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This paper starts by contextualizing the currenttrend of increasing academic fraud and corruptpractices in quality assurance and accreditationprocesses. Several factors are considered, suchas the diversification of higher education serv-ices and delivery systems, increased competi-tion among students and institutions,globalization and the cross-border educationphenomenon. The next section focuses on theopportunities for fraud and corruption that havebeen observed in two different contexts: first,in countries in which mechanisms for exami-nation and accreditation are under the author-ity of central public bodies; and second, incountries where these mechanisms are regu-lated and controlled by non-governmental bodies. Special attention is given here to inter-national delivery services, including institu-tions with large numbers of overseas students,extramural education institutions and e-highereducation. The next section considers six keystrategies that can be adopted to address thesechallenges, namely: regulating the market bymeans of transparent criteria, reducing the risksof conflict of interest, using more appropriatemanagement tools, developing standards andcodes of practice, facilitating public access toinformation and establishing and using aware-ness indicators, commonly referred to as redflags. After presenting the rationale behind eachstrategy, the paper then provides examples ofgood practices. The paper concludes with pol-icy recommendations for the national, regionaland international levels.

INTRODUCTION

Three major trends affect the demand for highereducation today: the global growth of studentenrolment figures, the redistribution of studentenrolment among regions and the increasedtraffic of students from country to country.These trends, which will be discussed in thispaper, arguably pose major challenges fortransparency and accountability in higher edu-cation management.

THE MASSIFICATION OF EDUCATIONIn 1970, the number of students in higher edu-cation was 28.2 million. By 1990, it had grownto 70.8 million and by 2004 to 132 million.These are minimum figures, as they onlyaccount for countries with available data. Themany reasons for this expansion in higher edu-cation include: the increasing complexity of thedemand of modern societies and economies formore highly trained personnel; the fact that, inmany fields, training that would have once beenprovided ‘on the job’has become formalized ininstitutions of higher education, including cor-porate universities; the emergence of new fieldsthat rely on universities as key sources of train-ing, such as biology and computer science; therestructuring of higher education systems inCentral and Eastern Europe and Central Asiaafter the fall of communism, which has led tothe emergence of new public and private insti-tutions and an increased number of studentsbeing admitted to higher education institutions.These trends, in generating further competitionamong students – not only to be admitted touniversities, but also to enter the best institu-tions and get the most highly valued degrees ordiplomas – have paradoxically encouraged a ratrace in higher education.

THE CHANGING GEOPOLITICALENVIRONMENTThe demand for higher education has evolvedgreatly in recent years. The following are thedominant countries in terms of size and growthof enrolment figures: China, which had 19.4million students in 2004; the United States,which had about 17 million students in 2004;India, which had 11.3 million students in 2004;Russia, which had 8.6 million students in 2004;Brazil, Indonesia, Japan, which had between 3and 4 million students each in 2004; and,finally, Argentina, Egypt, France, Italy, SouthKorea, Mexico, the Philippines, Poland, Thai-land, Turkey, the United Kingdom and Ukraine,which had between 2 and 3 million studentseach in 2004. With the collapse of the SovietUnion and the regional unification of Europe,new models are gaining popular support, suchas combining courses at different universities

ACADEMIC FRAUD, ACCREDITATION AND QUALITY ASSURANCE 109

I.7ACADEMIC FRAUD,ACCREDITATIONAND QUALITYASSURANCE:LEARNING FROMTHE PAST ANDCHALLENGES FORTHE FUTURE

Jacques Hallak and Muriel Poisson

Abstract

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and campuses in different countries, which at times blursthe overall picture.

Finally, while nations control what happens withintheir borders via various regulations and requirements,the vast enrolment figures for transnational education,which had about 2.5 million students in 2004, has natu-rally led to an increasing demand for quality assurance,mutual accreditation of institutions and awards, andmutual recognition of qualifications.

THE CROSS-BORDER PHENOMENON OF OVERSEASSTUDENTS AND COURSESEconomic globalization has contributed to the interna-tional mobility of labour and students (see Box I.7.1 forsome figures that illustrate this phenomenon). This hasgenerated a huge market in the international trade inhigher education, which now moves billions of dollarsand is a major source of income for a few provider coun-tries. However, the cross-border phenomenon is alsocharacterized by the development of overseas courseswith at times extremely complex and even opaque admin-istration. Pebble Hills University offers a striking exam-ple of this: not only does it claim to offer degrees in avariety of fields, it also claims to be incorporated in HuttRiver Province Principality in Western Australia and tohave a license to grant degrees from the Principality ofSeborga in Italy. Moreover, the degrees offered are taughtin learning centres in what are referred to as knowledgevillages in Dubai, Hong Kong, Singapore, Taiwan,Lebanon and Nigeria (Brown, 2005).

The explosion of new information and communicationtechnologies has rendered the current situation even morecomplex, with the multiplication of both virtual institu-tions and distance education programmes. The financingand quality assurance mechanisms of these educationalproviders are rather different from those of conventionalhigher education establishments.

These major trends are certainly promising, as theyreveal that more students have access to universities, new

regions are emerging and new opportunities for studyingabroad are rapidly developing. At the same time, theycontribute to increasing competition among students andinstitutions, to changes in roles and functions of univer-sities, to the emergence of new providers, and so on. Allof these factors could generate new incentives for aca-demic fraud and corrupt behaviour.

THE INCREASED COMPETITION AMONG STUDENTS AND

INSTITUTIONS

The increased competition among students (for admis-sion to the best or second-best institutions and prog-rammes) and between institutions (traditional,transnational, distance, single, networks of institutionsand programmes, and so on) is today a worldwide phe-nomenon. Unless well regulated and controlled, thispressure increases the risk of academic fraud and cheat-ing by students (for example to gain entrance to educa-tional institutions or pass exams) and by highereducation institutions (relaxing academic admission con-ditions, selling fake programmes or delivering fake cer-tificates, and so on). In Georgia, for example, someprivate tutors take bribes to help guarantee that studentsare admitted to the department of their choice. These pri-vate tutors are generally on examination committees andtherefore have connections within universities, are famil-iar with the content of exam papers, and can manipulateadmission procedures to improve the chances of anapplicant gaining entry to a particular university(Janashia, 2004). Competition in the area of research isalso having detrimental effects. For example, higher edu-cation institutions, as producers of research, are noweven more susceptible to plagiarism. As they are alsoconsumers of research (given that undergraduatedegrees, master’s degrees, PhDs and additional funding,particularly from private companies such as pharmaceu-tical industries, are all obtained through the submissionof research work), they are also more vulnerable to themanipulation of research results.

110 HIGHER EDUCATION IN THE WORLD 2007

According to UNESCO, there were over a mil-lion students studying abroad in 1995. Somedata suggests that by 2002 the number of for-eign students had grown to about 2.04 millionin industrialized countries and to 1.80 millionin the least-developed countries (LDCs), withthe leading providers being Australia, France,Germany, Japan, Russia, the United Kingdomand the United States (UNESCO Yearbook).According to the OECD, international studentmobility to OECD countries has doubled in the

past 20 years. Most international trade inhigher education services takes place withinthe OECD area, which has received 85 per centof foreign students over this period. Foreignstudents are now an important source ofexport revenue in several countries, as theyspend large amounts of money on travel, edu-cation and living expenses. Export revenue ineducation services, for example, amounted toan estimated minimum of US$30 billion in1999. Moreover, according to estimates, US

exports generated about US$8 billion (a ratherconservative estimate) in the late 1990s. Thefifth-largest export service sector was highereducation, which provided 4 million jobs. Anestimate by the Global Alliance for Transna-tional Education indicates that the UnitedStates, the United Kingdom and Australiatogether exported about US$27 billion worthof higher education to Asia and the Pacificover the same period.

