01.17.2013 - Garance Genicot

Suicide and Property Rights in India

Garance Genicot & Siwan Anderson

January 17,20132

Garance Genicot & Siwan Anderson (GU) Suicide and Property Rights January 17,20132 1 / 49

Motivation

Women’s ability to inherit property is restricted in many societies.

Evidence that improving women’s asset ownership improves theirbargaining power, female education & expenditures for children.

→ frequent justification for policies targeting women.

In most econ models, ownership of assets matters via outside options→ affects intra-household bargaining.

When wives contribute a greater share of the family wealth they expect,and are more likely to get, a more equitable sharing of decision power.

Motivation

However, female empowerment can increase intra-household conflict

by challenging traditional roles & more need for negotiation.

Large sociological literature on female empowerment and suicides:

Durkheim (1897)

Stack (1986) - US labor participation

Pampel (1998) - cross country

Das Gupta et al (2000) - China marriage law (1950)

Durkheim (1897)

Conflicting information on domestic violence and women’sempowerment

Panda and Agarwal (2005) - India: lower violence for women withgreater economic resources, such as land or employment.

Eswaran and Malhorta (2010) - India: employed women report violencemore frequently.

Bobonis et al. (2006)- Progresa: less physical but more emotionalabuse for recipient households, and more likely to separate.

Luke and Munshi (2011) - Indian tea plantation: violence increaseswith female income.

Hjort and Villanger (2012) – Ethiopia, randomized job offers, 13 % (34%) increase in physical ( emotional ) violence when women get job.

This paper studies the impact of female property rights on male andfemale suicide rates in India.

State level variation in women’s property right generated by

state Amendments to the Hindu Succession Act &

state reforms to agricultural land rights.

Better property rights for women are associated with a decrease in thedifference between female and male suicide rates,

but an increase in both male and female suicides.

state Amendments to the Hindu Succession Act

These changes have been shown to matter:

Deiniger, Gopal and Nagarajan (2010): amendment increased women’slikelihood to inherit land, their age at marriage & daughter’s education.

Roy, Sanchari (2010): amendments increase human capital investmentof women in NFHS data.

Besley and Burgess (2002): land reforms decrease poverty.

Stylized facts on suicide points to marital discord as a major cause ofsuicides for both gender.

→ Suggests intra-household conflict as an explanation.

We build a model of intra-household bargaining in which conflict is anintrinsic part of bargaining

Basic framework:

spouses bargain over the allocation of consumptions under the threat ofseparation/’separate spheres’.

add 2 crucial elements:

asymmetry of information (Bloch & Rao 2003)

rejecting offer initiates conflict.

At any point, individuals may choose the ultimate exit: suicide

Separations and suicides are predicted by the model

(see also Ligon, Hoddinott and Adam (2003))

Basic framework:

(see also Ligon, Hoddinott and Adam (2003))Garance Genicot & Siwan Anderson (GU) Suicide and Property Rights January 17,20132 7 / 49

Not to say that promoting women’s rights is bad:

Deiniger et al (2010), Roy (2010), Rosenblum (2010).

Outline of the Talk.

Inheritance Law

Suicides

Estimation

Results

Other possible explanations

Conclusion

India Inheritance Law

Hindu Succession Act 1956 governs Hindus property rights

applies to Hindus, Sikhs, Buddhists & Jains.

applies to all states but J&K

In the absence of will, ’separate’ property is divided equally between sonsand daughters.

But it does NOT apply to:

property stemming from tenancy right

joint property:

sons are automatic coparceners in joint family propertydaughter have rights only to father’s separate property

joint property:

An Example

Father 1/3

Daughter Son 1 1/3

Son 2 1/3

Father deceased

Daughter 1/3 * 1/3 = 1/9

Son 1 1/3 + 1/3 * 1/3 = 4/9

Son 2 1/3 + 1/3 * 1/3 = 4/9

An Example

Father 1/3

Daughter Son 1 1/3

Son 2 1/3

Father deceased

Daughter 1/3 * 1/3 = 1/9

Son 1 1/3 + 1/3 * 1/3 = 4/9

Son 2 1/3 + 1/3 * 1/3 = 4/9

Amendments

Some state amendments for equal inheritance of joint property.

