Transcript of Volume 2 a
- 1. REPORT OF THE TRUTH, JUSTICE ANDRECONCILIATION
COMMISSIONVolume IIA
- 2. REPORT OF THE TRUTH, JUSTICE ANDRECONCILIATION
COMMISSIONVolume IIA
- 3. Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission, 2013This
publication is available as a pdf on the website of the Truth,
Justiceand Reconciliation Commission (and upon its dissolution, on
the websiteof its successor in law). It may be copied and
distributed, in its entirety, aslong as it is attributed to the
Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commissionand used for
noncommercial educational or public policy purposes.Photographs may
not be used separately from the publication.Published by Truth
Justice and Reconciliation Commission (TJRC), KenyaISBN:
978-9966-1730-3-4Design & Layout by Noel Creative Media
Limited, Nairobi, Kenya
- 4. His ExcellencyPresident of the Republic of KenyaNairobi3 May
2013LETTER OF TRANSMITTALBy Gazette Notice No. 8737 of 22 July 2009
and pursuant to section 10 of the Truth, Justice andReconciliation
Act No. 6 of 2008, the undersigned were appointed to be
Commissioners of the Truth,Justice and Reconciliation Commission.
The Commission was established with the objective ofpromoting
peace, justice, national unity, healing, reconciliation and dignity
among the people of Kenya.Having concluded our operations, and
pursuant to section 48 of the Truth, Justice and ReconciliationAct,
we have the honour to submit to you the Report of our findings and
recommendations.Please accept, Your Excellency, the assurances of
our highest consideration.Amb. Bethuel KiplagatChairpersonTecla
Namachanja Wanjala(Vice Chairperson)Judge Gertrude Chawatama Amb.
Berhanu DinkaMaj. Gen (Rtd) Ahmed Sheikh FarahProf. Tom Ojienda
Margaret Shava Prof. Ronald Slye
- 5. iVolume IIAREPORT OF THE TRUTH, JUSTICE AND RECONCILIATION
COMMISSIONTable of
ContentsForeword..........................................................................................................................................iii
List of
Abbreviations...................................................................................................................viCHAPTER
ONEHistorical Context: A General
Overview.................................................................................................
1
Introduction....................................................................................................................................1
British Colonial Era
.......................................................................................................................3
President Jomo Kenyattas Era
.............................................................................................
17 President Daniel Arap Mois Era
..........................................................................................
24 President Mwai Kibakis
Era...................................................................................................
27Appendix Selected major events in
Kenya...........................................................................................
30CHAPTER TWOHistory of Security Agencies: Focus on Colonial Roots
of the Police andMilitary Forces
...................................................................................................................................................33
Introduction
................................................................................................................................
33 The Police
.....................................................................................................................................
34 The Military
..................................................................................................................................
72Conclusion
...................................................................................................................................
99CHAPTER THREEThe Shifta
War.................................................................................................................................................
101 Introduction
..............................................................................................................................101Origins...........................................................................................................................................103
Legal Framework
.....................................................................................................................109
Socio-Economic Policy in Support of The War
...........................................................111
Fighting The
War.......................................................................................................................113
Massacres During The Shifta
War......................................................................................131
Assigning
Responsibility.......................................................................................................137
- 6. iiVolume IIAREPORT OF THE TRUTH, JUSTICE AND RECONCILIATION
COMMISSION Mass Graves, Burial Sites and Forensic
Possibilities............................................. 142 Wars
End - October
1964...........................................................................................
144CHAPTER FOURUnlawful Killings and Enforced
Disappearances...........................................................................147Massacres.............................................................................................................................................
149 Political
Assassinations.................................................................................................................
430 Extra-Judicial Killings and enforced Disappearances
................................................... 477 Annex: List
of Massacre
Victims.........................................................................................552CHAPTER
FIVEUnlawful Detention, Torture and
ill-Treatment..............................................................................
589Introduction
..............................................................................................................................590
Definitions and Legal Framework
....................................................................................590Methodology
............................................................................................................................594
Detention and Torture during the Colonial Era
.........................................................599
Detention and Torture during President Kenyattas
Era..........................................602 Detention and
Torture during President Mois
Era....................................................605
Detention and Torture during President Kibakis Era
..............................................662 Annex: List of
Victims of Detention, Torture and
ill-Treatment............................664CHAPTER SIXSexual
Violence...............................................................................................................................................
707Introduction
..............................................................................................................................707Definition
....................................................................................................................................708Methodology
............................................................................................................................712
Reporting of Cases on Sexual
Violations........................................................................713
Sexual Violence during Peacetime
..................................................................................718
Sexual Violence during
Conflicts.......................................................................................721
Sexual Violence in the Context of Interrogation
.......................................................744 Sexual
Violence during Forced
Evictions.......................................................................746
Sexual Violence by the British Royal Army
...................................................................750
Impact of Sexual Violence on Victims and their Families
......................................753
- 7. iiiVolume IIAREPORT OF THE TRUTH, JUSTICE AND RECONCILIATION
COMMISSIONForewordThis Volume focuses on the major violations of
bodily integrity rights that werecommitted during the Commissions
mandate period. While most of the violations in thisvolume are
traditionally defined to require state action extra judicial
killings, enforceddisappearances, detention, torture the Commission
adopted a more expansive view ofthese violations. This was for four
reasons. First, while as a matter of law the distinctionbetween
state and non-state action is important with respect to many of
these violations,many victims are less concerned about the official
status of those who wronged them,and more with identifying those
individuals and addressing the consequences of theharm they
suffered.Second, if the Commission were to strictly define these
violations as requiring stateaction, the experience and narratives
of many victims would be lost. This would diminishthe ability of
the Commission to provide an accurate, complete and historical
record ofgross violations of human rights committed during the
mandate period.Third, while some of the violations described in
this volume were not directly committedby state officials, the
failure of the state to provide adequate security to many of
itscitizens provided an opportunity for such violations to occur.
In seeking to understandthe circumstances, factors and causes of
violations committed by militias and other non-state actors, the
Commission was inevitably drawn to an analysis of state inaction,
andin particular the failure of the state to provide, and appear to
be providing, justice andsecurity.Fourth, while the Commission does
make recommendations with respect to the law andlegal structures,
it is not a court of law, but rather a body dedicated to describing
andexplaining historical injustices and gross violations of human
rights. While accountabilityis part of the Commissions mandate,
justice is one of three equally important pillars,the other two
being truth and reconciliation. In interpreting its mandate,
therefore, theCommission was sensitive to furthering the fulfilment
of each of the three pillars, andnot giving undue weight to any one
over the other two.While much of this volume is focused on
violations directly committed by the state,it also includes
descriptions of killings, severe injury and violence, sexual
violence,detention, and other similar violations committed by
non-state actors.The volume starts with a general overview of the
political history of Kenya. This chapterprovides the overall
political context for understanding not only the other
specific
- 8. ivVolume IIAREPORT OF THE TRUTH, JUSTICE AND RECONCILIATION
COMMISSIONviolations in this chapter, but also the violations and
other materials in the rest of thereport. Because the political
history focuses heavily on the state and its development,we include
it here in the volume that focuses most on some of the worst
violationscommitted by the state.In the chapter on political
history we also, as in other parts of the report, discuss someof
the practices and violations of the colonial government. While the
Commissionstemporal mandate formally commenced at independence, the
Act also required us todescribe and analyze the antecedents,
circumstances, factors and context of violationscommitted during
the mandate period. There is no question that in order to
understand,for example, the newly independent governments reaction
to the Shifta War (notto mention injustices related to land, state
abuse of power, corruption, and many ofthe other violations
discussed in this Report), one needs to understand the policiesand
actions of the colonial government, as well as the legal,
political, and economicstructures they established and bequeathed
to the newly independent government.This general political overview
is then supplemented by a description of the historyof the state
security agencies. While other agencies of the state were
responsible forhistorical injustices and gross violations of human
rights during the mandate period (seee.g. Volume 2B which focuses
on land, economic crimes, violations of socio-economicrights, and
corruption), the security agencies were both primarily responsible
for manyof the acts of commission discussed in this volume, as well
as the acts of omission (thefailure to provide security) that
allowed many of the violations committed by non-stateactors to
occur.The next chapter focuses on the major armed conflict (in this
case a non-internationalarmed conflict) within the Commissions
mandate, the Shifta War. As the definingmoment of the independence
of the nation, the Shifta War acts as a bridge from theviolations
committed by the colonial power prior to independence and the
violationscommitted by the newly independent government. The Shifta
War had a profoundimpact on the early development of the state, the
effects of which are still being felttoday, not least by the
survivors and their descendants in the north eastern part of
thecountry.The remaining chapters are organized by class of
violations. Unlawful killings and enforceddisappearances are
divided into three separate parts: massacres, political
assassinations,and extra judicial killings. Detention, torture and
ill treatment were unfortunatelypresent during all periods of
Kenyan history. While the infamous Nyayo House torturechamber is
often the first thing that one thinks of with respect to the Kenyan
governmentand torture, this chapter illustrates how prevalent
illegal detention, torture, and othersimilar treatment continues to
plague the nation. Finally, the chapter on sexual violence
- 9. vVolume IIAREPORT OF THE TRUTH, JUSTICE AND RECONCILIATION
COMMISSIONdescribes a particular form of violence committed against
men and women, boys andgirls. It is only in the last three decades
that the international community has becomemore aware of the use of
sexual violence as a systematic tool of oppression and
armedconflict. Sexual violence was prevalent during the colonial
period, and unfortunatelycontinued unabated through independence to
the present day.Investigations related to some of the events in
this chapter e.g. the Wagalla Massacre;the assassinations of, among
others, Tom Mboya, J.M. Kariuki, and Robert Ouko aresome of the
most anticipated by many Kenyans. The report of the Task Force
reportedthe high interest in providing truth and justice with
respect to these violations, andthe experience of the Commission
was the same. The Commission was able to unearthsome new
information regarding some of these events. But there is no
question thatthe Commission was unable to provide clear answers to
all of the questions raised aboutthese injustices. A major cause of
this inability was the difficulty the Commission facedin securing
documents and the cooperation of witnesses and other interested
partieswith respect to these events. It is our hope that the
information provided here willre-emphasize the importance of the
government coming clean and releasing all of theinformation within
its possession with respect to these and other historical
injustices.
