02 Willows

INTRODUCTION

The vast literatures on labor relations and humanresources management rarely overlap. This is unfortunatebecause, at a fundamental level, both are necessary toassure healthy, effective workforces. Scholars have notedthis disconnect and called for empirical integration(Kearney and Carnevale 2001, Ban and Riccucci 1993).Likewise, the academic literature reflects a growingconcern with the complexities of labor relations writlarge. As Lewin et al. attest, “...it is crucial for researchersto analyze the environment, structures, processes and

outcomes that characterize collective bargaining ifgreater understanding of such bargaining is to be achieved... [we need] the development of better theoretical andempirical studies” (1988, 591). Our objective in this articleis to begin to unify labor relations and human resourcesmanagement (HRM) analyses.

Studies of the determinants of wage effects anddegree of unionization are relatively common, and thereis limited work that examines the impact of unionizationon HRM policies. For example, studies consider therelationship between unionization and benefits levels(McCurdy, Newman and Lovrich 2002; Roberts 2003;

INTEGRATING LABOR RELATIONS AND HUMAN RESOURCEMANAGEMENT: IMPACTS ON STATE WORKFORCES

WILLOW S. JACOBSONUniversity of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, USA

&ELLEN V. RUBINSUNY at Albany, USA

&AMY K. DONAHUE

University of Connecticut, USA

What is the combined effect of labor relations and human resources management onresults that are important to managers? This article provides a preliminary answer to thisquestion using data from the 50 state governments. Research considering the influence ofpublic sector unions on public sector outcomes typically operationalizes unionization asbivariate, which greatly understates the complexity of the relationships. Furthermore, laborrelations research often fails to consider the human resources management systems in whichlabor relations operates. Considering the effects of labor relations and human resourcemanagement policies together on intermediate outcomes such as quality of hires, turnover, andtenure begins to provide a more complete picture of the workforce management system, andprovides a roadmap for future research which can be informative for both the public andprivate sectors.

Key Words: Labor relations, Human resource management, performance

© International Review of Public Administration2008, Vol. 13, No. 2

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Kearney 2003), unionization and workplace diversity(Riccucci 1990, and Goode and Baldwin 2005) andunionization and HRM reforms (Kellough and Selden2003, Ellig and Thompson 2006). Recently, Verma(2005) examined the relationship between unionizationand HRM broadly. This study showed that unions canhave a positive impact on HRM policies, but noted thatthese effects can erode over time, and can limit manage-ment flexibility in certain areas.

Despite this emerging work, a survey of the literaturereveals that the relationships between traditionalpersonnel functions, labor-management interactions, andworkforce outcomes are not yet well understood. Thus,this article aims to fill three gaps. First, the analysispresented here extends Verma’s work (2005) by examiningthe effects of both labor relations and HRM practicestogether. Second, rather than measuring union perfor-mance traditionally (for example, in terms of variableslike wages), we focus on intermediate workforceoutcomes such as quality, turnover, and tenure, which areworkforce system performance indicators that are morerelevant to managers trying to understand how to beeffective. Our approach is descriptive. We consolidate acommon set of independent variables through review ofthese diverse literatures, and explore the impact of someof these variables on workforce results. Our findings onthe effects of labor relations and HRM practices generallydemonstrate influences postulated in the literature, aswell as some new insights. Third, labor relationsliterature is over-burdened with case studies that are notgeneralizable and do not synthesize findings into anactionable set of consistent measures. One major goal ofthis paper is to collect frequently-used measures fromacross the disparate case study literature and test relation-ships across multiple organizations. Few researchersattempt to do this because of the difficulty of datagathering. This is a primary contribution of the study.

Data from the U.S. states, gathered in 2000, is used toempirically assess the relationships between the variablesidentified in the labor relations and HRM literature.Taking a state government perspective is particularlyuseful at this juncture in the history of the labor movement.State governments remain concerned with laborrelations. Unionization of the public sector is growingdespite decreases in the private sector (Kearney andCarnevale 2001). Collaboration initiatives in Wisconsinstate government, the impact of unions on civil servicereform efforts in Florida, the 2001 state employee strikein Minnesota, and gubernatorial actions to erode bar-

gaining rights of state employees in Indiana, Kentucky,and Missouri highlight the importance of understandinghow unions influence the management of publicemployees.

The article proceeds as follows. First, we synthesizekey themes from the labor relations and HRM literatures.These themes are then used to identify variables forexploration using state government data. We present adescriptive analysis that highlights the merits of con-sidering these variables together and suggests that theymatter for sound workforce management. The articleconcludes with prospects for future research.

LITERATURE ON LABOR RELATIONS

The historical development of unions has beenthoroughly documented across a variety of disciplines,including economics, political science, public admini-stration, and industrial relations (Wachter 2003; Kearneyand Carnevale 2001; Spengler 1999, Zeiger and Gall2002). Nonetheless, Ban and Riccucci have noted thelack of “good empirical research on personnel and laborrelations ... [and] what little research is available is oftenquite narrow” (1993, 72). The literature fails to present anuanced understanding of the nature and influence oflabor-management relations, especially in the largercontext of strategic human resources management.

A challenge to any empirical study of labor relationsis that the literature is extensive and the list of potentialvariables identified as relevant is daunting. Terminologyis inconsistent, and many variables have been consideredas both independent and dependent, creating conceptualconfusion. A thorough review reveals recurrent constructs,however. Five common concepts are consistently presentthroughout the labor literature: density, scope ofbargaining, centralization, collaboration, and context. Wedescribe these dimensions in turn, recognizing that theyoften overlap and interact.

