1 Methodological Considerations on Anarchist Theory1 [Published in French as Considrations mthodologiques sur la thorie anarchiste, Philosophie de lanarchie: Thories libertaires, pratiques quotidiennes et ontologie, Jean-Christophe Angaut et al. (eds) (Lyon: Atelier de cration libertaire, 2012), pp. 327-53] 1. Introductory Apologia Mypreviousworkonanarchisttheory2hasmetwithcriticismofthreekindsfromscholarsof anarchism and anarchist activists: (1) fundamental criticism of my theoretical work on anarchism; (2)methodologicalcriticismofmyphilosophicalapproachtoanarchisttheory;and(3)substantive criticismofmyphilosophicalfindingsonanarchism.3Thus,therehasbeencriticismofwhatI amdoing,howIamdoingit,andwhathasresultedfromthis;thatis,prettycomprehensive criticism.Thiswasnotterriblysurprising:Ianticipatedsignificantcriticismofmyattemptto bridge the gap between so-called political anarchism and so-called philosophical anarchism; of my attempt, as it were, to drag Mikhail Bakunin away from his barricade and A. John Simmons out of his classroom, and to introduce them to one another. Fortunately, most of this criticism is easy enough to deal with, and I dont need to abandon my theoretical position just yet (though this position, as previously articulated, certainly needs some refinement and elaboration). I have considered the fundamental criticism (concerning the value or worthwhileness of theory)elsewhere4,andwillreturntoit brieflybelow(thoughitisnot mymaininterestinthis paper). Responding to the substantive criticism in any detail would, by contrast, take more space than is available to me here. However, I should at least note the main objections (and replies) as I see them. They are: (a) that I reduce anarchism to liberalism (or a radicalization of liberalism); 1 I would like to thank Daniel Cohnitz for his comments on an earlier draft of this paper. 2 Anarchism and Authority: A Philosophical Introduction to Classical Anarchism (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2007). 3 See the reviews by Sam Clark (Anarchist Studies, 16:1 (2009), pp. 120-22), Ruth Kinna (Contemporary Political Theory, 8:2 (2009), pp. 242-44), and Charles Masquelier (Studies in Social and Political Thought, 16 (2009), pp. 106-10), as well as a forthcoming paper by Benjamin Franks entitled Anarchism and the Problem of Political Philosophy. 4 In the original version of what was subsequently published as In Defence of Philosophical Anarchism, Anarchism and Moral Philosophy, eds. Benjamin Franks and Matthew Wilson (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), pp. 13-32. The full version of this paper has been translated into Estonian as Filosoofilise anarhismi kaitseks, Akadeemia, 2009: 10, pp. 1901-36. 2 (b)that Ineglectcentralorevendefinitiveethicalandutopianfeatures ofanarchism; (c)that I portray anarchism in too authoritarian a light; and (d) that my account of anarchism is historically spurious.To(a),Isimplysaythat,onmyaccount,anarchismactuallydiffersgreatlyfrom liberalism with respect to: (i) its fundamental philosophical problem (the problem of legitimacy (thelegitimacyofauthority),asopposedtotheliberalproblemoflimits(thelimitsofsocial control)); and (ii) its ethical commitments (since anarchists are not necessarily committed to the primary liberal value of individual freedom). To (b), I simply say that, whileethical and utopian features are indeed important features of the anarchist tradition of thought, they are certainly not definitiveofanarchismassuchsince:(i)thereisnosharedanarchistethicalcommitment(and someanarchistsrejectallsuchcommitments);and(ii)thereisnosharedanarchistvisionofa futuresociety(andsomeanarchistsrejectallsuchvisions).Incidentally,asimilarpointcanbe madeaboutthenaivebeliefsthatanarchistssupposedlyshareabouthumannature: thereisno sharedanarchistbeliefaboutsuchmatters(andsomeanarchistsrejectallsuchbeliefs).To(c), thechargethatindenyingthatanarchismissynonymouswithanti-authoritarianism(atleast of the standard,a priori variety), I admit too much authority into anarchism, I simply saythat: (i) I only acknowledge two forms of authority (parental and operative) for which an anarchist case for legitimacymightbemade(thoughtheremaybeothers);and(ii)Idontclaimthatanarchists necessarily accept these cases (anarchists may, on consideration, accept no such cases). Finally, I should say that Iam inclined to accept (d): as a strict engagement with the history of ideas, my previousworkonanarchisttheoryhasratherlittlemerit.But,thoughIwasntclearenough aboutthisatthetime,itwasneverintendedashistoricalwork:itwasintendedasasystematic philosophicalstudyofanarchism,whichmadeuseandratherfreeuseofthehistoryof anarchistideas.Suchanapproachtoanarchistthoughtmay,inprinciple,seemhighly questionable, especially given the influence of the Cambridge School on the history of ideas, for example.5Iwouldthereforeliketoclarifytherelationshipbetweensystematicandhistorical inquiry, as I now see it, before turning to methodological matters within systematic inquiry itself. Idistinguishrathersharplybetweentwogeneralfieldsofphilosophy:systematic philosophy and the history of philosophy. Systematic philosophy is a prospective discipline; the historyofphilosophyisretrospective.Systematicphilosophyaimstomakeprogressinthe 5Membersofthisschoolhavedonesomeratherbrillianthistoricalwork,workofrealvaluetosystematic philosophers (in a sense to be explained below). However, I believe that the influence of this work with its strong contextual emphasis has proved somewhat detrimental to the practice of systematic political philosophy (or its use of the history of ideas). 3 solution(oratleasttheclarificationoreventhedissolution)of philosophicalproblems (bythe means to be discussed below). The history of philosophy aims to record and make sense of the philosophicalwork(systematicandhistorical)ofthepast.Ofcourse,onthebasisofthis characterization,nothingfollowsaboutthevalueofeitherfieldofphilosophy,inabsoluteor relative terms. It should also be noted that this distinction (though, to my mind, rather sharp) is not absolute. Systematic work can help us to understand the history of philosophy; and historical work can help us to advance systematic philosophy. To offer an example from my own area of interest,contemporaryworkinsystematicpoliticalphilosophymayfacilitateabetter understandingofGodwinsethicsandpolitics,whilehistoricalworkonGodwinsethicsand politics may lead to progress in contemporary systematic political philosophy. Nevertheless, the systematicphilosopherandthehistorianofphilosophyare,asIseethem,verydifferent creaturescreatureswholookattheworld,or,atanyrate,itspast,inverydifferentways; though, ofcourse, thesame (somewhatschizophrenic)creaturemayadopttheseverydifferent perspectives at