Box I.7.1 The cross-border phenomenon: some figures

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THE MORE DOMINANT GATE-KEEPING FUNCTION OF

UNIVERSITIES

A university degree is gradually becoming a prerequisitefor an increasing number of occupations. Certification isnow indispensable for most positions of power, authorityand prestige in modern societies. This puts immenseresponsibility in the hands of higher education institutionsand, at the same time, opens enormous opportunities forcorrupt practices. Testing for admission to higher educa-tion has become a key role of higher education institu-tions, which they share with the ministry of education insome cases. Tests are the main tools used in the admis-sions process and are the major determinants of futuresuccess in education, employment, income and social sta-tus. Because of competition between institutions and foraccess to specific professions, the pressure of the demandfor access to the ‘right institution’ and the ‘right courses’generates and sustains corrupt behaviours. Furthermore,universities are playing a greater role as examining bod-ies. This is due to various reasons, in particular the expan-sion in education and the consequent need to provide evermore competitive sorting mechanisms to control accessto high-prestige occupations. Universities are seen defacto as meritocratic institutions that can be trusted to pro-vide fair and impartial testing. However, when their test-ing mechanisms break down (for example in China) orare subject to corrupt practices (for example in India),their image is significantly weakened.

THE EMERGENCE OF NEW HIGHER EDUCATION PROVIDERS

The emergence of new providers of higher education hascontributed to the diversification of the higher educationmarket, with the creation of technical institutes, commu-nity colleges, liberal arts colleges, mega-universities, onand off campuses, and so on. Many countries have there-fore experienced a boost in private secondary educationinitiatives (for example in the Philippines, the majority ofstudents attend private colleges and universities); an exo-dus of students abroad (a rough estimate suggests thatmore than 150,000 Indian students are enrolled in educa-tion abroad); a diversification of production and deliverytechnologies; and the development of a significant mar-ket for the providers of e-training and other distance andopen institutions (as early as 1992, the Open Universityin the United Kingdom had more than 120,000 students).For the higher education market to operate effectively andfairly within this context, there is a strong need for certi-fied information about what is being offered by each insti-tution and the actual value in terms of learningachievements, skill development and qualification. How-ever, there is a twofold obstacle to achieving this: not allstakeholders agree to respect the need for accreditation,

and even accredited entities and programmes do notalways provide services of similar quality.

THE DIVERSIFICATION OF HIGHER EDUCATION MARKETS

Advances in information and communication technolo-gies have assisted in the development of new ways ofdelivering higher education and demonstrated the possi-bility of enhancing the quality and quantity of learning.For well-established and large-scale distance teachinguniversities, the shift to using new technologies necessi-tates a major overhaul of activities and huge investmentsin entirely new infrastructure for the development anddelivery of new courses. The major decisions required toinitiate these changes cannot be taken easily or quickly.However, it is evident that if distance education universi-ties do not positively face the challenges of merging andcontinuously evolving technologies, they may lose stu-dents and government support. International joint ven-tures, financed by global networks, could help speed upthe adoption of new e-learning technologies on an evenwider scale. The question, however, is: in this scenario,who will be regarded as accountable, to whom and how?Due to the mushrooming of new degree programmes andprivate institutions, sometimes with a high likelihood ofthe delivery of fake services and certification, there is alsoa growing need for the recognition of certificates, diplo-mas, courses, training programmes and institutions. Thisneed is being translated into more demand for qualityassurance and accreditation from institutions and deliv-ery mechanisms.

THE DEMAND FOR PROFESSIONAL GOVERNANCE OF HIGHER

EDUCATION

Despite imponderables, it is likely that demand for accessto education by an ever-widening segment of the popula-tion will continue overall. However, limited funds and thedesire for efficient allocation of resources will come intodirect conflict with demands for access, which will putgreater pressure on higher education. As institutionsbecome larger and more complex, there will also beincreasing pressure for a greater level of professionaladministration. At the same time, traditional forms ofgovernance will come under increasing pressure toreform, as they will become inefficient in institutions thatare growing larger and more bureaucratic. Moreover, theoverall administration of higher education will be profes-sionalized. The demands for accountability will alsoincrease, causing institutions considerable difficulty. Andas academic budgets increase, there will be an inevitabledemand to monitor and control expenditures and a callfor more transparency and accountability in resourcemanagement.


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ACADEMIC FRAUD AND QUALITY ASSURANCE:KEY ISSUES

Corruption occurs at all levels in universities. The Geor-gian case study exemplifies this. There, widespread mis-conduct affects university examinations, the conferring ofacademic credentials, the procurement of goods and serv-ices, and the licensing and accreditation of institutions. Itis also now accepted that academic fraud and corrupt prac-tices involve a variety of stakeholders, including examina-tion candidates, teachers, faculty members, supervisors,officials and employees of examination authorities, inaddition to managers of courses, programmes, institutions,universities, and so on. Entities in charge of quality assur-ance and accreditation are also susceptible to corrupt prac-tices, which is even more worrisome. Within this context,and given the complexity and diversity of the trendsdescribed above, it is extremely difficult to produce a com-prehensive list of all opportunities for academic fraud.This would be a useful exercise, however, as it would helpto analyse the causes of corruption in higher education andto design strategies to address it. This paper thus focuseson a broad cluster of opportunities for corrupt practice. Indoing so, it maintains a distinction between the existingforms of higher education and the new forms emergingboth within and outside of traditional public and privatehigher education sectors, despite there being blurredboundaries between the two.

ACADEMIC FRAUD AND CORRUPTION IN TRADITIONALFORMS OF HIGHER EDUCATIONAcademic fraud and corruption in traditional forms ofhigher education take various forms, namely agreementsbetween students and faculty members or administrators,such as students paying professors for good grades or

administrators charging students’ families for admissionto their university. However, examinations are the keyarea for a variety of malpractices. These can take placebefore, during or after exams. Some examples of thesemalpractices follow.

BEFORE THE EXAMINATION

� University professors offering university applicantsexpensive tutorial sessions that serve as a conditionfor entry or success.

� Officials, paper-setters, moderators or school admin-istrators leaking the content of exam papers prior tothe exam because of nepotism, favouritism or bribery.

� Preparing the actual topics of an examination before-hand (for example in Pakistan, some paper-setterswere found to be operating their own tuition centresfor exam candidates, who, upon payment of substan-tial fees, were granted access to at least part of theirexam papers).

DURING THE EXAMINATION

� Impersonation (that is, unregistered candidates tak-ing the examinations of registered candidates, some-times with the full knowledge of the supervisor).

� Candidates smuggling in cheating material (for exam-ple written notes or textbooks hidden in garments).

� External assistance (from helpers, for example, withthe use of cell phones).

� Plagiarism in answering examination questions or inwriting term papers.

� Copying and collusion among candidates.� Irregularities during the examination process (for

example the amount of time allotted to a candidatebeing altered for no justifiable reason).

� Intimidation of supervisory staff (for example by


Academic fraud� Academic fraud is defined as the use of

public office for private gain in the academicfield, especially regarding accreditation ofcourses and institutions, examinations foraccess and for transfers between institu-tions, certificates and diplomas, university/college research and publications.

� It represents any prescribed action taken inconnection with an examination or test orwith accreditation that attempts to gainunfair advantage or, in some cases, to placea candidate – student or institutions – at adisadvantage.

� It also refers to the extent to which proce-dures to standardize the conditions under

which examinations are prepared, adminis-tered and scored are observed or violated.

