1. 2 What is Afrobarometer? 3 The Afrobarometer is an independent, non-partisan survey research...
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Transcript of 1. 2 What is Afrobarometer? 3 The Afrobarometer is an independent, non-partisan survey research...
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2
What is Afrobarometer?
3
The Afrobarometer is an independent, non-partisan
survey research project coordinated by the Centre for
Democratic Development (CDD-Ghana), the Institute for
Democracy in South Africa (Idasa) and Michigan State
University (MSU)
4
Implemented through a network of national research partners,
Afrobarometer surveys measure the social, economic and political
atmosphere of societies in transition in West, East and
Southern Africa.
5
Why is Afrobarometer Important?
The opinions of ordinary Africans are scarcely solicited
By asking their opinions on important issues affecting them, Afrobarometer gives voice to Africans
Because the same questions are asked every three years or so, Afrobarometer can compare findings across countries and track changes over time.
6
How is Afrobarometer data gathered?
7
Afrobarometer takes a representative sample of the adult population in each country
Face to face interviews are conducted in the languages spoken by the respondent i.e. Twi, Swahili, Yoruba, Wollof…
In round 2, over 23,000 people were interviewed in 15 African countries in 2002 and 2003 (21,000 people were asked similar questions in the round 1 survey in 1999 and 2001)
8
Caveat
The Afrobarometer does not represent Africa as a whole but countries that
have introduced a measure of democratic and market reform in recent
years. Thus, when we refer to "Africans," we have this limited
population (15 African countries) in mind.
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Key findings
10
What do Africans say about their
political conditions?
11
Africans express favourable opinions about democracy
12
69
64
1213 13
116
11
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
Democracy AlwaysPreferable
Non-DemocracySometimes OK
Doesn't Matter Don't Know
Support for Democracy:Round 1 (1999-2001) vs. Round 2 (2002-2003)
1999-2001 2002-2003
Two thirds of all adults say they support democracy
13
Larger proportions reject military rule and dictatorship
8277
8076
69 68
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
Reject Military Rule Reject PresidentialDictatorship
Reject One Party Rule
Rejection of Authoritarian Alternatives:Round 1 (1999-2001) vs. Round 2 (2002-2003)
1999-2001 2002-2003
14
Africans consider themselves better off under the new
democratic governments than they were under the previous
non-democratic regimes
15
However…Popular commitment to and positive evaluations of democracy have declined in some countries
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
Gha Les Nam Mali Tan Uga Zam Saf Bot Mwi Nig Cve Moz Sen Ken
Satisfaction with Democracyby Country, over Time
Percent satisfied, 1999-2001 Percent satisfied, 2002-2003
Note: Results for Ghana and Botswana exclude “don’t knows.”
16
Declines tend to occur in countries where governing parties have stayed longest in power, such as: Zambia, Malawi and South Africa.
60
71
40
50
7782
60576564
5854
7570
8074
85
7581
67
84
65
54
66
7581
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
Mali Les Gha Saf Mwi Nam Zam Uga Bot Nig Tan Moz Cve Sen Ken
Support for Democracyby Country, over Time
Prefer democracy, 1999-2001 Prefer democracy, 2002-2003
17
…and people tend to feel more positive about democracy in countries (Senegal, Kenya, Ghana, Mali, and Lesotho) where there has been recent electoral changeover
60
71
40
50
7782
6057
65645854
7570
8074
85
7581
67
84
65
54
66
7581
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
Mali Les Gha Saf Mwi Nam Zam Uga Bot Nig Tan Moz Cve Sen Ken
Support for Democracyby Country, over Time
Prefer democracy, 1999-2001 Prefer democracy, 2002-2003
18
Thus… Popular commitment to democracy
tends to decline as the enthusiasm of political transitions of the 1990s begin to fade
But, democratic political change-over and/or improvements in government performance renew public commitment to democracy
19
What do Africans say about their economic
conditions?