different times. At the risk of overstating my point (and I intend to be somewhat provocative here), one might think ofthe systematic philosophers attitude to historyas that of the resourceful scavenger surveying a rubbish dump. From this perspective, every bit of rubbish canconceivablybeputtofutureuse:assuch,ithasvalue,butitisinstrumentalratherthan intrinsic. It is of no interest in itself; nor is its original use, in its original context, of any interest (except to theextentthatit mightinformfutureuse).Butitisanobject ofrealinterestallthe same. That said, if it cannot be put to some future use, it might as well be ignored or forgotten lefttotheresourcefulscavengerofthefuture,ortothatverydifferentcreature,thehistorian. Thehistorianisnoresourcefulscavengeratarubbishdump,butanarchaeologistor anthropologist at an excavation site of ideas. Every object at such a site holds its own fascination: it tells a fascinating story of the past, even if that past is wholly removed from the present and of noinstrumentalvaluetothefuture.Andhereinliestherealdifferenceinattitude:between resourcefulness with respect to future possibilities and fascination about past facts. Mypreviousworkonanarchisttheorywasprimarilyofasystematicnature.Thispoint was not as clear as it should have been. Nor did I explain, let alone justify, the methodology that Iwasemployinginmysystematicinvestigationofanarchism;indeed,Itookacertain methodology for granted and simply worked with it. This largely accounts for the third category ofcriticismofmywork:themethodologicalcriticismwhichhasfocusedonaphilosophical approach, which, in general, is said to be exceptionally abstract (Kinna). What exactly is wrong with this alleged abstraction, especially in the philosophical context, is not spelt out. But perhaps 4 thecriticismisrelatedtosomeuncertaintyastowhyweneedadefinitionofanarchismatall (Clark). Indeed, the very possibility of philosophical definitions is a continual doubt raised with respect to (more or less) analytic approaches in political philosophy (Franks). And this doubt (as wellassomerelateddoubtsconcerningthenatureofpoliticalargumentation)motivateswhat follows.Iwillthereforedealwithsomemethodologicalmattersconcerningnotjustmyown worktodate(which,ofcourse,isofratherlittleinterestinitself),butthedevelopmentof anarchist theory overall. 2. Developing Anarchist Theory Myspecificquestionin thispapera methodologicalquestionisthefollowing:howcanwe developanarchisttheory?Thisquestionrestsontwoassumptions:thatdoingtheoryis worthwhile; and that anarchist theory is in need of development. So, before we turn to our main question, we should briefly consider the justifiability of these two assumptions. A curious feature of the first assumption is that it strikes so many anarchists as being so controversial; but perhaps many non-anarchists are mistaken in thinking otherwise. What reason mighttherebefor thinkingthat theoryisnotworthwhile?Toanswer thisquestion,weneed to considerwhatwouldmaketheoryworthwhilefromtheopponentsperspective,orwhatthe standard of worthwhileness supposedly is here. If the opponent in question is thought of as an activist of some kind, then the standard is presumably some contribution to social change. Now, this standard is surely inapplicable to all kinds of theory (the theory developed by astrophysicists, forexample6).Butletsassumethatitisapplicabletoacertaincategoryoftheorysay,social theoryor,moreplausibly,toacertaincategoryofsocialtheorysay,radicalsocialtheory andthatanarchisttheorybelongstothiscategory.Inthiscontext,thestrongestformof objection to a radical theory would be to say that it is not worthwhile because it makes (or can make)nocontributionnot evenanindirectcontribution tosocialchange.Thisobjectionis difficulttomaintainonfactualgrounds:manyradicaltheories(concerningeconomicand environmental exploitation, for example) have informed public discourse (in the mainstream and beyond)whichinturn hasmotivatedsocialaction(ofreactionary, reformist,andrevolutionary 6 There is some room for debate here, but to pursue this matter would lead us too far astray. 5 kinds).Moreover,thisobjectionseemstorestonanassumptiona(questionable)theoretical assumption (that such activists are in no position to justify) that theory (even theory pertaining to social action) and practice (even reflective practice) are wholly unrelated: that is, on a wholly abstracttheory-practicedualism.Indeed,byholdingsuchadualism,onecouldarguerather differently against theory on deontological or other non-consequentialist grounds. (The objection dealtwiththusfar,andmodifiedbelow,isconsequentialist:thatis,framedintermsofa particular good namely, social change that ought to be immediatelypromotedby means of humanendeavour.)Thedeontologistmight pointtoadutyofactivism(perhapsthroughsome understandingofdivinewillorhumanreason),buthasdifficultyinestablishingthattheory necessarilyviolatesthisdutywithoutsimplyassertingtheabstracttheory-activismdualism. Likewise,othernon-consequentialistsmightclaimthatactivismisgoodinitself(perhapsasan integral part of the good life), but have difficulty in establishing that theory is detrimental to this good without simply asserting the same theoretical dualism.7 A more serious objection is the claim that a radical theory such as anarchist theory makes an inadequate contribution to social change: perhaps it has some effect over time, but, faced with immediatecrisis,werequireimmediatechangethrough(largelynon-reflective)action.Thus, fromthecontemporary perspective,anarchisttheoryisseenasasecondarypursuitthatshould (atbest)bereservedforthoseprivilegedenoughtoliveinatimeofnon-crisis;asamatterof fact,however,itiscurrentlytheprimarypursuitoftheunjustifiablyprivileged(suchas professional academics) in a time of crisis. The essentially pragmatic argument here can be stated more straightforwardly in the following terms: immediate social change (of an anarchist nature) isnecessitatedbycurrentcrisis;activismismoreefficaciousthantheorywithrespecttothe achievement of (such) immediate social change; therefore, (as anarchists) we should now engage in activism rather than theory. For present purposes, lets accept the second premise and that the conclusion follows from the two premises (which, in fact, it doesnt8). The sticking point seems to be the first premise. This may sometimes be true, and there may therefore be periods in which we should engage in activism rather than theory. But it is doubtful whether this is always true (or thatwecouldmakesenseofwhatmightbecalledtheconstantcrisisthesis).Indeed,wemay suspect the activist of overplaying the crisis card, such that he or she is effectively in danger of 7Myassumptionhereisthatcertainteleologists(perfectionists,forexample)arenotconsequentialistsinastrict sense: that they are non-consequentialistic teleologists. 