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After the White House: The Politics of the Post-PresidencyNicholas F. JacobsUniversity of Virginia

As independent, elder statesmen, former presidents command a unique authority. This

essay focuses on the post-presidencies of Harry S. Truman and Dwight D. Eisenhower. Despite

their divergent personal backgrounds, both remained active and consequential in the politics of

their era and were forced to speak out on issues they might otherwise try to ignore.

Furthermore, both Truman and Eisenhower remained active, loyal partisans. They were just as

adamant in condemning their presidential successors on policy, and as senior party officials,

both helped to “build” their party organizations by mobilizing voters, recruiting candidates,

fundraising, and promoting structural reforms after leaving office.

Barack Obama’s decision to remain in Washington, D.C. after his presidency ended

produced the predictable split in partisan reactions. Supporters greeted the president’s decision as

confirmation of Obama’s long-stated plan to remain politically active after he left the White

House.1 Opponents were less than pleased. Suggesting that the former president was setting up

an “Obama Embassy” in the former first family’s new neighborhood of Kalomara, the journalist

Ed Klein adamantly declared that Obama choose the location to be close to other foreign

embassies so as to undermine Trump’s administration.2 Pennsylvania Representative Mike Kelly

(R) argued that the Obama’s are remaining in D.C. for “one purpose only…to run the shadow

government that is going to totally upset the new agenda.”3 And commentator Ben Stein saw the

decision as just more confirmation that Obama is, “essentially a super narcissist.”4

Political hyperbole aside, Obama’s physical residence in D.C. remains a potent symbol of

how he is defining his post-presidency, and there remains a legitimate question over what change

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a former president can effect.1 Already, Obama’s actions have contributed to President Trump’s

concern about the “deep state” – or the lingering, entrenched political interests in place that

might stifle conservative reform. But is Obama’s stated desire to remain active in American

politics anything new? In this essay, I argue that ex-presidents have continued to be moral

statesmen, party builders, and vocal leaders of the partisan opposition long after they leave the

White House. When compared to his previous eight successors, Obama can uniquely claim a

significant amount of post-presidential political capital. The last time this was true was after

Dwight D. Eisenhower and Harry S. Truman left office. As the most recent historical example of

this “institution,” they place the politics of the post-presidency in greater historical relief and

suggest that Obama, as a former president, is likely to behave much like he did as an actual

president.

Historical Precedent or Unique Ambition?

Consulting the historical record cannot, on its own, tell us whether former President

Obama should remain active after he leaves the White House. In American political history,

there is plenty of recourse to tradition and myth, which would suggest that the country benefits

from the president’s gracious departure. George Washington’s decision to leave after two terms

remained a deeply cherished norm for subsequent presidents. Coupled with the first president’s

decision to leave the Continental Army after the Revolution, his retirement as Commander-in-

Chief further solidified the romanticization of him as the American Cincinnatus.5 The

ratification of the 22nd Amendment in 1951 was further confirmation of this impulse - that no

single person should remain an active force in American politics for too long. 1 And, given that the last president to remain in Washington, D.C. after his presidency was the conservative anathema Woodrow Wilson, the condemnation of Obama’s decision was greater proof of the former president’s decision to fundamentally disrupt American politics as we know it. Wilson remained in the capital city to recuperate from a stroke that left him incapacitated during the final months of his administration. See: John Milton Cooper, Jr. 2011. Woodrow Wilson: A Biography. New York, NY: Vintage Books.

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The idea of a post-presidency, however, is not a modern convention, and despite

Washington’s virtuous return to Mount Vernon, his precedent of political retirement is

apocryphal, even by “pre-modern” standards. Washington himself accepted a commission in the

U.S. army from John Adams to help plan for war with France. His former aide-de-camp,

Alexander Hamilton, took over the lion’s share of the planning, but the former president,

however, soon died 33 months after “retiring.” Thomas Jefferson spent most of his post-

presidency engaged with his University of Virginia, but having groomed his two immediate

successors, Madison and Monroe, he continued to provide advice on how to deal with foreign

policy (Meacham 2012). Madison, in addition to “straightening out” many parts of the historical

record to more favorably portray his legacy in the American experiment, re-entered his practice

of “Constitution-making” at age 78 to settle a disruptive apportionment problem in the 1829

Virginia Constitutional Convention (Keysaar 2009). Famously, John Quincy Adams is the only

president to return to either chamber of Congress. As a member of the House of Representatives,

Adams chaired several important committees over his 18-year term; he also ran for

Massachusetts Governor, but dropped out after 29% of voters thought the former president had

what it took to run the state. John Tyler fathered 7 children after he left office and then served in

the Confederate Congress as a representative from Virginia. And, fulfilling his lifelong desire to

serve on the Supreme Court, Chief Justice William Howard Taft capitalized on his political

experience to fundamentally reshape the court and enhance its institutional capacity (Crowe

2007).

[INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE]

In the modern era, we have come to think of presidential retirement as unexciting and

apolitical. Jimmy Carter and his near 30-long dedication to Habitat for Humanity stands out as

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the modern exemplar of former presidents turned civic missionary. George W. Bush, and his

work with the Wounded Warriors Project follows in this vein (Bush 2017). Yet, while America’s

most recent presidents have made a conscience decision to remain out of the political limelight –

appearing briefly for a personal or celebratory cause – their collective political situation is a

fairly distinct one (Kaufman 2012). As Table 1 shows, President Obama will stand out as one of

the few presidents who will have left office with a claim to substantial political capital. Harry

Truman, Lyndon Johnson, Richard Nixon, and George W. Bush all left office with below-

majority support in the last presidential approval poll taken while in office; Nixon, of course

resigned, and Johnson chose not to seek re-election in 1968. Gerald Ford, Jimmy Carter, and

H.W. Bush left the White House because they lost an election, the most important “approval”

poll. Clinton and Reagan stand out as exceptions, but Reagan suffered from Alzheimer’s disease

for at least the last 10 years of his life, and Bill Clinton, while remaining politically active, was

most concerned with advancing Hillary Clinton’s political career; both of these are unusual

circumstances, which should not set the pattern for thinking about post-presidential politics.

The post-presidencies of Harry Truman and Dwight Eisenhower do, however, offer a

revealing comparison of what opportunities and constraints befall presidents after they leave the

White House. Truman departed with abysmal approval rankings, after a career of working for the

Democratic party, and after a repudiating election that put the GOP in its best political position

in over three decades. Eisenhower, on the other hand, was admired by both Republicans and

Democrats, left the presidency after less than a decade of holding elected office, and narrowly

lost his “third” term in the closest election in modern politics. Yet, despite their dissimilar

circumstances, both diligently tried to maintain an active political agenda, which included a host

of non-partisan issues (Eisenhower is partially responsible for the preservation of the Gettysburg

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battlefield, on which his 500-acre farm abutted) and writing their memoirs (Truman wrote three

and was working on a history of the U.S. Senate). More significantly for American political

development, Truman and Eisenhower remained embroiled in some of the most dramatic and

consequential political episodes of their era. As independent, elder statesmen, former presidents

command an authority as unique as the office they once served, and they are forced to speak out

on issues they might otherwise try to ignore. Truman was thrust into a dramatic confrontation

with Senator Joseph McCarthy and helped precipitate his demise; Eisenhower defended the

presidency as an institution and remained a non-partisan, stoic leader in the face of global crises.

Most remarkably, given their divergent political backgrounds, both Truman and Eisenhower

remained loyal partisans. They were adamant in condemning their presidential successors on

policy and as senior party officials, helped to “build” their party organizations by mobilizing

voters, recruiting candidates, fundraising, and promoting structural reforms (Galvin 2010). While

not exhaustive of their entire post presidencies (a collective 28 years), these moments help show

that like any political actor – including acting presidents – neither Eisenhower nor Truman were

always successful in affecting their desired outcome. Their behavior and intentions nevertheless

reveal that despite lacking the constitutional office, their post-presidencies were deeply

consequential.

Harry S. Truman (1953-1972)

While the Democratic party’s misfortunes in 1952 are not all attributable to Truman,

certainly no president seeking to capitalize on his partisan or personal leadership could have

found themselves in a worse position. Returning to his beloved Missouri and his pre-presidency

home in Independence, the ex-president set up a small office in the Kansas City Federal Reserve

building. Some former White House assistants joined him to assist in organizing the building of

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the Truman library, and in helping the president write his memoirs (his personal goal was 10,000

words per day). As Truman would later quip, two years after moving in, he put his name on the

door only after so many people were getting lost – looking for the restroom.6

Party Builder Truman soon returned to Washington less than six months after leaving, but went

to great lengths to avoid taking any political stand on the new Eisenhower administration. In the

first interview of his post-presidency, he was surprised that anyone cared to read about “an old

has been,” and when asked if he was surprised that Eisenhower had not invited him to the White

House, again Truman joked that, “He’s too busy to see every Tom, Dick, and Harry that comes

to town.”7 Such careful presentation, however, belied Truman’s post-presidential ambitions.