Density. Typically density is used as an indicator ofthe presence or degree of unionization, and is arguablythe most frequently used variable in studies ofunionization (Spengler 1999). Many analysts rely ondensity as their sole measure of unionization, eventhough this ignores other complexities (Riccucci 1990).Despite the extensive use of measures of density, aconsensus about how best to operationalize the conceptis lacking. Many simply identify presence or absence ofunions, or calculate the percentage of the workforce

14 Integrating Labor Relations and Human Resource Management: Impacts on State Workforces Vol. 13, No. 2

covered by a labor agreement (Asher and DeFina 1997;Hirsch, MacPherson and Vrooman 2001; Wagar 1997;Lipset and Katchanovski 2002). Others measure thenumber of dues-paying members (Cohen, et al. 2003;Jermier, Cohen and Gaines, 1988). The number ofbargaining units or agreements, rather than coverage ofindividuals is yet another density measure (Lipset andKatchanovski 2002; Delaney, Fiorito and Jarley 1999;Hirsch and Schumacher 2002). In some cases, multiplemeasures of density are used to balance the limitations ofsingle or narrowly defined measures of density(Dastmalchian, Blyton and Adamson 1991).

Density is commonly treated as a determinant ofunion strength, personnel outcomes, or industry wages.For example, Jacobson, Selden and Rubin (2002) findthat density (characterized as a union-nonunion dummyvariable) is related to increased training opportunities inlocal governments. Especially in economics andindustrial relations literatures, researchers have examinedthe influence of union density on compensation levelsand wage structure (Arbache 1999; Ashley and Jones1996; Booth, Francesconi and Zoega 2003; Ashraf 1997;Hirsh and Schumacher 2002; Klaff and Ehrenberg 2003;Rees 1993; Renaud 1998; Reilly, Schoener and Bolin2007; Kearney 2003). The most extensively studiedgroup of public sector unions are public safety employees,for whom most studies have found that union represen-tation has moderate positive wage effects of about 5-10percent (Freeman 1986; Bartel and Lewin 1981).Riccucci (2007) notes that the private sector unions havehad an excellent track record in winning wage increasesand improved benefits and working conditions for theirmembers. There is additional evidence that public sectorcollective bargaining is more likely to improve fringebenefits and working conditions in addition to wages(Methe and Perry 1980; Ashraf 1994; Kearney 2003).Some scholars have also examined reasons for changesin density levels across and within the private and publicsectors (Kearney and Carnevale 2001; Riccucci 2007;Adler 2006).

Scope of Bargaining. Scope of bargaining is commonlyunderstood to be “the range of issues subject to negotiationbetween employers and employee representatives”(Gershenfeld and Gershenfeld 1994, 51), and mostresearch adopts this definition. (See, for example,Swimmer and Bartkiw 2003; Kearney 2001; Bennet andTaylor 2001; Cutcher-Gershenfeld, Power and McCabe-Power 1996; and Pynes 1993.) Select studies havefocused on a particular substantive issue covered in the

bargaining process, such as contract language oncollaborative activities (Rubinstein 2001) or outsourcinglimitations (Naff 1991). Scope is important to considerbecause it varies across sectors and jurisdictions(Horowitz 1994). Although scope is broadly defined instatute and court decisions, within contracts the level ofdetail on negotiable topics varies. For example, Slither,Healy and Livernash (1960) note that most union-management relationships initially rest on a simple, briefdocument, but over time agreements become more com-prehensive and complex. Since most state level unionrelationships are well established, scope is therefore animportant dimension to consider.

Centralization. Generally centralization refers to theextent to which authority is retained at the top of ahierarchy versus being distributed to multiple sub-units.The locus of decision-making authority is often studiedyet not uniformly defined or measured. In both publicand private contexts, centralization has concerned theinstitutional mechanisms used to administer relationswith unions (Lyons and Vivenzio 1998; Veglahn andHayford 1976), and whether authority is decentralized todepartments for bargaining (Gill 1994). One study foundthat a city is more likely to use a centralized laborrelations professional to lead bargaining if the tax base islarge, if state law structures the labor environment, and ifa mayor-council form of government is present (Gelyand Chandler 1993). In a study of 40 cities, managementstructure for collective bargaining changed as thebargaining relationship matured (Burton 1982).

Researchers have also considered centralization fromlabor’s perspective, examining how unions organizethemselves to engage in the bargaining process (Craft2003) or the degree to which decision-making within theunion is hierarchical or distributed (Jarley, Fiorito andDelaney 2000; Warner 1975). Mellor and Mathieu(1999) found more centralized union hierarchies presentin organizations with lower levels of innovation. Anddecentralized union structures seem to facilitate greaterorganizing success, potentially by increasing levels ofcommitment to the union (Fiorito, Jarley and Delaney1995).

Collaboration. Collaboration concerns the degree towhich the relationship between managers and laborrepresentatives is harmonious or divisive, includingvehicles that specifically enable and foster cooperationand partnering once a contract is in place. Rubin andRubin (2006) define collaboration as “a joint processwhere both employees and their employer share in

September 2008 Willow S. Jacobson & Ellen V. Rubin & Amy K. Donahue 15

decision-making,” and note that “[it] has become a majortopic of discussion among organizational reformers”(283-284). Masters and Albright (2005) point out that“labor-management cooperation has yielded its ownliterature, primarily among industrial relations scholars”(354). This topic has recently become a prominent themeas organizations have tried to change what has historicallybeen a contentious, litigious, and process-drivenrelationship (Dubin 1949; Deutsch 1973; Gerhart 1994;Wagar 1997). Likewise, many authors have undertakenorganizational-level case studies of partnership efforts(Craft 2003; Savolainen 2002; Lyons and Vivenzio1998; Fretz and Walsh 1998; Rubinstein 2001; Rubinand Rubin 2006).

Few studies have systematically examined theactivities and effects of labor-management partnershipsin the public sector. Although there have been claimsthat more cooperation and participative modes of labor-management relations promote organizational interests,the research is limited. In a detailed study of theeffective-ness of federal efforts to foster partnershipsunder the Clinton administration, it was reported thatpartnerships moderately improved working relationshipsbetween labor and management, improved communication,helped facilitate organizational change, and coincidedwith a decrease in unfair labor practice charges (Mastersand Albright 2003). Additionally, council represen-tatives, those closest to partnership activities, perceivedthat their councils had a positive effect on selecteddimensions of organizational performance (Masters andAlbright 2005).