8 There is a missing premise connecting immediacy (of ends) and efficacy (of means). But my interest here is in the implications of such an argument rather than its validity. 6 cryingwolf.Whatthissuggestsisthatjudgementsneedtobemadeastowhen(onthis argument, at least) we should engage in activism and when we should engage in theory. We may sometimes make poor judgements, of course, but no general presumption against theory (such as that made by some anarchist activists) should be made here. Thereisalsoafactualproblemwiththisobjection.Asamatteroffact,manyradical theoriesarguablythemostinfluentialtheorieswereproducedintimesofcrisis:duringthe French Revolution, the Industrial Revolution, the Franco-Prussian War, and so on. How can the activistaccountforthis?Heorshecansimplyarguethatthetheoristsinquestionweredoing somethingwrongatthetime(thoughthisisrarelyclaimedofthesetheorists).Butaproblem concerningtheproductionofradicaltheoryradicaltheoryofreal,practico-historical significanceintimesofcrisisremains.Ifweacceptthisempiricalpoint,wecanmodifythe second premise in the above argument and offer a modest pragmatic counter-argument in favour oftheory(evenintimesofcrisis):immediatesocialchangeisnecessitatedbycurrentcrisis; radicaltheorycancontribute(tosomeextent)totheachievementofimmediatesocialchange; therefore, we should engage in theory (to that extent). Again, matters of judgement arise here as to the extent of theoretical influence, but there seems to be some such influence. Sometheoristsmight,however,findthisconsequentialistlineofreasoning unsatisfactory. For them, radical social theory plays, among other roles, a crucial justificatory role with respect to social change; and, in the absence of such justification, the attempt to achieve the social change in question is immoral. In other words, those who engage in activism have a moral responsibilitytojustifytheiractions(bothintermsofmeansandends)tothosewhomthese actionsaffectincludingothermembersofsocietywho,atleastinitially,disagreewiththe changes proposed or the means of pursuing them.9 This responsibility might be asserted on the basis, for example, of a right of private judgement, which the imposition of social change is seen as violating. Hence, both consequentialist and non-consequentialist cases can be made for doing theory, to the effect that: first, it is useful for the achievement of social change, even in times of crisis; and, second, it plays a morally necessary justificatory role. Whatofthesecondassumptionintroducedabove?Canwejustifytheassumptionthat anarchist theory is in need of development? It might be claimed that political theory in general is alwaysinneedofdevelopment,accordingtochangingreal-worldcircumstancesandthe 9Manyanarchistshaveanastonishing capacitytooverlook ortoexplainaway the fact(however unfortunate) that their views are marginal. Thus, the other members of society in question are the vast majority. 7 refinementoftheoreticalmethods(thosespecifictoadiscipline,aswellasthosedeveloped elsewhere butfruitful for that discipline). In terms of anarchist theory per se, however, there is some doubt about its pedigree. While this point is often exaggerated, it is perhaps true to say that the historical body of anarchist theory is somewhat uneven. Thus, there may indeed be a need or,inmorepositiveterms,anopportunityfortheoreticaldevelopment.Toofferaconcrete example,so-calledpoliticalanarchismhasprovenphilosophicallydeficientdeficientonthe conceptual and argumentative sides to date. Put simply, political anarchists have often written ratherobscurelyandarguedratherpoorlyfortheircase.10Thatsaid,so-calledphilosophical anarchism has proven similarly deficient with respect to empirical matters: that is, ignorant of or indifferenttoactualpoliticalstatesofaffairs,socialmovements,andsoon.11Mycontentionis thatthesedeficienciescanberemediedbyameetingofpoliticalandphilosophicalmindsin the anarchistcommunity, very broadly defined. What I suggest is needed in termsof anarchist theoryatleast,fromaspecificallyphilosophicalperspectiveis,therefore,thesimultaneous philosophization of political anarchism and politicization of philosophical anarchism. Tosome,thesuggestionthatthereisaneedforthetheoreticaldevelopmentof anarchismseemsarrogantasifthepersonproposingandundertakingthedevelopmentin question is assuming the right to speak for an entire tradition or an entire movement (a tradition or movement which is thought by some to define anarchism). But engaging with anarchist theory entailsnosuchassumption:itisnotanexclusiveorexhaustiveenterprisewhereanyone individualhasthefinalword.Rather,itisacommunalandopen-endedenterprisewhereany number of parties (individual or collective) are seen to make more or less significant theoretical contributions(fromavarietyoftheoreticalperspectives).Moreover,thesecontributionsare understoodtobeinformed(moreorlessdirectly)bysocialpraxis,whichthey,inturn,may inspire.Thus,whileanarchisttheoryisenrichedbysocialpraxis,andapossiblemotivational forceforsuchpraxis,itisalsoirreducibletothesocialpraxisoftheanarchistmovement,as some would have us believe. 10 Mikhail Bakunin, one of the better-known political anarchists, is a case in point here though he is by no means the worst case in point and this criticism is often overstated, asI have argued (pretty erratically) elsewhere: Mikhail Bakunin: The Philosophical Basis of His Anarchism (New York: Algora, 2002). 11 This criticism applies, in my view, to leading contemporary philosophical anarchists like Robert Paul Wolff and A. JohnSimmons. 8 3. Philosophical Development Ifweacceptthat thereisaneedforthetheoreticaldevelopmentofanarchism,howareweto proceed?Clearly,anumberoftheoreticalapproachesareavailable:political,economic, sociological, anthropological, psychological, philosophical, and so on. Anarchist theory is not the specificsubjectmatterofanyparticulardiscipline,suchasphilosophy.Indeed,Idoubtvery much that philosophy has any specific subject matter, which is not to deny that philosophers, as a matter of contingent fact, have their own characteristic interests. Nevertheless, the approach that I adopt is philosophical. That I do so should not be taken to imply that this approach is the best among the available options. It is simply one approach among many others, likewise evaluable in termsofitsfruitfulness(withrespecttoitscontributiontoouroverallbodyofknowledge,if nothing else). That I adopt a philosophical approach says more about my biography than anything else;andIwillnotborethereaderwithsuchdetailshere.Butwhatdoesitmeantoadopta philosophical approach? It is presumably to approach things in a certain, specific way. It is not simply to think or to converse or