The former president was in D.C. to lunch with Democratic Senators, a meeting, which

inflamed rumors that the former-president was gearing up for a Congressional campaign. Even

though Truman would only flirt with running for office, he grew increasingly active as the

Democrats set their eyes on retaking seats in the midterm elections. Truman headlined a 2,000-

person conference in Chicago as the “distinguished leader of the party” according to Democratic

National Committee (DNC) Chair Stephen Mitchell. Now a part of the “Big Four,” as Mitchell

described it, Truman spearhead the party’s strategy over their ill-fated “loyalty oath” – a policy

in response to Strum Thurmond’s run as a Dixiecrat in 1948, but which nearly split the party

again when instituted in 1952. Truman, undeterred by threats of another party schism,

nevertheless had harsh words for his partisan brethren, telling reporters that, “if the governors of

the south are worried about [the loyalty oath], that’s their problem.” Working with the rest of the

Democratic Congressional leadership and Virginia Governor John Battle, Truman brokered a

deal that would sideline the issue for at least another three years. But, with his party in disarray,

“Give ‘em Hell” Truman continued to publicly rally Democrats. Speaking at the first major

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fundraising dinner since the 1952 election, the former president lambasted the current

administration without remorse. Under Eisenhower’s leadership Truman avowed, “the wrecking

crew is at work, undermining and tearing down…if a Democratic Congress is not elected next

year, the country and the world will go down to ruin!”8

An emergency gall bladder and appendix operation in June kept Truman largely off the

1954 campaign trail (a year in which Senate Democrats eked out a majority 49-47). Yet,

Truman’s Chicago debut as the Democrat’s chief cheerleader comprised just one part of the ex-

president’s goal of building up a weakened Democratic party. The hustle and bustle of campaign

season behind them, Truman and his fellow Democrats focused their energies on the

reorganizing the DNC and the nomination process for the next presidential nominee. At DNC

planning meetings in April, 1955, Democrats retooled their campaign strategy, and decided to

make an all-out effort to focus their message on President Eisenhower. Joining the DNC

executive meeting was the former president, who at their Jackson-Jefferson Dinner fundraiser,

kicked off the party’s new strategy with full vigor. In the most anti-Eisenhower remarks of the

evening, Truman lambasted the administration’s China policy as a “bare-faced political fraud;”

continued on to say that Ike’s own behavior was scaring “the daylights” out of America’s allies

abroad; and to the audience’s chant to “pour it on,” the former president gleamed that, “They

may have struck the clock, but they can’t turn it back!” Several weeks later, the attacks on

Eisenhower continued, as Truman tried to hammer home a story about the administration’s inept,

“bungled” management of the newly released polio vaccine.9 The next month, the target of

Truman’s “give ‘em hell talks” was the current president’s “domination” by business interests –

the extent to which was largely unknown because of the “protective curtain which most of the

press throws around its Republican protégés.”10

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Truman’s independent voice on the speaking circuit became disruptive within the

Democratic party itself. In 1952, Truman had helped secure Adlai Stevenson’s nomination for

the presidency, but increasingly, reports leaked that the former president had begun to change his

mind (the first indication being his opposition to Paul Butler’s election as DNC chair in 1952).

Finally, Truman’s impromptu, post-presidency confidant, Drew Pearson, reported in October that

the former president thought Stevenson “jinxed” because of his previous loss to Eisenhower.

Having just recently met with his unwavering ally, New York Governor Averell Harriman, at the

Governor’s Mansion in Albany, Truman wanted to push an open nominating contest, with

Harriman having his full support.11 The next day, sitting alongside Harriman in the Governor’s

office, Truman extolled his executive skills, saying that Harriman “has all the qualifications to

make a good President,” and slyly adding that if he were allowed to vote in New York, “I know

who I’d be for.” At the end of 1955, Truman began to solidify the basic contours of a campaign

strategy for Harriman. Criticizing Eisenhower’s foreign policy, he praised Harriman’s diplomatic

experience – labeling it the most important qualification to consider in the next campaign.12

Truman even declined several offers from national newspapers and television studios to report

on the convention because it would impede his ability to “do what I hope to do and at the same

time write about it.”13

Truman traveled to Chicago at the beginning of August, 1954 to set up his private office

for the national convention. As Harriman himself acknowledged, the big question was whether

the former president would “take his coat all the way off, or only half way off,” to push his

nomination. Harriman, grew nervous as Truman privately confessed that he did not think it

appropriate for an ex-President to openly endorse candidates prior to the convention.14 The next

day, however, Truman joined Harriman at a press-conference on the eve of the convention, and

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proudly pinning his lapel with an “Honest Ave” for President button, threw his support entirely

for his former Secretary of Commerce.15 The formidable anti-Stevenson contingent – of multiple

varieties – was elated with this “opening night bomb,” none more so than the Tammany Hall

New Yorkers. As their leader Carmine G. De Sapio told reporters, Truman’s endorsement was

“inspiring, heartening news. President Truman is, in every sense, the leader of our party...”16

Truman not only threw his public endorsement behind Harriman, he commanded his

operatives in Chicago to direct their all out “blitz” to nominate the New York Governor. Old

allies from the White House including former DNC chairs William Boyle, Jr. and Frank

McKinney, worked on uncommitted state chairman to flip delegate pledges. Ironically, it was the

same set of political wranglers that Truman relied on to nominate Stevenson in 1952. The

eleventh-hour excitement quickly gave way to more realistic assessments of Harriman’s support,

however, as the mad rush of delegates never materialized. Rather than converting delegates to

Harriman, most Stevenson-leaning groups announced their second or third choice in case

Stevenson couldn’t pick up the first ballot; Harriman was not their choice.17 As a last-ditch effort,

Truman worked to drive the wedge on the race issue, hoping that the push for a stronger civil

rights platform would convince Northeastern liberals to switch their support to Harriman, or

drive enough Southerners from the convention. In pushing the civil rights issue (endorsing the

Supreme Court’s recent Brown decision, for example), Truman was willing to sacrifice the unity

of the party in order to get his man at the top of the ticket.2 Stevenson, had star power to match,

however. Eleanor Roosevelt arrived in Chicago with her full support already thrown to

2 After Harriman’s chances all but ended, Truman ultimately endorsed the “moderate” civil rights plank, saying that it would be something that would “contribute harmony” to the party enable Democrats to “go out and give the Republicans the licking they’re entitled to.” See, “Floor Fight on Rights Fizzles,” Chicago Defender, 16 August, 1956. On the 1956 Democratic National Convention and the fight for a moderating civil rights plank, see: John Martin. 1979. Civil Rights and the Crisis of Liberalism: The Democratic Party, 1945-1976. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.

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Stevenson. When Truman accused the presumptive nominee of betraying the New Deal and Fair

Deal backbone of the party, Roosevelt responded forcefully. Implying that Stevenson would

have more experience than Truman did when he unexpectedly took office, the former First Lady

continued to push against the ex-president’s continued influence in the party. “We cannot meet

the problems of today, or of the future with traditions of the past alone,” she concluded.18

Stevenson got the nomination. Truman, however, stuck with Harriman all the way to the

balloting, seconding his nomination on the convention floor, and citing his “experience in this

line.”19 Although “very, very surprised” that Stevenson won on the first ballot, Truman left

Chicago gracefully, telling the delegates on the final night that, “it is reliably reported that some

fellow whom I will not name has said that Adlai Stevenson will have trouble winning in

November. Now I want to tell you something. Don’t let that worry you.” And, in a line that

brought down the House, the ex-president reminded them, “That’s what they said about me in

1948.”20

Truman returned to Independence and continued his attacks on the Eisenhower

“racketeers.” Despite his convention chaos, the DNC requested that “give ‘em hell” Truman stay

on to give two to three speeches a week on behalf of Stevenson and other Democratic candidates.

However, Truman’s presence on the campaign trail was hardly felt. Few of his remarks garnered

any press coverage, and, given the Missourian’s penchant for news-making remarks, it is clear

that Truman confined himself to the sidelines.21 Eisenhower won by even larger margins than he

did in 1952; ironically, he picked up only one state, Truman’s own Missouri. In a very real way,

Stevenson’s dismal showing vindicated Truman’s claims made at the DNC, although,

Republicans capitalized on Truman’s DNC remarks more than Democrats chose to use the

former president as a campaigner. While Stevenson’s poor showing was not just attributable to

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Truman, the former president, dismissed so readily for his actions, quickly found himself in the

center of the party action. This time, Democrats were willing to embrace his fierce oppositional

style – a strategy that deeply wounded the GOP’s margins in 1958, and finally in 1960 with

Kennedy’s election.

Opposition Leader The bulk of Harry Truman’s post-presidency is best seen through his actions

as an opposition leader. Truman quickly recovered from his lost gamble at the 1956 Democratic

National Convention. By December, with Democrats reeling from their historic electoral loss,

DNC Chair Paul Butler was making progress towards fulfilling a long-awaited promise to party

liberals – the establishment of a “Party Advisory Council.”3 Spearheading this new committee,

which would attempt to wrest agenda control from more moderate leaders in the House and

Senate – Sam Rayburn and Lyndon Johnson – was Harry Truman and his co-leader Adlai

Stevenson.22

Truman did not just confine his partisan role to the policy-making function of this new

advisory council. Without a doubt, the former president had already proved to be a vocal,

persistent critic of the Eisenhower administration. When speaking in the western plains, Truman

railed against the administration’s natural resources and land-use policy; talking to organized

labor leaders he implied that Ike opposed full employment because it helps “keep labor in its

place;” and, despite the platitude, Truman’s critique did not “stop at the water’s edge” - he

routinely upbraided Eisenhower and his Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, for a foreign

policy that allowed “the unity of the free nations to disintegrate.” Speaking at Yale as a guest

3 For a discussion of the Democratic Advisory Council’s origins, see: Daniel DiSalvo. 2010. “The Politics of a Party Faction: The Liberal Labor Alliance in the Democratic Party, 1948-1972,” Journal of Policy History 22 (3): 269-299; Eric Schickler. 2016. Racial Realignment: The Transformation of American Liberalism, 1932-1965. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