- 10. viVolume IIAREPORT OF THE TRUTH, JUSTICE AND RECONCILIATION
COMMISSIONList of AbbreviationsADC Agricultural Development
ConsultAFC African Finance CorporationAP Administrative PoliceADCU
Air Defence Control UnitASTU Anti- Stock Theft UnitAMREF African
Medical and Research FoundationBBC British Broadcasting
CorporationCBK Central Bank of KenyaCJPC Catholic Justice and Peace
CommissionCEO Chief Executive OfficerCEDAW Convention on the
Elimination of All Formsof Discrimination Against WomenCID Criminal
Investigation DepartmentCMS Church Missionary SocietyCOVAW
Coalition of Violence against WomenCAT Convention against Torture
and other Cruel,Inhuman or Degrading TreatmentDSC District Security
CommitteeDNA Deoxyribonucleic AcidDO District OfficerDSBO District
Special Branch OfficerDTM December Twelfth MovementEAR East African
RiflesEATC East Africa Transport CorpsFAO Food and Agricultural
OrganitzationFERA February 18 Revolution ArmyFEM February
Eighteenth MovementFGM Female Genital MutilationGSU General Service
UnitGVRC Gender Violence Recovery CentreICTY International Criminal
Tribunal for the formerYugoslaviaIBEAC Imperial British East Africa
CompanyIMLU Independent Medico-Legal UnitILO International Labour
OrganizationIDPs Internally Displaced PersonsKAR Kings African
RiflesKR Kenya RiflesKANU Kenya African National UnionKDF Kenya
Defence ForcesKPU Kenya Peoples UnionKCB Kenya Commercial BankKADU
Kenya African Democratic UnionKGGCU Kenya Grain Growers Cooperative
UnionKPTC Kenya Posts and TelecommunicationsCorporationKAF Kenya
Air ForceKHRC Kenya Human Rights CommissionKNHRC Kenya National
Human Rights CommissionKNH Kenyatta National HospitalKMC Kenya Meat
CommissionKBC Kenya Broadcasting CorporationKWS Kenya Wildlife
ServiceKIC Kenya Intelligence CommitteeKDHS Kenya Demographic and
Health SurveyKPLC Kenya Power and Lighting CompanyKNUT Kenya
National Union of TeachersMoU Memorandum of UnderstandingMoH
Ministry of HealthMMB Meat Market Board
- 11. viiVolume IIAREPORT OF THE TRUTH, JUSTICE AND
RECONCILIATION COMMISSIONMP Member of ParliamentNCPB National
Cereals and Produce BoardNFD Northern Frontier DistrictNTZ Nyayo
Tea ZonesNBC Nyayo Bus CompanyNTZDC Nyayo Tea Zones Development
CorporationNARC National Alliance Rainbow CoalitionNPPPP Northern
province Peoples Progressive PartyNFDLA Northern Frontier District
Liberation ArmyNSC National Security CouncilNSIS National Security
intelligence ServiceNEP North Eastern ProvinceOLF Oromo Liberation
ForceODM Orange Democratic MovementOCS Officer Commanding
StationOCPD Officer Commanding Police DivisionOB Occurrence
BookPPSA Preservation of Public Security ActPSBO Provincial Special
Branch OfficerPPO Provincial Police OfficerPCIO Provincial Criminal
Investigations OfficerPNU Party of National UnityPRCT People for
Rural Change TrustPEV Post Election ViolencePC Provincial
CommissionerPSC Provincial Security CommitteeRHA Royal Horse
ArtillerySDO Special District OrdinanceSLDF Sabaot Lands Defence
ForceSSAs State Security AgentsSYL Somali Youth LeagueSOA Sexual
Offences ActTJRC Truth Justice and Reconciliation CommissionUAE
United Arab EmiratesUNDP United Nations Development ProgrammeUNESCO
United Nations Educational, Scientific andCultural OrganizationUPI
United Press InternationalUN United NationsVOK Voice of KenyaVOCA
Victims of Coup Attempt
- 12. viiiVolume I Chapter ONEVolume IIAviii REPORT OF THE TRUTH,
JUSTICE AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION
- 13. 1CHAPTERONEHistorical Context:A General
OverviewIntroduction1. On the eve of Kenyas Independence Day, the
Duke of Edinburgh said the followingto a people that about to
become free citizens of a new African nation:Tomorrow a new volume
will be opened and an independent Kenya will start to writea new
story. The pages of this volume are still blank and empty; the
story that is to bewritten on them is still in the hands and minds
of all the people of Kenya.12. The next day, 12 December 1963,
independence was greeted with jubilation andcelebrations across the
entire country. Immediately, Kenyans began to write thecountrys
story. Almost 50 years later, Kenyas story is a success story as it
is a sad story.It is a success story because, despite the many
challenges that have bedeviled thecountry, Kenyans have made huge
strides in achieving the goals that had been setforth at
independence, chief amongst which is the eradication of poverty,
diseasesand illiteracy. It is a sad story because it is burdened by
ghastly accounts of grossviolations of human rights and historical
injustices. It is mainly this sad part of Kenyasstory that the
Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission was tasked to
examineand document.1 Daily Nation, 13 December 1963.
- 14. 2Volume IIA Chapter ONEREPORT OF THE TRUTH, JUSTICE AND
RECONCILIATION COMMISSION3. This Chapter locates gross human rights
violations and injustices that occurred inKenya between 1963 and
2008 in their historical context. It provides a compositeaccount or
historical overview of the dynamics and factors that nurtured
anenvironment under which these violations and injustices thrived.
The overview ispresented in a chronological order beginning from
1895 when the Kenyan statewas created to 2008 when it was at the
edge of disintegration.4. For analytical purposes, the historical
period has been divided into four distinctepochs. These epochs
correspond with the four political administrations thatgoverned the
country during the Commissions mandate period: British colonial era
(1895 to 1963); President Jomo Kenyattas era (1963 to 1978);
President Daniel arap Mois era (1978 to 2002); and President Mwai
Kibakis era (2002 to 2008).5. As a historical overview, the scope
and focus of this Chapter is limited to describingand explaining
key events in the political realm during these four epochs. Assuch,
it does not describe any particular violations and injustices in
great detail.Comprehensive descriptions of such violations and
injustices are covered insubsequent chapters and volumes of the
Report.6. In analysing these key events and their historical
perspective, it is argued that theviolence generated in the context
of colonialism was perpetuated in the post-colonial period through
unaltered colonial structures, institutions and mentalities.Thus
Kenyas relatively long history of human rights violations cannot be
explainednor understood adequately without unravelling the countrys
colonial experience.Kenyas story is a success story as it is a sad
story. It is asuccess story because, despite the many challenges
thathave bedeviled the country, Kenyans have made hugestrides in
achieving the goals that had been set forth atindependence, chief
amongst which is the eradicationof poverty, diseases and
illiteracy. It is a sad storybecause it is burdened by ghastly
accounts of grossviolations of human rights and historical
injustices.
- 15. 3Volume IIA Chapter ONEREPORT OF THE TRUTH, JUSTICE AND
RECONCILIATION COMMISSIONBritish Colonial Era7. The creation of
modern day Kenya dates back to 1885 when European imperialpowers
assembled in Berlin, Germany, to partition Africa among themselves.
At theBerlin conference where these powers met, it was resolved
that those interested inAfrica would declare their spheres of
influence then follow such declaration witheffective control of the
new territories. What followed was the partition of Africa,with
little knowledge of the continent, especially its hinterlands. In
the end, someroughly 10,000 African polities were amalgamated into
40 European colonies andprotectorates. These colonies and
protectorates would later provide the basis forthe modern
nation-states of Africa including Kenya. Some African societies
with alot in common were rent apart while others with nothing or
little networks werefused together8. To establish and consolidate
their rule in Kenya, the British employed violenceon a locally
unprecedented scale and with unprecedented singleness ofmind and
purpose. The colonial violence was characterized by
unimaginablehuman rights violations and injustices which reached
its zenith in the 1950s,a time when communities in Kenya staged a
fight for political and economicself-determination.9. The British,
having earmarked Kenya for control, moved with speed to
implementthe Berlin resolution. Within two years, the British East
African Protectorate(where most of the present Kenya falls) had
been declared. Henceforth, most lawsapplicable in England and its
hinter territories such as India would be exerted inthe so-called
protectorate.Rule by proxy: Imperial British East Africa Company10.
Initially, the British chose to administer its newly-acquired
territory through aproxy: the Imperial British East Africa Company
(IBEAC). The IBEAC was granteda charter in 1888 to administer and
develop the territory as it saw fit. It used thisauthority to
exploit natural resources such as ivory. The charter was exclusive
butthe company faced numerous challenges in establishing its
authority in Kenya.Its agents have been described as alcoholics who
failed to establish workingrelationships with the local populations
with whom they were supposed totrade.2Moreover, the IBEAC lacked
the finances to develop infrastructure andwas therefore unable to
make the investments necessary to properly advance itsEast African
presence.2 B Berman Control and Crisis in Colonial Kenya: The
Dialectic of Domination (1990) 50.
- 16. 4Volume IIA Chapter ONEREPORT OF THE TRUTH, JUSTICE AND
RECONCILIATION COMMISSION11. In early 1890, the company started
constructing the Mackinnon-Sclater road, whichwas actually little
more than cattle-track designed to link Mombasa and Busia.The
company also ordered a large steamship, the SS William Mackinnon,
in thehope that it would crisscross Lake Victoria and further
stimulate commerce in theregion. Neither of these projects
succeeded. Indeed the failure of these projects,coupled with high
profile political disputes and wrangles in Uganda,
eventuallyconvinced the British government that the IBEACs charter
should be cancelled.Consequently, the charter was cancelled on
1July 1895. Administrative control ofthe territory passed from the
IBEAC to the British Foreign Office. In effect, Kenyabecame a
British protectorate.From British Protectorate to British Colony12.
