02/01/2006USC/ISI1 Updates on Routing Experiments Cyber DEfense Technology Experimental Research...

02/01/2006 USC/ISI 1

Updates on Routing Experiments

Cyber DEfense Technology Experimental Research (DETER) NetworkEvaluation Methods for Internet Security Technology (EMIST)USC Information Sciences Institute University of California, Berkeley University of California, Davis Penn State UniversityPurdue University International Computer Science Institute Stanford Research Institute (SRI) Network Associates SPARTA

02/01/2006 USC/ISI 2

Research Objectives

• Realistic Internet routing experiments on Dynamics (i.e., faults, failures, & attacks) with configurable parameters

• Study, analyze, evaluate, & validate hypothesis/principles related to Internet routing and its security

02/01/2006 USC/ISI 3

Problems in Understanding the Problems

• Inter-Domain Routing is very hard and complex to understand…

02/01/2006 USC/ISI 4

The “Internet”as February 1, 2006

• 21319 Autonomous Systems• 177300 IP Address Prefixes announced

http://bgp.potaroo.net/cidr/

02/01/2006 USC/ISI 5



• It is really not just scalability though…– Policy/configuration– Implementation

02/01/2006 USC/ISI 6

Simulation versus Emulation

• Simulation large-scale but might abstracting away low level characteristics.

• Emulation experimenting realistic implementations and observing the “unexpected”– Implementation differences– Analyzing/interpreting the interactions– May help in accomplishing better simulation tasks in

BGP.

02/01/2006 USC/ISI 7

Interactions/Dynamics

• Failures/faults/attacks• Mobility/configuration/policy changes• Cross-layer interactions• EGP versus IGP

02/01/2006 USC/ISI 8



• It is really not just scalability though…– Policy/configuration– Implementation

• And, industry is introducing new BGP features..

02/01/2006 USC/ISI 9

Route Flap Damping (RFC 2439)

02/01/2006 USC/ISI 10

Differential Damping Penalty

CISCO 12000AS65001

CISCO 2600AS65002

Zebra/LinuxAS65006

IBM 2210AS65003

IBM 2210AS65004

CISCO 2514AS65005

02/01/2006 USC/ISI 11

Penalty: 0

Penalty 1: 0Penalty 2: 0

Prefix: 169.237/16

02/01/2006 USC/ISI 12

Penalty: ???


Prefix: 169.237/16

02/01/2006 USC/ISI 13

Penalty: 1000 2000


Prefix: 169.237/16

artificial delay X

initialdifference

02/01/2006 USC/ISI 14

Penalty: 2000 -/+ X > 750

Penalty 1: 1000Penalty 2: 1000 -/x < 2000

Prefix: 169.237/16

02/01/2006 USC/ISI 15

Outbound Route Filter (ORF)

Internet draft, under implementation in Cisco

“defines a BGP-based mechanism that allows a BGP speaker to send to its BGP peer a set of Outbound Route Filters (ORFs). The peer would then apply these filters, in addition to its locally configured outbound filters (if any), to constrain/filter its outbound routing updates to the speaker. ”

If the peer damps a path, sends ORF to the downstream peer. So, the peer won’t receive further updates until the path is reused.

02/01/2006 USC/ISI 16

Penalty: 1000 2000


Prefix: 169.237/16

ORF

02/01/2006 USC/ISI 17

A Little Dampening Story

SSFNet Zebra Ciscoper prefix + per peer per prefix + per peer +

per AS path

02/01/2006 USC/ISI 18

Penalty: 1000 2000


Withdraw 169.237/16

02/01/2006 USC/ISI 19

SSFNet Simulator “Bugs”

Penalty: 1000 2000


Withdraw 169.237/16Missing!!

