Масштабируя TLS / Артём Гавриченков (Qrator Labs)

Масштабируя TLSАртём Гавриченков <[email protected]>

Краткая история нового времени• 2010: SPDY w/de-facto mandatory* SSL/TLS

• 2014: “HTTPS as a ranking signal” at Google

• 2015: HTTP/2 w/de-facto mandatory* TLS

• 2016: Let’s Encrypt

* – https://forum.nginx.org/read.php?21,236132,236184

* – https://daniel.haxx.se/blog/2015/03/06/tls-in-http2/

https://forum.nginx.org/read.php?21,236132,236184

https://daniel.haxx.se/blog/2015/03/06/tls-in-http2/

Краткая история нового времени• 2010: SPDY w/de-facto mandatory* SSL/TLS• 2013: NSA story• 2014: “HTTPS as a ranking signal” at Google• 2014:• 2015: HTTP/2 w/de-facto mandatory* TLS• 2015:• 2016: Let’s Encrypt• 2016:





Краткая история нового времени• 2010: SPDY w/de-facto mandatory* SSL/TLS• 2013: NSA story• 2014: “HTTPS as a ranking signal” at Google• 2014: Heartbleed, POODLE

• 2015: HTTP/2 w/de-facto mandatory* TLS• 2015: RFC 7457

• 2016: Let’s Encrypt





Краткая история нового времени• 2010: SPDY w/de-facto mandatory* SSL/TLS• 2013: NSA story• 2014: “HTTPS as a ranking signal” at Google• 2014: Heartbleed, POODLE

• 2015: HTTP/2 w/de-facto mandatory* TLS• 2015: RFC 7457, FREAK, Logjam

• 2016: Let’s Encrypt• 2016: DROWN





SSL/TLS PKI• Root certificate authorities, trust chain

SSL/TLS PKI• Root certificate authorities, trust chain• 92 CAs in Firefox

SSL/TLS PKI• Root certificate authorities, trust chain• Trusted, because they make it for living• Independent from large corporations, government, etc.


Except, some of them ARE government


And some of them are large corporationsExcept, some of them ARE government

SSL/TLS PKI• Root certificate authorities, trust chain• Trusted, because they make it for living• Independent from large corporations, government, etc.• Pursuing their interests as trusted third parties

SSL/TLS PKI• Root certificate authorities, trust chain• Trusted, because they make it for living• Independent from large corporations, government, etc.• Pursuing their interests as trusted third parties• Corporations and government always tend to elevate their own interests

The story of WoSign• Trusted since 2009• Aggressive marketing and free certificates• Passed audit by Ernst&Young

The story of WoSignhttps://wiki.mozilla.org/CA:WoSign_Issues• Issued certificates not requested by domain owner

https://wiki.mozilla.org/CA:WoSign_Issues


The story of WoSignhttps://wiki.mozilla.org/CA:WoSign_Issues• Issued certificates not requested by domain owner• Allowed using non-privileged ports (>50,000) to verify domain control



The story of WoSignhttps://wiki.mozilla.org/CA:WoSign_Issues• Issued certificates not requested by domain owner• Allowed using non-privileged ports (>50,000) to verify domain control• Allowed using subdomains to verify 2nd level domain



The story of WoSignhttps://wiki.mozilla.org/CA:WoSign_Issues• Issued certificates not requested by domain owner• Allowed using non-privileged ports (>50,000) to verify domain control• Allowed using subdomains to verify 2nd level domain• Allowed using arbitrary files to verify ownership



The story of WoSignhttps://wiki.mozilla.org/CA:WoSign_Issues• Issued certificates not requested by domain owner• Allowed using non-privileged ports (>50,000) to verify domain control• Allowed using subdomains to verify 2nd level domain• Allowed using arbitrary files to verify ownership• Allowed to issue certificates for arbitrary domains without verification



The story of WoSignhttps://wiki.mozilla.org/CA:WoSign_Issues• Issued certificates not requested by domain owner• Allowed using non-privileged ports (>50,000) to verify domain control• Allowed using subdomains to verify 2nd level domain• Allowed using arbitrary files to verify ownership• Allowed to issue certificates for arbitrary domains without verification• Issued backdated SHA-1 certificates



