosecrans – Attacks Union’s right flank at
dawn exploiting tactical surprise – Surprised Union troops on right
collapsed into closed “jackknife” like defensive stance
• 2 Jan 1863: Bragg then attacks Union left across Stones River – Union holds & its arty decimates
Rebel attack– Bragg forced to withdraw 30
miles SE to Tullahoma
47
Assessment: Stalemate & Contributing Factors
• Geography:– Virginia: numerous rivers & creeks (spring rains)
• Difficult to maneuver & deploy forces rapidly (time)
– Western Theater: greater distances:• Stretch out Lines of Communication & supply;
• Overland LOCs (rr) especially vulnerable to attack:
• Grant’s Overland Campaign to Vicksburg– Example: Van Dorn at Holly Springs & Bedford Forrest to NE
• Different fighting capacities & trade-offs:– North: Mpw, Logistic/supply, $$$ & industrial power– South: Well led & motivated troops, aggressive tactics
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Assessment –Toward Total War• Contrasting perspectives:
– Federal view: South’s determined resistance surprising
– McClellan’s theory: small Southern elite were main culprits
– Grant: Surprise assault at Shiloh proved otherwise:• Especially after Union victories at Forts Henry & Donelson
• Peninsula Campaign convinced the rest of North – long war
– Total War now appeared unavoidable
• Grand Strategy required major revision for Total War:– Southern society must now be changed by force;
– North must overthrow South’s entire way of life;
• Total War requires new & harsher tactics:– Seize & destroy property, crops, & all material support;
– Destroy industry & towns & RR, & treat civilians as enemy