Kerela in 1975;

Andhra Pradesh in 1986;

Tamil Nadu in 1989;

Maharashtra and Karnataka in 1994

The Hindu Succession (Amendment) Act, 2005:

brings all agricultural land on par with other property;

includes all daughters, especially married daughters, as coparceners injoint family property.

Amendments

Kerela in 1975;

Tamil Nadu in 1989;

Amendments

Kerela in 1975;

Tamil Nadu in 1989;

Amendments

Kerela in 1975;

Tamil Nadu in 1989;

Amendments

Kerela in 1975;

Tamil Nadu in 1989;

Suicides in IndiaOfficial data from the National Crime Records Bureau

Average suicide rates 1967-2004: 10 for men & 7 for women(per 100,000)

70 % of suicides victims are married

main reported cause: ’family problems’ for men & women 15-44

(28%) female 15-29; (33%) female 30-44; (26%) male 15-29 & (30%)male 0-44

Main means: poison (34.8%) & hanging (23.4%).

Under-reporting but similar pattern in detailed micro-level analysis:

same female:male ratio, most married, rural background, lowersocio-economic classes & marital disharmony is a main cause (35%)

Annual Suicide Rates by State.0

1970 1980 1990 2000 2010year

2.14.1

1970 1980 1990 2000 2010year

Suicides Rates

female male

Variable Mean Std devFemale Suicide Rate 0.07 0.048Male Suicide Rates 0.104 0.085Amendment 0.163 0.369Legal Hindus, pop share 0.827 0.154Muslims, pop share 0.152 0.173Schedule Tribes, pop share 0.074 0.074Schedule Castes, pop share 0.151 0.058Real State Domestic Product pc (log) 7.144 0.456Rural food product p.c. 0.307 0.273Yield 30.283 17.982Food Shock 0.261 0.439Flood 0.118 0.323Drought 0.113 0.317Rainfall 335.826 256.696Health Expenditure, rel to State income 0.012 0.005Development Expenditure, rel to State income 0.109 0.041Education Expenditure, rel to State income 0.035 0.012Bank per capita 0.057 0.027Urban Population Share 0.234 0.083Seats won by State Parties 0.114 0.232Seats won by Congress 0.418 0.259Seats won by Hard Left 0.085 0.15Seats won by Soft Left 0.02 0.049

Estimation

S ist = β0 + β1Xst + β2Ast + λs + γt + εst (1)

S ist is the suicide rate of females (i = F ) or males (i = M)

Ast = 1 if state s, in year t, has already passed an Amendment Act.

λs and γt are state and year fixed effects.

Xst are cultural and economic controls.

Table 1 - Suicides and Female Inheritance - OLS

Variable Female Female FemaleAmendment 0.03 (0.003)*** 0.02 (0.003)*** 0.003 (0.003)

Cultur Ctrls NO YES YESEcon Ctrls NO NO YES

Observations 603 569 489

0.91 0.92 0.94

Variable Male Male MaleAmendment 0.06 (0.007)*** 0.05 (0.007)*** 0.03 (0.007)***

Cultur Ctrls NO YES YESEcon Ctrls NO NO YES

0.89 0.89 0.92

Table 2 - Relative Suicide Rate and Female Inheritance - OLSVariable Female-Male Female-Male Female-Male

Amendment -0.03 (0.004)*** -0.03 (0.005)*** -0.02 (0.005)***

Cultural Controls NO YES YESEconomic Controls NO NO YES

0.85 0.85 0.88

Variable Female/Male Female/Male Female/MaleAmendment -0.09 (0.02)*** -0.08 (0.02)*** -0.05 (0.02)***

0.54 0.56 0.64

Suicide Rates with Years of Amendment- OLS Estimations

Variable Female Male Female-Male Female/Male

Years of Amend. 0.002 (0.0002)*** 0.006 (0.0005)*** -0.005 (0.0003)*** -0.006 (0.002)***

Cultural Controls YES YES YES YES

Economic Controls YES YES YES YES

Observations 531 531 531 531

0.94 0.93 0.91 0.62

Robustness Check

Exclude Kerala.

Exclude Bihar, Punjab and Uttar Pradesh.

Add state specific time trends.

