167

Notes

1 Introduction

1 . For a more detailed discussion of such an argument against pervasive rela-tivism, see Boghossian (2006) and Nagel (1997).

2 . See Stevenson (1963) p. 26–27 for more on how non-cognitivists can allow for conflicting attitudes.

3 . It is plausible that a subject does not even withhold toward a proposition that she has never even considered. Plausibly, she has no doxastic attitude whatsoever toward such a proposition.

4 . This is true so long as the level of generality is kept constant. It is plausible that a degree of belief of 0.7 and a degree of belief that is the range 0.6–0.8 are not incompatible. However, even this depends what one thinks these interval degrees of belief to represent. For instance, some take them to repre-sent the fact that the subject’s evidence does not rule out any assignment to the proposition in that range. Under that interpretation, it seems that an interval credence of 0.6–0.8 would be incompatible with a credence of 0.7.

5 . See Pascal (1670) for a more detailed explanation and defense of the wager. 6 . See Anselm (1965). 7 . The division between the epistemic and the pragmatic is perhaps not as

clear-cut as I have made it out to be. A somewhat recent debate within episte-mology concerns pragmatic encroachment into the epistemic. According to the thesis of pragmatic encroachment, or more formally interest-relativism (Stanley 2008), pragmatic considerations determine how good your epis-temic reasons need to be in order to be justified in believing some claim. So, according to this claim, it is possible that two individuals have equally good epistemic reasons to believe some proposition, yet only one of them is epistemically justified in believing it. If the two individuals had differing stakes in being correct, they could have different epistemic standards appli-cable to them. However, even here it is not that pragmatic reasons are acting themselves as epistemic reasons. Their influence lies elsewhere. For a defense of pragmatic encroachment in epistemology, see Hawthorne (2004), Stanley (2008), Fantl and McGrath (2002), (2007), and (2009). For a critical response, see Brown (2008) and (2012), and Fumerton (2010a).

8 . For a more detailed defense of epistemic objectivism see Matheson (2012). For a subjective account of rationality, see Foley (1993) and (2001).

9 . Others might insist on a third category of agential justification where it is the agent that is justified in holding a particular belief perhaps because she has fulfilled her epistemic obligations or been intellectually virtuous. I will not be concerned with this type of justification here.

10 . See Pryor (2000) for a more detailed defense of this claim. 11 . For a more detailed explanation and defense of evidentialism, see Conee and

Feldman (1985).

168 Notes

12 . Williamson (2000) is a notable exception. 13 . This terminology is taken from Bergmann (2005), 422. 14 . It is independent in that it does not take issue with the original study; it

simply makes its own case for the opposite conclusion. 15 . See Alvin Goldman’s (2009) account of reliabilism and Michael Bergmann’s

(2006) account of proper function for two representative examples.

2 Idealized Disagreement

1 . Although Kelly introduced the term into the literature on the epistemic significance of disagreement, he credits Gutting (1982) for coining the term.

2 . This case parallels an example given by Christensen (2007). For another example, see Feldman’s (2006c) Dean on the Quad case.

3 . See Carey and Matheson (2013) for more on this type of a reason to discount an epistemic peer.

4 . While it seems possible that you can disagree with yourself (at least at different times), the paradigm cases of disagreement are cases where you disagree with another individual. I will be focusing on such cases here.

5 . Dougherty (2013) also makes this point. 6 . For more on this, see Dougherty (2013). 7 . The case resembles one given by Feldman (2003a, p. 55–56). 8 . This example comes from Lehrer (1974, p. 97–99) 9 . Another powerful example comes from the McGurk effect. In the McGurk

effect, your visual information overrides your auditory information causing you to misinterpret what you are hearing.

10 . It might be that we are infallible and can be certain about some subset of introspective beliefs. A belief in the cogito proposition <I exist> is a plausible example.

11 . For instance, critical to Williamson’s argument for his desired conclusion is that there is a safety condition on knowledge. This is far from clear. Nevertheless, there does appear to be a safety condition on infallibility, so Williamson’s reliance on the idea that a subject’s introspective belief could easily have been wrong does not impede our purposes here. For more on Williamson’s anti-luminosity argument, see Brueckner and Fiocco (2002), Neta and Rohrbaugh (2004), Weatherson (2004), Fumerton (2009), and Poston and Meeker (2010).

