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Trust in God and Trust in Man: The Ambivalent Role of Religion in Shaping Dimensions ofSocial TrustAuthor(s): Michael R. Welch, David Sikkink, Eric Sartain, Carolyn BondSource: Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion, Vol. 43, No. 3 (Sep., 2004), pp. 317-343Published by: Blackwell Publishing on behalf of Society for the Scientific Study of ReligionStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1387629
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Trust
in
God and Trust
in
Man:
The
Ambivalent
Role of
Religion
in
Shaping
Dimensions
of Social
Trust
MICHAELR.
WELCH
DAVID SIKKINK
ERIC SARTAIN
CAROLYNBOND
We use data
from
the National Election
Study
(2000)
to
analyze
relationships
among
measures
of religious
orientation
and commitment
nd
three
aspects
of
social trust.
Results
rom
OLS and ordered
ogistic
regression
models indicate that individualsaffiliatedwith specific denominations e.g., Pentecostaland other Christian)
tend to
display significantly
ower levels
of
certain
types of
social trust than members
of
mainline Protestant
denominations,
nce
a
varietyof
controls
have been
applied.
This
pattern
s
reversed,
however,
mong respondents
who attendchurch
more
requently
and who
report
hat
religionprovides
them
substantial
guidance
in
their daily
lives.
During
the last
decade,
social scientists devotedconsiderable
attention o the
study
of
social
trust
(e.g., Fukuyama
1995;
Sztompka
1999;
Cook
2001;
Hardin
2002),
particularly
s it relates
to the formation
of social
capital
(Yamagishi
and
Yamagishi
1994;
Brehm
and Rahn
1997;
Heam
1997;
Smith and
Kulynych
2002).
Although
there s some
disagreement
boutthe
exact natureof
therelationship e.g., see the distinctionbetween trust nd assurance nd othercomplexities
raised
by Yamagishi
2001),
most tend to
view social trust as
having
an
important
nfluence
on the
level
of
social
capital
that exists
within a
group
or
society (e.g.,
Misztal
1996;
Hear
1997;
Wilson
2000;
Hardin
2002).
Indeed,
Putnam
(2000:19)
actually
defines social
capital
as
representing
he
sum total of connections
among
people-[particularly]
social networksand the
norms of
reciprocity
and trustworthiness hat arise
from them. This increased interest
in
the
nature
and
consequences
of social trust has also
led scholars to
begin
to examine
empirically
the
forces that
shape
social trust tself
(e.g.,
Wilson
2000).
Until
recently,
ew
empirical
studies had
provided
validated
nsights
about
the
type
of
group
or
community
contexts
thatfoster social
trust
among
individualsand even
now
many
of
the
most
well-establishedfindingsaboutthe determinants f trustarebasedprincipallyon experimental
data
from small
groups
(e.g., Macy
and
Skvoretz
1998; Molm, Peterson,
and Takahashi
1999;
Molm, Takahashi,
ndPeterson
2000).
Although
several
survey-based
tudieshavefoundthatboth
the
scale
(Putnam
2001)
and social
diversity
Knight
2001;
Rice
and
Steele
2001)
of communities
affect
the
levels
of trust
esidents
display,
ew
studies
havefocusedon
specific
nstitutional ontexts
and
examined
the
magnitude
of
these effects. Even fewer studies
(see
Smidt
1999;
Veenstra
2002 for notable
exceptions)
have
directly investigated
he connection between
an
individual's
involvement
n
religious organizations
nd the
level of social trust
one
exhibits towardothers.The
relative
absence
of research
on this
topic
is
especially surprisinggiven
the
presumed
heoretical
Professor
Michael
Welch an be
found
at 810
Flanner
Hall,
Department
of Sociology,
University
of
Notre
Dame,
Notre
Dame,
IN
46556.
All
correspondence
egarding
his
article should be addressed o
Professor
Welch.
David
Sikkink,
810
Flanner
Hall,
Department
of Sociology,
and Fellow
in the
Center
or
Research on Educational
Opportunity,
Universityof
Notre Dame.
Eric Sartain
s a
graduate
student n the
Department
of Sociology,
810
Flanner
Hall,
University
of
Notre Dame.
Carolyn
Bond,
13B St. John's
Road, Cambridge,
MA 02138.
Journalfor
the
Scientific
Study
of Religion
43:3
(2004)
317-343
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JOURNAL
FOR
THE
SCIENTIFIC
TUDY OF RELIGION
connectionbetween
religious
values and
the
views we come to hold aboutothermembers
of our
community
and
people
in
general.
Our current
view of the
linkage
between
religion
and
social trust s influenced
by
a
largely
untested heoretical iterature. n particular,he literature rguesthatreligion,especiallyconser-
vative
religion,
may
not be conducive
o
effective democratic
participation
Macedo
1986,
1990).
Civic
participation
s facilitated
by
social
capital,
as
reflected
n
social
networkscharacterized
y
norms of
reciprocity
and trust
(Putnam2000:19),
but not all
forms of
social
capital
contribute
to
healthy
civic
participation.
Bonding
social
capital
is
inwardly
ocused and
exclusive,
creating
potential
barriers o democratic
participation
and
cooperative
behavior outside the immediate
group.
In
contrast,
bridging
social
capital
is
inclusive,
creating
ties
of trust
and
reciprocity
hat
extend across social distancesbetween
groups
(Putnam
2000:20-22).
Thus,
the
existing
stock
of
bonding
social
capital
available within a
group
may
hinder
or
eventuallypreclude
the
develop-
ment of
bridging
social
capital.
Built on
symbolic
boundariesused
to
define
groupmembership,
bondingsocialcapitalmayincreasemembers' ntoleranceandprejudice owardout-groups.This
represents
he
so-called darkside
of
social
capital
(Portes
and Landolt
1996),
one that
promotes
tight
social ties marked
by in-group
rustand
reciprocity
but also often reinforces anaticismand
undemocratic
deologies
(Fiorina
1999;
Levi
1996).
The
resultingproliferation
f countercultural
groupsfragments
he
polity,
exacerbates
conflict
within
civil
society,
and undermines
he
ability
of democratic nstitutions o foster
persuasive
debate based on rationaland universal
principles
(Coser
1974;
Macedo
2000).
For our
purposes,
he main
point
is that
bonding
social
capital
may
accentuate
symbolic
boundariesbetween
in-groups
and
out-groups, hereby reducing
tolerance
for
social differencesand
making
t
difficult
to establish social trust.
Religion
bears
an
important
elation o
bonding
and
bridging
social
capital
(Wuthnow
1999,
2002).Forexample, hestrongbondingsocialcapitalgeneratedbyconservative eligiousgroups s
often
used
to
epitomize
the dark
ide
of
social
capital
Apple
1996;
Provenzo
1990).
Such research
would lead
us
to
expect
that,
n
general,
conservative
eligious
groups
undermine ocial trust
and
thereforeharmdemocratic
processes.