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lecturer during an economic contraction, Truman remarked that if he were still President, “I’d do

something! I wouldn’t be sitting still and playing golf. I’ll tell you that!”23

The former president’s most substantive role as opposition leader related to the pitched

budgetary battles that engulfed the Democratic Congress and the Eisenhower administration. As

president, Truman had suffered severe criticism from fiscal conservatives on both sides of the

aisle over the size of his budget proposals. Now, Truman led the charge against Eisenhower as

the administration struggled to cut desirable programs, maintain a low tax rate, and keep the

budget balanced. Calling Eisenhower’s FY 1959 budget a “political trap” that was intended to

make Democrats look either as “wasteful spenders” or “heartless reactionaries,” Truman publicly

urged Democratic members of Congress to hold firm against the administration’s proposed

budget.24

Truman’s public advice to the Democrats in response the 1957 recession was coupled

with a political first – the sworn testimony of a former U.S. President before the Congress to

advise on a legislation. With the Eisenhower administration adamant that the federal government

should maintain a balanced budget, even as unemployment rose, Congressional Democrats

sponsored their own series of public works packages to revitalize areas of chronic

unemployment. Representative Brent Spence announced that the House Committee on Banking

and Currency would hold 27 days of hearings from state-governors, economists, and labor union

heads on the causes of the unemployment crisis – the first major economic shock since the end of

WWII. Kicking off the hearings was former president Truman.25

Truman not only critiqued the current President for underestimating the underlying problems of

the nation’s economy, but suggested that Eisenhower had somehow brought it upon the country

for his refusal to spend money to overcome structural impediments to economic growth. “The

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needs of the American people have increased,” Truman argued, “…but the present government

of the United States is not aware of these things and has not advanced with the times. And in

spite of the Republican recession, the Republicans manage to keep prices going upward. This is

quite a feat, to have price inflation and recession at the same time. We had a hard time getting a

satellite off the ground but it was not trick at all for them to shoot the cost of living into outer

space!” 26 Sitting before the Congressional committee, Truman’s speech was broadcasted live

across the country and helped to solidify the Democratic alternative to Eisenhower’s balanced

budget fiscal policy.4 Eisenhower ultimately vetoed the public works bill, but it would reemerge

as a potent symbol of the Democrat’s Neo-Keynesian commitment when Kennedy came into

office two years later.

Elder Statesman Around the same time that Truman was solidifying his role as one of the

Democrat’s “Big Four,” the former president emerged center stage in battle over McCarthyism.

While Joseph McCarthy (R-WI) directed the Senate’s permanent investigations subcommittee on

communist infiltration, Rep. Harold H. Velde (R-IL) competed for publicity while chairing the

House Un-American Activities Committee (HUAC). After months of investigating the

communist ties of academia’s prestigious Rhodes scholarship trust, Velde pounced on reports

that Truman, when president, appointed a suspected communist to head the International

Monetary Fund (IMF) in 1946. Inflaming matters more, the news came from Eisenhower’s own

Attorney General, Herbert Brownell, who in mid-November announced that Truman appointed

Harry Dexter White to lead the IMF, despite holding a widely-circulated FBI dossier on White’s

spying activities for communist organizations.

4 On how the two parties defined their fiscal policy alternatives during this period, see: James Savage. 1988. Balanced Budget and American Politics. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, chapters 5-6.

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Velde quickly scheduled two-days’ worth of hearings that would expose the Democrat’s

“coddling of Communists.” No sooner had Harry Truman denied ever seeing such a report than a

subpoena for him to testify before Velde arrived at his hotel in New York.27 Velde’s release of

several documents, reportedly in White’s own handwriting from Whitaker Chamber’s pumpkin-

dossier, further entangled Truman. The former president, remained silent and stuck to his 7 a.m.

walking constitutional. The press hounded him the morning after he received the subpoena.

Truman, however, demurred, remarking instead on the “good simple rule” of obeying traffic

lights, and openly contemplating why so many pigeons were able to survive in New York City.28

Truman’s nonchalance – rare given the former president’s known tendency to swear and

berate political opponents – was a calculated maneuver to undermine Velde and McCarthyism

more generally. Within days of receiving his subpoena, Truman had composed a letter with the

help of his former White House aides.5 Addressed to Velde, Truman schooled the committee

chairman in the finer points of constitutional law. Citing “a long line of precedents, commencing

with George Washington himself in 1796” Truman argued that presidents and former presidents

should not submit to Congressional investigations of the executive: “If the doctrine of separation

of powers and the independence of the Presidency is to have any validity at all, it must be

equally applicable to a President after his term of office has expired…The doctrine would be

shattered and the President, contrary to our fundamental theory of constitutional government,

would become a mere arm of the legislative branch of the government if he would feeling during

5 Samuel I. Rosenman and Charles S. Murphy both visited Truman at his Waldorf-Astoria suite over the two days between receiving the subpoena and releasing his letter. Their involvement indicates what a sensitive situation the Velde subpoena really was for Truman, politically. Rosenman was a close confident and speech writer to both Franklin D. Roosevelt and Truman; most agree that Rosenman helped write Truman’s 1948 acceptance speech before the DNC. Murphy took over from Rosenman as special counsel to the president, “A Smiling Truman Accepts Subpoena,” New York Times, 11 November, 1953.

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his term of office that his every act might be subject to official inquiry and possible distortion for

political purposes.”29

In handling the Velde subpoena with a contradictory style of levity and astute

constitutional reasoning, Truman destabilized the attack on his character and the conduct of his

administration.6 Velde’s enthusiasm and Truman’s coy response embarrassed GOP leaders, who

pressed hard on the HUAC chairman to temper his investigation.30 But McCarthyism transcended

the political posturing of any single committee chairman. The response to Velde was enough to

placate constitutional lawyers, but most would agree that the public still had a right to know what

Truman then knew about White. The day before Brownell’s testimony before HUAC, Truman

announced through his spokesman that he would respond to the charges in an “all-out

broadcast.”31

On Monday, November 17 - less than 10 months after his presidency ended, Truman sat

behind a large wooden desk and spoke to an estimated 50 million Americans (1/3rd of the

population) during the three-major network’s prime-time broadcast.32 Truman began his speech

by relaying what he understood to be the major issue – a “personal attack” made by the “former

chairman of Republican National Committee,” which was “without parallel, I believe, in the

history of our country.” He then repeated his argument from his published letter to Velde about

the “constitutional principle” threatened by his subpoena. Truman then turned to the facts of the

case and acknowledged that he was well aware of the FBI’s secret investigation; he then further

conceded the basic facts of Brownell’s accusation – that he allowed White’s appointment to the

IMF to proceed, even though he knew about the accusations. According to Truman, however, he 6 Truman was careful to limit his critique of the Congressional investigation in two important ways, according to contemporaneous editorials by lawyers and presidential historians. First, he did not deny Congress the authority to investigate other branches, as did Jackson and Buchannan. Second, he did not deny that the president or a former president was immune from judicial proceedings that might require personal testimony of the executive. See: “In the Nation,” New York Times, 13 November, 1953.

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ordered the investigation to continue, fearful that any other course of action would stifle the

FBI’s investigation of White.

The matter-of-fact presentation of events then turned into something grander. Doubling

down on his interpretation of the facts that were before him, Truman argued that the accusation

was “shameful demagoguery [and] cheap political trickery.” The former president continued,

describing the political motivations for Brownell’s accusation: “It is now evident that the present

Administration has fully embraced, for political advantage, McCarthyism…the corruption of

truth, the abandonment of our historical devotion to fairplay…the abandonment of “due process”

of law…the use of the big lie and the unfounded accusation against any citizen in the name of

Americanism and security…the rise to power of the demagogue who lives on untruth…the

spread of fear and destruction of faith in every level of our society.” In invoking Eisenhower’s

administration, Truman likely knew that he could (and would) fall victim to the same critique he

himself was leveling. But in closing, the former president told the country that McCarthyism, “is

not a partisan matter. This horrible cancer is eating at the vitals of America and it can destroy the

great edifice of freedom. If this sordid, deliberate, and unprecedented attack on the loyalty of a

former President of the United States will serve to alert the people to the terrible danger that our

nation and each citizen faces, then it will have been a blessing in disguise. I hope this will arouse

you to fight this evil at every level in our national life. I hope that this may serve to stir the

conscience of the present Administration itself.”33

The former president’s condemnation of McCarthyism was framed in partisan terms and

contemporaneous reactions to his speech fell along the partisan divide. On the facts of the case,

Truman appeared to overplay his hand as the next day FBI head J. Edgar Hoover told Congress

that the president’s decision made it more difficult to investigate White. Yet, those looking

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beyond Truman’s presentation of the facts and into the heart of the case lauded the former

President’s denouncement of McCarthyism. Responding to the Washington Post’s own critical

posture to Truman’s speech, Michael Straight, the editor of the New Republic, argued that the

editorial board “has collapsed. It has concentrated on details, failing to see the broad sweep of

dangerous precedents and tragic events – tragic to those who wonder how many nations may fall

under Communist enslavement while Americans, at Mr. Brownell’s instigation, are fighting

among themselves.”34

Senator Joseph McCarthy (R-WI), who had until this point only be implicated in all of

this, recognized how advantageous a moment it was. In his own prime-time address one week

after Truman’s speech, McCarthy took aim at the former president. Almost immediately, the

Senator lashed out and claimed that Truman’s use of the word “McCarthyism” was definitive

proof that the former president sympathized with communists. For, as McCarthy told his

audience, the definition Truman used was, “identical word for word, comma for comma, with the

definition used by the Communist Daily Worker.” Not only was Truman’s definition tainted red,

but the real issue, according to the Senator, was not about McCarthyism, but the more dangerous

and debilitating, “Trumanism.” “Trumanism,” the Senator defined is, “the placing of your

political party above the interest of the country.” Trumanism, he added, “is the theory that no

matter how great the wrong, it is right if it helps your political party.” Trumanism, the Senator

continued, “in effect says to the head of a household if you catch a criminal looting your safe,

kidnapping your children, and attacking your wife, do not dare turn the spotlight on him, do not

get rough with him, do not call the police...”35 McCarthy did what Brownell, Eisenhower, and the

rest of the GOP leadership had actively sought to avoid in raising the White issue – claim that the

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former President of the United States actively and willingly sympathized with communists

working inside the government.

