Post on 16-Sep-2020
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Why do Political Elites like Participatory Democracy?
The Beliefs of Constituency Candidates in German State Elections1
Thomas Zittel, Goethe University Frankfurt2
Olga Herzog, Goethe University Frankfurt3
Abstract
Representative institutions are in the defensive in many Western democracies. Opinion
polls demonstrate wide spread demands for greater public involvement in politics.
Surprisingly, political elites are all too ready to join these battle cries for participatory
democracy. This paper asks, why those that benefit most in representative settings tend to
support alternative participatory modes of politics. It portrays this phenomenon as an
emotional reaction in the electoral game. We envision electoral defeat to translate in a sense
of frustration about the current state of democracy. Furthermore, we envision this frustration
to affect elites’ preferences for participatory institutions. In this paper, we test this argument
on the basis of data resulting from two new German candidate studies conducted at the state
level and in light of alternative theories on democratic reform.
Keywords
Representative democracy, political elites, constituency candidates, political beliefs,
political psychology
1 Paper prepared for the ECPR General Conference 2014, Glasgow/Scotland, 3-6
September. We thank Annika Hennl for helpful comments on a first draft of the paper. 2 Thomas Zittel is Professor for Comparative Politics at Goethe-University Frankfurt,
zittel@soz.uni-frankfurt.de 3 Olga Herzog is Lecturer at Goethe-University Frankfurt, herzog@soz.uni-frankfurt.de
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The new politics of participatory democracy
Representative institutions are in the defensive in many Western democracies. Opinion
polls demonstrate wide spread demands for greater public involvement in political decision-
making (Dalton 2007; Dalton, Bürklin, and Drummond 2001; Fuchs and Klingemann 1995;
Norris 1999). Governments face increasing levels of public protest in their efforts to
implement public policies (Brettschneider and Schuster 2013). New parties, political
organizations, and social movements actively promote new modes of participatory decision-
making (della Porta 2013).
Impressionistic evidence suggests that political elites are all too ready to join these
battle cries for participatory democracy. This is true at the rhetorical level and concerns floor
speeches, party convention addresses, and media announcements. For example, Thomas
Oppermann, current Speaker of the Social Democratic party group in the German Bundestag,
just recently declared in a floor speech the time ripe for bringing citizens back in by opening
up representative processes to public participation.4 Elite support for participatory instruments
of democracy also manifests itself in concrete policy initiatives across Western democracies
(Cain, Scarrow, and Dalton 2003; Geissel and Newton 2011; Saward 2006; Smith 2009; Zittel
2010; Zittel and Fuchs 2006). For example, in Germany the red-green government of
chancellor Schröder introduced a bill to complement the country’s staunchly representative
federal system of government with direct forms of decision-making. In the UK, the House of
Commons experimented with citizen consultations aimed at opening up committee processes
to the public.
At face value, this support for participatory politics from above is counter-intuitive and
most puzzling. Technically, from the perspective of elites, representative institutions secure
privileged access to public policies and thus from a strategic perspective should be viewed in
4 See Drs. 17/13873; http://www.spdfraktion.de/themen/mehr-bürgerbeteiligung-auf-
bundesebene (accessed 23.2.14)
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most positive ways (Bowler, Donovan, and Karp 2002). Furthermore, technically, any
increase in opportunities to participate in public policy making functions as a constraint on
political elites that should be by definition in command of decision making powers and
authority (Bachrach 1971). On this basis, Gordon Smith (1976, p. 7) characterized for
example the referendum as an anti-hegemonic device. This counter-intuitive observation
raises the question this paper is concerned with: Why do political elites support institutions
that they benefit least from?
This paper proposes to perceive the support of political elites for participatory
democracy as the result of emotional reactions in the context of the electoral game. The main
argument of the paper is that political elites support participatory politics as a reaction to
electoral hazards and resulting frustrations. Elites experiencing electoral defeat out of
frustration will be most likely to develop critical stances about representative institutions.
Furthermore, we envision dissatisfaction with representative institutions to translate into
support for participatory instruments of democracy.
With this argument, this paper firstly contributes to debates on the reform of
representative institutions. In this context, it aims to highlight the underlying emotional
factors driving the policy choices of elites. Secondly, the paper aims to contribute to the
broader literature on the beliefs of political elites and their consequences and sources. Thirdly,
with the argument made, the paper contributes to the debate on the winner-loser gap in
electoral studies. This debate predominantly focuses on the mass level and the effects of
losing in elections on voters’ support for democracy. This paper suggests applying it to the
elite level and to test an established and much debated hypothesis in light of a new empirical
phenomenon and new data.
To test its main argument, the paper is structured in five parts. In a first part, it briefly
surveys the literature on democratic reform to identify relevant answers to the question raised.
In a second part, it explains and models the genuine argument made in this introduction
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drawing from the winner-loser literature in electoral studies. In a third part, it introduces our
data and the research design adopted in our analysis that focuses on two constituency
candidate surveys at the German state level. In a fourth part, it tests the argument made on the
basis of these data and in light alternative explanations for the politics of participatory reform.