Academic fraud is evidently just one exampleof corrupt practice in higher education. Italways has consequences for higher educationin terms of corruption. For example, academicplagiarism is a form of academic fraud, but italso represents non-compliance with copyrightlaw. However, not all corrupt practices result-ing from corrupt academic management canbe regarded as academic fraud.

Autonomy and accountabilityAutonomy is inconceivable without accounta-bility – and not only in managerial and admin-

istrative terms. There is a duty to provide serv-ices within the framework of a balancebetween autonomy and accountability and anagreement between universities and the worldof work. The concept of autonomy is oftenused to support the claim that any form ofaccountability negates the principle that uni-versities must manage their own affairs with-out external interference. In pluralisticsocieties, most controls take the form ofaccreditation and institutional authorizations,as well as general official recognition, particu-larly of academic degrees and diplomas.

Box I.7.2 A reminder of a few definitions

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candidates, external helpers, parents, politicians, andso on).

� Improper assignment of candidates by officials to tar-geted centres.

� The use of ghost centres (that is, fictitious exam cen-tres established by corrupt examination officials,where candidates can complete exams with the sup-port of helpers and/or without supervision).

� The purchase of finished term papers, particularly onthe Internet (for example via so-called ‘paper mills’).

� Substitution of scripts (that is, scripts written duringan examination being replaced with scripts writteneither before or after the examination).

AFTER THE EXAMINATION (ADMISSION TO UNIVERSITIES)

� Grading malpractices (that is, collusion between thecandidate and the grader, intimidation of graders byparents, or intimidation of parents by graders seekingrewards from candidates’ parents).

� Bribery of the academic authorities responsible foradmissions and/or for officially awarding scholar-ships to candidates on the basis of academic qualifi-cations or exam results.

� Falsification of data files and result sheets, often bycorrupt officials (for example admission test scoresor the ranking of students in the admission list beingillegally changed).

� Illegally changing fee-paying and non-fee-payingquotas.

� Sale of seats to students whose test scores do not qual-ify them for a position (at times through a biddingprocess, if the number of seats is limited).

� Issuing fake credentials and diplomas (for examplevia diploma mills).

� Manipulation of curricula vitae in order to obtain ajob or pay increase (for example using fake diplomas,non-existent publications, and so on).

� Selling academic posts (for gifts, bribes, free work orother emoluments) or granting them based on ethnicor religious backgrounds.

Many malpractices are also found in the area ofresearch, academic journals and publications, such as pla-

giarism, fabrication or falsification of data, distortions ormanipulations of research results, manipulation of statis-tics, biases and conflicts of interest among reviewers, andso on. Some university lecturers and researchers, forexample, give consultations to private firms without anyform of control by their university hierarchy. At times,this practice has a strong impact on the rate of attendance,influences teaching content and introduces bias inresearch conclusions.

CORRUPTION IN NEW FORMS OF HIGHER EDUCATIONIn recent years, extensive developments in ICTs haveimmensely widened the scope for fraud in academia and,at the same time, introduced innovative new methods ofmalpractice. The Internet (and all forms of e-learning) isnow arguably the leading vehicle for fraudulent practices.Among other things, it has facilitated the practices of sell-ing essays and term papers (rendering plagiarism a majorproblem), as well as fake degrees, at times even from rep-utable colleges and institutions such as Harvard and Yaleor others in London and Paris. According to the SwedishNational Agency for Higher Education, Sweden is nowaffected by academic fraud to a greater extent than everbefore. The country’s problems include: bogus PhDs supposedly from Swedish higher education institutions,students applying for courses based on fake qualificationsand individuals applying for posts using fake degrees. Inaddition, there are many fake universities, some of whichadvertise in the international press, circulate informationby sending spam and rank high on the hit lists of searchengines. These universities also sell qualifications fromSwedish higher education institutions, claiming that theyare members of the institutions (see the website ofSwedish International Development Agency (Sida) at:http://www.sida.se).

Indeed, websites specializing in fraudulent servicesare numerous today. Two examples are www.fakede-grees.com and www.cheathouse.com. Box I.7.3 providesanother striking example of the impact that progress innew communication technologies has had on fraud inhigher education.

The transnational education boom has also contributed


Degree mills have been around for hundredsof years, and they are still flourishing all overthe world. During the 1980s, the number ofphony schools significantly diminishedbecause of the FBI’s DipScam diploma-mill taskforce. The work of this body helped to secureindictments and, in most cases, brought about

the convictions of many individuals. This trendhas unfortunately been reversed and the prob-lem is now actually getting worse. Both in theUnited States and in Europe, diploma millshave made a real comeback due to the declineof DipScam, which began in the early 1990s,as well as the advent of inexpensive laser print-

ers, colour copiers, overnight delivery services,800, 888 and 500 telephone numbers, faxes,computer bulletin boards and other accessibletechnology, especially the Internet.

Source: Bear and Bear, 2004.

Box I.7.3 Degree mills

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to the emergence of new opportunities for fraud. The fol-lowing are some illustrations of this involving the man-agement of overseas students and the franchising ofoverseas courses.

MANAGEMENT OF OVERSEAS STUDENTS

� Overseas students being offered financial incentivesto enrol.

� Applicants being given false hope or promised admis-sion on the spot.

� Applicants not eligible for admissions unduly chargeda variety of fees.

� Applicants using fake credentials to gain admission.� Applicants being charged by education agents for the

falsification of documents that will qualify them foruniversity entry.

� Indiscriminate recruitment of foreign students as ameans of chasing money (that is, the acceptance offake diplomas, lack of language skills, and so on).

� Bogus institutions that do not deliver the services theyadvertise. These are often unsustainable institutionsthat close down after the receipt of money.

� Bogus institutions promising visas to overseas stu-dents who enrol in their courses.

� Institutions and courses without proper accreditationbeing included on the official lists prepared for inter-national students.

� Lowering of academic standards for overseas stu-dents (that is, with regard to admission, performance,graduation, and so on).

� Overseas students being allowed to repeat courses sev-eral times, even when they have no prospect of passing.

FRANCHISING OF OVERSEAS COURSES

� Corrupt officers making money by issuing licencesand franchise rights and collecting fees/bribes fromthose wanting franchises.

� Students enrolling at franchised institutions assum-ing that since they are paying fees they will automat-ically qualify.

� Reducing the number of failing students by inflatingthe grades of those at risk of failing and turning ablind eye to plagiarism.

� Students, parents, the franchisee or the franchisinginstitution pressuring faculty members to adjust grad-ing standards so that everyone passes examinationsand assessments (for example, in institutions inChina, Malaysia and Vietnam).

CORRUPTION IN QUALITY ASSURANCE ANDACCREDITATION MECHANISMSAccreditation and certification processes worldwide are

increasingly being undermined by fraud. According toBear and Bear (2004):

There are more than 300 unaccredited universities nowoperating. While a few are genuine start-ups or onlineventures, the great majority range from simply beingof dreadful quality to being outright diploma mills,which are fake institutions that sell degrees forbetween US$3,000 and US$5,000. It is not uncommonfor a large bogus school to ‘award’ as many as 500PhD’s each year and, as a consequence, earn anaggregate income easily in excess of US$200 million.Data shows that a single phony school can earnbetween US$10 million and US$20 million annually.

More specific forms of malpractice in quality assuranceand accreditation include: � Payment of bribes to obtain successful certification

or accreditation.� Distortion in the application of accreditation criteria,

for example admitting below-standard candidates tomeet enrolment criteria (ex ante) or over-grading stu-dents to meet achievement criteria (ex post).

� Accreditation processes based on non-transparent cri-teria (because rectors have an interest in preventingcompetition).

