040218 formal bill of exception

8/14/2019 040218 formal bill of exception

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1 CAUSE NO. 89-3607-16

In the Matter of the Marriage of

VICKI GAE FLORES, Petitioner,and,

JAMES LEE KITCHEN,Respondent,

and in the interest of

AMANDA DAWN KITCHEN, andLINDSEY DIANE KITCHEN,

Minor Children,and

R. LANCE FLORES, Plaintiff-Intervenor.

IN THE

16TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT

OF TEXAS

DENTON COUNTY

PROCEDURAL HISTORY IN MEMORIA,

FORMAL BILL OF EXCEPTIONS

&

BYSTANDERS BILL OF EXCEPTIONS

onJanuary 11, 2004 Hearing on motions of Petitioner and Plaintiff


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Plaintiff-Intervenor, R. Lance Flores, files this bill of exceptions with the court, moves the

court to take judicial notice, and to admit the following evidence :

INTRODUCTION


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1 Original Petitioner is Vicki G. Flores (hereinafter the Petitioner); Respondent is James Lee

Kitchen (hereinafter the Respondent); Plaintiff-Intervenor is R. Lance Flores (hereinafter the

Plaintiff). There is one non-party, (Greg Abbott, Attorney General of Texas, by and through

agents in his employ) that continually attempts to unlawfully enter the jurisdiction of the court by

fraud.


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PROCEDURAL HISTORY IN MEMORIA

2 It is a well-established practice and policy of the 16TH District Court and the Denton Courts

to discriminate and act with specific bias and prejudice and malice aforethought against

2.1 attorneys who do not regularly practice law in Denton County, or


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2.2 litigants without legal counsel.

3 It is also common knowledge throughout North Texas, and well documented by numerous

complaints filed with the Texas State Commission on Judicial Conduct, record of the court, and

the press, that judges presiding over 16TH Judicial District Court of Texas in Denton County, as


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well as the Denton County Courts have regularly engaged in conduct that violates civil and

criminal statutes, the rules of court and the Code of Judicial Conduct.

4 It is also well-established that the 16TH Judicial District court has used or induced the

improper use of authority and power, or criminal acts of the courts coordinator Kelly Smith and


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district attorney Bruce Isaacks in order to aid in the concealment of proceedings in which:

4.1 the presiding judge has predetermined the outcomes of cases prior to hearing or trial,

4.2 the presiding judge participated in ex parte communications to make those

determinations,

4.3 or the presiding judge predisposed a case to political favor in order to conceal fraud and


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other crimes committed by parties and/or by their lawyers.

AND IN MEMORIA, THE FOLLOWING:

5 On or about October 28, 2003, the court coordinator, KELLY SMITH, despatched a notice

with her signature affixed thereto, through the United States Postal Service, dated Thursday,


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October 28, 2003 on the letterhead of Carmen Rivera-Worley, District Judge. The notice advised

the Plaintiff Lance Flores of a setting of a NON-JURY TRIAL to hear the merits on the courts

motion for dismissal for want of prosecution. The original Petitioner, Vicki G. Flores was not

sent notice of the proceeding.


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6 On Thursday, November 6, 2003, an examination of the records of the instant cause was

made for the acquisition of evidence for review by the Texas State Commission on Judicial

Conduct and the Travis County District Attorney by an independent observer (hereinafter the


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Observer).1 During the inquiry the Observer records, from a statement made by Court


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Coordinator, Kelly Smith, that Katrina W. English,2urged SMITH to set a hearing to dismiss the

Office of the Attorney Generals own suit for want of prosecution.

7 On January 30, 2002, Katrina W. English, inscribed her name to and filed a Motion to

Clarify and Reduce Unpaid Child Support to Judgment in behalf of John Cornyn, then Attorney


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General of Texas (hereinafter, Office of the Attorney General of Texas, the OAG), to

unlawfully and illegally cause the taking of funds from the Petitioner Vicki G. Flores without


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standing to do so. At the hest of James Lee Kitchen,3Howard G. Baldwin Jr., Brian R. Burton,

Joseph Sarpong, Marissa L. Balus, and Katrina W. English initiated a continuous course of

malicious litigation and fraud for a period of over two years.

8 On December 12, 2003, the Petitioner Vicki G. Flores moved the Court on a plea of privilege

1 See, Observers bystander affidavit; also, another similarly filed with the House Committee on Judicial Affairs, and the


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to transfer venue showing also:

8.1 that the Court had no subject-matter jurisdiction over actions of the OAG in the 16TH

District Court (a conjunct group ofuncontroverted verified motions4 were concurrently filed

on June 21, 2002 by the Plaintiff, a period in excess of seventeen (17) months having elapsed at

the time Petitioners plea of privilege was filed)

House Committee on Licensing & Administrative Procedures.


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8.2 that the pleadings of the OAG and Respondent were frivolous, and that their continued

prosecution was malicious with clear and obvious design to conceal numerous felony and

misdemeanor crimes, crimes of moral turpitude, where their acts were clearly and in violation of,

inter alia, the Texas Penal Code, Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, Texas Civil Practices and

Remedies Code, and the Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct;


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8.3 that Respondent, James Lee Kitchen, alone and in collusion with other parties,

committed numerous crimes and torts in violations of the Texas Penal Code, Texas civil statutes,

and federal crimes. (See Plaintiffs verified pleadings of December 11, 2003)5

9 On December 11, 2004 Kelly SMITH, the court coordinator, without leave of, nor notice to

2 Katerina W. English is an assistant attorney general, who originally appeared in the lower court (Title IV court Denton


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the Petitioner, Vicki G. Flores, executed the Fiat in the stead of the presiding judge setting a

hearing for January 8, 2004. SMITH also scheduled Plaintiffs Motion to Strike Testimony,

Motion to Quash & Dissolve Mary Carter Agreement, and Motion for Sanctions for hearing

without his knowledge and for which he submitted no Fiat to set hearing.

County) for Greg Abbot, Attorney General of Texas. English, a person in her personal capacity and under color of law, who had


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10 On January 6, 2004 Plaintiff dispatched an electronic communique to Kelly Smith,

informing her and all parties that he just became aware that a hearing was set for January 8, 2004

and that there were other parties that may not be aware that she had set a hearing date.

January 8, 2004 Hearing on Respondents Motion for Transfer and Plaintiffs Motion to Strike

no standing, fraudulently invoked the jurisdiction of the inferior court under the above-styled and -numbered cause. After the


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Testimony, Motion to Quash & Dissolve Mary Carter Agreement, and Motion for Sanctions

11 On January 8, 2004, appeared the Plaintiff and Brian R. Burton, Assistant Attorney General

OAG; Judge Carmen Rivera-Worley presiding; the court called the instant cause from the docket,

and before hearing argument and presentation of fact regarding the motions sub judice, the

original plea to the jurisdiction, motion to show authority, and answer & counter claims, were filed on May 22, 2002, the lower


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following objections and motion for judicial notice were asserted as follows:

Objection - On Motion to Show Authority

Attys for OAG - No Grounds or Standing - Jurisdiction Fraudulently Invoked

WHEREAS:

court relinquished jurisdiction and referred the matter back to the original trial court for disposition on the matters which were the


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12 The Court heard objection (raised by the Plaintiff invoking the issue of his verified and

uncontroverted First Amended Motion to Show Authority collaterally attacking the void

judgment of December 6, 1991) to the appearance and participation before the bar of Howard G.

Baldwin Jr., Brian R. Burton, Joseph Sarpong, Marissa L. Balus, and Katrina W. English

wherein:

subject of the Plaintiff-Intervenors cross-complaint and motions.