A fifth part briefly summarizes the main findings of the analysis.
The sources of participatory democracy in representative systems
Since the early beginnings of Representative Democracy, the role of participation has
been a contested issue. The literatures dealing with these contests unveil the key factors that
are said to explain democratic reform in representative settings. Empirical research on the
extension of the franchise is of particular concern in this regard (Jacobs and Leyenaar 2011;
Leyenaar and Hazan 2011). This research highlights two paradigmatic perspectives on the
politics of democratic reforms that we shall briefly summarize in this section.
Research on the extension of the franchise highlights two different types of behavior
political elites might adapt in their choices on electoral rules. A first type is said to be
rationalistic or strategic. From this point of view, political elites are expected to choose those
electoral rules that are most likely to maximize their political gains and/or minimize their
political losses (Benoit 2004). In contrast, a second type of behavior is said to be driven by
learned values and genuine preferences. From this perspective, political elites are expected to
choose those electoral rules that are closest to their basic values and norms. They are assumed
to behave in non-strategic ways.
The first rationalistic perspective on democratic reform stresses constituency demands,
the role of contentious politics, and related vote seeking concerns of elites as key factors
explaining franchise extensions (Acemoglu and Robinson 2000; Tarrow 2011). From this
perspective, the greater the ‘threat of revolution’ and the more pressing public demands are,
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the more likely it is that the franchise is extended and that elites thus allow for more
participation in representative settings. Lehoucque (2000, p. 469) for example stresses for the
Costa Rican case that elites in the 1920s remained unreceptive to extending the franchise to
women because of the lack of a broad based women’s movement (For a similar argument on
European democracies see Conley and Temini 2001; Freeman and Snidal 1982). In turn, the
de facto inclusion of racial minorities into the North American electorate in the 1960s has
been seen as a result of the pressures originating from a strengthening civil rights movement
(Lee 2002). By making concessions to pressures, elites might aim to secure votes and to
prevent losing political control (Cain, Scarrow, and Dalton 2003). A similar line of argument
can be found in debates on the origins of proportional electoral systems that are viewed as a
response of ruling elites to the introduction of the mass franchise and to strong labor
movements at the turn of the 19th century in most Western European democracies (e.g. Boix
1999).
A revised version of this first rationalistic perspective on democratic reform emphasizes
the context dependency of the relationship between external demands and the strategic
reactions of political elites. One related model stresses the impact of socio-structural contexts
in this regard, particularly the level of inequality, mediating between the demands of citizens
and the reactions of political elites. Paradoxically, greater social inequalities are said to
decrease the likelihood for democratic reform due to greater costs to pre reform elites
(Engerman and Sokoloff 2001; Ziblatt 2008). Other rationalistic models focusing on the role
of context highlight external crisis such as wars or recessions that might stimulate elites to
offer democratic reforms as bargaining chips while asking constituents for sacrifices such as
military services or cut-backs in social services (Przeworski 2009).
The second perspective on democratic reform in representative settings emphasizes the
values and ideas of elites in explaining the likelihood of reform. From this perspective, elites
are said to be able to set aside their own or their parties’ strategic interests to support distinct
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reform policies that they passionately believe in. For example, Lehoucque (2000, p. 469) on
the Costa Rican case highlights the patriarchal attitudes of many deputies as a main reason for
their opposition to extending the franchise to women in the 1920s, independent of the lack of
external pressures and demands. The broader literature on electoral reform stressed the
willingness of elites to turn to citizen assemblies as a signal that elites are motivated by
ideological and ethical concerns rather than short-term political interests (Bowler, Donovan,
and Karp 2006; Fournier et al. 2010).
Both of these two paradigmatic approaches to the politics of democratic reform suffer
from unresolved questions and issues. Rational models of electoral reform overestimate the
level of information actors possess on the consequences of their actions and the particular
social demands that they face. Models that emphasize values and ideas are based upon over
deterministic assumptions and thus are unable to explain short-term differences and
developments. In light of existing information deficits and human spontaneity, we would
expect emotional factors to significantly bias the support of political elites for increasing the
role of participation in representative setting. With few exceptions (Pilet and Bol 2011), the
electoral reform literature and also the broader literature on the reform of representative
democracy so far downplays this factor in explaining the politics of electoral institutions. This
is where our paper aims to contribute to and where it turns to in the next section.
Before we turn to discussing the emotional dimension of participatory democracy, we
briefly need to touch upon a third standard factor that is said to explain the beliefs of elites
and that features in most prominent ways in the literature on political elites and their beliefs.
This factor concerns political socialization in institutional contexts that results in a theory of
democratic elitism (Peffley and Rohrschneider 2007). In line with our previous discussion on
the role of values and ideas, elites are assumed to be particularly ideologically involved and
thus carry quite stable beliefs towards institutions (Eldersveld 1989; Putnam 1976). On the
other hand, political elites frequently are in a most direct relationship to these very institutions
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and thus are subject to processes to political socialization in institutional contexts. As a result
political elites function as guardians of democracy in general and particularly of particular
types of democracy related to particular institutional contexts they were socialized in
(McClosky 1964; Peffley and Rohrschneider 2007).