to write; it is to do these (and perhaps other) things which could, in principle, be done in all manner of other ways in a certain, specific way. But in what way?Thereislittleagreementaboutthis,evenamongphilosophersthemselves.Indeed,many philosophersrejectthenotionthatthereisone(seeminglyright)philosophicalwayofdoing things.Certainly,thereareanumberofmethodsavailabletophilosophers(elenchic(after Socrates),dialectical(afterHegel),phenomenological(afterHusserl),logical-analytic(after Russell),andsoforth).Butthephilosophicalapproachisnotamatterofthepluralityof philosophicalmethods;itisamatterofthesingular,characteristicphilosophicalmodeofthought(amode compatiblewithmanymethods).So,torephraseourquestiononceagain:whatisthe philosophical mode of thought? Theprimaryandcharacteristicmodeofphilosophicalthoughtisargumentation,inthe samesensethattheprimaryandcharacteristicmodeofscientificthoughtmightbesaidtobe experimentation, that of art, expression, and that of religion, representation. (My primary interest here is not in defending a particular account of the other, non-philosophical modes of thought. I fullyappreciatethatdoubtsariseastowhethertheprimaryandcharacteristicmodeofall scientificthoughtisactuallyexperimentation,andsoon.)Inotherwords,philosophers characteristicallyproceedinthefirstplacebyargumentativemeansthough,ofcourse,they mayavailofother,lesscharacteristicmeans,notablyexperimentation,inordertoinformtheir 9 argumentation, for example. In similar fashion, natural scientists characteristically proceed in the first place by experimental means though, of course, they may avail of other, less characteristic means,notablyargumentation,inordertomakesenseoftheirexperimentation,forexample. Whatthisindicatesisthat modesof thoughtdonotdistinguishdisciplineslikephilosophyand scienceinanyabsolutesense:inprinciple,philosophersandscientistscanmakeuseofeach others modes of thought, even if they do not primarily and characteristically depend upon them. Myaccountofphilosophyasanargumentativedisciplineraisesquestionsabout(a) alternativeconceptionsofphilosophyand(b)alternativeargumentativedisciplines.Alternative conceptions of philosophy (from Plato onwards) typically characterise it in terms of: (i) an attitude (namely,thatofwonder);(ii)agoal(namely,thatofwisdom);or(iii)specificsubjectmatter (namely Being, in classical terms at least). So, we read in Plato that: (i) This sense of wonder is themarkofthephilosopher.Philosophyindeedhasnootherorigin(Theaetetus,155d);(ii)the philosopher is the real lover of [that form of] knowledge [which] deserves the name of wisdom (Republic, 490a, 429a); and (iii) it [is] the nature of the real lover of knowledge to strive emulously for truebeingortocomeinto touchwith the natureofeach thinginitself(Republic,490a-b). Theproblemwiththesealternativeconceptions(thoughnotnecessarilywithPlatoinhisown context),however,isthattheyfailtodistinguishphilosophyfromotherdisciplines: mathematiciansare presumablyinspiredbyasense ofwonder;theologianspresumablyaimto achieve wisdom; and poets presumably write about such esoteric concerns as Being. However, itisimportanttonotethatatleastoneofthesefeaturesdistinguishesphilosophyfroman alternativeargumentativediscipline(ifitcanproperlybecalledsuch):thatis,rhetoric.The primaryandcharacteristicmodeofrhetoricalthoughtmayindeedbeargumentation.Buteven assumingthatthereisnosignificantdifferencebetweenphilosophicalandrhetorical argumentation (a subject which I dont intend to broach here), philosophy and rhetoric could be said to differ with respect to their goals: wisdom (or some contribution to our overall body of knowledge) in the case of philosophy; persuasion (or general discursive efficacy) in the case of rhetoric.Indeed,insofarasrhetoricdoesnotaimatwisdom,wemightdenythatitisa theoretical discipline at all. Thusfar,Ihaveclaimedthatphilosophyis:distinguishedfromothertheoretical disciplines byits (primary and characteristic) mode of thought; and distinguished from rhetoric byitsorientationtowardswisdom.Wecanaddherethatitisalsonotablefor(ifnot distinguishable by) its comprehensiveness. One can, in principle, argue about anything and everything (in the pursuit of the wisdom thereof). However, this seemingly promiscuous claim should not 10 be mistaken for a justification for intellectual indiscipline. Argumentation presumably has some standards,ifitistobedistinguishedfrommerewrittenwaffleorspokenchatter.Asimple sequence of random propositions does not constitute argumentation. Those who recognise such adistinctionassertcertainlogicaldemandsonphilosophicaldiscourse.Whatexactlytheselogical demands are demands for is a complex matter that can be studied both formally and informally. Butthereareotherdemandstoo:namely,semanticdemands.Itisarguablyinsufficienttoargue well in a logical sense, in order to avoid the accusation of waffle/chatter; one should also argue clearly. What exactly these semantic demands are demands for is also a complex matter, and we will take it up briefly below. Thus, in philosophical argumentation, there is a logical demand for what is traditionally termed rigour, as well as a semantic demand for what is traditionally termed clarity.Ofcourse,onecanarguerigorouslywhilearguingunclearly;onecanalsoargueclearly whilearguingnon-rigorously.Thatistosay,logicalandsemanticdemandsarenotnecessarily satisfiedsimultaneously.Adoptingalessformalattitudetowardsargumentation,one mightstill criticise philosophy that satisfies logical and semantic demands for being uninteresting in some sense:undulypedantic,forexample.Indeed,philosophy(andespeciallypracticalphilosophy) that views the satisfaction of these demands as an end in itself probably ought to be considered uninteresting. But this is not a view that I endorse here, as will become apparent. Before we move on to some problems with the philosophical development of anarchist theory,weshouldacknowledgetwofundamentalobjectionstotheaccountofphilosophy offeredabove.Accordingtotheseobjections,boththelogicaldemandsandthesemantic demands that we have been discussing are to be rejected by philosophical practitioners. Why so? Presumably,opponentsdonot reject thesedemandssimplybecausetheyaretoodemandingor require too much in the way of intellectual discipline and hard work. The first objection is that recognising logical demands results in philosophy that istoo formal; or that it reduces philosophy tothemerelogical(re)constructionofarguments.Thesecondobjectionisthatrecognising semantic demands results in philosophy that is too abstract; or that it reduces philosophy to mere conceptualanalysisintermsofnecessaryandsufficientconditions.Thephilosopherwho recognisesbothlogicalandsemanticdemandsisseeminglyguilty,therefore,ofreducing philosophy to mere logical and