02May14 - The demographic implications of Scottish independence

117
The demographic implications of Scottish independence Population Patterns Seminar Series Friday 2 nd May 2014 This event is kindly supported by Partnership #populationpatterns

description

During 2014, ILC-UK, supported by the specialist insurance company, Partnership Assurance Group plc, is undertaking a series of events to explore the relationship between our changing demography and public policy. The third event in the series explored the demographic implications of Scottish independence. In 2014, Scotland will vote in an independence referendum which could significantly change its relationship with the rest of the United Kingdom. An independent Scotland would have a fully independent NHS, control a significant proportion of the North Sea oil reserves and will take on a percentage of the UK national debt. An independent Scotland would also result in the UK having a new demographic makeup. There are currently a number of marked differences between the two countries which will be highlighted by the division. These include a 2.8 year gap in healthy life expectancy for men, as well as differences in overall life expectancy and mortality rates. Recent figures released by the ONS suggest that the future health of an independent Scotland may actually align with that of the UK. The number of children aged two to 15 either overweight or obese in Scotland is now equal to that of England (30%), and lower than Wales (36%), and Scottish men are significantly more active than their counterparts in both countries. The seminar explored these differences, as well as how the demography of an independent Scotland may change over time, and what future Scottish Governments (with or without independence) may need to do to adapt to these demographic changes. Scottish independence would have a number of age-related policy implications for both Scotland and the rest of the United Kingdom. The issue of Scotland’s ageing population has already entered political debate, with the SNP announcing that, if elected, they would make new pensioners £4.40 a month better off than in England, while also pledging to set up a commission looking at the state pension age. The Scottish government has also announced that benefits, tax credits and state pensions would continue to be paid from the first day of independence, but have not addressed how they will meet the challenge of moving schemes from one administration to another.

Transcript of 02May14 - The demographic implications of Scottish independence

Page 1: 02May14 - The demographic implications of Scottish independence

The demographic implications of Scottish independence

Population Patterns Seminar Series

Friday 2nd May 2014

This event is kindly supported by Partnership

#populationpatterns

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Welcome

Tim Ellis

Chief ExecutiveNational Records of Scotland

This event is kindly supported by Partnership

#populationpatterns

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David Sinclair

Assistant Director, Policy and CommunicationsILC-UK

This event is kindly supported by Partnership

#populationpatterns

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The International Longevity Centre-UK is an independent, non-partisan think-tank

dedicated to addressing issues of longevity, ageing and population change.

Demographic change in Scotland

David Sinclair, International Longevity

Centre – UK @ilcuk @sinclairda

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The International Longevity Centre-UK is an independent, non-partisan think-tank

dedicated to addressing issues of longevity, ageing and population change.

ILC-UK Planning Tomorrow, Today

think tank evidence based policy focussed balanced independent respected experts networked international

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The International Longevity Centre-UK is an independent, non-partisan think-tank

dedicated to addressing issues of longevity, ageing and population change.

We work with…

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The International Longevity Centre-UK is an independent, non-partisan think-tank

dedicated to addressing issues of longevity, ageing and population change.

Our focus is broad

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The International Longevity Centre-UK is an independent, non-partisan think-tank

dedicated to addressing issues of longevity, ageing and population change.

Percentage change in number of people of ‘working age’ 2013-2037

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The International Longevity Centre-UK is an independent, non-partisan think-tank

dedicated to addressing issues of longevity, ageing and population change.

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The International Longevity Centre-UK is an independent, non-partisan think-tank

dedicated to addressing issues of longevity, ageing and population change.

Fertility rates per 1,000 females by age group

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The International Longevity Centre-UK is an independent, non-partisan think-tank

dedicated to addressing issues of longevity, ageing and population change.

Percentage change in numbers in employment relative to 2012

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The International Longevity Centre-UK is an independent, non-partisan think-tank

dedicated to addressing issues of longevity, ageing and population change.

Employment rates by age band

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The International Longevity Centre-UK is an independent, non-partisan think-tank

dedicated to addressing issues of longevity, ageing and population change.

At birth life expectancy by region (2008-10)

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The International Longevity Centre-UK is an independent, non-partisan think-tank

dedicated to addressing issues of longevity, ageing and population change.

