01 BSP-71-Procedure-003 Simultaneous Operations OI - Operating Integrity

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Brunei Shell Petroleum Company Sendirian Berhad

Restr icted

BSP-71-P ROCEDURE -003

S I M U L T A N E O U S

O P E R A T I O N S

( S I M O P S )

R E Q U I R E M E N T S F O R M A N A G I N G

A N D C O N D U C T I N G E N G I N E E R I N G ,

M A I N T E N A N C E , P A I N T I N G , D I V I N G ,

W E L L E N G I N E E R I N G AN D W E L L

S E R V I C E S O P E R A T I O N S

S I M U L T A N E O U S L Y W I T H



Simultaneous Operations (SIMOPS) Restricted

Revision Record

Rev Revision description Date

0 First Issue 1994

1.0 Revision Aug 2000

2.0 Review of document content and rename from CPEMA to SIMOPS March 2009

3.0 Update and extension to cover Well Engineering & Well Services SIMOPS, incorporatedShell HSSE & SP GCF and DEM-2 requirements, and learning from incidents.

Sept 2012

This document has a maximum validity of five years from the last revision date. Within this period it must beassessed for relevance and re-validated in accordance with BSP Document Control Procedure and Section 6.2

Suggestions for further improvement in this document should be sent to the Document Owner.

Distribution

The document owner is responsible for distribution control. The original electronic version is stored inLiveLink and accessible via BSP OnLine web site. Paper copies are only controlled if they are physically

stamped “Controlled Hard Copy” , signed by the related remote location document controller and recorded inthe BSP71 Master Inventory.

Notice and Warning

Copyright 2012, Brunei Shell Petroleum Company Sendirian Berhad

This document is the property of Brunei Shell Petroleum Company Sendirian Berhad (BSP), Seria KB3534,Negara Brunei Darussalam. Circulation is restricted to BSP and its designated associates, contractors and

lt t It t t b pi d d f th p p th th th t f hi h it i ppli di h h i h i f BS

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

1 INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................................................. 6

1.1 Purpose and Document Structure ........................................................ ................................................... 6

1.2 Scope ........................................................ ................................................................. ............................. 6

1.2.1 Well Engineering & Well Services Activities .............................................................. ....... 7

1.2.2 Construction Activities .............................................................. ........................................ 7

1.2.3 Commissioning Activities .......................................................... ........................................ 7

1.2.4 Maintenance Activities .............................................................. ........................................ 8

1.2.5 Painting Activities .......................................................... ................................................... 8

1.2.6 Diving Activities ............................................................. ................................................... 9

1.3 SIMOPS Process Overview .......................................................................................................... .......... 9 1.4 Terminology .......................................................................................................................................... 11

2 RESPONSIBILITIES ......................................................................................................................... 14

2.1 SIMOPS Process Forum Responsibilities ....................................................... ...................................... 14

2.2 Activity Owner (AO) Responsibilities ............................................................... ...................................... 14

2.3 Asset Unit Responsibilities ......................................................... ........................................................... 15

2.3.1 Asset Manager (AM) ................................................................. ...................................... 16

2.3.2 Asset Engineer (AE) ................................................................. ...................................... 16

2.3.3 AU CPRA / SIMOPS Coordinator (SC) ........................................................... ................ 162.3.4 Person-In-Charge (PIC) ............................................................ ...................................... 17

2.4 Rolling Activity Planning (RAP) Forum ............................................................ ...................................... 17

2.5 SIMOPS Process Manual Custodian .............................................................. ...................................... 17

3 INITIATION & PLANNING OF SIMOPS PROGRAMS ..................................................................... 18

3.1 Planning Milestones ........................................................ .............................................................. ........ 18

3.1.1 Scheduling and Lead Time ....................................................... ...................................... 18

3.2 Mandatory Requirements for Initiation & Planning of SIMOPS Programs ............................................. 19

3 2 1 Hazard Identification and ALARP Risk Assessment 20




4.3.1 “Live” Area Identification ........................................................... ...................................... 37

4.4 Conversion of Instrument & Power Gas Systems to Compressed Air ................................................... 37

4.4.1 Air Compressor .............................................................. ................................................. 374.4.2 Nitrogen (N2) Purge ........................................................................................................ 38

4.5 Impact Protection .................................................................................................................................. 38

4.6 Chemical Injection ........................................................... ................................................................. ..... 38

4.7 Drip Pans, Drains and Sumps .............................................................. ................................................. 38

4.8 Local Vents and Flares ......................................................................................................................... 38

5 EXECUTION OF SIMOPS PROGRAMS .......................................................................................... 40

5.1 Single Point Accountability ......................................................... ........................................................... 40

5.2 Communication ..................................................................................................................................... 40 5.2.1 Pre-SIMOPS Meeting ............................................................... ...................................... 40

5.2.2 Daily SIMOPS Meeting ............................................................. ...................................... 40

5.2.3 SIMOPS Toolbox Meetings ......................................................................... ................... 40

5.2.4 Communications Equipment, Telephone Numbers and Radio Channels ....................... 40

5.3 Arrival of the Drilling Rig/Workboat/Barge and SIMOPS Equipment ..................................................... 41

5.3.1 Anchor Patterns ............................................................. ................................................. 41

5.4 Custody of Facilities ........................................................ .............................................................. ........ 42

5.4.1 Custodian Responsibilities ............................................................................................. 42

5.4.2 Hand-Over of Facilities ............................................................. ...................................... 42 5.4.3 Facility Hand-Over and Hand-Back Check Lists ..................................................... ........ 43

5.4.4 Delegation of Responsibility ........................................................................................... 43

5.5 Helideck Removal/Replacement and Rig-Up and Rig-Down ................................................................ 43

5.6 Other (Heavy) Lifts and Equipment Moves ........................................................................................... 44

5.7 Station Start-Up .................................................................................................................................... 45

5.8 Permit to Work (PTW) ................................................................ ........................................................... 45

5.8.1 PTW Restrictions ........................................................... ................................................. 46

5 8 2 Supervision of Multiple Activities 46




8 APPENDICES ................................................................................................................................... 59

Appendix 1 – Generic SIMOPS Task list ......................................................... ................................................. 60

Appendix 2 – SIMOPS Initiation Approval Form ......................................................... ...................................... 62 Appendix 3 – SIMOPS Change Proposal Form................................................................................................ 63

Appendix 4 – PHP Cover page, Signatory page & Suggested Table of Contents ............................................ 64

Appendix 5 – Structure and Contents of a Campaign-Specific SIMOPS HSE Case (CSHC) ........................... 67

Appendix 6 – Process Safety Basic Requirements - Brief Reference .............................................................. 68

Appendix 7 – Pre-SIMOPS Facility Inspection Checklist ................................................................ .................. 70

Appendix 8 – Confirmation of Integrity Memos ........................................................... ...................................... 74

Appendix 9 – Host Facility Hand Over Checklist ........................................................ ...................................... 77

Appendix 10 – Host Facility Hand-back Checklist ................................................................ ............................ 82

Appendix 11 – Example of a Standard Habitat Used to contain welding hot work slag / sparks (ignition sources) .............................................................................................................................................................. 85

Appendix 12 – RASCI MATRIX for Offshore Campaign Process ................................................................ ..... 86

Appendix 13 – RASCI MATRIX For Offshore/Onshore Blasting & Painting Campaign Process ..................... 87

TABLES Table 1. Generic SIMOPS Process Phases, Activities & Responsible Parties......................................................... 9Table 2. Process Flow for a typical Engineering / Maintenance SIMOPS Program or Campaign ............................ 9Table 3. Process Flow for a Typical Drilling or Well intervention SIMOPS Program or Campaign........................ 10Table 4. Definitions ............................................................ ................................................................. ................... 11Table 5. SIMOPS Process Forum Responsibilities ....................................................... ......................................... 14Table 6. Asset Unit Responsibilities ......................................................... .............................................................. 15Table 7. Typical Lead Time for Stage 1 of SIMOPS Planning....................................... ......................................... 18Table 8. Typical Lead Time for Stage 2 of SIMOPS Planning....................................... ......................................... 18Table 9. Typical Lead Time for Stage 3 of SIMOPS Planning.................................................. .............................. 19Table 10. Special Issues For SIMOPS At Normally-Manned Facilities ............................................................ ........ 28Table 11. Pre-SIMOPS Inspection Checks .......................................................... .................................................... 33Table 12. Well Equipment Checks ............................................................. .............................................................. 34Table 13. Default Platform Shutdown and Depressurisation Requirements for Final Move-in and Positioning ....... 41

Table 14 Facilities Hand Over Default Rules 42




1 I N T R O D U C T I O N

1.1 Purpose and Document Structure

The purpose of this BSP generic SIMOPS procedure, also known as the „ SIMOPS Process Manual‟ , is todefine BSP requirements to be applied in order to safely manage multiple activities being performedsimultaneously at a location, particularly when one of those activities is the production of Hydrocarbons.This is referred to as “simultaneous operations”, or “SIMOPS”.

The purpose of undertaking activities as SIMOPS is to reduce production deferment, while maintainingrisks at a level that is ALARP.

Sections 1 to 3 of this document describe the management process and management requirements forSIMOPS on BSP facilities. They include a description of the steps involved in SIMOPS programs, keyroles & responsibilities of parties involved in SIMOPS and mandatory requirements for initiation & planningof SIMOPS programs.

Sections 4 and 5 of this document address requirements for site/platform preparation for SIMOPS andexecution of SIMOPS programs.

Section 6 covers Management Review activities, as required to ensure continuous improvement.

1.2 ScopeThe scope of this SIMOPS Process Manual includes:

Well Engineering & Well Services Activities on live BSP production facilities, onshore and offshore,including:

o Drilling and other Drilling Rig supported activities i.e. „CPRA‟

o Well Intervention Unit (WIU) and Hoist activities

o Coiled Tubing Unit (CTU) activities




1.2.1 Well Engineering & Well Services Activities

Typical Well Engineering & Well Services activities within the scope of this manual include:

i. Well Engineering Activities (on a live production facility):

Drilling rig and WIU Barge movements and rig-up/rig-down1

Workover of existing wells

Drilling and Completion of new wells (including component activities such as milling,cementing, fishing, coring etc.).

The following activities may also be carried out as part of the above, either as on-line secondactivities or as off-line third activities

2:

o Perforating

o Stimulation (Acidising)

o Fracturing

o Well kick-off (including use of N2)

o Logging

o Securing (well killing)

o CTU and Wireline/Slickline operations while the Rig or WIU is present

o Conductor driving

o Grouting.

ii. Well Services activities (on a live production facility):

Well Intervention Unit (WIU) or Hoist-Assisted Well Service Operations involving wellworkover and completion where there is a need to carry out pulling and installation of tubing forthe production string

Coiled Tubing Unit (CTU) or Wireline Unit Well Service Operations , not requiring a drilling

i WIU S f C t ll d S b f S f t V l (SCSSSV) h t lift




equipment and systems that could be the subject of commissioning activities (on a live production facility)that fall within the scope of this manual include:

Mechanical equipment, and associated vessels and systems Electrical installations and instrument systems

Safety and fire fighting systems.

1.2.4 Maintenance Activities

Maintenance work is categorised as either:

a. Topsides Maintenance (onshore and/or offshore)

b. Underwater Maintenance (including Diving Activities - offshore).

1.2.4.1 Topsides Maintenance (on a live production facility)

Typical Topsides Maintenance activities within the scope of this manual include:

Work barge/boat movements

Lifting and materials handling

Demolition work

Rigging and scaffolding Welding, grinding, gas cutting

Hydrotest and functional testing of facilities

Grit/hydro blasting and spray painting

Re-laying cables and tubing

Work on electrical and instrument systems

Platform cleaning

Onsite Inspection




1.2.6 Diving Activities

Diving Activities (more correctly termed “Underwater Activities”) are required for Underwater Maintenance

(see above) and for some construction activities (e.g. installation of riser clamps for new pipelines) and tosupport some well engineering activities (e.g. use of an ROV to monitor JU spud can positions relative topipelines). When these activities are conducted at live production facilities or simultaneously with othercampaign activities (at the same offshore facility), they constitute SIMOPS and thus fall within the scope ofthis document. However, diving activities require highly specialist controls, most of which are not defined inthis generic SIMOPS document – reference must therefore be made to the relevant elements of BSP HSEmanagement system documentation and the relevant BSP service unit (AEO/4) for full details ofmanagement controls for Diving SIMOPS.

1.3 SIMOPS Process Overview

Every SIMOPS program consists of three distinct phases – the initiation, planning and execution phases – each with single point accountability and distinct hand off points. Overall accountability for each SIMOPSprogram is with the Asset Manager for the facility where the SIMOPS will take place.

The following three tables illustrate the process flow for typical generic SIMOPS Programs. Reference may

also be made to the Generic SIMOPS Task list in Appendix 1.