conceptual analysis, that is, to a crude analytic enterprise. Therearetwomainresponsestothislineofcriticism.Thefirstistosaythatthe objectionrestsonacaricatureofacertaintraditionofphilosophy.Fewphilosophers(ifany) would seriously suggest that all philosophy consists of is logical (re)construction and conceptual analysis.Moralphilosophy,forexample,alsoconsistsofnormativetheoryconstruction, 11 substantive evaluation of moral claims, and so on. But philosophy in generalstill benefits from logical and conceptual work. Conceptual work, for example, constitutes a useful preliminary for otherphilosophicalworkinatleastthreesenses:first,itenablesphilosopherstoavoidmere verbalconfusionabouttheconceptsinquestion;second,itenablesphilosopherstoavoidmore substantiveconfusionabouttheproblemathand;and,third,itenablesphilosopherstoavoid confusionaboutthesuccessconditionsforwhatwouldconstituteasolutiontotheproblemat hand.Inotherwords,confusionisthepotentialpricetobepaidforneglectingpreliminary conceptual work. The second response to this line of criticism is to question the consequences of thenon-recognition oflogicalandsemanticdemands.Itisonethingtoquestionthesedemands (and many philosophers quite reasonably do so); it is quite another thing to reject them (as some other philosophers seem to). In fact, it is difficult to make much sense of philosophy that gives uptheidealsofargumentativerigourandconceptualclarityaltogether.Onemaysuspectsuch philosophy of implicitly or unconsciously recognising these standards (to some extent or in some form, at any rate), or of amounting to some non-philosophical discipline (potentially fruitful for all that). 4. Philosophical Methodology Onthebasisoftheconsiderationsabove,Iconcludethatphilosophyisacomprehensive argumentativedisciplineorientedtowardswisdomthatissubjecttologicalandsemantic demands.Thequestionnowiswhetherand,ifso,howthisdisciplinecancontributetothe developmentofanarchisttheory.Icontendthatitcandoso,butthatthiscanonlybe demonstrated by examining how. Accordingly, I turn to some methodological issues in anarchist philosophy. Anarchistphilosophyisatraditionofargumentationthatarrivesatorseemingly justifiesanarchistconclusions.Thisdistinguishesitfromdogmaticanarchism(whereanarchist conclusionsaresimplytakenforgranted)andwhatmightbetermed(inapejorativesense) ideologicalanarchism(whereanarchistconclusionsaresomehowstrivenfor).Whetherthis distinction between philosophyandideology or betweenthefactualandintentionalarrivalat particular conclusions can actually be maintained is a questionable matter for all philosophers; but we will assume for now that the distinction makes sense, even if it sometimes breaks down 12 in philosophical practice. The basic questions that arise here for anarchist philosophy, then, are: (a) what are anarchist conclusions? (or what is the outcome of anarchist argumentation?); and (b) howaretheyarrivedat?(or,ataminimum,whatisthestarting-pointforanarchist argumentation?). Lets examine the second question first: the question of argumentative starting-points. To rephrase our question in pretty crude terms: what do philosophers have to work with in the first place?Ideally,theymightbeinpossessionofcertainfundamentaltruthsrevealedbysome supernatural entity, rationally self-evident, or whatever the case may be from which they could proceeddeductivelyin ordertoarriveatabsoluteconvictionsinvariousfieldsofphilosophical inquiry. So, in the field of moral philosophy, for example, it might be a fundamental truth that all men haveaseriesofinalienablerights;andthistruthmight be recognisedbyallorallthose who are worth taking seriously, in light of their naturally-endowed faculties of mind and socially-endowededucation.Fromthismoralstartingpoint,wecouldproceedtoconclusionsabout socialpractices,relations,andinstitutionswhich,inprinciple,wemightallagreeupon, notwithstanding the complexities of deductive reasoning. Unfortunately, it is doubtful that there are such fundamental truths, at least in the broad field of practical philosophy. And even if there weresuch truths,thefactofthe matteris thatwe generallydisagreequitefundamentallyabout them.So,assumingforthepresentthatwelacksuchcertain,universalargumentativestarting-points, to what on earth can we appeal in the first instance? Onepossibleanswertothisquestionis:toourintuitions.Ofcourse,furtherquestions followfromthisanswer.First:whatareintuitions?And,second:whatevidentialweightdo intuitions carry? There is significant debate about these matters in contemporary philosophy. But I am going to suggest answers that strike me as both (relatively) uncontroversial and plausible, at leastfromtheperspectiveofthepractical(andespeciallythepolitical)philosopher.Thatisto say,Idontwishtomakeanygeneralizedclaimsabouttheroleofintuitionsinallareasof philosophy. Even assuming that philosophers in different areas are dealing with the same kind of thingwhentheyaredealingwithintuitions,itseemstomethatintuitionscouldstilldoa different kind of work with a different degree of theoretical valuein the different areas. In anycase,itisdoubtfulthattheyaredealingwithexactlythesamekindofthing:thatthe classificationintuitionsthatareemployedin(say)epistemologyand(moredebatably)moral philosophy are the same kind of thing as the factual intuitions that may be employed in political philosophyinthewaythatIdiscussbelow.Onenotabledifferenceisthatfactualintuitions, unlikeclassificationintuitions,areelicitedasresponsestorealstatesofaffairs(asopposedto, 13 say,thoughtexperiments),aboutwhichtheymayconstitute(truth-apt)judgments(with propositional content) of (un)desirability and causality. Thus, factual intuitions may be complex, though immediate, judgments which can be reconstructed as follows: state of affairs x holds; x is (un)desirable; and x is caused by y. I will introduce some examples of such intuitions shortly, but we need to back-up a little first. Verygenerally,Itakeintuitionstobejudgmentsofacertainkind.Suchjudgmentsare principallycharacterizedbytheirimmediacy:thatistosay,theyareelicitedpre-reflectivelyor pre-theoretically(thoughthisshouldprobablybeunderstoodinrelativeterms:somereflection andevensometheorizationisarguablynecessaryinordertoarriveatanintuition).Inother words, intuitions are typically elicited in philosophical practice as the initial and direct response toaproblem(howeveradequatelythisproblemmaybeformulated).Becauseofthis,theyare oftenassertedrathertentatively(orsimplyreported),asfeelings,hunches,suspicions, misgivings,andsoforth.Thisnotionofintuitionssuggeststhatthereisnothingespecially remarkableaboutthem.Atanyrate,theyarenotnecessarily(a)theproductofsomespecial facultyofmind,or(b)formedpriortoexperience,or(c)entirelyuninfluencedbyearlier reflection,backgroundknowledge,andintellectualformation.Onemightthenwonderwhat evidential value they have. My effective answer is: rather little. Intuitions are a point of departure fortheoreticalreflection.Theyarerevisable,iftheysubsequentlyprovefalseor(asislikely) simply too imprecise. There is no reason to suppose that they are widely shared (across cultures, generations,genders,socialclasses,andsoon),letaloneuniversal.