The declaration of Kenya as a British protectorate was primarily a
diplomaticgesture, aimed at the Sultan of Zanzibar, Germany, Italy
and Ethiopia. It was adeclaration of exclusion of these powers from
this political space that ran fromJubaland to Lake Naivasha.3This
diplomatic gesture proved a major obstacle tothe British settlers
and the British Colonial Office in their attempts to secure
cheaploans under the Colonial Stock Act of 1900 for the development
of the protectorate.The Colonial Stock Act of 1900 only benefitted
British colonies and dominions andnot protectorates.4The crown
agents, therefore, advised the colonial office to lookinto ways to
change the status of the protectorate to a colony.13. It was this
desire to change the status of the protectorate to a colony that
exposedthe intricate political arrangement of the territory. It
became clear that
theincorporationofthe10-milecoastalstripintothecolonywouldarouseinternationalconflicts
from other countries that had entered into trading agreements with
theSultan of Zanzibar.14. The sultanate of Zanzibar for instance
had signed treaties with various states:United States of America in
1833, France in 1862, and Germany in 1886. Thesetreaties recognized
the sovereignty of the Sultan. Of particular importance wasthe 1886
Anglo-Germany treaty which internationally recognized the
10-milecoastal strip as the rightful dominion of the sultanate of
Zanzibar.5As a result ofmanipulation, persuasions and coercions,
the Sultan accepted the proposal andacknowledged that he:3
Atieno-Odhiambo Mugos Prophesy in W Ochieng (ed) Kenya: The Making
of a Nation. A Hundred Years of Kenyas History 1895-1995 (2000) 7.4
M John The Ten Mile Coastal Strip: An Examination of the Intricate
Nature of Land Question at Kenyan Coast (2011) InternationalJournal
of Humanities and Social Sciences 177.5 As above.
- 17. 5Volume IIA Chapter ONEREPORT OF THE TRUTH, JUSTICE AND
RECONCILIATION COMMISSIONwas the child of His Majestys government
and was always ready loyally to carry out itswishes. If His
Majestys government considered the alienation desirable, he was
quiteprepared to agree to it.615. Thus, in July 1920, the territory
of the East Africa Protectorate was annexed tothe British Crown
under the new name Kenya Colony. From then onwards, theformer
protectorate became the Kenya Colony. The British colonialists
imposedthe state structure on collections of ethno-political
communities in Kenya thathistorically lacked the inter-communal
coherence. The communities which livedindependently from each other
were forced to live together in newly-createdcolonial Kenya7. This
imagined or invented political community superimposed intomuch
older alignments and loyalties has continue to be a fault line of
ethnic socio-political mobilization and conflict till
today.Resistance and military expeditions16. The conquest of state
and territory for British settlement and exploitation in Kenyawas
achieved through colonial violence.8To force Africans into
submission, thecolonial administration in Kenya conducted punitive
expeditions in the 1890sagainst what they called recalcitrant
tribes. There were military expeditionsagainst the Nandi in 1901,
1905, and 1906, against the Embu in 1905, against theAbagusii in
1904, 1908, and 1914, against the Kipsigis in 1905 and against
theAbagishu and Kabras in 1907.17. Even the angels within the
British administration who recommended peacefulmethods of expansion
discovered that the majority of the African people werenot willing
to forgo their independence without some military show.9Sir
ArthurHardinge, the first protectorate commissioner, could even
remark: Thesepeople must learn submission by bullets - its the only
school; after that youmay begin more modern and humane methods of
education.10The aftermathof such violence was destruction of
property, rape, torture, death, and destructionto property.6 As
above.7 N Peter Colonialism and Its Legacies in Kenya, Lecturer
Delivered During Fulbright Hays Group Project, July 6thto August
6th2009, Moi University-Kenya; O Bethwell Introduction in W Ochieng
(ed) Kenya: The Making of a Nation. A Hundred Years ofKenyas
History 1895-1995 (2000).8 This study borrows from Tirop Simateis
Work Colonial Violence, Postcolonial Violations: Violence,
Landscape and Memory inKenyan Fiction. Here colonial violence is
understood to mean relationships, processes, and conditions that
attended the practiceof colonialism in Kenya and that violated the
physical, social, and/or psychological integrity of the colonized
while similarly impactingon the colonizer.9W Ochieng A History of
Kenya (1985) 89-9010 For details se J Lonsdale The conquest state,
1895-1904 in O William (ed) (1989) A Modern History of Kenya,
1895-1980(1989) 11.
- 18. 6Volume IIA Chapter ONEREPORT OF THE TRUTH, JUSTICE AND
RECONCILIATION COMMISSION18. Having been appointed as the first
commissioner, Sir Hardinge later realizedthe need to convert the
external, costly and destructive force of conquest intointernal,
negotiable and productive power.11In order to set up an
administrativeand judicial system, Hardinge fell back on the IBEAC
administrators, retainingpeople like Charles Hobley and Martin the
Maltese. He proceeded to divide theland into provinces and
districts. And since administrative boundaries tendedto be based on
ethnic or linguistic units, they froze cultural development
andpopulation mobility at a certain point in time, thus fossilizing
situations whichhad been fluid.12But more importantly, the
administrative creativity of Hobleywitnessed the planting of seeds
for ethnic hatred as communities started toestablish ownership of
their territories to the exclusion of others. Hardinge:had low
opinion of the Africans, whom he regarded as barbarous races and he
thereforehoped to rely on the Arabs and to a lesser extent, the
Swahili people who accordingto him were a civilizing influence for
local administration. The process of dividing theKenyan people into
primitive tribes and civilized tribes had begun and intensified
asthe administration spread into the interior13.19. Sir Arthur
Hardinge was succeeded as a commissioner by Sir Charles Elliot,who
had an even lower opinion of the Africans. His first task was to
consolidateBritish control within the protectorate and to formulate
administrative policiesand structures suitable for white settlers.
Unlike his predecessor, his actionswitnessed not only grave
injustices against Africans, but also widespreadfighting between
different African tribes in the second half of the 19th Century.The
tribal units thus created and defined were encased in district
boundaries,but many of these classifications were arbitrary in some
cases dividing groupsmore sharply than they had been previously
while in others they combinedgroups that were originally distinct.
As Ogot aptly concludes, new and biggertribes such as the Luhya,
the Kalenjin, and the Mijikenda had been invented by the Africans
themselves to safeguard the interest and welfare of smaller
unitsagainst possible domination by the larger groups. This kind of
balancing actionhas tended to intensify ethnic chauvinism and the
struggle for the capture of thepost-colonial state14.20. On the
ground, the British sought to establish alliances and loyalties of
Africans.In so doing, the British sought to manipulate, subvert and
at times circumventthe existing indigenous systems of authority. As
Atieno-Odhiambo explains:11 As above.12 Ogot Bethwell (2000:21)
Boundary Changes and the Invention of Tribes in William Ochieng
(ed) Kenya: The Making of a Nation.A Hundred Years of Kenyas
History 1895-1995 (2000) 21.13 As above.14 As above.
- 19. 7Volume IIA Chapter ONEREPORT OF THE TRUTH, JUSTICE AND
RECONCILIATION COMMISSIONthe politics of this time were at one
level the politics of conquest, but the moreenduring heritage was
the politics of manipulation.15Such were evident as theBritish
manipulated leaders of the Maasai namely Olonona, Ole Galisha,
andOle Masikonti. The British too manipulated the power equation in
Luhya landby inventing empires for Mumia in Wanga and for Sudi
Namachanja in Bukusu.This was followed by imposition of new leaders
such as Karuri wa Gakure andKinyanjui wa Gathirimu among the
Kikuyu. In the coastal region, the Sultan ofZanzibar was
manipulated by Sir Edward Northey and the British residents
inZanzibar to allow annexation of his 10-mile coastal strip to be
part of the newcolony.1621. Practically everywhere in Kenya, as was
the case in the rest of Africa, theimposition of colonial rule was
resisted. Such resistance inevitably provokedmilitary retaliation
from the colonial powers. Better armed and employing crackshot
mercenaries, colonial powers imposed their rule by violence and/or
militaryexpeditions. This was particularly the case between 1895
and 1914; a phase ofpacification of recalcitrant tribes fighting
for the preservation of their political,cultural and economic
independence.17The period was thus characterized byan unimaginable
degree of human rights abuses against defenceless Africans.The
military expeditions were accompanied by crimes such as theft,
rape,death and destruction of property by the colonial soldiers or
their associates.Such actions defy the view that the British
colonialist used humane andgentle methods to impose their rule in
Kenya.1822. Examples abound of how the British used brutal force to
impose its rule. On theKenya coast, Swahili chiefs like Mbaruk were
famous for resisting alien rule. Whenthe British took over Kenya,
the Mazrui chiefs resisted British rule as they hadrepeatedly done
in the past. They knew that they could not win pitched
battlesagainst an enemy who was far more powerful and better armed
than they. Sothey concentrated on fighting limited engagements and
making lightning attacks,and they sustained a fairly successful
resistance movement for some time. But theBritish were in Kenya to
stay. They therefore imported Baluchistan regiments fromIndia to
crush the African resisters.19Mbaruk, the leader of the resistance,
fled toTanzania, only to fall into German hands.15 Atieno-Odhiambo
(2000:7) Mugos Prophesy in William Ochieng (ed) (2000) Kenya: The
Making of a Nation. A Hundred Years ofKenyas History 1895-1995.