Table 1. GENERIC SIMOPS PROCESS PHASES, ACTIVITIES & RESPONSIBLE PARTIES

Phase Accountable Party Activities & Responsible Parties

Initiation Asset MaintenanceSupport Engineer(AE)

- or -

Well Activity Owner(XPE/3x)

Well Activity Owner (WAO) or Project Leader (PL) prepares an initial riskassessment and justification for completing the work as a SIMOPS program.On receipt of endorsement from the Asset Maintenance Support Engineer orHead Petroleum Engineer (XPE – in the case of well engineering and wellservices), the proposal is tabled at the Medium Term Integrated ActivityPlanning (IAP) Forum for consideration and inclusion in the “RAP”. Once theprogram has been included in the RAP, it is submitted to the Asset Managerf f l l




Phase Task Milestone Guide*

2 Initial HAZID / Risk Assessment for SIMOPS

3 Request include/change in Short Term 90 days activity plan changecontrol

4 Obtain Asset Manager approval for SIMOPS

Planning 5 Finalise SIMOPS Scopes

6 Confirm risk assessment on site and conduct bow tie gap analysis

7 Conduct IPOP and any other additional HEMP studies

8 Issue workpack/job cards & construction spading list for approval -16 weeks

9 Freeze SIMOPS actual workpack -4 weeks

10 Close out HAZID & IPOP actions -4 weeks

11 SIMOPS PHP / CSHC Approval -4 weeks

12 Final pre-SIMOPS inspection and onsite communication -4 weeks

Execution 12 Carry out SIMOPS

13 Post-SIMOPS verifications before production start up

END 14 Conduct After Action Review (AAR) +1 week




1.3.1 RASCI Charts

RASCI Charts have been created to indicate who is responsible, who is accountable, who needs to provide

support, who needs to be consulted and who needs to be informed at each stage of typical SIMOPScampaigns. These are presented in:

Appendix 12 for Typical Engineering / Maintenance SIMOPS Campaign RASCI

Appendix 13 for Typical Blasting and Painting SIMOPS Campaign RASCI

Relevant definitions are provided overpage.

LEGEND FOR RASCI

R- Responsible

Responsible to do it or get it done: the executing party. The Responsible party executes the necessary work andtakes the actions required to ensure compliance with legal requirements and BSP Policies and StandardsA – Accountable

Accountable approves, must “sign off” acceptance of results. The Accountable party approves the work done by theResponsible party and is Accountable for the resultsS – Support

Support to the Responsible party and the Accountable partyC – Consulted

Shall be consulted by the Responsible party on activities and results. The Consulted party must be given anopportunity to contributeI – Informed

Shall be informed about decisions, activities and results.

1.4 Terminology

Abbreviations, terms and references used frequently in this and other management system documentationare defined in the Management System Glossary. Terminology specific to this document is given in the

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Abbreviation/Term Meaning

CTU Coiled Tubing Unit

DFPV Depressurising – Flushing – Purging – Venting

DP Drilling PlatformDSV Drilling Supervisor

EC Emergency Coordinator

ECT Emergency Coordinator Team

EERA Escape Evacuation & Rescue Assessment

EFA Emergency Facilities Assessment

EPA Shell Exploration and Production Asia Pacific

ER Emergency Response

ESSA Emergency System Survivability Analysis

ESD Emergency ShutdownESDV Emergency Shutdown Valve

ETRER Escape, Temporary Refuge, Evacuation and RescueEWIMS Electronic Well Integrity Management System

F&G Fire & Gas (detection)

FOG Falling Objects Guide

FRED Fire, Release, Explosion and Dispersion modelling software

GSS General Shift Supervisor

HAC / HACC Hazardous Area Classification / Hazardous Area Classification Committee (see „Zone‟definitions below)

Hand-over The transfer of custody from one department to another department. This is considered atemporary change of ownership of the platform.

HAZAN Hazard Analysis, including phenomenological modelling such as FRED hazard rangeassessments

HAZID Hazard identification exercise. A “desk-top” evaluation exercise carried out to identify anddocument all hazards associated with a particular activity

HC Hydro Carbons

HEMP Hazards and Effects Management Process

HiPo High Potential (used in reference to any incident with high potential for a serious accident)

HSE Health, Safety and Environment

IA I t t Ai




Abbreviation/Term Meaning

PHP Project HSE Plan (see Section 3.2.9.1)

PIC Person In Charge

PIP Permit In PlacePL Project Leader

POB Personnel On Board

PM Preventative Maintenance

Production Activities Activities related to producing of hydrocarbons i.e., “live” facilities.

PSBR Process Safety Basic Requirements

PTB Personnel Transfer Bridge (aka Gangway)PTW Permit To Work

QRA Quantitative Risk Assessment

RAM Risk Assessment MatrixRAP Rolling Activity Plan

RASCI Responsible, Accountable, Support, Consult, Inform.ROV Remotely Operated Vehicle

SAR Structure Anomaly Report

SC SIMOPS Coordinator (aka „CPRA Focal Point‟ in the case of well engineering SIMOPS)

SCE Safety Critical Element

SCSSSV Surface-Controlled Subsurface Safety Valve

SIMOPS “Simultaneous Operations” is defined as multiple work activities taking place at the sametime, at the same location. This typically includes the following combinations:-

Maintenance/improvement/Diving/Painting activities with production activities Engineering/construction or commissioning activities with production activities

Drilling and Well Services with production activities

SOS Senior Offshore SupervisorSRI Safety Related Item

SSOW Safe System Of Work

SSV Surface safety valves

SU Service UnitTA Technical Authority

TR Temporary Refuge




2 R E S P O N S I B I L I T I E S

This section builds on the RASCI defined in Section 1.3 above, by further defining major responsibilitiesassociated with SIMOPS management. Also, to aid in completing tasks, the key players can refer to the

Generic SIMOPS Task Checklist in Appendix 1.

Each SIMOPS program shall have a dedicated resource to coordinate the program including its requiredHEMP studies. This is an HSE-Critical role and as such, the candidate shall have been assured ascompetent as appropriate for the scope of the program, before taking on the role.

2.1 SIMOPS Process Forum Responsibilities

The overall responsibilities for SIMOPS are divided between the “SIMOPS process forum” and the AssetUnits. The “SIMOPS process forum” is responsible for the “SIMOPS process”. The responsibilities arelisted in Table 5 below.

Table 5. SIMOPS PROCESS FORUM RESPONSIBILITIES

Category Description

Generic SIMOPS

HSE Case

Ensure the BSP generic („Base‟) SIMOPS HSE Case and the template for campaign-specific

HSE Cases are reviewed and updated in line with corporate standards. Ensure thedocuments are transferred to the Asset Units for implementation.

Campaign-specificSIMOPS HSE cases& Project HSE Plans

Ensure that the appropriate Asset Unit prepares a campaign-specific SIMOPS HSE Case(CSHC), or Project HSE Plan (PHP), as appropriate – reference Section 3.2.9.

Processmanagementmanual

Act as custodian of the SIMOPS Process Management Manual (this document). Update themanual as necessary to ensure that it complies with latest Group standards, includeslearning from latest industry experience and incidents, and remains compatible with the




Planning and Execution phases:

o Detailing the work packs

o Providing competent Supervisors for all activities

o Executing the work in accordance with the CSHC or PHP.

The AO conducts AAR‟s. With the AO‟s involvement in this task, the feedback loop is complete, as the AOhas an oversight role across the phases of the program and learning can be incorporated into impendingSIMOPS programs. It is left to the discretion of the AO, to complete the AAR on an individual basis, or tocluster and complete them in groups.

2.3 Asset Unit ResponsibilitiesThe Asset Units have responsibilities in all three phases of a SIMOPS program, including those listed inTable 6 below.

Table 6. ASSET UNIT RESPONSIBILITIES

Category Description Responsibility

HSE Initiate, and assist with collection of information for, a hazard identification(HAZID) and ALARP Assessment study, any other HEMP Studies (e.g. QRA)

needed to ensure that all significant risks will be identified and demonstrablyreduced to ALARP for each SIMOPS program.

Follow through recommendations from the HAZID and ALARP Assessmentexercise and any other HEMP studies undertaken for the proposed SIMOPS,to ensure they are closed out as appropriate.

Provide the risk inputs to the justification for each SIMOPS program (see“Economic assessment” below).

Contribute to SIMOPS plans to ensure that the risks of carrying out SIMOPS

XOP/1

XOP/5




Category Description Responsibility

Review Carry out review of each SIMOPS after it is completed and identify learningpoints for incorporation in future programs and the Process Manual and/orBase HSE case.

XOP/1

XOP/5

Training Ensure that all Operations Representatives and other production staff arecompetent in their SIMOPS responsibilities.

XOP/1

2.3.1 Asset Manager (AM)

In the initiation phase, the AM is accountable for the approval of the SIMOPS. In order to approve theSIMOPS, the AM must be satisfied that:

1. HSE risks associated with the SIMOPS are, and will continue to be throughout the program,tolerable and ALARP, in full compliance with BSP and Shell Group requirements (Refs. 6, 16)

2. The cost of the risk mitigation measures required to achieve (1) is balanced by the saving indeferment cost by not shutting down.

3. Any late changes to the SIMOPS program have been managed and approved through the ChangeControl Procedure described in Section 3.3.




A quality CSHC or PHP (as appropriate to the nature of the SIMOPS) is prepared, detailingrequired preparatory / remedial work and key risk controls and responsibilities

SIMOPS planning & preparation milestones are monitored and the Asset Manager is alerted ifany milestone dates are missed, so the AM can make a decision regarding continuing with theplan for SIMOPS.

2.3.4 Person-In-Charge (PIC)

The Person-In-Charge (PIC) at the SIMOPS site i.e. the OIM, CSR or DSV, has responsibilities in thePlanning and Execution phases, as follows:

In the planning phase, the PIC provides support to the SC as necessary for obtaining approval

of the SIMOPS plan

In the execution phase the PIC will have single point accountability for safe execution ofactivities, well-being of personnel, assets and the environment in accordance with the CSHC /PHP. This requires on-site coordination of activities, setting priorities and making on-siteevaluations of the consequences of concurrent activities upon each other (taking due accountof the prevailing MOPO).

2.4 Rolling Activity Planning (RAP) Forum

The RAP Forum provides an integrated review of the SIMOPS proposal, with the Forum‟s key responsibilitybeing implementation of the IAP planning process including assessment of Plan Entry Criteria (PEC) forinclusion in the 2 years look-ahead plan.

2.5 SIMOPS Process Manual Custodian

Annual SIMOPS Reviews shall be carried out by the SIMOPS Process Manual Custodian i.e. HSE/61 toensure that:




3 I N I T I A T I O N & P L A N N I N G O F S I M O P S P R O G R A M S

3.1 Planning MilestonesThe SIMOPS process includes a set number of planning „milestones‟. These are as listed in Table 2: thereare three fixed milestones to be completed before start of the Execution Phase work onsite:

Work pack issue for approval (16 weeks before SIMOPS commencement)

Approval of the CSHC or PHP (4 weeks before SIMOPS commencement)

Final pre-SIMOPS inspection (4 weeks before SIMOPS commencement).

The time frames for the other milestones are contingent on the AO‟s requirements. Failure to meet any planning milestones on time shall be identified by the SC and included in the SIMOPSInitiation Approval Form (Appendix 2 – SIMOPS Initiation Approval Form), to be brought to the attention ofthe appropriate AM for a decision. The advice and support of the department responsible for the activityshall also be sought before a decision is made.

Refer also to the Generic SIMOPS Task list in Appendix 1.

3.1.1 Scheduling and Lead Time

Sufficient lead-time for efficient planning of work shall be considered as an essential factor for the safeimplementation of the SIMOPS program. Typical lead-times for the different phases of the program are asper the following table for stage 1, stage 2 and stage 3 planning.

Table 7. T YPICAL LEAD TIME FOR STAGE 1 OF SIMOPS PLANNING

Item Activity Duration (wk) Deliverables

1 Conceptual

design

6 PEP Stating the plan of for construction/ maintenance/ commissioningSIMOPS project




Item Detailed Design Duration (wk)

3 Carry out detailed design incorporating all work-scoping findings such as as-built status and

necessary provisions, especially for construction/ maintenance/ commissioning SIMOPS,for efficient and safe implementation of the project. Procedure “Issued For Approval” (IFA)

design package.

Re-identify and produce any additional long lead materials.

24

4 Convene a meeting to review the IFA design package, participation from Safety Operations,

Maintenance, Construction and Commissioning personnel shall be sought. Also a Risk

Assessment shall be conducted based on the IFA design package, paying special attention

to construction/ maintenance/ commissioning SIMOPS requirements.

Consider and incorporate all essential recommendations from the review and riskassessment teams in the design package.

Prepare an overall construction/ maintenance/ commissioning SIMOPS project plan to be

included as part of the final AFC package. Procure all other project materials.

4

Sub-Total 32

Table 9. T YPICAL LEAD TIME FOR STAGE 3 OF SIMOPS PLANNING

Item Preparation Duration (wk)1 Review AFC package – overall construction/ maintenance/ commissioning SIMOPS project

plan, drawing M.T.O., etc.

4

2 Prepare Positive Isolation – Spading Plan, verify the inventory, i.e. certified spades and

blind flanges, gaskets.