Since his own speech, Truman had issued no comment on Brownell’s testimony and J.

Edgar Hoover’s explication of events.36 Following McCarthy’s tirade against “Trumanism,”

however, the ex-president headlined a 22-thousand-person rally at Chicago stadium and

denounced those who advocated “thought-control and book-burning, and the irresponsible

smearing of personal reputations.” Joined by film stars Cary Grant, Charlton Heston, and Gladys

Swarthought, Truman never mentioned McCarthy by name. Nevertheless, the message was clear.

“If we do not take a stand against these things,” Truman told the crowd, “then, no matter how

great our military strength, we shall surely lose the battle for world peace and justice in which we

are now joined.” Continuing, he added,

The struggle for truth and decency is first of all the struggle for freedom. By freedom I mean, of course,

responsible freedom – freedom in obedience to the laws of human reason and the moral code…I will not

say we are losing the struggle for freedom in America. But I will say that our freedoms are under attack –

and that these attacks are all the more serious because they are often indiscreet, indirect, and dishonest.37

On March 9, 1954 – three months after Truman’s prime-time address, Edward R. Murrow

took to the airwaves. It spelled the end for McCarthy and the worst excesses of McCarthyism in

that generation, but it was just one line in a chorus of denouncement (Fried 1990). McCarthyism

receded throughout the previous year, sapped of energy and support, in part, because it took on

the former President of the United States. While McCarthy and Velde both won re-election a

year after, fellow Republicans had had enough. By the end of 1953, leaks from the senior GOP

leadership spread throughout the major dailies that the Republican Policy Committee was

actively considering a proposal to change committee hearing procedures that allow for “one-man

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investigations.” Even the Vice President Richard Nixon, who had emerged as a national star

because of his work on HUAC as a fearsome “red hunter” took to the podium to take down

McCarthy; Nixon’s denouncement, while never defending Truman, spelled the end of McCarthy,

his “reckless talk and questionable methods.”38

Dwight D. Eisenhower (1961-1969)

Like his own predecessor, Harry Truman, President Eisenhower left Washington in

January, 1960 with every hope of a quiet retirement of writing memoirs. Now 70 years old, the

former General of the Army and president was newsworthy not for his military exploits or as

leader of the free world, but for learning how to drive again. Promising to wait at least five to six

months before saying anything noteworthy, the former president emphasized how much he was

looking forward to finally becoming just another private citizen.39 And golf; plenty and plenty of

golf.

Party Builder Despite begrudgingly entering into political life a year before he was elected

president, Eisenhower remained an active leader in the Republican party after leaving the White

House. While much of his political energy was spent helping his former administration officials

run for office –often unsuccessfully – Eisenhower also dedicated himself to reshaping and

expanding the entire GOP.

Just one week after meeting with Kennedy at Camp David to discuss the Bay of Pigs,

Everett Dirksen and Charles Halleck (R-IN) traveled up to Eisenhower’s Gettysburg office to

chart out a strategy for the 1962 midterms.40 Eisenhower, who suffered tremendous

Congressional losses while president, wanted the party to focus on the midterms before opening

up old foreseeable divisions that would come in nominating a presidential candidate. In

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Washington that June, less than five months out of office, Eisenhower spoke to over 6,000

Republicans at a fundraising dinner. “I come as a recent graduate of as tough a political cram

course as anyone could devise – six years with an opposition Congress,” Eisenhower cautioned

them, and “those who run too fast into the future sometimes trip over the present.” As a potential

message for the midterms, Eisenhower then introduced his stock critiques, which would define

the GOP line for the next eight years; the Democrats were the party of “big brother;” “immoral”

deficit spending; consolidation and federal overreach; and “rampant public power.”41

Throughout the year, as states and major cities held elections, Eisenhower crisscrossed

the country campaigning in James Mitchell’s New Jersey gubernatorial race, consulting Nelson

Rockefeller in New York, and actively promoting Louis J. Lefkowitz’s mayoral race against

Democratic incumbent Robert F. Wagner.42 Nixon flew into Gettysburg to meet with his former

boss who, as Roscoe Drummond wrote, had been “writing to him, telephoning him, and talking

to him in Gettysburg, that it was Nixon’s ‘duty’ to run and that no other decision was

tolerable.”43 In September, the 38 freshman GOP members of the House of Representatives all

traveled to Eisenhower’s farm to get briefed on the history of the Berlin and Cuba crisis, as well

as a simple message to carry with them into the midterms: “stop spending so blamed much

money.”44

All of this was a part of Eisenhower’s eager attempt to reconstruct the Republican party’s

image. The former president often stepped behind younger, less experienced candidates for local

and state races, with the hope of making the GOP a party no longer dominated by, in his words,

“gray-haired old men.” In addition to encouraging Richard Nixon to run for California’s

governorship, Eisenhower also took credit for motivating his former Interior Secretary, Fred

Seaton, to run for Governor of Nebraska, and for persuading George Romney, president of

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American motors, to run for Governor in Michigan.45 Helping to recruit and promote candidates

was just one component of Eisenhower’s attempt to bring “more young, sensitive people” into

the GOP. Once again inviting young Republicans to his farm in September, 1962, the former

president told them that it was up to them to provide the “enthusiasm, vitality, and vigor to keep

the federal government in its own place.” Speaking as a refined tactician, and often referring to

“the force” of the Republican party, Eisenhower told Republicans at fundraisers that the surest

way to revitalize the GOP was to reach out to the youth. “The Republican welcome mat,” he

said, “should be always out for potential allies – all kinds of citizens who want to help promote

sound and progressive government…This kind of organization, political but not blatantly and

publicly partisan, is especially appealing to younger citizens, particularly when they are not yet

fully committed to membership in either party. Indeed, youth, with its vitality, energy, and

idealism, seems often skeptical of the value and virtue of established party systems…”46 In a

lengthy cover story for the Saturday Evening Post, the former president declared that the

“Republican Party is now in something of an emergency situation and that, consequently, we

should give far less emphasis to seniority. It is more important than formerly to select new

candidates for office from the able and relatively young…we should seize the opportunity to

focus attention on the abilities and personalities of these vital leaders…”47

Dominated by Congressional leaders in Washington, D.C., Eisenhower also believed that

the party would be more effective if it brought more stakeholders into the party leadership.

Working with William Miller, chairman of the RNC, the two built a corollary organization to the

Democratic Advisory Council, known as the “All Republican Conference” or “Citizen’s

Council.” The first meeting, held in a large tent on Eisenhower’s Gettysburg farm, brought

together governors, state legislators, Eisenhower’s former Cabinet, and a small number of

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Congressional Republicans to talk policy and strategy for the 1964 election. Tagged as a “base-

broadening” move, the new organization drew the ire of nationally elected officials, none more

so than Barry Goldwater: “These are the same people who caused most of our present Party

troubles…It is unthinkable that they should be given another opportunity to lead us down the

path to political destruction.”48 Yet, Eisenhower defended the new organization, writing to Miller

that it would help attract “that new breed, the mobile American” who are “crucial to the

Republican Party’s resurgence.” “Our new national citizen’s organization,” he added, “which

will devote much attention to organizational activities in the big cities and metropolitan areas,

could well be the secret of Republican success...”49

As the 1964 Convention approached, the schism between the “amateurs” in the

Republican Citizens Committee and elected officials in Washington took on greater significance.

Eisenhower often couched his dislike of Goldwater, even though he, in principle, remained open

to any eventual GOP nominee.50 But, the Citizen’s Council took the lead in drafting the 1964

GOP platform by enacting another one of the former president’s proposals - a series of “party to

people forums.” Most prominently, it was to be from the Citizen’s Council where the party

would take its messaging cues and a subcommittee led by the former president’s brother, Milton

Eisenhower, was tasked with gauging public opinion on prominent GOP issues.51 The policy

positions that emerged mirrored the former president’s positions and openly diverged from most

of Goldwater’s most provocative statements – privatizing the TVA, building up America’s

nuclear arsenal, weakening federal civil rights protection, and a general isolationist stance.

Eisenhower’s role in the 1964 Republican National Convention belied the years-long effort to

wrest party control away from Goldwater and more conservative factions of the Republican

party. While there was rampant speculation that Eisenhower was advising Pennsylvania’s

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favorite-son, and close confidant of the former President, William Scranton, to fight it out in a

brokered convention, Eisenhower himself never publicly endorsed any candidate. Milton

Eisenhower, however led the convention team that pushed for Scranton in a last-minute effort to

block Goldwater’s nomination. Despite these deep connections to the anti-Goldwater faction, the

former president was adamant in suggesting that it would be inappropriate “try to run a political

organization or give orders or pull strings” in helping to choose the party’s next nominee. At the

convention, Eisenhower met with both candidates, as Scranton tried to persuade Goldwater to a

last minute, publicized debate over the meaning of “Goldwaerism.” Nevertheless, in the only

major public statement the former president gave before the nomination, Eisenhower tried to

temper the significance of the Arizona Republican’s likely candidacy: “I do not believe this

convention marks a great historic turning point…”52

After Goldwater’s now-historic speech lauding “extremism in the defense of liberty,”

however, Eisenhower was openly disappointed with the convention result. Despite his careful

posture prior to the nomination, the former president quickly distanced himself from the new

face of the party. Described as “dispirited” and increasingly unwilling to support Goldwater after

the address, news of Eisenhower’s dissatisfaction forced Goldwater to meet with the former

president the morning after the speech. After meeting with Goldwater for almost an hour, the

former president felt satisfied with the explanation of Goldwater’s choice of words, but publicly

expressed the Senator’s need to “speak about this during the campaign so as to clarify exactly

what he meant.” The issue, however, did not go away, as Eisenhower had given a taped TV

interview prior to their private meeting. Aired after the day after Eisenhower’s initial remarks,

the former president authoritatively undermined the Republican nominee’s rallying cry.