12 . This is not to say that it often (or even ever) actually is met. 13 . Kelly (2005) notes this possibility. If the Uniqueness Thesis is true (roughly,

for every body of evidence E, there is at most one doxastic attitude toward p that is justified by E) and evidence about the idealized disagreement is of no epistemic significance, then if you had already correctly responded to your evidence before getting evidence of the disagreement it might be that you are not only permitted but rationally required to retain your attitude.

14 . See King (2011) and Matheson (2014a) for more on the issues related to the nonexistence of peer disagreement.

Notes 169

3 Steadfast Views of Disagreement

1 . In addition, Gricean norms give us a good explanation why citing such evidence would be inappropriate. See Grice (2000).

2 . A principle that captures the point here is that evidence of evidence is evidence. For a further defense of this claim, see Feldman (2009). For a further objection, see Fitelson (2012), and for a response, see Feldman (2014). See also, Roche (2013).

3 . We will explore this claim in much more detail in Chapter 6. 4 . We will examine one problem with the argument here. In Chapter 7 we will

see a more fatal flaw. See also Matheson (2009). 5 . However, in Chapter 7, we will see that even on this setup the argument faces

a fatal flaw. 6 . In Chapter 7 I will defend the stronger claim that what you are justified in

believing on the basis of E* has changed. 7 . In Chapter 7 we will see good reason to believe that this is not so. That is, we

will see good reason to believe that even in these scenarios doxastic concilia-tion is called for.

8 . Arguments in this section are developed from Matheson (2009). Kelly (2010) explicitly rejects the canceling-out argument. We will explore his assessment of the argument in Chapter 7.

9 . We will explore this concern later in the book. 10 . We will give more attention to private evidence and its significance to the

disagreement debate when we move to our analysis of everyday disagree-ments in Chapter 6.

11 . For more on this point, see Conee (2009). There are also relevant issues here concerning personal information. These will be discussed in Chapter 5.

12 . Foley (2001, 79). There is some tension in Foley’s account here. When discussing disagreement from a tripartite doxastic picture, Foley claims that suspension of judgment is called for. However, in discussing disagreement in with a degreed notion of belief, Foley seems to suggest that no doxastic movement is required unless one has a reason to think that one’s opponent is in an ‘especially good position’ Foley (2001, 114).

13 . For a similar claim, see Enoch (2010) p. 982. For a criticism of Enoch, see Littlejohn (2013).

14 . For a defense of agent-centered views, see Huemer (2011) and DePaul (2013). For objections, see Littlejohn (2013).

15 . Christensen (2007) and Littlejohn (2013) also make this point. 16 . This has led some to claim that the assessment of the disagreement must

come from features independent of the disagreement itself. See Christensen (2007).

17 . A similar argument is made by Littlejohn (2013). 18 . It is worth noting that Plantinga’s concern here is with a deontological

conception of justification, and there are good reasons to believe that this is not the relevant sense of ‘justification’ under discussion here.

19 . For a more detailed defense of this claim, see Matheson (2011) and Matheson (2014b).

20 . It may also help to recall our earlier example of two sociologists who have each independently completed their own (equally good) surveys on some

170 Notes

issue. We can add to this case some features to turn it into an idealized case of disagreement. Suppose now that both sociologists share their data with each other, and that they are even equally aware of both sets of data. Suppose further that the first sociologist’s survey supported p and that she believes p, while the second sociologist’s survey supported not-p and that she believes not-p. While any belief on the matter requires taking some epistemic risk – there is an inevitable chance of being mistaken – the mere fact that the first sociologist conducted her survey does not give her an undefeated epistemic reason to go with its conclusion. While survey data is not the same as a seeming, this example shows that such evidence does not go undefeated simply because it is yours .

21 . For a more extensive discussion on Plantinga and the epistemic significance of disagreement, see Feldman (2003b).

22 . An important part of Bergmann’s case consists of objections to alternatives to Steadfast Views. We will examine these in Chapter 7.

23 . See Moffet (2007) for one example. For more on underdetermination in philosophy of science, see Duhem (1954), Quine (1953), Laudan (1990), and Laudan and Leplin (1991).

24 . This example comes from Feldman (2006c). 25 . This follows Feldman (2006c) and Matheson (2011). 26 . See White (2005) and Christensen (2007) for more on this point. 27 . For a more detailed analysis of the Uniqueness Thesis on a degreed picture of

belief, see Matheson (2011). See White (2005) and (2013) for further defenses of the Uniqueness Thesis.