The emotional sources of participatory democracy
Skeptics might second-guess the possibility to model and systematically trace the
effects of emotions as a factor in political life. However, this paper points to particular
emotions related to particular recurrent events in politics, namely frustrations resulting from
electoral setbacks. We envision electoral losers to be frustrated about the event of losing and
thus to develop feelings about dissatisfaction with the current state of democracy that
eventually translates in support for participatory forms of democracy.
The main argument in the paper is based upon assumptions on the structure of the
beliefs of elites that are rooted in previous research on belief systems and that we briefly need
to clarify (Aberbach, Rockam, and Putnam 1981; Almond and Verba 1963; Rohrschneider
2005; Rohrschneider and Peffley 2009). Drawing from previous research on belief systems,
we distinguish between three different types of orientation. These types are evaluative,
cognitive, and affective orientations. In this paper, we are solely interested in the evaluative
type of orientation, in whether elites consider something to be a “good” or “bad” thing.
Additionally, we distinguish between three different empirical objects that elites might
evaluate. The first object concerns the current state of democracy and whether political elites
are satisfied with or rather frustrated about it. The second object is more specific and concerns
the electoral process as a crucial instrument of democracy linking citizens and the state. We
are interested in whether political elites consider this a functionally satisfactory instrument of
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democracy that is able to secure the responsiveness of representatives. The third object
concerns specific policies/proposals designed to open up representative processes to public
participation. Thus, we are interested in whether political elites develop reformist beliefs
(Aberbach, Rockam, and Putnam 1981) actively supporting alternatives to established
representative processes. Particularly, we are interested in the support of political elites for
direct democracy, for using citizen consultation to give advice to legislatures, and for
increasing the transparency of legislative committees.
In this paper we consider this set of elite beliefs to stand in a distinct relationship to
each other. We envision a direct link between satisfaction with democracy in general and
elections as instruments of democracy on the one hand and support for any kind of
participatory reform on the other. The assumption in the paper is, that those elites that develop
frustrations about democracy and elections will in turn be positive about any participatory
reform out of frustration with the current state of democracy and particularly the electoral
process. Thus, passions for reform partly result from electoral frustrations and despair.
Our main argument draws from the winner-loser gap approach in electoral studies. This
approach aims to explain the attitudes of mass publics on democracy by pointing to individual
frustrations that result from the experience of voting for losing parties. Voters that voted for
losing parties are said to be more likely to dislike the democratic game and to develop
negative attitudes about democratic institutions (Anderson et al. 2007; Anderson and Guillory
1997; Bowler and Donovan 2007; Smith, Tolbert, and Keller 2010). We see no reason not to
adopt this argument to the elite level. After all, elites are human and thus should be subject to
emotional reactions similar to mass publics.
In this paper, following the winner-loser gap literature, we acknowledge the
differentiated nature of the incident of losing dependent upon the level of political
marginalization. For example, Anderson et. al (2007, p. 124) argue that the negative
attitudinal effects of losing in elections are muted when individuals encounter inclusive
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institutions that allow losers some kind of representation and thus prevent political
marginalization. Under these circumstances, the political concerns of those that were not able
to secure majorities are considered to somehow matter despite the incident of losing. Thus,
losing in elections might mean different things resulting in different emotional reactions.
In this paper, adopting the winner–loser gap argument to the elite level, we consider the
failure to individually secure a mandate to define the experience of losing. However,
following the winner–loser gap argument, we distinguish between three further forms of
losing distinguished by differences in the level of political marginalization.
The first form of losing concerns the failure to seriously compete for public office. It is
plausible to assume, that those trapped in hopeless contests defined by wide margins should
feel especially marginalized and thus should be frustrated in special ways. From the
perspective of competitors and bystanders, large margins might indicate a marginal relevance
of the political concerns of those losing. Also, from the perspective of competitors, large
margins indicate electoral safety. These perceptions should result in the fact that winners see
no need to listen to these types of losers and to acknowledge their positions. As a result, this
type of electoral loser faces utmost levels of political marginalization.
The second form of losing concerns the collective returns for a particular candidates’
party. After all, political parties are crucial players in electoral politics. From the perspective
of individual candidates, the question of whether his or her party is able to secure a majority
in the national electorate or at least participate in a coalition government should be of utmost
relevance for his or her perceptions. In cases in which candidates’ parties failed to secure
government participation, feelings of political marginalization should be particularly
pronounced compared to situations in which individual losers find themselves to be part of a
party in government.
The third form of losing again concerns candidates’ collective returns. Generally, we
suspect that individuals that lost collectively in addition to losing individually will feel
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especially marginalized and thus frustrated. Particularly, the incident of collectively failing to
win any mandate and thus representation should matter most. It is plausible to assume, that
candidates failing to collectively win mandates will most likely feel marginalized since they
lack any kind of ‘blackmailing potential’ (Sartori 1976). They will generally be perceived as a
marginal force in politics.
