1 Invasive Browser Sniffing and Countermeasures Aditya Sinha Harshvardhan Kelkar.

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1 Invasive Browser Sniffing and Countermeasures Aditya Sinha Harshvardhan Kelkar
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Transcript of 1 Invasive Browser Sniffing and Countermeasures Aditya Sinha Harshvardhan Kelkar.

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Invasive Browser Sniffing and Countermeasures

Aditya Sinha Harshvardhan Kelkar

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What is this paper about?

Browser Cache/History sniffing Proposed Solution (URL

personalization) Implementation ,costs and security

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Browser Caches/Browser History

Why use Browser Caches? Where do they reside? Vulnerable to timing based

attacks. What about Browser History?

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Threats? Phishing attacks Wiki:In computing, phishing is an

attempt to criminally and fraudulently acquire sensitive information, such as usernames, passwords and credit card details, by masquerading as a trustworthy entity in an electronic communication.

Link Manipulation

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How?

Spoofing Impersonating Websites

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AUSTRALIA LOTTO LOTTERY INC. 5th Floor East

Commonwealth Centre55 Currie StreetAdelaide SA 5000,South Australia.

  WINNING NOTIFICATION   We are delighted to inform you of  the result of the E-mail address ballot lottery

draw of the Australian cash-out lotto bv international programme,which took place on the 26th of MAY 2008.This is a computer generated lottery of Internet users using emailaddresses

for draws.

This lotto draw is fully based on an electronic selection of winners using their e-mail addresses from different World Wide Web(www)sites.Your e-mail address attached to ticket number: 275-189-657-23-05 with Serial number 8756-05 drew the lucky numbers  and bonus ball number which subsequently won you the lottery in the 2nd category.You have therefore been approved to claim a total sum of  US$500,000.00 (five HUNDRED THOUSAND U.S DOLLARS) in cash credit file ref:ILP/HW 47509/02.

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What happens next??

Social Engineering Detect online Behaviour Its all from the contextual

information.

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Potential CounterMeasures

Clearing Browser Cache Manually Disable all Caching Limiting Caching on client side Server side solution. (Prevention of

verification by personalization)

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Client side Vs Server side

Both are complementary. Address problem from different

angles. Server side solution plugs holes

which may arise in a client side solution.

Eg Caching proxy

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Ways to conceal the Cache

Hide the references to visited websites.

Pollute the references. Authors combined both methods. Internal and entrance URLS. Eg http://test-run.com http://test-run.com/logout.jsp

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What the Authors did?

Client side: Forcing Cache and History misses

Server side: Plug in solution

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Implementation Issues

The robots exclusion standard User Agent values eg. “Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0;

Windows NT 5.0)” “Mozilla/

5.0(compatible;googlebot/2.1)” Use of Privileges

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Goals as set by the Authors Fullest possible use of browser caches and

history 1. A service provider SP should be able to prevent

any sniffing of any data related to any of their clients, for data obtained from SP.

2.The above requirement should hold even if caching

proxies are used. 3.Search engines must retain ability to find data

served by SP.

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How these goals are achieved?

Customization technique for URLS.(Extention)

Cache pollution Hiding vs Obfuscating

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A Potential attack

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A formal goal specification

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We let ‘A’ be an adversary controlling any member of C but C.

‘A’ may post arbitrary requests x and observe the responses.

A goal of ‘A’ is to output a pair (S, x) such that HITC(x) is true.

We say that pi(S) is perfectly privacy-preserving if A will not attain the goal but with a negligible probability

We say that pi(S) is searchable if and only if E can generate a valid response x to the query.

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Server Side Solution

Similar to middleware The core is a filter What does the filter do? Modification/Customization

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Pseudonyms Establishing a pseudonym Entrance at the index page. Pseudonyms and temporary pseudonyms are selected

from a sufficiently large space, e.g., of 64-128 bits length.

Pseudonyms are generated pseudorandomly each time any visitor starts browsing at a web site.

Using a Pseudonym Translators domain comes in play Querystring like argument appended to URL

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Pseudonym validity Check Cookies Http-referer Message authentication codes It is a policy matter to determine what

to do if a pseudonym or temporary pseudonym cannot be established to be valid.

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Robot policies The same policies do not necessarily apply to

robots and to clients representing human users. one could – use a whitelist approach ie allow

certain robot processes additional privileges. Eg a crawler or a search engine with access to non-pseudonymized data.

Alternately use temporary Pseudonyms. What about other processes? Privacy Agreements between Search engine and

Server.