(Experimentalinvestigation demonstratesprettycompellinglythattheyarenot.)Indeed,theyfrequentlyappeartobe idiosyncratic,thoughthisinitselfdoesnotestablishtheirfalsity.Theirvalue,inotherwords, consistsintheirusefulnessasanargumentativestartingpoint.Oneneedstostartsomewhere, andimmediate,revisablejudgments(typicallyaccompaniedbysomedegreeoffactualand theoretical knowledge) seem to be as good a place to start as any. Take moral philosophy as an example. Quite often, intuitions serve to raise initial doubts inmoralphilosophydoubts,forinstance,abouttheacceptabilityofstrictlyconsequentialist notions of moral action. In themselves, these intuitive doubts do no more than cause pause for thought. Taken somewhat more seriously (or argued through), they may lead to the imposition of certain moral constraints on consequentialist reasoning. Taken more seriously still (or argued through further), they may lead to a fundamental revision in consequentialist theory or even to its rejection. The path from doubt to constraint to revision to rejection (if such a path is taken) is an argumentative one; it is best thought of as a winding as opposed to a straight path (following 14 amethodofreflectiveequilibrium,perhaps);butitisapathonwhichthefirststeptakenis intuitive. Where,then,doesanarchistargumentationstart?Whatistheanarchistintuition?The historical evidence suggests that there isnt a single anarchist intuition, but a family of intuitions whichnotonlyresembleoneanother,butwhichareconceptuallyboundtogether.Indeed,I would argue that these anarchist intuitions are part of an extended family of radical intuitions which, in turn, are part of an extended family of critical intuitions which, in turn, are part of an extended familyofmoralintuitions.Thebasicmoralintuition atissuemightbeexpressedinthefollowing terms: wrongs should be exposed (and possibly righted). Faced with a state of affairs that strikes us as wrong, most of us (I speculate) feel that we ought to do something about it, or at least to speakoutagainstit.(Thisdoesntentailactuallydoingso,ofcourse.)Wemaynothaveany sophisticatedargumenttosupportthisfeelinginitially,butwefeelitallthesame.Thebasic criticalintuitioninquestionmightbeexpressedasfollows:thereissomethingwrongwith existing society (or existing social practices, relations, and institutions). Many of us (I speculate) feel that the (local, regional, or global) society in which we live is somehow disordered or unjust. Again,wemay not haveanysophisticatedinitialargument tosupportsuchafeelingbutwe still feel it. As for the basic radical intuition at issue: this might be expressed as the feeling that there is something fundamentally wrong with our society perhaps related to its basic distribution of socio-political power. Some of us (it seems fair to say) feel that the disorder or injustice of our society is not a superficial matter, but is, as it were, built into the defining practices, relations, and institutionsofthesociety.Webelieve,inotherwords,thatoursocietyisdeeplydisorderedor unjust, even if we are not yet in a position to justify such a judgment. Finally, I would express the anarchistintuitioninthefollowingterms:thereissomethingfundamentallywrongwithour societythatisimportantly(ifnotultimately)relatedtoitsauthoritativepractices,relations,and institutions. In other words, a basic problem of our disordered or unjust society is authority. But a significant degree of argumentation would be required to support this judgment which may, after all, turn out to be false. Evenifotheranarchistsacceptthemethodologicalclaimsmadehere,aswellasthe characterization of intuitions themselves, they may dispute the manner in which I have expressed the anarchist intuition. Perhaps it has more to do with power, or domination, or hierarchy, or the state.Perhaps.Buttheleastwecansayisthattherearestrongconceptualtiesbetweenthese intuitions,tieswhichbecomeapparentaspartoftheconceptualanalysisofauthority.More problematically,otheranarchistsseemto believeinthesufficiencyoftheirintuitions bothas 15 thebasisforananarchistoutlookandforrelatedsocialpractice.Suchabrandofintuitive anarchism ignores boththe possibility that the judgments in question, wholly unjustified as yet, maysimplybefalse.Moreover,itisfacedwiththefactthatmanypeopleifnotthevast majorityofpeopledonotsharetheintuitionsinquestion;orthattheymakeverydifferent judgments. What is taken to privilege anarchist intuitions in and of themselves, let alone justify the associated transformative social practice? It should be noted here that intuitive anarchism is notsynonymouswiththedogmaticformofanarchismreferredtoabove.Thedogmatisttakes anarchistconclusionsforgranted(perhapshavingoncereachedthem,nevertoquestionthem thereafter).Theintuitiveanarchist,ontheotherhand,hasnotreachedanyconclusions.Thus, while dogmatic anarchism represents a deformation of anarchist philosophy, intuitive anarchism whichresistsanyargumentationfromitsintuitivestarting-point(andfinaldestination)is simply non-philosophical. While I have made somewhat modest claims for anarchist intuitions, I certainly oppose the attempt to explain them away, as is fairly common procedure. Thus, the psychologist might beinclinedtopointtosomepathologicalbasisforsuchdeviantjudgments(invirtueoftheir deviance). However, I take it that the deviance or, at any rate, the marginality of judgments has no obvious bearing on their truth or falsity (though it often leads us to doubt their truth asa matteroffact).Iftheanarchistintuitionismistaken,ithasnothingtodowiththelimited number of people who happen to share it. Sofar,Ihavearguedthatthestarting-pointforanarchistargumentation(atleastasI pursueit)isacertainintuitionaboutauthority.Theobviousquestion thatfollowsis:wheredo wego,orhowdoweproceed,fromthisintuitivestarting-point?Itseemsasifourargument musthavesomethingtodowithauthority.Butbeforewecanenterintosubstantive argumentationaboutauthority,reachanyconclusionsaboutauthority,orevenformulatea problem of authority, some clarification is seemingly desirable (if not, in strict terms, necessary). So, what exactly do we mean by authority? What is this authority that intuitively troubles us? In order to satisfy the kind of argumentative or logical demands mentioned earlier, therefore, it would seem helpful (at the very least) if we could satisfy some conceptual or semantic demands. And in order to satisfy these