Maseno University: Institute of Research and Postgraduate
Studies.16 Mwaruvie John op.cit, pg 17717 S Kiwanuka From
Colonialism to Independence: Reappraisal of Colonial Policies and
African Reactions 1870- 1960 (1973) 20.18 As above, 21.19 As above,
21.
- 20. 8Volume IIA Chapter ONEREPORT OF THE TRUTH, JUSTICE AND
RECONCILIATION COMMISSION23.
Heandfourotherleadersdiedinexile.20ThesamefatebefelltheOgadenSomaliin1889,when
they too attempted to resist British rule. Their opposition to
British colonialismforced the British to resort to more violent
methods. Convinced that the besttutorstomake the Ogaden see reason
were bayonets and machine guns, the British in
KenyamovedagainsttheOgadenwiththehelpofIndianregimentsin1889.Ogadenresisterswere
smashed and hundreds of their cattle confiscated by the
British.21Similarly, whileforcing theTaita to submission, Captain
Robert H. Nelson remarked:In a few minutes the men cleared out,
leaving some fifteen dead on the spot and I haveno doubt that a
good many received fatal wounds. I then marched on to the village
ofthe men who had been fighting us, burning the surrounding
villages and seizing thesheep and goats belonging to them.2224. In
the Mount Kenya region, Colonel Richard Meinertzhagen also led many
bloodyexpeditions between 1902 and 1906, in which many Kikuyu and
Tharaka peoplewere killed and about 11,000 head of stock
captured.25. British soldiers, porters and other associates made
more injustices in westernKenya, particularly among the Kisii and
the Luo people. When a message arrivedin 1905 of the Kisii revolt,
a detachment of a hundred African Police under RobertForan and a
company of the Third Kings African Rifles (KAR) under
captainJenkins were immediately dispatched to quell it. This is how
Foran described theencounter:The machine gun was kept in action so
long during this sharp engagement that itbecame almost red-hot to
the touch. Before then they left several hundreds deadand wounded
spearsmen heaped up outside the square of bayonets. This was not
somuch a battle as a massacre, but wholly unavoidable under the
circumstances. It was anurgent case of decimating the determined
attack or else being completely wiped out bythe Kisii
warriors.2326. In 1908, the British organized another expedition,
when the Kisii ambushed andspeared a colonial administrator,
Northcote. One of the relief patrols headed by Foransent to
Northcotes aid explained that the African Rifles were putting in
somestrenuous work burning villages, devastating standing crops,
capturing livestockand hunting down the bolting warriors24A series
of telegrams conveyed the resultsof the expeditions to the colonial
office in London. On 1 February 1908, a telegramreceived by the
colonial office read in part:Result of operations in Kisii to 28
January -20 Ochieng William A History of Kenya (1985) 90.21 As
above.22 As above, 91.23 For details see W Audrey Rural Rebels: A
Study of Two Protest Movements in Kenya (1977) 25.24 As above.
- 21. 9Volume IIA Chapter ONEREPORT OF THE TRUTH, JUSTICE AND
RECONCILIATION
COMMISSIONcattlecaptured5,636sheepandgoats3,281and100Kisiikilled.Twodayslateranothertelegram
reported the number of Kisii dead had risen to
160.25Manipulations27. The British colonialistsinjustices against
the people of Kenya were not only limitedto the 1895-1914 military
expeditions. British administrators and functionariesused
manipulation, colonial laws and policies, and continued to use
violenceand harassment to appropriate both human and natural
resources from Kenyathroughout the colonial period.28.
Manipulations were more evident in the signing of treaties
involving Britishadministrators and African leaders to create
frontiers for European settlers fromBritain, Canada, South Africa,
Australia and New Zealand. One such treaty whicheasily comes to
mind was the first and the second Maasai Treaty of 1904 and
1911.Thefirsttreaty,signedwithouttheknowledgeoftheMaasaipeople,agreedtomovethe
Naivasha Maasai en masse to the Laikipia plateau, together with
their cattle.Such a move enabled white settlers to occupy the whole
of the Rift, Zedong andGong. But even this grave injustice
committed against the Maasai by the colonialgovernment did not
satisfy the appetite of the white settlers for more productiveland.
They pressed that the Laikipia Maasai should be moved again to a
southernreserve so that the Maasai tribe could be together in a
United Maasai Reserve. On4 April 1911, the second Maasai agreement
was signed according to which thenorthern Maasai had agreed to move
to the southern reserve. Subsequently, thenew Maasailand was
declared a closed area and the policy of reservation for thenew
tribe continued throughout the colonial period. As such, attempts
to furtheralienate Maasai land during the post-colonial period
engendered strong ethnicfeeling among the people.2629. It was not
only the Maasai who suffered colonial manipulations, the same
wasthe case in the Kiambu-Thika area from 1903 to 1908, central
Rift Valley 1904to 1914, and lastly in the Kericho to Nyeri/Nanyuki
areas through the soldiersettlement schemes following the First
World War. This last scheme left theKipsigis without Kimulot, the
Nandi without Kipkarren valley, the Sabaot withoutthe Trans-Nzoia
pastures and made the Samburu, Meru and Kikuyu squatters inthe
Timau-Nanyuki areas.2725 As above.26 For details, see O Bethwell
Boundary Changes and the Invention of Tribes in William Ochieng
(ed) Kenya: The Making of aNation. A Hundred Years of Kenyas
History 1895-1995 (2000) 21; Ochieng William A History of Kenya
(1985) 90.27 Atieno-Odhiambo (n 3 above) 8.
- 22. 10Volume IIA Chapter ONEREPORT OF THE TRUTH, JUSTICE AND
RECONCILIATION COMMISSIONChiefs and forced labour30. British
officials, with African submission to their authority after
pacification, werepressed by the reluctant metropolitan taxpayers
to find means of making thecolonial territories self-financing.
They achieved this through the creation ofthe office of the chief
as agents of local administration and tasked them withthe
responsibility for tax collection, maintenance of law and order and
moreimportantly to supply cheap labour for public and settler
requirements. It wasthe assignment of these tasks which put the
colonial chiefs at the forefront in theabuse of human rights.31.
During the mobilization of labour for Europeans, chiefs were
empowered by aseries of labour laws to call out any number of
able-bodied persons to labourwithout pay on public works28. This
mandate was extended at the outbreak ofWorld War 1 to finding
able-bodied manpower for the First World War, a war thatcaused the
death of over 50,000 Africans and left thousands more
wounded.Astonishingly, most Africans who were recruited into the
war had very limitedunderstanding of why the Europeans were
fighting. In 1919 the Northey Circularspelt out its extension to
embrace the directive on African labourers to work forsettlers at
very low wages. These aspects of chief authority were backed by
force.Chiefs had retainers who in the process of tax collection,
punitively confiscatedpeoples animals and produce, seized their
women and routinely whipped theyoung men.29Such coercive chiefly
authority, supervised and approved by thedistrict commissioners,
brought in the intense hatred of the system, even in
thepost-colonial period.32. In his 1936 report on Kenyas finances,
Sir Alan Pim identified two potentialopportunities for corruption -
the counting of huts for hut tax, and the enforcementof tax payment
by chiefs. The hut counters responsible for determining tax
liabilitywere, certainly not of a type likely to be exempt from the
temptation to make alittle money; they used both influence and
bribery to exempt some who wererequired to pay and to extort taxes
from those who were not. Additionally, due tolimited staffing at
the district level, collection was largely enforced by employingthe
services of the chiefs or headmen with their various satellites.
This unavoidablygave opportunities for the abuse of authority,
either in the direction of usingimproper means to enforce payment,
or in connection with applications forexemption.28 Ochieng William
A History of Kenya. Nairobi (1985) 16.29 Atieno-Odhiambo (n 3
above) 8
- 23. 11Volume IIA Chapter ONEREPORT OF THE TRUTH, JUSTICE AND
RECONCILIATION COMMISSIONLand alienation33. After the First World
War, the colonial administration was keen at increasing
thenumberofsettlers,increasingsettlerlandholdingandboostingsettleragricultureby
providing them with good infrastructural services. Needless to say,
the landalienated to the settlers was carved out of the most
fertile regions, land whichwas inhabited by the Africans.
Therefore, the main injustice on Africans afterthe First World War
focused on land alienation and the creation of the
Africansquatters, both in Central and the Rift Valley regions of
colonial Kenya.34. In enforcing this injustice, the colonial
administration introduced the CrownLands Ordinance of 1915,30which
declared all waste and unoccupied land inthe protectorate Crown
Land subject to the governors powers of alienation. Inthe British
imagination, such land included any empty land or any land
vacatedby a native.31The protectorate administration gave no
cognizance to customarytenure systems, and by 1914 nearly 5 million
acres (2 million hectares) of land hadbeen taken away from Kenyan
Africans, mostly from the Kikuyu, Maasai and Nandicommunities. It
created the reserves fornativesand located them away from
areasscheduled for European settlement. These developments
witnessed the creationof what Mamdani refers to as citizen
(settlers) and subject (Africans) a dualsystem of land tenure and
land administration to consolidate colonial rule.3235. Colonial
appropriation of land and alienation of a large section of the
African peopleproduced a situation where by 1930, probably more
than 15 000 Kiambu Kikuyu hadlost their land ownership, while a
similar number lost their communal or tenant atwill use of land.
Thus, approximately 30,000 Kikuyu had lost land rights in
Kiambudistrict alone. About half that number lost land rights in
Muranga and Nyeri districts.The total loss of land among the Kikuyu
could therefore involve well over 45,000people. Annual reports for
the period indicate that there were 41,156 Africans
inEuropean-settled areas of Nakuru and Naivasha and these would
seem to supportour estimates, given that the majority of Africans
in these areas were Kikuyu.3336. Other troublesome communities,
like the Talai, were in 1934 forcibly evicted fromKericho/Nandi
areas on accusations of being extortionist and sent to open jails
inLambwe, a tsetse-flies infected area in a valley where sleeping
sickness was rampant.30S Wanjala Essays on Land Law: The Reform
Debate in Kenya (2002).31 Syagga Paul (undated) Public Land,
Historical Land Injustices and the New Constitution. Society for
International Development(SID): Constitution Working Paper No. 932M
Mamdani Citizen and Subject: Contemporary Africa and the Legacy of
the Late Colonialism (1996).33 Alila Patrick Kinyanjui Kabiru, and
Wanjoyi Gatheru (Rural Landlessness in Kenya (1985) 2.