This paper assumes that different levels of frustration resulting from these different
types of losing will matter for candidates’ attitudes towards representative institutions. Losers
will be less likely to be satisfied with the current state of democracy and also with elections as
instruments of democracy. The paper furthermore argues that this should be relevant for the
support of candidates for participatory democracy. Those candidates frustrated about
democracy and elections should be more likely to support any kind of alternative mode of
politics and thus also participatory forms of policy making. It is important to note that we
assume a mediating effect of critical beliefs about the current state of democracy and
elections. Support for participatory reforms should be explained by resentment resulting from
electoral setbacks and should not be directly related to any objective systemic factor in
electoral politics.
In this paper, we do not dispute the relevance of strategic concerns and values for the
choices of elites on democratic reform. We rather argue that emotional factors matter
independent of these other motivations. Therefore, in the proceeding analysis, we will test our
argument in light of the competing explanations that we discussed above. Thus, we follow a
y-centric research design aimed at explaining the policy beliefs of elites in most
comprehensive ways. However, this design aims to pave the way for future x-centric studies
on the issue to understand the emotional sources of democratic reform in greater depth.
Figure 1 summarizes the argument made in this section. It particularly emphasizes two
points. First, it stresses that we envision an indirect effect of the incident of losing on policy
beliefs mediated by critical beliefs on the state of democracy and elections as instruments of
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democracy. Second it emphasizes that, in contrast, we envision a direct effect of the values
and strategic concerns of elites on their beliefs on participatory democracy.
Fig. 1: The sources of elites’ beliefs on participatory democracy
Figure 1 implies the following specific hypotheses that we wish to test in our analysis
and that result from our previous theoretical considerations:
H1: Political elites that individually lost a bit for public office are more likely to be negative about democracy and the electoral process compared to winners.
H1a: Political elites that perceive themselves non-competitive in their
bit for public office are more likely to be negative about democracy and the electoral process.
H1b: Political elites that collectively failed to win participation in
government are more likely to be negative about democracy and the electoral process.
3.#Support#for#direct#democracy#
4.#Support#for#ci3zen#consulta3ons#5.#Support#for#greater#transperency#
Individual#failure#to#win#mandate#
Individual#failure#to#remain#compe33ve#
Collec3ve#failure#to#par3cipate#in#government#
Collec3ve#failure#to#secure#mandates#
1.#Dissa3sfac3on#with#dem
ocracy#2.#Dissa3sfac3on#w
ith#electoral#process#
Progressive#values#
Cons3tuency#demands#for#reform#
Democra3c#eli3sm#
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H1c: Political elites that collectively failed to win representation will
be more likely to be negative about democracy and the electoral process.
H2: Political elites that are dissatisfied with democracy and/or the electoral
process will be more likely to support participatory reforms complementing representative processes.
H3: Political elites that hold progressive values will be more likely to
support participatory reforms complementing representative processes. H4: Political elites that face constituency demands for participatory reforms
will be more likely to support participatory reforms complementing representative processes.
H5: Political elites that lack experiences of political socialization in
representative settings are more likely to support participatory reforms complementing representative processes
Research design, data, and empirical model
This paper tests our theoretical argument and the resulting hypotheses sketched above
on the basis of two pooled post-election candidate studies conducted in the German states of
Hesse and Bavaria in 2013. In these studies we contacted an overall number of 2091
candidates running for legislative offices (597 in Hesse and 1494 in Bavaria). Both elections
took place in September 2013. Candidates were able to respond between December 2013 and
April 2014 either in a pen and paper or an online format.5
Our overall universe of candidates represents 11 parties, six of them represented in one
or the other legislature (CDU/CSU, SPD, FDP, GRÜNE, LINKE, Freie Wähler).Additionally,
we contacted visible and much discussed fringe parties in German politics that competed in
one or the other electoral race (Piraten, AfD, ÖDP, NPD, Republikaner). The visibility of
these parties partly results from past electoral victories that secured them representation in
5 For further information see http://landtagskandidatenstudie.de
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other state parliaments (Piraten, NPD). Partly, it is the result of more recent debates which
consider the AfD a serious contender in future elections. We included the conservative-green
ÖDP and the right-wing Republikaner as interesting examples for conservative parties that
might challenge the CDU/CSU grip on the right party political spectrum in Germany.
Tab. 1: Response rate and representativeness of the two candidate studies
Hesse Bavaria Survey Population Survey Population Mode of Candidacy
List 32.4 38.4 41.8 43.0 Nominal 17.9 17.3 - - Dual 49.7 44.4 58.2 57.0
Incumbent (Prior to election)
Yes 6.2 7.7 7.1 9.2 No 93.8 92.3 92.9 90.8
Successful
Yes 19.3 18.4 10.6 12.1 No 80.7 81.6 89.4 88.0
Party
CDU/CSU 21.0 21.8 8.8 11.0 SPD 19.7 18.4 12.7 11.0 FDP 10.0 9.2 11.3 11.8 GRÜNE 12.1 11.6 14.5 12.1 Die Linke 12.4 10.4 9.6 10.5 Freie Wähler 9.3 10.6 10.6 9.9 Piraten 7.9 8.0 8.1 8.8 AfD 4.1 5.7 - - Republikaner 1.7 2.7 7.4 9.1 ÖDP - - 15.2 12.1 NPD 1.7 1.6 1.9 3.8
Gender
Female 23.8 29.3 25.8 26.24 Male 76.2 70.7 74.2 73.76
Age in Years (mean) 48.9 48.8 51.5 50.4 Share in per cent 48.6 100.0 39.7 100.0 N 290 597 593 1494
The response rates of both surveys are more than satisfactory compared to similar
candidate surveys (see Zittel 2014). In Hesse, 48.6 per cent of the contacted candidates
completed questionnaires, in Bavaria the respective rate was 39.7 per cent. Furthermore,
Table 1 demonstrates that the sample is highly representative of the whole (candidate)
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population. Most importantly, the party shares closely resemble those in the whole population
with only few incidents in which particular parties are slightly over- and underrepresented.
