® Abnormal Situation Management is a U.S. registered trademark of Honeywell Inc. Ergonomic Design...

® Abnormal Situation Management is a U.S. registered trademark of Honeywell Inc.

Ergonomic Design of Control Centers

Honeywell User Group 2000

“Control PerformanceGo for Gold”

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Brad Adams Walker Architecture, P.C.

Abnormal Situation Management ®Abnormal Situation Management ®Joint Research and Development Consortium

Creating a new paradigm for operations of complex industrial plants,with solution concepts that improve operations ability to prevent and respond to abnormal situations.

® Abnormal Situation Management is a U.S. registered trademark of Honeywell Inc.

BAWArchitecture

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Explosions and Fires

Accidents resulting in major damage to occupied buildings are rare but when they occur the results can be tragic and disastrous. Hickson & Welch (UK - 1992) La Mede Refinery Total (France - 1993) Phillips Pasadena, Texas (USA - 1992)

In each case 5 or more people died as a direct result of being in a building on a CPI site.

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Common causes

Most fatalities in buildings resulted from Vapor Cloud Explosions (VCE’s).

Other types of overpressure causes, such as Boiling Liquid Expanding Vapor Explosions (BLEVE’s) vessel failure & chemical reaction runaways, should also be considered.

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Other causesThe escape of toxic gas can also be a

threat, as demonstrated by the Bhopal disaster (1984).

Consider the implications of toxic release for people and the protection that a well designed and sited building can provide.

Buildings can also provide protection against fire especially when wearing NOMEX coveralls.

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Building Compromises The closer the building to the plant the

more effective the occupants could be in operating and maintaining the plant by being closer to the hardware they manage or the people with whom they interface. It is arguable that there is less likelihood of there being an accident due to better communications between key groups of people.

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The closer the people are to the plant the higher the risk they run of being exposed to the consequences of the hazards of the plant should these consequences be realized.

To balance these hazards it is important to consider the protection given to the people by the building they occupy. The closer to the hazards the more protection the building must provide and hence, the more it will cost.

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BAW User Centered Design Services

Feasibility Studies Develop a Shared Vision Comparison current vs. best practices Analysis building location Analysis organization vs. building Order-of-magnitude costs Estimate of the benefits List of recommendations

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The Impact Of Human ErrorAny serious attempt to improve

process safety in the CPI must address the fact that human error in:- design, construction, operations,

maintenance, and management of facilities

are the root causes of almost all quality deficiencies, production losses, & accidents.

CMA A Manager’s Guide to Reducing Human Error

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Source Failure Types

Unsafe ActsErrors &

Violations

Condition Tokens

Precursors

Functional Failure Types

Safety Information System

Interfacebetween theorganization

& the individual

Management Workplace

Stylistic or Cultural

Indicators

Top Down:

Commitment

Competence

Cognizance

data collected &

analyzed

Diagnostic and remedial measures

Recommendations:

General Failure Types

1-10 hit list

Proactive Design

SI Projects

Best Practices

EHM

Poor workplacedesign

High workloadUnsociable hours

Inadequatetraining

Poor perceptionof hazards

Control roomdesign

Workspace

Near miss

Auditing

Du Pont

Training

Workspace

Motivation

Attitude

Group Factors

Working Practice

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Costs of Reduced Human Performance

Coburn, Ed, “Shiftworker Fatigue: The $77 Billion Problem,” ShiftWork Alert, 1996.

A recent study by Batelle Research Labs showed that 60-70% of accidents in nuclear power plants occurred in non-day or back shifts, and some of the most costly accidents world-wide, including Three Mile Island, Chernobyl, the Exxon Valdez, and Bhopal occurred at night.

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These types of accidents cost the U.S. $7 billion/year. Smaller industrial accidents cost $39 billion/year, of which $1-2 billion are attributable to shiftworker fatigue.

Total cost attributable to shift work and loss of alertness: $13.5 billion/year

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Approximately 5% of productivity is lost as a result of reduced human alertness.

Value added by manufacturing in U.S. (Bureau of Census Annual Survey of Manufacturers) = $1 trillion

Cost attributable to shiftworker fatigue: $50 billion/year


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“Most manufacturing relies on round-the-clock operations. Improvements in productivity of 13% in a processing operation, and 32% in mining, have been obtained by redesigning environments to incorporate circadian physiology.”