� Higher education providers circumventing accredita-tion procedures through franchising schemes or intro-ducing courses in segments of the education systemwhere accreditation is not compulsory.

� Establishing schools for the sole purpose of making aprofit by lying about their accreditation status, thuspreventing their students from taking national licens-ing exams.

� Non-accredited institutions falsely issuing accrediteddegrees.

� Creation of fraudulent or bogus accreditation agen-cies (accreditation mills, which are at times estab-lished by higher education institutions themselves).

DIFFERENCES BASED ON CONTEXTBecause opportunities for corruption may depend on themodel in place, certain distinctions may arise based on thecontext. Indeed, a brief glance at higher educationthroughout the world reveals a continuum of academicsystems: from highly centralized models (for exampleFrance and China) to almost completely decentralizedones (for example Australia, Canada and India); from fed-eral systems (for example Germany and the United States)to systems where the private sector is in competition withthe public sector (for example Latin America and Japan);from systems which, until quite recently, were fragmented,


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with numerous and over-specialized establishments (as inthe former communist European countries), to systemsthat are virtually carbon copies of others (as in some coun-tries in Africa and the Arab region). Similarly, systems ofquality assurance and accreditation vary from country tocountry. A distinction should therefore be made betweenthe following two models: quality assurance and accredi-tation regulated and controlled by central public bodies(for example ministries of education, University GrantsCommissions, and so on) and quality assurance andaccreditation regulated and controlled by non-governmen-tal bodies (for example independent commissions, privateentities, professional associations, and so on).

QUALITY ASSURANCE AND ACCREDITATION REGULATED AND

CONTROLLED BY CENTRAL PUBLIC BODIES

This is the prevailing model in many societies, typicallythose with a strong tradition of centralized educationadministration, as in France and some former Soviet coun-tries. In this case, quality assurance mechanisms are oftenconfined to the educational activities of institutions withinnational boundaries and are not always consistent nation-wide. Moreover, the monopoly power exerted by publicbodies and the regular occurrence of collusion of interestsopen doors for a variety of corrupt practices, such as thepayment of bribes for university admission or to success-fully obtain accreditation, accreditation processes basedon non-transparent criteria, distortion in the application ofaccreditation criteria, and so on. A study undertaken inUkraine, where there are some 175 accredited privatehigher education institutions, shows that the main areas ofcorruption in the education sector include large state uni-versities that control licensing and accreditation. Inter-views conducted with 43 rectors, vice rectors andadministrators from five private universities revealed thatsuccessful licensing or accreditation applications, withfew exceptions, required some form of bribery; that licens-ing, mandatory only for private institutions, may requirea bribe of US$200 (about two months’salary for a typicalacademic); and that accreditation might call for a ‘gratu-ity’ of 10 or 20 times that amount (Stetar et al., 2005).

QUALITY ASSURANCE AND ACCREDITATION REGULATED AND

CONTROLLED BY NON-GOVERNMENTAL BODIES

With the higher education market now becoming liberal-ized, this is the model currently in vogue. In principle,this model offers low risks of collusion and conflict ofinterest between the bodies in charge of accreditation andthe beneficiaries of its service. But de-linking the bodiesin charge of quality assurance and accreditation fromhigher education institutions does not address the othermanifold causes of corruption and academic fraud, such

as: illegitimate regulatory bodies; the partial or inconsis-tent scope of quality assurance and accreditation, leavingroom for managers to misuse procedures; non-compli-ance of higher education institutions with quality assur-ance procedures, and so on. Experience shows that thisregulation model can also be distorted. For example,higher education providers can circumvent accreditationprocedures through franchising schemes, schools can lieabout their accreditation status, bogus accredited agen-cies can be created (particularly via the web), and so on.

ACADEMIC FRAUD AND QUALITY ASSURANCE:GUIDING PRINCIPLES

Given the enormous complexity of the problems, the vari-ety of opportunities for academic fraud, and the impor-tance of contextual and societal factors, universallyapplicable solutions cannot be provided to address thesechallenges. Each country, and institution, must be prop-erly diagnosed and the appropriate strategies to meet thechallenges must be identified. However, from the experi-ence gained worldwide in this area, three guiding princi-ples could be proposed for designing strategies.

PRINCIPLE 1: QUALITY ASSURANCE POLICIES SHOULDCONTRIBUTE TO A VIRTUOUS CYCLE (AND NOT AVICIOUS ONE)In most cases, quality assurance supports accreditationand accredited institutions are fraud-free. By addressingthe issues based on the type of provider, what needs to beprovided, the mode, media and location of the deliverysystem, and the curricula and teaching content, internaland external quality assurance arrangements provide thekey elements for accreditation and reduce or eliminateopportunities for academic fraud. Put differently, accred-ited institutions assume that quality assurance isaddressed and contribute to combating academic fraud.This is the virtuous cycle. Under this circumstance, qual-ity assurance and accreditation are central approaches forcombating fraud for both new and existing forms ofhigher education. When in some societies, for politicalreasons or because of lack of resources, it is impossible toadopt quality assurance and impose accreditation proce-dures on institutions, there are still some pragmatic meansof addressing corruption, as illustrated in the sectionbelow, Addressing the challenges.

However, a vicious cycle can occur when the chal-lenges of quality assurance are not properly addressedand the quality assurance process offers opportunities forcorruption. This is the case when the accountability ofthe accrediting institution or mechanism is not well


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established; when the accrediting institution or mecha-nism is not free of collusion of interests or when it is atool of social, political or financial pressure on the deliv-ery system requesting accreditation. Worst of all, thisoccurs when the team in charge of quality assurancemanipulates data and the accrediting mechanism is basedon dishonest grounds. An unaccredited institution, how-ever, is not necessarily a diploma mill. Some truck-driv-ing schools, massage therapy colleges and evencomputer schools, for example, choose not to be accred-ited and yet still hold classes, teach students and holdthem accountable for learning.

PRINCIPLE 2: SOUND POLICIES SHOULD CONSIDER THEWIDE DISSEMINATION OF THE SOCIAL, FINANCIAL ANDETHICAL COSTS OF FRAUDThe costs of fraud are generally either ignored or over-looked by higher education stakeholders. However, inorder to mobilize authorities and the public at large againstfraud, there is a need to raise their awareness about theenormous social, financial and ethical implications it canhave. Consequences of fraud include greater inequity andunfairness in selection procedures, scepticism about theperformance of higher educational systems, costs involvedin introducing reliable security measures, and so on. Thedifferent categories of stakeholders affected by differenttypes of fraud include the following: � The honest clients who are the victims of fraud. They

are charged fees and other costs and receive inexchange fake services and certificates or the personthey think is a trained teacher, business consultant, orengineer may not have the degree or even the know-ledge required.

� The employers who are victims of unqualifiedemployees using fake credentials, which causes themfinancial liability and may also cause injury to peopleor property. In a recent survey of human resourcemanagers in 1,500 major UK companies, over halfsaid that lying on CVs was a serious problem for theirorganization and over 70 per cent said that they hadencountered cases of serious lying on CVs fromprospective job applicants (‘t’ Magazine 2000).

� The citizens who as taxpayers subsidize higher edu-cation, and therefore may gradually question the rai-son d’être of the tax system and the legitimacy offinancing higher education. Fake institutions canindeed take millions from good institutions and foulthe waters of non-traditional higher education.

Within this context, the ethical cost of fraud should betaken very seriously, as its consequences are potentiallydevastating. Two illustrations of this are: a prominent

paediatrician was discovered to have forged his medicaldegree from the University of California; and for morethan 20 years an expert witness provided scientific testi-mony in more than 300 cases before the California Supe-rior Court without having the adequate credentials.

