.: ..:SUBMARINES IN MODERN WAR

By REAR ADMIRAL LUTZOW

'IAere ilf olle phau in this '~~Ir Q/~ which tlte leader8 oj tlte Allied camp hm'enot (li<1played optiminn ill recent montM. 011 the cOlltmry. they ha've cO/I«i8tetllly"tre«aed the /l'itilMto t1'II81INlIOWltlld rfiiJicultie8 fucitl.g them in thill plUMe. 1J'e refertQ the 1111"llcces,~""1 baltle oj the Allies (lyaill8/. Ucrman 8l1bmarillu.

11/ tl'e foiloloill(J article, specioll!1 'lIIriltell lor "The X Xlh Cenl"rg." .ddmir(ll£'Iil::ow. lite 01/181(1/1(1;'11/ German flat.,r/ commentator, prese/II" Iti", idea« Oil the 8l1bjtet.-K.M.

THE aim of naval waJiare has alwaysbeen to gain supremacy over mari­time connections. To keep these

open for oneself and to close them forthe enemy-that was the objcct of thest,ruggle. ,In former centmies the deci­sions in such naval wars were alwaysbrought about in naval battles fought byfleets of warships. The victor of thesebattles could send out his own merchantships and drive those of the enemy offthe seas. ConsequentIy, the proportionatestrength of the various navies ai thebeginning of a war had an im~ant

bearing on such decisions. And since,in contrast to the land, the open scasknow no obstacles of terrll,in, a com­parison of the numbers of warships readyfor action was a good standard on whichto base an estimate of the ratio of strength.

These well-founded views on navalwarfare were suddenly blown sky-highby the sinking of the three British armoredcruisers Hogue, Cre8tty, and Aboukit, by aGerman submarine, commanded by OttoWeddigen, on Septe:rp.l~r 12, I~J4. Forthis proved with one st.roke t.hat thesubmarine was able to pierce the navalsupremacy of even the strongest battlefleet. Without regard for the enemy'snumerical superiority, the submarinecould injure his maritime communicationsand their protection, indeed, even destroythem, without, on the other hand, beingable to ensure its own side's maritimeconnections.

The fact that" as l\ result of theseexpel'iences, the German V-boat attackswere directed from 1915 onwards, not somuch against the warships of the 'enemy,as against his merchant fleets w~ br<?~ght

about by the hunger blockade impOstmupon Germany by Great Bri~.·, Inorder to carry out this blockade, theBritish Admiralty kept back its Navyand carefully avoided any battle and, asfar as possible, any contact with' V~boats.We replied to the hunger blockade witha counterblockade by V-boats.' FromHH4to 1918, Britain employed about ~hroothousand vessels against the V-boats andfought them with depth ~harge~I,,i;nin;e:nets, captive balloons, airships, hydro-'planes, and V-boat traps. 'By 'the, m­trodu<'tion of the convoy systeni'iil' 1917,she banished the danger to such a degreethat the revolution in Germany preventedthe V-boat war from taking full effect.In the autumn of 1918 there were 436Gel'man submarines under construction.

(This figure is the largMt yet revealedin this co.nnection and, coming as itdoes Jmm an eminent'aut!w"tY, seems to1£8 to be oj st'nsational significance. If, byth,e end oj the first World War. Germany,cut oJ! from aU 801lrCe8 of IfUpply andlacki'W} a clear naval policy, was workingon 436 U -boat8, one can imagine what mmtbe going on on the wlulrves oj ,all Europetoda,y, when Ote leaders oj Germany arefully awal..~e to the paramount importanceoj submarine war/a,re.-The Editor.}

SUBMARINES IN MOD~UN WAR

I n tho autumn of 19:~1l, the EnglishPrime Ministt'r assured his nation thatEngland possessed a means of defenseagain. t the newly arising U-boat menacet·hat would certainly do 1\way with thismenace. What he meant WL~fiI the systemof convoys. which indeed wa.'! carried outwith deie~mination and skill and withthe experien(',68 of the Great War to goby. Yet it did not fulfill t.h(~ expectationsplacoo on it. In November I\)40, Churchillhad to admit in a radio speech that thegrowing U-boat menace was the mostoutstanding sign of the cJitical situationof tile British Empire. And the U-boatmenace was growing in spite of anoxcellt'ntly flmctioning system of convoy~.

