1 George Mason School of Law Contracts I K. PreliminaryNegotiations © F.H. Buckley...

46
1 George Mason School of Law Contracts I K. PreliminaryNegotiations © F.H. Buckley [email protected]

Transcript of 1 George Mason School of Law Contracts I K. PreliminaryNegotiations © F.H. Buckley...

Page 1: 1 George Mason School of Law Contracts I K. PreliminaryNegotiations © F.H. Buckley fbuckley@gmu.edu.

1

George Mason School of Law

Contracts IK. PreliminaryNegotiations

© F.H. Buckley

[email protected]

Page 2: 1 George Mason School of Law Contracts I K. PreliminaryNegotiations © F.H. Buckley fbuckley@gmu.edu.

Relational Contracts

Should different principles apply when business parties propose to enter into a long-term relationship?

2

Page 3: 1 George Mason School of Law Contracts I K. PreliminaryNegotiations © F.H. Buckley fbuckley@gmu.edu.

Relational Contracts

Should different principles apply when business parties propose to enter into a long-term relationship? Corporations

Business Corporations Act Non-profit Corporations Act Close Corporations Act

3

Page 4: 1 George Mason School of Law Contracts I K. PreliminaryNegotiations © F.H. Buckley fbuckley@gmu.edu.

Relational Contracts

Should different principles apply when business parties propose to enter into a long-term relationship? Partnerships Act

4

Page 5: 1 George Mason School of Law Contracts I K. PreliminaryNegotiations © F.H. Buckley fbuckley@gmu.edu.

Relational Contracts

But generally no statutory default rules for contractual arrangements

Joint ventures Distributorships Long-term supply and requirements contracts Employment Contracts Franchise Laws

5

Page 6: 1 George Mason School of Law Contracts I K. PreliminaryNegotiations © F.H. Buckley fbuckley@gmu.edu.

Some History: Legal Realism

6

The life of the law has not been logic; it has been experience

Page 7: 1 George Mason School of Law Contracts I K. PreliminaryNegotiations © F.H. Buckley fbuckley@gmu.edu.

Legal Realism

7

Roscoe Pound Louis Brandeis

Page 8: 1 George Mason School of Law Contracts I K. PreliminaryNegotiations © F.H. Buckley fbuckley@gmu.edu.

Legal Realism

8

Use insights from other disciplines (“Law and …”)

The decline of law as an autonomous subject

An instrumental view of the law

Page 9: 1 George Mason School of Law Contracts I K. PreliminaryNegotiations © F.H. Buckley fbuckley@gmu.edu.

Legal Realism and Contract Law

9

Look at how people bargain in fact

Ian MacNeil (“the MacNeil”)

Page 10: 1 George Mason School of Law Contracts I K. PreliminaryNegotiations © F.H. Buckley fbuckley@gmu.edu.

Relational contracts as different in kind from one-shot transactions

1. Relations are seen as semi-permanent

10

Page 11: 1 George Mason School of Law Contracts I K. PreliminaryNegotiations © F.H. Buckley fbuckley@gmu.edu.

Relational contracts as different in kind from one-shot transactions

1. Relations are seen as semi-permanent2. A lengthier process of negotiation where it

may be difficult to identity the moment at which contractual duties arise

1. The preliminary agreement problem

11

Page 12: 1 George Mason School of Law Contracts I K. PreliminaryNegotiations © F.H. Buckley fbuckley@gmu.edu.

Relational contracts as different in kind from one-shot transactions

1. Relations are seen as semi-permanent2. A lengthier process of negotiation where it

may be difficult to identity the moment at which contractual duties arise

3. The object of exchange is not easily quantified

12

Page 13: 1 George Mason School of Law Contracts I K. PreliminaryNegotiations © F.H. Buckley fbuckley@gmu.edu.

Relational contracts as different in kind from one-shot transactions

1. Relations are seen as semi-permanent2. A lengthier process of negotiation where it

may be difficult to identity the moment at which contractual duties arise

3. The object of exchange is not easily quantified

4. Trust becomes more important

13

Page 14: 1 George Mason School of Law Contracts I K. PreliminaryNegotiations © F.H. Buckley fbuckley@gmu.edu.

14

Cooperate Defect

Cooperate 3 -1

Defect 4 0

Player 1

Relational vs One-short ContractsDefection dominates in one-shot bargains

Page 15: 1 George Mason School of Law Contracts I K. PreliminaryNegotiations © F.H. Buckley fbuckley@gmu.edu.

15

Cooperate Defect

Cooperate 3 4

Defect -1 0

Player 2

Relational vs One-short ContractsDefection dominates in one-shot bargains

Page 16: 1 George Mason School of Law Contracts I K. PreliminaryNegotiations © F.H. Buckley fbuckley@gmu.edu.