- 24. 12Volume IIA Chapter ONEREPORT OF THE TRUTH, JUSTICE AND
RECONCILIATION COMMISSIONIt was described as theValley of
Deathwhere 30 years earlier, 60 percent of Lambwevalley inhabitants
had been killed by diseases.3437. By 1945, there were about 203,000
people rendered squatters and labourers inEuropean farms, with
101,000 Kikuyu as resident labourers on European farms andabout
21,000 more employed mainly in the governments department of
forestry. Asubstantial number of Africans in the settled area were
not enumerated in this labourcensus and the total number of the
Kikuyu in the alienated area must have been alot more than 150,000
by 1945. No wonder, three years later, in 1948, the number ofKikuyu
recorded as living outside their native reserves was more than
294,000 ornearly 29 percent of the total Kikuyu population. Some of
them lived in towns or inother African reserves, but nearly all of
them had been effectively uprooted by theprocess of alienation.
They were outside their reserves in search of work and or newland
as a means of subsistence.3538. The creation of reserves in areas
deemed unsuitable for European settlement hadfar-reaching
implications, both for the natives and the colonial
administration.Underlying them was a policy of exploitation and
oppression against
thecolonizedpeopleaccentuatedbylandalienation,forcedmalelabourmobilization,overcrowding,
insecurity, stagnation in African agricultural production,
massivelandlessness and rapid land deterioration due to
fragmentation, over-stockingand soil erosion.39. In the long term,
the problems in the reserves led to unrest and eventually to
apolitical uprising the Mau Mau resistance movement that organized
aroundthe issue of foreign rule, land alienation and political and
economic inequality.36The colonial states answer to the unrest was
to initiate an ambitious project ofland tenure reform in the
reserves that would serve as a bulwark against ruralradicalism. The
colonial agronomists thought about the individualization of
landtenure was first contained in the less well-known JH Ingham
Report published in1950. However, the blueprint that was to destroy
the indigenous/communal accessto land was formulated by Roger
Swynnerton in what was to be known as the1954 Swynnerton Plan. The
architect of this plan argued persuasively in support
ofindividualization of tenure in Kenya as a pre-condition for
enhanced agriculturalproduction37.34 D Anderson Black Mischief:
Crime, Protest and Resistance in Colonial Kenya (1993) 36 The
Historical Journal 36, 851-87735 For details see: A Patrick et al
Rural Landlessness in Kenya (1985) 2.36S Okuro Land Reforms in
Kenya: The Place of Land Tribunals in Kombewa in Elisio Macamo ed.
Negotiating Modernity (2005).37 Studies have shown that those on
whose names land was registered as principal landholders-men,
assumed exclusive individualrights in given pieces of land at the
expense of women, widows and juniors whose rights to land remained
either secondary orusufruct.
- 25. 13Volume IIA Chapter ONEREPORT OF THE TRUTH, JUSTICE AND
RECONCILIATION COMMISSIONMau Mau War40. The Mau Mau war, from 1952
to 1955, marked the climax of African resistance toBritish colonial
rule in Kenya. It was a key event in Kenyas history. Recent
studiesby Caroline Elkins, David Anderson and Charles Hornsby have
demonstrated theextent of British atrocities hitherto undocumented
in Kenyan History.41. In contrast to the conventional notion that
the counter-insurgency was aimedat the Mau Mau militants, Elkins
recognizes that the British interned practicallythe entire Kikuyu
population as Mau Mau. Key to this was turning the
insurgencyinward, into a battle of Kikuyu militants against Kikuyu
loyalists, thereby turningMau Mau insurgency into civil war. The
turning point came on the night of 26March 1953, at Lari, which was
the site of two successive massacres, the first bythe Mau Mau and
the second by homeguards. During this massacre, Andersondescribes
how the Mau Mau militants herded Kikuyu men, women and childreninto
huts and set them on fire, hacking down with pangas anyone who
attemptedescape, before throwing them back into the burning huts.
The vast majority of the400 killed at Lari were women and
children.42. But even more importantly, the Mau Mau started to
target, less and less the settlerson the highlands or even less the
colonial power itself, but increasingly those theyperceived as
local beneficiaries of colonial power, turning neighbours and
relativesagainst each other in a rapidly brutalizing civil war.
This was not the only massacre;the colonial administration also
committed a similar massacre in Hola in 1959 inwhich 11 detainees
were clubbed to death, with 77 having permanent injuries.38The
submissions of Michael Gerard Sullivan, the colonial officer
in-charge of Holacamp to the commission investigating the death of
the detainees revealed the firminstructions from Compell, the
deputy commissioner of prisons, to torture the MauMau detainees by
denying them drinking water for a number of hours, weedingrice
fields with bare hands and use of batons on the non-cooperative
ones.3943. Elkins has indeed demonstrated the injustices meted on
the Mau Mau by the colonialpolice and the loyalist. For example she
argues that electric shock was widely used, aswell as cigarettes
and fire. Bottles (often broken), gun barrels, knives, snakes,
vermin,and hot eggs were thrust up mens rectums and womens vaginas.
The screeningteams whipped, shot, burned and mutilated Mau Mau
suspects, ostensibly to gatherintelligence for military operations
and as court evidence.38 M Wunyabari Mau Mau and Kenya: An Analysis
of a Peasant Revolt (1993).39 KNA, Documents related to the death
of 11 detainees at Hola camp in Kenya. Reference No. K967.62
- 26. 14Volume IIA Chapter ONEREPORT OF THE TRUTH, JUSTICE AND
RECONCILIATION COMMISSION44. Between 150,000 and 320,000 Africans
were detained for varying lengths of timein more than 50 detention
and work camps. The treatment in the camps, staffedby little
trained non-Kikuyu, loyalists and European settlers, was often
brutal. Theinformation about what was happening there was carefully
controlled and thecolonial office and the governor systematically
denied reports of mistreatment.Elkins extended descriptions of the
regime of torture, one is struck by itspredominantly sexual nature.
Male detainees were often sexually abusedthroughsodomy with foreign
objects, animals, and insects, cavity searches, the impositionof a
filthy toilet bucket-system, or forced penetrative sex. Women had
variousforeign objects thrust into their vaginas, and their breasts
squeezed and mutilatedwith pliers.Variations abounded, with sand,
pepper, banana leaves, flower bottles(often broken), gun barrels,
knives, snakes, vermin, and hot eggs being thrust upmens rectum and
womens vaginas. A common practice during interrogation wasto
squeeze testicles with pliers. Josiah Mwangi Kariuki (popularly
known as J.MKariuki) was detained in 14 detention camps between
1953 and 1960. In his bookMau Mau Detainee, he wrote that his
experience at Kwa Nyangwethu detentioncamp was the worst:Kwa
Nyangwethu was, however, particularly bad and was notorious not for
merebeatings, but for castration. I have seen with my own eyes that
Kongo Chuma whomI first met in Nakuru before he was detained and
who is now living at Kianga inEmbu district, has been castrated. He
had not been like this when he was in Nakurubut when we met in the
detention camp at Athi River he told me it has been done tohim by
the screeners at Kwa Nyangwethu. He also told me that bottles of
soda waterwere opened and pushed into the uterus of some women to
make them confess.Kongo said these things were done by the Africans
but the European officers knewwhat was going on.4045. The Mau Mau
fighters were also responsible for unspeakable atrocities. Contrary
toAfrican customs and values, they assaulted old people, women and
children. Thehorrors they practiced included decapitation and
general mutilation of civilians,torture before murder, bodies bound
up in sacks and dropped in wells, burningvictims alive, gouging out
of eyes and splitting open the stomachs of pregnantwomen41. Mau Mau
officially ended with the capture and execution of DedanKimathi,
the uprisings most senior leader in October 1956. While the figures
aredebatable, the Mau Mau are said to have caused the death of at
least 14,000Africans, 29 Asians and 95 Europeans.40 JM Mwangi Mau
Mau Detainee (2009) 30.41 O Bethwell Alan BRITAINS GULAG Histories
of the Hanged: Britains Dirty War in Kenya and the End of Empire.
ByDAVID ANDERSON. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 2005. Pp.
viii+406 (ISBN 0-297-84719-8). Britains Gulag:The Brutal End of
Empire in Kenya. By CAROLINE ELKINS (London: Jonathan Cape, 2005).
Pp. xiv+475". TheJournal of African History (Cambridge University
Press) 46: 493505.
- 27. 15Volume IIA Chapter ONEREPORT OF THE TRUTH, JUSTICE AND
RECONCILIATION COMMISSION46. To establish the root causes of Mau
Mau, the colonial administration appointedthe Corfield Tribunal,
which relied extensively on psychologist JC Carothersand in their
report recorded 11,503 Mau Mau dead. It was understandable thatthe
number was under-estimated to disguise the ferocity of the colonial
officeresponse to Mau Mau. A thousand were hanged upon being
convicted by courts,while more were killed by troops in the forest.
There were also extra-judicialexecutions by the colonial police and
homeguard units. Moreover, the beatingand torture of Kikuyu
suspects was commonplace, and the security forcesmurdered hundreds.
The Mau Mau war did not only mark the end of the Africanresistance
against colonial rule, but it was the climax of colonial atrocities
onAfricans suspected to be members of Mau Mau.47. In 1999, a few
former fighters calling themselves the Mau Mau Original
Groupannounced that they would attempt a 5billion claim against the
UK, on behalfof hundreds of thousands of Kenyans for ill-treatment
they said they sufferedduring the rebellion. In November 2002, the
Mau Mau Trust - a welfare groupfor former members of the movement -
announced it would attempt to sue theBritish government for
widespread human rights violations committed againstits members.
