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AEDPA TAKES A CONSTITUTIONAL HIT

On April 19, 1995 Timothy McVeigh bombed the Alfred B. Murrah Federal

Building in Oklahoma City killing 168 people and injuring another 800. It

was the worst terrorist attack against America before the September 11,

2001attacks at the World Trade Center in New York City.

In the wake of the Oklahoma City bombing attack, Congress enacted, and

President Bill Clinton signed into law on April 29, 1996, the Antiterrorism

and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA). Section 302(a) of AEDPA,

codified in 8 U.S.C. 1189 , authorizes the Secretary of State (the

"Secretary") to designate a group as a "foreign terrorist organization"

(designated organization). Section 303(a) of AEDPA, codified in 18

U.S.C. 2339B(a), makes it a crime for anyone to provide support to even

the nonviolent activities of the designated organization. See: HumanitarianLaw Project v. United States Dept of Justice, 352 F.3d 382 (9th Cir. 2003),

vacated, 393 F.3d 902 (9th Cir. 2004).

Specifically, 8 U.S.C. 1189(a)(1) authorizes the Secretary to designate an

organization as a foreign terrorist organization ... if the Secretary finds that

(A) the organization is a foreign organization; (B) the organization engages

in terrorist activity ...; and (C) the terrorist activity or terrorism of the

organization threatens the security of United States nationals or the national

security of the United States. See: 8 U.S.C. 1189(a)(1). See also:Humanitarian Law Project v. Mukasey, 2007 WL 4293310 (9th Cir. Dec. 10,

2007).

On October 8, 1997, the Secretary designated the Kurdistan Workers Party,

a.k.a. Partiya Karkeran Kurdistan (PKK), the Liberation Tigers of Tamil

Eelam (LTTE), and twenty-eight other foreign organizations as designated

organizations. See: 62 Fed.Reg. 52, 650, 52, 650-51 (10-08-97). The PKK

and LTTE remain designated organizations to this day. Id.

Ralph Fertig, Ilankai Thamil Sangam, Dr. Nagalingham Jayalingham, andfive organizations [Humanitarian Law Project, Tamils of Northern

California, Tamil Welfare and Human Rights Committee, Federation of

Tamil Sangams of North America, World Tamil Coordinating Committee]

have been longtime supporters of PKK and LTTE. With enactment of

AEDPA, these individuals and groups feared they would be criminally

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investigated, prosecuted and convicted under 2339B(a) for their support of

these groups so they began withholding their support.

On March 19, 1998 these individuals and groups [plaintiffs] filed a

complaint in federal court alleging that AEDPA violated their First and Fifth

Amendment rights. The plaintiffs sought to enjoin the federal government

applying to them AEDPAs prohibition against providing material support

or resources to PKK and LTTE. The plaintiffs based their case on the

following three arguments:

AEDPA violated their First Amendment right to freedom of

association and their Fifth Amendment right to due process because

2339B(a) imposed a criminal penalty for their association with the

designated organizations without requiring the government to prove

the plaintiffs had a specific intent to further the designatedorganizations unlawful goals.

AEDPA violated their First Amendment right to association by

prohibiting them from making political contributions to the designated

organizations.

AEDPA violated their First and Fifth Amendment rights because it

gave the Secretary unfettered licensing power to designate a group as

a foreign terrorist organization.

Id., WL at 1.

The plaintiffs who supported the PKK wanted to:

1. Train members of PKK on how to use humanitarian and international

law to peacefully resolve disputes.

2. Engage in political advocacy on behalf of Kurds who live in Turkey.

3. Teach PKK members how to petition various representative bodies

such as the United Nations for relief.

The plaintiffs who supported LTTE wanted to:

1. Train members of LTTE to present claims for tsunami-related aid to

mediators and international bodies.

2. Offer their legal expertise to negotiating peace agreements between

the LTTE and the Sri Lankan government.

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3. Engage in political advocacy on behalf of Tamils who live in Sri

Lanka.

Id., WL at 1.