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12.1.1 the motion affirmatively plead the lack of grounds, standing and

authority of the OAG, (the Office of the Attorney General neither answering by verified

pleading nor answering under oath nor even challenging the objection in open court)

12.1.2 the manifest fact was presented as a matter of record of the court by

declared reference to Plaintiffs First Amended Motion to Dismiss for Lack of


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Jurisdiction,6 and

12.1.3 the supporting civil statute (Texas Government Code 74.053) was

presented showing that the order upon which the OAG advance grounds and standing

was void,7

12.1.4 the supporting criminal statutes (Tex. Penal C. 32.46 and 38.12) of


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the criminal actions in which, inter alios, the attorneys (Assistants Attorney General) for


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the OAG had engaged,8

12.1.5 the prevailing precedent set forth per curiam by the Supreme Court of

Texas in Flores v. Banner9 showing specific congruency between the instant cause and

Flores that the order upon which the attorneys for the OAG assert grounds for their

standing is void as a matter of law.

3 James Lee Kitchen was involved in a series of unlawful acts, felonies and other crimes, that included the kidnaping of


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WHEREFORE:

12.2 Carmen Rivera-Worley, presiding judge, continued a pattern of judicial misconduct

by her wrongful use of the power of her office;

12.2.1 by acting intentionally with gross indifference the her duties required of

Petitioners children, Amanda Dawn Kitchen and Lindsey Diane Kitchen. Mr. Kitchen secreted his and their whereabouts until


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her to

12.2.1.1 upon the showing in open court that the OAG had no standing nor the

Court subject-matter jurisdiction, strike the pleadings and dismiss the actions of the

OAG and Respondent Kitchen for lack of jurisdiction,

12.2.1.2 require the OAG attorneys to show authority,

past their age of majority, then attempted to fraudulent claim child support payments through the Office of the Attorney General


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12.2.1.3 not permit the OAG attorneys to appear in the cause with out showing

authority, and

12.2.1.4 to strike the OAG pleading because the failed to show authority.10

12.2.2 Judge Worley callous disregard of the law is error, and violates Tex.

Const. Art.V 1-a(6)A, and the Texas Code of Judicial Conduct which the continued

for the period he had possession of the children resulting from the kidnaping.


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thenceforth.

12.3 Judge Rivera-Worley, knowing that her actions were in violation of the canons of

judicial conduct, criminal law and civil statutes, did wilfully refuse to comply with the those

canons and law, and instead engaged in a course of judicial misconduct from the bench after

4 06/21/2002 First Amended Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction (Verified)


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presented with and having knowledge of:

12.3.1 manifest fact form the records of the court,

12.3.2 statutory law that left but one course of non-discretional action; and

12.3.3 prevailing precedence, to presume facts in evidence to be true;11 and

12.3.4 misconduct by the lawyer for the Respondent and the lawyers for the


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Attorney General of Texas, in that they had committed numerous and continuous

violations of the Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct that raises a

substantial questions as to the their honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyers in

other respects;

12.4 By her failure to act on the Plaintiffs oral Objection andJudicial Notice and Motion


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to Show Authority, judge Rivera-Worley, wilfully abused her authority and power.12 (willful

relating to a judges conduct, has been clearly defined by our Supreme Court relating to judicial

misconduct,

06/21/2002 First Amended Answer to Motion to Clarify and Reduce Unpaid Child Support to Judgment, Intervenor's


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seeIn re James L. Jim Barr, Judge;13 and also, In re Lowery14 ). By her willful and flagrant

disregard of State and federal law and rule, and her engagement in the concealment of criminal

acts of others she breached the Texas Code of Judicial Conduct by violating the following

Canons as shown in pertinent part:

12.5 Canon 1 A judge should participate in establishing, maintaining and enforcing


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high standards of conduct, and should personally observe those standards so that the integrityand independence of the judiciary is preserved. 12.6 Canon 2 A. A judge shall comply with the law and should act at all times in amanner that promotes public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary 12.7 Canon 3 B.(2) A judge should be faithful to the law and shall maintain professionalcompetence in it. A judge shall not be swayed by partisan interests, public clamor, or fear ofcriticism.12.8 Canon 3 B.(4) A judge shall be patient, dignified and courteous to litigants, jurors,witnesses, lawyers and others with whom the judge deals in an official capacity, and should

Counterclaims and Collateral Attack on Void Judgment (Verified)


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require similar conduct of lawyers, and of staff, court officials and others subject to the judge'sdirection and control.12.9 Canon 3 B.(8) A judge shall accord to every person who has a legal interest in aproceeding, or that person's lawyer, the right to be heard according to law. A judge shall notinitiate, permit, or consider ex parte communications or other communications made to the judgeoutside the presence of the parties between the judge and a party, an attorney, a guardian orattorney ad litem, an alternative dispute resolution neutral, or any other court appointeeconcerning the merits of a pending or impending judicial proceeding. A judge shall requirecompliance with this subsection by court personnel subject to the judge's direction and control


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12.10 Canon 3 C.(2) A judge should require staff, court officials and others subject to thejudge's direction and control to observe the standards of fidelity and diligence that apply to thejudge and to refrain from manifesting bias or prejudice in the performance of their official duties

12.11 Canon 3 D. (2) A judge who receives information clearly establishing that a lawyerhas committed a violation of the Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct should takeappropriate action. A judge having knowledge that a lawyer has committed a violation of theTexas Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct that raises a substantial question as to thelawyer's honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in other respects shall inform the Office


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of the General Counsel of the State Bar of Texas or take other appropriate action.

Judicial Notice

WHEREAS:

13 On motion in open court by the Plaintiff to take judicial notice, the Court took notice of


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Plaintiffs uncontroverted verified pleadings:

Judicial Notice on Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction

14 First Amended Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction & Collateral Attackwherein

it irrefutably establishes:

06/21/2002 First Amended Motion to Show Authority (Verified)


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14.1 that on 10/18/1991 the Plaintiff, timely filed a PLEA IN INTERVENTION15 prior to

a judgment being rendered in the above-styled cause pursuant to the TRCP Rule 60, with service

had pursuant to TRCP 21 and 21a, pleading a justiciable interest in the on-going suit;16

14.1.1 that on 12/02/1991, at 8:47 A.M. CST, Plaintiff filed an OBJECTION


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TO ASSIGNMENT OF JUDGE (hereinafter, the Objection)17 challenging the

assignment of visiting judge Barbara Culver Clack18 precluding her from taking any

action other than the function of disqualifying herself from the case;

14.1.2 that on 12/02/1991, the day of the hearing, prior to docket call, prior to

the visiting judge being seated, and prior to the calling the case, the Objection, was

5 12/11/2003 Motion to Strike Testimony, Motion to Quash and Dissolve Mary Carter Agreement, Motion for Sanctions,


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presented in hand to Barbara Culver Clack; and

14.1.3 that the instruments presented were verified copies from the records of

the Court and that thePlea in Intervention and Objection to Assignment of Judge were a

matter record which were manifest fact mandating judicial notice;

14.1.4 that a verified exhibit was enclosed presenting the court with the

and Collateral Attack on Void Judgment (Uncontroverted / Verified)


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prevailing precedent set forth per curiam by the Supreme Court of Texas (Flores,

supra)19 with specific congruency between the instant cause andFlores.

WHEREFORE:

14.2 Upon collateral attack on void order and showing that the OAG had no standing nor

the Court subject-matter jurisdiction, the Court erred, through the direction of judge Carmen


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Rivera-Worley who allowed the continuation of the proceedings without subject-matter

jurisdiction.Carmen Rivera-Worley, presiding judge, continued a pattern of judicial misconduct

by her wrongful use of the power of her office;


her to

6 See First Amended Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction II. FACTS, A-D, pp 3,4


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7 Id. at III. Argument and Authorities, A-C.1, pp 4-7


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authority, and

14.2.1.4 to strike the OAG pleading because the failed to show authority.20



thenceforth.