28 . Rosen (2001): 71–72. 29 . The arguments here follow Matheson (2011). 30 . The arguments here follow Matheson (2011). Christensen (2007, p. 192)

makes a similar point. 31 . Conee calls this “evidence relevant to the dispute.” 32 . Kelly (2013) can be read as making a similar claim. 33 . Goldman’s focus is on what he calls ‘E-systems’: epistemic systems comprised

of different epistemic norms, standards, and principles (2010, 187). 34 . Feldman (2006c) makes this same point. 35 . Conee (2011) considers a similar principle. 36 . For a further attack on agent-centered norms, see Littlejohn (2013). 37 . See White (2005) and (2013) for some arguments against moderate

permissivism. 38 . Christensen (2007, 211) makes the same point. 39 . For more on the relationship between the Uniqueness Thesis and Conciliatory

Views of disagreement (and the Equal Weight View in particular), see Cohen (2013).

40 . In Newcomb’s problem a predictor (who is extremely accurate in his predic-tions on these matters) presents you with two boxes – one clear and one opaque – and the choice to take one or both boxes. In the clear box is $1000. What is in the opaque box depends upon what the predictor predicted. If he predicted that you would take only one box, there is $1,000,000 in the opaque box. If he predicted that you would take both boxes, there is nothing in the opaque box. Newcomb’s problem concerns which choice would be rational for you to make in this scenario. One-boxers claim that taking only

Notes 171

the opaque box is the rational response, whereas two-boxers claim that taking both boxes is the rational response.

41 . ‘Actual world chauvinism’ is Carey’s (2011) wonderful term. 42 . These considerations also give us reason to believe that premise (2) is false as

well. It is likely that most individuals possess evidence that they are fallible and that it is possible that someone in their epistemic position with respect to p is nevertheless mistaken about p. However, when one first gains such evidence, it seems that it is of epistemic significance – that it does call for a somewhat weakened confidence in one’s beliefs. I take it that this is some-thing that instructors of courses on introduction to philosophy attempt to do with their students.

43 . Carey (2011, 379) also makes this point. 44 . I include ‘informed’ to make sure that the individual is aware of the higher-

order evidence of opinions on the solution to Newcomb’s problem in her world.

45 . Lammenranta (2011) also discusses such a case. 46 . For an extended discussion of Kelly’s tyrant case, see Carey (2011). 47 . Tersman (2013) also defends this conclusion. 48 . We will return to this important difference in Chapter 7.

4 Conciliatory Views of Disagreement and the Equal Weight View

1 . We will not be considering views according to which gaining evidence that you are a party to an idealized disagreement increases your justification for the doxastic attitude you had adopted toward the disputed proposition.

2 . Here is the contrast with some Steadfast Views of disagreement. Some Steadfast Views of disagreement maintain that gaining evidence that you are party to an idealized disagreement gives you evidence to adjust your doxastic attitude toward the disputed proposition but that this evidence is always itself defeated due to considerations involving self-trust, an error theory you possess, and so forth.

3 . Here I am following Elga (2007). 4 . As we saw in Chapter 2, if you were justified in believing that your peer was

not likely to be correct on the matter – that she is not in a good epistemic position on the matter – then you would not gain a reason to believe that her adopted attitude is the justified response to that evidence. Of course, if you were nevertheless justified in believing that you were peers in such a situa-tion, parallel considerations would have it that you would not have a good reason to believe that your own response to the evidence is justified.

5 . Symmetrical considerations have it that you also have a reason to believe that your peer’s response to the shared evidence is mistaken (given that your peer disagrees with you). We will explore this more below.

6 . Kelly (2010), Lackey (2010), and Littlejohn (2013) all make this point as well. 7 . Conee (2009), Dougherty (2013), and Littlejohn (2013) all give such exam-

ples to support Conciliatory Views. 8 . Here it is important that the subjects were not antecedently aware of such a

disagreement.

172 Notes

9 . Many examples also involve watches. See Christensen (2007), Enoch (2010), Feldman (2007), Kelly (2010), and White (2009) for some examples.

10 . This case parallels one given by Kelly (2010, 152) and, more loosely, cases given by Christensen (2007, 196) and Feldman (2006b, 234).