02/01/2006 USC/ISI 20

SSFNET

SSFNET + WD

CISCO

02/01/2006 USC/ISI 21

SSFNET

SSFNET + WD

CISCO

02/01/2006 USC/ISI 22

ICDCS’2005 Best Paper Award

SSFNET

SSFNET + WD

CISCO

02/01/2006 USC/ISI 23

Problems or Issues

• Damping implementation• MRAI timer• The Single Router AS Assumption• Route Withdraw• ORF

02/01/2006 USC/ISI 24

Collecting the Results in 2005

show IP BGP …

selected prefixesper routerper 1 second

1 peer (SPRINT)Full Routing Table(9MB compressed)BGP Updates(2 hours -- 168KB)

updates -- MRT

02/01/2006 USC/ISI 25

AS-101

AS-112

AS-117

AS-114

AS-113

AS-121

02/01/2006 USC/ISI 26

AS 101 Multi homing =====================================================Wed Sep 28 02:26:00 PDT 2005===================================================== Paths: (3 available, best #3, table Default-IP-Routing-Table) Advertised to non peer-group peers: 101.0.0.1 101.0.0.2 112.0.0.2 114.0.0.2 114 113 121 114.0.0.2 from 114.0.0.2 (114.0.0.2) Origin IGP, localpref 100, valid, external Last update: Wed Sep 28 02:13:28 2005 112 117 112.0.0.2 from 112.0.0.2 (112.0.0.2) Origin IGP, localpref 100, valid, external Dampinfo: penalty 543, flapped 1 times in 00:13:05 Last update: Wed Sep 28 02:25:39 2005 113 121 113.0.0.2 from 113.0.0.2 (113.0.0.2) Origin IGP, localpref 100, valid, external, best Last update: Wed Sep 28 02:13:11 2005

02/01/2006 USC/ISI 27

AS 101

0

0.5

1

1.5

2

2.5

3

200 400 600 800 1000 1200 1400 1600 1800 2000

Time

Stat

us

Path 112-117

Path 114-113-121

Path 113-121

117 112 101 113 121114

AS-117announced

AS-121withdrawn

OASC

02/01/2006 USC/ISI 28

Creation and Evolution of BGP modeling

SSFNet:Current Understand of

The BGP Model

DETERAll BGP information

are available

Conflicts Anomalies

02/01/2006 USC/ISI 29

Observation Point Data

• ORV/RIPE– Relatively incomplete in understanding the

behavior

02/01/2006 USC/ISI 30

On Explaining and Model-Building

the Model Anomaly Detection

Anomaly Analysis and Explanation

02/01/2006 USC/ISI 31

Creation and BGP model

• What are the event ?– Event changes in BGP table

• Cause by : – OP Configuration– BGP peers – Other means , OSPF redistribute route

– Event results BGP update messages

• How are the event related ?

02/01/2006 USC/ISI 32

BGP Behavior

BGP

Update

RedistributePolicy / local pref

Y

N

Operator

OSPF Done

Update

02/01/2006 USC/ISI 33

Mapping

TIME

2D AS Topology via project to Z=0

Announce

Announce

Announce

Announce

Withdraw Withdraw

Time 60

Time 30

Time 0

02/01/2006 USC/ISI 34

BGP Events: Causality and Correlation

• Causality Relationship among each individual BGP event (across different routers/ASes)– Critical to simply understand/correlate BGP

behavior– Discovery new types of relationships (or

filter/correct false causality in experiments)– Important for generating/replaying realistic BGP

events

• Using emulation to verify the causality– Maybe also with commercial routers (e.g., Juniper)

02/01/2006 USC/ISI 35

Plan for the June 2006 Demo

• One “very interesting” defense tested..– in a stealthy mode…

• Event correlation• “realistic” and “comprehensive” BGP

model– Many interesting examples and comparisons

• Still in development (not sure yet)– Using the model to examine real BGP data– What patterns should we expect from the

observation points?

02/01/2006USC/ISI1 Updates on Routing Experiments Cyber DEfense Technology Experimental Research...

Documents

Transcript of 02/01/2006USC/ISI1 Updates on Routing Experiments Cyber DEfense Technology Experimental Research...