Context. Context refers to the legal and politicalenvironment in which unions operate. Historical researchoutlines the development of legal recognition andstatutory support that influence the development ofunionization (Kearney and Carnevale 2001; Freeman1986; Ichniowski 1988, Freeman and Valletta 1988;Dickerson and Cayer 1994). The ability to form unions,specification of which employees can be covered bybargaining agreements, and the extent of bargaining islargely determined in statute and case law (Kearney2001; Gershenfeld and Gershenfeld 1994; Horowitz1994; Pynes and Lafferty 1993).

Legal aspects of labor relations both depend on unionbehavior and drive performance. As Waters and Hillexplain, “the extent of public sector unionization has asignificant positive influence on the passage of pro-laborbargaining legislation and bargaining legislation hasstrong, independent effects on the extent of public sector

unionization” (1994, 355). Progressive state labor lawsand mandatory bargaining laws increase union density(Reid and Kurth 1984; Dalton 1982; Moore 1998;Ichniowski 1984). Additionally, in the private sector,right-to-work laws significantly affect union density(Davis and Houston 1995). And, the legal environmentis often included as an influence on union organizationaleffectiveness (Hammer and Wazeter 1993) and bothunion and nonunion wages (Freeman and Ichniowski1988).

Apart from statutes and case law, institutional rulesalso shape labor-management interactions (Wagar 1997).A survey of union leaders in the U.S. revealed that localformalization was positively related to local innovation(Mellor and Mathieu 1999). Routine practices that maynot be codified also influence labor relations, but aretypically less enduring, susceptible to change as a resultof turnover or organizational reforms.

Finally, labor relations systems operate within apolitical environment. Unions are political actors theymobilize members (Masters 2004) and operate aspressure groups (Pencavel 2005). But, as Masters andDelaney note, “Political action has arguably becomemore salient to organized labor as union membership andbargaining power have declined” (2005, 365). Forexample, police and firefighter political activity asidefrom bargaining power positively affects departmentalexpenditures (Gely and Chandler 1995). Unions havealso been seen to affect who wins elections, at a level atleast as powerful as incumbency (Moe 2006).

Overall, scholars consistently identify five conceptsthat are important to understanding the relationshipbetween unionization and HRM policies. Density, aconcept that is used frequently but operationalized inmultiple ways, consistently exhibits an upward effect onwage and benefit levels, although the magnitude of thatimpact seems to vary between the public and privatesectors. Scope of bargaining is typically considered in adescriptive manner and thus it is difficult to predict thetype of relationship it may exhibit empirically. Likedensity, centralization is frequently considered butinconsistently conceptualized. Broadly, centralization ingovernment of the labor relations responsibilities seemsto increase as professionalization and experienceincrease, and coincides with a decrease in managementinnovation. The limited research on the empirical effectsof collaborative efforts, a growing topic of interest inlabor relations research, suggests a positive relationshipwith organizational change and communication. Finally,


context, which structures the legal environment in whichunions operate, appears to influence density and wageoutcomes. As can be seen across this review, the literatureon labor relations has treated unions as both the dependentand independent variable for investigation. Despite thedifferent approaches, all have been found to be critical tobetter understanding union relations and their impact onHRM, and thus warrant further investigation. A betterunderstanding of how these elements impact the workforceand performance of organizations remains an importantgap.

LITERATURE ON HUMAN RESOURCESMANAGEMENT PRACTICES

Successful implementation of public programs dependson a capable, motivated, and dedicated workforce that ismarshaled through workforce management policies andpractices. It is therefore important to consider thecombined effects of HRM and labor relations in a holisticway. Studies of unions occasionally examine the interactionbetween labor and human resources management.Verma’s 2005 meta-analysis, for instance, examinesunion effects on management and human resourcemanagement policies, and identifies a consistent positiveeffect of unions on management, due in part to the factthat “management tends to develop formal systems andprocedures that contribute to efficiency and organizationaleffectiveness” in response to union pressures (444).

A review of the table of contents of any personnelmanagement text will reveal that key HRM functionsinclude elements like classification, compensation,recruitment, selection, training, evaluation, rewarding,and a lengthy list of others. To organize these activities,we follow the approach of the Government PerformanceProject, which grouped HRM functions into four areas:obtaining, maintaining, motivating, and civil servicestructure (Selden and Jacobson 2007; Selden, Ingrahamand Jacobson 2001; Ingraham and Selden 2001).1

Obtain Employees. The extent to which an organizationis able to recruit and hire the employees it needs isessential to all sectors. To accomplish this, an organizationmust be able to attract and acquire appropriately skilledand qualified employees in a timely manner. Recruitinghas received some empirical attention in both the labormanagement and HRM literatures. For example, Vermafinds that, on average, “union firms were more likely toemploy fewer but more formal methods of recruitment”

(2005, 436). In government agencies in particular, unionand nonunion agencies used similar methods (Koch andHundley 1997). Unions also appear to influence stateefforts to move away from the use of pre-employmentexaminations (Ban and Riccucci 1993) and the “rule-of-three” in hiring (a rule which permits the appointingofficial to choose only among the top three individualscertified), and to reform civil service rules more generally(Kellough and Selden 2003).

Maintain Employees. An organization’s ability topreserve a suitably skilled workforce by providingtraining to develop employee skills, retain experiencedemployees, discipline poor performers, and terminateemployees who cannot or will not meet performancestandards is an essential function of any HRM system.The relationship between unions, training, retention andturnover is considered in the literature. For example, arecent study examined the relationship betweenunionization, job satisfaction, turnover intention, andtenure and found “no significant relationship betweenunion membership and intention to quit once wages andsatisfaction were held constant” (Hammer and Avgar2005, 250). In labor research, the literature suggests thatunions increase the likelihood of employees receivingformal training and professional development, and thatunionized organizations have a greater diversity oftraining opportunities (Osterman 1995; Arulampalamand Booth 1998; Kennedy, Drago, Sloan and Wooden1994; Jacobson, Rubin and Selden 2002; Heyes andStuart 1998; Betcherman, McMullen, Leckie and Caron1994; Ng and Maki 1994).