Placebo test: add dummy Ast−10 which equals to 1 for all years greateror equal to t − 10, if state s passed the Amendment Act in year t.

Cluster standard errors by state.

Robustness Check

Exclude Kerala.

Robustness Check

Exclude Kerala.

Robustness Check

Exclude Kerala.

Robustness Check

Exclude Kerala.

Table 3 - Suicides and Female Inheritance - Placebo

Variable Female Suicide Male Suicide Ratio

Amendment 0.01 (0.003)** 0.03 (0.008)*** -0.07 (0.02)***

Amendment -10 years 0.004 (0.003) -0.006 (0.006) -0.02 (0.03)

Cultural Controls YES YES YESEconomic Controls YES YES YES

0.94 0.92 0.64

Estimation

S ist = α0+α1Xst+α1Lst+α1FLs∗Lst+α1Tst+α1FTs∗Tst+δs+θt+εst (2)

Lst - cumulative state-level landholding reforms, Besley & Burgess 00

FLs - degree to which landholding reforms favored women, Agarwal 95.

FLs = 0 no daughter recognized; FLs = 1 only married daughtersrecognized; FLs = 2 all daughters recognized.

Tst - cumulative state-level tenancy reforms, BB 00,

FTs - degree to which tenancy reforms favored women, Agarwal 95.

FTs = 0 only male heirs; FTs = 1 daughters and sisters are recognized butvery low; FTs = 2 personal law applies.

δs & θt are state and year fixed effects.

Estimation

S ist = α0+α1Xst+α1Lst+α1FLs∗Lst+α1Tst+α1FTs∗Tst+δs+θt+εst (2)

Lst - cumulative state-level landholding reforms, Besley & Burgess 00

FLs - degree to which landholding reforms favored women, Agarwal 95.

FLs = 0 no daughter recognized; FLs = 1 only married daughtersrecognized; FLs = 2 all daughters recognized.

Tst - cumulative state-level tenancy reforms, BB 00,

FTs - degree to which tenancy reforms favored women, Agarwal 95.

FTs = 0 only male heirs; FTs = 1 daughters and sisters are recognized butvery low; FTs = 2 personal law applies.

δs & θt are state and year fixed effects.Garance Genicot & Siwan Anderson (GU) Suicide and Property Rights January 17,20132 22 / 49

Table 4 - Suicides and Land Reforms - OLSVariable Female Female Female

Landholding Acts -0.07 (0.008)*** -0.07 (0.01)*** -0.07 (0.01)***Tenancy Acts -0.01 (0.005)*** -0.009 (0.005)** -0.01 (0.004)***Female*Landhld Acts 0.03 (0.004)*** 0.03 (0.005)*** 0.03 (0.005)***Female*Tenancy Acts 0.007 (0.003)*** 0.005 (0.003)** 0.006 (0.002)***

Cultural Controls NO YES NOEconomic Controls NO NO YES

0.90 0.90 0.93

Variable Male Male MaleLandholding Acts -0.15 (0.02)*** -0.15 (0.02)*** -0.11 (0.02)***Tenancy Acts -0.03 (0.007)*** -0.03 (0.009)*** -0.02 (0.008)***Female*Landhld Acts 0.07 (0.01)*** 0.07 (0.01)*** 0.05 (0.01)***Female*Tenancy Acts 0.02 (0.004)*** 0.02 (0.005)*** 0.01 (0.005)***

Cultural Controls NO YES YESEconomic Controls NO NO YESObservations 360 354 306

0.91 0.92 0.94Garance Genicot & Siwan Anderson (GU) Suicide and Property Rights January 17,20132 23 / 49

Table 5 - Relative Suicide Rate and Female Reforms - OLS

Variable Female-Male Female-Male Female-Male

Landholding Acts 0.07 (0.02)*** 0.08 (0.02)*** 0.04 (0.02)***Tenancy Acts 0.01 (0.005)*** 0.02 (0.006)*** 0.01 (0.006)**Female*Land Acts -0.03 (0.008)*** -0.04 (0.008)*** -0.02 (0.008)***Female*Ten Acts -0.009 (0.003)*** -0.01 (0.003)*** -0.008 (0.003)***

Variable Female/Male Female/Male Female/MaleLandholding Acts 0.19 (0.05)*** 0.36 (0.08)*** 0.14 (0.09)Tenancy Acts 0.20 (0.07)*** 0.22 (0.07)*** 0.13 (0.06)**Female*Landhold. Acts -0.08 (0.02)*** -0.13 (0.03)*** -0.07 (0.04)*Female*Tenancy Acts -0.09 (0.04)*** -0.09 (0.04)*** -0.06 (0.03)*

0.88 0.88 0.92

Estimation

Unobservables could determine both suicides and property legislation.