This lawsuit commenced a 9-year litigation odyssey that resulted in

Congressional amendments to AEDPA and a trilogy of decisions from the

Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals before culminating with a December 2007

ruling that granted partial relief to the plaintiffs and partial relief to the

government. Id., WL at 2.

The federal district in June 1998 had initially enjoined the government from

enforcing those provisions of AEDPA that prohibited the plaintiffs from

providing training and personnel to PKK and LTTE because those terms

were impermissibly vague. See: Humanitarian Law Project v. Reno, 9F.Supp.2d 1205, 1215 (C.D.Cal. 1998). The district court, however, rejected

the plaintiffs remaining challenges to AEDPA, holding:

Prohibition on providing material support or resources to designated

organizations is a content-neutral limitation on Plaintiffs right to

freedom of association and is subject to an intermediate scrutiny

level of review. Id., at 1212.

AEDPA does not impose guilt by association alone in violation of

the First Amendment because the AEDPA only limits the permissible

ways in which Plaintiffs can associate with PKK and LTTE. Id.

AEDPA does not criminalize mere membership, rather it

criminalizes conduct that provides material support or resources to a

designated organization. Id.

Plaintiffs had failed to establish a probability of success on their

claims that AEDPA affords the Secretary unfettered discretion in

designating a group as a designated organization. Id., at 1213.

See also: Humanitarian Law Project, supra, WL at 2.

On March 9, 2000 the Ninth Circuit upheld the district courts ruling. See:

Humanitarian Law Project v. Reno, 205 F.3d 1130, 1137-38 (9 th Cir. 2000),

cert. denied, 532 U.S. 904 (2001). The case was remanded back to the

district court. Once back in the district court, the court entered a permanent

injunction barring the governments enforcement of AEDPAs prohibition

on providing personnel and training to designated organizations. See:

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Humanitarian Law Project v. Reno, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16729 (C.D.Cal.

10-03-01).

Both the government and plaintiffs appealed. The plaintiffs renewed their

previously rejected claims and raised an additional Fifth Amendment due

process claim that 2339B(a) imposes vicarious liability because it does

not contain a mens rea element. Id., WL at 2.

The Humanitarian Law Project litigation prompted Congress on October 26,

2001 to enact the Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing

Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act (USA

Patriot Act} amending AEDPAs definition of material support or

resources to include the prohibition against providing expert advice or

assistance to a designated organization. See: 2339A(b) and 2339B(g)

(4). See also: Humanitarian Law Project, supra, at WL 3.

Following this congressional action, the plaintiffs in August 2003 filed

another complaint challenging AEDPAs amended prohibition on providing

expert advice or assistance to a designated organization. The district court

once again granted plaintiffs injunctive relief, finding that the term expert

advice or assistance while not overbroad, was unconstitutionally vague.

See: Humanitarian Law Project v. Ashcroft, 309 F.Supp.2d 1185, 1204

(C.D.Cal. 2004).

Both the government and plaintiffs once again appealed.

In the meantime, the Ninth Circuit in December 2003 affirmed the previous

district court ruling that the terms training and personnel were

unconstitutionally vague. See: Humanitarian Law Project v. United States

Dept of Justice, 352 F.3d 382 (9th Cir. 2003), vacated, 393 F.3d 902 (9th Cir.

2004). A majority of the original three-judge panel found a mens rea

requirement in 2339B because the government must prove beyond a

reasonable doubt that the donor had knowledge that the organization was

designated by the Secretary as a foreign terrorist organization or that thedonor had knowledge of the organizations unlawful activities that caused it

to be so designated. Id., at 403.

The plaintiffs and government both sought, and were granted, an en banc

review. See: Humanitarian Law Project v. United States Dept of Justice,

382 F.3d 1154 (9th Cir. 2004).

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Congress once again got into the picture. On December 17, 2004, just three

days before oral arguments were heard by the en banc Ninth Circuit,

Congress passed the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention ACT

(IRTPA) which once again amended AEDPA:

Whoever knowingly provides material support or resources to a

foreign terrorist organization, or attempts or conspires to do so, shall

be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 15 years, or both,

and, if the death of any person results, shall be imprisoned for any

term of years or for life.