PRINCIPLE 3: POLICIES SHOULD BE COMPREHENSIVEAND TARGET NOT ONLY ACADEMIC FRAUD BUT ALSOOTHER CORRUPT PRACTICES Higher education, like any other sector, is subject to cor-rupt practices, as it involves the management of differentkinds of resources. Corrupt practices are known to affectall kinds of expenditures, including construction, pur-chase of equipment and materials, payment of salaries,and so on. It can take the form of misuse of physical andhuman resources and accompany the outsourcing ofactivities (for example support services to students andacademics). Like at other levels of education, corruptpractices can develop when financing mechanisms (thatis, per capita grants) offer opportunities for misbehaviour.A recent illustration of the possible manipulation of sta-tistics is offered by El Alto, the public university ofBolivia, which failed to certify its enrolment figures. Asa consequence, it could not receive its financial allocationfrom the Bolivian gas royalty until quite recently (ElDiario, February 16, 2006).

Beyond these similarities, in order to assess the vari-ous costs of corruption in higher education, it is impor-tant to keep in mind that higher education is distinctiveas a socioeconomic activity in the following two respects:� First, it is intensive in ‘specific capital investment,

both human and physical’, meaning that its capitalmust be designed and defined specifically for the con-struction of buildings, the installation of trainingequipment and the recruitment of staff and lecturers,and so on. Because physical and human capital is toa large extent different in each case, it is difficult tostandardize and therefore benchmark investmentcosts. Unlike manufactured goods, for instance, thesupplier has much more information about the truecosts than the purchaser does (the ‘information asym-metry’), which translates into greater opportunitiesfor corruption, even when competitive bidding is inplace and adhered to. This is all the more true withcross-border providers, when education is deliveredvia open or distance methods (especially in the caseof e-teaching), and when a programme or courseoffered is a small or marginal part of the servicesoffered by a mega-university or corporate institutionthat can easily transfer investment costs between var-ious services.


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� Second, higher education is a network activity. It isnot fundamentally a heap of structures but rather aflow of services, that is, training, research, certifica-tion, support services to the community, contractualarrangements with industry and services, partnershipand other linkages with sponsors, and so on. Being anetwork activity, higher education runs two majorrisks: one, the range of services offered often includesareas with monopoly power, which are in the hands ofeither the training institution or one of its counter-parts; and two, the services are not always offered bya single stakeholder or controlled in a transparentway, thus offering easy opportunities for corrupt prac-tices supported by potential collusion of interests(sponsors may interfere in the choice of a servicedelivery method, a provider, equipment, and so on).

This is why government authorities usually regulate theoperation of institutions of higher education and requirethat external audits be conducted on a regular basis. At thesame time, when regulators (accrediting bodies) includeareas with monopoly power, and even more so, when col-lusion of interests occurs in regulating bodies and highereducation institutions, corruption can become rampant oreven pandemic. Regulators themselves may need to beregulated. On a different yet relevant note, in many coun-tries, including the European region, access to jobs inhigher education (particularly teaching positions) is notregulated by an entirely free and well-informed job mar-ket, which leads to opportunities for corrupt practices. Allof these issues need to be properly taken into considerationwhen addressing corruption problems.

ADDRESSING THE CHALLENGES: SIX LINES OF ACTION

Six main lines of action are presented below to addressthe various challenges mentioned above. Examples ofgood practices are mentioned whenever possible, so as toillustrate the strategy.

LINE 1: REGULATING THE MARKET WITH TRANSPARENTCRITERIAWhether the system is centralized or decentralized, withpredominant control by the state or non-governmentalprocedures, it is necessary to regulate the operating con-ditions of the higher education market so as to combatfraud. This means that clear admission criteria and pro-cedures must be set. This concern has led certain formerSoviet countries to establish reliable, transparentmechanisms for administering exams for graduationfrom higher education. Ukraine, for instance, has createdstandardized national exams and Kyrgyzstan has set upa unified testing system (see Box I.7.4). It also means thatclear assessment guidelines and transparent standardsand processes for quality assurance and accrediting bod-ies must be developed. UNESCO and OECD have pavedthe way by formulating guidelines for quality in cross-border higher education (see the section in this volumedevoted to this issue).

Of course, the issue is not only setting up transparentcriteria and procedures, but also ensuring that they havebeen actually enforced. There have been many successfulsystems for checking qualifications and credentials (seeBox I.7.5). All of these systems are gradually turning toe-mechanisms, either independently at the national level(for example in South Africa, China and the UnitedStates) or by soliciting the help of specialized organiz-ations such as QualSearch in Australia or Experian in theUnited Kingdom. China also claims to have developed acentral verification system through which the legitimacyof qualifications can be verified (www.chsi.com.cn), butthere is no evidence that it is fully operational.

LINE 2: REDUCING THE RISK OF CONFLICTS OFINTERESTAn efficient means of reducing the risk of conflicts ofinterest among agents in charge of certification andaccreditation is to establish autonomous professionalbodies with fair representation of stakeholders (public


In Kyrgyzstan, since 2002, admission to uni-versities is based on the National ScholarshipTest (NST), which is run by an independenttesting organization. Potential university stu-dents now have to take standardized multi-ple-choice aptitude tests, which areadministered with strict security measures(such as paper scanning and computerized

grading). The NST is supported throughoutthe country, essentially because it has resultedin the fair distribution of scholarships. Its per-vasive effect on equity and transparency, how-ever, is an issue that still needs to beaddressed. Another issue is sustainability:high-stakes testing is a volatile politicalendeavour in any country. Despite success to

date, weak governance and widespread cor-ruption fosters conditions that will continueto make the sustainability of independenttesting challenging for its proponents.

Source: Drummond and DeYoung, 2003.

Box I.7.4 The National Scholarship Test in Kyrgyzstan

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and private). A promising development in this regard isthe outsourcing and subcontracting of exam manage-ment in order to limit interferences and thus lower theprobability of academic fraud. Another is the establish-ment of independent organizations, such as the Aus-tralian Universities Quality Agency (see Box I.7.6 formore details). Private consulting firms that offer theirservices online to provide judgments on accredited andnon-accredited institutions can also be very useful. Suchinstitutions must comply with codes of conduct that pro-tect against distorted behaviour such as conflicts ofinterest. Another important approach is to de-link bodies in charge of certification and accreditation. Forexample, in the medical field, Heyneman (2004) sug-gests that the process by which individuals apply topractise or become certified in their professions shouldbe separate from the realm of higher education instit-utions: ‘No matter how excellent, no university shouldprovide a license to practice medicine. This licenseshould be awarded by a board of medical examiners that

also manages a system of testing that all medical students must pass. Similar systems must be establishedfor law, accounting and others. The key to this new system is to allow many higher education institutions tocompete with one another.’

However, in some societies, institutional control tendsto take the form of political repression. As a result, univer-sities in these countries put up enormous resistance toquality assurance and accreditation by outside bodies.The real dilemma is that countries with a lack of socialcontrol may fuel corruption by demanding accreditationand pressing for more accountability and that countrieswith more established democratic traditions may limit theautonomy and thus distort the behaviour of academicinstitutions so as to serve the public opinion agenda.

To be effective, an accountability system should (i)clearly state the rules and procedures associated withmanaging the education system; (ii) provide a mechanismfor monitoring compliance; (iii) specify the consequencesof non-compliance; and (iv) be consistently enforced.


In South Africa, a global background ver-ification company known as Kroll MIE(www.mie.co.za) runs a fully automated, cen-tralized online degree verification system. Thesystem links each university and technikon toa centralized database where third-partyqueries may be filed.