→ Follow BB (2000) & instrument for these legislations using lagged seatshares

Ast = γ0 + γ1Xst + γ2Zst−1 + ϕs + ψt + ηst

Estimation

Table 6 - Suicides and Female Inheritance - IV-2SLS

VarsFirst-Stage

AmendmentFemaleSuicides

MaleSuicides

Female/MaleSuicides

Amend. 0.04 (0.01)*** 0.10 (0.03)*** -0.45 (0.13)***

Hard Left -0.12 (0.17)Soft Left -0.67 (0.16)***State Part 0.33 (0.12)***Congress 0.13 (0.07)**

Cult Ctls YES YES YES YESEcon Ctls YES YES YES YES

F-stat 9.76

Obs. 486 485 485 485

0.68 0.91 0.89 0.62

Estimation

For land and tenancy reforms, need to instrument both cumulativeindexes of reforms: Lst , and Tst and interaction with female orientedpolicy indices, FLs ∗ Lst and FTs ∗ Tst .

→ following Angrist and Pischke (2009), first estimate :

Lst = δ0 + δ1Xst + δ2Zst−1 + πs + σt + µst

then use predicted values, Lst & interaction with female policy index,FLs ∗ Lst as instruments in 2 first-stage estimations of Lst & FLs ∗ Lst in2SLS procedure:

Lst = λ0 + λ1Xst + λ2Lst + λ3FLs ∗ Lst + τs + χt + ιst

FLs ∗ Lst = ρ0 + ρ1Xst + ρ2Lst + ρ3FLs ∗ Lst + ωs + δt + ζst

Estimation

For land and tenancy reforms, need to instrument both cumulativeindexes of reforms: Lst , and Tst and interaction with female orientedpolicy indices, FLs ∗ Lst and FTs ∗ Tst .

→ following Angrist and Pischke (2009), first estimate :

Lst = δ0 + δ1Xst + δ2Zst−1 + πs + σt + µst

then use predicted values, Lst & interaction with female policy index,FLs ∗ Lst as instruments in 2 first-stage estimations of Lst & FLs ∗ Lst in2SLS procedure:

Lst = λ0 + λ1Xst + λ2Lst + λ3FLs ∗ Lst + τs + χt + ιst

FLs ∗ Lst = ρ0 + ρ1Xst + ρ2Lst + ρ3FLs ∗ Lst + ωs + δt + ζst

Table 7 - Suicides and Female Landholding Acts - IV-2SLS

VariableFirst-Stage

LandholdingFirst-Stage

Female*LandholdingHard Left 3.20 (0.65)***Soft Left -3.03 (0.50)***State Parties -0.87 (0.18)**Congress -0.17 (0.11)

Landholding -0.58 (0.18)*** -0.86 (0.45)**

Female* Landholding 0.53 (0.07)*** 0.95 (0.17)***

Cult Ctls YES YES YESEcon Ctls YES YES YES

F-stat on Instr 30.25 45.7 23.4

0.92 0.94 0.92

Table 8 - Suicides and Female Landholding Acts - IV-2SLS

VariableFemaleSuicides

MaleSuicides

Female/MaleSuicides

Landholding Acts -0.07 (0.04)* -0.19 (0.07)*** 0.72 (0.45)Female*Landholding Acts 0.04 (0.01)*** 0.10 (0.03)*** -0.27 (0.18)

0.91 0.91 0.88

Table 9 - Suicides and Female Tenancy Acts- IV-2SLS Estimations

VariableFirst-Stage

TenancyFirst-Stage

Female*TenancyHard Left 5.35 (0.97)***Soft Left 1.60 (2.05)State Parties -0.21 (0.24)

Tenancy 1.82 (0.33)*** 2.76 (0.71)***

Female* Tenancy -0.45 (0.14)*** -0.43 (0.31)