Goldwater’s phrasing, according to Eisenhower, “would seem to say that the end always justifies

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the means…[but] the whole American system refutes that idea and that concept.” He then openly

questioned his own role, or lack thereof, at the convention. “I will say this,” the former president

concluded, “I don’t think that my efforts had any great apparent success…I did what I thought

my conscience dictated and what I thought to be a proper role for a former President in the

councils of his party and I think I would probably assume the same role again, but probably I

would try to do it better.”53

Eisenhower’s interview weighed down the post-convention momentum usually enjoyed

by the out-party. It also prompted Goldwater to expend significant amounts of energy and time in

bringing his party back together through a series of “unity sessions’ that August. Held in

Hershey, PA, the summit meeting concluded with a comprehensive, if tepid endorsement from

Eisenhower. The former president, reflective of what was most likely discussed at the meeting,

emphasized the Senator’s promise to adopt a more pragmatic foreign policy stance and support

federal civil rights legislation. Goldwater, standing next to Eisenhower, responded that he

promised not to appoint any Cabinet official in the State Department or Department of Defense

without first consulting the former president.54 Goldwater even suggested that, if elected, one of

his first acts would be to send the former WWII General to Vietnam to assess and advise on the

military situation – a suggestion that brought quick denial from Eisenhower himself. As the

campaign wore on, the former president was noticeably absent from the campaign trail and

fundraising dinners that marked his behavior in the 1962 midterm elections. His support

extended primarily to filming a set of half-hour sit-down interviews with the GOP candidate to

discuss campaign issues titled, “A Conversation at Gettysburg.”55

After Goldwater’s defeat, though, the president threw himself back into the fight for the

soul of the Republican party. Attending planning meetings for the upcoming January RNC

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meetings that would likely oust party chairman Dean Burch, the former president pushed again

to keep the GOP’s tent big. As he told Republican leaders, reeling over their historic loss, “In

later years, we have been more than Republicans. We have been liberal Republicans, moderate

Republicans, middle-of-the-road Republicans, and conservative Republicans... Now I want to

plead with you, let’s become again just Republicans!” Beyond rhetoric, the former president

took with him a set of sweeping organizational proposals to help revamp the GOP and limit the

control of Congressional Republicans, including a plan to dismantle the House and Senate

Congressional campaign committees. Fortunately for Eisenhower, the interim meeting of the

RNC elected Ray Bliss to revamp the GOP in preparation for the 1966 midterms. Eisenhower

deferred to Bliss’ reform efforts, often encouraging fellow partisans at fundraising dinners to

back Bliss “as he seeks to fulfil his pledge of reorganizing, of reunifying, of re-energizing the

Party from the bottom to the top.” The former president also cautioned against splintering

organizations that would “compete with us in the soliciting of Republican funds.”56

Bliss did not push the reorganization plans as full heartedly as he indicated in the

aftermath of the 1964 election, but the Republican Party turned towards Eisenhower’s strategy

nevertheless. A young, Republican-convert in California, Ronald Reagan, won the Governorship

on Eisenhower’s line of “common-sense” government, and the former president quickly

acknowledged him as a great choice for the party come 1968.57 By 1968, Republicans rebuilt at

the state level, controlled a majority of the nation’s governorships, and retained a formidable

bloc of moderate partisans as it began to draft its 1968 platform.7 Eisenhower’s ultimate

7 Robert Novak and Rowland Evans recognized that by 1968, largely due to Eisenhower’s political maneuvering, moderate Republican governors like Raymond Shafer and George Romney had successfully coalesced to counter-act the power of national, Congressional leaders. In writing the 1968 platform, Bliss maintained near universal control over selecting convention officers, a compromise position between moderates and conservatives – one strikingly different than the outcome four years earlier. See, Rowland Evans and Robert Novak, “Governors Fail to Enlist Eisenhower,” Washington Post, 22 February, 1968.

26

endorsement of his former Vice-President helped Nixon cement his nomination and secured his

vision for the Republican party into the next decade.

Opposition Leader The splintering of the GOP in the early 1960s meant that every policy

statement offered by the former president was also an attempt to move the GOP in a particular

ideological direction. However, Eisenhower crafted and directed a unifying partisan line of

attack, highly critical of Kennedy and Johnson’s budgetary politics.

Eisenhower during his presidency was immensely skeptical of Neo-Keynesian, pump-

priming fiscal policy, which defined elements of the New Frontier. As Kennedy was attempting

to pass a massive public works bill in 1962 (a bill based on the one Truman testified on in 1958),

Eisenhower increasingly used his public reputation to denounce the Democratic party’s budget

philosophy. At a GOP fundraising dinner in 1962, at the height of the administration’s efforts to

pass the bill, Eisenhower’s denouncement was greeted with “cheers, whistles, and hurrahs,” as

he lambasted Kennedy’s plans. Suggesting that the president had been “floundering aimlessly

and desperately” behind a front of “sophistication,” he told crows that “it is always necessary to

examine critically those appropriating and to stop assuming that mere spending means increased

strength.” Despite their growing animosity, Goldwater followed and capitalized on Eisenhower’s

critique of the New Economics, calling on Republican voters to send a message to Kennedy to

replace his “brain trusters” with “hard-headed business men” who actually understood the

economy. Dirksen and Halleck in their weekly press conference said that only a GOP Congress

could successfully declare a moratorium on Kennedy’s “economic novelties,” return to “fiscal

sanity,” and abandon this “old scheme to cover up extravagant government spending.” And, in

providing the alternative, Eisenhower continued to tour the country claiming that Republicans

27

are those who “see dedication to balanced budgets as one measure of responsibility in political

leadership!58

Even on some of the least technocratic elements of the New Frontier, Eisenhower struck

a hard line on the Kennedy administration’s spending priorities, often earning front-page

newspaper attention. On increased money for space exploration, the former president declared

that, “at the very least we might not defer buying tickets for a trip to the moon until we can pay

cash for the ride!” Campaigning for Maryland candidates in 1962, the former president told

cheering crowds pinning “We miss Ike buttons” that, “In my day we called people who would

not pay their way deadbeats. I think they, the Democrats, are asking us to be deadbeats!”

Speaking in Illinois, Eisenhower declared that Republicans of any stripe were united because

they were “the kind of people who will eliminate the Alice-in-Wonderland thinking” that

embodied Democratic Party orthodoxy. In Minneapolis, the former president lambasted the

“little clique of professors” who were advising the president to make “an unconscionable grab

for power” with the Executive’s budgetary discretion over public works. Speaking to an

estimated 25,000 people in Hartford, Connecticut, the ex-president continued his attack on the

technocratic underpinnings of the New Frontier – “They want a Washington…where the

executive gets its goals and purposes from a clique of theorists who specialize in experimental

tampering and tinkering and talk…timidity in everything, except in spending money!” Holding a

news conference at the Capitol building, Eisenhower treated over 170 reporters to a White-House

style press conference on the Kennedy budget. He focused on the growing set of obligations that

comprised Kennedy’s domestic agenda, as well as the young presidents attempt “to vest more

power in the Executive.” Increased federal concentration, he added, was “the real threat to liberty

in this republic.” Eisenhower’s press conference followed from a set of day-long meetings with

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senior GOP officials on Capitol Hill, in which he forewarned the impending danger of the

Democratic party’s “Leviathan State.”59

Eisenhower further made headlines when, in in a surprising move of ideological

consistency, the former president lambasted the Kennedy administration’s budget increases for

military spending. “I must record by personal belief,” Eisenhower remarked at a GOP

fundraising dinner, “that substantial amounts in our current defense budgets reflect unjustified

fears, plus a reluctance in some quarters to relinquish outmoded concepts.”60 The spat portended

a deep division over the direction of the GOP heading into the presidential nomination contests,

but few could must the same degree of authority as the former General. He continued this

critique in 1963, writing in the Saturday Evening Post about the need to cut down on troops in

NATO, primarily because of the financial stress put on the federal budget – now the largest

peacetime budget in American history. Eisenhower’s fiscal conservatism and balanced budget

mentality only grew as President Johnson’s “nutty” Great Society took hold. Eisenhower was

never alone in his condemnation of big government spending, but as former president, his

opinions carried unmatched authority, and never ceased to be newsworthy. 61

Elder Statesman It was President Kennedy who first drew Eisenhower back into political life as

an elder statesman in support of America’s foreign interests and the presidency’s role in securing

them.

As soon as Kennedy took office, a mammoth international crisis threatened to erupt in

Laos. Under Eisenhower, the U.S. government had aided the anti-communist general Nosavan

Phoumi. The Eisenhower-established SEATO treaty proved ineffective, and neither of America’s

two strong allies in the region – Britain and France – were unwilling to support the military

leader. As this crisis threatened to further destabilize the region, the Kennedy administration

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reached out directly to former president Eisenhower for consultation. During the transition

period, Eisenhower and Kennedy worked closely to keep the transitioning administration

apprised of developments.8 Kennedy had handled the Laos crisis delicately upon entering the

White House, but the minor interventions had made the possibility of a military invasion more

likely. By mid-March, Kennedy announced that the U.S. would no longer unconditionally

support Phoumi; rather, they would support a concerted effort to broker a cease-fire and make

Laos a neutral state.

Eisenhower, who was heavily implicated in the success or failure of the region’s stability,

announced that he would pause his Palms Spring vacation and speak to reporters about

“international affairs” and Kennedy’s decision. Eisenhower was adamant – the young

administration, despite a worsening situation, was conducting itself admirably. Recalling his

phone conversation with the president earlier that morning, Eisenhower told reporters that “His

[Kennedy’s] idea seemed to conform exactly with what we had tried to do the last few years.” He

added that, “the present Administration seems dedicated to peace and is trying to be fair.”