20
Africans express considerable discontent with their economic conditions
21
Levels of deprivation are generally high…
22
A disturbing proportion lack access to food
35%
18%
47%periodicallymany times/ alwaysnever
23
A disturbing percentage lack access to clean water
55%
27%
18%
neverperiodicallymany times/ always
24
Many cannot access medicines or medical care
42%
38%
20%
never
periodically
manytimes/ always
25
Access to fuel to cook remains inadequate
58%30%
12%
never
periodically
manytimes/ always
26
A substantial number lack cash incomes
24%
40%
36%neverperiodicallymany times/ always
27
Chronic unemployment underlines African economic
discontentment
41
25
66
4
8
12 139
22
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
Unemployed Employed Part-Time Employed Full-Time
Self-Reported Unemployment,Afrobarometer Round 2 (2002-3)
Not Looking for a Job Looking for a Job Total
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Africans generally conclude that…
Economic reforms
have made their lives
worse, rather than
better
2831
24
66
60
45
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
Helped Most People Agree with Neither Hurt Most People Don't Know
Social Effects of Economic Reform:Round 1 (1999-2001) vs. Round 2 (2002-2003)
1999-2001 2002-2003
29
Nevertheless…
Hope prevails: Africans believe that their children will lead better lives than themselves
30
1057636962344221
405255
5960
686970727476768083
94
504338
37262124
26242020
1816
35
6
0% 50% 100%
LesothoMalawi
TanzaniaUganda
Mozambique
SenegalSouth Africa
ZambiaNamibia
Mali
BotswanaGhana
Cabo VerdeKenya
Nigeria
Worse OffNo ChangeBetter Off
How optimistic are Africans?
Will Your Children Be Better Off Than You?
31
More over…
Economic patience has increased over the past four years
38
72
47
59
49
57
4553 52
57
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
Ghana Uganda Mali Nigeria Tanzania
Economic Patience:Round 1 (1999-2001) vs. Round 2 (2002-2003)
Percent patient, 1999-2001 Percent patient, 2002-2003
Which of the following statements is closest to your view?
A. The costs of reforming the economy are too high; the government should therefore abandon its current economic policies
B. In order for the economy to get better in the future, it is necessary for us to accept some hardships now.
32
What do Africans think about
HIV/AIDS?
33
HIV/AIDS appears to be taking a toll on Africans. Large proportions of people (especially in east and southern Africa) have either lost family or friends to the pandemic, or suffered significant AIDS related burdens
34
Yet ordinary Africans do not share the experts’ forecasts of the dire consequences of the
pandemic
35
Consequently …
Africans are undecided about whether their governments should divert resources from other priorities to fight AIDS in their country
Except Botswana, Namibia, and South Africa, African publics are not convinced that AIDS constitutes a public health problems worthy of government attention
36
For example: AIDS versus health as a priority issue
30
13
28
11
26
10
16
38
14
26
10
29
7
34
5
13
4
15
3
22
3
24
3
38
2
24
1
34
1
36
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
% Citing AIDS As MIP % Citing Health as MIP
37
Furthermore …
Poor people demote AIDS to the level of a low priority problem behind more immediate pressing concerns like jobs or hunger
38
Policy implications
39
1. Democratic power alternation and improved performance of government increases popular commitment and support for democracy
2. Unless economic reforms translate into job creation; it would be difficult to sustain and/or increase citizens support for these reforms
3. Lack of popular demand for attention to AIDS should not be taken to mean that AIDS is not an important issue to warrant Government action
40
Comparing Mali Results to other African
Countries
41
30
13
28
11
26
10
16
38
14
26
10
29
7
34
5
13
4
15
3
22
3
24
3
38
2
24
1
34
1
36
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
% Citing AIDS As MIP % Citing Health as MIP
AIDS IS A LOW PRIORITY HEALTH ISSUE FOR MALIANS
Mali is least concerned with AIDS
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Definition of Poverty
43
Lack of food is a more defining feature of poverty in Mali than other African
Countries
0%
5%10%
15%20%
25%30%35%
Africa Mali Africa Mali Africa Mali
Lack of Food Lack of Money Not havinganything
First Meaning of "Poor"
44
However, Malian poverty trends are generally consistent with African trends
0%5%
10%15%20%25%30%35%40%45%50%
Afr
ica
Mal
i
Afr
ica
Mal
i
Afr
ica
Mal
i
Afr
ica
Mal
i
Afr
ica
Mal
i
Never Just onceor tw ice
Severaltimes
Manytimes
Alw ays
How Often Have you Gone Without Food?