11 . This is not to say that this evidence cannot be defeated. 12 . For an objection to this argument, see Pritchard (2013). 13 . See Carey and Matheson (2013) for more on this point. 14 . This is not to say that this evidence cannot be defeated. We will examine

potential defeaters for this evidence in Chapters 6 and 7. 15 . Again, this is not to say that this evidence cannot be defeated. 16 . Kelly (2010, 117) pushes this point. 17 . Kelly (2010, 118) also points out that there are additional complications

for the tripartite account regarding disagreements involving more than two parties. Since we are focused here on idealized two-party disagreements, we will ignore these complications here.

18 . Of course, on a tripartite doxastic taxonomy, both of these options result in adopting the skeptical attitude of suspension of judgment.

19 . Perhaps this is why Feldman (who adopts a tripartite taxonomy) restricts his discussion of the epistemic significance of disagreement to cases where one individual believes p and the other individual disbelieves p.

20 . A further technical challenge for the Equal Weight View concerns how revising one’s attitudes toward peer propositions should affect one’s attitudes toward other non-peer propositions. See Jehle and Fitelson (2009). According to Jehle and Fitelson, the Equal Weight View is at least incomplete when it comes to this matter, and they raise some problems within a Bayesian frame-work for some straightforward solutions. For a potential Bayesian resolution, see Dougherty (2013).

21 . It doesn’t matter whether matters of humor are indeed relative. Francine’s evidence may be misleading evidence. Nevertheless, even misleading evidence can defeat.

22 . Similarly, one would have a defeater for splitting the difference if one were also justified in being an anti-realist about the disputed proposition. Things are a little more complicated here since to also gain evidence that one was a party to an idealized disagreement, one would need evidence that there were doxastic attitudes being adopted to the disputed proposition, and most anti-realists deny that we have beliefs about anti-realist matters. However, this needn’t be the case. See, for instance, Horgan and Timmons (2006).

23 . We will examine another kind of defeat, self-defeat, in Chapter 7. 24 . Principles similar to Independence can be found in Elga (2007), Kornblith

(2010), Cohen (2013), and at least implicitly in Frances (2010). See also Christensen (2009).

25 . We will examine objections to Independence in the following chapter.

5 Objections to the Equal Weight View

1 . For more on this point, see Matheson (2009). 2 . This is Kelly’s term (2010, 159).

Notes 173

3 . Since one is an epistemic peer of oneself and the two beliefs are inconsistent, we seem to have a case that at least closely parallels an idealized case of peer disagreement. However, since there is not a disagreement over any one particular proposition in this case, there is also a noteworthy difference between these cases of doxastic conflict.

4 . In Kelly (2010) this example is labeled ‘Case 5’. I have made only minor amendments to Kelly’s case.

5 . While we have not yet considered the epistemic significance of agreement, our conception of higher-order evidence has it that in such a case each party would receive some confirming higher-order evidence that a 0.3 degree of belief toward H is the appropriate response to that first-order evidence.

6 . This parallels a case given by Lackey (2010a). 7 . This is particularly relevant since those who raise worries about extreme

disagreements also typically take conciliation to be called for in these philo-sophical disagreements.

8 . This follows an example in Matheson (2011a). 9 . This point is argued for at length in Matheson (2011a and 2014c).

10 . If the defeater in question were a rebutting defeater (if it simply gave evidence against believing p without attacking the connection between E and p), then the evidence for believing p could defeat this defeater and would if it were equally as strong (or stronger).

11 . Cohen (2013) comes to a similar conclusion, though he takes it that the significance of personal information has it that the Equal Weight View is only approximately correct since he does not build symmetry of personal information into the idealized peer disagreements.

12 . This makes this response on Lackey’s part somewhat strange. Her focus is on the significance of peer disagreement, but peer disagreement too is in many ways cut off from the real world.

13 . We will return to this issue in Chapter 6. 14 . This bears some similarity to the problem of the speckled hen for direct

acquaintance accounts of knowledge. See Chisholm (1942). 15 . Christensen (2011, 8) makes a similar point. 16 . Christensen, in assessing the Extreme Restaurant Check case also utilizes

independent considerations to discount the other’s party’s opinion. (2007, 200–202) He claims that in this case we have a ‘common sense’ check against the independent piece of information that shares of a bill are never higher than the total bill. While such a piece of information may be available as an independent reason to discount the other party, it is worth noting that it needn’t be. We can add to the Extreme Restaurant Case that the other party also disagrees with the claim that the shares are always less than the total. If so, then the fact that the shares are always less than the total will no longer be a piece of information independent from the disagreement, capable of discounting the other party.