In
this
article,
we
examine this claim
by
investigating
he
relationship
between
religious
traditionand
social
trust,
an essential element of social
capital
that
facilitates the
cooperation
and
sociability
necessary
for the
functioning
of
democraticsocieties
(Putnam
1993,
2000).
We focus
particularly
n the connection
between
heightened
nvolvement
in
conservative
religious
groups
and
the
degree
of trustone
bestows
on
neighbors,
co-workers,
and
people
in
general.
RELIGIOUS
GROUPS
AND
THE
FORMATION OF
SOCIAL TRUST
Concernsabout undamentalist
eligion
aside
(Diamond
1995;
Peshkin
1986;
Provenzo
1990;
Rose
1988),
most
religious
congregations
and
groups
have been
viewed
by
several
scholars
(Tocqueville
1945;
Coleman
1988;
Leege
1988;
Putnam
1993, 2000;
Greeley
1997;
Wuthnow
2002)
as
contributing
mportant
resources that
help
sustain the
vitality
of civil
society.
These
groupsprovide
heir
members
with
manypractical
rganizational
kills thatcan
be
applied
usefully
in
a
variety
of othersocial or
institutional
ettings
Leege
1988;
Wuthnow
1991;
Smidt
1999;Verba,
Schlozman,
and
Brady
1995).
Moreover,
and what
is
perhaps
more
important
or our
purposes,
they
also
promote n-groupbonding
and nstill a sense of social
connection hatcan extend
beyond
group
boundaries
Smidt
1999;
Wuthnow
2002).
It
is these latteroutcomes that
would
seem to
relate most
directly
to the formationof social trust.If we consider the natureof
many religious
congregations
and
the
types
of interactions hat occur within
them,
it
is
easy
to understand
why.
With the
exception
of
Catholic
parishes,
Jewish
synagogues,
and Protestant
mega-churches
(Thumma1996),
most
congregations
are
relatively
modest
in
size
(see
Chaves et
al.
1999:468),
making
it
comparatively asy
for
congregants
o interact
requently
and become familiar
with
one another.1
Congregants
also share sets
of
basic
religious
and moral beliefs that
they
hold in
common
by
virtue of
their
membership.Finally, many congregations
are also
characterized
by
318
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RELIGION'SAMBIVALENTROLEIN
SOCIALTRUST
ethnic or
socioeconomic
homogeneity
(Emerson
and Smith
2000)
and
low
levels of
membership
turnover.
Taken
ogether,
hese conditionstend
to createa
group
environment hatseems
likely
to:
(1)
foster a
relativelyhigh
level
of value
consensus and
attitude
imilarity
among
most
members,
(2)promotealongstandingamiliarity mongmembers,and(3)conferahighlevel ofpredictability
on
interactionswithin the
group
context. Previousstudiesof
group
and/or
community
nteraction
(Kollock
1994;
Macy
and Skvoretz
1998; Molm, Peterson,
and
Takahashi
1999;
Nee and
Sanders
2001;
Rice and Steele
2001)
have demonstrated hat
all these
attributes-especially perceived
predictability,
member
similarity,
and
familiarity-are strongly
associated with the
formation
of
social
trust.
This
suggests,
of
course,
that
many congregationsmay
representhighly
conducive
environments
n which
individuals
can learn to trustone
another.But what is
the natureof such
trustand how far does it
extend?
Here
we must consider
differences
among
religious
traditions.
Differences
by
Religious
Tradition
Thus far
in
our
discussion,
it is
clear that involvement
n
a
religious
congregation
would
offer a conducive
setting
for
generating
social
trust,
which
may
create the kind of
sociability
that allows us to extend this trust to
others,
such
as
neighbors
and work
colleagues.
But
we
would
expect,
consistent
with
the thesis that contends there is a
darkside of
social
capital
(Fiorina
1999;
Portes and Landolt
1996),
that all
religious
subgroups
are
not created
equal
in
their
capacity
to
generate
social
trust.
In
particular,
everal scholarshave
raised
concernsabout
fundamentalist
eligion
(Diamond
1995;
Peshkin
1986;
Provenzo
1990;
Rose
1988).
From
their
perspective,
conservative
religion
and
bonding
social
capital
may
combine to foster
prejudice
and mistrust
of
outsiders.We note
particularly
he
differences
n
views of
humannature.
Though
thesetheologicalpreceptsmayhaveonly a minoreffect on theeverydaypracticesof conservative
believers
(e.g.,
Williamsand
Blackburn
1997),
it
is
likely
that he
extentand
rigidity
of boundaries
differentiating
he
congregation,
he
believer,
and the world
would
substantially
educe
social
trust.
Thus,
following
theories that
identify
liabilities
associated
with
bonding
social
capital,
we would
predict
that members of
those
religious
traditions
hat have formed
their collective
identities
through
he constructionof
strongsymbolic
boundariesbetween
the
religious
in-group
and
surrounding
ut-groups
are
likely
to
display
diminished
rust
n
neighbors,
co-workers,
and
people
in
general.
Catholic
traditions,
at least since Vatican
II,
would not
be
expected
to
depress
general
so-
cial trust.
Although
Putnam
argues
that the vertical or
hierarchicalbonds
of
dependency
and
exploitation
that
typify
the
Catholic
Church n
Italy clearly
hinderedthe
development
of
trust
and
cooperation
within Italian
society
(Putnam1993),
the
organizational
ultureof the
American
Catholic Church
s
quite
different,
owing largely
to
featuressuch as the
ratheractive
role
played
by
the NationalCouncil of Catholic
Bishops
and the relative
ndependent-mindedness
f the
laity
(D'Antonio
et al.
2001).
Moreover,
most U.S. Catholicsdo not hold
highly
negative
views of hu-
mannature
nor
do
they
reside
n
parishes
hatmaintaina
rigid
boundary
between
the
congregation
and the outside culture
(Gremillion
and
Castelli
1987;
D'
Antonio et al.
2001).
Thus,
it
seems
unlikely
that
we
should
expect
Catholics as a whole
to
display
lower levels of
social trustthan
members
of other
religious
groups.
One
could
argue
hat older
Catholics
may
differ
substantially
from
younger generations
on these
dimensions,
given
that
older
cohorts
of Catholics were so-
cialized
initially
into
pre-Vatican
I
religious
traditions,
onfronted
directlyby
the
experience
of
religious
discrimination,
nd influenced
stronglyby
the
socially
centripetal
orces that
formerly
operated
withinmost
Catholicethniccommunities
Abramson
1973;
Gleason
1987;
Hoge
2001
.2
Such circumstances
may
indeed
have
combined
to foster lower levels of social
trust-especially
generalized
social trust.
MainlineProtestant
denominations re
relativelyeasy
to
categorize
on these
dimensionsand
have
generally
been viewed as
exhibitinghigh
levels
of
bridging
social
capital,especially
as it is
manifested
n
social outreach
e.g.,
Wuthnowand Evans
2002).