See: 18 U.S.C. 2339B (a)(1).

The term material support or resources includes:

any property, tangible or intangible, or service, including currency or

monetary instruments or financial securities, financial services,

lodging, training, expert advice or assistance, safehouses, false

documentation or identification, communications equipment,

facilities, weapons, lethal substances, explosives, personnel (1 or more

individuals who may be or include oneself), and transportation, except

medicine or religious materials.

See: 18 U.S.C. 2339A (b).

Besides enhancing the definition of material support or resources to

include an additional ban on providing service, Congress for the first time

defined the terms training and expert advice or assistance. See:

2339(A)(b)(2)-(3). Congress also clarified its ban against providing

personnel to designated organizations. See: 2339B(h). Finally, Congress

gave the Secretary (with approval of the Attorney General) the authority to

exempt from prosecution persons who may otherwise be held liable for

providing "training," "expert advice or assistance," and "personnel" to adesignated organization. See: 2339B(j). Congress, through IRTPA, then

defined the following terms:

Training as instruction or teaching designed to impart a specific

skill, as opposed to general knowledge. 2339A(b)(2).

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vague while the scientific and technical knowledge part of the

definition is not.

The new definition of personnel under IRTPA cured the previously

held vagueness of that term.

The rest of the plaintiffs challenges were denied.

See: Humanitarian Law Project v. Gonzales, 380 F.Supp.2d 1134, 1151-55

(C.D.Cal. 2005).

Both parties once again appealed the district courts ruling, leading to the

December 2007 decision by the Ninth Circuit. Like the district court, the

Ninth Circuit issued a mixed bag decision, granting some relief to plaintiffs

while denying others. The following is a look at how the Ninth Circuit

addressed the plaintiffs constitutional challenges:

Mens rea the plaintiffs argued that 2339B(a) as amended by

IRTPA violates their Fifth Amendment due process rights because it

does not require proof that the donor of material support or

resources to a designated organization acted with a specific intent to

further the terrorist activity of that organization. The Ninth Circuit

rejected this argument, saying: Here, AEDPA section2339B (a)

already requires the government to prove that the donor defendant

provided material support or resources to a designated foreign

terrorist organization with knowledge that the donee organization is adesignated foreign terrorist organization, or with knowledge that theorganization is or has engaged in terrorist activities or terrorism. 18

U.S.C. 2339B (a) . As amended, AEDPA section2339B (a) complies

with the conventional requirement for criminal conduct--awareness

of some wrongdoing. Thus, a person with such knowledge is put on

notice that "providing material support or resources" to a designated

foreign terrorist organization is unlawful. Accordingly, we hold that

the amended version ofsection2339B comports with the Fifth

Amendment's requirement of personal guilt. Id., WL at 6.[Internal

citations omitted and emphasis original]. Vicarious criminal liability Plaintiffs argued that 2339B(a) as a

statute imposes vicarious criminal liability. The Ninth Circuit also

rejected that argument, finding: Vicarious liability involves holding

one person accountable for the actions of another. Section 2339B (a)

criminalizes the act of knowingly providing material support or

resources to a designated foreign terrorist organization. Donor

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defendants are penalized for the criminal act of support. Donor

defendants cannot be penalized undersection2339B (a) for the illegal

conduct of the donee organization In enacting IRTPA, Congress

explicitly stated that knowledge of the organization's designation as a

foreign terrorist organization, or knowledge of its engagement in

terrorist activities or terrorism is required to convict undersection

2339B (a) . As the district court correctly observed, Congress could

have, but chose not to, impose a requirement that the defendant act

with the specific intent to further the terrorist activity of the

organization, a requirement clearly set forth in sections2339A and

2339C of the statute, but left out ofsection 2339B Moreover, it is

not our role to rewrite a statute, and we decline to do so here. Id., WL

at 7.