17 . This case is based on a true story described to me by an acquaintance. 18 . Remember, they have independently come to their conclusions, so the expla-

nation that I am the victim of an elaborate prank is not very plausible.

174 Notes

6 Everyday Disagreements

1 . Frances (2010), King (2011), and Matheson (2014a) are notable exceptions. 2 . For more on this point see King (2013) and Matheson (2014a). 3 . See King (2013) for more on this point. King terms this conception of

evidence “the dialectical conception of evidence.” 4 . Thanks to an anonymous referee for pressing me on this point. Christensen

(2011) also has this worry. 5 . Christensen (2011) considers such a case. 6 . See van Inwagen (1996). 7 . Given that Feldman is now himself a dean, it is important to the integrity

of the case that the dean thought to be seen is not identical to one of the individuals looking out the window.

8 . Additionally, several small differences can add up to large differences. See King (2013) for more on this point.

9 . At least presuming that your background information does not have it that two glasses of wine is sufficient to make a significant difference in her (rele-vant) cognitive abilities.

10 . Dougherty (2013) and Matheson (2014a) also make this point. 11 . I have left the relativizations to a time implicit. 12 . For more on this point, see Dougherty (2013). 13 . We can also flip this case around and suppose that the professor instead

finds the gifted student to agree with her. Plausibly, this would permit her to increase her confidence in the target proposition (remember, we are supposing that these are the only two opinions on the matter that either party is aware of). Finding out that other reliable individuals agree with you gives you an additional reason to believe that you are correct, even if you are in a slightly better epistemic position on the matter than they are.

14 . Plausibly, your awareness of Priest and others who share his belief has some epistemic effect on your justification for believing that there cannot be true contradictions. Even if you remain justified in so believing, plausibly your justification for this is not as high as it would be if you were not aware of any dissent.

15 . Frances (2010) argues for a similar point. 16 . Kornblith (2013) and Carey and Matheson (2013) also argue for this point. 17 . Carey and Matheson (2013) coined this term. 18 . Similar considerations can apply to particular degrees of belief. If we want to

adopt a more fine-grained doxastic taxonomy, then we will have more fine-grained ‘candidates’ and a more fine-grained ‘winner.’

19 . For more on this, see Elga (2007) and Goldman (2001). 20 . See White (2011) and Bogardus (2013b) for more on the issue of contingency

and belief. 21 . Some additional motivation for such an account may come from the

Condorcet Jury Theorem. For more on the Condorcet Jury Theorem, see List and Goodin (2001). However, see Lackey (2013) for reasons to believe that numbers still matter even when there is not independence.

22 . This argument is a slight variation from Carey and Matheson (2013). There is also a similar argument given in Frances (2013).

23 . See Carey (2011) for more on this point.

Notes 175

24 . This issue is explored in Goldman (2001). 25 . Goldman (2001, 94) also makes this claim. 26 . Frances (2013) also discusses this objection. 27 . At least, having considered it, you are aware of it. 28 . While the truth of p itself may be relevant for knowledge, our concern is with

epistemic justification, so it suffices that close worlds simply have the same first-order evidence.

29 . Ballantyne (2013) and Carey and Matheson (2013) also discuss nearby possible disagreements.

30 . Given the lack of progress in philosophy, and the continual failures to achieve anything close to consensus on major philosophical claims, it may be quite likely that there are nearby worlds whose epistemic elections crown different winning attitudes to the major philosophical claims. For more on the lack of progress in philosophy, see Kornblith (2013).

7 Objections

1 . For our purposes it does not matter what the individual’s memorial evidence consists of – whatever it is, she loses it every five seconds.

2 . However, not everyone shares this worry. Others see the skeptical conse-quences as entirely appropriate. See, for instance, Frances (2005), Feldman (2006c), Goldberg (2009), Goldberg (2013a), and Kornblith (2013).

3 . Here we need to remember that no-longer-living individuals’ votes still count in the epistemic election, and they can count even quite significantly. So, simply killing off dissenters will not eliminate controversy in the way needed to declare a clear winner in the epistemic election.

4 . For a comparison between Cartesian skepticism and the skepticism resulting from disagreement, see Lammenranta (2013).

5 . See for instance van Inwagen (1996), Bergmann (2009), Plantinga (2000b) 6 . See Moore (1959, 226). 7 . While one might claim that there is an important asymmetry between the

two Moorean arguments – an asymmetry that makes the Moorean response to the skeptical threat from disagreement better than the Moorean response to external world skepticism – it is hard to see what such a difference could be. In fact, as we will see, if anything the Moorean response to the skeptical threat from disagreement is less likely to succeed.