16

But what about Iterated PD Games?

Axelrod, The Evolution of Cooperation (1984) Tit-for-tat as a dominant strategy for

iterated PD games Telser, A Theory of Self-enforcing

agreements, 53 J. Bus. 27 (1980)

16

Page 17: 1 George Mason School of Law Contracts I K. PreliminaryNegotiations © F.H. Buckley fbuckley@gmu.edu.

Preliminary AgreementsHow deals begin…

17

Page 18: 1 George Mason School of Law Contracts I K. PreliminaryNegotiations © F.H. Buckley fbuckley@gmu.edu.

Preliminary AgreementsAssume both parties sign the following:

“This letter is to memorialize our agreement in which you will ship 1,000 widgets from Los Angeles to my address by Monday next for $5,000.” A binding contract? Can the court gap-fill any missing terms?

18

Page 19: 1 George Mason School of Law Contracts I K. PreliminaryNegotiations © F.H. Buckley fbuckley@gmu.edu.

Preliminary Agreements

Restatement § 33(2) The terms of a contract are reasonably certain if they provide a basis for determining the existence of a breach and for giving an appropriate remedy.

19

Page 20: 1 George Mason School of Law Contracts I K. PreliminaryNegotiations © F.H. Buckley fbuckley@gmu.edu.

Preliminary Agreements

What if important terms are left out but the parties specify: “This constitutes a binding contract between us”

20

Page 21: 1 George Mason School of Law Contracts I K. PreliminaryNegotiations © F.H. Buckley fbuckley@gmu.edu.

Preliminary Agreements

Restatement § 33(1) Even though a manifestation of intention is intended to be understood as an offer, it cannot be accepted so as to form a contract unless the terms of the contract are reasonably certain.

21

Page 22: 1 George Mason School of Law Contracts I K. PreliminaryNegotiations © F.H. Buckley fbuckley@gmu.edu.

Preliminary Agreements

Restatement § 33(3) The fact that one or more terms of a proposed bargain are left open or uncertain may show that a manifestation of intention is not intended to be understood as an offer or as an acceptance.

22

Page 23: 1 George Mason School of Law Contracts I K. PreliminaryNegotiations © F.H. Buckley fbuckley@gmu.edu.

Preliminary Agreements

What if they add: “No binding contract between us will exist until we have executed a final agreement”?

23

Page 24: 1 George Mason School of Law Contracts I K. PreliminaryNegotiations © F.H. Buckley fbuckley@gmu.edu.

Preliminary Agreements

§21. INTENTION TO BE LEGALLY BOUND. Neither real nor apparent intention that a promise be legally binding is essential to the formation of a contract, but a manifestation of intention that a promise shall not affect legal relations may prevent the formation of a contract.

24

Page 25: 1 George Mason School of Law Contracts I K. PreliminaryNegotiations © F.H. Buckley fbuckley@gmu.edu.

Preliminary Agreements

What if they add: “We agree that this letter agreement will be reduced to a binding definitive agreement”? Recall Ciaramella (220) and Adjustrite

(228)

25

Page 26: 1 George Mason School of Law Contracts I K. PreliminaryNegotiations © F.H. Buckley fbuckley@gmu.edu.

Preliminary Agreements

Restatement § 26. PRELIMINARY NEGOTIATIONS. A manifestation of willingness to enter into a bargain is not an offer if the person to whom it is addressed knows or has reason to know that the person making it does not intend to conclude a bargain until he has made a further manifestation of assent.

26

Page 27: 1 George Mason School of Law Contracts I K. PreliminaryNegotiations © F.H. Buckley fbuckley@gmu.edu.

Preliminary Agreements

Restatement § 27. Manifestations of assent that are in themselves sufficient to conclude a contract will not be prevented from so operating by the fact that the parties also manifest an intention to prepare and adopt a written memorial thereof, but the circumstances may show that the agreements are preliminary negotiations.

27

Page 28: 1 George Mason School of Law Contracts I K. PreliminaryNegotiations © F.H. Buckley fbuckley@gmu.edu.

Coley v. Lang at 284

28

Page 29: 1 George Mason School of Law Contracts I K. PreliminaryNegotiations © F.H. Buckley fbuckley@gmu.edu.

Coley v. Lang at 284

Lang shares

29

Coley

IAS Inc. Asset sale to IASCO(old IAS shareholders)

Page 30: 1 George Mason School of Law Contracts I K. PreliminaryNegotiations © F.H. Buckley fbuckley@gmu.edu.

Coley v. Lang at 284

What in Heaven’s name was the purpose of the deal?

30

Page 31: 1 George Mason School of Law Contracts I K. PreliminaryNegotiations © F.H. Buckley fbuckley@gmu.edu.