Motivate Employees. Motivating is an organization’sability to encourage employees to perform effectively insupport of the organization’s goals. Successful motivationefforts typically rest on the use of monetary and non-monetary incentives, performance appraisal, andsolicitation of employee feedback. Additionally, unionsappear to have a negative effect on the use of formalappraisal systems (Ng and Maki 1994). Research showsthat unions appear to decrease the use of individualincentive plans (Betcherman, McMullen, Leckie andCaron 1994; Gunnigle, Turner and D’Art 1998; Ng andMaki 1994; Cohen-Rosenthal and Burton 1993).

Structure. An organization’s personnel system structuredefines and organizes its positions; in a government thisis defined by the civil service structure (Shafritz et al.2001). The constraints imposed and flexibilities allowedby the personnel system structure are therefore offundamental concern to unions. States that have


undertaken large scale civil service structural changeshave primarily been in low union density states(Kellough and Selden 2003).

To summarize, the key tasks of a personnel systemare to attract employees with appropriate skills andabilities to the organization, maintain the capabilities toaccomplish organizational goals through retention andtraining efforts, motivate employees by intrinsic andextrinsic means, and to do so within a formalized structure.Research examining the association between laborrelations and these other HRM activities is limited, butdoes suggest the direction these relationships may take.For example, unions appear to have a dampening effecton efforts to reform hiring methods, but a positive impacton the diversity of professional developmentopportunities available to employees. Likewise, asunionization increases, the likelihood of incentive andperformance appraisal system usage decreases, as doesimplementation of overall personnel system reforms.

Looking across the research that considers the impactof unionizations generally, and the impact of unionizationon HRM in particular, a number of themes emerge, as doissues requiring further study. First, measuring theinfluence of unions is done in a myriad of ways,including focusing on the density of the union presence,the scope of bargaining, the degree to which activitiesare coordinated in a centralized way, collaborativeefforts, and the legal context in which unions operate.These variables are used as both predictors and criterionvariables and considered in an expository fashion in casestudies. Much of the research focuses on private sectorlabor relations, despite the interesting diversity availablefor study in the public sector, and centers on singleorganizations. The findings of this body of scholarshipindicate that a unionized environment exhibits bothpositive and negative effects on HRM policies, some-times simultaneously. Furthermore, single, overly-simplified measures do not reveal the complexity of therelationships. Ultimately, though, this overview makesclear that labor relations and HRM are not examined incombination for their unified effect on HRM outcomes.The remainder of this article aims to take a first step inthat direction.

DATA, MEASURES, AND METHODS

Our aim is exploratory: We examine the influence ofhuman resources management and labor relations

practices on managerial outcomes, as defined below.And we take a more comprehensive view by consideringthe influences of both human resources management andlabor relations factors in concert, so that we can get somesense of their independent effects while controlling for abroader array of relevant influences than do most studies.While we do not test formal hypotheses in this paper, ourliterature review does yield some expectations about therelationships between these variables, and we reflect onthese when we discuss our findings, below.

We explore labor relations in state governments usingdata from Syracuse University’s Government PerformanceProject (GPP), a multi-year effort, funded by the PewCharitable Trusts, to rate management capacity in stateand local governments and selected federal agencies inthe five areas of financial management, human resourcesmanagement, capital management, managing for results,and information technology management. In March,2000, the GPP administered a written survey to stategovernments that included 104 multi-part closed andopen-ended questions about a broad array of humanresources management policies, procedures, activities,and results. Typically the state human resources officecompleted this section of the survey. All fifty statesreturned these surveys, though not all were complete.The GPP’s surveys were designed to support its criteria-based assessment of management capacity; they werenot designed to examine labor relations alone. They dooffer measures that are consistent with the body of laborrelations research, however. We use the broad laborrelations and human resources management literatures tohelp us select measures that are available in the GPP’sdata. For reference, the variable names are includedparenthetically in the text in bold. The measures wechose, their definitions, and their descriptive statistics,are shown in Table 1.

Intermediate Management Outcomes. Many scholarshave called for additional empirical investigation of theimpact of unions (Lewin at al. 1988), some specificallyidentifying the area of HRM as a much overlooked andneeded area for further investigation (Kearney andCarnevale 2001). This analysis responds to that call byexamining the coincident influences of labor relationsand HRM policies on intermediate workforce outcomesthat are important to managers. Finding performancemeasures that can be used for both public and privatesector organizations may seem difficult, given the lack ofprofit motive to drive government activities. However,interest in metrics such as those provided by total quality


management activities, balanced score card initiatives,social responsibility indices, and recognition like theBaldridge Award, have crossed the sectors, providing acommon set of performance measures linking humanresources management (HRM) activities, including laborrelations, to outcomes of interest to managers.

The lion’s share of labor relations studies have focusedon wages and benefits (see, for example, Johansson andCoggins 2002; Kaufman 2002; Renaud 1998) or othereconomic effects (Vedder and Gallaway 2002; Reynolds1983). A handful of authors have examined therelationship between unionization and productivity,using a variety of measures such as the output of specificgroups (Babcock and Engberg 1997) or quality of service(Brock 1998). We take a different approach, focusinginstead on a set of what have been termed “intermediate”outcomes not programmatic results, but results that

pertain to workforce character and capacity and that aretherefore important to managers (Campbell 1977; Cum-mings 1977; Donahue, Jacobson, Robbins, Rubin andSelden 2004). This choice is based on growing evidencethat improved human resources management systemscan have significant consequences for managementcapacity in the public sector (Donahue, Selden andIngraham 2000; Ingraham, Selden and Jacobson 2001;Ingraham, Joyce and Donahue 2003; Selden andJacobson 2007). Following this literature, we believe thatlabor relations influences the character and success ofpolicy through its effects on the capability of theworkforce.