With the assistance of the Kenya Human Rights Commission, in2011,
the Mau Mau group succeeded in suing the British after a British
courtruled that the Kenyans could sue the British government for
their torture.48. After the Mau Mau War, the colonial government
not only relaxed the ban onthe formation of African political
parties, but also attempted to increase Africanrepresentation in
the colonial administration. The colonial administrationpermitted
the re-establishment of African district- based political parties
and/or associations and disallowed national organizations. The
first to be registeredwas the Nairobi District African Congress in
April 1956, with Mau Mau lawyerArgwings Kodhek as the president.
The other district-based associations thatemerged at this time were
the Mombasa African Democratic Union, the AfricanDistrict
Association, the Abagusii Association of South Nyanza District, the
SouthThere were also extra-judicial executions by the
colonialpolice and homeguard units. Moreover, the beating
andtorture of Kikuyu suspects was commonplace, and the
securityforces murdered hundreds.
- 28. 16Volume IIA Chapter ONEREPORT OF THE TRUTH, JUSTICE AND
RECONCILIATION COMMISSIONNyanza District African Political
Association, the Taita African Democratic Union,the Nakuru African
Progressive Party, the Nakuru District Congress, the
AbaluhyaPeoples Association and the Nyanza North African
Congress42.49. One of the legacies of these district-based
political associations was that the paceof political developments
among the various districts continued to be unevenand parochialism
rooted in ethnic loyalties was encouraged at the expense ofAfrican
unity.43It provided the foundation of alignment of political
orientation andethnicity. The other effect was the emergence of
local powerful figures that wouldresist attempts at political
centralization by colony wide political organization suchas the
Kenya African National Union (KANU).50. The process of increasing
African and other races representation into the
colonialadministration was initiated by the British Colonial
Secretary Oliver Lyttletonin 1954. In his advice to the
administration, he said it is prudent to have all theinhabitants of
the colony to share in the responsibility of government, albeit at
asubservient level. His advice resulted in the enactment of the
Lyttleton Constitutionin 1954, which put in place institutional
structures to curb anti-colonial revolts,establish a multi-racial
society and provide a timetable for independence. Butin reality it
asserted minority interests while the language of democracy
wasemployed to hoodwink the majority.44The War Council created by
the constitutionwas racially exclusive and emerged as the supreme
organ with powers to enactlegislation to deal with the Emergency
without reference to the legislative council.Even the Council of
Ministers was by and large in the hands of a handful of
settlers.The contradictions emanating from the dispensation of the
Lyttleton Constitutionculminated in protracted political struggle
in which Africans, Arabs and Asiansdemanded an all-inclusive
political process. The political crises after the 1957general
election witnessed the enactment of another constitution, the
LennnoxBoyd Constitution in 1956.51. While the Lennox Boyd
Constitution increased the number of African representativesin the
Legislative Council, it did not adequately address the Africans
grievances.However,itsharpeneddivisiveracialandethnicpoliticalintereststhatspilledoverintothe
1960 Lancaster House Constitutional Conference where a new
constitution wasnegotiated. Therefore the Lancaster House
conferences became a space for contestby various racial groups and
emerging political elites and commitment to democraticand social
change remained abstract.4542 Ogot Bethwell and Ochieng William
(eds) Decolonization and Independence in Kenya (1995) 52.43 As
above.44 For details see: Samwel Alfayo Nyanchoga et al
Constitutionalism and Democratisation in Kenya, 1945- 2007
(2008).45 As above.
- 29. 17Volume IIA Chapter ONEREPORT OF THE TRUTH, JUSTICE AND
RECONCILIATION COMMISSIONPresident Jomo Kenyattas Era52. On 12
December 1963, Kenya got independence from British rule with
JomoKenyatta as the Prime Minister. A year later, Kenya became a
Republic with JomoKenyatta as the President and Jaramogi Oginga
Odinga as the Vice President.Within a short period into
independence, gradually returned to the ways of thecolonial master.
The government and the ruling political party, Kenya
AfricanNational Union (KANU), not only retained repressive colonial
laws, but also becameincreasingly intolerant of political dissent
and opposition. Political assassinationsand arbitrary detentions
were turned into potent tools for silencing dissentingvoices and
ultimately for dismantling opposition political parties. For the
largerpart of Kenyattas reign Kenya was a de facto one-party
state.Official amnesia53.
TheattainmentofKenyaspoliticalindependenceonthe12December1963,withJomo
Kenyatta as the first Prime Minister, marked the culmination of 68
years ofanti-colonial struggles waged by Kenyan Africans to free
themselves from Britishdomination, oppression and exploitation.
However, in his independence speech,Jomo Kenyatta did not suggest
any substantial change in the colonial
structures.Thecolonialstatewouldremainintactdespitethefactthatthefightfornationalindependence
had been dominated by demands for social justice,
egalitarianreforms, participatory democracy, prosecution of those
who had committedmass killings and other forms of crimes during the
war of independence, andthe abolition of the colonial state and its
oppressive institutions.54. Also, in his independence speech, Jomo
Kenyatta never mentioned theheroism of the Mau Mau movement.46No
Mau Mau freedom songs weresung, no KLFA leaders was allowed to
speak during the historic day. Instead,Kenyatta asked the people to
forget the past to forgive and forget theatrocities committed
against them by the British and their Kenyan supportersduring the
war of independence47. He became no radical on nationalizationof
foreign-held assets including land and often remarked: I regard
titles as aprivate property and they must be respected I would not
like to feel thatmy shamba (smallholding) or house belongs to the
government. Titles mustbe respected and the right of the individual
safeguarded48. In this way, theKenyatta administration provided a
relief to the settler community that theirland will not be taken
away from them without compensation.46 The usage of KLFA to refer
to Mau Mau is rather problematic in literature. KLFA is not simply
another name for Mau Mau: it was thename that Dedan Kimathi used
for a coordinating body which he tried to set up for Mau Mau. It
was also the name of another militantgroup that sprang up briefly
in the spring of 1960; the group was broken up during a brief
operation from 26 March to 30 April47 Maina wa Kinyatti (2008:363)
History of Resistance in Kenya, 1884-2002 (2008) 63.48 For details
see Daniel Branch Kenya: Between Hope and Despair, 1963-2011
(2011)
- 30. 18Volume IIA Chapter ONEREPORT OF THE TRUTH, JUSTICE AND
RECONCILIATION COMMISSION55. The attainment of political
independence shadowed several tensions andcleavages which occupied
the new ruling elites prior to and immediately
afterindependence.49For example, the radicals represented by Oginga
Odinga andBildad Kaggia who favoured nationalization of foreign
owned corporations,seizing of white settler farms without
compensation and following more pro-Eastern foreign policy. Odinga
persuasively argued that I understand thatin communist countries
the emphasis was on food for all. If that was whatcommunism meant
then there was nothing wrong with that50. He as hissupporters opted
to look to Soviet Union, China and their allies for backing.On the
other hand, conservatives led by Jomo Kenyatta and Tom Mboya -
thenationalists who espoused a constitutionalist and reformist
approach andwere after independence concerned with the maintenance
of the coloniallegacy. As the struggle raged for control of the
state, decisions based on short-term expediency were interspersed
with fundamental directional choices.56. Kenya soon returned to a
command and control leadership model strikinglysimilar to that of
the colonial era. Decisions about development, money andmilitary
protection drove foreign relations, domestic policy and land
policy,which in turn drove greater centralization and a
conservative social andpolitical model that combined individual
accumulation with a partisan andinterventionist state.51The
struggle for power saw the abandonment of theMajimbo Constitution,
which conceded much autonomy to the regions for a defacto one party
state. The dissolution of the Kenya African Democratic Union(KADU)
was a critical moment, setting the stage for three decades of
single-party dictatorship and prioritisation of the maintenance of
public order by theKenyatta administration.Dealing with Mau Mau57.
Jomo Kenyatta took over power in a country which was already
polarized bythe Mau Mau issue over land and more
importantlyownership of the fight forindependence. The reason for
this was the expectation that those who foughtfor Uhuru
(independence) should exclusively eat the fruits of
independence52.This debate thrived even in the context of the
revelations that Kenya had manypowerful voices in the anti-colonial
movement. Indeed Bethwell Ogot hasdemonstrated the roles and
responsibilities of all the communities in Kenya, inanti-colonial
movements53. Therefore the first issue which Jomo Kenyatta hadto
deal with was the Mau Mau a movement whose main agenda revolved49
For details see: Hornsby Charles Kenya: A History Since
Independence (2012)50 For details see Branch (n 48 above) 36.
201151 As above.52 E Atieno Odhiambo Matunda Ya Uhuru, Fruits of
Independence: Seven Theses on Nationalism in Kenya in E Atieno
Odhiamboand John Lonsdale (eds) Mau Mau and Nationhood: Arms,
Authority and Narration (2003).53 O Bethwell Mau Mau and
Nationhood: Untold Story in ES Odhiambo and J Lonsdale (eds) Mau
Mau and Nationhood: Arms,Authority and Narration (2003).
- 31. 19Volume IIA Chapter ONEREPORT OF THE TRUTH, JUSTICE AND
RECONCILIATION COMMISSIONaround land and the colonial land
alienation among the Kikuyu, which hadcreated a special group of
Kikuyu without land54. Before independence,Kenyatta had pardoned
the remaining Mau Mau detainees in prison andissued an amnesty for
Mau Mau fighters to leave the forest and surrender theirweapons.