We would
expect
that
a
theology
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JOURNALFOR
THE SCIENTIFIC
TUDY OF
RELIGION
that
tempers
he doctrine
of humansinfulness with that of common
grace,
human
potential,
and
goodness
would lead to
higher
levels of social trustrelative
to
conservative
Protestant
eligious
subgroups.
Furthermore,
mong
members
of
mainline
denominations,
he social and cultural
boundaries
between the
congregation,believer,
and
the
outside
ociety
and culture are much
more
permeable Hoge,
Johnson,
and Luidens
1994;
Wuthnow
and Evans
2002).
In
contrast,
most of the varieties
of
conservativeProtestantism
maintain
relatively strong
views on
the sinfulness
of
human
beings,
which is
only mitigated
by
God's
gift
of
special grace
to
the believer
and,
in some
evangelical subgroups,
God's
provision
of common
grace
to
society
and
nonbelievers.Conservative
Protestant hurches
n
general
also maintaina
relatively
strict
form of
congregational
organization,
which
includes
high
demandson
participants
n
exchange
for collective and
symbolic provision
of
goods
(lannaccone
1994;
Starkand
Finke
2000).
But at
this
point,
the social life and
religious styles
of
different
conservativeProtestant
roupsdiverge.
Evangelicals,
who
emphasize engagement
with American
society
and culture rather
than
countercultural
eparation
Smith
et al.
1998),
are the closest to the mainline
in
terms
of
a
less
rigid boundary
between
the
faithful
and the world.
Many evangelical
churches,
while still
relatively
strong
in
bonding
social
capital
(Putnam2000),
do not maintain
he level of strict
organizational
tyle
found
in
other conservativeProtestant
groups.
We
would
expect
that this
setting
allows the
development
of
sociability, amiliarity,predictability,
nd so on that enhances
trust,
while
not
combining strong
social
bonding
with
exclusive
boundariesthat
separate
the
religious community
rom the broader
ociety.
Fundamentalists,
owever,
emphasize
the creationof alternative nstitutions
n
order o
sep-
arate
from the world
(Ammerman
1987;
Carpenter
1997;
Marsden
1980;
Smith et
al.
1998;
Woodberry
and Smith
1998),
which
enhances
bonding
social
capital
and combines
the
strict
churchmodel
with
rigid,
less
permeable
boundariesbetween
the
religious
(countercultural)
om-
munity
andthe outsideworld.It seems
likely
that he
strong
boundary
betweenthe fundamentalist
community
and
the
surrounding ociety
and culture would overcome
any positive
effect of
the
strong
social
bondingcapital
that accrueswithin
fundamentalist
ongregations.
Finally,
unlikemost studies
e.g.,
Smidt
1999;
Wuthnow
1999;
Smith
et al.
1998),
we consider
the
Pentecostal
onservativeProtestants s distinct
rom
evangelicals
n
ways
that
may
affect evels
of social trust.3
In
terms of
religious
belief,
the Pentecostals
erect
perhaps
the
highest
cultural
barrier
of
all
conservativeProtestants
n
relation
to the
dominant
society
and culture
(Sikkink
1999).
The distinction
between the faithful
and
the secular
s made more
vivid
for Pentecostals
in
theologies
that
emphasize
the conflict
of
personal
forces
of evil
and
good
within
everyday
life. There
is
no doubt a
strong
social
bonding capital
exists within
Pentecostalism,
but we note
thatthe role of the indwellingof the spiritwithin Pentecostalism Wacker2001) createsa further
individualizing
effect of Pentecostalismon the believer. We would
expect
that the
independent
effect of Pentecostalism
s
likely
to be
negative
on various
orms of social trust.
Moderating
Effects of
Involvement and Salience:
The
Importance
of Immersion
in
Functional
Religious
Communities
The
preceding
discussion and
previous
research
raise the
question
of how the effect on
social
trust
of
membership
n
religious
subgroups
s conditioned
by
one's level
of involvement n
congregations
ndthe salience
of one's faith.Workon social
capital
and
religion
(Wuthnow
1999)
would lead us to expectthatgreatercommitment o a conservative eligious congregationwould
make
t
moredifficult
o have time
for
developingbridging
ocial
capital.
Moreover,
he
formation
of
strong bonding
social
capital
at
the
expense
of
bridging
social
capital may
be detrimental o
social trust.
This
implies
an nteraction f
religious
attendance
nd
religious
subgroup,
ut
previous
researchhas not examined his
possibility
in
regard
o social trust.
Greater nvolvement
n
a
mainline or
Catholic
congregation
seems
unlikely
to
affect
the
relationbetween
membership
n
those traditions ndsocial
trust,
given
that
he boundaries etween
these traditionsand
society
and culture
are
not
rigidly
exclusive. To the extent that mainline
and
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AMBIVALENT
ROLE
IN
SOCIALTRUST
Catholic
congregations
are not
as
strict,
nd marked
by
lower
levels of
bonding
social
capital
in
general,
higher
evels of involvement n
Catholic
and
mainline
raditions
may only
increase he
positive
effects of
these traditionson individualsocial
trust.
The effect of involvement n conservativeProtestant ongregationson social trust is much
more difficult
to discern.
There are at least two
competing
predictions.
The
first
is
that
greater
involvement or commitment to conservative
Protestant
congregations
increases the
exclusive
effect of
the
boundary
between
the
religious
community
and the outside
world,
which
should
lower one's level of
general
social trust as
well as levels
within
specific
domains of
trust.
A
conservativeProtestant
who
is more embedded
n
his or
her
religious
tradition
perhaps
onstructs
identity
over-against
he outside
world,
which
almost
by
definitionwould lead to
diminished ocial
trust.
This
effect would be
expected
to be
especially strong
for
fundamentalists nd
Pentecostals,
though perhaps
ess
strong
among evangelicals.
A
second
explanation
s that
exposure
o
strong
social
bondingcapital
within
strict
eligious
organizations
ends to
mitigate
any negative
effects that
pessimistic religious
beliefs abouthuman
nature
might
have on
social trust. The
experience
of a functional
surrounding
ommunity-a
community
marked
by relatively
dense
social
networks,
a
sense of mutual
respect,
anda
legitimate
normativeorder
Coleman 1988)-even
a
religious community,may
be an
important
ntidote o
the lack
of
social trust hat s
generated
when
one remainswithin a
privatized
and isolated
family
or individual ife. This thesis runs counter to the
claim that involvement
n
groups
with
strong
bonding
social
capital
may
be
detrimental o
an
individual's
exercise
of
democratic
citizenship.
For the
person heavily
involved in
a
congregation,
he
sociability, predictable
nteractions,
and
value consensus
he
or she
experiences
all
contribute
o the
formationof
greater
social trust-at
least relative o otherswho are more
nominally
affiliated
with
a conservativeProtestant
eligious
subgroup
and thus less involved
in the
day-to-day
nteractionsof a strict
ongregation
hat are
most
likely
to foster social trust.