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The employee turnover rate among shift workers is very high. Therefore, personnel hiring and training costs are considerable.

It costs at least $100,000 to train one licensed nuclear power plant control room operator.

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Annual $ of shiftworker fatigue in the U.S.

Health-Related Costs Coronary Artery Disease/Heart $5.5 billion

Attacks Motor Vehicle Accidents $2.5 billion Accidental Injuries & Deaths at $2.5 billion

Work Other Medical & Psychiatric Illnesses $2 billion

Productivity and Accident Costs Manufacturing Productivity $50 billion Industrial Accident Cost $13.5 billion Employee Turnover & Retraining $1 billion

Costs

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OSHA Repetitive Strain

Fitting a job to the physical limitations of the worker.

647,000 lost days of work per year. Prevention of 300,000 injuries and

save employers $9 billion annually. This is a fraction of the $77 billion

associated with shift worker losses.

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Aim for comfortable and varied working postures and dynamic work of moderate intensity involving large muscle groups. Avoid static postures.

Consider the possibility of rest. The working posture and need for the body to rest during work are noted and the need for resting surfaces, e.g. in the form of chairs, should be specified here.

General Principles of Workstation Design

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The Operator is the Front Line

FieldActuator

ProcessDCS

Controller

Sensor

Disturb-ances

Most operators’ view of what’s

really happening in the field is limited by the

“system”

DCS

Field

Process Conditions and control signals

Almost NO EQUIPMENT CONDITION

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Errors in data entered in the computer

An operator wanted to reduce the temperature on a catalytic cracker from 982DEGF to 980 DEGF. Unfortunately, he pressed the keys in the wrong order (908) and immediately pressed the Enter key.

Slide valves closed & flow reversal along the riser.

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Operator was changing a feed rate from 75 to 100 gallons per minute. She entered 1000 in error. The computer opened the feed valve wide, raising the pressure in the plant.

RV lifted

Errors in data entered in the computerErrors in data entered in the computer

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Many systems designers regard human beings as unreliable and inefficient, yet they still leave people to cope with those tasks that the designer could not think how to automate - most especially, the job of restoring the system to a safe state after some unforeseen failure.

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Evolution of Control Rooms1900 - 1950

1940 - 1980

1970 -1990

1990 - 2040

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1950’S

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SuccessfulResponse

OperatorAbility

InformationAvailability

DistractionsTraining

ExperienceProcedure

QualityPSI

GraphicsScreens

Console Layout

OperatorInput

DCS – SISSystem Design

OverviewScreens Trends

RelianceSupervisor

KeyboardEntry

Adjacencies OthersTraffic

Alertness

Alarms

Model produced by Ian Nimmo – BAW Architecture ©

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Performance Shaping Factor (PSF) Anything that effects

a worker’s performance of a task within the process system is a performance shaping factor (PSF)

Internal PSFs External PSFs StressorsVery Low Optimum Heavy

High

Low

Very Moderately ExtremelyLow Optimum High High

ThreatStress

Task Load

Stress Level

Pe

rfo

rma

nc

eE

ffe

cti

ve

ne

ss

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Internal Performance Shaping Factor’s Training/Skill Practice/Experience knowledge of

Required Performance Std.

Stress (Mental or Bodily Tension)

Intelligence Motivation/Work

Attitude

Personality Emotional State Gender Physical

Condition/Health Influences of Family

& Other Outside Persons or Agencies

Group Identifications Behavior Style Culture

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Brad Adams Walker Architecture, P.C.External Performance Shaping Factor’s

Situational Characteristics Architectural

Features Environment Work Hours/Work

Breaks Shift Rotation Staffing Levels Organizational

Structure Actions by others

Task, Equipment, & Procedural Characteristics Procedures Communications Cautions & Warnings Work Methods Team Structure Long

& Short Term Memory Control Display

Relationships Task Criticality

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Stressor Performance Shaping Factor’s

Psychological Stressors Suddenness of Onset High Task Speed Heavy Task Load High Jeopardy Risk Threats Sensory Deprivation Distractions Lack of Rewards