8 Id. at III.C.2-3, p 7


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14.3 By her failure to act on the Plaintiffs oral objection by judicial notice of his

9 Flores v. Banner, 932 S.W. 500, 1996 Tex


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uncontested verified Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction, Judge Rivera-Worley, wilfully21


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abused her authority and power.22 By her willful and flagrant disregard of State and federal law

and rule, and her engagement in the concealment of criminal acts of others Carmen Rivera-

Worley breached the Texas Code of Judicial Conduct by violating Canon 1 { 11.5 at 9}, Canon

2 {11.6 at 9}, Canon 3 B.(2) {11.7 at 9}, Canon 3 B.(4){ 11.8 at 9} , Canon 3 B.(8) {11.9 at

9}, Canon 3 C. (2){11.10 at 9} , and Canon 3 D. (2) {11.11 at 9}

10 Air Park-Dallas Zoning Comm. v. Crow-Billingsley Airpark, Ltd., 109 S.W.3d 900 (Applicable Law Any party may


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Judicial Notice on Motion to Show Authority

WHEREAS:

15 The Plaintiff made a second assertion of TRCP Rule 12, lack of authority of Brian Burton,

for the Office of the Attorney General, to appear in the instant cause was made by moving the

file a motion to show authority. TEX. R. CIV. P. 12. The challenged attorney has the burden of proof to show sufficient authority


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court to judicial notice of his uncontested verified Motion to Show Authority & Collateral

Attack. Said motion indisputably showed by manifest fact, and clear and unambiguous law and

ruling, that Howard G. Baldwin Jr., Brian R. Burton, Joseph Sarpong, Marissa L. Balus, Katrina

W. English, attorneys for the OAG, and the Attorney General of Texas, have fraudulently

invoked the Courts jurisdiction. Further, that the same individuals have intentionally and

to represent the client.Id.If sufficient authority is not shown, the attorney is not permitted to appear in the cause.Id.


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willfully continued the prosecution of an action in which they have no grounds for standing and

have fraudulently invoked jurisdiction, committing, inter alia, the crime of barratry.

WHEREFORE:

15.1 Upon the courts judicial notice of Plaintiffs 1ST Amended Motion to Show

Authority, showing that the OAG had no standing nor the Court subject-matter jurisdiction, the

Further, if no authorized person appears, the court shall strike the pleadings on file.


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Court again erred by the direction of Judge Rivera-Worley, who allowed the OAG to proceed

without standing and the Court without subject-matter jurisdiction. Carmen Rivera-Worley,

presiding judge, continued a pattern of judicial misconduct by her wrongful use of the power of

her office;

15.1.1 by acting intentionally with gross indifference to required duties:


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authority, and

15.1.1.4 to strike the OAG pleading because the failed to show authority.



thenceforth.


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15.2 By her failure to act on the Plaintiffs oral motion and the courtsjudicial notice on

Plaintiffs answer, Judge Rivera-Worley, again, wilfully abused her authority and power. By her

willful and flagrant disregard of State and federal law and rule, and her engagement in the

concealment of criminal acts of others Carmen Rivera-Worley, breached the Texas Code of

Application of Law to Facts - Rule 12 provides that the motion may be heard at any time before the parties have announced


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Judicial Conduct by violating Canon 1, Canon 2, Canon 3, Canon 3 B.(2), Canon 3 B.(4), Canon

3 B.(8), Canon 3 C. (2), and Canon 3 D. (2).

Judicial Notice on Answer to Motion to Clarify &c. and Counterclaims

16 Plaintiff raised on judicial notice in open court, his uncontested verified First Amended


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Answer to Motion to Clarify and Reduce Unpaid Child Support to Judgment, Intervenor's

Counterclaims and Collateral Attack on Void Judgment wherein it presented the court with

uncontroverted evidence that:

16.1 raises a plea to the jurisdiction;

16.2 collaterally attacks the void order upon which Howard G. Baldwin Jr., Brian R.

ready for trial. Id. The purpose behind enactment of the rule also weighs in favor of allowing Rule 12 challenges as soon as


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Burton, Joseph Sarpong, Marissa L. Balus, Katrina W. English, attorneys for the OAG, and the

Attorney General of Texas, advanced grounds upon which they falsely asserted standing and

fraudulently attempted to acquire subject-matter jurisdiction of the court.

16.3 irrefutably establishes that Howard G. Baldwin Jr., Brian R. Burton, Joseph Sarpong,

Marissa L. Balus, Katrina W. English, attorneys for the OAG, and the Attorney General of Texas,

practicable after new or different counsel attempts to appear in a case. The rule's purpose is to discourage and cause dismissal


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have fraudulently invoked the Courts jurisdiction and that same have intentionally and willfully

continued the prosecution of an action in which they have no grounds for standing and have

fraudulently invoked jurisdiction, committing, inter alia, the crime of barratry.

WHEREFORE:

16.4 Upon judicial notice taken on Plaintiffs 1ST Amended Answer&c. showing that the

of suits brought without authority Sloan, 693 S.W.2d at 784; see also Mobile Homes of Am., Inc. v. Easy Living, Inc., 527


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OAG had no standing nor the Court subject-matter jurisdiction, the Court again erred on the

direction of Carmen Rivera-Worley, who allowed the OAG to proceed without standing and the

Court without subject-matter jurisdiction.

16.5 By her failure to act on the Plaintiffs oral motion to take judicial notice and the

Courts notice of his uncontested and verified 1ST Amended Anwer judge Rivera-Worley,

S.W.2d 847, 848 (Tex. Civ. App.-Ft. Worth 1975, no writ).


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wilfully abused her authority and power. Carmen Rivera-Worley, the presiding judge, thus

continued a pattern of judicial misconduct by her wrongful use of the power of her office;


her to



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authority, and

11 Federal Underwriters Exchange v. Brigham, 184 S.W.2d 849 (These allegations were not denied by appellant by


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16.5.1.4 to strike the OAG pleading because the failed to show authority.



thenceforth.

16.6 By her willful and flagrant disregard of State and federal law and rule, and her

verified pleadings, and therefore under the specific provisions of Rule 93, Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, must be presumed to


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engagement in the concealment of criminal acts of others she breached the Texas Code of

Judicial Conduct by violating Canon 1, Canon 2, Canon 3, Canon 3 B.(2), Canon 3 B.(4), Canon

3 B.(8), Canon 3 C. (2), and Canon 3 D. (2).

Judicial Notice on Motion to Strike Testimony, Motion to Quash and Dissolve Mary Carter

be true.)


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Agreement Motion for Sanctions and Collateral Attack on Void Judgment

WHEREAS:

17 Plaintiff raised on judicial notice in open court, his uncontested verified Motion to Strike

Testimony, Motion to Quash and Dissolve Mary Carter Agreement, Motion for Sanctions,

and Collateral Attack on Void Judgment wherein it presented the court with uncontroverted


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evidence which showed:

17.1 that on, 06/28/2002, G. David Heiman the attorney for the Respondent Kitchen,

James Lee Kitchen and Beverly Kitchen initiated fraud against two different district courts

concurrently further establishing a willingness to engage in violations of civil and civil statutes

12 In re Whitfield, 115 S.W.3d 753 (Evidence regarding uncontroverted matters, including the existence of the


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which include but not limited to pattern of barratry,23et seq.

17.1.1 Heiman, and the Kitchens in a continued pattern of using the well-

known practice of the 16TH Judicial District Court to conceal criminal activity, attorney

malpractice and malfeasance within its general jurisdiction;

17.1.2 the record of the 16TH Dist. Ct., shows, however, that G. David Heiman

arbitration agreements, was before the court in the form of verified pleadings, judicial admissions, an affidavit, and


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attempted to extend the dead handof the 16TH District Court of Texas beyond Denton

County in order to illegally and unlawfully circumvent the lawful jurisdiction of the

101ST Judicial District Court,24 in Dallas County. G. David Heiman, James Lee Kitchen

and Beverly Kitchen not only attempted to secure an unlawful order by deception, which

is a crime, but attempted to do so covertly; thtis, without giving notice to any of the

authenticated documentary evidence.The trial court abused its discretion in finding that Whitfield did not establish the


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parties concerning a hearing on the protective order.

17.2 that at or about 2:30 PM on 07/01/2002, in an unscheduled surprise hearing25 in

which no lawful notice26 had been given, attorney John B. Hawley, attorney G. David Heiman,

existence of an arbitration agreement. [emphasis added])


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and Asst Attorney General George M. Barnes constructed an unlawful Mary Carteragreement27

and kept secret from the Plaintiff-Intervenor.