Vagueness/training Plaintiffs argued the prohibition on training

is so vague and unclear they it could be interpreted to criminalizeprotection speech and expression. The Ninth Circuit agreed with the

plaintiffs, finding: To survive a vagueness challenge, the statute must

be sufficiently clear to put a person of ordinary intelligence on notice

that his or her contemplated conduct is unlawful. Because we find it

highly unlikely that a person of ordinary intelligence would know

whether, when teaching someone to petition international bodies for

tsunami-related aid, one is imparting a specific skill or general

knowledge,we find the statute's proscription on providing training

void for vagueness. Id., WL at 9.

Vagueness/Expert advice or assistance - Plaintiffs argued the

prohibition on providing expert advice or assistance is also so vague

and unclear they it could be interpreted to criminalize protection

speech and expression. The Ninth Circuit granted part of this

challenge and rejected other parts, finding: IRTPA defines the term

expert advice or assistance as imparting scientific, technical, or

other specialized knowledge We agree with the district court that

the Federal Rules of Evidence's inclusion of the phrase 'scientific,

technical, or other specialized knowledge' does not clarify the term

'expert advice or assistance' for the average person with nobackground in law At oral argument, the government stated that

filing an amicus brief in support of a foreign terrorist organization

would violate AEDPA's prohibition against providing expert advice

or assistance. Because the other specialized knowledge portion of

the ban on providing expert advice or assistance continues to cover

constitutionally protected advocacy, we hold that it is void for

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vagueness The portion of the expert advice or assistance

definition that refers to scientific and technical knowledge is not

vague. Unlike other specialized knowledge, which covers every

conceivable subject, the meaning of technical and scientific is

reasonably understandable to a person of ordinary intelligence. Id.,

WL at 10.

Vagueness/service Plaintiffs argued IRTPAs amended definition

of material support and resources add the prohibition on rendering

service to a designated organization is unconstitutionally vague

because each of the other challenged provisions could be construed as

a service. The Ninth Circuit agreed with the plaintiffs. We adopt

the district court's holding and its reasoning. The term service

presumably includes providing members of PKK and LTTE with

expert advice or assistance on how to lobby or petition

representative bodies such as the United Nations. Service would alsoinclude training members of PKK or LTTE on how to use

humanitarian and international law to peacefully resolve ongoing

disputes. Thus, we hold that the term service is impermissibly vague

because the statute defines 'service' to include 'training' or 'expert

advice or assistance, and because 'it is easy to imagine protected

expression that falls within the bounds' of the term 'service' Id.,

WL at 10.

Vagueness/personnel - Plaintiffs argued the prohibition on

personnel is also so vague and unclear that it could be interpreted to

criminalize protection speech and expression. The Ninth Circuit

rejected plaintiffs argument, saying: As amended by IRTPA,

AEDPA's prohibition on providing personnel is not vague because

the ban no longer blurs the line between protected expression and

unprotected conduct. Unlike theversion of the statute before it was

amended by IRTPA, the prohibition on personnel no longer

criminalizes pure speech protected by the First Amendment. Section

2339B (h) clarifies that Plaintiffs advocating lawful causes of PKK

and LTTE cannot be held liable for providing these organizations with

personnel as long as they engage in such advocacy entirelyindependently of th[ose] foreign terrorist organization[s]. 18 U.S.C.

2339B (h). Id., WL at 11.

The Ninth Circuit then examined, and rejected, the plaintiffs claim that the

terms training, personnel, expert advice or assistance and service

are substantially overbroad. The appeals court noted that a statute is facially

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overboard when its application to protected speech is substantial, not only

in an absolute sentence, but also relative to the scope of the laws plainly

legitimate applications. Id., WL at 11 [citing Virginia v. Hicks, 539 U.S.

113, 119-20 (2003)].

The court then outlined its reasoning for rejecting plaintiffs overbreath

claim:

Section2339B (a) 's ban on provision of material support or resources to

designated foreign terrorist organizations undoubtedly has many legitimate

applications. For instance, the importance of curbing terrorism cannot be

underestimated. Cutting off material support or resources from terrorist

organizations deprives them of means with which to carry out acts of

terrorism and potentially leads to their demise. Thus, section2339B (a) can

legitimately be applied to criminalize facilitation of terrorism in the form ofproviding foreign terrorist organizations with income, weapons, or expertise

in constructing explosive devices.

