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Transcript of - 1 - Secure and Serverless RFID Authentication and Search Protocols Chiu C. Tan, Bo Sheng, and Qun...
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Secure and Serverless RFID Au-thentication and Search Protocols
Chiu C. Tan, Bo Sheng, and Qun LiIEEE Transactions on Wireless Communication APRIL 2008
Taesung Kim2008.09.11
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Contents
• Abstract• Introduction• Related Work• RFID Privacy and Security• RFID Authentication• RFID Search
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Introduction
• Solution for RFID Security and Privacy problem– Central database model– Three players in this model
• RFID reader, tag, database– 리더와 태그의 상호인증에 database 에 저장된 인증정보를
이용– Database 와 연결이 없는 오프 사이트 위치에 있는 리더는
태그의 정보를 볼 수 없다 .• Simple alternative
– Downloading database to reader– Mobile reader can be stolen.– An adversary will have access to information which in-
clude unique tag id and password.– The adversary can make fake tag based on this informa-
tion.
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Introduction
• This paper suggest– Security protection as the central database model with-
out persistent connection to the database.• RFID searching problem
– Single reader, multiple tag 상황에서 특정 tag 의 정보를 검색하는 경우 .
– Authenticating each tag one at a time is a time consum-ing process.
• This paper suggest several solutions for RFID searching problem.
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Related Work
• Weis– randomized hash lock– Tag reply to reader query
• (r, ID⊕fk(r))– where r is a random number generated by the tag, – k is the tag’s secret key – and fk is a pseudorandom function.
• A secure database searches the ID/secret key, then the real tag ID returned to reader.
• Molnar and Wagner– Randomized hash lock scheme does not defend against
an eavesdropper.– Reader 가 secret key 를 알고 있다고 가정– Reader 와 tag 가 각각 random number 를 만들고 교환한다 .
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Related Work
– Tag reply• ID⊕fk(0, r1, r2)
– Compromised reader problem.• Dimitriou
– Tag reply• (h(IDi), nt, hIDi (nt, nr))
– where IDi is the tag secret.– nt, nr are both random nubers generated by tag and reader
• Database return hIDi+1(nt, nr)
• The tag update its screct IDi+1
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RFID Authentication
• Notations
CA Trusted party, responsible for authenticating readers and deploying tags
RiRFID reader i
riid for RFID reader Ri
Liaccess list for RFID reader Ri
n number of entries in Li
TiRFID tag i
idiid for RFID tag Ti
tisecret for RFID tag Ti
h(x) one-way hash function
f(x,y) Concatenate x and y, then applying h(.), h(x||y)
l number of bits of hash h(.)
m CA defined number of bits, m < l
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RFID Authentication
• Set up– R obtains r and L from a certificate authority, CA.– Tag, T contains a unique value id, a unique secret t.– Access List Li
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RFID Search
• 특정 태그를 찾고자 할 때
• Reader issues a search request such that only au-thenticated tag can understand.
• The tag reply in such that only an authenticated reader can understand.