45
Attitudes to command control versus free market economies:
46
Malian preference for government-run economy is higher than the average African
0%5%
10%15%20%25%30%35%40%45%
Africa Mali Africa Mali Africa Mali
Prefer MarketEconomy
PreferGovernment-
Does notMatter
Prefer Market or Government-run Economy
47
In addition, Malian approval of CC system is higher than the African average
0%5%
10%15%20%25%30%35%40%45%
Afr
ica
Mal
i
Afr
ica
Mal
i
Afr
ica
Mal
i
Afr
ica
Mal
i
Stronglydisapprove
Disapprove Approve StronglyApprove
Government Plans Production and Distribution
48
Attitudes towards free-market values:Malians embrace of free market values is higher than the African average
0%5%
10%15%20%25%30%35%40%45%
Afr
ica
Mal
i
Afr
ica
Mal
i
Afr
ica
Mal
i
Afr
ica
Mal
i
Stronglydisapprove
Disapprove Approve StronglyApprove
People go back to the land
49
Malians demonstrate slightly more moderate leanings towards communitarianism than the African average, but they have less extreme leanings than the African average
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
30%
35%
Africa Mali Africa Mali Africa Mali Africa Mali
Stronglydisapprove
Disapprove Approve StronglyApprove
Wealthy people provide for community needs
50
Attitudes to Economic Reforms
51
Even though Malians are consistently more supportive of abandoning economic reforms than African countries on average, their views are not glaringly divergent from the African norm
0%5%
10%15%20%25%30%35%
Afr
ica
Mal
i
Afr
ica
Mal
i
Afr
ica
Mal
i
Afr
ica
Mal
i
AgreeStrongly
Agree Disagree DisagreeStrongly
Abandon Economic Reforms versus Accept Hardships
52
Democracy as the preferred system of governance Malian support for Democracy is higher than the African average
0%10%20%30%40%50%60%70%80%
Africa Mali Africa Mali Africa Mali
Democracypreferable
Sometimesnon-
Doesn't matter
Support for Democracy
53
Military rule as the preferred system of governance:Malian Support for Military rule is higher than African Average
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
Afr
ica
Mal
i
Afr
ica
Mal
i
Afr
ica
Mal
i
Afr
ica
Mal
i
Stronglydisapprove
Disapprove Approve StronglyApprove
Support for Military Rule
54
Women’s Rights:Malian support for women’s rights is remarkably lower than African average
0%5%
10%15%20%25%30%35%40%45%
Afr
ica
Mal
i
Afr
ica
Mal
i
Afr
ica
Mal
i
Afr
ica
Mal
i
AgreeStrongly
Agree Disagree DisagreeStrongly
Women Subject to Traditional laws vs. Equal Rights
55
Violent Conflicts:Malians experience with violent conflict in the communities is less than the than African average
0%5%
10%15%20%25%30%35%40%45%
Africa Mali Africa Mali Africa Mali Africa Mali
Never Sometimes Often Always
Violent Conflicts Within Community
56
On the average, ethnic, political, and religious factors are more pervasive causes of conflicts in other African countries than in Mali. Boundary/land disputes however, are considerably more serious sources of violence in Mali than in other African countries
0%
2%
4%
6%
8%
10%
12%
14%
16%
Africa Mali Africa Mali Africa Mali Africa Mali
Ethnic Boundary/land Political Issues Religion
Causes of violent conflicts - 1st Response
57
Malian attitudes to violence generally mirrors that of the African average
0%5%
10%15%20%25%30%35%40%45%
Africa Mali Africa Mali Africa Mali Africa Mali
AgreeStrongly
Agree Disagree DisagreeStrongly
Violence is never jusified, but sometimes necessary
58
We gratefully acknowledge support for the Afrobarometer’s research, capacity-building and outreach activities, from, among others, the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency, the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the U.S. Agency for International Development.
For more information, see: www.afrobarometer.org
Or contact:
Tanya Shanker (27-[0]21-467-5600 [email protected]) (South Africa),
Edem Selormey (233-21-776142 [email protected]) (Ghana), or Carolyn Logan (1-517-432-0214 [email protected]) (USA).
For comment,
contact Bob Mattes (27-[0]83-234-0333) [email protected] or Paul Graham
(17-[0]82-571-3887) (South Africa),
E. Gyimah-Boadi (233-21-776142 [email protected]) (Ghana),
or Michael Bratton (1-517-351-7264 [email protected]) (USA).
59
END