Life expectancy by region 1981-2030

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The International Longevity Centre-UK is an independent, non-partisan think-tank

dedicated to addressing issues of longevity, ageing and population change.

Dependency ratio indexed to 2012

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The International Longevity Centre-UK is an independent, non-partisan think-tank

dedicated to addressing issues of longevity, ageing and population change.

Oil and Gas revenues

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The International Longevity Centre-UK is an independent, non-partisan think-tank

dedicated to addressing issues of longevity, ageing and population change.

Spending per person in Scotland is currently higher than in the UK, at £12,629 per person in 2011/12, compared with £11,381.

The Institute for Fiscal Studies has modelled what might happen to the government finances of an independent Scotland assuming that there is no policy change.

As a result of demographic trends and slowing oil revenues, the IFS forecast that public sector net debt in Scotland will exceed 100% of national income by 2033-34. By comparison, the UK which has some what more favourable demographics and is less reliant on revenues from fossil fuel, will see net debt to GDP fall to around 60% over the same time period.

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The International Longevity Centre-UK is an independent, non-partisan think-tank

dedicated to addressing issues of longevity, ageing and population change.

Public Sector net debt projections

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The International Longevity Centre-UK is an independent, non-partisan think-tank

dedicated to addressing issues of longevity, ageing and population change.

So

By international standards, the challenges facing

Scotland are not unique

But with no policy change, Scotland faces

arguably bigger demographic challenges than the

UK as a whole.

So how should Scottish policymakers (irrespective

of the independence vote) respond?

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The International Longevity Centre-UK is an independent, non-partisan think-tank

dedicated to addressing issues of longevity, ageing and population change.

David Sinclair

Assistant Director, Policy & Communications

International Longevity Centre

[email protected]

02073400440

Twitter: @ilcuk and @sinclairda

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Richard Willets

Director of LongevityPartnership

This event is kindly supported by Partnership

#populationpatterns

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Welcome by Partnership

Richard Willets

International Longevity Centre – 2 May 2014

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Life expectancy trends in different countries

April 10, 2023

23

• Source: www.mortality.org

• In which pair of countries have trends in life expectancy been most similar?

• Used figures taken from the Human Mortality Database* for OECD countries covering a 50-year period (1960 to 2009)

• Considered life expectancy at age 65 (for males and females separately)

• Compared figures in 28 countries (i.e. 378 pairs)

• Calculated correlation coefficient between life expectancy figures for each pair of countries

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Countries included in the analysis

April 10, 2023

24

Australia

Austria

Belgium

Canada

Czech Republic

Denmark

Estonia

Finland

France

Hungary

Israel

Ireland

Italy

Japan

Luxembourg

Netherlands

Norway

Poland

Portugal

Slovakia

Spain

Sweden

Switzerland USANew Zealand

England & WalesScotland Northern Ireland

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The least similar pair of countries…

April 10, 2023

25

• Source: www.mortality.org

• Japan & Slovakia (least similar – 378th out of 378)

1960

1963

1966

1969

1972

1975

1978

1981

1984

1987

1990

1993

1996

1999

2002

2005

2008

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20Japan

Slo-vakia

Male life expectancy at age

65

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Similar, but not the most similar…

April 10, 2023

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• Source: www.mortality.org

• Spain and Portugal (ranked 38th)

• Sweden and Finland (ranked 67th)

• France and Belgium (ranked 53rd)

• Australia and New Zealand (ranked 73rd)

• USA and Canada (ranked 34th)

• Republic of Ireland and Northern Ireland (ranked 106th)

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The most similar pair of countries …

April 10, 2023

27

• Source: www.mortality.org

• England & Wales and Scotland

1960

1963

1966

1969

1972

1975

1978

1981

1984

1987

1990

1993

1996

1999

2002

2005

2008

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20England & Wales

Scotland

Male life expectancy at age

65

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Summary

April 10, 2023

28

• Source: www.mortality.org

• For males England & Wales and Scotland have the most similar trend

• For females the same pair are ranked 8th of 378

• Interesting to see whether trends will be as similar over next 50 years…

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Thank you

April 10, 2023

29

Partnership is a trading style of the Partnership group of Companies, which includes; Partnership Life Assurance Company Limited (registered in England and Wales No. 05465261), and Partnership Home Loans Limited (registered in England and Wales No. 05108846).