4

3 Carry out a Work-scoping exercise to confirm As-built status and the feasibility of spading

plan. Input should be sought from:-

Operations Installation Manager (OIM)

3




Compliance with DEM-2 PSBR has been demonstrated – see 3.2.4 below

HAC drawings accounting for all facilities and activities involved in the SIMOPS have been

prepared and approved by the HACC – see 3.2.6

A MOPO, clearly defining the bounding limits for the SIMOPS, is in place – see 3.2.5

A CSHC or PHP has been prepared and approved by the appropriate parties – see 3.2.9 below

The host facility where SIMOPS is going to take place (e.g. offshore drilling platform, onshoreproduction plant etc.) has been prepared in accordance with the requirements of Section 4 of thisdocument

The SIMOPS program and the associated deferment has been included in the Medium Term RAP

by the appropriate IAP forum, and the appropriate Asset Manager has approved the program

Final Pre-SIMOPS inspection, onsite communication and a full emergency drill have taken place.

3.2.1 Hazard Identification and ALARP Risk Assessment

A HAZID and ALARP Risk Assessment exercise shall be carried out for each SIMOPS program, inaccordance with BSP-02 Guideline-022 “HAZID” (Ref 11) and BSP-02 Guideline-005 “Guide to Application

of BSP HSE Risk Tolerability and Control Acceptance Criteria” (Ref 6). The purpose of this exercise is to

identify all the significant HSE hazards and accident threats associated with a SIMOPS program including,in particular, Major Accident Hazards and Threats (MAH, MAT), and to identify appropriate risk-reducingmeasures to achieve compliance with BSP ALARP criteria. Furthermore, the study must generate inputs todecisions regarding shutdown and depressurisation of facilities for rig/workboat/barge moves and (heavy)lifting activities, continued use of host facility electrical equipment that is not rated for use in hazardousareas („HAC Zones‟), hot work, local venting and flaring, 3

rd activities, and emergency response including

DEM2 PSBR3 (TR) compliance if any 5B or Red risks are identified in the HAZID.

A conceptual work plan and site layout shall be provided for the HAZID & ALARP exercise. Otherinformation may include host facility integrity data (HC Red Anomalies, Orange TAs and SRIs), status of




Risks must be assessed against the Shell Group Risk Assessment Matrix (RAM), an image of which isprovided in Figure 2 below. Where release of a given hazard has multiple possible outcomes, eachoutcome must be assessed for risk and the worst case (highest) risk taken as the overall risk for that

hazard. Historical experience of accident occurrences serves as a starting point (only) for estimating thelikelihood of each potential outcome: specific circumstances must be taken into account in order to arrive atthe final assessment of likelihood.

Figure 2. Group Risk Assessment Matrix (RAM), Version 2, December 2009




assessed. However, QRA is considered to be most useful for comparison of options, e.g. when theselection of risk reduction measures cannot be established using qualitative assessment methods.

If a QRA is not carried out for an individual SIMOPS program, the results of the QRA in the relevantOperations or NUI HSE case, or past SIMOPS programs, should be used for guidance.

3.2.2 Achieving and Demonstrating ALARP Assurance that all HSE risks associated with carrying out SIMOPS are being, or will be (via theimplementation of Remedial Actions Plans), reduced to a level that is ALARP, is required before theSIMOPS can proceed.

Formal demonstration of ALARP, within the CSHC or PHP, is mandatory for Major Accident Hazards(MAH) i.e. credible accident hazards that potentially fall into the Red Risk area and/or severity level 5 areaof the Group RAM. Risk reduction measures are mandatory for Red Risks in order to reduce them toYellow or Blue.

Yellow Risks need to be reduced to ALARP by identification and implementation of practicable cost-effective risk reduction measures. However, formal demonstration of this for Yellow Risk hazards withconsequence Severity of 4 or lower is not required. The process of identifying and implementing„practicable cost-effective risk reduction measures‟ shall consider shutting down and depressurisingfacilities as one option – with deferment costs to be balanced against expenditure on risk mitigationmeasures in order to avoid the deferment (see Figure 1).

Hazards within the Dark Blue Risk area need to be managed for continuous improvement in accordancewith the HSE-MS and Company Policies.

Do we need to d o a QRA for this SIMOPS Camp aign?

If qualitative risk assessment against the Group RAM is not adequate to demonstrate compliance with BSP risk tolerabilitycriteria e.g. due to lack of resolution or uncertainty about final residual risk level, and/or if additional inputs are needed todecisions regarding risk mitigation measures, then the answer is Yes. However, before embarking on new or additionalQRA modelling, consideration should be given as to whether results from previous QRAs could be called upon to providethe answers for this SIMOPS campaign.




thus enabling improved incident learning and prevention.

In accordance with EP Business HSE Control Framework EP2005-0300 HEMP and EP2005-0310 HSE

Case, BTA is mandatory for all Major Accident Hazards (MAH) i.e. those hazards with potential for RAMSeverity level 5 accident effects and/or Red Risk on the Group RAM.

Bow Ties have been developed for all BSP facilities MAH; these must be reviewed (by „Gap Analysis‟) and,if necessary, extended to account for additional threats or changes to controls during SIMOPS. Also, if theSIMOPS introduces new MAH, then additional Bow Ties will be needed for those MAH – these must bedeveloped as part of the SIMOPS initiation and planning.

The SIEP supported Bow-Tie software package THESIS is the preferred tool for developing andimplementing Bow-Ties. Alternatively they can be developed in spreadsheets or a database, and manually

depicted.Reference should be made to the BSP AU and SU Operations HSE Cases, for the latest BSP facilitiesMAH Bow Ties.

3.2.3 Major Accident Hazard Assessment Sheets (MAHAS)

The CSHC or PHP should include Major Accident Hazard Assessment Sheets (MAHAS) that provide fulldetails of each of the MAH identified for the subject SIMOPS program. The MAHAS detail the nature of thehazard, the threats and consequences from the associated potential Major Accident Events (MAE), a

description of the accident barriers and risk controls put in place, including effectiveness review, and ademonstration of ALARP management of the risk.

3.2.4 Requirements from Design Engineering Manual-2 (DEM-2)

Compliance with DEM-2 Process Safety Basic Requirements (PSBR), Ref. 16, is mandatory for allSIMOPS activities and must be addressed in the Initiation and Planning phases of each Program. Thismandatory requirement shall also be cascaded down to all contractors involved in the SIMOPS program -requiring them to have compliant facilities and equipment and BSP-accepted HSE Cases demonstratingcompliance with DEM-2 PSBR.




An escape route from the portable building (a door) should always be provided in the wall facingaway from the well(s) and flowlines

Personnel should vacate the portable building during erection of and work-over derricks and masts,and rig down activities, and move clear of the fall radius of the derrick/mast. This standinginstruction should be documented in the rig-up / rig-down operations procedures.

3.2.4.2 PSBR #3 - Temporary Refuge (TR)

The provision of adequate Temporary Refuge (TR) during SIMOPS is mandatory for Workboats, DrillingRigs and Offshore Platforms. Refer detail requirements in DEP 37.17.10.11-Gen Design of OffshoreTemporary Refuges (Ref. 1) and DEM-2 PSBR # 3 Gap Closure Action Plan Reports (Ref. 16).

The main function of the TR shall be to provide a place where the total POB can muster without undue riskand have access to the communications, monitoring and control equipment necessary to ensure theirpersonal safety, and from where, if necessary, safe and complete evacuation can be effected.

The functions of the escape and evacuation routes and the embarkation areas shall be to provide, withoutundue risk to POB:

Secure means of escape to the TR, and

Secure means for a complete evacuation from the TR.

In order to demonstrate that the risk of impairment of TR is tolerable & ALARP, it may be3

necessary tocarry-out the following HEMP studies, as part of the development of the CSHC or PHP, in order to captureand address TR integrity issues including whether blast overpressure or other immediate effects couldimpair escape routes, Muster area, Command Support, structural collapse onto the TR, TEMPSC, etc.:

PEM – Physical Effects Modelling

EERA – Escape Evacuation & Rescue Assessment

ESSA – Emergency System Survivability Analysis




3.2.6 Hazardous Area Classification

“Hazardous Area Classification (HAC)“ BSP-12 Guideline-303 (Ref. 18) shall be used as the basis for

defining HAC zones created by all facilities (production facilities, drilling rigs, fuel tanks etc.) and activitiesinvolved in the SIMOPS. HAC drawings (showing all SIMOPS facilities and equipment in position) shall beincluded in the CSHC or PHP and shall be subject to approval by the BSP HACC prior to SIMOPS beingallowed. This approval process shall include due consideration of equipment ratings / suitability withrespect to the HAC zones.

3.2.6.1 Equipment in Hazardous Areas

All equipment used at the SIMOPS site/platform must be suitably rated for the HAC Zone in which it is, orwill be, located, as evidenced by the equipment certification.

The appropriate reference documents for hazardous area zoning and certified equipment are as follows:

DEP 80.00.10.10-Gen (Ref. 19), Area Classification (Amendments/Supplements to IP15)

IP Code Part 15 (Ref. 20), Area Classification Code for Installations Handling Flammable Fluids

DEP 33.64.10.10-Gen (Ref. 26), Electrical Engineering Design Guidelines

BSP-72-P-010-14 (Ref. 27), Maintenance of Certified Electrical and Electronic Instrumentation inHazardous Areas.

3.2.6.2 Hot work in Hazardous Areas

Hot work during SIMOPS is subject to approval by the PIC and to the precautions specified in the Permit-to-Work system BSP-02-Procedure-1668 Safe System of Work (SSOW) (Ref. 28), applied to Hazardous

Area Classifications as follows (refer terminology):

Hot Work activities are not allowed in Zone 0 Areas

Hot Work activities are restricted in Zone 1 Areas

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3.2.9 Project HSE Plans (PHP) and Campaign-Specific HSE Cases (CSHC)

Every SIMOPS program must be supported by a Project HSE Plan (PHP) or a Campaign-Specific HSE

Case (CSHC). Sign-off of the PHP or CSHC is the primary mechanism for evidencing Senior Managementapproval of the SIMOPS program and authorisation to proceed.

A PHP is slightly less extensive than a CSHC, and therefore provides a slightly lower level of assurance ofMAH control. The decision regarding whether a given SIMOPS program requires a PHP or a CSHC, istherefore dependent upon the level of risk involved and the scope of relevant existing Facilities andOperations HSE Cases. The following is a general guide:

Campaign-Specific HSE Cases (CSHC) are required for:

o SIMOPS by Drilling Rigs (i.e. „CPRA‟)

o SIMOPS by a Well Intervention Unit (WIU)

Project HSE Plans (PHP) are required for:

o SIMOPS by Well Servicing Units (e.g. stand-alone wireline unit)

o Engineering and Maintenance SIMOPS ( „CPEMA‟)

o Painting and Blasting SIMOPS („CPPA‟)

o Diving SIMOPS.

The final decision regarding whether a CSHC or PHP is required for any given SIMOPS program, shall bethe responsibility the BSP Technical Safety Authority, and shall take due account of:

The hazards and risks involved in the SIMOPS program

Whether the SIMOPS will significantly increase the chance of release of flammable / explosivesubstances

Whether the SIMOPS activities are within the scope of existing AU and/or SU Operations HSE




o Alarm and shutdown philosophy

o Change Control management

o POB management

o Communication arrangements

Hazards and Effects Management, Process outputs, including:

o Identification of major HSE hazards, risks and critical controls for the SIMOPS location,facilities, equipment and activities

o Verification that all significant HSE risks have been reduced to ALARP

o Any required actions or special precautions in view of the identified HSE hazards andthreats

Verification that all necessary safety checks and evaluations have been completed for the SIMOPSlocation, facilities, equipment and activities (see also Section 3.2.11 Statement Of Fitness below)

A project-specific MOPO

Emergency Response (ER) arrangements, including:

o ER Organisation

o Facility ETRER provisions, including:

Alarms

Escape Routes

Muster points / TR

Evacuation systems

o Schedule of ER Drills.




3.2.10 Bridging Document

“Bridging Document” or “Interface Document” refers to a written document which defines how two or more

HSE Management Systems are to be implemented together, to allow co-operation and co-ordination onmatters of HSSE protection between different parties (i.e. between BSP and the Contractor). Such adocument references the detailed procedures that will be used and defines the responsibilities,accountabilities and work activities of the various parties.

In the event of any HSE management system other than BSP‟s being used, in part or in full, for anyelements of a SIMOPS program at a BSP asset, then an approved Bridging Document (between BSP‟sHSE-MS and the relevant contractor HSE-MS) shall be developed and included as a reference documentin the SIMOPS PHP/CSHC.

3.2.11 Statement Of Fitness

The requirements from BSP-71-Standard-002 Statement of Fitness (Ref. 9), which describes theOperational Excellence Standard, Blade 24 – Field Operations, including the Statement of Fitnessrequirements to confirm the facility is safe to operate, shall be implemented as appropriate.

The resulting statement of fitness shall be included in the CSHC / PHP.

3.2.12 Special Considerations for Manned Facilities

Special consideration needs to be given when planning SIMOPS at normally-manned facilities including themanned offshore production complexes. Although this document is written to be applicable to all SIMOPSprograms, the extra complications associated with conducting SIMOPS at a manned facility increase thechance of rules being misinterpreted or wrongly applied. With only a small number of SIMOPS programscarried out at manned facilities, and allowing for the differences between locations, it is not practical ordesirable to list rules to cover all possible combinations of activities and facilities.

As an alternative, a special meeting shall be held to identify and address special issues whenever aSIMOPS program is planned for a normally-manned facility. The meeting should be attended by thefollowing people:-

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Topic Issue

Permit to work A system that will allow operations and the relevant Service provider e.g. TSW, to be

continually aware of all active permits is required.