The danger (lid not diminiRh, for tht'feverish improvement and reinforcementof dpfen"i \'C mansuros wer(\ balanced byincrt-'asing V-boat attacks. ]n Novembe'"r) 940. the (:erman High Command revealedfor the lirst time t.hat V-boats had Rue­cessfuUy attacked n convoy not onlysingly but in pllcks.

Chur('hiU's ('ries for help to Rooseveltbeca.m(' mOI'C urgmlt. 'Vhen the sill.kingtlfigure decreased in the H('cond half of1941, Lonrlon gave u sigh of relief. Tht'reasons for this decrease could not beimmediately I\S('l'l·tained. They were tobe found in the restmint plaood lIponV-boats towards the l'lhips of the UnitedStatell, whicll country was officially 8tillneutraJ. This restraint wus imposed bythe Oerml\n f:O\'ernment for reasons offoreign policy. Another reason for thedecrease in I;inkin~s wa." to be attributedto the fact that it- was necessary to senda considerable pnl·t of the U-boats tothe Arctic Ocean in order to impede thedelivery of war materials to the SovietUniOD, a8 well l\8 to the Mediwrmncanin order to interfere with British ship­pm, between GibraltaI' and Alexandria.

Suooess' was not long in appearing inthe Mediterranean. The large offensi \'e~ .on November 18, 1941, againstRommel .in Libya was founded on theConviction Churohill had expressed onNovemh,er 12 that the British were the1Il88ters of the Mediterranean. Howeverin November and December 1941, all

British battleships in the Mediterraneanwere either sunk (Barham) or Pllt O\lt ofcommission for months (Malaya, Volia,,,,',and Queen. El1'znbeJJ,.). Moreover, our 'air­planes rendered Malta temporarily asgood as uD.'*lrviooahle as a flying base;and one aircraft carrier (Ark Royal),several cruisers and destroYers. as well asa dozen or so transports. ~'ere Runk. Allthis brought the British 8upplil18 toEgypt and Tobruk to a halt. At thesan10 time. the supplies for our owntroopt4 in Africa could be sent (rom Italyto Tripolis without hindrance. Rnd in thisway enubled Rommel by the l'nd of theyear to undertake his victorious ('ountt>r­attack.

]n tho meantime, ROO8f>velt. throughhis provocative attitude toward the Em­peror of Japan, brought down uponhimself the declaration of war on thepart of the Tripartite poWl'rs. the firstanniversary of which historic e\'ent, weare now celebrating. 111e Anglo-Ameri­can battle fleet immediately sufferedheavy defeats in Pearl Harbor and offMalava. defeats which resulted in acomplete reversal of the war 8ituation inthe Pacific. To this WllS 800n addedanother equally great disaster when. onJanuary 24, 1042, German submal'inesappeared suddenly in North Americancoastal waters and, more or less underthe eyes of the Statue of I..iberty, sankone ship after allothpI', especially oiltankerg, off New York as well as manyother ports, without an effective protec­tion against these attacks being devisedduring the first few months. OUl' U-boatshad not been con8idered able to carrythe war to America on thpir own. TheAllies wcre surprised and unpreparedwhcn th('! U -boatR carried their attacbinto the Gulf of Mexico, the Caribbean,the South Atlantic. and eVl'n the IndianOoean and al~ in conjunction with air­planl'8, gained considemble SUC008868 'inthe Mediterrnnean and the Aretic Ocean..