17.2.1 It is important to note that the Plaintiff had demanded production

pursuant to TRCP Rule 196 which would have included of documents such as the Mary

Carter Agreement and witness lists in his original answer and counter claim and again in


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his amended answer and counter claim; the purpose for which, was to prevent a trial by

ambush. Neither documents or witness were ever produced to the Plaintiff. Further, the

only way in which this hearing could have occurred is if Hawley and Heiman had

conspired with the Court in an ex parte meeting to hold the unannounced trial by

ambush.

13 In re Barr, 13 S.W.3d 525, The term "willful," as applied in Tex. Const. art. V, 1-a(6)A, is the improper or wrongful


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17.2.2 How could a hearing be had otherwise? If a hearing was not scheduled

on the docket, and there was no motion, and no notice, how could be heard anything?

How was the Court moved to hear what Rivera-Worley subscribes happened in the

hearing for the Agreed Take Nothing Judgment and Severance of Intervenor. There was

no motion for hearing on an Agreed Take Nothing Judgment and there certainly was no

use of the power of his office by a judge acting intentionally, or with gross indifference to his conduct.


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motion for a hearing on Severance of Intervenor. The Records of the Court show no such

motions. The only way to have arranged the surprise hearing that day was for an ex

parte meeting to have occurred between the judge, G. David Heiman and John B.

Hawley in which they had a meeting of the minds and planned a trial by anbush in

which they would secret from the Plaintiff an agreement made between the OAG,


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Heiman and Hawley. The Plaintiff later discovered a hand written construction of the

secreted agreement in the possession of the court reporter, never appearing in the record

of the court until the Plaintiff filed his motion to strike testimony and strike the Mary

Carter Agreement. The final version or rather the result of the Mary Carter Agreement,

the Agreed Take Nothing Judgement &c. which was secreted from the Plaintiff, and at


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sometime thereafter, was entered into the record as an exhibit.28


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17.3 that again, the Plaintiff raised a plea to the jurisdiction,29

17.4 that John B. Hawley, G. David Heiman, and George Michael Barnes, conspired to

use threats of continued (unlawful) prosecution by the strong arm of the State against Petitioner

Vicki Flores,

17.5 that Hawley, Heiman, Burton, Sarpong, Balius, English, Barnes, the Attorney


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General of Texas and the KITCHENS, crafted a passive self-serving extortion or

blackmail scenario to escape likely amerceable sanctions for malpractice, misconduct,

tort actions, and criminal liability for intentionally misleading the16TH and 101ST District


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Courts.30

17.6 that Hawleys, coerced his client by intimidation an threats, to capitulate to the

Mary Carter agreement, effectively withdrawing her actions, and fulfilling his

consideration in the unlawful agreement he had reached with the judge, Heiman, the


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Kitchens, and the attorneys for the Office of the Attorney General.31

17.7 that John Hawleys intent and motives to extort the silence of Vicki Flores to

cover up his malpractice, fraud on the court, torts, and malice extends further in order to

prevent his client from disclosing his sexual advancements and torts ofOffensive Physical


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Contact and sexual advancements were the sole purpose for his contrivance to secretly

negotiate the unlawful agreement.32

17.8 that Hawleys behavior is a continuation of a history of violation of the

Thoma, 873 S.W.2d at 489-90. As noted in Thoma, willfulness involves more than an error of judgment or a mere lack of


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Disciplinary Rules and cause for his public reprimand33 for

17.8.1 endorsing his clients check to her physician;

17.8.2 offensive and inappropriate physical contact with a female client;

and

diligence. By way of further exposition, the Thoma Review Tribunal additionally noted that "willfulness" necessarily


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17.8.3 action with intention to intimidate his female client in order to stop

formal complaints ofhis actions.

17.9 that the actions of HAWLEY, HEIMAN, BURTON, SARPONG, BALIUS,

encompasses conduct involving moral turpitude, dishonesty, corruption, misuse of office, or bad faith generally, whatever the


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ENGLISH, BARNES, THE OFFICE OF ATTORNEY GENERAL OF TEXAS34 and the

KITCHENS35 included entering the court with unclean hands by their egregious and outrageous

acts and under extraordinary circumstances, that include but not limited to acts and conduct of:36

17.9.1 intentional violation of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure calculated tounlawfully avoid notice and due process,17.9.2 suborning perjury,

motive. A specific intent to use the powers of the judicial office to accomplish a purpose which the judge knew or should


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17.9.3 submitting false evidence to the court by perjured testimony,17.9.4 abuse of process,37

17.9.5 intentional inflection of emotional distress,38

17.9.6 fraud,39

17.9.7 fraud upon the court,17.9.8 civil & criminal barratry,40

17.9.9 malfeasance,41

17.9.10 moral turpitude,42

have known was beyond the legitimate exercise of his authority may in and of itself constitute bad faith. A judge acts


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17.9.11 official misconduct43

17.9.12 and other serious crimes44 including but not limited to the Texas PenalCode (Tex P C) Under:

17.9.13 Tex P C 7.02 Criminal Responsibility for Conduct of Another it is acriminal offense to aid a person in the commission of a crime or fail to prevent theoffense if there was a legal duty to prevent the commission.17.9.14 Tex P C 15.02 Criminal Conspiracy complicity in a felony is acriminal offense if a person acts to aid in a crime with one or more persons. An offense

intentionally, or with intent, when the act is done with the conscious objective of causing the result or of acting in the


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under Criminal Conspiracy is one category lower than the most serious felony that is theobject of the conspiracy.17.9.15 Tex P C 32.46 Securing Execution of Document by Deception it is acrime if a person by deception causes the signing or execution of any document whichaffects property or service or the pecuniary interest of another and is a felony of the thirddegree.17.9.16 Tex P C 36.05 Tampering with Witness it is a criminal offense if aperson coerces a witness or prospective witness in an official proceeding to falselytestify, to withhold his testimony or any part of this testimony, information, document, or

manner defined in the pertinent rule of conduct. See In re Conduct of Schenck, 318 Ore. 402, 870 P.2d 185, 189 (Or. 1994).


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thing and is a felony of the third degree.17.9.17 Tex P C 36.04 Improper Influence it is a criminal offense if a personprivately addresses a representation, entreaty, argument, or other communication to anypublic servant who exercises or will exercise official discretion in an adjudicatoryproceeding with an intent to influence the outcome of the proceeding on the basis ofconsiderations other than those authorized by law and is a Class A misdemeanor.17.9.18 Tex P C 36.06 Retaliation it is a criminal offense if a personintentionally or knowingly harms or threatens to harm another by an unlawful act inretaliation on account of another as a witness, prospective witness, informant, or a

[emphasis added]


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person who has reported the occurrence of a crime and is a felony of the third degree.17.9.19 Tex P C 37.03 Aggravated Perjury it is a criminal offense if a personcommits perjury during or in connection with an official proceeding and is a felony ofthe third degree.17.9.20 Tex P C 37.09 Tampering With or Fabricating Physical Evidence itis a criminal offense if a person, knowing that an investigation or official proceeding ispending or in progress, he alters, destroys, or conceals any record, document, or thingwith intent to impair its verity, legibility, or availability as evidence in the investigationor official proceeding and is a felony of the second degree.


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17.9.21 Tex P C 38.12 Barratry it is a criminal offense if a person obtains aneconomic benefit for himself by instituting any suit or claim that he knows is false and isa Class A misdemeanor.17.9.22 Tex P C 39.01 Official Misconduct a public servant commits acriminal offense if he knowingly violates a law relating to his office intending to harmanother; this offense is a Class A misdemeanor.17.9.23 Tex P C 9.02 Official Oppression it is a criminal offense for a publicservant acting "under color of law" to use his office to intentionally deny or obstruct aperson's civil rights or any other privileges, powers or immunities, when that public

14 In re Lowery, 999 S.W.2d 639, "Willful" as applied in Tex. Const. art. V, 1-a(6)A is the improper or wrongful use of


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official knows his action is unlawful; this offense is a Class A misdemeanor.