Alarms The meaning and effect of alarms on both the host facility and the attendant drilling facility/ workboat / service vessel must be understood by Operations and by the relevant Serviceprovider e.g. TSW.

3.2.13 Classification of SIMOPS Activities

SIMOPS, by definition, involves multiple simultaneous activities. To assist with safe control of SIMOPS, allactivities in a given SIMOPS program shall be classified as „First‟, „Second‟ or „Third‟ Activities, in -line with

the following definitions and guidance.

3.2.13.1 First (1st

) Activities

During SIMOPS at a Hydrocarbon production facility, Hydrocarbon production is the first (1st) activity, by

definition. Activities that are a normal part of the duties of the relevant BSP Operations department, andwhich were considered in the SIMOPS HAZID and included in the overall risks as assessed for theSIMOPS, may be included in the defined scope of the first activity. Such activities comprise normal routineproduction support activities that do not introduce any significant additional hazards. For example,

Operators coming onboard to read gauges and adjust flow control valves is considered to be part of normalproduction activities. However, activities that introduce significant additional hazards, such as disjointingand hot work, require special controls and shall therefore not be included within the defined scope of„normal production‟ activities.

3.2.13.2 Second (2nd

) Activities

The second (2nd

) activity during SIMOPS is the main activity that is being conducted simultaneously withHydrocarbon production i.e. either (Well) Engineering or Maintenance or Well Services or Painting or Diving (on the platform). Activities that are a normal part of the work scope and duties of the Service Unit




Production and the main SIMOPS Activity. „Significant‟ in this context means that the activity has somepotential impact on risks e.g. because it introduces additional accident threats or additional hazards orscope for increased accident consequences. Examples of typical 3

rd Activities during Well Engineering

SIMOPS (CPRA) include:

Well Tie-ins by AEO (significant because of the increase in the number of personnel on the DP – typically up to 16 additional personnel, who may be at risk from any Major Accident Event duringSIMOPS)

Preventative Maintenance (PM) activities (significant because they may interfere with SCE and/orincrease in the number of personnel at risk from any Major Accident Event during SIMOPS)

Wireline activities (including „routine‟ wireline activities such as SCSSSV replacement, plug/unplug

well, GLV change-out, open/close SSD, drift run etc. - significant because they may introduceadditional accident threats and increase in the number of personnel at risk from any Major AccidentEvent during SIMOPS).

3.2.13.4 Approving 3rd

Activities

All 3rd

Activities must be defined in advance of commencing the SIMOPS program, and included in thescope of the PHP / CSHC and approved by the relevant Asset Unit and Service Unit (e.g. TSW).

Is Well Testing a ‘Third Activity’ during SIMOPS?

If the well test involves introduction of additional flammable inventory and/or potential leak sources e.g. due to bringing atest separator on-line, then yes - it must be categorised and treated as a 3

rd Activity. However, if the process facilities are

fitted with a MPFM on a line that is in continuous use, then well testing may not introduce any new hazards or threats orincrease any potential accident consequences – in which case it need not be categorised as a 3

rd Activity.

Is Perforating a ‘Third Activity’ during SIMOPS?

Usually, the answer is No, since perforating is a normal online activity within Well Engineering and is included in thedrilling program; it need not be categorised or treated as a 3

rd Activity. However, if perforating work is to be carried out

offline while producing and drilling then it should be treated as a 3rd Activity.




PIC

(DSV / CSR)Asset Unit

Engineering

ProjectsTSW

Campaign

Operations

1 Define the "third activity".

Submit proposal for inclusion in

SIMOPS program

2 Confirm activity is appropriate "third

activity".

Proposal accepted

3 Conduct hazard identification excersice(HAZID) for the proposed third activity

4 Evaluate the effect of the third activity on

overall ri sk levels for the SIMOPS

program

5 Include the third activity in the

CSHC/PHP, or rejec t itrisks intolerable

proposal rejected

Third activity included

in CSHC/PHP

6 Decide in real time whether the third

activity can be safely carried out on site

Proposal rejected

TASK

Third activity can not be carried out safely:

re-plan

Proceed with Third activity

1

2

3

11

333

4

5

3

Start Start Start

66




ensure adequate steps are taken to verify this including, when necessary, reconvening the HAZID team toensure that changes to hazards, threats and risks are captured and risks continue to be reduced to ALARP.The SIMOPS Change Proposal Form is provided as Appendix 3.

3.4 Deviation Management

Reference should be made to Deviation Management Procedure BSP-71 –Procedure-001 (Ref. 17) andShell HSSE & SP Control Framework – Management of Change.

Any deviations from SIMOPS Procedures and/or the PHP/CSHC must be Fully justified and handled usingthe above procedure and approved by the OM and the Activity Owner and the relevant Technical

Authorities.

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4 S I T E / F A C I L I T Y P R E P A R A T I O N F O R S I M O P S

Prior to any SIMOPS, preparatory works must be carried out, in order to facilitate the safe implementation

of the SIMOPS activities. The preparatory works shall include, but not be limited to, those described in thissection of the SIMOPS Process Manual.

4.1 Pre-SIMOPS Inspections and Repairs

All production facilities involved in SIMOPS programs shall be inspected by the SIMOPS project teambefore the program commences, and identified safety issues / deficiencies resulting from the inspectionsshall be rectified prior to commencement of SIMOPS. The checks to be carried out during the inspectionsare listed below. The head of Operations Support for the appropriate Asset unit will be responsible for

initiating pre-SIMOPS site / facility inspections.

Table 11. PRE-SIMOPS INSPECTION CHECKS

Item Check to be made

Platform layout andstructure *

Check the physical layout and structural integrity of the platform, including deck materials,stairs etc., to confirm suitability for the planned SIMOPS equipment / facilities and activitiesand to identify any necessary pre-SIMOPS repairs.

Hydrocarbon

containingequipment *

Check the general condition of piping, pipeline risers, vessels, flanges, pumps, valves, and

valve handles to confirm their integrity and to identify any issues or required modifications orrepairs for the planned SIMOPS activities.

Check the positions of sub-sea pipelines and risers with respect to planned MODU /workboat / barge positions for SIMOPS and anticipated anchor patterns, to identify anypipelines at risk.

Confirm the Integrity of Wellheads, Master Valves, SSV and SCSSSV, Tubing, Annuli andGas Lift Non-Return Valves.

Instrumentation andElectrical

Check the general condition of Instrumentation and Electrical Equipment to confirm theirfunctional integrity and to identify any issues or required modifications for the planned




SIMOPS Service Unit (e.g. TSW) Representative

Senior Representative of the Contractor engaged to conduct the main SIMOPS activity

Well Owner (if the SIMOPS involves well engineering or well servicing)

Maintenance Lead for the asset

Engineering Representative

AEO / AEN Representative

Asset HSE Adviser or Technical Safety Adviser.

An example pre-SIMOPS inspection checklist is provided in Appendix 7.

4.1.1 Platform Structure

The structure of the platform involved in a SIMOPS program shall be verified as being capable ofwithstanding all loads imposed on it during the program, e.g. Laydown area, DES or WIU weight andoperational loads, jacket leg for soft mooring etc.

4.1.2 Subsea Pipelines

Pipelines determined to be at risk from anchor damage or jack-up legs during MODU / work boat / barge

mobilisation and demobilisation and/or heavy lifts, must be shut down and depressurised. BSP Geomaticsand Marine Departments shall assist with these assessments and all anchor patterns and plans shall besubject to SMR review and approval.

4.1.3 Site / Seabed

The SIMOPS site / seabed shall be confirmed as suitable for the SIMOPS rig or vessel. Seabed debrissurveys shall be conducted for all drilling rigs, and soil boring for jack-up rigs.




Equipment Check to be Completed pressures reduced to zero before commencing SIMOPS.

Packers Test leak integrity. Repair as required.

Wire line plugs Identify wells that need to be plugged prior to commencing SIMOPS. Install

plugs as required.

Gas lift non-return valves Check integrity of valves. Replace with new valve required

4.1.5.1 Sub-Surface Safety Valves

Pre-SIMOPS leak tests shall be carried out for all SCSSSV in wells on the SIMOPS platform not more thanone month before the start of the SIMOPS program. The test will be based on the following requirements:

The leak test should not start until 5 minutes after the well has been closed-in, to allow liquid todrain below the SCSSSV

The leak test should last for 15 minutes. Longer tests may give a false indication of the conditionof the SCSSSV

The maximum allowable leak rate equates to a pressure build-up of 345 kPa within the 15-minuteperiod. Higher leak rates shall be investigated by Well Services.

SCSSSVs that fail the test shall be repaired before the SIMOPS commences. If this cannot be done, the

well shall be plugged and shut in for the duration of the SIMOPS program.

4.1.5.2 Gas Lift Non-Return Valves

On platforms where gas lift is installed, the non-return valves at the gas lift casing connection on producingwells shall be checked to verify they are working. The check can consist of either a leak check or removingthe valve from service and visually inspecting it. All faulty valves shall be replaced with new valves notmore than one month before the SIMOPS program commences.




that the existing system may not provide adequate coverage for SIMOPS, additional gas detection shall beprovided as follows:

For drilling and other well intervention activities that involve entering a live reservoir without awellhead in place, comprehensive temporary fixed flammable gas detection shall be provided onthe wellhead deck, and tied into the facility alarm and ESD systems

For all SIMOPS types, portable flammable gas detectors must be used to monitor all live orpotentially-live ignition sources that are not covered by temporary or permanent fixed gasdetection, and open areas of the Drilling Rig/Workboat/Barge that are within the flammable gascloud range of potential major gas leaks

Portable Hydrogen Sulphide (H2S) gas detectors shall be used in SIMOPS programs at locations

where this gas is known or suspected to be present.

4.2.2 Fire Detection

Existing fire detection systems will remain in use during SIMOPS programs. When SIMOPS is carried outat platforms where HEMP work indicates that the existing fire detection system may not provide adequatecoverage for SIMOPS, additional fire detection shall be provided and tied into the facility alarm and ESDsystems.

For certain activities such as radiography and welding/cutting, it may be necessary to isolate or override

some fire/flame detectors to avoid unnecessary alarm or shutdown. In such cases, the PTW shall considerthis, and number of detectors isolated or overridden must be kept to the minimum, a manual fire watchmust be in place, and all detectors must be reinstated as soon as the activities are completed.

4.2.3 Alarms

Audio-visual alarms to alert personnel of F&G detection and other emergencies must be provided on allfacilities involved in the SIMOPS.

The CSHC / PHP will describe the alarm system in place for each program.




4.3.1 “Live” Area Identification

Any lines and systems on or passing through the installation that do not shut down during when ESD isactivated, must be positively identified and isolated from systems that are de-activated. Markings of all livelines and systems require extraordinary efforts to ensure that they are identified correctly. Therecommended practice is for vulnerable items (such as easily damaged instrument fittings) to be markedand to operate as if all adjacent pipe work is live in the area of such vulnerable items.

4.4 Conversion of Instrument & Power Gas Systems to Compressed Air

There has been a high frequency of Loss of Containment (LOC) incidents (i.e. leaks) from small borepipework used as the primary containment for Instrument Gas (IG) Systems, mainly on NUIs. SIMOPSactivities can constitute additional LOC, ignition and/or fire & explosion escalation threats. By switching

over from hydrocarbon gas to compressed air, the risks of, and from, IG LOC and fugitive leaks, duringSIMOPS can be eliminated.

In view of the above, Instrument Gas and Power Gas systems shall be temporarily converted to Instrument Air (IA) for SIMOPS unless it can be demonstrated that not doing so presents ALARP risks (e.g. when theduration of SIMOPS is very short and no specific threats to the IG system are identified and changing overto IA would incur disproportionate cost). In addition to this, the Asset Owner needs to provide a detailMethod of Statements to demonstrate ALARP and incorporated in SIMOPS Project HSE Plan. The specificControls shall be included in PTW and effectively being implemented on site.

All instrument gas systems (e.g. COM unit, Autocon Unit, PCV actuators, etc.) and other hydrocarbon gaspowered systems, e.g. jib crane, sump pump, etc., shall be purged with nitrogen and only operated usingN2 or compressed air during SIMOPS. The hydrocarbon instrument gas supply shall be disconnected andpositively isolated.

The vent and drain facilities for instrument air supply system must not be connected with any vent anddrain facilities used for hydrocarbon gas.

An example of when it may not be reasonably practicable to convert IG to IA is stand-alone wirelineSIMOPS - because wireline activities involve relatively little equipment that could ignite a leak and POB,

Si lt O ti (SIMOPS) R t i t d




4.4.2 Nitrogen (N2) Purge

A nitrogen purge, pressurisation facility shall be available on the Work Site to ensure that all hydrocarbongases are displaced from the pneumatic system prior to switching over to air. It should also act as apressure buffer in the event a fluctuation in normal air supply and facilitate conversion to/from instrumentair without the need for facility shutdown (including for unplanned events such as barge pull-away in badweather): the required volume of N2 shall be determined taking these objectives into consideration.Furthermore, independent tie-ins for IA and N2 should be provided to avoid need to shut down the platformduring conversion.