Cultural Controls YES YES YESEconomic Controls YES YES YES

F-stat on Instruments 10.8 17.8 13.6

0.91 0.92 0.91

Table 10 - Suicides and Female Tenancy Acts - IV-2SLS

Variable Female Suicides Male SuicidesFemale-Male

SuicidesTenancy Acts -0.02 (0.008)*** -0.05 (0.01)*** 0.02 (0.008)***Female*Tenancy Acts 0.01 (0.005)** 0.02 (0.008)*** -0.01 (0.005)**

0.93 0.93 0.92

Due to Conflict?

We can use the suicide rate by ”cause”.

Table 11 - Suicide Rates from Family Conflict and Female Inheritance- OLSEstimations

Variable Female MaleAmendment 0.005 (0.001)*** 0.008 (0.002)***

Cultural Controls YES YESEconomic Controls YES YES

Obs. 439 439

0.86 0.85

Table 12 - Proportion of Total Suicides from Family Conflict and FemaleInheritance- OLS Estimations

VariableFemale

(All Suicides)Male

(All Suicides)Amendment 0.06 (0.01)*** 0.04 (0.01)***

Cultural Controls YES YESEconomic Controls YES YES

Observations 438 438

0.58 0.61

Domestic Violence

National Family Health Surveys of India: married women aged 15-49.

Two measures:Yis equals 1 if a given female i (residing in state s) thinks that wife

beating (by her husband) is justified under any of a number ofcircumstances (mean around 0.5)

Yis equals 1 if a given female i (residing in state s) has been beaten byher husband (mean around 0.25)

estimateYis = ψ0 + ψ1Xis + ψ2Ais + αs + εis (3)

where Xis include: education, age, occupation of wives & husbands; caste& religion of wives; rural/urban; and hhd durable good ownership.

Domestic Violence

Table 13 - Domestic Violence and Female Inheritance (1998 NFHS-2) - ProbitEstimations

VariableWife Beating

JustifiedWife

BeatenYears Amendment 0.01 (0.003)*** 0.03 (0.005)**

Individual Controls YES YESHousehold Controls YES YES

Clustering at State Level YES YES

0.12 0.07

Table 14 - Domestic Violence and Female Inheritance (2005 NFHS-3) - ProbitEstimations

VariableWife Beating

JustifiedWife

BeatenYears Amendment 0.008 (0.005)* 0.03 (0.004)**

Individual Controls YES YESHousehold Controls YES YES

Clustering at State Level YES YES

0.09 0.07

Main Elements of the Model

Model of Intra-household bargaining.

Surplus generated under cooperation.

Bargain over allocation under threat of separation: ’separate spheres’.

Asymmetry of Information: private satisfaction from the marriage.

→ bargaining failure occurs

Rejecting offers initiate conflict.

conflict is costly to both spouse, cost uncertain ex-ante.

Suicide is a way out of the pain.

Consistent with the main views in psychology on suicide: Leenars(1996), Schneidman (1985).

suicide often linked to events involving loss or conflict in existinginterpersonal relationships.

it is not just the stress or pain but the inability to cope

unendurable psychological pain is stimulus & person desperately wantsa way out

cognitive constriction (ie, rigidity in thinking, narrowing of focus, tunnelvision, etc.) is common.

PreferencesPreferences depend on the status of the marriage.

If the marriage is intact

V h(Ih + Iw , x , θh) & V w (Ih + Iw , x , θw )

Ij for j ∈ {h,w} represent the resources of the husband & wife

x indicates how pro-wife the division of non public goods are within thehousehold.

θj for j ∈ {h,w} are the husband and wife’s private level of satisfactionwith the marriage, drawn from distribution Gj .

If the husband and wife separate or revert to ”separate spheres”(Lundberg and Pollak (2003))

Uh(Ih) & Uw (Iw ).

Timing

Personal levels of satisfaction with the marriage are revealed.

Husband makes an offer x .

Wife accepts or rejects.

If she accepts, they enjoy the utilities V h and V w .

If she refuses, it triggers marital discord or conflict within thehousehold:

husband and wife incur costs κh and κw drawn from distribution F .

then they separate and enjoy utilities Uh and Uw .