Title 18 Crimes and Criminal Procedure45 Under:

17.9.24 18 USC 3 Accessory after the fact, it is a criminal offense if a personknowing that an offense against the United States has been committed, receives, relieves,comforts or assists the offender in order to hinder or prevent his apprehension, trial orpunishment;17.9.25 18 USC 241 Conspiracy Against Rights of Citizens it is a federal

the power of his office by a judge acting intentionally, or with gross indifference to his conduct. "Willful" is more than an error


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criminal offense if two or more persons conspire to injure, oppress, threaten, orintimidate any inhabitant of any state, territory, or district in the free exercise orenjoyment of any right or privilege secured to him by the Constitution or laws of theUnited States, or because of his having so exercised such right or privilege, such personsmay be fined and/or imprisoned;17.9.26 18 USC 242 Deprivation of Rights Color of Law it is a criminaloffense if under color of any law, statute, ordinance, regulation, or custom a personwilfully deprives an inhabitant of any State of his rights, privileges, or immunitiessecured or protected by the Constitution or laws of the United States, and punishable by

of judgment or a lack of diligence and encompasses conduct involving moral turpitude, dishonesty, corruption, misuse of


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fine or imprisonment for no more than one year.17.9.27 18 USC 512 Tampering with a Witness, victim, or informant it is afederal criminal offense to interfere with the communication by any person to a lawenforcement officer or judge of the United States of information relating to thecommission or possible commission of a Federal offense;17.9.28 18 USC 1961-1963 Racketeer Influenced and CorruptOrganizations Act it is a criminal offence punishable by fine or imprisonment of notgreater than twenty years for any acts or threat involving extortion which is chargeableunder State law and punishable by imprisonment for more than one year or any act under

office, or bad faith. [emphasis added]


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certain provisions of Title 18 of the United States Code including but not limited to 1341 (relating to mail fraud), 1343 (relating to wire fraud), 1503 (relating to obstructof justice), 1510 (relating to obstruction of criminal investigations), 1511 (relating tothe obstruction of State or local law enforcement), 1513 (relating to retaliating againsta witness, victim, or an informant), 1951 (relating to interference with commerce);

17.10 additionally, all, or part of the aforementioned persons, directly, by consent, or by

conscience indifference - engaged or encouraged, or failed to dissuade or assisted in the


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participation of inappropriate, unlawful, or illegal acts including but not limited to:

17.10.1 assisting or counseling client to engage in conduct that was criminal orfraudulent;46

17.10.2 failing to dissuade client from committing a crime or fraud;47

17.10.3 failing to make reasonable efforts under the circumstances to persuadeclient to take corrective action;48

17.10.4 making a claim or defense primarily for harassment, to injure the

15 1ST Amended Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction &c. at II.B., pg. 3


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Plaintiff-Intervenor maliciously;49

17.10.5 making a claim or defense for which there was no good faith argumentthat the action taken is consistent with existing law, rules or is supported by a good faithargument;50

17.10.6 a claim or defense that contains a knowingly false statement of fact;51

17.10.7 taking positions that unreasonably increases the costs or burdens thecase and delays litigation;52

17.10.8 using or relying upon false evidence and referring to that evidence;53

16 1ST Amended Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction &c. Exhibit 1 PLEA IN INTERVENTION


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17.10.9 failing to avoid assisting criminal and fraudulent acts;54

17.10.10 violation of prohibitions against improper influence of witnesses,and obstructive tactics in general;55

17.10.11 falsifying evidence or counseling or assisting a witness to testifyfalsely;56 and17.10.12 habitually violating the Texas rules of civil procedure andevidence.57

17 Ibid. at II.E., pg 4


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WHEREFORE:

17.11 Upon judicial notice taken on Plaintiffs 12/11/2003 Motion to Strike Testimony,

Motion to Quash and Dissolve Mary Carter Agreement, Motion for Sanctions, and Collateral

Attack on Void Judgment and presenting uncontroverted, verified, and affirmatively plead fact

and law the Court took notice,

18 Id. Exhibit 2 OBJECTION TO ASSIGNMENT OF JUDGE


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17.11.1 that the attorneys for the Office of the Attorney General had no

standing nor the Court subject-matter jurisdiction,

17.11.2 that the attorneys for the Office of the Attorney General, G. David

Heiman, and James Lee Kitchen fraudulently invoked the jurisdiction of the court, and

17.11.3 that in a continuous pattern of violations of law to conceal previous

19 Flores,supra at FN


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crimes, torts, malpractice, maleficence, and violations of the Texas Disciplinary Rules of

Professional Conduct committed by HAWLEY, HEIMAN, BURTON, SARPONG,

BALIUS, ENGLISH, BARNES, THE OFFICE OF ATTORNEY GENERAL OF

TEXAS committed additional violations which were intended to conceal those


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offenses and subvert justice.58

17.12 AND, by failing to act on the uncontroverted evidence and clear unambiguous well-

established law the Court again erred on the direction of Carmen Rivera-Worley, who allowed

the Office of the Attorney General to proceed without standing and the Court without subject-

matter jurisdiction in light of the crimes committed and other violation of law.

20 Air Park-Dallas Zoning Comm. v. Crow-Billingsley Airpark, Ltd., 109 S.W.3d 900 (Applicable Law Any party may


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17.13 By her failure to act on the Plaintiffs oral motion to take judicial notice and the

Courts notice of his uncontested and verified motions judge Rivera-Worley, wilfully abused her

authority and power. Carmen Rivera-Worley, the presiding judge, thus continued a pattern of

judicial misconduct by her wrongful use of the power of her office;


file a motion to show authority. TEX. R. CIV. P. 12. The challenged attorney has the burden of proof to show sufficient authority


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her to

17.13.1.1 upon the showing in open court that the OAG had no standing nor

the Court subject-matter jurisdiction, strike the pleadings and dismiss the actions of the



to represent the client.Id.If sufficient authority is not shown, the attorney is not permitted to appear in the cause.Id.


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17.13.1.3 not permit the OAG attorneys to appear in the cause with out

showing authority,

17.13.1.4 to strike the OAG pleading because the failed to show authority,

17.13.1.5 report attorney misconduct,

17.13.1.6 to act on knowledge of clear and apparent crimes committed .

Further, if no authorized person appears, the court shall strike the pleadings on file.


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17.13.2 Judge Rivera-Worley callous disregard of the law is error, and violates

Tex. Const. Art.V 1-a(6)A, and the Texas Code of Judicial Conduct which the

continued thenceforth.

17.14 By her willful and flagrant disregard of State and federal law and rule, and her

engagement in the concealment of criminal acts of others she has brought bad light and disgrace


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upon the Texas judiciary breaching the Texas Code of Judicial Conduct by violating Canon 1,

Canon 2, Canon 3, Canon 3 B.(2), Canon 3 B.(4), Canon 3 B.(8), Canon 3 C. (2), Canon 3 D.

(2).

Law & Precedence Brought Before the Bench


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18 Near-after the calling of the hearing of Plaintiffs motions, the Plaintiff presented in hand to

Judge Rivera-Worley, LexisNexis annotated citations of Flores v Banner, 932 S.W.2d 500,


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1996 Tex59 andWestLaw annotated citation of Morris v. National Cash Register Co., 44


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S.W.2d 433 Tex.Civ.App. 1931,60 in support of his argument at bar. The aforementioned citations

presented clear and well-determined law about which there is no confusion or question as to its

interpretation where Plaintiffs complained-of legal error is egregious that is a part of a pattern or

practice of legal error made in bad faith.61

19 Judge Rivera-Worleys continual and intentional refusal to abide by the law is not only error

21 Barr, Lowery, Thoma ,supra


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by the court, but a clear abuse of power not mere indiscretion. Furthermore, her intentional

violation of Constitutional prohibitions of procedural and substantive due process are clearly

violation of federal criminal statutes for which she is clearly.