The external air supply system tie-in must be disconnected and nitrogen purged, prior to switching theinstrument system back to hydrocarbon gas operation at the end of the Project.

4.5 Impact ProtectionImpact protection shall be provided for all equipment and piping at serious risk of being damaged bydropped or swung loads during a SIMOPS program. Impact protection can consist of a combination ofimpact-resistant decking, additional plates and procedures that ensure that dropped objects cannot fallthrough. As a general rule, platform top decks that are not „impact-resistant‟ shall be covered withLightweight Impact Protection Plates (LIPPs) for well engineering SIMOPS, and all unprotectedhydrocarbon containment systems at risk from heavy dropped or toppled or swung objects shall be shutdown).

Note that impact protection plates may not be effective against dropped „Heavy Lifts‟, which by definitionare capable of causing global deformation of support structures - with associated risk of loss ofcontainment from hydrocarbon piping, risers etc. that rely on those structures for physical support, even ifthese hydrocarbon systems are not directly in the fall zone . The traditional definition of a „Heavy Lift‟ asany lift over 5 tons weight, is only a rough guide, since the effect of a dropped object is dependent upon itsweight, shape, height of the drop and strength of the structure upon which it falls. Therefore BSP‟sTechnical Authorities for Structural Engineering, Lifting, Operations and Technical Safety, shall beconsulted regarding what protection is appropriate for each lift or category of lift.





If phenomenological modelling indicates that any personnel or critical equipment involved in the SIMOPSmay be at risk from local vents or flares, then mitigating measures shall be put in place. QRA may berequired to compare the risk reduction effects of different potential measures.





5 E X E C U T I O N O F S I M O P S P R O G R A M S

5.1 Single Point Accountability

The CSHC / PHP shall clearly define the SIMOPS management organisation, including a single pointaccountable party for the execution phase of the SIMOPS program. Normally, the OIM on site, or the DSVin the case of CPRA, will be the single point accountable party (even if the SIMOPS is at a mannedcomplex). For SIMOPS at remote locations, it may be necessary to appoint a designated OIM for theSIMOPS program.

5.2 Communication

5.2.1 Pre-SIMOPS Meeting

Prior to start of each SIMOPS program, a kick-off meeting shall be held to communicate details of theCSHC / PHP to all parties involved in the program. The Drilling Supervisor or the SIMOPS CSR/OIM willact as chairman of the meeting. It will also be attended by the Production Lead, the Operationsrepresentative and the senior contractor representative. The BSP Service Unit representative will keep arecord of the minutes of the meeting. The CSHC / PHP contents will be used as the basis for the meetingagenda.

5.2.2 Daily SIMOPS MeetingFor SIMOPS programs, a daily communication meeting will be held between all parties involved. Thefollowing people shall attend the meeting:

OIM and/or designated Operations Representative

DSV or CSR as appropriate / applicable (depending on the type of SIMOPS)

Contractor‟s Senior Representative





5.3 Arrival of the Drilling Rig/Workboat/Barge and SIMOPS Equipment

BSP Marine Services (SMR) are responsible for overseeing the safe arrival and positioning of the drillingRig or workboat or Barge at the SIMOPS host Platform. Marine Procedure Module 10 BSP-14.05-Pocedure.110 and Marine Procedure Module 06 BSP-14.05-Procedure.106 (Ref. 23 and 24) and the BSPSMR Marine MOPO apply to these operations. Notwithstanding SMR‟s responsibilities, the vessel Masterremains in command and responsible throughout for the safety of all personnel onboard and for the safemanoeuvring of his vessel.

The SIMOPS host Platform shall be shut down and depressurised prior to Rig/workboat entry into its 500mexclusion zone, unless the HAZID & ALARP Risk Assessment studies for the SIMOPS campaign havedemonstrated to the satisfaction of all parties, including BSP Technical Safety TA and the Contractor‟sWarranty Surveyor (if applicable), that the risks associated with moving in to the live platform will be

tolerable and ALARP. The ALARP Assessment shall take due account of the risks of collision both withrisers and with the platform / jacket structure and potential effects thereof.

SMR and the facility OIM or Production Lead shall discuss and agree any potential risk of potential damageto sub-sea pipelines associated with the placement and retrieval of anchors and jack-up legs/spud cans onarrival and departure of the Rig/work boat/barge. This will normally be done as part of the SIMOPS HAZID,or else as a follow-on action from the HAZID. Pipelines identified as being at risk must be depressurisedunless adequate mitigation measures can be put in place to ensure the risk is tolerable and ALARP.

Table 13. DEFAULT PLATFORM SHUTDOWN AND DEPRESSURISATION REQUIREMENTS FOR FINAL MOVE-IN AND

POSITIONING

Default Platform Shutdown and Depressurisation Requirements for Final Move-in and Positioning of DrillingRigs, Workboats and Barges

Shut in wells on SCSSSV (NB. any wells with faulty SCSSSV must be plugged as part of SIMOPS preparation – see Section 4.1.5.1)

Depressurise tubing and gas lift annuli





Use of updated Anchor Planning Charts.

5.4 Custody of Facilities

All BSP facilities must be under the control, or custody, of a BSP department at all times. Equally, nofacility can be under the custody of more than one BSP department at any time.

5.4.1 Custodian Responsibilities

The department that has custody of a facility is responsible for all activities, equipment and people at thefacility. This includes the following:

Activities relating to the operation of the equipment

Activities relating to the maintenance of the equipment

Controlling the work performed by other departments.

5.4.2 Hand-Over of Facilities

Custody of the facilities where SIMOPS is to take place shall normally be handed over from the AUOperations department to the main SIMOPS Service Unit e.g. TSW, for the duration of the SIMOPS. AnOperations Representative shall be present to support the Service Unit with advice and productionoperations interfacing while they have custody of the facilities. However, the extent of hand-over will bedependent upon the type of SIMOPS and the nature of the facility where it is to take place, e.g. for SIMOPSby a Drilling Rig or Well Intervention Unit, the entire DP or WJ shall be handed over to TSW, whereas forWell Servicing without a Drilling Rig or Well Intervention Unit present, only the well being serviced shall behanded over. For CPEMA, CPPA and Diving SIMOPS, platform/facility custody shall remain with the AssetUnit.

For large facilities e.g. multi-platform offshore complexes, extensive onshore production or processingareas, a single platform or part of the onshore facility where SIMOPS is to take place may be handed over,rather than the entire facility. As a general rule, the SIMOPS Service provider should have control over




p ( )

For partial facility hand-over, the platform or area being handed over for SIMOPS shall be separated fromthe other platforms / facility areas, with either a temporary fence, striped safety tape or sign boards.

The main SIMOPS Service Unit, e.g. TSW, will be responsible for the operation of all equipment within the

hand-over area. The AU Operations department (XOP) will remain responsible for all equipment outsidethe area.

The hand-over of the facility and the start-up of production will be carried out in two stages:-

1. The first step involves the transfer of the facility. This will occur either at the pre-SIMOPS meeting

or immediately after the drilling Rig / WIU / Work Boat arrives at the location

2. The second step involves the acceptance of SIMOPS safety equipment after it has been

commissioned. This approach has been adopted to minimise delays to the SIMOPS program.

The drilling or well intervention program can commence without the second stage of hand-over beingcompleted, provided that the facility remains shut down.

By separating the hand-over into two stages, the SIMOPS Service Unit, as the custodian of a facility, cancommence preparation work immediately upon arrival, therefore reducing delays.

5.4.3 Facility Hand-Over and Hand-Back Check Lists

Standard hand-over and hand-back check lists, as provided in Appendix 9 & Appendix 10 are to be used

whenever custody of a BSP facility is transferred as described above.

The SU DSV or CSR (as appropriate to the SIMOPS program) together with the AU GSS/FOS shall beresponsible for completing the check lists. Both the DSV/CSR and the GSS/FOS must initial theappropriate box adjacent to each question on the check lists and sign and date the hand-over box at theend of the check list, to signify their agreement.

Work can only commence on SIMOPS programs once the Hand-Over check list has been completed andsigned by the DSV/CSR – indicating that he is satisfied that the Asset integrity has been verified andSIMOPS-related equipment has been successfully commissioned.




p ( )

Table 15. DEFAULT PLATFORM SHUTDOWN AND DEPRESSURISATION REQUIREMENTS FOR HELIDECK LIFTS AND

RIG-UP /DOWN INVOLVING HEAVY LIFTS

Default Platform Shutdown and Depressurisation Requirements heavy lifts e.g. during Rig-Up and Rig-Down

Shut in wells on SCSSSV (NB. any wells with faulty SCSSSV must be plugged as part of SIMOPSpreparation – see Section 4.1.5.1)

Depressurise tubing and gas lift annuli

Depressurise all hydrocarbon-containing surface facilities

Isolate sub-sea pipelines

Depressurise any sub-sea pipelines that are deemed to be at risk from dropped or swung heavy objects, due

to direct impact on the pipeline or its riser, or loss of structural support to the riser.

5.6 Other (Heavy) Lifts and Equipment Moves

All lifts during SIMOPS shall be strictly controlled and planned in accordance with BSP Lifting and HoistingPolicy and Standard (Ref. 25). Hydrocarbon facilities and equipment at risk from dropped or swung loadsshall either be protected against impacts – in accordance with Section 4.5 of this document, or shutdownand depressurised, unless the risks of not doing so can be demonstrated to be tolerable and ALARP. Inaddition to the default rules provided in sections 5.3 and 5.5 above for heavy vessel movements and rig-

up/rig-down, the following requirements shall be adhered to during SIMOPS.

Table 16. DEFAULT PLATFORM SHUTDOWN AND DEPRESSURISATION REQUIREMENTS FOR OTHER (HEAVY) LIFTS AND EQUIPMENT MOVES

Activity Facility Default Actions

All lifts Any Do not lift over, or close proximity to, people or unprotected livehydrocarbon-containing equipment (pipes, vessels, wells, flowlinesetc.).




Potential fall damage areas for dropped objects should be identified and captured in the facility layoutdrawings. When conducting the assessment to identify these areas, the following must be taken intoaccount:

All required lifting operations with potential to cause significant structural damage and/orhydrocarbon LOC if the load is dropped – this depends on the weight, shape and height of the liftedobject, but as a general rule, all tubulars and all other lifted items above 2 tons can be assumed tofall into this category

The lift path

All structures and equipment directly underneath and immediately adjacent to the lift path, includinghydrocarbon containment systems below decks and sub-sea

The location of temporary equipment required for SIMOPS, which may be vulnerable to impactse.g. Oxy Acetylene bottles

Tall structures that present a collision hazard for the crane boom or load

The capabilities and limits of the crane or hoist that is being used for the lift

The possibility of loads "swinging" due to adverse weather or operator error

Any structural anomalies that may have a bearing on the safety of the lift or the consequences of adropped load.

5.7 Station Start-Up

If the SIMOPS host facility has been shut down for any reason, e.g. for rig-up at the beginning of aSIMOPS program, then start-up will be performed by Operations. If Operations are not the custodian of theplatform/facility at that time, then a Permit To Work approved by the installation custodian (ref. Section 5.4) shall be required for start-up. The following requirements must be satisfied for commencement / re-commencement of production during SIMOPS:

Introduction of hydrocarbons (initial start up) is to be carried out during the hours of daylight only




The OIM, or DSV /CSR if the facility has been handed over, shall authorise all hot work permitsand validate for work on the drilling rig/work boat/barge/service equipment

The Area Authority will be responsible for all PTW implementation on the BSP facilities. Area

Authority must visit the worksite together with the Worksite Supervisor before work is allowed tocommence

All work activities shall be covered by PTW including those considered routine under normaloperations

PTW applications shall be submitted in advance to allow sufficient time for assessment

A PIP Control Board shall be in place to monitor and control all work activities.

If SIMOPS is being carried out on part of a facility only e.g. one platform in a manned complex, and custodyof the single platform or site area where SIMOPS is being carried out is transferred to the Service Unit,then the Service Unit will be responsible for issuing permits only for the platform or site area for which theyhave custody. Operations will continue to issue the permits for the remainder of the facility/complex.However, to avoid potential conflicts between Operations and Service Unit activities, all permits must becountersigned by the adjacent area/platform custodian i.e. the DSV or CSR (as applicable) countersigns allpermits for work carried out on platforms adjacent to the SIMOPS platform, and similarly, the SOScountersigns all permits for work on the SIMOPS platform. The SOS and DSV/CSR must also keep eachother informed of any non-permit work under their control, which could affect the safety of others.

It must be noted that all activities, which are not a part of normal production or drilling operations aredefined as “third activities”. In addition to normal PTW requirements, these activities cannot be carried outduring the SIMOPS program unless they meet the requirements included in Section 3.2.13.4 of thisdocument.

5.8.1 PTW Restrictions

Issuance of permits for activities that have an inherent risk of causing, or igniting, a hydrocarbon leakduring SIMOPS, are subject to additional restrictions – as described in Sections 5.12.2 and 5.13.3 below.




2. Pressurised process lines being isolated using two block valves with a bleed line between them(i.e. double block and bleed).

5.10.1 Positive IsolationPositive isolation means total isolation from a potentially hazardous source (e.g. hydrocarbons, power orradiation). Only properly installed spades and blinds can be considered as a means of positive isolationfrom hazardous hydrocarbon materials.

