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2.4: Game Theoretic approach to Horst-RB

Mateusz Wielgosz, AGH? ?, ? ?, 2014

Socially-aware Management of New Overlay Application Traffic combined with Energy Efficiency in the Internet

European Seventh Framework STREP FP7-2012-ICT-317846 http://www.smartenit.eu

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Players – End user and Provider

Provider is interested in reduction of his inter-domain traffic. He must weigh cost/benefit (C, B) of the mechanism.

End user benefits from higher QoS (Q), but may suffer from delay (due to searching for local/prefetched content) and may need encouraging to participate in WiFi sharing mechanism (privacy issues?) (D, S).

User \ Provider Provider supports HORST HORST not supported

Using HORST [Q – (D+S) , B – C] [0 , 0]

Not using HORST [0 , B-C] [0 , 0]

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Chain migration

More users participate home router sharing, more likely each user is to benefit from improved QoS.

Assuming gaussian distribution of users, cumulative benefit function therefore is expected to reflect cumulative distribution of normal distribution.

0 20 40 60 80 100 1200

0.2

0.4

0.6

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To be adressed

Simulation analysis Delay aspect of HORST search for local content.

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Thank you !

Questions?