Physiological Stressors Long Duration of Stress Fatigue Pain or Discomfort Hunger or Thirst Temperature Extremes Oxygen Deficiency Vibration Chemical Exposure Disruption of Circadian

Rhythm

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Commonly observed negative performance shaping factors include:

Inadequate separation of workplaces causes interference with operator task performance:

traffic of non-production personnel through control room

lack of telephone outside control area for non-operator use

lack of separate engineering workstations for control loop tuning and other applications maintenance efforts

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Non-optimal workstation arrangement reduced operator efficiency and effectiveness:

poor communication interactions between console operators

high level of distracting traffic between consoles

lack direct access to time critical equipment at workstation, i.e., operator must leave workstation to access equipment

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Control room lighting restricts simultaneous viewing of console display information and reading material:

lack of adequate control over lighting intensity from operator seating position

lack of adequate control for individual preferences at separate workstations

failure to analyze reflectance for screen positions

inadequate anti-glare material on display monitors

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Control room noise during upset conditions interferes with communications:

noisy fans used to cool computer equipment printers located next to workstations absence of noise reduction materials on

surfaces non-optimal arrangements of workstations,

too many people in too small of a space low signal to noise ratios on field

communications equipment

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Control room disturbances during day hours due to poor maintenance coordination:

The 8:0am permit rush Lack of communication The 4:0pm permit rush non-optimal arrangements of workstations,

too many people in too small of a space No place for paper records

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Human factor problems Increase demands on user’s memorycause users to be uncertain as to

where and when they should focus their attention

make it difficult for users working in terms to share the same situational awareness

impair mental models of the system increase workload during high-

demand periods

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Limit the users’ ability to develop effective strategies for coping with task demands

increase stress and anxiety increase the potential for confusion

through enhanced flexibility (i.e., many possible levels and types of automation).

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Cognition

Operators can process complex information far more capably than the most powerful computers in existence, provided, It is correctly perceived (see above), and Sufficient attention can be devoted

(workload is low enough, distractions are under control), and

Well known limitations in human processing capabilities are not exceeded.

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In particular, for example, humans are poor at processing [remembering]

more than about seven unrelated things at once for more than a few seconds,

humans are poor at conducting more than about three ongoing activities in parallel [simultaneously], but are capable of much more if the activities can be time sliced—conducted sequentially— but only if support is provided at the boundaries of the time slices [humans are very unreliable at saving the status of their own stacks, registers, and flags].

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humans perform poorly both in the absence of stress and in the presence of too much of it,

humans perform better in context than out of it, especially if they are able to immerse themselves in the task at hand and need not wrestle with tools, tasks, or interfaces,

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humans make consistent and predictable errors of specific types. For example, they make errors in processing incoming data at odds with their expectations (they tend to ignore it), in predicting the likelihood of disjunctive events (the likelihood is underestimated) or conjunctive events (the likelihood is overestimated) and in taking base rates into consideration in estimating outcomes (base rates are not processed as such).

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Humans are better at :-Humans are better at :- Recognizing patterns Learning from past experience Solving original problems Improvising & adapting Exercising judgment when

events are not completely defined

Reacting to low probability events

Detecting signals in high noise levels

Continuing to perform when overloaded

Comparing Humans & Machines

Machines are better at :-Machines are better at :- Processing storing & recalling

large quantities of information quickly

Performing routine, repetitive or precise operations over long periods of time

Operating in environments hostile to humans

Exerting great force with precision

Sensitive to stimuli beyond range of human senses

Monitoring (both humans & machines)

Deductive reasoning

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Clarification Analysis & definition Integrated Concept

proposal Design proposal Operational Feedback

ISO/CD 11064-1Ergonomic design of control centersPart 1: Principles for the design of control centers

International Draft Standard from ISO

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A Prototypical Ergonomic System Design Approach• Problem Definition & Shared Vision• System Description & Task Analysis• Task Allocation & Job Roles• Control Center Detailed Design• Operational Feedback

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BAW User Centered Design Services

Control Building programming Develop a Shared Vision Control Building Human-Machine

System Description Functional Specification Control Room Detailed Design Construction Documents Construction Post Occupancy Survey

The End

® Abnormal Situation Management is a U.S. registered trademark of Honeywell Inc. Ergonomic Design...

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