20 That Judge Rivera-Worley might argue that she is unfamiliar with laws or rule which require

her to follow specific procedural processes or prohibitions on denial of due process is wholly


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unacceptable as legal argument of unintended error when it is clearly intended to violate federal

criminal statute.62 This has been particularly true in light of the U.S. Supreme Courts long-held

position in Screws.63 This is especially true in her own case, where she had previously held a

position in the Denton County District Attorneys Office. She should have been, given even the

most limited competency needed to preform those duties, intimately familiar with constitutional

22 Whitfield, supra


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prohibitions.

NOTWITHSTANDING THE FOREGOING PROCEDURAL HISTORY Plaintiff submits the

following bill of exceptions to the January 12, 2004, Hearing on Respondents Motion for

Transfer and Plaintiffs Motion to Strike Testimony, Motion to Quash & Dissolve Mary Carter


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Agreement, and Motion for Sanctions:

23 See, Plaintiff-Intervenors Motion to Strike Testimony, Motion to Quash and Dissolve Mary Carter Agreement &c. II,


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BILL OF EXCEPTIONS

January 12, 2004 Hearing on

Respondents Motion for Transfer and Motion to Dismiss (Motion to Modify)

Plaintiffs Motion to Strike Testimony,

Plaintiffs Motion to Quash & Dissolve Mary Carter Agreement, andPlaintiffs Motion for Sanctions

S, T - p.11


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The Facts:

21 On the afternoon of January12TH, 2004, hearings set on the courts own direction on January

8TH, 2004 where called from the docket on motions made by the original Petitioner and Plaintiff-


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Intervenor.

22 Three observers attended the hearing to record the events of the proceedings as bystanders.

23 Prior to argument of the motions Plaintiff attorney and Petitioner attorney were ordered by


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judge Rivera-Worley to be sworn before initiating presentation of their motions. The court did

not require the same of attorney G. David Heiman and attorney Brian Burton, for the OAG. The

court thus ordered the two parties with motions before the court to be held to higher standards to

argue and present evidence while not requiring the parties who had been shown earlier not to


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25 The Plaintiff66 approached the bench and presented the court with a copy the said document

(Judgment on the Mary Carter Agreement) along with a copy of the envelope in which it was

delivered. Plaintiff, still at the bench, then presented the Court with the original documents,

including the envelope, to examine and verify the authenticity of the copies being entered into

the record. While before the bench, Plaintiff moved the court to note for the record the following,


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and the same was entered:

25.1 that the same said instrument alleges that it resulted from the hearing on July 1,

2002. (The day the illegal Mary Carter agreement was constructed by G. David Heiman, John B.


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Hawley and George Michael Barnes.)67

25.2 that the instrument was signed by Carmen Rivera-Worley on December 22, 2002

(six months, after a Mary Carter Agreement was created without knowledge or agreement of all

of the parties)

25.3 that the Judgment on the Mary Carter Agreement shows a Denton County District

25 See, Motion to Strike Testimony, Motion to Quash and Dissolve Mary Carter Agreement &c, II, W thru W.5.


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Clerk file stamp recording that the 16TH Judicial District Court (Judge Carmen Rivera-Worley

presiding) secreted the unlawful agreement and did not enter the Judgment on the Mary Carter

Agreement for over a year, December 29, 2003,68 and

25.4 that the postmark on the envelope (in which Judgment on the Mary Carter

Agreement was delivered) bearing the return address of The Law Firm of G. David Heiman

26 Pursuant to TRCP Rule 21, 21a.


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showed that it was mailed on Thursday, January 8, 2004.

26 Following, the Courts receipt of the aforementioned Judgment documents into evidence,

Judge Rivera-Worley became noticeably hostile toward the Plaintiff.


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27 During the proceeding Plaintiff raised the jurisdictional challenge until such time the court

refused to hear objections preserving errors of the court. By a mandate from the bench, Judge

Rivera-Worley issued notice that she would not hear any more objections at [that] time; a

period that persisted after numerous violations of procedural and substantive due process were

conjoined by Heiman, Burton and Rivera-Worley in an effort to estop probative evidence from

27 The Texas Supreme Court severing from the rest of the agreement and holding that null and void, inElbaor v. Smith, 845


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being brought before the court and entered into the record.

28 The court refusal to allow objections was initiated when Heiman and Burton interrupted the

Plaintiffs proceeding alleging improper notice of the hearing. However, neither Heiman nor

Burton introduced any evidence and only made allegations at bar.

S.W.2d 240 (1992 Tex.), 36 Tex. Sup. J. 245:


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28.1 Be it remembered that Judge Rivera-Worley required the Plaintiff and Petitioner to

prosecute their motions under oath, and that Heiman and Burton were not required to do the

same.

28.2 It was at this time Plaintiff raised again, an objection (under oath, resulting from

Judge Rivera-Worleys order) to show authority and again to raise a plea to the jurisdiction.


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However, before the Plaintiffcould complete his objection, Judge Rivera-Worley refused to hear

the objection stating that she would hear no more objections at this time, thereafter

immediately proceeded,

28.3 Judge Rivera-Worley proceeded to act on allegations pertaining to the notice


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document69 without submission of evidence made by Heiman, while gaging the Plaintiff and

preventing his objection to the obvious evidentiary error. Rivera-Worley, announced to the Court

that the Plaintiffs motion was improperly before the court and she was going to dismiss the

Plaintiffs motions.

28.4 The Plaintiff attempted again to object noting that a reference made by Heiman was


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an apparent typographical error, but Rivera-Worley responded, thats not good enough,then

again refused to allow Plaintiff to complete his objection and offer evidence. et seq:

28.4.1 Be it remembered that the Plaintiffs motions were initially set by Kelly

Smith, court coordinator, for the court, not set by the Plaintiff, on December 11, 2003

without notice to the Plaintiff, then reset by the Judge Rivera-Worley in open court on

The case before us reveals yet another jury trial and verdict distorted by a Mary Carter agreement. The trial judge, who


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January 8, 2004 to be heard on January 12, 2004.

I, Lance Flores, do certify that the foregoing


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instrument/correspondence, was delivered on January 8, 2004,to the [office of] G. David Heiman, Attorney of Record for

James Kitchen, and Vicki G. Flores in hand.

28.4.3 The Date/Time/CSID/TSID code affixed by either the transmitting or

receiving telephonic facsimile equipment upon the transmitted document shows the

fully grasped the detrimental effect these agreements could have on the outcome, attempted to monitor the lawsuit by assiduously


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transmission/receipt time to be 1/12/2004 9:48 PM FROM: DLPost2143811295

TO: 940-349-2311".

28.4.3.1 The transmission date code on the document Heiman and Burton were

alleging shows Heiman was not given proper notice, also shows it didnt exist in the

known Universe at a the time they were alleging error based on a document that would

applying the guidelines suggested in the Smithwickconcurrence. The conduct of this trial, however, confirms the apprehension


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not even exist for at least another seven hours.

28.4.3.2 Yet, there, at bar, stood G. David Heiman, appearing before the court,

arguing improper notice, from a document he alleged was in possession, that showed, he

would not receive that document until 9:50 PM, later that night.

28.4.3.3 What did appear on the document, of more rational consequence, was a

expressed by Justice Spears in Smithwick: that these remedial measures would only mitigate and not eliminate the unjust


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certificate of service showing Mr. Heiman was notified of the January 12TH hearing, on

the same day that Judge Carmen Rivera-Worley set that hearing in open court on

Thursday, January 8TH, 2004.

Petitioners Motion to Transfer Venue

influences exerted on a trial by Mary Carter agreements. Equalizing peremptory strikes, reordering proceedings, thoroughly


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andMotion to Dismiss for Want of Prosecution

the Respondent James Lee Kitchens

Motion to Modify &c.