Pressed on whether Eisenhower would have pursued a military option, the former president

strongly critiqued the question. “None of us can help by irresponsible suggestions,” he said, “I

would want exactly the same facts that the President has before I made any statement on that.

The man responsible for foreign affairs is the President.”62

Less than a month later, all attention turned from Laos towards Cuba. In late April, news

quickly rolled in about some Cuban rebels who were ambushed at the Bay of Pigs. World leaders

and press reports quickly implicated the White House and the country’s CIA for the unsuccessful

8 As Arthur Schlesinger recounts, the last conversation among many conversations Kennedy had with Eisenhower during the transition concerned the possibility of military action in Laos. See, Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr. 1965. A Thousand Days: John F. Kennedy in the White House. Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin Company, 162-164; 320.

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revolt, turning what would have been an isolated uprising into a global crisis. Kennedy moved

quickly to quell the unrest and stave off partisan attacks, meeting with Senators Goldwater and

Rockefeller, and conferring with Richard Nixon. The President also wanted to meet with

Eisenhower, under whose administration a version of the invasion was first conceived. Flying an

Air Force helicopter out to the former president’s farm in Pennsylvania, Kennedy and

Eisenhower met at Camp David on Saturday, April 22. As Kennedy’s press secretary, Pierre

Salinger, told reporters the day before the meeting, the president felt that Eisenhower, “as leader

of the Republican party and former President, should know what the situation is.”63

As Eisenhower later recounted in a 1964 oral history, the meeting with Kennedy was

more than just a partisan ploy to temper the blowback. Up to that point nobody had fully taken

responsibility for the invasion. Eisenhower recalled that, “he [Kennedy] was asking what to do

now and he wanted to know what I thought would be the Russian reaction…he was afraid…He

was more interested in what I thought he should do now, than what the Russians would like to

do.”64 Meeting alone in the Aspen Lodge, the president and former president met for almost two

hours. Speaking to reporters shortly after, Kennedy paid respect to his predecessor, saying that

he wanted to meet with Eisenhower to “get the benefit of his thoughts and experience.”

Eisenhower then told the press that he was “all in favor of the United States supporting the man

who is carrying the responsibility for our foreign affairs.”65

Eisenhower’s solidarity with the new president, coupled with Kennedy’s own humble acceptance

of blame, won praise in the mainstream press. The president’s “appeal to Mr. Eisenhower for

support,” The Washington Post read, “was a wise gesture of national unity; and the generous

response of the former President, who has known like strains and disappointments was

characteristically patriotic.” The columnist Roscoe Drummond – who Kennedy credited with

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suggesting the initial pre-inaugural meetings concerning Laos66 - recognized the significance of

this relationship best, writing “That Mr. Eisenhower will not make political capital out of the

failure of the Cuban invasion and will strongly support the President in whatever decisive action

is needed to remove an unelected Communist state from our doorstep.”67

Despite the former president’s admonition, blame still trickled in from the other side of

the aisle. The following week, though, Eisenhower made another show of support, inviting 20 of

his former Cabinet secretaries and White House aides to his Gettysburg office to discuss the need

to further temper GOP critiques of Kennedy’s foreign policy. Later that summer, while standing

in front of 6,000 Republicans at a fundraising dinner at the National Armory, Eisenhower

pressed his unifying commitments further saying, “As the President attempts to preserve our

freedoms, as he seeks to strengthen peace as he confers with foreign leaders, whether friendly or

hostile, he has the hopeful and sympathetic good will of all loyal Americans, regardless of

party.” He added that he had “pride” in those Republicans who “did not attempt to criticize,

condemn, or belittle those in authority.” Eisenhower continued this massive display of

presidential support into the Kennedy administration’s next crisis – Berlin – later that summer.

Standing alongside Nelson Rockefeller, at his office at Gettysburg College, Eisenhower again

asked that Americans unite around their President and support the administration’s foreign aid

and defense policies. As the situation worsened, press routinely pushed Eisenhower into

expressing his views on the administration’s response. Emphasizing that he was not “up on

things,” Eisenhower justified each of the current president’s decisions with a similar line – that

he must be “doing it for a good reason.”68

The White House recognized Eisenhower’s efforts to rally around the flag. Eisenhower,

in response to the Berlin crisis, penned a lengthy essay in the Saturday Evening Post. Kennedy

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wrote to the former president, praising his essay as “constructive and helpful.” After Eisenhower

appeared on CBS to denounce extremism in America, coming most prominently from the John

Birch Society, Kennedy again penned his predecessor writing that, “I want you to know how

much I appreciated and admired your televised remarks about extremists. I don’t know of anyone

whose opinion on this matter will have greater weight; and your statement is another example of

your service and devotion to the country.”69

Eisenhower was not 100 percent consistent in his defense of Kennedy’s foreign policy.

As William Ewald, the president’s speechwriter, later recounted,

When Kennedy became the leader, he [Eisenhower] couldn’t care who it was, he’s going to support him,

especially on foreign policy, national security policy... Now he obviously had a great deal of bitterness and

resentment at the Kennedy attacks on him, on his record, his performance…In the ‟62 campaign,

somewhere along the line, something got off the rails. And Kennedy made a speech or part of a speech,

talking about how great his record was on foreign policy against Eisenhower’s. And this infuriated

Eisenhower…and he went up to Harrisburg and he made a blistering attack on the Kennedy record. And

then he said, “I think we ought to stop this. And I won’t say anymore, and I don’t think you should say

anymore.” I tell you neither side said any more...70

Ewald’s account mirrors the historical record quite accurately, and even while

Eisenhower continued to critique Kennedy’s domestic spending, he nevertheless urged the

country to stand behind the President “without regard to their political affiliation as he seeks to

lead us to a peaceful and honorable” place in world affairs. And throughout 1962 and 1963,

Kennedy routinely met with Eisenhower for brief meetings, often lasting longer than planned,

including after the death of civil rights activist Medgar Evans and Kennedy’s landmark civil

rights address. In 1963, the Kennedy administration actively sought and secured Eisenhower’s

support of their controversial nuclear test ban treaty - “the biggest battle since the Treaty of

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Versailles,” according to the White House. As president, Eisenhower had tried to negotiate a

ban-treaty in 1958, but negotiations fell flat, in large part due to intra-party opposition.

Eisenhower’s prospective endorsement became all the more imperative in Kennedy’s fight to

pass the treaty when the former chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, Lewis Strauss,

criticized the agreement and Barry Goldwater ramped up his attack. Even the Senate Foreign

Relations Committee chair, James Fulbright (D-AK), requested Eisenhower’s perspective on the

matter.71 In response, Eisenhower traveled to Washington to meet with Senators to clarify his

position, and make clear his support of the administration’s goals. As Ewald later explained,

Eisenhower’s support of Kennedy actually went against the advice of his political advisors.

Strauss and Brownell both remained skeptical and encouraged Eisenhower to remain silent on

the matter. In the end, however, Eisenhower recognized that it “was one of those things where

there was no compromising, and it didn’t take him long; he did endorse it.”72

The Politics of the Post-Presidency

The post-presidencies of Truman and Eisenhower show that authority gained as President

of the United States does not quickly recede, but that the form it takes is predictable. Truman,

remained an active, polemical darling for the Democratic party, helped promote an alternative

fiscal policy to counter Eisenhower’s balanced budget approach, and, in retrospect, courageously

battled the politics of McCarthyism. Surprisingly, Eisenhower remained just as politically active

as Truman, and despite having less experience, was arguably more successful in directly

imprinting his legacy on his party. While never getting the reputation of “Give ‘em Hell”

Truman, Eisenhower turned out to be just as critical of subsequent administrations as Truman

was of his, but, as the elder statesman, he used his position to unify the country during multiple

foreign crises. However, this also included conferring with Johnson over the decision to send

34

more troops to Vietnam, and supporting the Vietnam War until his death in 1969.73 To this

extent, both Eisenhower and Truman’s claim to leadership as an elder statesman was never

value-neutral, nor was it intended to be.

To be sure, Obama’s decision to remain in Washington was an incredibly personal one;

the family wants daughter-Sasha to finish her two more years of high school. However, even if

he was not living in the nation’s capital, Obama’s presence in Washington’s political scene may

be just as domineering, as was Eisenhower and Truman’s. In late December, less than a month

before he left office, President Obama sat down with his former chief strategist, David Axelrod

for a lengthy interview on the president’s retirement plans. Obama responded with an ambitious,

open-ended list of priorities to “build that next generation of leadership” and “identify really

talented staff and organizers who are already out there and encouraging them to get involved

[with the Democratic Party].” 74 In the closing months of his presidency, more of his priorities

came into sharper relief. As an opposition leader, he and his first Attorney General, Eric Holder,

have already organized a 527-advocacy group to push redistricting reform, with the implicit goal

of helping Democrats recover some semblance of power in state government.75 Obama’s My

Brother’s Keeper has a unique private-public partnership design that will allow the president to

maintain direction over it, now that is no longer a White House priority; with former Obama-

official Broderick Johnson as its newly elected chair, this mentoring initiative will continue to

solidify the former president’s place as an elder statesman in national and local conversations on

racial equality.