Partnership Life Assurance Company Limited is authorised by the Prudential Regulation Authority and regulated by the Financial Conduct Authority and the Prudential Regulation Authority. Partnership Home Loans Limited is authorised and regulated by the Financial Conduct Authority. The registered office for both companies is Heron Tower, 5 th Floor, 110 Bishopsgate, London, EC2N 4AY.

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Kirsty MacLauchlan

Head of DemographyNational Records of Scotland

This event is kindly supported by Partnership

#populationpatterns

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Implications of the referendum on demographic change

Kirsty MacLachlan

Head of Demography

2 May 2014

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• Recent changes in demography

• How might the referendum impact on demography in the future?– Population – Life expectancy– Fertility– Migration– Age structure

Overview

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How has Scotland’s population changed over time?

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An average ScotIn the late 1850s– were called John Smith or Mary

Macdonald

– had a 1 in 7 chance of dying before their first birthday

– lived almost 2 to a room, with a 1 in 3 chance of sharing the room with the whole family

– got married at 27 (John) and 25 (Mary)

– had a 1 in 3 chance of being married in their 20s

– had a life expectancy at birth of 40 (John) and 44 (Mary)

At end of the 20th Century– were called Lewis Smith or Emma

Brown

– had a 1 in 200 chance of dying before their first birthday

– each had 2 rooms to live in

– got married at 32 (Lewis) and 29 (Emma)

– had a 1 in 7 chance of being married in their 20s

– had a life expectancy at birth of 76 (Lewis) or 81 (Emma)

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Estimated population of Scotland on 30 June 2013 was 5,327,700

An increase of 14,100 since mid-2012 - the highest ever recorded

0

1,000

2,000

3,000

4,000

5,000

1953 1958 1963 1968 1973 1978 1983 1988 1993 1998 2003 2008 2013

Po

pu

lati

on

(th

ou

sa

nd

s)

Year

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Population Change 1953-2013

•Mid-2012 to Mid-2013: Natural change: +900 Net migration: +10,000

-50

-40

-30

-20

-10

0

10

20

30

40

50

1953 1963 1973 1983 1993 2003 2013

Pe

rso

ns

(th

ou

sa

nd

s)

Year

Natural change (births - deaths) Net migration

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Scotland Performs Purpose TargetTo match average European (EU15) population growth over the

period from 2007 to 2017

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What are the factors influencing changes in the

composition of the population?

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Fertility

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Live births per 1,000 women, by age

0

50

100

150

200

250

15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44

Age of mother

Fert

ility

rate

1951

1964

1977

1991

2012

1Rate for age 15 includes births at younger ages and for age 44 for births at older ages

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0

500

1000

1500

2000

2500

3000

2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012

Bir

ths

Calendar Year

Births in Scotland to mothers born outside the UK, by mother’s country of birth, 2002 to 2012

Other EU pre-2004 EU Accession States Commonwealth Other countries

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0

5000

10000

15000

20000

25000

30000

35000

40000

45000

50000

2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012

Bir

ths

Calendar Year

Births in Scotland, by mother's country of birth, 2002 to 2012

Scotland Rest Of the UK Outside UK

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Total Fertility Rate, selected European countries, 2011

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Life Expectancy

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Average age at death, selected causes, Scotland, 1978-2012

6062

6466

687072

7476

788082

8486

8890

1978 1981 1984 1987 1990 1993 1996 1999 2002 2005 2008 2012

Year

Aver

age

age

All causes

Stroke

Ischaemic heart disease

Cancer

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65 67 69 71 73 75 77 79 81 83 85

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

Years

MALE FEMALE

SCOTLAND

Leastdeprived

Mostdeprived

Ordered by lowest male life expectancy to highest

Life Expectancy at birth, 2008-2010

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Migration

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Rest of UK migration +7,900An increase of 4,900 from the previous year

47,700 in-migrants, 39,800 out-migrants

-80

-60

-40

-20

0

20

40

60

80

1983 1985 1987 1989 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 2013

Pe

rso

ns

(th

ou

san

ds)

Year

Out In Net

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Overseas migration +2,100Net migration fell by 7,600. In-migration fell by 7,700

-40

-30

-20

-10

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

1993 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 2013

Pe

rso

ns

(th

ou

san

ds)