This concerns for example the CSU, GRÜNE and the ÖDP in Bavaria. Candidates
representing the former party are slightly underrepresented while the opposite is true for
candidates representing the latter two parties. However, these deviations are small and also
few in numbers.
The shares of successful candidates also closely resemble the whole universe with 19.3
per cent in Hesse (compared to 18.4%) and 10.4 per cent in Bavaria (compared to 12.1%).
Last but not least, the shares of the different types of candidates (party list, dual and nominal)
closely resemble the whole candidate population. The only larger deviation that we are able to
detect concerns the issue of gender in the candidate survey on Hesse. In this survey, women
are underrepresented by about 6 per cent.
Candidate studies are a useful and most relevant data source to explore the issues this
paper is concerned with. First and foremost, they focus on the type of political elites our
model is most interested in, namely political elites that run for public office and that are thus
potentially subject to electoral setbacks and resulting disappointments and frustrations.
Furthermore, candidate studies provide data on the beliefs of elites that are hard to access in
other ways. Third, individuals running for public office are important players within party
organizational contexts and thus should exert significant influence on the positions and
institutional policies of their parties. Consequently, their beliefs should matter for the
positions and choices of their parties. Table 2 provides an overview of the variables that we
use to test our hypotheses:
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Tab. 2: Independent and dependent variables in our models
Dependent Variables Indicators N
Satisfaction with democracy in Germany 1 = Not satisfied (1 and 2) 0 = Satisfied (3 and 4) 879
Evaluation of state elections as instruments of democracy
1 = Not good (1 and 2) 0 = Good (3 and 4) 874
Direct democracy at federal level in Germany 1 = Support (5 and 4) 0 = Don’t support (1 thru 3) 877
Transparency of committee meetings through electronic media
1 = Support (1 thru 3) 0 = Don’t support (4 thru 7) 877
Parliaments should use citizen consultations to receive advice in decisions processes
1 = Support (1 thru 3) 0 = Don’t support (4 thru 7) 877
Independent Variables
Individual loser 1 = yes, 0 = no 884
Individual lack of competitiveness Subjective expectation ranging from certainty of losing (=4) to certainty of securing a seat (=0) 867
Member of party in opposition 1 = member of party in opposition 0 = member of party in government 884
Member of party not represented 1 = member of party not represented; 0 = member of party represented 884
Progressive values -5 = extreme left position thru +5 = extreme right position 870
Professionalism / Democratic elitism Summary Index of legislative and executive offices held previously ranging from 0 to 5 883
Constituency demands for more participation Proportion of young age cohorts in district6 884
Proportion of welfare recipients in district7 884
In Figure 1 we summarized our theoretical expectations that we aim to test in the
following analysis. In this analysis we perform a logistic-regression analysis that advances in
a two-step process. In a first step, we first regress the satisfaction of candidates with
6 Pure list candidates received in this measure the proportion of young population (age 15-40) in
their federal state (Hesse) or in the multimember-districts (Bavaria) as proxies for perceived public demands.
7 Pure list candidates received in this measure the proportion of welfare recipients in their federal state (Hesse) or in the multimember-districts (Bavaria) as proxies for perceived public demands.
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democracy and the electoral system on our main independent variables that we summarized in
Table 2. In a second step we regress candidates’ support for different participatory reforms on
our main independent variables, now including the satisfaction of candidates with democracy
in general and with the electoral process in particular.
In this paper, our focus is on candidates for federal state parliaments in Hesse and
Bavaria. Focusing on the subnational level has important advantages for the purpose of this
analysis. First, at the state level we are able to hold crucial social-cultural factors constant
such as overall socio-economic development and democratic experience in a country. Second,
at the same time, we are able to find variance regarding important contextual variables that
might affect candidates’ satisfaction with democracy such as party systems and the general
voting behavior of the population. While in Bavaria, the CSU is a dominant political force
that is usually able to win absolute majorities, in Hesse, coalition government and also
changing party political governments are more common. Third, at the subnational level we
are able to increase our N and to provide variance with regard to the variable we are most
concerned with, namely the difference between winners and losers and also between different
types of losers.
German candidates’ beliefs on democracy
In this section we provide some descriptive evidence on the core dependent variables
our analysis is concerned with. Table 3 demonstrates striking differences in this regard. A
majority of 59 per cent of all candidates claims to be quite or very satisfied with democracy in
Germany. However, a significant minority of 41 per cent is not much or not at all satisfied.