More than 2,000 did so in the first weeks after independence far
morethan the British had expected55. But after the amnesty for Mau
Mau expired inJanuary 1964, the government started treating the
remnants as criminals.58. By early 1965, most of the remaining Mau
Mau hard-core fighters had beencaptured and killed by the new
independent government. The Mau Mau whomade good their threat to
return to the forest under the slogan of Not yetUhuru, Baimungi,
were quickly executed. Kenyattas message in the 1960swas clear -
there would be nothing for free. In the 1970s, it was
politicallyimprudent to be called Mau Mau. Although on paper, Kenya
acknowledged therole Mau Mau had played in the struggle for
independence; his governmentpersistently downgraded its importance
and did nothing to reward the thosewho had suffered. Despite
President Kenyattas promise in 1964 that the landconfiscated during
the Emergency would be returned, nothing happened.59.
TheBritishremovedandhidmostrecordsofthewarontheeveofindependencetoprotect
loyalists from reprisals and themselves from demands for
compensationfor atrocities. Ex-Mau Mau were given no preferential
treatment in access to landand jobs.5660. The ex-Mau Mau fighters
were thus short-changed after independence. Evenwhen the settlement
schemes were initiated between 1963 and 1967, theMaasai
whosufferedthemostgotnothingandthe Kalenjin receivedsmall
areasaround Sotik and Nandi. The squatters were not any better in
their continueddemand for cultivatable land across the highlands.
Those living in the formerWhite Highlands were evicted. In the
majority of the settlement schemes inNakuru and Nyandarua, the
existing squatters were simply removed by force,with new claimants
chosen to occupy the plots. The situation of the landlessdid not
improve with the sale of larger farms under the willing buyer,
willingsellermodel. A decade after the implementation, one sixth of
the settler landswere found to have been sold intact to the
emerging African elite comprisingKenyatta, his wife, children and
close associates. These elites did not even needmuch money to buy
settler farms, as they were also able to raise loans fromgovernment
bodies such as the Agricultural Finance Corporation (AFC) andthe
Land and Agriculture Bank.5754 M Patrick The Land Question and the
Mau Mau today (2005) IFRA: Kenya Studies, IFRA ~ Les Cahiers, N
2855 The Times, 19thDecember 196356 Hornsby Charles (2012: 117)
Kenya: A History Since Independence. London I. B. Tauris57 As
above.
- 32. 20Volume IIA Chapter ONEREPORT OF THE TRUTH, JUSTICE AND
RECONCILIATION COMMISSIONShifta War61. After dealing with the Mau
Mau issue, the next issue that the emergentfragile state had to
deal with was the Shifta War. Before independence, theSomali had
maintained a constant attack on police posts and army camps
inSomali-inhabited regions. Two days after independence, the
Somalia stagedfive more incursions, forcing the government to
declare a state of emergencyon 25 December 1963. The government
became convinced that Somalia wastraining and providing bases for
up to 2,000 shifta (bandit) guerrillas. While theshifta used
guerrilla tactics, including hit-and-run attacks and mining of
roads,the Kenya government adopted British counter-insurgency
techniques usedduring the Mau Mau uprising, including the
establishment of collective villagessurrounded by barbed wire and
guarded by troops. There were widespreadbeatings and killings of
civilians and mass confiscation of livestock. As withthe Kikuyu in
1953 to 1955, every Somali was seen as a potential shifta
andtreated accordingly, although, there was no equivalent of the
detention camppipeline, and the loyalists were not so well
rewarded.62. The government used its ability to detain without
trial anyone it believedto be helping the shifta. No official death
figures were published for theconflict, which received little
international attention. The conflict establishedpatterns of
suspicion and hostility between ethnic Somali and other Kenyansthat
has endured for decades. Development in the colonial era in
NorthEastern where the Somali live had been non-existent and this
changed littleafter independence. The state treated the Kenyan
Somali as subjects ratherthan citizens and the region as a
military-ruled colony.Consolidation of power63. On 24 January 1964,
there was a strike by several hundreds of soldiers ofthe Kenya
Rifles 11thBattalion, based in Lanet near Nakuru. The mutineerswere
driven by disgruntlement over pay, working conditions, and fear
oftheir future under the KANU government which held on to British
expatriateofficers. With increasing internal tensions and external
threats, the Kenyattaregime became even more repressive after the
January 1964 mutiny. With noreference to the cabinet, Kenyatta
appealed for and received the support ofthe British Army units to
restore order without significant bloodshed.64. But to make an
example to mutineers, 43 soldiers were court-martialed, andthe
military court jailed 16 ring leaders for a total of 197 years. To
consolidatepower, the Kenyatta regime supported constitutional
amendments between1964 and 1969 whose objective were to destroy
democratic institutions while
- 33. 21Volume IIA Chapter ONEREPORT OF THE TRUTH, JUSTICE AND
RECONCILIATION COMMISSIONprotecting the KANU-led government and the
interests of the compradorclass.58Selected constitutional
amendments (1963-1969)The Constitution of Kenya (Amendment) Act No.
14 of 1965This Amendment Act reduced the threshold for amending the
Constitution from 90percent to 65 percent in Senate and 75 percent
to 65 percent in the National Assembly.It also increased the days
within which Parliament should approve a state of emergencyfrom 7
to 21 days. Importantly, it reduced the threshold for approval of
state ofemergency from 65 percent to a simple majorityThe
Constitution of Kenya (Amendment) Act No. 16 of 1966The Amendment
Act introduced the rule that a Member of Parliament would lose
hisseat in Parliament if he missed 8 sittings or was imprisoned for
a period of over sixmonths. This amendment was intended to deal
with KANU rebels and those who hadjoined KPU. The amendment also
increased the Presidents powers to rule by decree inNorth Eastern
Province.The Constitution of Kenya (Amendment) (No. 2) Act No. 17
of 1966 (Turn Coat
Rule)UnderthisAmendmentAct,aMemberofParliamentwouldbylawlosehisparliamentaryseat
of he defected to another political party. The amendment was meant
to deal withMembers of Parliament who had defected from KANU to
KPU.The Constitution of Kenya (Amendment) (No. 3) Act No. 18 of
1966This Amendment Act increased the period for National Assemblys
review of emergencyorders from 2 to 8 months. It permitted greater
and wider derogation powers offundamental rights and freedoms. It
also removed the provision calling for reasonablejustification for
such derogations. This amendment was intended to allow for
detentionof KPU members who had defected from KANU.The Constitution
of Kenya (Amendment) Act No. 13 of 1967This Amendment Act was
intended to clear doubt over section 42A which spelt out theTurn
Coat Rule. It backdated the effect of the Fifth Amendment to
1963.The Constitution of Kenya (Amendment) (No. 2) Act No. 16 of
1968Under this Amendment Act, independent candidates were barred
from participating inelections.The amendment also removed
parliamentary approval for state of emergencydeclaration.The
Constitution of Kenya (Amendment) Act No. 5 of 1969This amendment
Act consolidated all the constitutional amendments as at
February1969 thereby resulting in a revised Constitution of Kenya
in a single document whichwas declared to be the authentic
document.58 For details see: Samwel Alfayo Nyanchoga et al (2008)
Constitutionalism and Democratisation in Kenya, 1945- 2007.
CatholicUniversity of Eastern Africa
- 34. 22Volume IIA Chapter ONEREPORT OF THE TRUTH, JUSTICE AND
RECONCILIATION COMMISSION65. The polarization of the country
between the radicals and the conservativescontinued to remain a
threat which Kenyatta had to handle. The first attemptto deal with
this situation was the development of Sessional Paper Number 10of
1965, which was a mix of the socialist and capitalist models,
rejecting bothMarxism and laissez-faire capitalism, and stressing
African traditions, equity andsocial justice. Kenyatta made it
clear in his introduction to the paper that theintent was not to
stimulate discussions on Kenyas economic policy, but to endit.
However, Oginga Odinga and his camp instructed Pio Gama Pinto to
preparea competing paper to mobilize for the rejection of the
government sessionalpaper. But before Pinto could prepare the
parallel paper, he was murdered on24 February 1965 outside his home
in Nairobi by people believed to have beenauxiliaries loyal to
Kenyatta. The killing of Pinto marked the process of
politicalassassinations under the Kenyatta regime.66. The year
1966, marked the turning point in Kenyas political history
andwitnessed the introduction of the motion of confidence in the
president by TomMboya without the knowledge of Oginga Odinga, who
was then the leaderof government business. The year also saw the
holding of the KANU NationalDelegates Conference in Limuru, which
created a new position of eight newprovincial vice-presidents.
These actions forced Odinga and his supporters topursue the
constitutional opposition by forming a political party, the
KenyaPeoples Union (KPU). On 14 April 1966, Odinga resigned as
vice-president andtogether with his supporters joined KPU. In his
resignation statement, Odingaargued that he refused to be part of a
government ruled by undergroundmasters serving foreign interests,
and accused the Limuru Conference of beingrigged in favour of
Kenyatta and his allies. The Kenyatta regime also passed
thePreservation of Public Security Act in 1966, which provided the
state with widepowers for detention without trial and allowed
control of free movement, theimposition of curfews and press
censorship. The Act was used effectively from1966 to 1968 in
dealing with those perceived to be critical of the Kenyatta
regime,particularly in the jailing without trial of Odinga and KPU
supporters.67. Next was the assassination of Tom Mboya on 5 July
1969 in the current MoiAvenue.59As with Pintos death, the apparent
culprit was a petty crook withconnections to the intelligence
service who was charged with the murder on 21July the same year.
Facing a revolt from the Luo and the growing support forchange
among many Kenyans horrified by Mboyas assassination,
Kenyattasclosest allies reverted to their ethnic bailiwicks,
through oathing to force Kikuyuvoters to return sitting members of
parliament in the election.68. KPU MP Okelo-Odongo claimed that
those being oathed were stripped naked,tied with a rope around
their neck and forced to swear to fight the Luo and not59 Other
prominent leaders and academicians who died in politically
controversial circumstances included but were not limited
toArgwings Kodhek (1969) and Ronald Ngala (1972)
- 35. 23Volume IIA Chapter ONEREPORT OF THE TRUTH, JUSTICE AND
RECONCILIATION COMMISSIONto allow any other tribe to lead
Kenya.60The worst came on the 25 October1969, when Kenyatta visited
Kisumu to open the Russia-built Nyanza ProvincialGeneral Hospital.