Year

Out to overseas In from overseas Net

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Net migration

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•Country of birth

7 per cent of people living in Scotland were born outside of the UK increase of 3 percentage points since 2001

55 per cent of those born outside of the UK arrived between 2004 and 2011

69 per cent were of working age (aged 16-64) when they arrived

38 per cent were in their twenties

In Aberdeen City, 1 person in 6 was born outside of the UK compared with East Ayrshire where 1 person in 44 was born abroad

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• Countries of birth outside of the UK

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Growing ethnic diversity

2001 2011

• Proportion of people reported as belonging to minority ethnic group • between 2001 and 2011, Scotland

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European comparisons: Proportion of foreign born population

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ONS figures- UK migration

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UK migration – main reason for entering UK

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Impact of demography on

Households

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0%

5%

10%

15%

20%

25%

30%

35%

40%

1961 1971 1981 1991 2001 2011Year

Per

cen

tag

e o

f al

l ho

use

ho

lds

1 person

2 people

3 people

4 people

5+ people

More people are living in smaller households

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Growth in households has slowed since the start of the economic downturn

Annual increase in households, 2002-2012

0

2,000

4,000

6,000

8,000

10,000

12,000

14,000

16,000

18,000

20,000

22,000

24,000

26,000

2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012

Year

An

nu

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in

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Start of global economic downturn

Source: Household estimates based on Council Tax data

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• Numbers are increasing (though slower than rest of UK and rest of the world)

• Life expectancy is increasing (at similar rate to rest of UK and EU)

• Fertility dropped in the 70s (and is now lower than the rest of the UK but still higher than the EU average)

• Greater urbanisation (and move from West to East)

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Implications of the referendum?

• Is fertility likely to increase, decrease or stay the same?

• Is life expectancy likely to increase, decrease or stay the same?

• Is migration likely to increase, decrease or stay the same?

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What is the projected population?

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Estimated population of Scotland, actual and projected, 1952-2087

0

1,000

2,000

3,000

4,000

5,000

6,000

7,000

1952 1967 1982 1997 2012 2027 2042 2057 2072 2087

Year

Pe

rso

ns

('0

00

s) Projected

Footnotes 1) Continuous line shows final population estimates and the broken line (2002 to 2010) shows those years which will be rebased using information from the 2011 Census. 2) 2012 based projection.

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Key points: 2012-2022

• The population of Scotland is projected to increase from an estimated 5.31 million to 5.52 million over the ten years

• Increase in population – natural increase : 28%– net migration : 72%

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Scotland’s changing age distribution

300,000 200,000 100,000 0 100,000 200,000 300,000

0-4

10-14

20-24

30-34

40-44

50-54

60-64

70-74

80-84

90+

Age

(5 y

ear a

ge g

roup

s)

FemaleMale

1861

300,000 200,000 100,000 0 100,000 200,000 300,000

0-4

10-14

20-24

30-34

40-44

50-54

60-64

70-74

80-84

90+

Age

(5 y

ear a

ge g

roup

s)

FemaleMale

1961

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There is a projected increase of over

half a million households over the

next 25 years.

Wide variety in household growth across the country.

Projected percentage change in households, 2010-2035

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•Variant projections

•High migration•High life expectancy•High fertility

•Low migration •Low Life expectancy• Low fertility

• High population

• Low population

•Single component variants •Combination component variants

•Zero net migration

•Special component variant

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Actual and projected total population, Scotland, under the 2012-based principal and selected

variant projections, 1982-2087

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Change in average (median) age 2012-2037 (variant projections )

39

40

41

42

43

44

45

46

47

48

2012 2017 2022 2027 2032 2037Year

Ag

e in

yea

rs

Natural change

Low population

Low fertility

Low migration

High life expectancy

Principal

Low life expectancy

High migration

High fertility

High population

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-40%

-20%

0%

20%

40%

60%

80%

100%

120%

HighPopulation

High lifeexpectancy

Highmigration

High fertility Principal Low fertility Naturalchange only

Low migration Low lifeexpectancy

LowPopulation

Variant

Per

cent

age

chan

ge

0-15 16-29 30-44 45-59 60-74 75+

Percentage change in age structure 2012-2037 variant projections

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Projected percentage of population over 75, selected European countries, 2035

Source: ONS (UK and constituent countries) and Eurostat.