Our second dependent variable reveals an even more striking pattern. Table 3 shows a similar
divide between positive and negative perceptions. However, in this case, we see a reverse
distribution between supporters and critics of state elections as instruments of democracy. A
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majority of candidates (58%) considers the electoral process at the state level an insufficient
instrument of democracy.
Tab. 3: Candidates’ beliefs on democracy in Germany
Level of satisfaction in per cent Satisfaction with Democracy1
State Elections as Instruments of Democracy 2
Not satisfied at all (not well at all) 11.5 14.1
Not very much satisfied (not so well) 29.5 43.6
Quite satisfied (well) 47.6 38.3
Very satisfied (very well) 11.5 4.0
N 879 874
1 Original question: „Sind Sie mit der Art und Weise, wie die Demokratie in Deutschland funktioniert, alles
in allem gesehen…. „ 2 Original question: „Wie gut garantieren Ihrer Meinung nach die Landtagwahlen, dass die Ansichten der
Wähler/-innen von den gewählten Abgeordneten auch vertreten werden?“
According to Table 4, the beliefs of candidates on measures of participatory democracy
show similarly striking differences and also striking levels of support for reforming
representative institutions. A majority of 69 per cent welcomes the introduction of referenda
at the federal level compared to 31 per cent opposing this measure. Similarly, almost 62 per
cent of the surveyed candidates positively lean towards citizen consultations as a means to
give advice to legislatures and to thus improve their responsiveness. In contrast, only 38 per
cent lean towards an alternative statement emphasizing parties and legislators as sufficient
means to represent the interests of voters.
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Tab. 4: Candidates’ beliefs on institutional policies in Germany
Level of support in per cent Referenda at Federal Level Citizen Consultations Transparency of
Committees
Rather Yes 69.4 61.6 48.7
Rather No 30.6 38.4 51.3
N 877 877 877
The distribution of candidates’ support for increasing the transparency of legislative
committees stands out since it is strikingly polarized with no clear majority in either direction.
The particular question that was asked in our survey concerns the option to broadcast
committee meetings in real time via electronic media. Around 51 per cent reject this reform
option leaning towards the position that the legislative process should not be degraded to a
media spectacle.
The emotional sources of candidates’ beliefs on democracy from a bivariate perspective
Winning or losing an election does make a difference for candidates' satisfaction with
democracy in Germany and with state elections as instruments of democracy. This is the main
result of our bivariate analysis, which thus fully supports the first part of our theoretical
argument. Table 5 shows the different bivariate relationships between our two dependent
variables on the one hand and our main independent variable, namely the incident of losing,
on the other.
Table 5 shows in particular that compared to losers relatively small numbers of winners
are dissatisfied with democracy in Germany and the electoral process in their particular states.
This amounts to 10 per cent and 17 per cent respectively. In contrast, within the group of
losers, a striking majority of 64 per cent is dissatisfied with elections as instruments of
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democracy. Furthermore, a very significant minority of almost 46 per cent is dissatisfied with
the functioning of democracy in general. In both cases, Cramer’s V indicates moderate
relationships between our independent and dependent variables. Chi2 tests reveal that both
relationships are highly significant at the .001 level.
Tab. 5: Electoral success at the individual level and satisfaction with democracy
Loser in % Winner in % N Chi2* Cramer's V
Dissatisfied with democracy
Yes 45.7 10.2 360 53.42*** 0.25
No 54.3 89.8 519
Dissatisfied with elections
Yes 64.0 17.0 504 92.64*** 0.33
No 36.0 83.0 370
* Levels of significance of Chi2 values: * p < .1; ** p < .05; *** p < .001
The level of satisfaction with democracy does make a difference for the policy beliefs
of our candidates. This is the result of a bivariate analysis documented in Table 6, which thus
fully supports our theoretical expectations. The support for reforms is around 30 percentage
points higher in the group of those dissatisfied with democracy in general compared to those
candidates that are satisfied.8 Particularly, the numbers in Table 6 show a striking pattern with
regard to the reform measure that received the most aggregate support among the surveyed
candidates, namely introducing referenda at the federal level. This measure is supported by
almost 90 per cent of all those dissatisfied with democracy in Germany. With 56 per cent, the
support for referenda is also strong among those satisfied with the functioning of democracy,
but the difference between the groups is still remarkable. Again, in all three cases, Cramer’s V 8 We find similar results for our second dependent variable that focuses on the dissatisfaction
with elections as an instrument of democracy. Detailed results are available upon request.
20
indicates moderate relationships between our independent and dependent variables. Chi2 tests
reveal that all three relationships are highly significant at the .001 level.