8 . This sketch of a response to external world skepticism leaves open how our beliefs may enjoy prima facie justification. It may be in light of being produced by reliable faculties, by corresponding to the way things appear, by fitting our evidence, etc.

9 . For a similar account, see Huemer (2001), 183. 10 . For more on this, see Lammenranta (2013). 11 . Lammenranta (2013) also makes this connection. 12 . See Frances (2009) for more on this point. 13 . Goldberg (2013a) also argues for this claim. 14 . See Mercier (2012), Nickerson (1996), Dawson et al. (2002), Schulz-Hardt

et al. (2002) and Shulz-Hardt et al. (2006) for some examples. 15 . For more on this issue, see Dunn (manuscript).

176 Notes

16 . Kornblith (2013) makes a similar point. 17 . I have added the name and have made several small changes to the case. 18 . For more on this, see Kornblith (2013). 19 . Perhaps stranger still, philosophers are likely to see this increased disagree-

ment itself as progress! For example, Adams (2013) notes all the disparate views regarding the moral permissibility of eating meat. He notes that we have carved out more conceptual space than was seen in the past. This has increased the disagreement (by increasing the number of opposing camps), yet we are likely to see this a philosophical progress.

20 . Thanks to Kevin McCain for pressing me on this point. 21 . Sisyphus is a character from Greek mythology that was punished by being

forced to continually roll a large boulder up a hill only to watch it roll back down.

22 . Russell (‘The Value of Philosophy’). 23 . See Elga (2010), O’Connor (1999), Plantinga (2000a) and (2000b), Taliaferro

(2009), and Weatherson (2014). For responses, see Bogardus (2009), Christensen (2009), Elga (2010), Frances (2010), Graves (2013), Kornblith (2013), and Littlejohn (2013).

24 . The distinction between automatically self-undermining claims and poten-tially self-undermining claims is Christensen’s (2009).

25 . When coupled with other normative claims, there may be additional impli-cations. For instance, given certain norms of assertion, there may be addi-tional consequences regarding appropriate assertions of the Equal Weight View. See Goldberg (2013a) for an argument that there are not.

26 . Similarly, Plantinga’s own view of warrant, proper functionalism can be turned on itself. Plantinga claims that a belief has warrant roughly when it was formed by a properly functioning belief forming process aimed at truth and operating in an environment for which it was designed. However, it is possible that a belief in that proposition is never itself formed by a properly functioning belief forming process aimed at truth and operating in an envi-ronment for which it was designed.

27 . For more on this point, see Conee (2004). 28 . According to the knowledge norms of assertion, assertions that p are appro-

priate only if the speaker knows p. For a defense of the knowledge norm, see Williamson (2000), Unger (1975), DeRose (1996), Hawthorne (2004), and Stanley (2008). According to the justification norm of assertion, asser-tions that p are appropriate only if the speaker is justified in believing p. For defenses, see Lackey (2007) and Kvanvig (2009). On either of these accounts, if you are required to be skeptical about the Equal Weight View, it would also be inappropriate for you to assert that the Equal Weight View is correct. For a novel argument that defenders of the Equal Weight View needn’t be violating any norm of assertion, see Goldberg (2013a).

29 . Arguments in this section develop those initially presented in Matheson (2014b).

30 . Elga’s terminology is ‘inductive methods’. As Elga understands them, an inductive method puts forward a rule for how to respond to certain circum-stances. For instance, ‘in circumstance C, you should believe p’ would be an inductive method. I am simply calling such claims epistemic principles.

Notes 177

31 . We haven’t considered what a Steadfast View of disagreement would prescribe in the everyday, multi-party disagreements, but for the purposes of this example, let us suppose that it mandates remaining steadfast.

32 . Or at least I cannot do both justifiably. 33 . At least we are not justified in believing that there is such a winner once we

are aware of the widespread disagreement on the matter. 34 . Littlejohn (2013) argues that it is not even a possibility that Conciliatory

Views of disagreement give incoherent advice. 35 . Similar examples are given by Frances (2010) and Graves (2013). 36 . For more on this point, see Matheson (2014b).