0%

2%

4%

6%

8%

10%

12%

14%

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Summary

• Scotland’s population is likely to continue to increase and age over the next 25 years regardless of the outcome of the referendum

• Net migration assumed to be the main contributor to population growth

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Any questions?

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Professor David Bell

Professor of EconomicsUniversity of Stirling

This event is kindly supported by Partnership

#populationpatterns

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Demographic Implications of Scottish Independence.

PROFESSOR DAVID BELLDIVISION OF ECONOMICSSTIRLING MANAGEMENT SCHOOLUNIVERSITY OF STIRLING

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There has been a substantial increase in the number of states in the world in recent decades

• The number of sovereign states has been steadily increasing for the last six decades at least

• Median country size now less than 6m people. • Scottish population = 5.3m.

1950 1940 1970 1980 1990 2000 20100

50

100

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Nu

mb

er

of

So

ve

reig

n

Sta

tes

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Has the Union been bad for Scotland’s population?Scotland’s Population/England’s Population 1600-2011

1600 1650 1700 1750 1800 1850 1900 1950 2000 20500%

5%

10%

15%

20%

25%

Year

Sc

otl

an

d P

op

/En

gla

nd

Po

p

Act of Union

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Two areas where demographics are making a significant impact on the independence debate

• Migration

– Can an independent Scotland’s economy grow consistently faster than rUK unless it is experiencing at least the same rate of net immigration?

– What policy tools are available and effective in increasing net migration?

• Ageing

– Could an independent Scotland meet the additional costs associated with population ageing?

– Could these costs be mitigated if Scotland was independent?

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Ageing

• Higher welfare costs?

• Shorter life expectancy in Scotland

• But fewer people of working age per pensioner

• Estimates of extra costs in Scotland sensitive to assumptions about future net migration in Scotland and rUK

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Welfare Spending in Scotland 2011-12

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Relative Costs of Benefits per Working Age PersonScotland v Great Britain 2012-13

Maternity Allowance

Council Tax Benefit

Over 75 TV licences

Winter Fuel Payments

Total identified expenditure

Pension Credit

Income Support

Industrial Injuries Benefits

Disability Living Allowance

SDA (of which working age)

Employment and Support Allowance

Incapacity Benefit

-30% -20% -10% 0% 10% 20% 30% 40%

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Differences in Costs of Pensioner Benefits Per Working Age Person

2012

/13

2014

/15

2016

/17

2018

/19

2020

/21

2022

/23

2024

/25

2026

/27

2028

/29

2030

/31

2032

/33

2034

/35

£0

£1,000

£2,000

£3,000

£4,000

£5,000

£6,000

ScotlandEngland

Ex

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itu

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n P

en

sio

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Pe

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ers

on

Page 92: 02May14 - The demographic implications of Scottish independence

Demographic ChangeEuropean old-age dependency ratios 2010

Source: Eurostat

Page 93: 02May14 - The demographic implications of Scottish independence

Old-age Dependency Ratios 2040

Source: Eurostat

Page 94: 02May14 - The demographic implications of Scottish independence

Ageing

• Costs to society – measure as share of GDP – depends crucially on relative productivity of Scottish economy

• Private pensions – sensitive to interest rates. Pension funds will buy Scottish Government bonds. Cheaper/more expensive than UK bonds?

Page 95: 02May14 - The demographic implications of Scottish independence

Migration

Page 96: 02May14 - The demographic implications of Scottish independence

What we know:Net Migration to Scotland

Source: National Records of Scotland, 2013 *The broken line (2002 to 2011) shows estimates which may be recalculated using the 2011 Census

Page 97: 02May14 - The demographic implications of Scottish independence

Wages and Proportion of Foreign Born Residents (2012)

£440 £460 £480 £500 £520 £540 £560 £5800

5

10

15

20

25

5.94999999999999

5.97

8.15000000000001

8.40000000000001 8.54000000000

001

9.24000000000001

9.96000000000001

10.4312.04

23.2433333333333

Gross Weekly Wage (£)

Pro

po

rtio

n F

ore

ign

Bo

rn

Source: Annual Survey of Hours and Earnings 2012, Annual Population Survey 2012

Page 98: 02May14 - The demographic implications of Scottish independence

Further evidence: COMPAS public opinion research October 2013; 4,200+ responses

98

• Scotland: more welcoming/less hostile towards migration– Scotland: 58% desire reductions in immigration– England & Wales: 75% desire reductions in immigration