The use of the spectacle blinds is recommended, especially for line size 6-inch and above, andrecommendations should be incorporated into the spading plan of the design package wherever positiveisolation is required for SIMOPS work activities.

Where spading and blinding is not possible, double block and bleed valves arrangement is acceptable.

The valves shall be tagged to indicate the reason for closure. They shall be padlocked after closure and/ orhave their hand wheels removed.

5.10.2 Isolation and Spading Implementation

Individual equipment isolation plans shall be appended in the Master Isolation Plan. The OIM (ordesignated equivalent person) shall have overall responsibility for the installation and removal of positiveisolation. All parties including OIM, WS, CSR, Contractor Construction Superintendent and projectengineer should review the marked up spading drawings provided in the work pack and agree on any

changes.Positive isolation shall be indicated by a RED isolation tag, whereas a YELLOW tag shall be used forconstruction spades or blinds.

The isolations shall be verified as per the "Master Isolation Plan" by following through, line-by-line andcross-referring to the positive isolation checklist. Any last minute changes in position or requirement ofspades shall be left to OIM's decision and authorization. Upon completion of the positive isolation check,the OIM, CSR and Complex Supervisor shall sign the appropriate columns in the positive isolationchecklist.




5.12 Hot Work

In view of the increased risks during SIMOPS, hot work must be avoided whenever possible, and mustbe very strictly controlled when it can not be avoided. The following sub-sections define additional

requirements for the restriction and control of hot work during SIMOPS.

5.12.1 General Requirements

Hot work is only permitted in 2 areas per platform at any one level

During hot work, there shall be:

o No local venting of hydrocarbons to atmosphere

o

No draining of hydrocarbons to drip panso No process system bleeding down, sampling and draining of hydrocarbons/mixtures

o No pigging operations carried out

o A Fire Watcher in attendance at the worksite whenever hot work is being carried out, andfor an agreed period after the work is finished

All key personnel should be supplied with radio communication

Category 1 hot work shall be contained within a „habitat‟ – either of the pressurised type (see

5.12.2 below) or, if the hotwork is outside of all HAC zones, a standard (fit for purpose) fireretardant 5+1 sides habitat (refer to Appendix 11), deployed to contain hot work slag/sparks(ignition sources), and the bottom floor of the habitat is wetted

Activities located in the vicinity of the sump area also require close monitoring by the Area Authority or similarly competent operational staff

Sufficient lighting to be provided to all activities and specific to sump areas during poor visibility ordarkness




Type of Hot Work Permissions and Conditions

Zone 0 Zone 1 Zone 2

overridden.

3. Authorised Signatoryappointed by the OIM is onsite at all times monitoringthe activities and situation.

4. A qualified firewatcher ispresent at the Hot WorkSite at all times.

5. All other conditions listedbelow (under “All Hot

Work”) are complied with.

overridden.

3. Authorised Signatoryappointed by the OIM is onsite at all times monitoringthe activities and situation.

4. A qualified firewatcher ispresent at the Hot WorkSite at all times.

5. All other conditions listedbelow (under “All Hot

Work”) are complied with.

All Hot Work Notallowed

Maybe allowed, subject to Category 1 hotwork restrictions listed above,and provided that all the following conditions are met:

1) No well testing or live safety valve testing.

2) Within the process system, no bleeding down, venting, sampling,draining of hydrocarbons or mixtures.

3) Isolation of all hydrocarbons to drip pans, including sight glasses.

4) Drip pans are sprayed with water while work is in progress.

5) Check for leaks around nearby flanges while work is in progress.6) Fire retardant blanket or tarpaulin (not blue commercial plastic

sheeting) is available especially around hot turbine exhaust stacks.

7) A gas tester is onsite to check levels prior to hot work and during it, asspecified by Authorised Signatory (AS) on the PTW. Such testingshall be performed using portable gas detection units and as aminimum shall cover the area within a radius of 3 metres surroundingthe hot work site, at up wind points and close to any potential sourcesof hydrocarbon leaks. These requirements are additional to any

i i f ili i ‟ d i




The sump must be evacuated of any hydrocarbon liquids and verified before any hot work isauthorised

The power gas supply line to the sump pump is positively isolated

Fire resistant physical barriers have been erected to contain falling sparks and hot slag

Physical barriers have been erected to contain falling objects when personnel are working at aheight of more than two metres above the normal working level. Otherwise, no one should beallowed to work below the area

All critical valves especially those on scraper launchers/receivers must be proven to be positivelyisolated

All calibration and re-certification of relief valves are valid

All open ended hydrocarbon pipes have been plugged or spaded

The following facilitates equipment has been checked to confirm certification details are valid :

All portable fire fighting equipment

Lifeboats and Life rafts

Hoisting and Lifting appliances / equipment

Installation Portable Fire fighting equipment must not be used for hot work

All known system leaks, passing valves, out of date certification of unserviceable equipment hasbeen listed and a copy of the list attached to the work permit

The barrel isolating valves around Scraper Launchers and Receivers have been inspected, and allscraper barrels in the area filled with water and then pressurized.

5.12.4 Gas Testing

T f i t i th f h t k ti iti th h t SIMOPS P j t t i t




5. There shall be clear communication of the scope of work and planning/scheduling/executionmanagement between offshore and onshore operations/execution personnel

6. The facility shall have been inspected adequately and deemed safe to proceed with the required

blast cleaning and painting work. All inspected and identified PARs (in particular INTERNAL corrosion), SARs and defects of concerns shall thus be clearly recorded and communicated to allparties involved

7. All other concurrent works (e.g. welding and cutting) within or near-by the same facility where theblast cleaning and painting work will be executed, must be clearly identified along with interfacesand controls

8. Daily regular and real-time work planning and progress reporting meetings shall be held on-sitebetween the Operations and Executing parties, including the weekly-look-ahead plan/schedule.

5.13.1 High Pressure Water Jetting

HSE Module Standard 25 (High Pressure Water Jetting) shall be used as a starting reference guide toidentify all related hazards, assess their risks and put appropriate precautionary measures (and mitigations)into place to effectively manage the intended work at any specific facility. If there are 5B hazardsassociated with the SIMOPS, the Emergency Escape arrangements must comply to DEM2 PSBR3.

Cleaning by high pressure water jetting, may be required prior to blast cleaning and painting activities, andin some cases before some welding activities. They are normally used to remove drilling muds, grease, oil

contaminants and loose rusts from the work surfaces.

Prior to any platform cleaning operation, all unaffected areas are to be physically protected and masked toavoid injury to personnel and damage to sensitive equipment e.g. electrical and instrumentation equipment.

High pressure water jetting may be used with the inclusion of suitable detergents. Any detergents usedshall be those approved by the company as “Safe to Use” and bio-degradable.

5.13.2 Blasting




4. Reinstatement of cathodic protection electrical cables to each pipeline risers shall be done andelectrically verified upon completion of the blast cleaning and painting activities. This is to ensurethe individual subsea pipeline remains under effective cathodic protection against externalcorrosion

5. All safeguarding and sensitive equipment e.g. pressure and temperature gauges (not includingportable fire extinguishers) shall be properly masked and protected against any damages from theblast cleaning and painting activities

6. The actual number of blast cleaning nozzles/personnel per specific facility shall be individuallyassessed and shall largely depend on the complexity of the working areas and safe monitoringconsiderations. This item shall be clearly recorded within the specific PTW assessed and issuedfor that facility

7. Piping Contact Point and Pipe Support structural areas – surface preparation and cleaning ofrusted areas within these specific locations shall only be executed when proper inspections hasbeen done and concluded that it is safe to proceed

8. All rotating equipment and critical components shall be adequately protected and masked toprevent any detrimental ingress of airborne blast cleaning debris

9. Where the blast cleaning has exposed any areas of integrity concerns on the facility, the work shallstop immediately and the Operations Area Authority shall be immediately informed of the exposedconcerns

10. Where dry blast cleaning is carried out in the vicinity of accommodation units, air quality checkswithin the units shall be conducted upon commencement of and periodically during the blast-cleaning program. If air quality falls below acceptable levels (HSE) the accommodation units shallbe de-manned or blast cleaning shall cease

11. Static electricity is identified as a potential ignition source. To minimise the build-up of staticelectricity several precautionary measures are to be strictly implemented:

a. Effective earthing and grounding of the work facilities and the blast cleaning/paintingi d l PPE




For Gas Compression areas, dry abrasive blast cleaning shall not be allowed due to the concernswith sparks generation, ignition sources and detrimental ingestion of airborne blast debris into theturbines‟ intake. Therefore:

- Only wet abrasive blast cleaning or high pressure water jet cleaning shall be allowed

- Small scale/spot hand tool surface preparation may be considered if it can be demonstrated to besafe to execute

Piping Contact Point and Pipe Support structural areas – surface preparation and cleaning ofrusted areas within these specific locations shall only be executed when proper inspections hasbeen done and concluded that it is safe to proceed

Structural Staircase, Stair Tread and Drip Pans – adequate integrity pre-inspections shall be

verified to be safe on such corroded items before allowing any blast cleaning or painting work toproceed on-site

Hand/power tool surface preparation by hammer chipping shall not be allowed

During spray painting application, it must be noted that flammable chemical solvents within the

liquid paint are liberated. Thus adequate ventilation, identification and elimination of all ignitionsources (including static electricity) are paramount for safe work.

The following additional restrictions shall be applied for work in hazardous areas (HAC Zones):

In Zone 0, no surface preparation or cleaning or painting shall be allowed. All work shall only bedone during Shutdown Mode

In Zone 1, dry abrasive blast cleaning shall not be allowed

- Wet abrasive blast cleaning or high pressure water jet cleaning or hand tool surface preparationmay be considered if it can be demonstrated to be safe to execute

In Zone 1, any surface preparation/cleaning and painting to be considered and assessed shall belimited to only small spot areas within that specific facility. The painting shall be by brush




5.14 Underwater Activities

The use of Remotely Operated Vehicles (ROVs) or divers, at live production facilities and/or simultaneouslywith above-water activities, requires special precautions. Any such activities must be captured in the

SIMOPS HAZID and CSHC/PHP and must conform to all relevant BSP standards and other standardsadopted or specified by AEO/4, as well as detailed work procedures approved by AEO/4.

Underwater activities should not be undertaken simultaneously with overhead / over-the side lifting or in thevicinity of pump inlets or boat propellers unless the pumps/engines are shut down and isolated to preventinadvertent start-up.

BSP 02-Standard-1652, HSE Standard Module 18 – Diving & ROV Operations shall be applied, and nodiving activity shall be conducted unless an approved diving PTW is in place.

5.15 Shift Changes During SIMOPS Programs

When shift changes occur during a SIMOPS programs. The PIC shall prepare a detailed, written SIMOPShand-over for the incoming person. The hand-over will include, but not limited to, the following : –

A list of active and suspended work permits, special hazards precautions and established barriers

Lifting activities

Work plan for the next day.

Refer to handover procedure BSP-71-Standard-011.

5.16 Emergency Response

The CSHC/PHP shall include an Emergency Response Plan, with an Emergency Response Organogramand clearly defined Roles and Responsibilities for all key personnel.

5.16.1 On Scene Commander (OSC)








of the events. If the emergency has the potential to affect the drilling platform, all wells and equipmentmust be shut-in by activating an emergency shutdown of the platform.

5.16.1.3 Partial Facility hand-over

In the case of partial Facility hand-over for SIMOPS e.g. when just the DP of a manned offshore complexhas been handed-over from the AU to the Service Unit, for SIMOPS, then, the AU Operations OIM shallcontinue to act as OSC for emergencies on parts of the facility not handed over. The Operations OIM willbe responsible for securing all facilities and areas except for those handed over e.g. the DP, which is underTSW control. The Operations OIM shall inform the Service Provider‟s Senior Representative of theemergency as well as contacting the appropriate emergency services.

5.16.1.4 OSC Responsibility

No matter who is assigned the role, the OSC shall have primary responsibility for directing and ensuringsafe effective response to any emergency, including contacting and interfacing with the appropriateemergency services and other key personnel involved in the SIMOPS and/or with responsibility for thelocation / facilities. In particular, the OSC will establish contact with the Duty Emergency Coordinator (EC)and, if the Emergency Coordination Team (ECT) is mobilised, maintain contact through the designatedOperations Advisor in the ECT. Once mobilised, the ECT takes over the coordination of the onshoresupport. Refer to BSP-02-Procedure-0359 Emergency Coordination Procedure and BSP-02-Procedure-0384 Well Engineering Emergency Procedure and BSP-02-Procedure Integrated Emergency ResponseManagement System (Ref. 13, 14, 15) for details of responsibilities and actions in an emergency.

5.16.2 Emergency Escape

There shall be at least two independent means of escape from all platforms and sites involved in SIMOPS.For example: the first means of escape may be to the drilling tender, jack-up rig or workboat, and thesecond means of escape may be either by bridge (for bridge linked platforms) or by the boat landing (forstand-alone platforms).

The escape, muster locations, temporary refuge, evacuation and rescue arrangements should be


















6 M A N A G E M E N T R E V I E W

6.1 After Action Reviews

The AE is responsible for initiating and conducting an AAR for each (or a group of) SIMOPS program(s)carried out onsite or offsite. The results of the review shall be used for the planning of subsequentSIMOPS programs.

