+ Measuring Social Capital Michael J. Gilligan, New York University.
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Transcript of + Measuring Social Capital Michael J. Gilligan, New York University.
+
Measuring Social Capital
Michael J. Gilligan, New York University
+Social Capital: Definitions
“institutions, relationships, attitudes, and values that govern interactions among people and contribute to economic and social development” (Grootvaert and Bastelaer, 2002).
They divide social capital into three categories: “Structural” membership in associations and networks “Cognitive” trust and adherence to norms “Collective action”
We are mainly interested in three behaviors/attitudes: Trust Trustworthiness Obligation, i.e. willingness to contribute to joint community
endeavors
+Implications for Conflict Prevention and Development
Trust: crucial for cost-effective self enforcement of contracts and peace agreements
Obligation: Compliance with social norms: non-violence, compromise, fairness
Obligation: contributions to public goods
Obligation: Respect for legitimate sources of authority
+A Few Findings (among many)
Putnam (1993) shows that local governments in Italy are more efficient where there is greater civic engagement.
Knack and Keefer (1997) demonstrate that increases in country-level trust lead to large increases in the country’s economic growth.
La Porta et. al. (1997) establish a strong positive link between trust and judicial efficiency and a strong negative link between trust and corruption.
+Implications
Because social capital is linked to development and post conflict peace the World Bank and other international actors have many programs to foster the growth of social capitalCommunity-based DDRCommunity-driven development
programsA focus on local capacity in
peacekeeping efforts“Local ownership” of development and
peacebuilding programs
+Measuring Social Capital
These are very difficult concepts to measureIn many cases they are not observed
directlyIndicators differ greatly across different
cultures
Three sorts of measures can be employed”ObservationalSurveyBehavioral
+Familiarization
Community Tours
Interviews with local leaders
Focus groups
Including locals on the team is crucial
+Community Observation
Focus group discussion
Crime reports
School attendance
Upkeep of public spaces
Use of public space
Participation at public events—very context dependent, so be careful!
+Surveys
Collective ActionCommunity clean-ups, road building,
church raising etc.Cooperatives: financial, child care,
agricultural, fishing, etc.Peaceful political activities, for
example lobbying of central government
+ Surveys
Community associationsList of those that are activeActivitiesMembership: both individual level and
total
+Surveys
Attitudinal questionsIs this a good place to raise children?I am proud of my communityLocal community leaders are
honest/indifferent/corruptAnd many others
+Behavioral activitiesCommunity observation and surveys
can fail to uncover true individual social attitudes.
Behavioral group activities can be better measures because they isolate and incentivize the precise attitudes and behavior we need to measure.
These are referred to as “games” in the academic literature, but that name understates their seriousness as an effective tool for measuring social capital
+Behavioral games
Four important games are:Risk gameAltruism game Trust game Public goods game
Our main interest is in trust and public goods games, but we also need to conduct risk and altruism games to control for risk attitudes and altruism
+Game Instruction
+Physical Set up
+LotteryMeasures subjects’ attitudes toward risk
It is important to control for this attitude because behavior that appears to be trust may really be risk acceptance
+Example from Nepal
Lottery Heads Tails1 40 402 30 503 20 604 10 705 0 80
+Nepal Lottery Choices
Lottery Freq. Percent Cum.
------------+-----------------------------------
1 | 50 39.06 39.06
2 | 28 21.88 60.94
3 | 21 16.41 77.34
4 | 12 9.38 86.72
5 | 17 13.28 100.00
------------+-----------------------------------
Total | 128 100.00
+Altruism Game
Subjects were given a sum of money In Nepal 40 NPR in 5 NPR notes
Subjects are asked how much they wanted to contribute to a local needy family
The identity of the family is not revealed
+
+Altruism Game: Amount SentExample from Nepal
Sent Freq. Percent Cum.
0 16 6.35 6.355 52 20.63 26.98
10 75 29.76 56.7515 15 5.95 62.720 59 23.41 86.1125 3 1.19 87.330 3 1.19 88.4935 6 2.38 90.8740 23 9.13 100
Total 252 100
+Trust Game
Subjects are randomly assigned to one of two roles: sender or receiver
Both types are given initial endowment of money
Senders decide how much of their endowment to send to the receiver
We triple that amount and give it to the receiver
The receiver decides how much of this total to return to the sender
All players and types are anonymous
Nash: send zero, return zero
Social optimum: send full endowment, return whatever
+Trust
Different than “trustworthiness” (Glaeser et. al)
Confounded with risk aversion (Schechter 2006)
Confounded by feelings of altruism and fairness (Cox 2002)
Confounded with patience (de Oliviera et. al 2010)
+Public Goods Game
All subjects play simultaneously
Each player is given two cards, one with an “X” and one blank
For each “X” card turned in in the first round all players receive an amount of money, say 4NPR
Turning in an “X” card in the second round earns the player that turned it in a larger amount, say 20 NPR
Nash: keep “X” card
Social optimum: everyone turns in “X” card
+Example from Nepal:Does exposure to Conflict Affect Social Capital?Victimization may lead to lack of trust
Difficult circumstances may force communities to work together
If the former a vicious cycle could result
An answer is important for transitional programming.
Blattman (2009) and Voors et. al. (2009) using different measures have found a positive link between conflict exposure and social capital
+Trust: Amount sent
+Trust: Percent returned
+Effect of Conflict on Trust
Variable | Coef. Std. Err. T-stat----------------------------------------------------------------------Dictator sent .1457.029 5.09Log income -.532 .213
-2.49Log Family Mem. .619 .465 1.33 Conflict area 1.257 .722
1.74Constant 7.297 2.738
2.67
N = 93Standard error are clustered on village
+ Effect of Conflict on Trustworthiness
Variable Coef. Std. Err. T-stat
----------------------------------------------------------------------Sender sent 1.053 .246
4.28Log income -.0187 .213
-0.09Log Family Mem. 1.674 1.979 0.85Dictator sent .254 .0749
3.39Conflict Area 1.172 1.095
1.07Constant -5.216 3.863
-1.35
N = 88Standard errors clustered on village
+Public goods and Conflict
Variable Coef. Std. Err. Z-stat
--------------------------------------------------------------------------Log income 0.185 0.102
1.82Log Family Mem. -0.471 0.186
-2.53Conflict Area -0.527 0.270
-1.95Constant -1.673 1.125
-1.49
N = 178Standard errors clustered on village
+Summary of findings
Conflict is associated with…(1) A greater willingness to provide public goods (2) Higher levels of trust (3) But not higher levels of trustworthiness.
+Conclusion
Social capital is an important component of post-conflict stability and economic development
Many development programs are designed to foster the growth social capital
The extent to which these programs accomplish this goal is an important evaluative criterion of these programs
Social capital is measurable by observational survey and behavioral measures