• Support for Scotland controlling its own immigration policy– 60% Scottish Government, 31% UK government

• Yes voters less opposed to immigration than No voters – 58% of No voters desire a reduction in immigration – 28% of Yes voters desire a reduction in immigration

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Voting intentions and attitudes to migration

99

Too low About right Too high Don't know0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

YesNoDon't know

Voting Intention

Do you think the level of migration into Scotland in the last decade has been:

Page 100: 02May14 - The demographic implications of Scottish independence

A Separate Immigration Policy for Scotland within the UK?

• Requires political consent from both levels of government

– Acceptable to public(s)

– Effectiveness in meeting objective(s)

– Stable within devolved settlement

– Seems to work in Quebec

100

Page 101: 02May14 - The demographic implications of Scottish independence

Conclusions

• Demographic arguments may favour a more open approach to immigration in Scotland (whether independent or not)

• Arguably, while an independent policy might have slightly stronger policy levers, a devolved migration policy might face fewer constraints in terms of implementation

• Ageing poses a challenge with or without independence• Risk pooling argument would suggest benefits from continuing to handle

risks at UK level• But Scotland might be able to put in place a better structured welfare

policy• Within tight fiscal constraints, difficult to argue that there would not be

losers as well as gainers from a restructuring of welfare

101

Page 102: 02May14 - The demographic implications of Scottish independence

Professor Carol Jagger

AXA Prof of Epidemiology of AgeingInstitute for Ageing and Health

Newcastle University

This event is kindly supported by Partnership

#populationpatterns

Page 103: 02May14 - The demographic implications of Scottish independence

Implications of Scotland’s independence on healthy longevity

Carol JaggerAXA Professor of Epidemiology of Ageing

Pia WohandSenior Research Associate

Institute for Ageing and HealthNewcastle University

ILC UK Debate 2 May 2014

Page 104: 02May14 - The demographic implications of Scottish independence

Demographic challenge for Scotland and rest of UK

• Inequalities in Disability-free life expectancy (DFLE)– Widening or narrowing?– What factors explain them?

• Challenges of extending working life in terms of– Inequalities in DFLE– Who cares for whom?

“ Increased longevity without quality of life is an empty prize. Health expectancy is more important than life expectancy.”

Dr Hiroshi Nakajima, Director-General WHO 1997

Page 105: 02May14 - The demographic implications of Scottish independence

DFLE inequalities exceed those in LE and are widening

1991 2001 1991 2001

mean 77.5 79.2 62.5 62.40.10 76.5 77.3 60.3 59.80.90 78.4 80.8 65.1 65.2

10-90% range 1.9 3.5 4.8 5.5mean 79.2 80.9 63.9 64.60.10 77.5 79.1 60.1 59.90.90 80.7 82.6 67.0 68.3

10-90% range 3.2 3.5 6.9 8.4mean 72.0 73.8 59.2 59.40.10 69.9 71.8 56.3 56.60.90 74.0 75.9 61.8 61.7

10-90% range 4.1 4.1 5.6 5.2mean 73.8 76.4 60.9 62.20.10 71.7 74.0 56.4 56.90.90 75.6 78.5 64.5 66.3

10-90% range 3.9 4.5 8.1 9.4W

omen

Men

LE DFLE

Scot

land

Eng

land

&

Wal

esSc

otla

ndE

ngla

nd &

W

ales

Page 106: 02May14 - The demographic implications of Scottish independence

Where you live or how you live?

Page 107: 02May14 - The demographic implications of Scottish independence

Which socio-economic factors explain variation in DFLE in E&W?