demands, we may engage in a process of conceptual analysis (fairly looselydefinedatthispoint).Suchanalysisisaproblematicmatter,withrespecttowhatitis supposed to involve (and the role of intuitions therein, for example), its possibility, and even its desirability.Butwemightthinkoftheidealofconceptualanalysishereasthespecificationof necessaryandsufficientconditionsfortheapplicationofterms.So,forexample,onemight 16 establishthatsocialpowerandrightfulnessarenecessaryconditions,togethersufficient,for the application of the term authority. Thus, what authority means in each and every instance, in each and every context, is captured by such an analysis. It could not possibly mean anything else (if the analysis is properly conducted). Understandably, such analysis raises suspicions, especially in the case of normative terms likeauthority. Surely, it could be the case at least as a matter of convention that in some other possible (not to mention actual, historical) context authority might mean something else: itmightbereducibletosocialpower(entailingnothingaboutrightfulness);itmightinvolve further seemingly necessary conditions (such as maleness); or it might mean something wholly unrelated to all of this. Without getting into a prolonged discussion of these matters, let us grant that the objection holds: that the ideal of conceptual analysis, so understood, is (at best) merely anideal.Butacasecanstillbemadeforconceptualanalysisinpracticalphilosophy:a methodologicalcaseforanalysisthatyieldswhatmightbetermednon-arbitrarystipulativedefinitions. Thus,withoutattemptingtomakeasubstantivecaseforanalysisasatheoreticalactivitythat yieldssomekindofconceptualtruths,amethodologicalcasecouldbemadeforanalysis:to establish no more than that it facilitates substantive moral evaluation, or the evaluation of moral phenomena(likeauthoritativerelations)understoodatacertainlevelofgenerality(intermsof authority).Intheformer,substantivesense,conceptualanalysismightberegardedasa philosophical end in itself. In the latter, methodological sense, conceptual analysis is regarded as a means towards an ethical end. From the methodological perspective, the purpose of analysis is notthediscoveryofapriorimeaning,butthestipulationofmeaningforpresenttheoretical purposes.Andthejustificationforthiskindofanalysisrestsonitstheoreticalusefulness:ona claimthatmoralphilosophy,forexample,isbetterservedbydoingitthannot(insofarasit facilitates the solution of theoretical coordination problems, for example). But is the stipulation which results from such analysis always an arbitrary affair, such that blacknesscanbedefinedintermsofwhitenessoranythingelseinviolationofthe conventionsofagivenlinguisticcommunity(howevertheboundsofthiscommunityare determined), for instance? I claim not: theoretically justifiable stipulation (at any rate, for ethical purposes)mustbeanon-arbitraryaffair;otherwise,allsubsequentevaluationiswholly immaterial,andtheethicsthatemergesisacompleteabstraction.Themeasureofnon-arbitrariness, as I understand it here, is the apparent necessity ofat least some of the conditions specified.Thus,non-arbitrarystipulationentailssomerespectfortheconventionsofagiven linguistic community. So, for example, the definition of authority in terms of social power is 17 non-arbitrary:fromtheviewpointofthelinguisticcommunitytowhichmostofmyreaders presumably belong, authority is necessarily a form of social power. Or, if it is not, then we need toreviseouranalysisofauthorityquitefundamentallyandseektospecifyotherseemingly necessaryconditions.However,apartfromthespecificationofsuchnecessaryconditions,we generally specify other contentious conditions in order to produce more adequate definitions and to maintain a certain level of theoretical coherence and quite reasonably expect to revise these conditions in the course of our argumentation. So, for example, the definition of authority in terms of rightfulness might appear to be contentious and likely in need of revision though it may still prove (evaluatively) useful for immediate theoretical purposes. Atthispoint,weshouldconsideranarchist objectionstoconceptualanalysisevenof thekinddepictedabove(consistinginthemethodologicallyjustifiablestipulationofseemingly necessary and morecontentious conditions for the application of terms). The general objection to conceptual analysis seems to be that it involves the ahistorical or use-independent fixing of meaning.Thus,conceptualanalysisisanarbitraryaffair,anda(consciouslyorunconsciously) concealedoneatthat.Worsestill,fromananarchistperspective,thiskindoffixingisan authoritarianactonthepartofsomeintellectualthoughpreciselywhatauthoritarianism means itself stands in need of some fixing here. In any case, while the kind of analysis depicted abovedoesinvolvethefixingofmeaning(oritsstipulation),itdoesnotfixmeaningina whollyahistoricaloruse-independentmanner.Indeed,itdoesso(non-arbitrarily)withdue respectfortheconventionsofagivenlinguisticcommunity;thatis,inanon-ahistoricaland nonuse-independent fashion. 5. Defining Anarchism Tothispoint,Ihaveclaimed,methodologically,thatapointofdepartureforanarchist argumentation is a certain anarchist intuition (or one of a family of such intuitions); and that we proceedfromthisstartingpointbymeansoftheconceptualanalysisofrelevantterms.After this, we engage in the substantive evaluation of relevant moral phenomena (those picked out by our intuitions and clarified by our analysis). And, ultimately, we arrive (as anarchists, if such we are)atanarchistconclusionsaboutthesephenomena.Ofcourse,atallstagesofthis methodological sequence, we may revisit the other stages of our argument in order to revise our 18 intuitions,stipulativedefinitions,substantivearguments,andconclusions.But,crudely characterised, this is one direction that anarchist argumentation may be seen to take. Having considered how anarchist conclusions might be reached, a final question remains forthispaper:whatconstitutesananarchistconclusion?Presumably,ananarchistconclusion (understoodinmyterms)isaconclusionaboutthemoralphenomenonofauthority.Butwhat kind of conclusion? A caricature of this conclusion would be that all authority is to be rejected in principle. Is this anti-authoritarian conclusion the anarchist conclusion properly understood? It would seem not (as a matter of fact) since many anarchists argue (i) that at least some forms of authority are justified (if not legitimate12) and (ii) that even if this were not the case, it could be thecase(buttranspiresnottobe).