Several countries with the same educationsystem as the United Kingdom have cometogether to create a new centralized service forchecking higher education qualifications. Theservice is based on data provided by HigherEducation Futures Ltd, a subsidiary of the

Higher Education Statistics Agency (HESA) andthe first body of its type in the world. The serv-ice will provide employers with a single refer-ence where they can verify an individual’sdegree qualifications. The new service will beprovided by Experian and will form part ofCandidate Verifier, a comprehensive servicethat checks a range of credentials on CVs (‘t’ Magazine).

Higher education providers in the UnitedStates have traditionally outsourced the verification of qualifications. Due to the vol-ume of verifications required, companies such

as the National Student Clearinghouse(www.degreeverify.com) and Credentials(www.degreechk.com) have taken up thechallenge.

Australia has welcomed the introduction ofQualSearch (www.qualsearch.com.au), anonline authentication system designed toassess claims of qualifications conferred byAustralian universities. The system draws onan existing platform that facilitates third-partyqueries performed via an online portal.

Box I.7.5 Qualification fraud in South Africa, the United Kingdom, the United States and Australia

AUQA was established under the AustralianCorporations Law as a not-for-profit companylimited by guarantee. It has a board of twelvedirectors, four of whom are elected by theCEOs of self-accrediting institutions, and oneby the CEOs of non-self-accrediting institu-tions. Its members are the nine ministersresponsible for higher education at the state,territory and Commonwealth levels.

AUQA’s objectives are to:

1. Arrange and manage a system of periodicaudits of quality assurance arrangements

relating to the activities of Australian uni-versities, other self-accrediting institutions(SAIs) and state and territory higher educa-tion (HE) accreditation bodies.

2. Monitor, review, analyse and provide pub-lic reports on quality assurance arrange-ments in SAIs, on the processes andprocedures of state and territory accredita-tion authorities, and on the impact of thoseprocesses on the quality of programmes.

3. Report on the criteria for the accreditationof new universities and non-universityhigher education courses, using information

obtained during the audit of institutions andstate and territory accreditation processes.

4. Report on the relative standards of the Aus-tralian higher education system and itsquality assurance processes, including theirinternational standing, using informationobtained during the auditing processes.

AUQA has not yet completed its first cycle ofreviews of all Australian universities and otherhigher education providers. The reports areavailable on their website: www.auqa.edu.au.

Box I.7.6 Australian Universities Quality Agency (AUQA)

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LINE 3: DEVELOPING STANDARDS AND CODES OFPRACTICE OF ACADEMIC INTEGRITYAnother important component of a strategy to fight aca-demic fraud is the design and adoption of professional,ethical and honour codes of conduct for both students andteachers. A number of countries such as Canada, HongKong, India and the United States have had particularlyrelevant experiences in this regard. Comparative studiescarried out by the International Institute for EducationalPlanning (IIEP) in this area (Nuland et al., 2006) concludethat a number of conditions are required for such codesto be effective and complied with, namely: participatoryprocedures for their design and maintenance; a properinformation system on their content and the ‘rules of thegame’, including the penalties for non-compliance; andthe training of key stakeholders, including members ofthe education and administrative professions. The mainconcern is not to identify and prosecute individuals butto change the ethos and quality assurance culture byaccrediting entities and academic institutions. In a con-text of internationalization and even more so of the glob-alization of higher education, special guidelines andcodes of practice are required for the recruitment and sup-port of overseas students (see Box I.7.7).

LINE 4: USING MORE EFFECTIVE AND TRANSPARENTMANAGEMENT TOOLSMore effective and transparent management tools areneeded for both traditional and new forms of higher edu-cation, and for the mechanisms and bodies in charge ofquality assurance and accreditations. The more system-atic use of ICTs, for instance, offers the potential to detectfraud, check for plagiarism and increase the costs of cor-rupt practices in examination processes and in access tothe labour market for higher education graduates. Thereare many examples of this. In the Philippines, an elec-tronic device is used to detect fraud in exams by identifystatistically improbable results (for example when gradesappear to have risen sharply, or when the statistical distri-bution of the scores is erratic or difficult to interpret).

Other countries, particularly in Europe and North Amer-ica, recommend using a website to detect plagiarism(www.turnitin.com). Others recommend adopting auto-mated procedures to manage all stages of examination.These procedures are based on the experience of Azer-baijan, where the higher education admissions process isrun entirely by computer: designing tests, administeringexams, grading tests, processing university admissionsand informing candidates of the results. The UniversityGrants Commission of India has decided to request thatuniversities add computer microchips to the degrees theyaward to students in order to reduce the circulation of fakeuniversity degrees (Upadhyay, 2004).

LINE 5: FACILITATING PUBLIC ACCESS TO INFORMATIONReliable and user-friendly information systems are neededin higher education and accrediting institutions. In partic-ular, many English-speaking countries have developeddirectories of courses or institutions accredited by theirrecognized institutions and approved accreditation agen-cies. A directory of distance education programmesaccredited by the Distance Education and Training Coun-cil is now available on the Internet at www.detc.org. In theUnited States, the state of Oregon has an Office of DegreeAuthorization (www.osac.state.or.us) and the state ofMichigan has compiled a list of unapproved accreditationagencies (www.michigan.gov). Furthermore, the Interna-tional Association of University Presidents has created aregister of reliable accreditation agencies.

However, in the context of internationalization and theglobalization of higher education, access to internationalreference databases on accredited higher education insti-tutions and courses needs to be facilitated. The Councilfor Higher Education Accreditation (CHEA), a coordinat-ing body for higher education accreditation, has paved theway by creating a database with examples of US accredi-tation obtained by higher education institutions located in31 different countries. In addition, information on relia-bility, quality and standards could be made available toapplicants interested in overseas courses. For example, for


Developing codes of practice and standards ofacademic integrity for personnel of highereducation institutions and overseas students:this strategy has been adopted by Northwest-ern University (USA), where the registration ofoverseas students now requires adherence tocodes of conduct and to the University’s stan-

dards of academic integrity. These codes pro-hibit the following behaviour: falsification ofany portion of the application for admission orfinancial aid; falsification or alteration of anyacademic or personal records required for par-ticipation; and plagiarism, cheating, fabrica-tion, obtaining an unfair advantage, and so

on. Students can be withdrawn from the pro-gramme at any time if they violate the codes orstandards or conduct themselves in a way thatbrings the programme into ‘disrepute’.

Source: http://www.northwestern.edu/studyabroad/summerstudy/Code_of_Conduct.pdf

Box I.7.7 Codes of practice of Northwestern University, USA

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all cross-border higher education, there is a need to widelypublicize (on websites) recruitment fairs, course require-ments and help lines, as well as rules, regulations, agree-ments, placement schemes for new students, and so on.One good example is South Africa, which seeks to main-tain websites listing accredited overseas universities.Finally, systems to penalize institutions that provide unre-liable or false information could be established.

LINE 6: ESTABLISHING AND USING AWARENESSINDICATORS OR ‘RED FLAGS’These indicators could help various stakeholders withdifferent levels of responsibility, including accreditinginstitutions, entities in charge of quality assurance, pres-idents and rectors of universities, department directors,academics, managers of e-training companies, fundingand sponsoring agencies, students, and users of highereducation graduates. The table included in the Appendixprovides an example of guidelines for checking theintegrity of an accrediting organization or training insti-tution. Box I.7.8, inspired by the work of Johansson, provides a checklist of indicators or ‘red flags’ for iden-tifying fake universities.