For our analysis, we assess four dependent variablesthat capture satisfaction, stability, and quality of theworkforce. Scholars have found that employees that aremore satisfied with their employment are likely to be


Table 1. Variables.

n Min Max Mean SD

Intermediate outcomestenure average number of years of service 50 4.50 15.00 10.97 1.97turnover Percent of total employees that left the workforce voluntarily in 1999 50 1.56 19.64 8.09 3.52quality Reported quality of hires in 1999 50 4.00 10.00 7.78 1.12fired Percent of total probationary employees fired during probation 38 0.00 25.80 5.33 5.45

Labor relationsplancov Number of different topics covered by workforce plan 50 0.00 19.00 11.38 6.07laborcenWhether the locus of authority for labor issues is the central HR staff 50 0.00 1.00 0.46 0.50involve Whether labor unions are involved in developing the workforce plan 50 0.00 1.00 0.14 0.351survcov Number of kinds of topics covered by employee surveys 50 0.00 10.00 3.00 3.89workcov The percent of workers covered by labor contracts 45 0.00 95.00 46.29 38.87agree The number of separate labor agreements 40 0.00 75.00 13.00 17.01

Human resources managementrecruit Number of different types of recruiting techniques used 50 7.00 26.00 17.10 5.03trainneed Whether training needs assessments are conducted 50 0.00 1.00 0.88 0.33traincen Number of kinds of training provided centrally 50 2.00 28.00 21.06 5.27payinnov Number of kinds of pay innovations in use 50 1.00 8.00 4.34 1.70classtitl Number of classification titles 50 380 8500 1738 1309trainage Number of kinds of training provided by agencies 50 4.00 29.00 19.62 7.75skilbase Whether skill-based pay is in use 49 0.00 1.00 0.22 0.42

External environmentunempl 1999 unemployment rate 50 2.50 6.60 4.11 1.01pereduc Percent of state population that has completed a bachelor°Øs degree 50 14.80 33.20 23.78 4.28

better, more productive workers (Rainey 2003).Kellough and Nigro (2002) link employee satisfactionwith public personnel systems to trust in management.

Likewise, stability, including absenteeism and turnoverrates, is a common workforce indicator (Freeman andIchniowski 1988; Brock and Lipsky 2003; Wagar 1997;Babcock and Engberg 1997; Dastmalchian et al. 1991).Low voluntary turnover is seen as an indicator ofsuccessful human resource management (Tsui andGomez-Mejia 1988). Employee turnover is costly toorganizations, where it can cost up to 150% of a person’sannual salary to replace them if they leave.2 Given this,turnover is a significant issue for organizations, especiallyas competition for a shrinking supply of qualified laborbecomes more pressing. Involuntary turnover resultsfrom action by the organization to separate from poorlyperforming employees or employees with conductissues. Voluntary turnover, on the other hand, typicallyinvolves employees that the organization wants to retain,and whose withdrawal reduces the skill-base of theworkforce.

To assess the combined effects of labor relations andHRM policies on important intermediate outcomes, theGPP provides both direct and approximate measures ofsatisfaction, stability, and quality. First, the average tenureof state employees (tenure) is used as an approximatemeasure of satisfaction3. Mean length of tenure in thestates is 11 years, ranging from less than eight years inthree states to 13 or more years in six states. Voluntaryturnover, which refers to employees that left the workforceof their own accord, is used as a measure of stability(Freeman and Ichniowski 1988; Wagar 1997; Babcockand Engberg 1997; Wagar 1997; Dastmalchian et al.1991; Huselid 1995). The percent of employees who leftthe workforce voluntarily (turnover), excluding thosewho retired, is used for this analysis. The mean percentof employees leaving voluntarily in 1999 was 8.09.Voluntary turnover ranged from less than four percent infour states to more than 15 percent in three states.

The GPP’s survey asked human resources directorsto assess subjectively the quality of the employees theyhired in 1999 on a scale of one to ten, where ten is highestquality, and we include this assessment (quality). Themean quality of hires was 7.78, with the lowest reportedquality ranking being four, and with ten statesdesignating their new hires as a 10 in terms of quality(See Table 1). Thirty states reported the quality of newhires at eight or above. Finally, states reported thepercent of employees fired during the probationary

period (fired), an indicator of the ability and willingnessof governments to dismiss poor performers before theybecome “permanent” members of the workforce. Themean percent of employees fired was 5.33. Percent ofprobationary fires ranged from less than one percent infour states to 10 percent or more in five states.

Labor Relations. We operationalize measures ofdensity, scope of bargaining, centralization, collaboration,and context. Density is measured as the number of laboragreements (agree)4 and the extent of coverage of laborcontracts (workcov), consistent with previous research(Bennett and Masters 2003; Hirsch, MacPherson andVroman 2001; Pantuosco, Parker and Stone 2001;Turner 1994; Ashley and Jones 1996; Koeller 1996;Fosu 1993; Hirsch and Macpherson 1993; Wagar 1997;Lipset and Katchanovski 2002; Troy 2001). An averageof 13 labor agreements exist in each state, with ten statesreporting no labor agreements and four states reportingmore than 30 agreements. Additionally, an average of45% of state employees are covered by labor agreements,with 10 states reporting no employees covered by laboragreements, and five states reporting that more than 90%of employees are covered by labor agreements.

To measure centralization, the GPP asked states toindicate the locus of authority within the stategovernment for various HR functions and practices,which is in line with previous authors who also measurecentralization as the locus of decision-making authority(see, for example, Fiorito, Jarley and Delaney 1995;Jarley, Fiorito and Delaney 2000; Warner 1975; andFiorito et al. 1997). One of these questions asked was ifthe authority for labor relations in the state is housed in acentralized office, such as an office of labor relations.The presence of a professionalized office of laborrelations or an equivalent (laborcen) is a dummyvariable. Twenty-eight states reported having somethinglike an office of labor relations.

The GPP lacked usable data on scope of bargainingand traditional measures of collaboration. However, thedata do present useful proxy measures, which areemployed to minimize omitted variable bias. Thenumber of topics covered in workforce planning efforts(plancov) is used as a proxy for scope of bargaining.Twenty states cover 15 or more of the potentialworkforce planning topics, while 10 states cover five orfewer topics, with an average of 11 topics. To assessefforts to collaborate, we use an additional proxy, whichconsiders whether labor is involved in the workforceplanning process (involve) to indicate a propensity


toward partnering. Seven states reported involvingunions in the development of workforce plans. We alsoinclude the breadth of employee surveys (survcov), as anindicator of efforts to garner inputs into decision-making.States were asked to indicate if employee surveysaddressed any of ten different topics; on average statesincluded three of these topics.