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Pollution Policy A client C can arrive at a web site through four means:

typing in the URL, following a bookmark, following a link from a search engine, and by following a link from an external site.

When is C’s Cache polluted? How to choose the pollutants? If S cannot guarantee that all of the sites in its

pollutants list will provide the same list, it must randomize which pollutants it provides.

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Example - Translator

C asks for S

Goes to S(t)

S(t) adds p , queries S(b) and replies

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Translation Off Site

References Translator – Proxy for the page

Off site References ?

Knowledge from off site references

Two ways to handle it :

Forward to the client

Forward using the same redirection URL

Dont over-use the translator

A translator working on all sites is an open proxy

server !

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Redirection

Redirection – is it always necessary ?

Collaborate or Separate sites ?

Collaborate

Use the same translator

More work

Policy to see if needed

Separate

Shows up as internal page

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Translation Policies

Off site Redirection Policy – Should redirection

take place through the translator ?

=> Is it safe or unsafe ?

Data Replacement Policy – Should data

redirection take place through the translator ?

Same Question .

=> Flash , Movies , Jpegs

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Client Robot Distinction

If we are using artificially intelligent robots to access

sites ? HA ! I wish .

Client Robots means really dumb client applications

eg vlc player , Google Bot , Wget .

Does redirection work in the same way ?

History not affected

Cache affected

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Special Cases 1

Akamai – Distributed Content Delivery System

Two ways to handle this

ISP provides the feature to translate to all customers

(web sites) for Akamai

Translator for the web site being accessed

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Special Case 2

A =======> B

Redirection between A and B through A's translator .

I don't want to !

Two ways :

Shared – if B “adopts” A's pseudonym

Transfer – if B “accepts and replaces” A's

pseudonym

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Cache Pollution Reciprocity

Why create your own mess when you can get Site

Admin's to create mess for you !

A group of site Admin's could “agree” to pollute all

the cache's of all the clients with the same set of

URL's

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Security

Internal PagesPseudonym

1. Temporary – So not alive always

2. Shared – Trusted Party

If client is dumb to give it to third party , well then

client's screwed !

If trusted party is not really trustworthy , well everyone's

screwed !

Else pseudonym authenticated !

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Security

Entrance Page

Dump Garbage – We are assured of “mess” from Site

Admin's

Searchability

Search Indexing done by “robots”

Already excluded , oblivious to pseudonyms .

Smart clients

Clients can change pseudonyms but WHY !

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Translator

Written in Java

Pseudonym's calculated using

java.security.SecureRandom

Using 64 bit random number

Exclude “robot” or “wget”

Parsing in header of HTTP request and response

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Algorithm

Get Request from Client

Is pseud present ?

=> If not generate and reply

=> If present , authenticate and reply with same

pseud

If not text//html forward data through redirection

policy

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Timing

Not much over head w.r.t time

when “translating” - 1000 times

loop

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Cumulative Time

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Considerations

Client Agent Type Forwarding

Blind Server knows only the translator agent

Cookies

Client sends cookie only to the server it got it from . If

translator on different domain then it ends up

changing cookies all the time . Not really something

we want to do .

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Cookie

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Lazy Translation

For static Html pages

Pseudonyms stored at the same place

Administrator can specify before hand

No parsing for translator

Translator very happy

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Sample Translation

<a href=’http://www.google.com/’>Go to google</a>

<a href=’http://10.0.0.1/login.jsp’>Log in</a>

<img src=’/images/welcome.gif’>

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Sample Translation

The translator replaces any occurrences of the SB ’s

address with its own.

<a href=’http://www.google.com/’>Go to google</a>

<a href=’http://test-run.com /login.jsp’>Log in</a>

<img src=’/images/welcome.gif’>

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Sample Translation

Then, based on ST ’s off-site redirection policy, it

changes any off-site (external) URLs to redirect

through itself:

<a href=’http://test-run.com/redir? www.google.com’>

Go to google</a>

<a href=’http://test-run.com/login.jsp’>Log in</a>

<img src=’/images/welcome.gif’>

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Sample Translation

Next, it updates all on-site references to use the

pseudonym. This makes all the URLs unique:

<a href=’http://test-run.com/redir?www.google.com?

38fa029f234fadc3 ’> Go to google</a>

<a href=’http://test-run.com/login.jsp?

38fa029f234fadc3 ’>Log in</a>

<img src=’/images/welcome.gif?38fa029f234fadc3 ’>

VOILA !!

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Special Thanks

This is a completely stolen piece of

work !

We didn’t do anything except make

the presentation !

All the work done by - Markus

Jakobsson , Sid StammA