FUTURE TRENDS, LESSONS LEARNED ANDCONCLUSIONS

The persistent growth in the demand for higher educationservices (see forecasts in Table I.7.1), coupled with thevariety of agencies involved in the market, will sustain thepressure for more distorted practices. Fortunately, and asa direct consequence, a trend towards more transparency,accountability and ethics is simultaneously on the rise.This trend demands more regulation, the design of codesof conduct, training to fight academic fraud, better accessto reliable information, separating examinations fromaccess to jobs, and so on. At the same time, recent trendsshow that the nature of certification and accreditation ischanging. Greater emphasis is being placed on the resultsand skills obtained by students rather than on the processesor means involved. In this context, the notion of ‘account-ability’ of accrediting institutions and quality assurancesystems might change and there may be a significantmovement towards more transparency.

Furthermore, complementary action trends are alreadyaddressing the challenge of adapting existing qualityassurance and accreditation mechanisms to the develop-ment and diversification of demand. These trends includevoluntary cooperation among partners within the highereducation profession, the creation of international lists of


� The institution either claims to be accreditedby an unrecognized organization or playsdown the significance of accreditation.

� The name of the institution is remarkablysimilar to that of a genuine university.

� The institution often changes address.� The name of the institution is invented or

misleading.� The institution lacks a physical address and

can only be contacted by email or fax.

� Enrolment requirements are minimal.� The institution emphasizes on its website

that it is not a fake university.� Information about fees refers to degree

certificates and not tuition fees.� Degrees are based purely on vocational

experience.� Degree requirements are minimal and

degrees are awarded within a brief period.

� Illustrations of the degree certificates arepublished on the institution’s website.

� The logos of recognized credit card compa-nies are shown on the institution’s website.

� Degree documents can be pre-dated.

Source: adapted from Johansson (2005), available at:http://english.hsv.se/?contentId=2181

Box I.7.8 Fake universities often have one or more of the following features:

TABLE I.7.1 Forecasts of global demand for international higher education for the top five source countries

2000 2005 2010 2020 2025 Growth (%)

China 218,437 437,109 760,103 1,937,129 2,973,287 11.0

South Korea 81,370 96,681 114,269 155,737 172,671 3.1

India 76,908 141,691 271,193 502,237 629,080 8.8

Japan 66,097 65,872 68,544 71,974 73,665 0.4

Greece 60,486 68,285 75,339 84,608 89,903 1.6

Source: Global Student Mobility 2025, available at: http://www.idp.com/

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quality-assured and accredited institutions and pro-grammes, and the introduction of consultancy servicesfor potential students and users. According to the princi-ple of subsidiarity, a cascade of mechanisms and entitiessharing different degrees of responsibility for certifica-tion are thus expected to progressively develop at differ-ent levels, as follows: � At the institutional level, internal evaluation and audit

systems will develop to complement external auditmechanisms. This is the case in Slovakia, where thelaw has introduced internal university auditing as ‘anobjective activity focused mainly on operative andindependent assessment of the appropriateness andefficiency of the operation of the entity covered bythe audit.’

� At the national level, quality assurance arrangementswill depend on historical factors: centralized versusdecentralized higher education and the private sectorshare. U21 is a good example: quality assurance is notmanaged by prestigious universities but by an inde-pendent institution linked to a profit-making companycalled Thomson Learning.

� At the sub-regional level, independent regional,public or private accreditation agencies (for examplethe Central and Eastern European Network of Qual-ity Assurance Agencies) will evaluate institutionsand providers.

� At the regional level, regional mechanisms for mon-itoring and recognizing national quality assurance andaccreditation systems will be strengthened. TheBologna process in Europe, for instance, favours thecreation of bodies such as the European Consortiumfor Accreditation (ECA), which aim to make nationalquality assurance systems transparent – not to replacethem (see Box I.7.9 on the Netherlands).

� At the international level, international mechanismsfor monitoring and recognizing regional and nationalquality assurance and accreditation systems mayimprove and enjoy more support by stakeholders.UNESCO, the World Bank, OECD and other interna-tional institutions – public and private – will pursueinitiatives in this regard. However, no excessive opti-mism is warranted here.

Observers say that a comprehensive internationalquality assurance system is unlikely to develop in the nearfuture as a substitute for national policies and proceduresbecause of inertia, national resistance and the practicaldifficulties of imposing coordination and rules of thegame on an uneven galaxy of providers. Put differently,a comprehensive international higher education marketis unlikely to be established soon. At the same time, somearguments suggest that, because of globalization, it islikely that strong pressure will encourage the concentra-tion of the market of higher education providers. It mayhave some of the following features:� Stable elite higher education sector (both public and

private). � A growing share of corporate institutions.� The deterioration, if not closing down, of some tradi-

tional public higher education institutions.� The disappearance of many private institutions.� Great volatility and instability of small institutions.

This may have important consequences for trans-parency and accountability issues. Indeed, depending onthe segment of the higher education sector concerned(that is, small private higher education institutions, whichare not regarded as part of the ‘elite’), opportunities forcorruption may remain high or grow in the future – and sowill the need to address them.


At the national level:

� Same requirements for public and privateproviders.

� Independent judgments and clear sanc-tions.

� Plurality in methods of quality assessment.� Accreditation and quality assessment

report made public.

At the European level:

� Creation of the European Consortium forAccreditation.

� Mutual recognition of accreditation deci-sions.

� Introduction of a code of good practice,which must be sufficiently independent

from government, higher education insti-tutions, businesses, and so on.

� Public accountability through public andofficially available policies, procedures,guidelines and criteria.

Source: http://www.qa-in.nl/

Box I.7.9 Higher education accreditation in the Netherlands

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REFERENCES/SOURCES

Association of University Teachers (AUT) and DevelopmentEducation Association (DEA) (1999) Globalization andHigher Education. Guidance on Ethical Issues Arising fromInternational Academic Activities. London: AUT.

Altbach P. Academic corruption: the continuing challenge, Inter-national Higher Education (Number 38, winter 2005 andthe issue of winter 2004 on the same subject).

Bear, J. and Bear, M. (2004) Quackwatch, 14 November.Brown, G. (2005) Fighting credential fraud, World Education

Services (WES), 18(5). New York: WES.Centre for Educational Research and Innovation, CERI (2004)

Internationalization and Trade in Higher Education:Opportunities and Challenges. Paris: OECD.

Drummond, T. and DeYoung, A. J. (2003) Perspectives andproblems in education reform in Kyrgyzstan, in Heyneman,S. P. and DeYoung, A. J. The Challenges of Education inCentral Asia, pp. 225–42. Greenwich: Information AgePublishing.

Eckstein, M. (2003) Combating Academic Fraud: Towards aCulture of Integrity. IIEP series on ethics and corruption ineducation. Paris: IIEP-UNESCO.

Hallak, J. and Poisson, M. (2002) Ethics and corruption in edu-cation: results from the expert workshop held at IIEP, Paris,28–29 November 2001. IIEP Policy Forum. Paris: IIEP-UNESCO.

Hallak, J. and Poisson, M. (2005) Academic Fraud and QualityAssurance: Facing the Challenge of Internalization ofHigher Education. Policy Forum on Accreditation and the

Global Higher Education Market, Paris, 13–14 June 2005.Paris: IIEP: UNESCO.

Hallak, J. and Poisson, M. (2006) Corrupt Schools, Corrupt Uni-versities: What can be done? IIEP series on ethics and cor-ruption in education. Paris: IIEP-UNESCO (forthcoming).

Heyneman, S. (2004) Education and corruption, InternationalJournal of Educational Development, 24(6), pp. 637–48.Amsterdam: Elsevier Ltd.

IDP Education Australia. Global Student Mobility 2025. Avail-able at: http://www.idp.com/

Janashia, N. (2004) Corruption and higher education in Geor-gia, International Higher Education, winter 2004. Boston:Center for International Higher Education, Boston College.