8 Conclusion

1 . For a defense of this group, see Crisp (1998) and Rogerson (2002). 2 . For defenses of this group, see Singer (1975), Regan and Singer (1976), Hooley

and Nobis (forthcoming), and Engel (2002). 3 . Davis (2002) and Zamir (2004) are two exceptions. Even here, though, the

argument is that enough individuals need to consume meat. Presumably, enough individuals will consume meat even if any given individual ceases to consume meat.

178

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189

Index

Advisor’s Advice, 155–156agreement, 67–68, 126–128Anselm, 8–9anti-realism, 4–5Art Collection, 69

Bergmann, Michael, 15, 49–52Bogardus, Tomas, 106–107bootstrapping, 73, 89–93

Christensen, David, 45–46, 62, 68–69, 82–83, 97, 105, 109, 155

Compatibilist Cathy and Incompatibilist Irene, 36

Conciliatory Views of disagreement, 65–83

Conee, Earl, 46, 57–58, 145–146Consumer Reports, 153

Dean on the Quad, 119defeat, 11–13, 30–31, 82–83, 100–101

full, 11–13misleading, 30–31partial, 11–13rebutting, 11–13undercutting, 11–13

deGrasse Tyson, Neil, 19–20, 46, 66, 120

Differing Weights, 57direct acquaintance, 106–107disagreement

apparent, 7–8everyday, 113–135extreme, 97–107genuine, 6–8idealized, 28–34, 113–114merely possible, 61–64, 133–135multi-party, 125–128

doxastic attitudes, 6–7, 54, 75–77

Eddy & Epistemology, 130–131Elementary Math, 98Elga, Adam, 21–22, 69, 73, 149, 153

Enoch, David, 15epistemic election, 126–135Epistemic Election, 153Epistemologists and Evil Demons, 69Equal Weight View, 83error theories, 49–52evidence

first-order, 13, 36–41, 57, 84–90, 94, 100

higher-order, 13, 36–41, 45, 57, 72, 84–95

private, 41–42, 118–120psychological, 91–95underdetermined, 52–61

experts, 67, 69, 92, 126, 127, 128, 130

externalism, 10–11, 30–31Extreme Hallucination, 98Extreme Restaurant Check, 97

Feldman, Richard, 119, 144–145Foley, Richard, 15, 43Frege, Gottlob, 107Funny Freddy?, 80

Goldman, Alvin, 57

Henry’s Hazing, 27Holocaust Denier, 95Horserace, 69Huemer, Michael, 44

independence, 82, 95–96, 117–118internalism, 10–11, 30–31

justificationdoxastic, 10epistemic, 8–9objective, 9pragmatic, 8–9prima facie, 11, 13propositional, 10real, 9

190 Index

justificationist view, 84, 97–106

Kelly, Thomas, 14, 17, 21–22, 36–41, 61–63, 85–97, 101, 136–139

Kornblith, Hilary, 156–157

Lackey, Jennifer, 97, 101–104, 121Lewis, David, 134Lucky Lotto, 105

Minimal Humility, 155Misjudging Theist, 137–138Misjudging Theists, 137Misleading Message, 30, 32Moore, G. E., 141–143, 158Moral Caution, 163Müller-Lyer, 48

Newcomb’s Problem, 61–63

Pam’s Pain, 28Pascal, Blaise, 8–9peers, epistemic, 21–25, 113,

115–123demoting, 104–106qualified, 25–26, 36, 51–52

personal information, 111, 112, 118, 121, 122, 123

perspectivefirst-person, 26, 43–47, 111third-person, 43, 68, 91, 110, 111

Plantinga, Alvin, 15, 47, 149Possible, 61Priest, Graham, 109–110, 125

rational uniqueness, see Uniqueness Thesis

reasonsepistemic, 8–9, 144–146pragmatic, 8–9, 144–146synchronic, 146

Red Light, 100relativism, 2–4, 80–81

ethical, 4Restaurant Check, 68Rosen, Gideon, 54–55Russell, Bertrand, 148

Sam’s Stroke, 110self-defeat, 149–157self-trust, 42–47splitting the difference, 74–77steadfast views of disagreement,

35–64Stroud, Barry, 148Sue the Scientist, 145–146

Theo’s Thermometer, 70–71Total Evidence View, 84–87True Story, 96

Uniqueness Thesis, 52–61, 79–80

van Inwagen, Peter, 41–42, 134

Warming Wendy, 28Wedgwood, Ralph, 15, 43–44White, Roger, 59Williamson, Timothy, 28