The opening of this health facility coincided with the
KisumuDistrict sports day, with a huge number of students
attending. Odinga was notinvited, but he and his supporters came in
force shouting Dume (Bull, the partysymbol of KPU).69. In the
ensuing commotion, a full-scale riot erupted, the presidential
escortand the dreaded crack paramilitary General Service Unit (GSU
surroundedthe president, shot their way through the threatening
crowd and continuedshooting 25 kilometres outside the town. When
the dust settled, the KisumuMassacreof 1969 was complete, with many
shot dead, including school pupils,by the presidential security.
Virtually all the films of the incident was seizedand destroyed.
Odinga and his supporters were arrested and detained withouttrial
and KPU, the party associated with Odinga was banned. A curfew
wasimposed in Central Nyanza and Siaya and hundreds were
arrested.70. Although KPU was banned and its leaders arrested,
after 1969 Kenyattaslegitimacy and that of his government was still
being questioned by left-wing politicians. Kenyatta himself became
more intolerant of dissent and thecentralization of power around
him encouraged sycophancy, exploitationand the creation the
so-labeled Kiambu Mafia Josiah Mwangi Kariuki wasthe governments
most influential critic between 1970 and 1974. J.M Kariukicatalysed
the wishes of the poor, landless and those unhappy with the
directionthat Kenya was taking. It was Kariuki who coined the
phrasewe do not want a Kenya of ten millionaires and ten million
beggars. He was also at the forefrontof the fight against
corruption and the social policies of the government.
Asassistantministerfortourismandwildlife,hewasprobablyinvolvedinrevelationsabout
poaching and ivory smuggling.6171. Under a state orchestrated fear
on 3 March 1975, Maasai herdsmen discoveredJMs tortured and
mutilated corpse on the slopes of Ngong Hills near Nairobi.His
fingers had been cut off and his eyes gouged out before he was
shot. Thekillers had burnt his face with acid to prevent
identification of the body and hisfingerprints were gone. JMs death
also joined the long list of unresolved politicalassassinations
during the Kenyatta era. To respond to Kariukis murder and
torebuild his authority, the Kenyatta regime continued arresting
and jailing thosehe labelled troublesome MPs such Jean Marie
Seroney, Martin Shikuku, ChelagatMutai, Peter Kibisu, Mark Mwithaga
and George Anyona on dubious groundseven within the precincts of
Parliament Buildings. As Kenyatta departed fromthe political scene
with his death in Mombasa in August 1978, he left a handfulof
unaddressed issues including: corruption, tribalism, state
orchestratedrepression, political assassinations, and land
distribution policies.60 Okelo- Odongo East Africa Standard 12
August 1969.61 For details see Daniel Branch Kenya: Between Hope
and Despair, 1963-2011 (2011)
- 36. 24Volume IIA Chapter ONEREPORT OF THE TRUTH, JUSTICE AND
RECONCILIATION COMMISSIONPresident Daniel Arap Mois EraFollowing in
Kenyattas footsteps72. Daniel arap Moi assumed the presidency after
Kenyattas death in 1978.On assuming power, President Moi promised
that he would follow in
JomoKenyattasfootsteps.InDecember1978,PresidentMoireleasedallthe26politicaldetainees
across the ethnic spectrum, most of whom had been languishingin
jail for years (Shikuku, Seroney, Anyona, Koigi wa Wamwere, and
Ngugi waThiongo). He also reassured Kenyans that his administration
would not condonedrunkenness, tribalism, corruption and smuggling
problems which werealready deeply entrenched in Kenya under
President Kenyattas administration.This was partly a strategy
geared towards the achievement of specific objectives,namely, the
control of the state, the consolidation of power, the
legitimisationof his leadership and the broadening of his political
base and popular support.62President Moi was well aware of his own
underlying problems, especially the factthat he was from a minority
community. Leading the country to independencehad brought President
Kenyatta economic opportunities that had permittedhim to rule over
a period of prosperity.6373. President Mois first priority was to
secure his position and to weaken not onlyhis most vociferous
Kikuyu opponents, but also those he perceived to be criticsof his
regime. To achieve his objective, President Moi under the cover of
ananti-corruption crusade, systematically started replacing
President Kenyattascourtiers with his own to topple the Kikuyu
ascendancy. Like his predecessor,he also resorted used the law to
consolidate his power.74. To bolster his grip on power, President
Moi also embarked on the gradualKalenjinisationof the public and
private sectors from the 1980s. President Moi is aTugen, one of the
smaller Kalenjin ethnic groups. He began to "de-Kikuyunize"
thecivil service and the state-owned enterprises previously
dominated by the
KikuyuethnicgroupduringPresidentKenyattasadministration.HeappointedtheKalenjinto
key posts in, among others, the Agricultural Development
Corporation (ADC),Kenya Commercial Bank (KCB), Kenya Posts and
Telecommunications Corporation(KPTC), Central Bank of Kenya (CBK),
Kenya Industrial Estates (KIE), National Cerealsand Produce Board
(NCPB), Nyayo Tea Zones (NTZ), Nyayo Bus Company (NBC),Nyayo Tea
Zones Development Corporation (NTZDC) and the Kenya Grain
GrowersCooperative Union (KGGCU).64This process marked the rise of
the Kalenjin elite,who strategically positioned themselves to
benefit from state resources.62 Korwa G. Adar and Isaac M. Munyae
Human Rights Abuse in Kenya under Daniel arap Moi 1978-2001 (2001)
5 African StudiesQuarterly 1.63 Hornsby Charles Kenya: A History
Since Independence (2012) 334.64Ibid
- 37. 25Volume IIA Chapter ONEREPORT OF THE TRUTH, JUSTICE AND
RECONCILIATION COMMISSIONConstitutional amendments75. President
Mois government sponsored a series of constitutional amendments in
abidtoconsolidatepowerinthepresidency.TheConstitutionofKenya(Amendment)Act
No. 7 of 1982 introduced Section 2(A) which had the effect of
transformingthe country into a de jure one-party state. Moreover,
Parliament reinstated thedetention laws which had been suspended in
1978. The application of a numberof laws had the effect of denying
citizens enjoyment of human rights. These lawsincluded the Chiefs
Authority Act, the Public Order Act, the Preservation of
PublicSecurity Act, the Public Order Act, and the Penal Code.The
parliamentary privilege,which gave representatives the right to
obtain information from the Office of thePresident, was also
revoked. Parliamentary supremacy became subordinated tothe
presidency and the ruling KANU party.6576. Moreover, the provincial
administration became highly politicized and
provincialadministrators wielded wide discretionary powers. In
1981, President Moi bannedall ethnic-centred welfare associations.
The president also outlawed the civilservants union and the
university academic staff union.Selected Constitutional amendments,
1982 -1991The Constitution of Kenya (Amendment)Act No 7 of 1982This
Amendment Act introduced Section 2A that changed Kenya from a de
facto to dejure one party state. It also abolished the Turn Coat
Rule.The Constitution of Kenya (Amendment)Act No 14 of 1986This
Amendment Act removed security of tenure of the Attorney General
and Auditorand Controller GeneralThe Constitution of Kenya
(Amendment)Act No 20 of 1987This Amendment Act made all capital
offences non-bailableThe Constitution of Kenya (Amendment)Act No 8
of 1988This Amendment Act made it lawful to detain capital
offenders for 14 days before theycould be formally charged in a
court of law. It also removed the security of tenure
ofconstitutional office holdersThe Constitution of Kenya
(Amendment)Act 1990This Amendment Act reinstated the security of
tenure of constitutional office holdersThe Constitution of Kenya
(Amendment)Act No 12 of 1991This Amendment Act repealed Section 2A
of the Constitution hence bringing an endto the de jure one-party
rule in Kenya. It also reintroduced the Turn Coat Rule.
Thenomination procedure leading to elections of the National
Assembly and Presidencywere amended to accommodate multi-party
system of governance.65 Weekly Review, Nairobi, 8 May 1987. See
also, Ogot, B. A., "Politics of Populism", pp. 187-213, in Ogot and
Ochieng,op. cit., 187-213.
- 38. 26Volume IIA Chapter ONEREPORT OF THE TRUTH, JUSTICE AND
RECONCILIATION COMMISSIONAttempted Coup and the aftermath77. On 1
August 1982 there was a military coup attempt by Kenya Air Force
(KAF)officers.The attempted coup was however brutally quashed by
Kenya Army officerswho were loyal to President Moi. It was put down
at an estimated cost of 600 to1,800 lives lost in addition to other
human rights abuses, including arbitrary arrests,detention and
torture. The coup attempt and the punitive reaction accelerated
theprocess of the control of the state and solidified President
Mois authoritarian rule.In 1986, Parliament amended the
Constitution to remove the security of tenure ofthe Attorney
General and of the Auditor and Controller Genera. This was
followedin 1988 by another constitutional amendment that removed
security of tenure ofconstitutional office holders. The amendment
also made it lawful to detain capitaloffenders for 14 days before
they could be formally charged in a court of lawLimitations on the
independence of the judiciary, with far-reaching human
rightsviolations. By this time, Parliament was functioning largely
as a rubber stamp ofpolicies initiated by the presidency.6678.
Following the attempted coup, the government resorted to even more
vicious andrepressive ways of dealing with dissent. Political
activists and individuals who daredoppose President Mois rule were
routinely detained and tortured. This led to theformation of
dissident groups whose main focus was to agitate for opening up of
thedemocratic space, social justice and respect for human
rights.The best known of thedissidents groups is Mwakenya movement.
The government moved to quash thismovement with brutal force. In
1986 alone, 100 people were arrested and detainedfor their alleged
association with Mwakenya. Moreover, between March