Human Resources Management. In addition to thelabor relations variables, we operationalize measures ofefforts to obtain, maintain, and motivate employees, inaddition to measures of civil service structure. Obtainingis measured according to the number of different types ofrecruiting techniques used (recruit). States varied in thenumber of recruitment techniques employed, with aminimum of seven and a high of 26, and an average of17. We measure maintaining in terms of training, followingJacobson, Selden and Rubin (2002), and capture thevariety of training provided at various organizationallevels. The number of kinds of training provided by thecentral Human Resources office (traincen) varied acrossstates from two to 28 with an average of 21; while thetypes of training offered by agencies (trainage) variedfrom four to 29 with an average of 20. We also measurewhether training needs assessments are conducted(trainneed), with 88 percent of states reporting that theyare.

Efforts to motive employees are measured accordingto the number of different kinds of pay innovations thestates use (payinnov), such as performance bonuses(Eaton 1994; Kim and Voos 1997), whether skill-basedpay in particular is available (skilbase). States weresurveyed about eight types of possible compensationtechniques; on average four techniques are used in eachstate. Fifty-four percent of states reported using skillbased pay. Structure is measured as the number of classi-fication titles (classtitl). The number of classificationtitles within the states ranged from 380 to 8,500 with anaverage of 1,738.

External Environment. Finally, it is important toaccount for characteristics of the government’s externalenvironment that may affect intermediate outcomes. Weinclude an economic measure, the unemployment rate inthe jurisdiction (unempl), and a demographic measure,the education level in the jurisdiction (pereduc), both ofwhich we expect could bear on the availability andquality of the labor force. These measures are consistentwith other studies that consider stability and mobility inthe labor market (for example, Andrews and Naylor1994; Ashley and Jones 1996; Christofides and Stengos

2003; Pantuosco, Parker and Stone 2001).Methods. For this analysis, our conceptualization is

represented by the following function

Oi = 0 + 1D1 + 2D2 + 3E + i [1]

where O i is one of the intermediate managementoutcome variables specified above (tenure, turnover,quality, or fired), 0 is a constant, D1 is a vector ofmeasures of the labor relations component, D2 is a vectorof measures of the human resources managementcomponent, E is a vector of environmental factors, andE is an error term.

To assess the effects of labor relations and HRMpolicies on satisfaction, stability, and quality of the work-force, we use Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regressionas a tool for exploratory, descriptive multivariate analysis.OLS is appropriate when sample size is sufficiently large(at least 30 observations) and dependent variables arecontinuous in nature. The population of states meets theformer criterion, but we recognize that this is nonethelessa small number of observations. While OLS does providethe most robust estimators, our standard errors are likelyto be too large and multi-collinearity could be a concern.Diagnostics suggest that the variables we include are notcollinear.5

The dependent variables of tenure, turnover, andfired are continuous. The dependent variable quality isordinal. For large-n samples, an ordinal dependentvariable would normally call for the use of maximumlikelihood models, such as an ordered logit or orderedprobit. Maximum likelihood models require largersample sizes or populations than OLS to achievenormality, consistency, and efficiency. Long (1997)suggests that a minimum sample of 100 observations isneeded for maximum likelihood to produce efficientestimators, a size which he suggests should increasedepending on the number of parameters. Because ourdata come from the population of the 50 states, it is notpossible to expand the sample to meet the requirementsneeded for maximum likelihood to produce unbiasedestimators.6

FINDINGS

The four models illustrate moderate support for theclaim that labor relations and HRM policies togetheraffect intermediate outcomes such as satisfaction,



Table 2. Explaining state human resources outcomes.

tenure turnover quality fired

constant 12.453 ** 18.203 ** 10.216 *** 40.624 ***(4.594) (7.479) (2.273) (11.487)

Labor relationsplancov .035 .091 .077 * -.424 **

(.087) (.142) (.043) (.198)laborcen -1.107 .582 -1.031 * -4.120

(1.087) (1.770) (.538) (2.670)involve -2.102 * -.459 .135 6.457*

(1.191) (1.939) (.590) (3.175)survcov -.247 * -.032 -.098 .087

(.126) (.205) (.062) (.314)workcov .032 * -.026 .021 ** -.017

(.016) (.027) (.008) (.041)agree .006 -.025 -.007 .021

(.025) (.040) (.012) (.051)

Human resources managementrecruit .062 -.160 -.085 * -.428 *

(.094) (.153) (.047) (0.114)trainneed -.573 3.066 1.617 ** -3.675

(1.192) (1.940) (.590) (4.234)traincen -.017 -.152 -.051 -.590 **

(.080) (.130) (.039) (.237)payinnov .371 -1.529 *** -.030 -.493

(.268) (.436) (.132) (.616)classtitl -.00001 .000 .000 .000

(.000) (.000) (.000) (.001)trainage .012 .130 .040 .304 *

(.068) (.111) (.034) (.148)skilbase .486 6.683 *** .680 4.143

(1.136) (2.143) (.651) (3.212)

External environmentunempl -1.017 ** .527 -.481 * -2.489 **

(.474) (.771) (.234) (1.240)Pereduc .002 -.238 -.043 .058

(.112) (.183) (.056) (.276)

R2 0.672 0.551 0.553 0.764R2 (adj.) 0.093 0.259 0.261 0.527

F 1.260 1.884 * 1.896 * 3.229 **n 39 39 39 31

* p < .10 ** p< .05 ***p < .01Standard errors are in parentheses

stability, and quality of the workforce. Each of themodels will be discussed briefly in turn. Overall, theresults highlight both relationships that are consistentwith previous research as well as others that offer newinsights. The results of the analysis are presented inTable 2.