Perhaps
commitment o conservativeProtestant
ubgroups
hat
emphasize
human
sinfulness,
without
the
mitigating
effects
of
immersion within a
functional
religious community,
creates the conditions that most
strongly depress
social
trust. Under
this
line
of
argument,
we would
expect
that
the vivid
and
personalized
contrast
of
good
and evil
embodied
n
Pentecostaldoctrines
would
tend to create
the
greatest
difference n
levels of social
trustbetween
high-attending
nd
low-attending
affiliates.
The interactiveeffect
of
religious
traditionand
congregational
nvolvement s not
the
only
interaction
hat
we
would
expect
to
shape
social trust.As
explained
above,
many
social
theorists
view the true
believer,
especially
the
religious
conservative,
as a threat o
democracy
because
bonding
social
capital
and
rigid symbolic
boundarieswith
out-groupsmay
increase
ntolerance
andprejudice Gutmann1987, 1998;Macedo2000;Putnam2000).Thus,wewouldexpectthat he
effects of
religious group
membership
n social trust
would
be intensified
among
those
for whom
religious
faith has
great
salience
in
everyday
life. From
this
perspective,
the
easily
accessible
aspects
of a conservative
religious
faith,
such as the culturalconstructionof a
boundary
between
the believer
and the nonbelieverand the sinfulness
of
human
beings,
would be enhancedfor
an
adherent
who is
more committed
to
incorporating
he tenets of
conservative
religious
faith
into
everyday
ife. But we must also consider he
alternative:
amely,
hat
morecommitted ndividuals
in
each
religious subgroup develop
a
deeper
understanding
of other
aspects
of the
religious
doctrine,
one that
s
more nuancedand
may temper
he
superficial
understanding
f the faith that
is more
prevalent mong
hose who
are
ess committed.
A
positive
nteractive ffect of conservative
religionand the importanceof faith wouldprovideevidence for this latter nterpretation.
It
is
difficult o
answer he
question
of how
membership
n
religious
subgroups
elates o social
trust-independently
and
in
interaction
with
religious
attendanceand
religious
salience-based
solely
on the
limited
empirical
vidence thatcan be culled
from
existing
studies.
In
a
cross-national
telephone survey
of
Canadiansand
Americans,
Smidt
(1999)
examined
relationships
between an
index of
generalized
social trust and measures of
respondents'
religious
traditions
and level
of
church attendance.He found that
the
religious
traditionmeasure showed
only
a moderatenet
relationship
o the
degree
of trust
respondents
attributed o
others,
with American
evangelicals
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OF
RELIGION
tending
o exhibit ower levels
of
trust han heir
religious counterparts.
midt
also
reports
a
weak
curvilinear
elationship
between
attendance
and
trust,
net of othercontrols.
Using
data from the 1992
NES,
Wilson
(2000)
focused on selected
subsamples
of
women,
AfricanAmericans,andevangelicals, analyzing generallevels of trust and trust n government
displayed
by
respondents
n
each
category.
Among
evangelicals,
he
reports,
hose
who
identify
strongly
with their
religious group
are
significantly
ess
likely
to
profess
trust
in
generalized
others than
evangelicals
who
display
a lower
degree
of
identification
Wilson
2000:14-15).
This
strength
of
identification
with
one's
religious
subgroup
may
also be reflected
in
levels of
participation
r involvement
n
religious
activities,
but Wilson did not include
such measures
n
his
analyses.
Given the
findings
that
emerged
from both of
these
studies,
it seems reasonable
to infer that
repeated
exposure
to the
specific
beliefs and norms
that characterizea
particular
religious
group
s
crucialto
the
degree
of trustone
places
in
others,
especially
those
encountered
outside
of faith
communities.
NeitherSmidtnorWilson nvestigated theraspectsof trustmoresystematically.nparticular,
they
did not
investigate
how the effects
of
religious
tradition re modified
hrough
nteraction
with
level of
involvement
n
a
religious
congregation
or the
degree
to which a
set of
religious
beliefs
provides
guidance
in
one's
everyday
life. Wuthnow
(1999)
provides
a
cogent argument
hat
conservativeProtestants
generate
bonding
social
capital
within the
congregation,
but he
notes
that this crowds out
opportunities
or
bridging
social
capital
that would
link
congregants
o
the
wider
community
and
society.
This
seems to
imply
that
social trustwould be
generated
within
the
congregation
but would
not extend
beyond congregational
borders.But Wuthnow
does not focus
explicitly
on social
trust
and,
as
with
other
research,
does not
investigate
he
interactionbetween
religious
denominationand
degree
of
commitment o that
denomination.
Drawingfrom this existing literature,but necessarilygoing beyond it, we would expect
thatconservativeProtestant
ubgroups, specially
fundamentalists nd
Pentecostals,
would
show
lower levels of social trust
(in
their main
effects)
compared
o
religious
groups
such as
mainline
Protestants ndCatholics.For
reasons
we
discussed
above,
we would not
expect
the interaction
f
mainliners
and
Catholics with attendanceat
religious
services or commitment o
one's
religious
faith
to
affect levels of social trust.
For
conservative
Protestants,
we do not have a solid
theoreticalor
empirical
basis to
predict
how
membership
n
religious
subgroups
would interact
with
religious
commitment o affect social
trust.We do
argue,
however,
hat or
any particular
onservative
Protestant
ubgroup,
he
effect of
greater
attendance
depends
on
the relative
balanceof an
increased ense of social
trustattributable
to the
experience
of a functional
community,
and the
reinforcement f
religious
beliefs
thatraise
the
boundary
between the
faithful
and the
world.Evidence
of
a
positive
interaction ffect on trust
between conservativeProtestant
affiliation-especially
if the
interactiveeffect is
stronger
for
fundamentalists nd Pentecostals-and
attendanceat
religious
services
would
lend
credence to
the
theory
that
conservative
eligious
doctrines
may
in
themselves be a hindrance o
social
trust,
although
functional,
conservative
religious
communities of faith are
not.
Put another
way,
the
least
trusting
are most
likely
to be
those
who
adhere o
conservative
Protestant
eligious
doctrines
without
communing
with a
conservativeProtestant
eligious community,
ince involvement
n
the
bonding eligious
community
would
help
to
mitigate
the
negative
effect that conservative
religious
beliefs exert on
trust.
In
this
article,
we use
data
rom
the
2000 NationalElection
Study
(NES)
to examine
inkages
between an individual's
religious
orientationand involvementand the level of trust he or she
displays
toward
co-workers,
neighbors,
and
people
in
general.
DATA AND
METHODS
Toexamine he
relationship
etweenan
ndividual's
eligious
orientation ndhis
or
hertrust n
others,
we
used data rom the 2000 NationalElection
Study
(NES).