Johansson, E. (2005) Diploma mills, fake universities and boguscredentials. Paper prepared for the 17th Annual EAIE Con-ference 2005, Cracow, Poland.

Karosadnize, T. and Christensen, C. (2005) Anew beginning forGeorgia’s university admissions. Tbilisi: TI Georgia(national chapter), in Meier, B. and Griffin, M. (eds) Steal-ing the Future: Corruption in the Classroom. Berlin: Trans-parency International (TI).

Mangan, K. S. (2002) The fine art of fighting fakery. Admissionsofficers and credentials consultants increasingly have tocheck documents for forgery, The Chronicle of Higher Edu-cation, 1.

Nuland (van), S. and Khandelwal, B. P. with contributions fromBiswal, K., Dewan, E. A. and Bajracharya, H. R. (2006)Ethics in Education: the role of teacher codes. Canada andSouth Asia. IIEP series on ethics and corruption in educa-tion. Paris: IIEP: UNESCO (forthcoming).


How can I determine if an accrediting organization may be a ‘mill’?

What questions should I ask to determine whether a degreeprovider is a ‘mill’?

If the answers to many of the following questions are ‘yes’, theaccrediting organization under consideration might be a ‘mill’:

� Does the operation allow accredited status to be purchased?

� Does the operation publish lists of institutions or programmes theyclaim to have accredited without those institutions andprogrammes knowing that they are listed or have been accredited?

� Does the operation claim that it is recognized (by, for example,USDE or CHEA) when it is not?

� Are few if any standards for quality published by the operation?

� Is a very short period of time required to achieve accredited status?

� Are accreditation reviews routinely confined to submittingdocuments and do not include site visits or interviews of keypersonnel by the accrediting organization?

� Is ‘permanent’ accreditation granted without any requirement forsubsequent periodic review, either by an external body or by theorganization itself?

� Does the operation use organizational names similar to recognizedaccrediting organizations?

� Does the operation make claims in its publications for which thereis no evidence?

If the answers to many of the following questions are ‘yes’, thedegree provider under consideration may be a ‘mill’:

� Can degrees be purchased?

� Is there a claim of accreditation when there is no evidence of this status?

� Is there a claim of accreditation from a questionable accreditingorganization?

� Does the operation lack state or federal licensure or authority tooperate?

� Is little if any attendance required of students, either online or in class?

� Are few assignments required for students to earn credits?

� Is a very short period of time required to earn a degree?

� Are degrees available based solely on experience or resumé review?

� Are there few requirements for graduation?

� Does the operation fail to provide any information about a campusor business location or address and provides only a post office box?

� Does the operation fail to provide a list of its faculty and theirqualifications?

� Does the operation have a name similar to other well-knowncolleges and universities?

� Does the operation make claims in its publications for which thereis no evidence?

Source: Council for Higher Education Accreditation, 2005 (available at: http://www.chea.org/degreemills/default.htm)

APPENDIX: ACADEMIC CORRUPTION AND ACCREDITATION (A PROPOSAL)

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Ongom, D. L. (1990) Malpractices in examinations. Paper pre-sented at a seminar on malpractices in examinations, Zomba(Malawi).

Rumyantseva, N. L. (2005) Taxonomy of corruption in highereducation, Peabody Journal of Education, 80(1), pp. 81–92.Nashville: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc.

Smith, A. (2003) The darkening shadow of stolen words, TheAge, 24 August. Melbourne: The Age Ltd.

State Student Admission Commission (2001) Automatizationand computerization of examination system to enable fur-ther transparency. Republic of Azerbaijan. Baku: SSAC.

Stetar, J., Panych, O. and Cheng, B. (2005) Confronting corrup-tion: Ukrainian private higher education, InternationalHigher Education (38), winter 2005, pp. 13–15. Boston:Center for International Higher Education, Boston College.

t Magazine (2000) Lies, damn lies ... and CV’s.Upadhyay, S. (2004) Micro chips to help curb fake degree

racket. Times of India 3 January. Available at: http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com


INTRODUCTION Since the fall of the USSR, the five inde-pendent republics of Central Asia (Kaza-khstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistanand Turkmenistan) have undergone pro-found socioeconomic and politicalchanges that have had particularly seriousrepercussions on the education sector.

The difficulties involved in preservingthe high literacy and education levelsinherited from the Soviet period soonbecame apparent. The disorganizeddecentralization of education structures,budgetary constraints and decreasedstate involvement that followed the col-lapse of the USSR created unforeseenobstacles for the authorities of the newrepublics. Local authorities were suddenlyconfronted with the difficult task of run-ning educational institutions locally, with-out receiving the required level of localfinancial autonomy and investment.

As the centrally planned economies ofthe region continue their transformationinto dynamic market economies, publiceducation systems are still suffering thenegative consequences of the transitionprocess. They fail to adapt to a new eco-nomic context that demands new skills,the introduction of new education mod-els and an effective overall reform of theeducation system.

The resulting deterioration in the over-all quality of education and the difficul-ties that higher education systems in theregion are currently confronted with areprimarily the result of five key factors: cor-ruption; low salaries; an insufficient sup-ply of appropriately trained staff; limited

material and equipment; and inadequateinfrastructure and teaching facilities. Asa result of these factors, the overall qual-ity of the education systems in the regionis deeply compromised.

UNDERSTANDING THE WIDERCONTEXTThe collapse of the USSR and the severesocioeconomic crisis that followedbrought about serious economic prob-lems and increased the incidence ofpoverty across Central Asia (whichincludes some of the poorest republics ofthe former Soviet Union). These changesopened new possibilities for the well-connected, and increased the opportuni-ties for those willing to engage in corruptpractices. The introduction of market cap-italism also brought about the liberaliza-tion and subsequent privatization of theacademic sector. However, it failed to putin place effective regulatory bodies and anadequate accreditation system, therebyfacilitating the spread of corruption.

Although the existence of academiccorruption during the Soviet period iswell documented, the centrally controllededucation system ensured that corrup-tion remained restricted to each of thedefined structural levels.1 Since indep-endence, such practices have spreadacross the board, creating a generalsociopolitical context marked by wide-spread corruption in all spheres and sociallevels. The pervasiveness of corruption inhigher education is of particular concern.

At present, corruption in education isone of the main problems taking a heavy

toll on the societies of these transitioncountries, since education constitutes akey pillar on which to lay the foundationsof the future development of the region.

Thus, academic corruption in CentralAsia must be understood within a widersocial context that is marked by pervasivecorruption at all levels; from the adminis-tration, judiciary, police forces and localauthorities to key public services (includ-ing health and education). The existenceof widespread endemic corruption at allsocial levels has created a situation inwhich buying positions, exam grades oraccess to university are not only con-ceived as possibilities but are regarded associally accepted practices in countrieswhere bribery is accepted as part ofeveryday life. There are so many irregu-larities that certain corrupt practices areoverlooked and not regarded as corrup-tion. This is particularly the case in theeducation sector.

UNDERSTANDING ACADEMICCORRUPTION The endemic corruption that exists in allspheres of society has permeated theeducation systems of Central Asia in sev-eral ways. Although corrupt practicesbegin at elementary school, evidencesuggests that the worst corruption is atuniversity level (Moore, 2004). Corrup-tion in higher education involves the saleor provision of places, grades, degrees,academic credentials, and a long and soon. (covering a wide range of areaswithin the academic sector) by those inpositions of power. (Academic corrup-

SPECIAL CONTRIBUTION I.3Academic corruption in Central Asia

Itziar Gómez Carrasco

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