Tenure. Average tenure with the state government isused as a proxy for satisfaction. Individuals that are moresatisfied are more likely to stay with an organization(Tett and Meyer 1993; Hellman 1997; and Hom,Caranikas-Walker, Prussia and Griffeth 1992). Of theunion variables in the tenure model, both the percentageof the workforce covered by union agreements andwhether labor unions are involved in developing theworkforce plan are significant. As the percentage of theworkforce covered by union agreements increases,average tenure increases. This oft-used measure ofdensity is positively related to length of service. Previousresearch that suggests that unions have a moderatelypositive impact on wages and benefits, and favorseniority-based systems, is consistent with this finding.

The negative sign on the coefficients for collaboration(involve and survcov) indicate that average tenure, orsatisfaction, is lower in states that seek feedback fromemployees and involve their unions in workforceplanning activities. Collaboration and inclusive decision-making are typically seen as having a positive impact inorganizations (Rainey 2003). A possible explanation forour findings may be that collaboration is not easy. Itincreases opportunities for conflict, which may create adisincentive to extending one’s tenure with the employer.Workforce planning often involves strategies andpractices (such as high performing pools and acceleratedadvancement), some of which are not consistent withtraditional union interests, such as seniority. Further,planning may entail strategies like early retirement,which would reduce average tenure. With respect to thesurvey variable, this result may indicate that employeesdon’t find organizations responsive to the feedback theyprovide, which frustrates them and drives them to leave.

Turnover. None of the union measures demonstrateda statistically significant effect on voluntary turnover,consistent with the findings of Hammer and Avgar(2005). This is reasonable considering the long history ofturnover literature which indicates that actual separationfrom an organization is the culmination of multipleindividual decisions and assessments based on both theinternal work environment and the external labor market.For example, intent to turnover is a consistently used

antecedent in turnover studies, as are job satisfaction andthe availability of alternatives (Tett and Meyer 1993;Hellman 1997; and Hom, Caranikas-Walker, Prussia andGriffeth 1992). While we include a control for the un-employment rate, we do not have data on intent to quit.A select number of human resources managementmeasures did offer some insight into the relationshipwith turnover levels. For example, as the number of payinnovations used increases, voluntary turnover decreases.This is consistent with claims that pay innovation assistsin retention. However, when considering skill-based payspecifically, its relationship with turnover is negative.States offering skill-based pay may have implementedthis innovation recently, meaning that the policy has notyet had an effect on stemming turnover rates, or thedirection of this relationship could be due to factors weare not controlling for in the models.

Quality. The union variables in this model had mixedresults on the quality of hires. The percent of employeescovered by labor contracts is associated with greaterquality of hires. This may indicate that hiring officialsare more careful in their initial selection of applicants soas to avoid the grievance and appeal procedures, used inthe process of removing employees or revisingperformance appraisals that are typically more detailedand formalized in unionized environments. We also findthat when authority for labor relations is held by thecentral Human Resources Office, the quality of hiresdecreases. This finding may be related to arguments againstbureaucratic procedure (“red-tape”) in government.Formalization in personnel management is consistentlyfound to be a greater burden in the public sector than inthe private sector (Rainey and Bozeman 2000). Scope ofbargaining, as measured by the proxy of the breadth ofworkforce planning efforts, had a positive effect onquality of new hires. A broader and more sophisticatedworkforce planning effort would likely be associated withgreater clarity of hiring needs, enabling governments tohire employees with the competencies and skillsidentified through workforce planning efforts. Therelationship between the variety of recruiting strategiesused and quality of hires is negative, implying thatgovernments are not targeting appropriately qualifiedcandidates and should reassess the return-on-investmentof their recruiting dollars, or the direction of thisrelationship could be due to factors we are notcontrolling for in the models.

Fired. Firing employees during the probationaryperiod is one indicator of the governments’ flexibility


and willingness to remove problem employees beforethey become permanent and covered by civil serviceprotections. Alternatively, firing employees during theprobationary period may be considered an indication thata government has not done an adequate job of screeningapplicants or determining its needs prior to hiring.

Labor relations appears related to probationary firing.As unions are more involved in workforce planning,firing increases. If the union is involved in the planningprocess it is likely an indicator of its strength within theorganization, and as such its protection of employeesonce they are permanent may be perceived by managersto be stronger. As a result, managers are more proactivein using the probationary firing in order to ensure thatthey remove problem employees while they retaingreater termination flexibility and control. An increase inthe scope of bargaining, measured using a proxy oftopics covered in workforce planning, however, resultsin a decrease in those fired during the probationaryperiod. This is consistent with the quality model whichindicated that an expansion in the scope of bargainingresults in increased quality of new hires.

In most cases, the HRM factors generally act todecrease the percentage of probationary fires. Thismakes sense when we think about the fact that humanresources management systems are designed, in part, toimprove the hiring process. Effective hiring proceduresminimize the need to remove individuals during theprobationary period. Even so, it is important that humanresources management systems allow for separationwhen a candidate is not the ideal fit. As more training isoffered centrally, the amount of probationary firesdecreases, likely because managers see a means toimprove performance through training rather than simplyresorting to separation. Interestingly, as training offeredat the agency level increases, the number of probationaryfires also increases. This may seem inconsistent with thefinding on centralized training, but it could be that theagency does not want to incur the cost of an employeethat would need agency-based training. Agency trainingbudgets are often lean and the need to provide thattraining for a nonperforming employee can be asignificant expense.

CONCLUSION

Across the models, there is preliminary empiricalsupport that labor relations and HRM policies together

affect the intermediate outcomes examined, though thefactors that are relevant to each outcome vary noticeably.This is important for a number of reasons. First, laborresearch does not typically assess the relationshipbetween union measures and these kinds of outcomes,yet these results are of particular interest to managers andto scholars because they are assumed to be correlatedwith programmatic performance and policy outcomes.Second, it provides initial support that our exploration ofthe relationship between labor relations, HRM policies,and these outcomes is heading in the right direction andencourages researchers to examine this more systemati-cally.