The story of WoSignhttps://wiki.mozilla.org/CA:WoSign_Issues• Issued certificates not requested by domain owner• Allowed using non-privileged ports (>50,000) to verify domain control• Allowed using subdomains to verify 2nd level domain• Allowed using arbitrary files to verify ownership• Allowed to issue certificates for arbitrary domains without verification• Issued backdated SHA-1 certificates• Used unpatched software (such as dig) on the validation server



The story of WoSignhttps://wiki.mozilla.org/CA:WoSign_Issues• Issued certificates not requested by domain owner• Allowed using non-privileged ports (>50,000) to verify domain control• Allowed using subdomains to verify 2nd level domain• Allowed using arbitrary files to verify ownership• Allowed to issue certificates for arbitrary domains without verification• Issued backdated SHA-1 certificates• Used unpatched software (such as dig) on the validation server• Purchased other CA (StartCom) and attempted to suppress

information about the ownership transfer



The story of WoSignThe aftermath?

The story of WoSignThe aftermath?• Banned by Google in Chrome• Banned by Mozilla for a year

The story of WoSignThe aftermath?• Banned by Google in Chrome• Banned by Mozilla for a year• Still trusted by Microsoft

and lots of unpatched equipment

Aftermath• Go and choose the cheapest CA available• Bonus points if it provides some kind of API

Aftermath• Go and choose the cheapest CA available• Bonus points if it provides some kind of API• Pick multiple CAs

Aftermath• Go and choose the cheapest CA available• Bonus points if it provides some kind of API• Pick multiple CAs• “Extended validity” certificates?

Aftermath• Go and choose the cheapest CA available• Bonus points if it provides some kind of API• Pick multiple CAs• “Extended validity” certificates are a security theater

(don’t bother if you are not a bank and auditor doesn’t force you to)

Aftermath• Go and choose the cheapest CA available• Bonus points if it provides some kind of API• Pick multiple CAs• “Extended validity” certificates are a security theater

(don’t bother if you are not a bank and auditor doesn’t force you to)• Prefer short-lived certificates

Long-living certificates?Pros:• Discount• Less pain in the #^$ updating all the certs

Long-living certificates?Pros:• Discount• Less pain in the #^$ updating all the certs

Cons:• Soft-fail CRL and OCSP are not reliable• Hard-fail CRL and OCSP are never used

(you may do it in your app though)• Certificate deployment and management must be automated anyway

Long-living certificates?• CRL and OCSP are not reliable• Certificate deployment and management must be automated

Long-lived cert is a technical debt. It wouldn’t punish you immediately.It will hurt you eventually.

Automated certificate management• Add, remove, change and revoke your certificates real quick• Manage certificates properly: short lifetime, multiple keys• Set up a clientside TLS auth

Automated certificate management• Add, remove, change and revoke your certificates real quick• Manage certificates properly: short lifetime, multiple keys• Set up a clientside TLS auth• Quickly work around obscure issues like “Intermediate CA was

revoked”

The story of GlobalSign• During a planned maintenance, accidentally revoked its own certificate• Used CDN (Cloudflare) for CRL and OCSP• Undid revocation, but it’s got cached on CDN

The story of GlobalSign• During a planned maintenance, accidentally revoked its own certificate• Used CDN (Cloudflare) for CRL and OCSP• Undid revocation, but it’s got cached on CDN

• Four days before cached response will expire in a browser• Wikipedia, Dropbox, Spotify, Financial Times affected• Large sites affected more because CRL got cached everywhere

immediately

The story of GlobalSign• Large sites affected more because CRL got cached everywhere

immediately• “All is good and yet traffic dropped by 30%”• Really hard to troubleshoot• The issue is of distributed nature• You depend on a vendor

The story of GlobalSign• Large sites affected more because CRL got cached everywhere

immediately• “All is good and yet traffic dropped by 30%”• Really hard to troubleshoot• The issue is of distributed nature• You depend on a vendor

• Multiple different certs from different vendors helped to track down• tcpdump also of a great help: sessions got stuck at TLS Server Hello

The story of GlobalSign• Really hard to troubleshoot• The issue is of distributed nature• You depend on a vendor

• Multiple different certs from different vendors will help to track down• tcpdump also of a great help: sessions got stuck at TLS Server Hello

TLS is still bleeding edge of technology.Unsufficient tools, unsufficient knowledge.