(Nevertheless,itisworthnotingthatsomeanarchistsdo reach the anti-authoritarian conclusion, and reject all authority in principle. Thus, there is an anti-authoritarian brand of anarchism, though it is relatively uncommon.) Initial caution is therefore called for in the characterization of anarchist conclusions. But, minimally, the anarchist seems to conclude that all forms of authority are questionable and at least some of them are illegitimate if notwhollyunjustified.Assuch,hisorherpositioncanbedefinedasoneofscepticismtowards authority. Thereare,however,anumberofobjectionstosuchanaccount.Forsome,itissimply mistaken,insofarastheprincipalobjectofanarchistconcern(scepticalorotherwise)isnot authority but, say, the state or hierarchy. The problem with an anti-statist alternative (anarchism definedastherejectionofthestate),however,isthatitistooreductivetoconstituteevena minimal definition. The focus of anarchist concern is not the state as such, but the authority of the state (as well as other social powers); or not simply what the state does, but that it claims to rightfullydoso(inasimilarwaytoothersocialpowers).Whatthestatedoescouldbe(and sometimes is) done by other socio-political agents; but these other agents do not claim the same intriguingrightsthatthestateclaimsforitself.13Similarlyintriguingrightsareclaimedin differentwaysandondifferentscalesbyanynumberofsocialpowers(familial,religious, 12Onthisdistinction,seeJustificationandLegitimacyinA.JohnSimmons,JustificationandLegitimacy:Essayson Rights and Obligations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), pp. 122-57. 13Anarchistsrecognisethispointwithrespecttothestatespositive functions(e.g.,distributionofcertainsocial goods), but often overlook it with respect to its negative functions (e.g., exercise of coercive force). Such functions (positive and negative) could, in principle, be performed by the Mafia. But the Mafia, unlike the state, has never been a particular object of anarchist concern. Presumably, this is because the Mafia does not (or does not appear to) claim the kind of special rights that so trouble anarchists. 19 educational, economic, etc.), and these have also attracted the sceptical attention of anarchists. If the state appears to attract disproportionate attention, this is most likely related to the extent of its social power and is thus, after all, more or less proportionate. Therearetwowaysofdefininganarchisminrelationtohierarchy.Thefirst,anti-hierarchical definition all hierarchy is to be rejected in principle is as implausible as the anti-authoritariandefinitionintroducedabove.Anarchistsseemtoregardatleastsomehierarchies (real or conceivable) as justified (if not legitimate); that is, at minimum, as practically necessary (if nototherwisedesirable).Arguably,allformsofself-governmentandself-managementrequire (or even benefit from) some such social configuration, however this differs from traditional top-downforms.Evenbottom-upsocialconfigurationsappeartoconstitutehierarchies(as opposed to completely horizontal social configurations), even if they are inverted in some way. At any rate, there are grounds to suspect that inverted hierarchies are still hierarchies, however justifiable or legitimate these may be. A more promising alternative definition of anarchism is scepticism towards hierarchy. I havetosaythatIamunsureexactlyhowanarchismsounderstoodwouldactuallydifferfrom anarchismasIunderstandit(asscepticismtowardsauthority).Onereasonforthisisthatlittle analysishasbeenconductedasyetoftheconceptofhierarchy,whichconsequentlyremains rather obscure (philosophically). I can only speculate about the difference in emphasis (if nothing else) between hierarchy and authority. Hierarchy is primarily a sociological concern: the type of socialconfigurationthatsociologistsseektodescribeandexplain.Authority,bycontrast,is primarily a philosophical concern: the type of normative power that philosophers seek to analyse andevaluate.Perhapsthedifferenceinemphasishereislargelyacontingentmatter(andthere areobvioushistoricalcounterexamples,suchasWeberssociologicaltreatmentofauthority). Nevertheless,theverynormativityoftheconceptofauthoritywouldappeartodistinguishit from the concept of hierarchy and to lend it to philosophical investigation. Otherobjectionstomydefinitionofanarchismarebasedontheassertionthatitis inadequateratherthanmistaken.Itignoresthedistinctivesocial,political,andeconomicends (perhapsutopian)ofanarchism,aswellasitsmeansofpursuingthem(notablythrough prefigurative social praxis). That is to say,it reduces anarchism to its critical element (even if it accurately identifies the object of anarchist criticism). The diversity ofanarchist means and ends afascinatingtopicinitsownrightshouldcertainlybeexaminedinanadequatestudyof anarchism. But this very diversity precludes the possibility of any general definition of anarchism 20 which factors in means and ends. Related to this point is a final objection to my definition: that thereisnoneedforanysuchdefinitionofanarchism.Perhapsdefiningitdoesntinvolveany authoritarianfixingofmeaning;butitisstillunnecessary.Iconcur:inastrictsense,itis unnecessary for the theoretical investigation of anarchism. But it is still useful. That is, it is useful to have some minimal sense of what we mean by anarchism in mind when we are discussing it and especially evaluating it. Of course, we may have to revisit and revise our definition in the courseofourdiscussion.Butthispossibilityinitselfdoesntunderminethegeneral methodological approach outlined in this paper. 6. Concluding Remark Inthispaper,Iarguedthat:(1)thedevelopmentofanarchisttheoryisworthwhile;(2)the developmentofanarchisttheoryisnecessary;(3)thephilosophicaldevelopmentofanarchist theory is one possible avenue for such development; (4) philosophy as such might be understood asacomprehensiveargumentativeprocessorientedtowardwisdom;(5)suchaprocessis subjecttologicalandsemanticdemands;(6)suchaprocess,sofarasanarchismisconcerned, might depart from a certain intuition about authority; (7) such a process, so far as anarchism is concerned,mightbenefitfromtheanalysisoftheconceptofauthority;(8)thisanalysismight involvethespecificationofseeminglynecessaryandothercontentiousconditionsforthe application ofthe term authority; and (9) anarchist argumentation arrives at conclusions that, minimally, can be defined in terms of scepticism towards authority. Theseargumentsdoubtlessraiseallmannerofproblems,bothfromthe metaphilosophical and the political points of view. At the most general metaphilosophical level, thereareprobablyproblemswithmyconceptionofphilosophy.Moreparticularly,thereare probablyproblemswith myconceptionof thephilosophical(or, morespecifically,ethical)role ofintuitionsandconceptualanalysis.Politically,thereareprobablyproblemswithmy conceptionofanarchistintuitions,anarchistconclusions,andthedefinabilityofanarchism.By nomeansdoIclaimtohavesolvedallsuchproblems.ButIdohopetohaveclarifiedand motivated such methodological matters to a certain extent.