Our initial findings suggest numerous opportunitiesfor future work in three broad areas. First, there areelements of labor relations that have not received closeempirical scrutiny, or that lack satisfactory measures.Issues such as trust, dispute resolution mechanisms,stability, professionalization, and the role of oversightboards such as the National Labor Relations Board or itsrelevant equivalent, may further influence the effects oflabor relations and HRM policies on important outcomes.Research would further benefit from better measures ofthe scope of bargaining and collaborative efforts thanwere available for this analysis. It would be a benefit toscholars to operationalize empirical measures for boththe scope of bargaining and collaborative efforts becausemuch scholarship typically focuses on legal history andcase studies.

Second, we have asserted that the components oflabor relations we identify are likely to interact incomplex ways. This follows from research cited abovethat uses many of the independent variables in this studyas dependent variables. To recognize this complexityadequately, larger data sets are needed that contain morerobust measures, which can allow for more sophisticatedempirical models and a more thorough examination ofthe relationships. Finally, performance is a cumulativeresult, suggesting that analyses should be longitudinal, toaccount for the coincident affects of labor relations andHRM policies over time. Furthermore, new policies taketime to implement, especially in large organizations, andthe impact of those policies may not be realized foryears, depending on the breadth of the changes.

The identification of common elements in the laborrelations and HRM literatures also suggests that it maybe possible to develop a theoretical model of the rel-ationship between these variables and measures ofperformance that are important to managers. As


researchers, we should ask ourselves if density, scope ofbargaining, centralization, collaboration, and measures ofcontext adequately describe labor relations in anorganization, and if measures of how organizationsobtain, maintain, motivate, and structure HRMadequately describe the personnel system. Additionally,are the definitions presented here and theiroperationalization something that we can agree on or arethere better alternatives? Scholars can further identifywhat else should be included and identify a consistentmeasure of those concepts. Beyond this, it will berevealing to test these key relationships in other contexts.Some of the following seem most interesting: differentsizes of private sector organizations, federal agencies,municipal governments, and particular professionswhere union power is seen as substantial, such as publicsafety, education, and the airline industry. Recent debatesat the federal level regarding the appropriateness ofunions in defense and homeland security lend urgency tothis agenda. A systematic examination of the relationshipbetween unions and programmatic outcomes mayindicate a positive or negative interaction that anecdotalevidence and case studies cannot fully explore. Theassociations found in this preliminary assessmentindicate that the relationship is likely complex positivein some instances and negative in others challengingthe efficacy of sweeping generalizations.

Although the empirical analysis used in this researchemployed data from American states, the measures canbe used in non-U.S. contexts. For example, laws indifferent countries will influence the percent of theworkforce allowed to unionize, the topics that can bebargained upon with management, and the number ofseparate labor agreements in place. The measures usedhere are generic, such that the context of each countrycan be respected. Specifically, the measure of the scopeof bargaining can account for a more limited list ofnegotiable issues, the measure of density can accommo-date smaller spans of eligibility. Broad measures such asthese may be useful as countries new to managing publicsector labor relations, like Korea, grapple with thechallenge of how to measure success and how to developconstructive relationships. Likewise, the field of laborrelations would benefit from testing the impact ofunionization on the performance of other managementsystems, such as financial management and informationmanagement. If such a relationship exists, it would helpmanagers better understand the nature and significanceof labor relations. Additionally, the field would benefit

from further qualitative research examining thesedimensions, to add to the understanding of the nuancesof these concepts and inform future large scale surveyresearch. Ultimately, a full analysis would consider thedependent variables of greatest concern: the outcomes ofpolicies and programs.

NOTES

1. The Government Performance Project, conducted at theMaxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs atSyracuse University, was a criteria-based assessment ofmanagement systems in federal agencies and state andlocal governments. The project’s website presents detailsof the GPP, its data collection, analytic methods, results:www.maxwell.syr.edu/gpp.

2. As estimated by the Saratoga Institute, and independentlyby Hewitt Associates. See Lermusiaux, Yves, “Calculatingthe High Cost of Employee Turnover.” On the Web athttp://www.ilogos.com/en/expertviews/articles/strategic/20031007_YL.html.

3. Due to the limitation of data available through the GPPsurvey, tenure is the closest approximation to a measureof satisfaction available. Tenure and turnover are complexphenomena, but meta-analyses find that satisfaction is akey determinant of turnover (Tett and Meyer 1993;Hellman 1997; and Hom, Caranikas-Walker, Prussia andGriffeth 1992). To control for the possibility that oppor-tunities in the labor market play a role in tenuredecisions, the model controls for the unemployment ratein states at the time of the survey. Future studies on therelationship between labor relations, satisfaction, andturnover should include better, more commonly usedmeasures of these variables.

4. We also examined the number of bargaining units, whichis distinct from, but highly correlated with, the number oflabor agreements.

5. We examined the variance inflation factors (VIF) for thevariables in our models. While there is no formal criterionfor determining how large a VIF indicates that theindependent variables are so highly correlated that theircorresponding significance tests cannot be trusted, acommon rule of thumb is VIF greater than four. The VIFsfor the variables in our models are below this threshold,generally in the range 1.5-2.5.

6. Since one of our outcomes measures, quality, is con-strained to a scale of 1-10, we also estimated thesemodels using double-censored Tobit. The coefficients arenot identical to the OLS coefficients, but the signs andmagnitudes are the same, and the values are very similar.


The significance improves. The results reported are OLSresults.

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Willow S. Jacobson is an Assistant Professor of PublicAdministration and Government at the School ofGovernment at the University of North Carolina atChapel Hill. Her teaching, research, and service activitiesfocus on human resource management, organizationaltheory, and public management questions. Her currentwork focuses on local government workforce planningefforts.

Ellen V. Rubin is an Assistant Professor at the Depart-ment of Public Administration and Policy at SUNYAlbany. Her research interests include proceduraljustice, public sector labor relations, and civil servicereform.

Amy K. Donahue is Head of the Department of PublicPolicy at the University of Connecticut. Her researchfocuses on the management of public organizations andon the nature of citizen demand for public services. Sheis especially concerned with emergency services anddisaster policy, and she serves as a technical advisor tothe U. S. Department of Homeland Security’s Scienceand Technology Directorate, helping to develop researchand development programs to meet the technologicalneeds of emergency responders.

Received: May 17, 2008 Accepted with one revision: September 12, 2008


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