While Obama will carry with similar levels of media attention and personal loyalties

necessary to effect political change, in one important respect, however, he will be distinct from

the post-presidencies of Eisenhower or Truman. President Obama entered into office in large part

35

because of his independence from the formal Democratic party, using his personal campaign

organization (Obama for America, now titled Organizing for Action) to mobilize voters, solicit

campaign funds, and pronounce party doctrine. As Sidney Milkis and John York (2017) write,

“It remains to be seen, however, whether the presidential partisanship practiced by Obama’s

information-age, grassroots organization offers a novel and enduring form of party building or

marks, instead, a new stage of executive aggrandizement that subordinates collective party

responsibility to a cult of personality.” By most accounts, President Obama used his organization

to prioritize his own personal loyalties over his party’s collective position. Interestingly enough,

in the modern era, only Dwight Eisenhower suffered greater party-seat losses in the Congress

than President Obama (Jacobs and Ceaser 2016). Yet, Eisenhower redoubled his efforts to

reshape the Republican party after his term by actively working through its pre-existing

institutions. Obama has the option of forgoing the Democratic party and instead using his own

impressive institutional capacity to carry forward his post-presidential ambitions.

36

Table 1: Presidential Approval During Last Week in Office

Incumbent President Date Range Presidential

ApprovalApproval by

President’s PartyApproval by

Opposing PartyPresident’s Party in Two-Party Vote

H. Truman December 15, 1952 32% 50% 9% 44.55% (1952)

D. Eisenhower December 12, 1960 59 88 43 49.92 (1960)

J. Kennedy November 12, 1963 58 80 31 61.34 (1964)

L. Johnson January 5, 1969 49 63 32 49.96 (1968)

R. Nixon August 4, 1974 24 50 13 48.95 (1976)

G. Ford December 12, 1976 53 80 40 48.95 (1976)

J. Carter December 7, 1980 34 49 14 44.69 (1980)

R. Reagan December 28, 1988 63 93 38 53.90 (1988)

H.W. Bush January 10, 1993 56 86 33 46.55 (1992)

W. Clinton January 13, 2001 66 93 39 50.27 (2000)

W. Bush January 10, 2009 31 75 6 46.31 (2008)

B. Obama January 18, 2017 59 95 14 50.51 (2016)

Source: Gallup Polls, Presidential Job Approval Center. URL: http://www.gallup.com/interactives/185273/presidential-job-approval-center.aspx?g_source=PRESIDENTIAL_JOB_APPROVAL&g_medium=topic&g_campaign=tiles . Last Accessed, March 8, 2017. Presidential Vote Share of the Two-Party Vote calculated from data provided by: N. Jacobs and J. Ceaser, “The 2016 Presidential Election by the Numbers and in Historical Perspective,” The Forum 14 (2016): 361-385.

37

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Fried, Richard M. 1990. Nightmare in Red: The McCarthy Era in Perspective. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press

Galvin, Daniel J. 2010. Presidential Party Building: Dwight D. Eisenhower to George W. Bush. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

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Martin, John. 1979. Civil Rights and the Crisis of Liberalism: The Democratic Party, 1945-1976. Boulder, CO: Westview Press

Milkis, Sidney M., and John Warren York. 2017. “Barack Obama, Organizing for Action, and Executive-Centered Partisanship.” Studies in American Political Development: 1–23.

Savage, James 1988. Balanced Budget and American Politics. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press

Schickler, Eric. 2016. Racial Realignment: The Transformation of American Liberalism, 1932-1965. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

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38

ENDNOTES

1 Obama first hinted at remaining in Washington in November, 2013 during an interview with Barbara Walters, almost 2 and a half years before Donald Trump announced his candidacy. The Obama family confirmed their decision in late 2015. Video of the interview is available at: http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/politics/2013/11/obamas-might-stay-in-washington-after-presidency-ends-2/ . Last Accessed, April 7, 2017. 2 Fox & Friends, FOX News Chanel, December 28, 2016. URL: http://video.foxnews.com/v/5263549712001/?#sp=show-clips . Last Accessed, April 7, 2017. 3Associated Press, March 10, 2017, “GOP rep backs off claim Obama running ‘shadow government,’ URL: http://bigstory.ap.org/2e1752947b0543169c02b090b2e8bf36?utm_campaign=SocialFlow&utm_source=Twitter&utm_medium=AP . Last Accessed, April 7, 2017. 4 Your World with Neil Cavuto, FOX News Chanel, May 26, 2016. URL: https://mediamatters.org/video/2016/05/26/ben-stein-calls-obama-super-narcissist-staying-dc-after-presidency/210605 . Last Accessed, April 7, 2017. 5 Philip Freneau’s ode and comparison to the great Roman general who saved the Republic is perhaps the most famous; “Verses, Occasioned by General Washington’s arrival in Philadelphia, on how way to his seat in Virginia,” December, 1783. The Poems of Philip Freneau: Poet of the American Revolution, vol. II. Fred Lewis Pattee, ed. 1903. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 228.6 Drew Pearson, “Truman Pays Tribute to Hoover,” 8 January, 1954, The Washington Post; Clarence A. Johnson, “Being Ex-President is Wearing.” The Washington Post, 30 January, 1955.. 7 “Happy Harry Truman’s Back,” Washington Post, 22 June, 1953. 8 “Truman Does Not Choose to Run for Congress,” Washington Post, 9 July 9, 1954; “Old Campaigners Meet as Democrats Rally in Chicago,” New York Times, 13 September, 1953; “Truman Comes Here for 2 Day Party Meeting,” Chicago Daily Tribune, 13 September, 1953; “Democratic Chiefs Meet for 3 Hours,” The Washington Post, 14 September, 1953; “Democrats Borrow Eisenhower Tactic,” Wall Street Journal, 15 September, 1953, . 9 Truman’s attempt to connect rumors of a polio vaccine shortage to decisions made up high in the Eisenhower administration never panned out. On his remarks, see: Los Angeles Times, 25 May, 1955; Washington Post, 26 May, 1955. 10 “Democrats Plan to Pin ‘GOP Confusion’ on Ike,” Washington Post, 16 April, 1955; “Rayburn Hits GOP Right Wing As ‘Disloyal Opposition’,” Washington Post, 17 April, 1955; “Few Listen to Truman, Hagerty Declares,” Washington Post, 30 August, 1955. 11 Drew Pearson, “Truman, Harriman to Hold Conference,” The Washington Post, 8 October, 1955. 12 “GOP Policy, Nixon Stir Truman Scorn,” Washington Post, 27 November, 1955,. 13 “Truman Praises Gov. Harriman,” Washington Post, 9 October, 1955; Washington Post, February 14, 1956, “3 Groups Putting Pressure on Ike,” 51. 14 Joseph Aslop and Stewart Aslop, “Matter of Fact…Harry Truman’s Role,” Washington Post, 10 August, 1956. 15 Truman’s full remarks are re-printed in, “Text of Statement by Ex-President,” Washington Post, 12 August, 1956. 16 “Harriman Elated By Endorsement,” New York Times, 12 August, 1956. 17 The first and second day delegate counts are most robustly reported in “Harriman Drive is Stopped,” Wall Street Journal, 14 August, 1956. 18 “FDR Widow Takes Issue with Truman,” Washington Post, 13 August, 1956. 19 “Truman Gives Seconding Talk for Harriman,” Los Angeles Times, 17 August, 1956,. 20 Not only did Stevenson win, he secured he nomination on the first ballot with 905 ½ votes; 219 more than need, which also happened to be 9 more votes than what Harriman eventually secured. “Truman Rallies to Stevenson as a Real Fighter,” Los Angeles Times, 18 August, 1956; “Text of Address by Truman, Kefauver, and Stevenson Before Democratic Convention,” New York Times, 18 August, 1956. 21 “Truman Returns to Independence,” New York Times, 19 August, 1956; “Truman Plans Trip to Australia,” Washington Post, August 25, 1956. 22 “Butler Says He’ll Form Committee as Ordered,” Washington Post, 14 December, 1956. By 1959 the council’s membership would grow to about 30-members and include such prominent members of the party as Sen. John F. Kennedy and Eleanor Roosevelt (as a “consultant”). The council was partially responsible for pushing a more liberal civil rights agenda, and criticizing Eisenhower on these grounds. See also, “Open Shop Bid Hit by Council of Democrats,” Washington Post, 6 May, 1957. 23 “GOP Answers Truman ‘Falsehood’,” Washington Post, 23 September, 1958; “Truman Hits Eisenhower Policies,” Washington Post, 11 September, 1956; “Truman Starts Lectures at Yale, Takes Dig at Ike,” Washington Post, 9 April, 1958,. 24 “Parties Switch Roles on Cutting the Budget,” Washington Post, 19 May, 1957,. 25 As the Republican House Whip told the press, Spence’s high-profile push for public works was “nothing more nor less than political dramatics for Democrat propaganda purposes.” “Partisan Battle on the Economy Seen,” New York Times, 10 April, 1958.