This
survey
contained everal
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RELIGION'SAMBIVALENT
ROLE
IN
SOCIALTRUST
specific
questions
that addressed
ssues
of
social
trust,
as well as other
relevant
demographic
and
religious
items,
and was
thus
well suited for our research.
Measures
of
Social
Trust
The
2000
NES
includes
several
sets
of items
that
represent espondents'
evels of social trust.
One set
of items
(V1475-V1477)
was
especially
useful
in
measuring
the
generalized
level
of
social
trust hat
respondentsdisplay
in
their
daily
interactions. ndividuals
were asked to
respond
to the
following questions
by selecting
one of the two alternative
esponses
that were
provided:
(1)
Generallyspeaking,
would
you say
that most
people
can be
trusted,
or
that
you
can't be
too careful
in
dealing
with
people?
(1
=
most
people
can be
trusted,
0
=
can't be too
careful);
(2)
Do
you
thinkmost
people
would
try
to take
advantage
of
you
if
they got
the chance or would
they try
to be
fair?
(1
=
try
to be
fair,
0
=
take
advantage);
3)
Would
you say
that
most
of
the
time
people try
to be
helpful,
or that
they
are
ust
looking
out
for
themselves?
1
=
try
to
be
helpful,
0
=
just looking
out for
themselves).
We
summedeach
of
these
binary
tems to
create
a
composite
index of social trust
(alpha
=
0.73).
Another set
of items
(V1695-V1698)
reflected
the level of social trust
respondentsplaced
in
their
co-workers.
Respondents
ndicated
their
responses
to the
following
questions
on either
a
four-point
or
five-point
Likert scale:
(1)
In
general,
with these
people
in mind
[co-workers],
would
you say
that
they
are
ust looking
out
for
themselves
all of the
time,
most of the
time,
some
of the
time,
hardly
ever or never?
1
=
all of the
time,
5
=
never);
(2) Would
you
say
that those
people you
see
regularly
at
work
try
to take
advantage
of others
all
the
time,
most
of
the
time,
hardly
ever
or
never? (1
=
all of
the
time,
5
=
never);
(3)
Would
you say
that
they
treatothers
with
respect
all of thetime,most of thetime,someof thetime,
hardly
everornever? 1 = never,
5
=
all of
the
time); (4)
Would
you say
that
honest describes he
people you
work with
extremely
well,
quite
well,
not
too
well,
or not well at all?
(1
=
not
well
at
all,
4
=
extremely
well).
These
items
were
summed
to create an index of trust
n
co-workers
alpha
=
0.76).
A
third
set of items
(V1737-V1740)
represented
he level of social trust
respondents
placed
in their
neighbors.
These items used
basically
the same stem
questions
and
Likert
response
scales
that were used to
represent
rust
n
co-workers,
except
that the
focus was on the
people
you
see
regularly
n
your neighborhood
nstead
of co-workers.These items were summed to create an
index of trust
n
neighbors(alpha
=
0.74).
Measures
of
Religion
To examine the
relationship
between
religion
and social
trust,
we
include three different
measures
of
religion
in
our
analyses.
The first
representscategories
of
religious
subgroups
o
which individuals
belong.
This measureof
religious
affiliation
was built
from
NES item
V0904 and
the
accompanyingappendix.
Using
this
categorization,
we created
10
separatedummy
variables
(1
=
specific
denominational
radition,
0
=
other)
to
represent
he
following
denominational
groupings:
1)
fundamentalist,
2)
nontraditional
undamentalist,
3)
Pentecostal,
4)
evangelical
Protestant,
5)
black
Protestant,
6)
Catholic,
(7)
Jewish,
(8)
other
religions,
(9)
none,
and
(10)
mainline
Protestant.4
The
classification
of
specific
denominations
s
reported
n the
Appendix.)
MainlineProtestantwas usedas the reference
category
n all
analyses.5
A measureof attendance
was built
from
responses
o three
questions
V0877-V0880)
that
askedwhether
a
respondent
ver
attended
religious
services
apart
rom
the
occasional
weddings,baptisms,
or funerals
1
=
yes)
and
how
frequently
he or she attended
eligious
services
(1
=
never,
6
=
more thanonce a
week).
We
also include
a measureof the amountof
guidance
that
religion provides
for an
individual
n
his or her life.
This
measure
was
built
from the
following
two items
(V0872
and
V0873): (1)
Do
you
consider
religion
to
be
an
importantpart
of
your
life,
or
not?
(1
=
important);
2)
Would
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THE
SCIENTIFIC
TUDY
OFRELIGION
you
say
that
religion provides
some
guidance
in
your day-to-day
living,
quite
a bit
of
guidance,
or
a
great
deal of
guidance
in
your day-to-day
life?
(1
=
some,
2
=
quite
a
bit,
3
=
a
great
deal).
Other Measures
Demographic
variables
representing
age
(coded
in
years),
education
(highest grade
com-
pleted), gender
(1
=
male),
marital status
(1
=
married),
and annual income
(reported
in thou-
sands
of
dollars)
were included in our
analyses.
In
addition,
we
included three
dummy
variables
to
represent
the
race and
ethnicity
of
respondents
(1
=
African
American,
1
=
Hispanic,
1
=
other),
with white
respondents representing
the reference
category.
Geographic
region
was sub-
divided into northeast
(coded
1),
north central
(coded
1),
west
(coded
1),
and south
(the
reference
category).
We also
categorized respondents
as suburban
(coded
1),
small town
(coded 1),
and
rural
(coded 1)
residents,
comparing
them
to residents of urban
areas.
Dummy
variables
representing
individuals who
are
employed
part
time
(coded 1)
or
who
are
unemployed
(coded 1)
were
included
and
compared
to individuals who are
employed
full
time.
In
addition,
individuals whose
occupation requires
that
they
work with others
(coded
1)
were
also
represented.
These three
measures were used to control for the
level and
frequency
of
workplace
contacts individuals have with
co-workers. We also
used
two
dummy
variables to
designate
homeowners
(coded 1)
and those who
indicated that
they
had worked
with
a
neighbor
on an issue or
problem
of
common interest
(coded
1).
These measures were
used
to
represent
the
degree
of commitment
an individual
displays
toward the
neighborhood
in
which he or
she
lives
and
the
person's
level of
involvement
in
that
neighborhood.
Descriptive
statistics
for
all the variables
used
in
our
analyses
are
reported
in
Table 1.