DFLE at birth

Women

1991 2001

Univariable Multivariable Univariable Multivariable

β (SE) p β (SE) p β (SE) p β (SE) p

Social Class IV and V (%) -0.46 (0.02) <0.001 -0.16 (0.03) <0.001 -0.66 (0.02) <0.001 -0.35 (0.03) <0.001

Unemployment rate (%) -0.64 (0.03) <0.001 -0.53 (0.05) <0.001 -1.33 (0.05) <0.001 -0.67 (0.08) <0.001

Retirement migration 1.71 (0.11) <0.001 0.42 (0.11) <0.001 3.18 (0.24) <0.001 1.42 (0.15) <0.001

Population density -0.04 (0.01) <0.001 0.02 (0.01) 0.005 -0.04 (0.01) <0.001 -0.01 (0.01) 0.337

Non-white population (%) -0.08 (0.02) <0.001 0.03 (0.02) 0.063 -0.07 (0.02) <0.001 0.05 (0.01) <0.001

r2 0.70 0.81

Source: Wohland et al 2014, JECH (in press)

Page 108: 02May14 - The demographic implications of Scottish independence

Ethnic composition 2011 census

ENGLAND SCOTLAND Aberdeen City Edinburgh, City of

Glasgow City75

80

85

90

95

100

Other Ethnic GroupBlack / African / Caribbean / Black BritishAsian / Asian British: Other AsianAsian / Asian British: ChineseAsian / Asian British: BangladeshiAsian / Asian British: PakistaniAsian / Asian British: IndianMixed / Multiple Ethnic GroupsGypsy / Traveller / Irish TravellerWhite

Page 109: 02May14 - The demographic implications of Scottish independence

LE and DFLE at birth by ethnic group, 2001

♀♂

AsianWhite Mixed Black Other

Differences compared to White British

Wohland et al 2014, Ethnicity & Health

Page 110: 02May14 - The demographic implications of Scottish independence

Potential for extending working life UK*, men 2001Average age at onset of

disability

Regions 65+ (N) <65 (N) <65 (%)

EE 48 0 0

EM 35 5 13

LO 28 4 13

NE 10 13 57

NW 29 14 33

SE 67 0 0

SW 44 0 0

WM 31 3 9

YH 16 5 24

Wales 12 10 45

Total (E&W) 320 54 14

Scotland 22 10 31

*European Union 2005 analysis in Jagger et al, Lancet 2009

Page 111: 02May14 - The demographic implications of Scottish independence

Need for care

Critical (requires 24-hour care) Short-interval (requires help at

regular times daily) Long-interval (requires help less than

daily) Independent

Source: Jagger et al. BMC Geriatrics 2011

• 75% in care homes• If at home main carer child

• 33% in care homes• If at home main carer spouse

(34%), child (31%)

• 4% in care homes• If at home main carer child

(37%), no-one (18%)

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Who are the carers?

Born age 85 child bornchild age when

parent 85

1921 2006 1947 59

1931 2016 1956 60

1941 2026 1965 61

1951 2036 1976 60

1961 2046 1986 60

1971 2056 1997 59

Page 113: 02May14 - The demographic implications of Scottish independence

Conclusions• Inequalities in healthy ageing

– Between different ethnic groups– Explained partly by unhealthy behaviours

• Ability to raise SPA and encourage longer working may be difficult– In those areas with age at onset of disability <65

• Longer life expectancy and growing 85+ population means working longer will entail juggling work and unpaid care for parent. This will disproportionally affect – women who provide most care

Page 114: 02May14 - The demographic implications of Scottish independence

Acknowledgements

Newcastle 85+ Study funded by the Medical Research Council, Biotechnology and Biological

Sciences Research Council and the Dunhill Medical Trust. Additional work has also been funded by the British Heart Foundation, Unilever Corporate

Research, Newcastle University and NHS North of Tyne (Newcastle Primary Care Trust).

http://www.ncl.ac.uk/iah/research/areas/biogerontology/85plus/

InHALE Inequalities in Healthy Active Life Expectancy: the role of time, place, person and

methodsESRC Research Fund RES-062-23-2970 1 October 2011 - 30 September 2014

http://research.ncl.ac.uk/InHALE

Page 115: 02May14 - The demographic implications of Scottish independence

Find out more about healthy life expectancy

REVES 2014Edinburgh

28-30 May 2014

Page 116: 02May14 - The demographic implications of Scottish independence

Implications of Scotland’s independence on healthy longevity

Carol Jagger([email protected])

Pia Wohand([email protected])

Institute for Ageing and HealthNewcastle University

ILC UK Debate 2 May 2014

Page 117: 02May14 - The demographic implications of Scottish independence

The demographic implications of Scottish independence

Population Patterns Seminar Series

Friday 2nd May 2014

This event is kindly supported by Partnership

#populationpatterns