26 U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Banking and Currency, Legislation to Relieve Unemployment: Hearings before the Committee on Banking and Currency, 85th Cong, 2nd sess. 25-77. 27 Velde also issued summons for Supreme Court Justice Tom Clark, who was attorney general at the time of White’s appointment, and South Carolina Governor James Byrnes, who was then serving as secretary of state. Byrnes who had broken with Truman and the Democrats in 1952 had by that time added support to the allegations by confirming that Truman knew of White’s spying activities. “Truman, Clark Subpoenaed!” Chicago Daily Tribune, 11 November 11, 1953; “Truman, Byrnes Subpoenaed with Clark in White Case,” New York Times, 11 November, 1953. 28 “A Smiling Truman Accepts Subpoena,” New York Times, November 11, 1953. 29 Full text of Truman’s response is re-printed in several newspapers, including the Chicago Daily Tribune, 13 November, 1953; New York Times,13 November, 1953. 30 “Truman Subpoena Upsets GOP Chiefs,” Los Angeles Times, 14 November, 1953; “GOP Leaders Bar Citing of Truman,” New York Times, 13 November, 1953. 31 “Truman will Give White Case ‘Facts’ On Air Tomorrow,” New York Times, 15 November, 1953. 32 “Ex-President Blasts ‘Cheap Political Trickery,” Washington Post, 17 November, 1953; “Truman Accuses Brownell of Lying,” New York Times, 17 November, 1953. 33 Full remarks of Harry Truman’s speech re-printed in, Washington Post, 17 November, 1953. 34 Straight’s response to the Washington Post is re-printed in, “Interpreting Truman,” Washington Post, 27 November, 1953. For a review of positive and negative reactions to Truman’s speech, see: “Press Commentary on Truman Speech Varies,” Los Angeles Times, November 18, 1953. 35 Joseph R. McCarty, “A Speech Against Harry S. Truman,” WNYC archives id: 151018; Municipal archives id: LT2634. Contemporaneous reports of the nationally televised address can be found in Washington Post, 25 November, 1953. 36 Truman did give a small speech before a 500-person meeting of Young Democrats in Kansas City, but he primarily focused on the anti-Democratic bias in the media. “Truman Urges Party to Turn From Past,” New York Times, 20 November, 1953. 37 Excerpts of Truman’s address, printed nearly in full, are from “Truman Assails Fear Tactics of Politicians,” Chicago Daily Tribune, 29 November, 1953; See also, “Truman Says Freedoms are Now Under Attack,” Los Angeles Times, 29 November, 1953; “Truman Hits ‘Vigilantes of Intellect’,” Washington Post, 29 November, 1953. 38 “GOP Leaders in Congress Discuss Plans to End One-Man Probes by Subpoena and Hearing Curbs,” Washington Post, 29 December, 1953; “Nixon Says ‘Questionable Methods’ and ‘Reckless Talk’ of Red Hunters are Diversion from GOP Program,” New York Times, 14 March, 1954. 39 “Eisenhower Calls Soviet Insincere,” New York Times, 25 January, 1961; “Georgia Quail Hunter,” Washington Post, 25 January, 1961; “Eisenhower Finds New Life ‘Great’,” New York Times, 21 January, 1961. 40 “Ike and GOP Leaders Chart Course Today,” Washington Post, 1 May, 1961; “Witch-Hunt Opposed by Ike,” Washington Post, 2 May, 1961. 41 “Ike Urges GOP Fight Now for ’62, Not ’64,” Washington Post, 2 June, 1961. 42 “Ike to Campaign at Mitchell Rally,” Washington Post, 5 August, 1961; “Ike Urges Firm Stand on Berlin,” Washington Post, 12 July, 1961; “NY GOP Leaders Map Strategy with Ike,” Washington Post, 13 August, 1961. 43 Roscoe Drummond, “The Nixon Decision,” Washington Post, 30 September, 1961. 44 “38 Republican Freshmen in House Tour Gettysburg Battlefield with Ike,” Washington Post, 12 September, 1961. 45 “Ike, 71, Said to Bar his Aid to ‘Old Men’,” Washington Post, 10 February, 1962,. 46 Transcript of the address reprinted in New York Times, 2 February, 1962.47 Dwight Eisenhower, “Ike Takes a Look at the GOP,” Saturday Evening Post, 21 April, 1962, 15-19; Dwight Eisenhower, “Danger from Within,” Saturday Evening Post, 26 January, 1963, 14-19. 48 “Goldwater Blasts GOP Plan to Use Old Guard Chiefs,” Washington Post, 3 July, 1962,. 49 “Ike Joins Party Fight, Lines Up with Liberals,” Washington Post, 5 July, 1962. 50 In the Fall of 1963, Eisenhower remarked that he was “unclear” on Goldwater’s message. Less about the ideologically consistent position of the Arizona Senator, contemporaneous accounts understood Eisenhower’s message to be a veiled condemnation of the prospective presidential candidate. “Love and Marriage Complicate GOP Candidate Hunt,” Washington Post, 15 June, 1963; “Ike Said to Narrow GOP Choices to 4,” Washington Post, 7 July, 1963.51 “Eisenhower GOP Council to Study Key Issues,” Washington Post, 5 August, 1963. 52 “Ike and Scranton Talk Creates Stir in Ranks of GOP,” Washington Post, 7 June, 1964; “Last Thing I Want is to Run Party, Pull Strings, Ike Quoted as Saying,” Washington Post, 8 July, 1964; “Ike Says He’ll Support Barry if He is Nominee,” Washington Post, 14 July, 1964. 53 “Eisenhower Bids Arizonan Explain,” New York Times, 18 July, 1964; “Clarify Talk, Eisenhower Asks Senator,” Los Angeles Times, 19 July, 1964; “Eisenhower Hits at Idea ‘End Justifies Means’,” Los Angeles Times, 20 July, 1964; “Extremism Reaction of Ike Shown by Tape,” Washington Post, 20 July, 1964. 54 Roscoe Drummond, “Extremists vs. Goldwater,” Washington Post, 23 September, 1964.

55 “Goldwater Sets Series of GOP Unity Sessions,” Washington Post, July 28, 1964; Statement of Eisenhower is reprinted in full in Washington Post, 13 August, 1964. Statement of Goldwater is reprinted in full in Washington Post, 13 August, 1964; “Ike, at 74, Shies from Viet-Nam,” Washington Post, 15 October, 1964; “Barry Sees LBJ Afraid to Debate,” Washington Post, 22 September, 1964. 56 “Last Thing I Want is to Run Party, Pull Strings, Ike Quoted as Saying,” Washington Post, July 8, 1964; “Leaders Agree with Ike on Poor Image of GOP,” Washington Post, 22 January, 1965; “Ike, at Ohio Dinner, Asks GOP Unity Behind Bliss,” Washington Post, 10 June, 1965; “Ike Scores Splintering Amid GOP,” Washington Post, 29 June, 1965. 57 At the GOP post-mortum meeting in December 1964, Eisenhower closed his speech, remarking that, “ It doesn’t make too much difference what ways we will solve the major problems of the world as long as we popularize the term ‘common sense.’ We should make it the byword of the party, and, in this way, we can again become the majority party.” On Reagan, see: “Ike Likes Reagan as 1968 Possibility,” Washington Post, 16 June, 1966. 58 “Eisenhower’s Attack on Kennedy’s Policies Causes New Problems for Administration,” Wall Street Journal, 25 June, 1962. 59 “Ike Denounces Foreign Policy and Spending,” Washington Post, 17 September, 1961; “Democrats Make US ‘Nation of Deadbeats,’ Ike Says at GOP Rally,” ; Washington Post, 8 September, 1962; “Ike Attacks ‘Power Grab’ By Kennedy,” Washington Post, 11 October, 1962; “Ike Sees GOP Administrations Desperately Needed in States,” Washington Post, 16 October, 1962; “Ike Charges Kennedy Seeks Wider Powers,” Washington Post, 11 May, 1962; “GOP Chiefs Say Kennedy Tries to Build Up ‘Leviathan State’,” Washington Post, 14 May 1962. 60 “Big Spenders Sway Kennedy, Kike Says,” Washington Post, 30 June, 1962. 61 “Ike, 75 Today, Lets Mind Go to Past, Then to Future of Republican Party,” Washington Post, 14 October, 1965. 62 “Eisenhower Backs Kennedy’s Actions in Laos Crisis,” New York Times, 25 March, 1961; “Ike, Kennedy Express Same Views on Laos,” Chicago Daily Tribune, 25 March, 1961; “Ike Gets Call From Kennedy,” Washington Post, 25 March, 1961.63“Ike, Kennedy to Confer on Cuban Crisis,” Chicago Daily Tribune, 22 April, 1961. 64 Dwight D. Eisenhower's Post-Presidential Papers, 1965 Signature File, Box 7, PR-3 Public Relations-3 Interview 11-27-64; NAID #12023937, pages 15-1665 “Eisenhower Urges Nation to Back Kennedy on Cuba,” New York Times, 23 April, 1961; “And Another in Cuba,” Chicago Daily Tribune, 23 April, 1961. “Eisenhower Meets with Kennedy, Asks Nation to Back Him,” Los Angeles Times, 23 April, 1961,. 66 Papers of John F. Kennedy. Presidential Papers. President's Office Files. Special Correspondence. Eisenhower, Dwight D., 1961: January-December; document 5. 67 “Aftermath of Cuba,” Washington Post, 24 April, 1961; “Ike and Kennedy,” Washington Post, 1 May, 1961. 68 “Ike Urges Firm Stand on Berlin,” Washington Post, 12 July, 1961; “Eisenhower Urges Calm in Facing World Crisis,” Washington Post, 23 July, 1961. 69 Papers of John F. Kennedy. Presidential Papers. President’s Office Files. Special Correspondence. Eisenhower, Dwight D., 1961: January-December; 47 – 49. 70 William B. Ewald, Oral History Interview – JFK #1, July 15, 1983. Interviewer Sheldon Stern; and the John F. Kennedy Library, 13-14. 71 “Eisenhower for Test Ban,” New York Times, 27 August, 1963; “Ike Approves Test Ban,” Washington Post, 27 August, 1963. 72 William B. Ewald, Oral History Interview, 16. 73 “President Tells of Talk with General Eisenhower,” Washington Post, 8 October, 1965; Dwight D. Eisenhower, “America's Place in the World,” Reader's Digest 87:522 (October 1965), 76–8174 David Axelrod, “The Axe Files, Ep. 108: President Barack Obama,” The University of Chicago Institute of Politics & CNN. Audio and Interview transcript available at CNN.com. URL: http://podcast.cnn.com/the-axe-files-david-axelrod/episode/all/Yg1u54uYTmB7Mb/me1tyh.html . Last Accessed, March 28, 2017. 75 Edward-Isaac Dovere, “Obama, Holder to lead post-Trump redistricting campaign,” Politico, 17 October, 2016. URL: http://www.politico.com/story/2016/10/obama-holder-redistricting-gerrymandering-229868 . Last Accessed, April 7, 2017.