The Supreme Court cautioned in Hicks that there are substantial socialcosts createdby the overbreadth doctrine when it blocks application of a law

to constitutionally unprotected speech, or especially to constitutionally

unprotected conduct. Were we to restrain the government from enforcing

section2339B (a) that prohibits individuals in the United States from

providing material support or resources to foreign terrorist organizations,

we would potentially be placing our nation in danger of future terrorist

attacks.

Moreover, although Plaintiffs may be able to identify particular instances of

protected speech that may fall within the statute, those instances are not

substantial when compared to the legitimate applications ofsection

2339B (a).

Thus, because AEDPA section2339B is not aimed at expressive conduct

and because it does not cover a substantial amount of protected speech, wehold that the prohibition against providing material support or resources to

a foreign terrorist organization is not facially overbroad. Id., WL at 12.

Finally, the appeals court dealt with the plaintiffs licensing claim. IRTPA

added a new section to AEDPA with 2339B(j). This section permits the

Secretary, with the approval of the Attorney General, to allow certain

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individuals and organizations to engage in activities that would otherwise

be considered as providing material support or resources to a designated

organization. 2339B(j) specifically provides that no one can be prosecuted

under the terms personnel, training, or expert advice or assistance if

the material support or resources provided to a designated organization is

approved by the Secretary and Attorney General. Plaintiffs argued that this

statutory scheme constitutes an unconstitutional licensing scheme. The

appeals court disagreed:

Section2339B (j) gives the Secretary of State the discretion to approve the

provision of material support or resources. It does not regulate speech per

se. Rather, the statute permits the Secretary of State to authorize the

otherwise prohibited provision of material support or resources to a

designated foreign terrorist organization. Indeed, we clarified in [previous

rulings] that contributions of material support or resources to foreignentities designated as foreign terrorist organizations should notbe equatedwith political expression and association itself, even if such organizations

are engaged in political expression ... Thus, we hold that the discretion given

to the Secretary poses no real and substantial threat to Plaintiffs' protected

expression or their expressive conduct

We recognize that it is possible for the Secretary to exercise his or her

discretion in a way that discriminates against the donor of material support

or assistance. For example, the Secretary could conceivably exempt from

prosecution a person who teaches peacemaking skills to members of

Hezbollah, but deny Plaintiffs immunity from prosecution if they teach the

same peacemaking skills to PKK. However, when evaluating the

constitutionality of a licensing scheme, we look at how closely the prior

restraint, onitsface, regulates constitutionally protected activity. Here, even

though it is possible for the Secretary to refuse to exercise his or her

discretion to exempt from prosecution a disliked speaker, any such power is

incidental. The statute does not give the Secretary substantialpower to

discriminate based on the content or viewpoint of speech or the identity of

the speaker.

Moreover, in Plaintiffs' case, any potential for content or viewpoint-based

discrimination or discrimination based on the identity of the speaker is

significantly reduced because the government is enjoined from enforcing

those provisions of the statute we hold vague. Thus, because Plaintiffs are

already immune from prosecution for protected speech, the danger that the

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Secretary can base his or her exercise of discretion on Plaintiffs' identity or

the content or viewpoint of Plaintiffs' message is almost non-existent. Id.,

WL at 13-14 [emphasis original][internal citations omitted].

It is unclear at this juncture what impact the December 2007 decision by the

Ninth Circuit will have on other federal appellate circuits. The decision will

undoubtedly influence, one way or the other, the Fifth Circuits review of

the conviction obtained by the government in the Holy Land Foundation

case this past October in Dallas. The Fifth Circuits review of that

conviction will be shaped not just by the objections made by the defendants

attorneys prior to and during trial but the legal premises on which those

objections were based. It can reasonably be assumed that the attorneys for

Holy Land Foundation defendants were stay abreast of the extensive

litigation history in the Humanitarian Law Project cases.