TABLE 1
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS FOR
VARIABLES USED
IN THE
ANALYSES
Dependent
Variables
Coded Variables %
Mean
SD
Social trust ndex
Range:
0-3
(low
trust o
high
trust)
1.879
1.159
Trust
n
neighbors
Range:
1-19
(low
trust o
high
trust)
14.130
2.489
Trust
n co-workers
Range:
1-19
(low
trust o
high
trust)
13.756 2.487
Dependent/Control
Variables
Age
Coded in
years
47.206 16.962
Education
Highest gradecompleted
13.616 2.570
Male
I
=
Male 43.72
Married 1= Married 52.15
Northeast I
=
Resident
of
northeast
egion
17.49
North central
=
Residentof midwest
region
24.90
West
I
=
Resident
of
western
region
21.25
Employed,
part
ime I =
Employedpart
ime
2.77
Unemployed
I
=
Unemployed
32.60
Workswith others
I=
Works
with
others
63.97
Black =
Black
11.63
Hispanic
1 =
Hispanic
5.20
Other 1 = Otherrace 5.26
Income
Annual ncome in
dollars
(thousands)
53.029 38.469
Homeowner
I
=
Homeowner 67.24
Neighborhoodproblem
solving
1
=
Worked o
solve
problem
24.37
Suburban I =
Reside
in
suburb
40.66
Small town 1 =
Reside
in
small town 26.24
Rural
1
=
Reside
in
ruralarea
4.87
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RESULTS
Because of the
relatively
imited
range
of variation
n
the
general
trust
ndex,
we use ordered
logistic regressionto examine the net relationshipsbetween our measures of an individual's
religious
orientationand
general
social
trust,
controlling
for the effects of the other variables
included
in
the
analysis
(Borooah
2001).6
Table
2
presents
the unstandardized
oefficients
for
models
predicting
evels of
generalized
social trust.
It
is clear
from Model
1
that,
net of other
factors, older, wealthier,
and more well-educated
individuals end to show
higher
evels of social
trust,
as do
those who are
married,
own
theirown
homes,
and
are
required
o work
with
others
within
the
context
of
theirjobs.
Individuals
who
have
cooperated
with their
neighbors
n
working
on local
problems
or
issues
of
common interestalso
tend to be more
trusting
when other factors are controlled.
Compared
o residents
of
the
south,
individuals
residing
in the
western
region
of the United States exhibit more
trust,
net of
other
effects. African
Americans,
however,
show lower
levels of trust than their white
counterparts.
Similar
demographic
ffects are also observed
n
Model
3,
with
the
exception
that
the effects of
marital tatusare
nonsignificant.
The coefficients
representing
he net
effects of one's
religious
orientation re somewhatmore
surprising.
n both Models 1 and
3,
individuals
rom
a
variety
of
denominational
backgrounds
do not differ
appreciably
rom their mainline
Protestant
ounterparts
n the
levels
of trust
they
display.
Catholics
do
not
differ
from the
mainliners,
and a
separateanalysis
(available
on
request)
did
not show that older Catholics
(those
socialized
prior
to
Vatican
II)
differed
from
younger
Catholics.
There s one
important
xception
to the
similarity
n trustacross
religious subgroups:
Pentecostals
show
significantly
lower levels
of trust
compared
to mainline
Protestants,
when
othervariables
are controlled.
Otherstudies thathave not accounted
or the distinctivenessof the
Pentecostal radition
appear
o have missedthis
important
elationbetween conservative
eligion
and
trust.
The coefficients
reported
n
Models
2 and
4
are also
quite
similar
n
directionand
magnitude.
Among
the
demographic
variables,
only
the effects
of
marriage
and
western
residence fail to
reach
the level
of
statistical
ignificance,although
neither he directionnor
the
magnitude
of
these
effects
varies
n
any
other
appreciable
way
from the effects
reported
Models
1and 3. The net
effect
of Pentecostal
affiliationalso
operates
n these models to
produce
a lower level of trust than is
seen
among comparable
membersof mainlinedenominations.
Although
he
sense
of
guidance
an
individualreceives
from
religion generally
appears
o have
no
meaningful
connectionto the level
of social
trustone
reports
Models
1
and
2),
the
statisticallysignificant
nteraction erm ndicates
thata moderating ffect is observedamong ndividualsaffiliatedwithPentecostaldenominations.
Thus,
Pentecostals
who
report
hat
they
receive
high
levels of
guidance
actually
tend to be
more
trusting
han heir
counterparts
n
mainlinedenominations.There
s
also
a
pronouncedmoderating
effect
among
Pentecostal
affiliates
who
attend
religious
services more
frequently.Figures
1
and
2
show the
predicted
evels
of trust
as
attendance nd
guidance
ncrease
or
the Pentecostalsand the
comparisongroup
(i.e.,
mainliners).
Although
our
analysis
cannot sort out the
precise
reasonfor
this
finding,
t
is consistentwith
the
theory
hata little Pentecostalism s a bad
thing,
butthose who
delve
deeper
into the
religious
tradition
ind
other culturalresources that
mitigate
a
superficial
view of sin and
separation
rom the world with
religious support
or
social trust.
Figure
1 shows that
the
highest
attending
Pentecostals
are
actually
somewhatmore
trusting
than theirmainlinecounterparts.Althoughlevels of trust increasesubstantiallyamong Pente-
costals
who
report
that
they
receive
higher
levels
of
guidance
from their
religious
beliefs,
the
levels
of
trust
only approach-but
never
surpass-those displayed
by
theirmainline
counterparts.
(Main
and
interaction ffects
for fundamentalists how
similar
patterns, hough
he effects are not
quite significant
at the
conventional
evels.)
The
Pentecostal
effects
provide
additionalevidence
for the
alternative
heory
that
religious
beliefs
may
lead to a lack of trust
in
the
abstract,
but
the concrete
social
experience
of a
functional
religious community
overrides he
negative
effect
Pentecostal
religious
traditionshave
on social trust.