At any point in this process, individuals may instead choose to exit:end the pain and commit suicide → get 0.

Timing

Decisions

Assume that an offer has been rejected

Costs of conflict κh and κw are realized

j stays alive if κj ≤ U j(Ij) for j ∈ {w , h}

this assumes that cost of conflict and cost of dealing the spouse’ssuicide are the same, to remove any strategic aspect.

→ E j(Ij), for j ∈ {w , h}, is j ’s expected utility if the wife rejects an offer

E j(Ij) ≡ Fj [Uj(Ij)]U j(Ij)−

∫ U j (Ij )

0κdFj(κ)

Decisions

∫ U j (Ij )

0κdFj(κ)

Decisions

∫ U j (Ij )

0κdFj(κ)

Decisions

∫ U j (Ij )

0κdFj(κ)

Decisions

∫ U j (Ij )

0κdFj(κ)

Decisions

∫ U j (Ij )

0κdFj(κ)

Wife accepts offer x if

V w (I , x , θw ) ≥ Ew (Iw )

where I = Iw + Ih.

→ threshold θ(x)

→ Gw [θ(x)] is the probability that an offer x is rejected.

Husband chooses an offer x that maximizes his expected utility[1− Gw [θ(x)]

]V h(I , x , θh) + Gw [θ(x)]

[Eh(Ih)

V w (I , x , θw ) ≥ Ew (Iw )

where I = Iw + Ih.

→ threshold θ(x)

]V h(I , x , θh) + Gw [θ(x)]

[Eh(Ih)

V w (I , x , θw ) ≥ Ew (Iw )

where I = Iw + Ih.

→ threshold θ(x)

]V h(I , x , θh) + Gw [θ(x)]

[Eh(Ih)

V w (I , x , θw ) ≥ Ew (Iw )

where I = Iw + Ih.

→ threshold θ(x)

]V h(I , x , θh) + Gw [θ(x)]

[Eh(Ih)

Pro-women Redistribution

Pro-women redistribution of wealth, an increase in Iw that is exactlycompensated by a decrease in I h.

Suicides rates are the expected probability of conflict times thelikelihood of suicide in case of conflict.

→ Proposition: When suicide rates are positive, pro-womenredistribution decreases the ratio of female to male suicide rate.

Effect of a pro-women redistribution on suicides for both genders isambiguous.

It depends crucially on the effect on the likelihood of conflict.

Example with linear utility

Assume linear utilities

V w (I , x , θw ) = xbI + θw & V h(I , x , θh) = (1− x)bI + θh.

and uniform distribution of θs between 0 and θ.

When wives own nothing they’ll accept anything → husbands offerx = 0 & no conflict.

If relatively small surplus, (b − 1)I < θ, husbands with low valuationsoffer nothing as long as women’s share of wealth is low enough→ Conflictnecessarily rises over this interval.

As we keep on raising women’s share of wealth, conflict will thendecrease as women and men are becoming more equal.

Let b = 1.2, θ = 50 and U j(I ) = I for j ∈ {h,w}.

Costs of conflict follow a Pareto distribution (κ = 0.5 and α = 1.1

I = 100

We progressively raise the level of resources owned by the wife Iw from1 to 99.

I = 100

0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 900

Wife Wealth

Probability of Conflict

(a) likelihood of conflict

0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 900

2.5x 10−3

Wife Wealth

Female Suicide RateMale Suicide Rate

(b) suicide rates

Figure: Effect of Pro-Women Redistribution

Other Possible Explanation

Brothers and Sisters

Theoretically similar

Marital discord more relevant in stylized evidence

Women pushed to suicides

Does not explain men’s suicides

Indian Evidence Act: when a woman commits suicide within 7 years ofher married life, her husband quickly come under suspicion.

Conclusion

We study the impact of female property rights on male and femalesuicides in India.

State level variation in women’s property right generated by stateAmendments to the Hindu Succession Act and to agricultural land rights

We build a model of intra-household bargaining with asymmetry ofinformation and conflict.

Pro-women redistribution decreases the female:male suicide ratio

Pro-women redistribution can raise marital conflict.

In which case male suicides increase and female suicides can increase ordecrease.

Conclusion

01.17.2013 - Garance Genicot

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