Tab. 6: Satisfaction with democracy in general and support for participatory democracy
Dissatisfied in % Satisfied in % N Chi2* Cramer's V
Support for referenda at federal level
Yes 88.3 56.3 607 101.83*** 0.34
No 11.7 43.7 268
Support for citizen consultations
Yes 80.5 48.4 538 91.99*** 0.32
No 19.6 51.6 337
Support for greater transparency of committee process
Yes 64.7 37.8 427 61.06*** 0.26
No 35.3 62.2 448
* Levels of significance of Chi2 values: * p < .1; ** p < .05; *** p < .001
In a next step we will test our argument on the basis of a multivariate logistic regression
model. In this step, we aim to test whether the relationships that we detected in our bivariate
analyses hold when we control for some of the alternative explanations sketched above. Also,
the aim is to gauge the effects of losing on candidates’ beliefs on democracy in more
differentiated ways by distinguishing between different types of losing and thus different
levels of frustration. This analysis proceeds in two steps. In a first step, we will estimate the
impact of losing on support for democracy and the electoral process. In a second step, we will
estimate the impact of the satisfaction with democracy on candidates’ support for different
types of participatory reforms. In this second step, we include all other independent variables
from our previous analysis. This two step process is in line with our theoretical argument that
losing in elections results in a feeling of frustration about the rules of the game. As a result,
21
those affected will support any proposal towards changing these rules including proposals for
implementing measures of participatory democracy.
The emotional sources of candidates’ beliefs on democracy from a multivariate perspective
The results of our analysis that are shown in Table 7 support our main argument in
impressive ways. Those candidates that lost their bid for public office are more likely to be
dissatisfied with democracy in Germany and also to consider the electoral regimes in their
states as unsuited instruments for democracy (H1). Both relationships are significant at the
.001 level. With regard to our more differentiated measures on the incident of losing, the
collective failure to secure mandates (fringe party) clearly matters independent from the
simple incident of losing individually. Candidates representing fringe parties are more likely
to be dissatisfied with the current state of democracy and with state elections as instrument of
democracy. The relationship is significant at the .001 level (H1c). Similarly, failing
collectively to secure participation in government significantly influences the dissatisfaction
with the democratic system in general and even more so with candidates’ satisfaction with the
electoral system (H1b).
Table 7 does not show any support for hypothesis 1a. Losing by wide margins does not
provide an additional explanation for candidates’ beliefs on democracy. One plausible ad hoc
explanation concerns the vote seeking assumption that underlies our analysis. Obviously,
candidates differ in this regard and some of those losing by wide margins actually do not seek
votes and thus should not be frustrated losing big. However, this does not contradict the
impact of failing individually and collectively to secure representation on candidates’ beliefs
on democracy. Those failing to win mandates are more likely to be frustrated about the state
of democracy and elections as instrument of democracy.
22
Tab. 7: Explaining dissatisfaction with democracy and state elections
Democracy (1 =yes)
Elections (1 = yes)
Loser (=1) 1.195*** (.414)
1.211*** (.348)
Wide margins (=4) .106 (.087)
-.010 (.087)
Opposition (=1) .508* (.308)
1.334*** (.278)
Fringe party (=1) 1.684*** (.193)
1.141*** (.196)
Progressive values (=-5) -.173*** (.036)
-.142*** (.037)
Professionalism (=5) -.256*** (.080)
-.214** (.079)
District_proportion of young -.089** (.036)
-.106** (.036)
District_welfare recipients .133** (.068)
.088 (.068)
Constant -.257 (1.084)
.799 (1.050)
Pseudo R2 0.20 0.20
N 851 846
Note: Multivariate logistic regression model. Entries are non standardized regression coefficients, standard errors in parentheses; *p < .1; ** < .05; *** < .001.
The effect of losing on candidates’ satisfaction with democracy clearly holds
independent from other effects that we are able to witness in Table 7. Most prominently,
candidates with progressive values are more likely to express dissatisfaction with the state of
democracy. This is plausible since progressives by definition are critical about the status quo
and wish for social and political change. Furthermore, as we would expect, candidates defined
by a high level of professionalism are less likely to express dissatisfaction with democracy
and elections. However, the incidents of losing individually and collectively show effects
independent of the values of candidates and thus impressively support our main theoretical
argument. The fit of both models with r2 values of .20 is satisfactory.
23
Tab. 8: Explaining support for participatory democracy
Referenda (1=yes)
Consultations (1=yes)
Transparency (1=yes)
Dissatisfied with democracy (=1) 1.075***
(.227) .786***
(.198) .751***
(.180) Dissatisfied with elections (=1) .523**
(.200) .476**
(.187) .262
(.180) Loser (=1) -.189
(.329) .116
(.315) .575*
(.311) Wide Margins (=4) .0004
(.093) -.078 (.086)
.089 (.081)
Opposition (=1) .538** (.251)
.343 (.253)
.221 (.249)
Fringeparty (=1) .806*** (.237)
.618** (.214)
.326* (.192)
Progressive values (=-5) -.243*** (.044)
-.232*** (.040)
-.189*** (.035)
Professionalism (=5) -.066 (.084)
-.212** (.079)
.133* (.074)
District_proportion of young .042 (.037)
.006 (.035)
.092** (.033)
District_welfare recipients -.112 (.068)
-.056 (.065)
-.081 (.061)
Constant -1.290 (1.113)
-.439 (1.039)
-4.298*** (.998)
Pseudo R2 0.20 0.18 0.10
N 841 843 842
Note: Multivariate logistic regression model. Entries are non standardized regression coefficients, standard errors in parentheses; *p < .1; ** < .05; *** < .001.