325
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TABLE 2
UNSTANDARDIZED
NET
COEFFICIENTS FOR ORDERED
LOGISTIC
REGRESSION
M
OF
GENERALIZED
TRUST
(n
=
1,346)
Measuresof
Religious
Influence
Religious
Guidance
Model
I
Model
2
Mo
b
z-value
b
z-value
b
Age
0.022
5.72***
0.022
5.74**
0.022
Education
0.191
7.98***
0.192
7.97**
0.188
Income
0.004
2.21*
0.004
2.15*
0.004
Male
0.095
0.87
0.101
0.93
0.108
Married
0.230
1.98*
0.210
1.80
0.221
Northeast 0.035 0.21
0.020 0.12
0.054
Northcentral
0.255
1.79
0.245
1.71
0.252
West
0.307
1.99* 0.278
1.78
0.314
Rural
0.174
1.15
0.174
1.13
0.179
Small town
0.154
1.07
0.143
0.99 0.152
Suburb
0.308
1.73
0.298
1.66
0.302
Part-time
work
0.442
1.49 0.389
1.31
0.437
Unemployed
0.106 0.74
0.101 0.70
0.111
Worksw/others
0.278 2.17*
0.270
2.10*
0.280
Black
-1.045
-4.02***
-1.125
4.29**
-1.068
Hispanic
-0.432
-1.71
-0.451
-1.77
-0.438
Otherrace -0.493 -1.86 -0.467 -1.75 -0.503
Homeowner
0.339
2.69**
0.357
2.82**
0.331
Neighborhood
problem
solving
0.374
2.94**
0.373
2.92*
0.379
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TABLE
2
(Continued)
Measuresof
Religious
Influence
Religious
Guidance
Model
1 Model
2
Mo
b
z-value
b
z-value
b
Denomination
&
Religiosity
Fundamentalist
-0.117
-0.38
-0.967
-0.95
-0.148
Nontraditional
undamentalist
-0.004
-0.01
0.143
0.12
-0.063
Pentecostal
-0.878
-2.91**
-3.047
-2.85**
-0.911
Evangelical
-0.164
-0.90
-0.791
-1.48
-0.189
Black Protestant
0.170
0.05
-0.508
-0.57
0.155
Catholic
-0.083
-0.52
-0.253
-0.61
-0.105
Jewish
-0.443
-1.25
-0.373
-0.49
-0.442
Other
religion
-0.407
-1.04
-1.217
-1.11 -0.395
None -0.117 -0.61 -0.091 -0.22 -0.078
Religious
guidance
-0.000
-0.01
-0.082
-0.77
Attendance
0.027
Religiosity
Interaction
with Denomination
Fundamentalist
0.273
0.91
Nontraditional undamentalist
-0.021
-0.06
Pentecostal
0.657
2.14*
Evangelical
0.206
1.24
Black
Protestant
0.229
0.93
Catholic
0.060
0.43
Jewish
-0.068
-0.21
Other
0.280
0.80
None
-0.078
-0.46
Log
likelihood
-1593.08
-1588.67
-1589.32
Probability
0.000
0.000
0.000
Pseudo-R2
0.092
0.095
0.094
*p
<
0.05;
**p
<
0.01;
***p
<
0.001.
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JOURNALFOR THE SCIENTIFICSTUDY OF
RELIGION
FIGURE
1
GENERALIZED TRUST-PENTECOSTAL
BY
RELIGIOUS
GUIDANCE
__
_w_
1
2
3
Guidance
-.-
. Mainline
Pentecostal
Because of the
greater range
of variation
(0-19)
in
the indices
measuring
evels of trust
extended
towardco-workersand
neighbors,
we use OLS
regression echniques
to
analyze
those
measures. Table 3 presentsthe unstandardized oefficients for models predictingthe levels of
trust ndividuals
place
in
their
co-workers.
Coefficients
reported
n
Models
1
and 3 are similar n
magnitude
and direction
o
those that
appeared
n
Models
1
and
3 of Table
2,
although
here are some notable differences.
Controlling
for other
factors,
older
individualsand those
with
at least
a
high
school educationtend to have a
higher
evel of
trust
n
theirco-workers.
Compared
o those who workfull
time,
part-time
workers
FIGURE
2
GENERALIZED
TRUST-PENTECOSTAL
BY
ATTENDANCE
'~ ' ~ -~~---.-_
__-
o
I-
N
-
1.
0
C3
0
3
4
5
Attendance
-----^
Mainline
Pentecostal
4.0
lt
a
4
1 2
6
328
.A
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TABLE 3
UNSTANDARDIZED NET
COEFFICIENTS FOR
OLS REGRESSION MODELS PREDICTING
TOWARD CO-WORKERS
(n
=
1,132)
Measures
of
Religious
Influence
Religious
Guidance
Model
1
Model 2 Mod
b z-value
b z-value
b
Age
0.014
2.47***
0.014 2.41** 0.014
Education 0.113 3.46** 0.113
3.43***
0.111
Income
0.003
3.46***
0.113
1.24
0.003
Male
-0.548
3.71***
-0.549
-3.71***
0.546
Married
0.222
-0.139
-0.248 -1.55 -0.215
Northeast -0.106 -0.47 -0.097 -0.43 -0.098
Northcentral
-0.097
1.74
0.329 1.69 0.338
West
0.355 1.71 0.368 1.76 0.357
Rural 0.014 0.07 0.041 0.19
0.007
Small town -0.146
-0.74
-0.148 -0.75
-0.155
Suburb
0.013 0.06
-0.003 -0.01 0.010
Part-time
work 1.270 3.21***
1.210 3.05** 1.254
Unemployed
0.441 1.99* 0.249
1.92 0.430
Works
w/others
0.423 1.83 0.443 1.91 0.421
Black
-1.286 -3.36***
-1.344 -3.45*** -1.300
Hispanic
0.174 0.046 0.142 0.38 0.168
Otherrace -0.586 -1.68 -0.562 -1.61 -0.582
Homeowner
0.311
1.75
0.327 1.83
0.310
Neighborhood
problem
solving
0.291 1.74 0.306
1.83 0.293
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TABLE 3
(Continued)
Measuresof
Religious
Influence
Religious
Guidance
Model 1 Model 2
Mo
b z-value
b
z-value b
Denomination
&
Religiosity
Fundamentalist -0.286
-0.62 0.368
0.25
-0.302
Nontraditionalundamentalist
0.339 0.68
0.175
0.12 0.310
Pentecostal
-0.195 -0.44 -3.780 -2.59** -0.219
Evangelical
-0.106 -0.43 0.005
0.01
-0.117
Black Protestant 0.295
0.59 -0.289
-0.20 0.282
Catholic -0.147 -0.70 -0.809
-1.50
-0.155
Jewish -0.735
-1.64 -1.197
-1.26
-0.719
Other
religion
-0.323
-0.63
-0.761 -0.54
-0.319
None -0.132 -0.51 -0.574 -1.08 -0.123
Religious guidance
0.003
0.05
-0.135
-0.98
Attendance
0.018
Religiosity
Interaction
with Denomination
Fundamentalist
-0.167
-0.39
Nontraditional
undamentalist
0.077
0.18
Pentecostal 1.103
2.59**
Evangelical -0.017
-0.07
Black Protestant
0.212 0.52
Catholic
0.245 1.33
Jewish 0.185
0.47
Other 0.159 0.35
None 0.180
0.76
Constant 11.045 11.398 11.071
Probability
0.000
0.000 0.000
Adj.
R2
0.080 0.080
0.079
*p
<
0.05;
**p
<
0.01;
***p
<
0.001.
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RELIGION'S
AMBIVALENT
ROLE
IN SOCIALTRUST
tend
to be more
trusting
of fellow
workers,
net of other effects
(Models
1
and
3).
In
Model
1,
however,
those who are now
unemployed
also
report
higher
levels of trust
(probably
reflecting
feelings
of retired
workers).
Both
African Americansand males show
significantly
ower
levels
of trust n their co-workers han theirwhite andfemalecounterparts.
The
patterning
f the coefficients
presented
n
Models
2
and
4
resemblesthe
pattern
observed
among
the
demographic
variables
n
Models
1
and
3 in this table. The most notable
difference,
however,
s thatsome
of the effects of
religious
orientation ttain tatistical
ignificance
n Models
2
and4.7
Pentecostals,
or
example,
tend to exhibit ower levels
of trust
n
co-workers
han
mainline
Protestants,
but this
pattern
s
again
reversed
among
Pentecostals who attend church
services
frequently
and those
who receive considerable
guidance
from their
religious
beliefs.