The story of GlobalSign• Really hard to troubleshoot• So, hours wasted before the root cause is found• The fix must be immediate => cert management automation!

Automated certificate management• CA with API

Automated certificate management• CA with API• Let’s Encrypt?


Very good if you don’t need wildcard certificates.


Very good if you don’t need wildcard certificates.

• Tools like SSLMate• In-house plugins for ansible etc.

What to set up during the deployment?

What to set up during the deployment?• Strict Transport Security• “Opportunistic encryption” simply doesn’t work• Most users won’t notice if HTTPS is absent• HTTPS only makes sense if it’s enforced

What to set up during the deployment?• Strict Transport Security• “Opportunistic encryption” simply doesn’t work• Most users won’t notice if HTTPS is absent• HTTPS only makes sense if it’s enforced

• Public Key Pinning• Pin all end-entity public keys• Create a backup• Include future leafs• Rotate often => use automated tools to generate the header

What to set up during the deployment?• Ciphers• https://wiki.mozilla.org/Security/TLS_Configurations

What to set up during the deployment?• Ciphers• https://wiki.mozilla.org/Security/TLS_Configurations outdated• https://mozilla.github.io/server-side-tls/ssl-config-generator/• Update frequently (automation?)

https://mozilla.github.io/server-side-tls/ssl-config-generator/

https://mozilla.github.io/server-side-tls/ssl-config-generator/

The story of Rijndael

The story of Rijndael(finally it sounds almost like Tolkien)

The story of Rijndael/AES• Ordered by U.S. federal government• Approved by NSA, 1998-2001• Adopted by U.S. DoD and Army

The story of Rijndael/AES• Adopted by U.S. DoD and Army• Military required three distinct security levels,

with less sensitive data to be encrypted using the most weak method and vice versa


with less sensitive data to be encrypted using the most weak method and vice versa• Crypto designers implemented three key sizes (128, 192, 256),

with the most weak still unbreakable in foreseeable future(except quantum computers)


with less sensitive data to be encrypted using the most weak method and vice versa• Crypto designers implemented three key sizes (128, 192, 256),

with the most weak still unbreakable in foreseeable future(except quantum computers)• So, AES-128 is still good enough• Not that it matters much with modern AES-NI

The story of Perfect Forward Secrecy• Present in ephemeral Diffie-Hellman ciphers

The story of Perfect Forward Secrecy• Present in ephemeral Diffie-Hellman ciphers• Makes out-of-path analysis impossible• Makes historic data analysis impossible

The story of Perfect Forward Secrecy• Present in ephemeral Diffie-Hellman ciphers• Makes out-of-path analysis impossible• Makes historic data analysis impossible• Good catch for an out-of-path DPI and/or WAF

70% HTTPS requests come and go without analysis

• Present in ephemeral Diffie-Hellman ciphers• Makes out-of-path analysis impossible• Makes historic data analysis impossible• Good catch for an out-of-path DPI and/or WAF

70% HTTP requests go without analysis

The story of Perfect Forward Secrecy

60% legitimate90% malicious

Protocols

Protocols• SSLv2 is dead

Protocols• SSLv2 is dead• SSLv3 is dead*• TLSv1.0 is dead

* – if you don’t have to serve content to IE6 or a TV set

Protocols• SSLv2 is dead• SSLv3 is dead*• TLSv1.0 is dead• TLS is alive and growing


Protocols• SSLv2 is dead• SSLv3 is dead*• TLSv1.0 is dead• TLS is alive and growing• Maybe too fast: TLSv1.2 allowed DDoSCoin


Misc• OCSP stapling• Persistent connections (TLS handshake is expensive)• Fight unencrypted content!

Sound Bytes• Use short-lived certificates!• Automate!• Trust Mozilla! :-)

Q&Amailto: [email protected]

Bonus track• Client certificates

Bonus track• Client certificates• May be combined with 2FA

Bonus track• Client certificates• May be combined with 2FA• May be integrated into certain applications as well• Unsupported by some mobile browsers OOTB :-(

Масштабируя TLS / Артём Гавриченков (Qrator Labs)

Engineering

Transcript of Масштабируя TLS / Артём Гавриченков (Qrator Labs)