Coley v. Lang

The Deal… On or before [17 days later] this letter

agreement will be reduced to a definitive agreement binding upon all of the parties

Until then Coley can bid on behalf of IAS [?]

31

Page 32: 1 George Mason School of Law Contracts I K. PreliminaryNegotiations © F.H. Buckley fbuckley@gmu.edu.

Coley v. Lang

The Deal… Did the parties intend that the contract

would be binding as of Sept. 1?

32

Page 33: 1 George Mason School of Law Contracts I K. PreliminaryNegotiations © F.H. Buckley fbuckley@gmu.edu.

Coley v. Lang

The Deal… Can you think of a reason why Coley

might have wanted out?

33

Page 34: 1 George Mason School of Law Contracts I K. PreliminaryNegotiations © F.H. Buckley fbuckley@gmu.edu.

Coley v. Lang

The Deal… Does the court have enough information

about the details of the deal to award specific performance? What was missing?

34

Page 35: 1 George Mason School of Law Contracts I K. PreliminaryNegotiations © F.H. Buckley fbuckley@gmu.edu.

Coley v. Lang

Did the parties intend this to be binding? “reduced to a definitive agreement” Elmore v. Parish on “agreements to

agree” Leval good faith duties?

35

Page 36: 1 George Mason School of Law Contracts I K. PreliminaryNegotiations © F.H. Buckley fbuckley@gmu.edu.

Coley v. Lang

Is this a suitable case for promissory estoppel?

36

Page 37: 1 George Mason School of Law Contracts I K. PreliminaryNegotiations © F.H. Buckley fbuckley@gmu.edu.

Coley v. Lang

Is this a suitable case for promissory estoppel? No “definite and substantial” reliance over

18 days?

37

Page 38: 1 George Mason School of Law Contracts I K. PreliminaryNegotiations © F.H. Buckley fbuckley@gmu.edu.

Coley v. Lang

Qu. the current version of Restatement § 90(1) A promise which the promisor should

reasonably expect to induce action or forbearance on the part of the promisee or a third person and which does induce such action or forbearance is binding if injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of the promise. The remedy granted for breach may be limited as justice requires.

38

Page 39: 1 George Mason School of Law Contracts I K. PreliminaryNegotiations © F.H. Buckley fbuckley@gmu.edu.

Coley v. Lang

Supposing you didn’t want litigation. How would you draft the agreement if you don’t want a binding contract?

39

Page 40: 1 George Mason School of Law Contracts I K. PreliminaryNegotiations © F.H. Buckley fbuckley@gmu.edu.

Coley v. Lang

Supposing you didn’t want litigation. How would you draft the agreement if you don’t want a binding contract? The parties understand that this is not a

binding agreement and that no liability will arise until a definitive agreement is signed.

40

Page 41: 1 George Mason School of Law Contracts I K. PreliminaryNegotiations © F.H. Buckley fbuckley@gmu.edu.

Coley v. Lang

Supposing you didn’t want litigation. How would you draft the agreement if you don’t want a binding contract? The parties understand that this is not a

binding agreement and that no liability will arise until a definitive agreement is signed. Restatement § 21: “a manifestation of

intention that a promise shall not affect legal relations may prevent the formation of a contract.”

41

Page 42: 1 George Mason School of Law Contracts I K. PreliminaryNegotiations © F.H. Buckley fbuckley@gmu.edu.

Coley v. Lang

Supposing you didn’t want litigation. How would you draft the agreement if you want a binding contract?

42

Page 43: 1 George Mason School of Law Contracts I K. PreliminaryNegotiations © F.H. Buckley fbuckley@gmu.edu.

Coley v. Lang

Supposing you didn’t want litigation. How would you draft the agreement if you want a binding contract? The parties understand that this is a binding

agreement and that failure to sign a definitive agreement will give rise to liability.

43

Page 44: 1 George Mason School of Law Contracts I K. PreliminaryNegotiations © F.H. Buckley fbuckley@gmu.edu.

Coley v. Lang

Supposing you didn’t want litigation. How would you draft the agreement if you want a binding contract? (2) The parties understand that this is a

binding agreement and that failure to sign a definitive agreement will give rise to liability. Restatement § 27

44

Page 45: 1 George Mason School of Law Contracts I K. PreliminaryNegotiations © F.H. Buckley fbuckley@gmu.edu.

Coley v. Lang

Restatement § 27. Manifestations of assent that are in themselves sufficient to conclude a contract will not be prevented from so operating by the fact that the parties also manifest an intention to prepare and adopt a written memorial thereof, but the circumstances may show that the agreements are preliminary negotiations.

45

Page 46: 1 George Mason School of Law Contracts I K. PreliminaryNegotiations © F.H. Buckley fbuckley@gmu.edu.

Coley v. Lang

Which term would the client want and why?

46