Table 8 documents the second step in our multivariate analysis. It demonstrates the
expected relationship between candidates’ dissatisfaction with democracy on the one hand
and their support for different reform options on the other (H2). Candidates that are
dissatisfied with democracy are more likely to support introducing referenda, citizen
consultations, and greater transparency of legislative committees. Five of the six relationships
are significant at the .05 or lower level. The sixth relationship points into the right direction
24
but fails to show significance. This solid pattern across different reform options impressively
supports our theoretical assumptions on the impact of emotions on candidates’ support for
participatory democracy.
The results in Table 8 further support our theoretical considerations because they
demonstrate almost no effect of the incident of losing individually on candidates’ support for
institutional reforms. Clearly, the relationship between the electoral fortunes of candidates
and their beliefs on democratic reform is mediated by their beliefs on the current state of
democracy. Candidates that lost are more likely to be dissatisfied with democracy in Germany
and the electoral process in their states; candidates that are more dissatisfied are more likely
to support democratic reforms. The only effect of the incident of losing individually that we
see in Table 8 concerns candidates’ support for greater transparency of legislative
committees. In this case, individual losers are more likely to support this measure independent
of their dissatisfaction with democracy. However, the relationship is only significant at the .1
level. Furthermore, this is theoretically plausible because it is the most ‘technical’ reform
option that we test for and thus less likely to be solely driven by emotional factors.
Table 8 does show that the effect of failing collectively to secure mandates remains in
place independent of the level of satisfaction with democracy. Members of parties without
legislative representation are more likely to support proposals for participatory reforms. Two
relationships documented in Table 7 are significant at least at the .05 level, one is significant
at the .1 level. Additionally, we observe a positive effect of the opposition status, that is in the
expected direction, and also significant at the .05 level. However, the important finding is that
candidates’ dissatisfaction with the current state of democracy has an independent and
impressive effect on candidates’ support for participatory reforms.
The expected direct relationship between candidates’ values and their support for
participatory reforms (H3) is clearly demonstrated in Table 8. Candidates with progressive
values that place themselves to the left of the political spectrum are more likely to support
25
participatory democracy independent of their dissatisfaction with democracy. This
relationship holds for all three dependent variables and is significant at the .001 level.
Table 8 also supports the expectations resulting from a rationalistic perspective on
reform politics, but only in selective and weak ways (H4). According to the results
demonstrated in this table, candidates representing districts with greater proportions of young
voters are more likely to support policies aimed at increasing the transparency of legislative
committees via the Internet. The relationship is significant at the .05 level. The effects of this
variable on the other two policy related variables point into the same direction but fail to show
significance. In addition, candidates representing more well-to-do districts with lower
proportions of welfare recipients are more likely to support democratic reforms. However,
these relationships fail to show significance, though some only narrowly.
Our results also show selective support for theories of democratic elitism emphasizing
the professional experience of candidates (H5). Candidates with greater experiences in elected
and administrative offices are less likely to support introducing referenda at the federal level
and to support citizen consultations. The latter relationship is significant at the .05 level.
However, candidates’ attitudes on legislative transparency do not meet our theoretical
expectations. The relationship points into a different direction and even is significant at the .1
level.
The important point of our analysis documented in Table 8 is that, independent of
rationalistic, value-based and elitist explanations that we control for and that are party
confirmed, emotions resulting from the incident of losing and mediated by individual
frustration on the state of democracy matter for the support of candidates for participatory
democracy; the experience of losing results in greater dissatisfaction with the current state of
democracy. Dissatisfaction with democracy in turn results in support for participatory
alternatives independent of alternative well established explanations.
26
Summary and discussion
This paper is a first effort to gauge the emotional sources of democratic reform aimed at
increasing opportunities for political participation. It shows that emotions do matter
independent from strategic, value driven and elitist motivations. It shows that negative
emotions about the current state of democracy indicated by dissatisfaction and disappointment
result from electoral setbacks at the individual and collective levels and directly affect the
beliefs of elites on the need for participatory reforms. Elites that are subject to electoral
setbacks are more likely to turn their back on representative democracy and to support
introducing participatory add-ons. Clearly, losing elections hurts and hardens feelings with
regard to the rules of the game.
Our results are promising and suggest paying further attention to the effects of affects.
Uncovering the emotional basis of participatory democracy strikes us as relevant for three
reasons. First, it helps to gauge the limits of strategic and value-based behavior and also of
theories of democratic elitism and thus contributes to behavioral theories of politics. Second,
it fosters our understanding on practical reform debates and on the how they need to be
perceived. Clearly, with regard to long-term institutional developments we would wish to
minimize the role of emotional factors and to ensure that regimes are rooted in the interests
and values of those they ought to govern. Third, focusing on the electoral sources of emotions
helps us understand what electoral rules might be most problematic at that level and might
raise problems for the need to mobilize broad based consensus on the institutional bases of
democracy in given contexts.
27
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