A brief report on AAR should contain the following:

An assessment of the success of the program (i.e. the interaction of activities, not the individualactivities themselves)

The results of any HSE incidents or audits during the program

Any errors in the assumptions used in the HAZID, ALARP or MOPO

Any relevant input from other departments or contractors involved in the program

The cost of carrying out the SIMOPS program compared to the planned cost

The actual production deferral compared to the planned deferral

The Non Productive Time (NPT) effect and cost of any delays work boat/barge

Any improvement of the location is cascaded to subsequent SIMOPS for lessons learnt.

6.2 BSP71-Procedure-003 SIMOPS Process Manual Updates

A formal review of the SIMOPS Process Requirements shall be carried out every 5 years, to ensureoperational and safety needs continue to be met. The review will be initiated by the SIMOPS ProcessManual Custodian and will cover the following:

The accuracy and effectiveness of the SIMOPS process




7 R E F E R E N C E S

1. DEP 37.17.10.11-Gen “Design of offshore temporary refuges”

2. DEP 34.17.10.35-gen for well sites (for onshore SIMOPS)

3. HSSE & SP Control Framework Documented Demonstration of ALARP Guide: Preparing and HSE

Case, Version 1

4. EP Procedure „HSE Case‟, Document number EP2005-0310-PR-10

5. EP Specification „Manual of Permitted Operations (MOPO)‟, Document number EP2005-0300-SP-

04

6. Guide to Application of BSP HSE Risk Tolerability and Control Acceptance Criteria (BSP ALARPFramework), Document number BSP-02.Guideline-005

7. HSE Case, Volume 3 - HEMP Requirements, Tools and Techniques, Document number EP2005-

0310, 2006

8. BSP HSE Management Manual, Document number BSP-02-Guideline-0367, Rev 6.0, January

2009

9. BSP-71-Standard-002 Statement of Fitness

10. BSP Standard HSE Modules 01 to 51

11. BSP-02 Guideline-022 HAZID

12. Shell Upstream International Asia (UIA) Support Services Directorate HSE Function ALARP

Framework UIA Guideline Issue Rev 0, April 2008

13. BSP-02-Procedure-0359 “Emergency Coordination Procedure”




29. BSP-71-Standard-002 Statement of Fitness, Revision 1.0 May 2011

30. BSP Matrix Of Permitted Operations (MOPO) document number BSP-71-Procedure-016

31. BSP-02-Standard-1646, HSE Standard Module 8

32. BSP71- Procedure -017 Readiness For Shut Down

33. BSP-71-WI-GEN.225.1 Depressurisation and Flushing of Oil Flowline

34. BSP-71-WI-GEN.225.2 Depressurisation and Flushing of Gas Flowline

35. BSP-71-WI-GEN.91.1 Isolation for Maintenance or Modification Work

36. BSP-71-WI-GEN.91.2 Isolation for Personnel Entry

37. BSP-71-WI-GEN.91.3 Isolation of Equipment for Extended Period

38. BSP-71-WI-GEN.91.4 Isolation of Equipment Containing Toxic Gas or Liquid

39. BSP-71-WI-GEN.91.5 Isolation of Gas Well for Long Term Closed In

40. BSP-71-WI-GEN.91.6 Isolation of Oil Well for Long Term Closed In

41. BSP-71-WI-GEN.91.8 Isolation of Oil Well for Short Term Close In

42. BSP-71-WI-GEN.91.x Mechanical Isolation of Production Equipment

43. BSP-71-WI-GEN.220 Gas Freeing and Cleaning of Process Vessels

44. BSP-71-Procedure-013-Hose Register Procedure

Simultaneous Operations (SIMOPS) RESTRICTED



















8 A P P E N D I C E S


Appendix 1 – Generic SIMOPS Task list

“R” = Required for each SIMOPS program / location. “R*” = Required but can be done for a batch of similar SIMOPS programs within one AU. “O” = Optional

Engineering / Painting Underwater Well Well Well Services Form Template or Guideline

http://sww-livelink.bsp.shell.bn/livelink/llisapi.dll?func=ll&objId=10769886&objAction=Open&viewType=1&nexturl=%2Flivelink%2Fllisapi%2Edll%3Ffunc%3Dll%26objid%3D10750450%26objAction%3Dbrowse%26sort%3Dname

http://sww-livelink.bsp.shell.bn/livelink/llisapi.dll?func=ll&objId=10769886&objAction=Open&viewType=1&nexturl=%2Flivelink%2Fllisapi%2Edll%3Ffunc%3Dll%26objid%3D10750450%26objAction%3Dbrowse%26sort%3Dname



BSP-71-Procedure-003 Simultaneous Operations of 87

Hardcopy documents are not controlled unless verified and recorded in t he BSP71 Procedure Master Inventory

Task

Engineering /Construction /Maintenance

(CPEMA)

Painting(CPPA)

UnderwaterOperations

(Diving)

WellEngineering

(CPRA)

WellInterventions

(WIU)

Well Services Form, Template or Guideline

CTU Wireline &Hoist

Evaluate work as SIMOPS and non-SIMOPS.Prepare justification and initial riskassessment. Request activity to be carriedout as SIMOPS

R R R R R R R SIMOPS Initiation Approval Form

Include in Integrated Activity Plan (IAP) R R R R R R R Approve SIMOPS proposal R R R R R R R SIMOPS Initiation Approval Form

Initial review of the program. Identify anyissues which could jeopardise the program

R R R R R R R

Conduct initial pre-SIMOPS facility inspection.Include safety related items such as handrails,stairs, lighting etc.

R R R R R R RSIMOPS Site visit checklist

Confirmation of Integrity Memos

Check integrity of platform structure; inspectfacility piping, vessels and risers. Issue repairplans (If necessary). Issue integrity statementfor installation (structure and hydrocarboncontainment systems)

R R R R R R R

CIRRAS


Check functional integrity of facility Process

Safeguarding systems including detectors,ESD valves

R R R R R R R CIRRAS


Check integrity of Wells. Issue repair plans (Ifnecessary). Issue integrity statement forWells

R R R R EWIMS


Perform HAZID and ALARP Assessment, andreview of the generic MOPO (or develop anew MOPO for the program), determine needfor further HEMP studies (e.g. QRA EFA)

R* R* R* R R R* R* EP 95-0312, HSSE & SP ControlFramework, BSP StandardisedHAZID & ALARP worksheets

Perform further HEMP studies (e.g. QRAEFA) if any were deemed necessary by theHAZID or by BSP Technical Safety TA

O O O O O O OEP 95-0300 & EP 2005-0300series, and BSP HEMP Studyguidelines

Initiate development of PHP R R R R R PHP Template

Initiate development of CSHC R R CSHC Template

Complete engineering design of requiredplatform modifications (if any)

R R R R R R RShell DEPs


Task

Engineering /Construction /Maintenance

(CPEMA)

Painting(CPPA)

UnderwaterOperations

(Diving)

WellEngineering

(CPRA)

WellInterventions

(WIU)

Well Services Form, Template or Guideline

CTU Wireline &Hoist




Hardcopy documents are not controlled unless verified and recorded in t he BSP71 Procedure Master Inventory

Complete repairs for process piping, processvessels, risers, wells, process safeguardingsystems, safety related items

R R R R R R R

Final pre-SIMOPS inspection to confirmrepairs and modifications complete R R R R R R R

SIMOPS Site visit checklist


Issue work pack and spading plan and

approvalR

Approve and issue PHP R R R R R PHP Template

Approve and issue CSHC R R CSHC Template

Confirm functionality of Shutdown Systems R R R R R R R

Arrange work boat/barge/equipment/drilling rigto move to location

R R R R R R R

Take custody of platform/facility/site fromOperations

O O R R OHandover checklist

Install and test SIMOPS equipment at facility R R R R R R R

Perform pre-SIMOPS emergency responseexercise and conduct on-site SIMOPS kick-offmeeting

R R R R R R RSIMOPS program PHP / CSHC

Commence and carry out SIMOPS workprogram

R R R R R R RHandover Checklist

Inspect facility at the end of the SIMOPS workprogram and perform any necessaryrectification work including removal ofSIMOPS equipment and cleaning

R R R R R R R

Return custody of platform/facility/site toOperations

O O R R OHand-back Checklist

Conduct after Action Review of SIMOPSprogram

R* R* R* R* R* R* R* AAR Template




Appendix 2 – SIMOPS Initiation Approval Form

SIMOPS INITIATION APPROVAL FORM

(1) SCOPE/ACTIVITYBrief description of specific scope of work, activities involved location and duration.INCLUDE PROGRAM MILESTONES.

(2) MAIN RISKS/EXPOSURES

Identify and rank risks and exposures specific to scope/activity in item (1).

(3) MITIGATION MEASURES

List risk reduction measures specific to the risks identified in (2) to demonstrate risk level is ALARP.

(4) RECOMMENDATIONS

To proceed or not to proceed SIMOPS with justifications. (Indicate impact of executing work without SIMOPS)

(5) Proposed by : Project Engineer/ Well Engineer/ Well Services Engineer/ Maintenance Engineer

Signature: ………………………………. Indicator: ………… Date: ………………….. (6) Endorsed by: Project Leader/ Head of Wells Delivery Team/ Head of Well Service/ Maintenance EngineeringManager/ Head of Engineering Services




Appendix 3 – SIMOPS Change Proposal Form

CHANGE CONTROL TO SIMOPS PROGRAM

1) DESCRIPTION OF DEVIATION

2) RISKS/EXPOSURES INCURRED 3) ADDITIONAL MITIGATION MEASURES PUT INPLACE

4) RECOMMENDATION

(5) Proposed by : Project Engineer/ Maintenance Engineer

Signature: ………………………………. Indicator: …………… Date: …………..

(6) Endorsed by: Project Leader/ Maintenance Engineering Manager/ Head of Engineering Services




Appendix 4 – PHP Cover page, Signatory page & Suggested Table of Contents

PHP COVER PAGE

Brunei Shell Petroleum Company Sendirian Berhad

Restr icted

BSP-xx.xx-Procedure-nnn

P R O J E C T H S E P L A N

T H I S D O C U M E N T D E S C R I B E S T H E




PHP SIGNATORY PAGE

SIGNATORIES PAGE FOR PHP

Proposed by : Project Engineer/ Maintenance Engineer/ Head of Maintenance Execution/ Head ofMaintenance Improvement and Inspection


Endorsed by: Project Leader/ Maintenance Engineering Manager/ Head of Engineering Services


(7) Endorsed by:


(8) Endorsed by: Technical Safety Lead





SUGGESTED PHP TABLE OF CONTENTS

I Cover Page

II Signatory Page

III List of Abbreviations

1.0 INTRODUCTION

1.1 Executive Summary

1.2 Objectives

2.0 WORKSCOPE

2.1 Summary2.2 Detail

3.0 HSE MANAGEMENT

3.1 Organisation, Roles and Responsibilities

3.1.1 Single Point Accountability

3.1.2 Organisation Structure

3.1.3 Roles and Responsibilities

3.2 PTW Management3.2.1 PTW Interfaces

3.2.2 PTW Signatories

3.2.3 JHA

3.3 Change Control

3.4 Emergency Response

3.4.1 Overview

3 4 2 Organisation




Appendix 5 – Structure and Contents of a Campaign-Specific SIMOPS HSE Case(CSHC)

The preferred structure for a Campaign-Specific SIMOPS HSE Case (CSHC) is that of the Shell UIAHSE Case template, as reproduced below.


Appendix 6 – Process Safety Basic Requirements - Brief Reference




Hardcopy documents are not controlled unless verified and recorded in the BSP71 Procedure Master Inventory

Appendix 6 Process Safety Basic Requirements Brief Reference







Appendix 7 – Pre-SIMOPS Facility Inspection Checklist



Appendix 7 Pre SIMOPS Facility Inspection Checklist

The following is an example; the exact content may vary depending on the type of Asset and type ofSIMOPS.

Visit Participants Name Company / Indicator

Absentees:

ITEM / CATEGORY FINDINGS/REMARKSACTIONPARTY

COMMENTS /ACTIONS STATUS

1. SAFETY EQUIPMENT

1.0 Has a life raft been installed on the


ACTION COMMENTS /



ITEM / CATEGORY FINDINGS/REMARKS PARTY ACTIONS STATUS

2. PROCESS EQUIPMENT

2.0 Any red PAR or / and orange-TAanomalies have been reported as stillpending in the CIRRAS Integrity Status?

2.1 The risk of a dangerous (to the rig)release of HC from process trips via ventstack is inherent in the QRA documentPLL (potential loss of life) calculation.Specific modelling of gas clouds has onlybeen explicitly studied for instrument gasreleases however. In the opinion of theTSW DSV is the vent stack positioned

sufficiently far from the DES to accept therisk of a HC release during the CPRAactivities?

2.2 Have HC deposits in all processequipment drip pans been cleaned?

2.3 Is there any evidence of leakingvalves, pump packing, flanges or otherequipment? If so have these items beenidentified by WOP for repair prior to rigmove?

3. PLATFORM STRUCTURALINTEGRITY

3.0 Have AED inspected the platformand confirmed that it is capable ofwithstanding the load associated with thedrilling operations?