29 Following Judge Rivera-Worleys decision to dismiss Plaintiffs motions which she had set

for hearing, the original Petitioner, Vicki Flores, presented her case, (Be it remembered, the

disclosing the true alignment of the parties, and revealing the agreement's substance cannot overcome collusion between the


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Petitioner was ordered to be placed under oath to argue and present her motion) stating the

following in oratory:

29.1 On April 10, 1991, Jim Kitchen filed a "Motion to Modify" with the court.

29.2 On October 18, 1991, Lance Flores filed a "Plea in Intervention" under the

authority of the Texas Rules of civil Procedure Rule 60 and under the service authority of Texas

plaintiff and settling defendants who retain a financial interest in the plaintiff's success. In fact, Mary Carter agreements may


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Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 21 and 21a

29.3 Under the rules, a plea in intervention cannot be stricken without a motion to

strike, and cannot be stricken if the intervenor could have brought the same action or any part

thereof of his own right if the intervention would not complicate the cause by excessive

multiplication of issues, or if the intervention was almost essential to effectively protect the

force attorneys into questionable ethical situations under Rule 3.05 of the Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional


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intervener's interest.

29.4 The court has already received two cases in which this [issue] is upheld 793

SW2d 652, Guaranty Federal and 857 SW2d 580 Tony's Tortilla[ Tony's Tortilla Factory, Inc.

v. First Bank, 857 S.W.2d 580 ]

29.5 At the time of the plea in intervention, the opposing party was asking for a

Conduct, which is titled "Maintaining the Impartiality of the Tribunal." Comment 2 to that rule notes, regarding alternate


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psychological evaluation of Lance[Lance Flores, Plaintiff-Intervenor].

29.6 On December 2, 1991 at approximately 8:47 am, Lance filed an Objection to the

assignment of Judge against Judge Clack, prior to the docket call, Prior to the judge being

seated, and prior to the case being called.

29.7 On the same day, Judge Clack refused to step down, and proceeded to conduct a


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trial.

29.8 Now under the Texas Government Code 74.053 when a party files a timely

objection to an assigned judge under 74.053, the assigned judge's disqualification is mandatory.

An objection is timely filed if the party files before the first hearing or trial over which the

assigned judge is to preside, which is what happened in this case.

methods of dispute resolution (like Mary Carter agreements), that "a lawyer should avoid any conduct that is or could


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29.9 If the assigned judge overrules a timely section 74.053 objection, then the judge's

subsequent orders are void. It is our contention that the order issued by Judge Clack is

therefore void, that the last valid order is the final decree of divorce, and that the attorney

general has no standing in this case.

29.10 Objections under 74.053 were cited in the case Flores v. Banner 932 SW2d 500

reasonably be construed as being intended to corrupt or to unfairly influence the decision maker." See SUPREME COURT


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previously presented to the court.72

29.11 In that case, specifically under 74.053 b & d, it states it allows a party to make

one objection to an assigned judge and unlimited objections to an assigned former judge who

was not a retired judge, which applies to Clack. 74.053 (d) states that a former judge or justice

who was not a retired judge may not sit in a case if either party objects to the judge or justice.

OF TEXAS, TEXAS DISCIPLINARY RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT art. X, 9 (1990) [emphasis added]; cf.


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29.12 Therefore, because the order issued by Judge Clack is void, and the motion for

trial was never reset by Kitchen, this action should be dismissed for want of prosecution. The

motion to modify has never been legitimately prosecuted and is now moot.

29.13 This means that the Attorney General's office has never had the authority to bring

an action against me and does not have the authority now. The AG has never filed any

MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-20 (1979)(attorneys responsible for upholding adversarial


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answers to any motions filed in this case, and under Morris v. National Cash register, 44 SW2d

433, all facts alleged in a motion sworn and not contested should be accepted as true. Under

the provisions of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure 93N (6) allegations not denied by a party

by verified pleadings must be presumed to be true, as shown in Federal Underwriters Exchange

system). The dissent acknowledges that Mary Carter agreements skew the trial process. This effect reasonably could be construed


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v. Brigham73

29.14 Because of the void order, I am still managing conservator. Now, when the

invalidity of a judgement is so shown affirmatively on record of the case which is based, it is

subject to collateral attack and may be attacked at any time or place by injunction or otherwise,

which is what we are doing now.

as unfairly influencing the decision maker.


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29.15 In Cassidy v. Fuller 568 Sw2d 845, a child is to be considered as residing in the

county where the managing conservator resides.

29.16 Under the Texas Family Code 1106(b) - on the timely motion of any party and on

showing venue is proper in another county, the court shall transfer proceeding to the county

where venue is proper. Therefore, this court should transfer this case to Dallas County


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29.17 [testimony/argument was then interrupted by the Court]

30 Following the Courts disruption of the Petitioners motions by Judge Rivera-Worley,

complaint was made by G. David Heiman and Brian R. Burton, advancing his same heard story74

of the purloined notice described in 27 through 27.4.3.3. Again Rivera-Worley heard unsworn


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testimony from the bar without submission of any evidence.

31 Judge Carmen Rivera-Worley then dismissed Petitioners motion as well.

(30)Rivera-Worleys decision to order Plaintiff and Petitioner to


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ARGUMENT:

32 ERROR 1 Denial of Due Process Pathology Failure to Act on Prior Knowledge of

Lack of Authority to Prosecute Case

(4 thru 19 are incorporated by reference hereto) The court erred through Judge Carmen

As a matter of public policy, this Court favors settlements, but we do not favor partial settlements that promote rather than


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Rivera-Worleys failure to apply the law pursuant to TRCP Rule 12. Rivera-Worley had prior

knowledge that Brian R. Burton for the OAG had after nineteen (19) months not shown

authority.75 The had been made aware after objection was made by Plaintiffs invoking and

securing judicial notice then moving on Plaintiffs motion to show authority in the hearing on

January 8, 2004. Her refusal to act according to the Rule and allow the OAG attorneys to

discourage further litigation. And we do not favor settlement arrangements that skew the trial process, mislead the jury,


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continue their appearance without showing authority establishes willful intent to deprive

Plaintiffs of due process and violate the Rules of Procedure with malice aforethought. The

challenged attorneys had the burden of proof to show sufficient authority to represent the Office

of the Attorney General by affirmative defense made under oath.76 Rivera-Worleys refusal to

require the OAG attorney to show sufficient authority, not to permit the OAG to appear in the

promote unethical collusion among nominal adversaries, and create the likelihood that a less culpable defendant will be


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cause, and failing to strike the pleadings of the OAG on file (See Air Park-Dallas Zoning

Comm., surpa, FN10, at 7). Such constitutes:

32.1 POINT 1: Violation of TRCP Rule 12. Judge Rivera-Worley may not arbitrarily

overlook requirements of rules of procedure that brace the foundation of due process rights at her

hit with the full judgment. The bottom line is that our public policy favoring fair trials outweighs our public policy favoring


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whim;77 rules of procedure must be applied ipso jure.78

32.2 POINT 2: Violation of Tex. Const. art 1, 19, Bill of Rights Due Course of Law


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32.4 POINT 4: Violation of Tex. Const. art. 5, 1-a(6),81

32.5 POINT 5: Violation of the Texas Code of Judicial conduct Canon 1, Canon 2,

Canon 3 B.(2), Canon 3 B.(4), Canon 3 B.(8), Canon 3 C. (2), and Canon 3 D. (2).82

partial settlements. [emphasis added]


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33 ERROR 2 Denial of Due Process Pathology Failure to Act on Prior Knowledge of

OAG Lack of Standing and Courts Lack of Subject-Matter Jurisdiction

(4 thru 19 are incorporated by reference hereto) The Court erred through Judge Carmen

Rivera-Worleys specific intent to use the powers of her judicial office to accomplish a purpose

which she knew or should have known was beyond the legitimate exercise of her authority to


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callously disregard of the law. At the calling of the hearing Judge Rivera-Worley had prior

knowledge acquired on or before the January 8TH hearing that the OAG had no standing and the

court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction83

to proceed. Rivera-Worley intentionally refused to

dismiss the action brought by the Office of the Attorney General on the behest of James Lee

Kitchen. Rivera-Worleys refusal to enforce that which was required by law is a commission of


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egregious legal error, a commission of a continuing pattern of legal error, and the commission of

legal error which is founded on bad faith, that constitutes:


provision,

33.2 POINT 2: Violation of U.S. Const. Amendments V and XIV, Due Process


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33.3 POINT 3: Violation of Tex. Const. art. 5, 1-a(6),