Although the t'xtension of the U-boa.ts'field of operation places great dem.daon both ships and Crell"B, it haa inC('eUedtheir chances of success. For the' tacticsof the U-boat wnrfllre con~i8ted in keep-

THE XXtb CENTURY

ing under observation the weak spots indie enemy's maritime connections, whichchange according to the situation, andin attacking so suddenly that the enemy'smeasures of protection can only be takenafter the V-boats have finished their job.As the battlefield extended, tho distancesbetween the various V-boat attacks grewproportionately, the enemy protectionneeded all the more time t{) appear at anew scene of attack, fmd the V-boatscould continue their attacks that muchlonger before being driven off. Thus, forinstance, U-boats and airplancs togethersucceeded in the period from July 2 to7, 1942, in destroying every single ship ofa convoy of 3H vcssels headed for t,heMurma.nsk coast.

The only means of banning tJle dangerseemed to be the rnpid and increasedconstruction of ships. The United Statestook the lead in this, Admiral Land,who demanded that ships be constructedsolidly, was ovcrshadowcd by AdmiralVickery, who insisted upon the mostrapid possible construction without regardto solidity. In spite of this, the lead ofthe U-boots has not yet been diminished,since the increase in the construction ofshipe was balanced by an increase in thenumber of our 8ubma,rines ready foraction. Our enemies agree with us thatthe V-boats are the most urgent threatto them. When, at the beginning ofNovember 1942, they had to tukc uponthemselves the risk of landing in NorthAfrica, they were fully aware how difficultit would be to safeguard their suppliesagainst U-boat attacks.

Meanwhile, on thc annivcrsar~' ofJapan's entry into the war, we proudlyrealize the fact of the close reciprocaleffect of our simultaneous victorics in theAtlantic and the Pacific. The naval1088e8 in the Mediterraneantowards the end of 1941 pre­vented the British from send­ing an adequate number ofshipe to ensure their positionof naval power in the East andcontributed toward their de­feats off Malaya, in the Java

Sea (February, 1942), and in the Coral :s<'a(May 19(2). The shortage of Mippingspace caused by our attacks in the At­lantic )lfCvcnted reinforcements arrivingin time at Singapore. as was confirmedby Churchill himself in LL spe<'ch beforeParliament.

C'hurchill has also ndluitt<'<1 tc) Par­liament that our V-boat successes in thoAtlantic have forced the Vnit<"d Statesto increase her protection thcl'£! at t.hecost of her safety in the Pacitic, Andthe repeated victories ngainRt convoys inthe Arctic Ocean have tied lIJI not onlyBritish but also American lwavy forct'sin the North Atlantic. The reperclUI6ionsfrom tho Pacific were eqmtlly important..There the Japa,nese victoric.s preventedthe USA from concentrating her forcosin the Atlantic. Moreo\"cr, the loss ofraw-material SOUl'COS in the PaQific hasforced the USA t{) obtllin substitutesfrom cOlmtl'ies whose mal'itinle connec­tions are directly threattmed by ourV-boats, for example, tin from Boliviaand rubber from Brazil. The appearanceof Japanese 8ubmal'ines in the IndianOcean split up the naval protection oftho British and the Amcrican~ evenfurther and benl'fitt'd thc hattl(· ()f tonsin the Atlantic. The fighting around theSolomon Islands, whidl broke out inAugust Bl4t, hilS cost the US Navymllny unit:-; of the indispensable classesof cruisers, airl'rllft cllrrier!'!, and destroyersand hUiI wenkencd its offensive and de­fensivc power Oil aU other tlu"ilters ofwar, on the .-\fl·ican COlIst as much asanywhere else.

Thus the events on tbe ,-anous theatersare closely related to each other, Andjust as the war aims of Germany. Italy,Md Japan rWl parallel in that, they areall centered on freeing their "living

space" from Anglo-America.despotism, their naval warfareon the vast oceans is also onegreat joint undertaking. Justas the Japanese Fleet haa livedup to its task in the Pacific,the German U-boats have ful­filled their task in the Atlantic.