3.1 Do any well heads require collarclamps to be fitted?


ACTION COMMENTS /




5.0 The skid beams clear and in goodcondition?

5.1 Here any preparation work that couldbe done in advance of the rig‟s arrival?

6. PLATFORM MODIFICATIONS

6.0 Modification of the LIPPS platesbeen completed?

6.1 The LIPPs plates delivered in time?

6.2 Here any requirement to modifyplatform beams and or hatch covers forwellheads and risers?

6.3 Could this work be conducted inadvance?

6.4 The increased height of the BOPdeck associated with the LIPPs plateinstallation been included in the drillingriser designs? This issue has previouslybeen a problem.

7. INSTRUMENTATION

7.0 The instrumentation requiringcovering for protection against drillingfluids been identified?

7.1 Have appropriate covers beeninstalled?

7.2 Historically scaffolds and tarpaulinshave been used to cover productionmanifolds on the main deck to protectagainst drilling mud etc.

7.3 Is it prudent to install similar


ACTION COMMENTS /




11.1 POB control. Some personalarriving via platform unannounced.

11.2 Crane on platform?

11.3 Anchor Pattern

11.4 Cement Grouting on Conductors

11.5 General Housekeeping

11.6 Instrument Gas

11.7 Timber on main deck of platform

11.8 Helideck Number

11.9 Helideck issues

11.10 How much does drilling take over?

11.11 Drilling activity schedule

11.12 Escape/access routes?

11.13 Rig alarm system

12.14 IPP planning

12.15 Eyewash

12. AOB


Appendix 8 – Confirmation of Integrity Memos



Appendix 8 – Confirmation of Integrity Memos

MEMO 1: Confirmation of Structural Integrity

From:Name: Senior Structural Engineer Ref. Indicator:

Signature:

To:SIMOPS CoordinatorName:Ref. Indicator:

Date:

Subject:

SIMOPS preparation – Confirmation of Structural Integrity.

Platform/Facility:

In preparation for the planned SIMOPS program at the above platform/facilities, the structure of theplatform/facilities has been assessed based on the activities included in the program.

Provided the loads encountered during the program do not exceed the loads specified, the platformstructure is suitable for this SIMOPS program.

The strength of the decks has also been assessed in relation to potential impact from dropped objects.The following modifications and additional protection are recommended to provide adequate protection.

Specific for Drilling Activities/WIU:

Drilling/well intervention activity is scheduled for ………… using the ……… rig.

The ……….. DES imposes approximately ………tonnes operational load directly on the platform. Thedrilling platform has been analysed for its capacity and reliability to cater for this additional weight. Theanalysis shows that no strengthening is required for the platform with limited operational loading on themain deck.


I confirm that all piping, vessels and risers at the platform (or platforms) are “Fit For Purpose” inaccordance ith the r les established in the Global FSR S stem Therefore all req ired anomalies ha e



accordance with the rules established in the Global FSR System. Therefore, all required anomalies havebeen either repaired or isolated, before the commencement of SIMOPS.

MEMO 3: Confirmation of Instrumentation and Electrical Equipment Integrity.

From:Name: Asset Maintenance Lead Ref. Indicator:

Signature:

To: SIMOPS CoordinatorName:Ref. Indicator:

Date:

Subject:

SIMOPS preparation – Confirmation of Instrumentation and Electrical

Equipment Integrity.

Platform/Facility:

In preparation for the planned SIMOPS program at the above platform/facilities, an evaluation has beencarried out on the condition of the Instrumentation, emergency shutdown system and electricalequipment. This evaluation and any necessary inspection have been carried out less than one monthbefore the planned start of the SIMOPS at the platform.

I confirm that all instrumentation, shutdown system and electrical equipment are “Fit For Purpose” of

carrying out SIMOPS at the platform/facility.

MEMO 4: Confirmation of Safety Related Item Integrity

From:Name: Asset Maintenance Lead Ref. Indicator:

Signature:

SIMOPS Coordinator


MEMO 5: Confirmation of Integrity on Well head, Master Valve, SSV and SCSSSV, Tubing, AnnulusIntegrity Checks and Gas Lift Non Return Valves



Integrity Checks and Gas Lift Non-Return Valves

From:Name: Field/Complex Operations Supervisor Ref. Indicator:

Signature:

To:SIMOPS CoordinatorName:Ref. Indicator:

Date:

Subject:SIMOPS preparation – Confirmation of Integrity on Well head, MasterValve, SSV and SCSSSV, Tubing, Annulus Integrity Checks and Gas LiftNon-Return Valves

Platform/Facility:

In preparation for the planned SIMOPS program, the “yearly routine maintenance” integrity checks werecarried out by TSW/4 on the following items on the platform/wells –

Well heads

Master Valves

SSV

SCSSSV

Tubing and Annuli.

These checks were carried within one month before the start of the SIMOPS. The results of the checksare attached. In addition the following requirement must be sustained and implemented:-

A correct rated pressure gauge must be installed in the well head cap for each well, and annuligauges


Appendix 9 – Host Facility Hand Over Checklist





FACILITY HAND-OVER CHECKLIST

No. Action / Check YES NO N/A*Checked

by

Confirmed

by

Comments

*If action is “N/A”, state why here

Section 1 – Host Facility Integrity

1 All Red PARs and Orange TAS on HC lines have been closed

out (or else the process sections isolated, depressurised and

tagged).

2 All SRIs have been closed out (except where they form part of

the SIMOPS work scope) and the structure has been verified

as fit-for-purpose, for the SIMOPS equipment and activities

(including imposed loads).

3 All remaining non-critical Anomalies have been clearly tagged

for easy identification.

4 The integrity of all production wells has been checked andconfirmed, and any problems have been rectified or else the

problem well has been plugged.

5 SCSSSV and SSV are of a failsafe design and have been

leak tested within the last three month.

6 There are no wells with potential for unacceptable (700 kPag)

annuli pressure build up.

7 A full ESDV “close/open” test was carried out [date]

8 Fire detection system have been tested [date]

9 All safety-related items & features of the host facility have

been checked and any necessary repairs completed.








by

Confirmed

by

Comments


10 Onboard communications systems are working (telephones,

navigation lights etc.)

11 The equipment, features and dimensions of the facility match

the drawings and assumptions made in the HAZID & ALARP

Assessment.

Section 2 – Host Facility Preparations

12 All modifications required for the SIMOPS have been made

and all necessary commissioning / testing completed.

13 Key drawings including HAC and emergency facilities

drawings have been updated as necessary for the facility with

SIMOPS equipment & activities in place, and approved and

issued.

14 The entire topsides HC process system has been shut down

and depressurised – if required for final SIMOPS vessel

move-in and/or rig-up.

15 Pipelines identified as being at risk from the Vessel Mooring

/Anchoring Plan and/or Lifting Plan have been shut down and

depressurised.

16 There are no leaks from HC systems that are still pressurised.

17 Drip pans have been cleaned of hydrocarbons and isolated

from the sump by blind flange.

18 The sump end of the drip pan drain has been fitted with a

bleed valve.

19 Chemical Injection Skids have been shut down and isolated.



Ch k d C fi d C t






by

Confirmed

by

Comments


20 The test separator is shut down and isolated.

21 The Coppus Generator/TEG has been shutdown.

22 Fall damage protection required by the lifting plan /PHP /

CSHC has been installed.

23 The instrument gas system is converted to instrument air.

24 The ESD system has been tested (after work boat/barge/rig is

on location).

25 Water supplies are available for [hot work / wash down / water

mist].

26 Kill knobs have been installed on the [work boat gangway /

boat landings / …etc….as per PHP / CSHC] .

27 Extra gas detection defined in the Fire and Gas Detection

Plan / PHP / CSHC has been installed and tested (with alarm

@ 20% LFL and ESD + alarm @ 60% LFL).

28 Vulnerable instrumentation has been protected against

damage and arrangements made to assure its on-going

functionalist throughout the SIMOPS program.

29 Audible emergency alarms have been provided on the

platform/site and on the work boat/barge/rig.

30 Portable Fire fighting equipment has been placed on the

platform/site in the locations identified in the Fire Fighting

Equipment Plan.

31 Firewater is available from….[work boat / rig…]



Ch k d C fi d C t






by

Confirmed

by

Comments


32 Life jackets[s] and Life raft(s) [no.] have been placed at the

boat landing(s).

33 All emergency escape routes are clear.

34 For partial facility hand-over, barriers and/or signage have

been put in place to clearly demarcate the area(s) being

handed over.

Section 3 – AIPSM Manual / BSP-71-Standard-002 Statement of Fitness

35 The Asset & facilities where SIMOPS is to take place have a

documented demonstration of ALARP, in the form of an

Operations HSE Case that has been developed, reviewed

and updated in accordance with the relevant requirements.

36 Process safety risks have been identified and documented

and are managed to ALARP.

37 All HSE-Critical Equipment meets its Technical Integrity

requirements.

38 The Process Safety Basic Requirements (PSBR) are met.

39 Employees or contractors executing HSSE Critical Activities

are competent and fit to work.


Asset Unit Operations Department SIMOPS Primary Service Provider SIMOPS Primary Contractor

The above checks are completed and I am satisfied that

the facility is prepared and ready for hand over for the









the facility is prepared and ready for hand-over for the

SIMOPS program to commence

Signed on behalf of AU Operations Date

(Field Operation Supervisor or equivalent)



Signed Date

(CSR, DSV or equivalent)



Signed Date

(Toolpusher or equivalent )


Appendix 10 – Host Facility Hand-back Checklist

FACILITY HAND-BACK CHECKLIST





FACILITY HAND BACK CHECKLIST


by

Confirmed

by

Comments


Section 1 – Host Facility Integrity and Systems Reinstatement

1 The facility structure is undamaged

2 The floors, roadways, gratings, hand rails, stairs etc. are

undamaged

3 Process containment systems are undamaged

4 All repairs included in the SIMOPS work scope have been

completed

5 All testing and commissioning included in the SIMOPS work

scope have been completed

6 The facility paintwork is undamaged

7 All cables / cable trays, lights, solar panels, switchboxes etc.

are undamaged

8 All SIMOPS equipment has been removed (including

materials, scaffolding, impact protection plates, barriers,

cables, hoses, lights etc.)

9 All emergency escape routes are clear

10 The F&G system and alarms have been reinstated as-was

11 The ESD system has been reinstated as-was

12 The Instrument Gas system has been reinstated as-was

13 Power supplies been reinstated as-was

14 CI systems have been reinstated as-was



N A i / Ch k YES NO N/A*Checked Confirmed Comments






by

Confirmed

by

Comments


15 Drip pans and sumps have been reinstated as-was

16 The facility has been cleaned and cleared of all spills,

residues, deposits, debris and waste materials from SIMOPS

activities

17 A post-SIMOPS seabed debris survey has been organised

Section 2 – Host Facility Systems Status

18 Is the production system pressurised?

19 Are the connected pipelines pressurised?

20 Is the test separator pressurised?

21 Is there any evidence of HC leaks?

22 Has the ESD system been tested?

23 Have the new wells been cleaned up?

24 Are all production wells tied-in and on-line?

25 Are the communications systems all working (PA, telephones,

navigation lights etc.)?

26 Life jackets[s] and Life raft(s) that were supplied for the

SIMOPS program have been …..[?]

Section 3 – AIPSM Manual / BSP-71-Standard-002 Statement of Fitness

27 Design and construction of the Asset modifications meet the

design and engineering requirements

28 Modifications are complete and have been authorized as

specified in the manual section Management of Change



N A ti / Ch k YES NO N/A*Checked Confirmed Comments





No. Action / Check YES NO N/A*by by *If action is “N/A”, state why here

29 Process safety risks that are affected by the modifications

made during SIMOPS have been identified and documented

and are managed to ALARP

30 The Operations HSE Case for the Asset continues to be valid

in the light of modifications made during the SIMOPS

31 Employees or contractors executing HSSE Critical Activities

are competent and fit to work

32 All HSE-Critical Equipment is identified and meets its

Technical Integrity requirements

33 The Process Safety Basic Requirements (PSBR) are met

34 Procedures are in place to operate HSSE Critical Equipment

within its Operational Limits. The Asset Register, Safety

Critical Equipment (SCEs), SCE related PerformanceStandards (PS) acceptance criteria and Maintenance /

Inspection Routines are identified and loaded into the

maintenance management system (SAP) before start up

Asset Unit Operations Department SIMOPS Primary Service Provider SIMOPS Primary Contractor


the facility is ready for hand-back to Operations

Signed on behalf of AU Operations Date

(Field Operation Supervisor or equivalent)



Signed Date

(CSR, DSV or equivalent)



Signed Date

(Toolpusher or equivalent )


Appendix 11 – Example of a Standard Habitat Used to contain welding hot workslag / sparks (ignition sources)



slag / sparks (ignition sources)


Appendix 12 RASCI MATRIX for Offshore Campaign Process

URL LINK to RASCI Matrix For Offshore Campaign Process ,BSP71-Procedure-003-RASCI-01, Rev 1.0









Appendix 13 - RASCI MATRIX For Offshore/Onshore Blasting & Painting Campaign Process

URL LINK to RASCI Matrix For Offshore/Onshore Blasting & Painting Campaign Process ,BSP71-Procedure-003-RASCI-02, Rev 1.0





01 BSP-71-Procedure-003 Simultaneous Operations OI - Operating Integrity

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