34 ERROR 3 Denial of Due Process, Judicial Bias, Right to Fair Hearing Pathology

Mary Carter agreements frequently make litigation inevitable, because they grant the settling defendant veto power over


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Failure to Act on Prior Knowledge Crimes, Concealment of Crimes, Fraudulent

Concealment, Engagement in Criminal Activity to On-going Criminal Activity (16 thru

16.13.2 are incorporated by reference hereto) The Court erred through Judge Carmen Rivera-

Worleys prior knowledge and specific intent to use the powers of her judicial office to

accomplish a purpose which she knew or should have known was beyond the legitimate exercise

any proposed settlement between the plaintiff and any remaining defendant. SeeBass v. Phoenix Seadrill/78 Ltd., 749 F.2d 1154,


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of her authority. It was error of the court for Rivera-Worley to callously disregard the law and act

in concert to conceal and further state and federal crimes. It was error of the court for Rivera-

Worley to willfully and intentionally engage in the concealment of criminal acts where, inter alia,

those crimes include numerous counts of mail and wire fraud, and where such include sufficient

predicated acts or other criminal acts set forth in 18 U.S.C. 1961(1) which would invoke the

1156 (5th Cir. 1985)(Mary Carter agreement gave settling defendant veto power). Thus, "only a mechanical jurisprudence could


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breadth and force of the Racketeering Influence and Corrupt Organizations Act. The court errs by

Rivera-Worleys prima facie attempt to conceal her involvement in the criminal acts85 of the

OAG attorneys, G. David Heiman, John B. Hawley, and James Lee Kitchen.86

The court errs by

Rivera-Worleys use of the force of the State to retaliate against the Plaintiff and Petitioner

through the threat of continued unlawful prosecution of the case by the 16TH Judicial District

characterize Mary Carter arrangements as promoting compromise and discouraging litigation--they plainly do just the opposite."


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Court, the Attorney General of Texas and others, and the denial to a fair and impartia l hearing

which constitutes:


provision,

34.2 POINT 2: Violation of U.S. Const. Amendments V and XIV, Due Process Clause of

Stein v. American Residential Mgmt., 781 S.W.2d 385, 389 (Tex. App. -- Houston [14th Dist.] 1989), writ denied per curiam, 793


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the Fourteenth Amendment - Right to a Fair Hearing.




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Concealment of Crimes, Fraudulent Concealment, Engagement in Criminal Activity to On-

going Criminal Activity

S.W.2d 1 (Tex. 1990)


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(23 thru 25 are incorporated by reference hereto) The Court erred through Judge Carmen

Rivera-Worleys indifference to uncontroverted evidence showing active concealment of an

unlawful Judgment created out of a Mary Carter Agreement designed to conceal wrongdoing and

skew the trial process, mislead the jury, promote unethical collusion among nominal adversaries.

It was error of the court for Rivera-Worley to callously disregard the law by her open bias and


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hostility toward the Plaintiff when it was revealed that she had kept secret a document she

falsified by signing a the Agreed Take Nothing Judgment And Severance of Intervenor. The fact

that it was discovered in open court that Judge Carmen Rivera-Worley had been involved in

falsifying a government document, executing a document by deception and secreting the

unlawful execution of that document does not give her leave to further deny due process by


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purposely hindering the Plaintiffs right to a fair hearing by extending her hostility to overt bias.88

Such is error and constitutes:


provision,

35.2 POINT 2: Violation of U.S. Const. Amendments V and XIV, Due Process Clause of


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the Fourteenth Amendment - Right to a Fair Hearing.




In his concurring opinion in Scurlock Oil Co. v. Smithwick, 724 S.W.2d 1, 8 (Tex. 1986) (on motion for rehearing), Justice


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"Willful" conduct involving moral turpitude, dishonesty, corruption, misuse of office, and

bad faith where clear and uncontroverted evidence and well-settled law were presented to

the Court requiring but a specific course of action where that mandate by law was callously

Spears pointed out that "Mary Carter agreements should be prohibited because they are inimical to the adversary system, and


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disregarded. (28 thru 28.17 are incorporated by reference hereto)90 During the Petitioners

recitation on her Motion to Transfer Venue, and Motion to Dismiss for Want of Prosecution &c.

the Court erred by failing to dismiss the action of the Office of the Attorney General of Texas for

its lack of standing, and failure to show authority; further, because the Petitionershowed that the

court had no subject-matter jurisdiction.

they do not promote settlement their primary justification." The truth of this statement has been recognized by commentators


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36.1 Be it rememberedthat Rivera-Worley forced Plaintiff and Petitioner to present their

motions under oath. Judge Rivera-Worleys obvious intent to require a higher pleading standard

of the Plaintiff and Petitioner on argument, an act in itself a violation of due process equal

protection and equal access. It is inescapable that Rivera-Worleys acts were constructed by

conscience design to hinder if not severely handicap their motion arguments.


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36.2 However, unlike Rivera-Worleys refusal to hear objections so as to gag the Plaintiff

and Petitioner from raising objection to preserve error, her attempt to bind their hands by

requiring a higher pleading standard would come to be her undoing. Rivera-Worleys

requirement of a higher pleading standard of the Petitioner produced adverse unexpected

consequences for her. The Petitioners argument by the legal nature of a sworn oath, despoiled

and has been proven by the subsequent history regarding the use of Mary Carter agreements.


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the effect of Rivera-Worleys calculation. Instead of impeding Petitioners argument, Rivera-

Worleys miscalculation produced uncontroverted sworn testimony calling into evidence

manifest fact from the Courts own record, positive law, and well-established and binding

precedent, that once more indisputably establishes:

36.2.1 that the order upon which the attorneys for the Office of the Attorney


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General of Texas advance grounds for their standing was void;

36.2.2 that without grounds, the Office of the Attorney General had no

standing, and the Court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction;

36.2.3 that without standing, the OAG continued pursuit of the case after

learning they had no standing,


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36.2.4 that the OAG had willfully with malice aforethought, fraudulently

attempted to acquire jurisdiction by continuing to file motions and appearing before the

court in the instant matter, securing the unlawful Mary Carter Agreement and the

resulting fraudulent Agreed Take Nothing Judgement And Severance of Intervenor;

36.2.5 Howard G. Baldwin Jr., Brian R. Burton, Joseph Sarpong, Marissa L.

28 Plaintiff became aware that the Mary Carter Agreement had been made after later examining the court reporters records


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Balus, George Michael Barnes and Katrina W. English willfully engaged in the crimes

and attempts to conceal those crimes identified throughout this instrument with John B.

Hawley, James Lee Kitchen and G. David Heiman;

36.2.6 Howard G. Baldwin Jr., Brian R. Burton, Joseph Sarpong, Marissa L.

Balus, George Michael Barnes, Katrina W. English, John B. Hawley, James Lee Kitchen

of which he secured a copy.


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and G. David Heiman enlisted Judge Carmen Rivera-Worley to conspire in the

falsification of the Agreed Take Nothing Judgment And Severance of Intervenor by

falsely representing in the judgment that

36.2.6.1 ON the 1ST day of July, 2002 came on for hearing (however, the

record of the court shows there was no hearing, which is because there is no record of a


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hearing being set and no motion setting a hearing on the alleged Agreed Take Nothing

Judgment And Severance of Intervenor further, there cannot be produced any

document showing that any notice was given to any party of the alleged hearing the

court had been involved in a conspiracy of a trial by ambush)

36.2.6.2 the Office of the Attorney General of Texas appearing by and

29 Motion to Strike Testimony/Motion to Quash and Dissolve Mary Carter Agreement, at II A-Q, pp. 4-11


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through its counsel George Barnes The Court was aware that the OAG had no

standing;

36.2.6.3 upon evidence offered and adduced, upon the arguments of counsel,

exhibit entered and other things and matters appearing before the court including the

express agreement of

040218 formal bill of exception

Documents

Transcript of 040218 formal bill of exception