Figure
3
indicates that Pentecostals
who believe
they
receive the
highest
levels
of
guidance
from their
beliefs exhibit
higher
evels
of trust hanmainlinersand
Figure
4
shows
that he
highest-attending
Pentecostals
again actually
surpass
mainliners
n
the trust
hey display
toward
co-workers.
Table4 presents he unstandardizedOLScoefficientsfor modelspredicting he levels of trust
individualsbestow on their
neighbors.
The
patterning
f the unstandardized
oefficients
reported
n
both Models
1
and 3 in Table
4
differs
somewhatfrom
preceding
findings.
In
both
models,
older, wealthier,
more well-educated
individuals,
and homeowners
show
higher
levels of trust
n
their
neighbors,
net of
other effects.
(The
effects
attributableo income
probably
reflectunmeasured
differences
n
the
neighborhoods
where
higher
income
respondents
reside.)
In
both
models,
however,
African
Americans and
members of other
races
(i.e.,
Native
Americans,
Asians,
and
non-Hispanics)
end to trust
their
neighbors
ess,
compared
o their white
counterparts;
nd,
relativeto urban
residents,
those who
live
in
small towns tend to trust
their
neighbors
more.
In
Model
1,
individuals
who reside
in
the
western United States
are less
trusting
han
southerners,
et
of
other
effects,
but
the effect fails to
reach
significance
in Model 3.
In
Models
2
and
4,
the effects
of the
demographic
variables
operate
similarly
in
both
mod-
els,
except
for
western
residence
(it
is not
significant
n
Model
4).
Results
for
religious
effects
diverge
somewhat between Models
2
and
4,
however.
In Model
2,
Pentecostals
again
tend to
place
less trust
in their
neighbors
than
do their mainline Protestant
counterparts,
when
other
variablesare
held constant.But individuals
who
report
hat
they gain
substantial
guidance
from
FIGURE
3
CO-WORKER
TRUST-PENTECOSTAL
BY
RELIGIOUS GUIDANCE
4---?~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~..
9-
...,_.....
................. ..... . .............. ..... . ... .. ........ . . ..... . .... . . . . . . . . . .
.
......
a)
..
0
I
)
.
**
1 2
3
4
Guidance
Mainline
Pentecostal
331
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JOURNAL
ORTHESCIENTIFICTUDY
OFRELIGION
FIGURE
4
CO-WORKER
TRUST-PENTECOSTAL
BY ATTENDANCE
(I,.
.......
. .. ..... . **...
..
..
....
? --
+--..^.--_.--- ^,: _
X-f
O
C,^....
:
:.
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ I --------u
.
.
-
*.
1
2
3
4
5
6
Attendance
|
.
.l
ainline
Pentecostal
their
religious
beliefs,
and
who are
categorized
as
being
affiliated
with a Pentecostal or other
nontraditional undamentalist
denomination,
end be more
trusting
of
neighbors
than mainline
Protestant espondents see Figures5 and6). The Pentecostals
with the
highest
level of
guidance
exhibit
greater
rust
n
neighbors
than
their
mainline
counterparts.
n
Model
4,
membersof black
Protestantdenominationsexhibit
lower levels
of trust than their mainline
counterparts,
ut this
effect
is
again
reversed
among
membersof black
Protestantdenominations
who attendservices
frequently
Figure
7).
Finally,
membersof
nontraditionalundamentalist
enominations
who at-
tend services
frequently
also show
greater
rust
n
their
neighbors
han s
displayed
by
mainliners
(Figure
8).
DIsCUSSION
In
regard
o the effects of such
demographic
variablesas
age,
education,race,andregionof
residence,
our results
presented
ew
surprises.
Consistent
with
previous
findings
(Putnam
1995;
Brehm and
Rahn
1997;
Smidt
1999),
older
and more well-educated
ndividuals end
to be more
trusting
of all
types
of
people, including neighbors
and
co-workers,
once
controls
are
applied.
African-American
espondents
also show
consistently
lower levels
on all measures
of trustthan
their white
counterparts, finding
that accords
with
past
research
(Hanes
1985;
Mullen
1991;
Kramer
1994).
The effects of home
ownership
and efforts at
cooperativeproblem
solving
are
more
difficult to
understand,however,
with home
ownershipdisplaying
statisticallysignificant
positive
net
relationships
to all of the
measured forms of trust and
problem
solving
showing
only
a
significantpositive
net
relationship
o the measure of
general
trust.
We would
speculate
that home ownershipis an indicatorof geographicallystable respondentsand those who live
in
more stable
neighborhoods
with less
crime,
which would
tend to increase
reported
evels of
social trust.
Perhapsproblem-solving
activity
is
picking up
some of these
same factors
if
group
problem
solving
is more
likely
in
neighborhoods
and communities
in
which
there are
a lot of
problems
hat
mustbe addressed.
t is also
possible
that he
experience
of a
neighborhood
roblem-
solving group,
unlike a
congregation,
does not include sufficient
value
consensus,
familiarity,
nd
predictability
of
interaction hat
might
contribute
o
building
social trust. Such
neighborhood
332
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TABLE
4
UNSTANDARDIZED NET COEFFICIENTS FOR
OLS REGRESSION MODELS
PREDICTING
TOWARD NEIGHBORS
(n
=
1,290)
Measures of Religious
Influence
Religious
Guidance
Model 1
Model
2 Mod
b z-value
b z-value
b
Age
0.026
5.29*** 0.026
5.22***
0.025
Education
0.099
3.36***
0.091
3.09**
0.091
Income
0.007
3.04** 0.007
3.08**
0.007
Male
-0.259
-
1.98*
-0.250 -1.91
-0.257
Married
0.148
1.01 0.105
0.71
0.136
Northeast -0.370 -1.76 -0.394 -1.88 -0.357
Northcentral
0.047 0.26
0.053 0.030
0.041
West
-0.385
-1.99*
-0.392 -2.02* -0.371
Rural
0.262 1.36
0.279
1.45 0.256
Small
town 0.394
2.17* 0.409 2.25*
0.394
Suburb
0.267 1.19
0.291 1.31
0.263
Part-time
work 0.360
0.99
0.322 0.89
0.328
Unemployed
0.071
0.39 0.084.
0.47 0.071
Worksw/others
0.040
0.24 0.032
0.19
0.036
Black
-1.070 -3.20***
-1.126 -3.64**
-
1.092
Hispanic
-0.416
-1.24
-0.430 -1.28 -0.401
Otherrace -1.031 -3.14** -1.007 -3.08** -1.031
Homeowner
0.614
3.77*** 0.617 3.78***
0.599
Neighborhood
problem
solving
0.071
0.46 0.061 0.040
0.066
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TABLE 4
(Continued)
Measuresof
Religious
Influence
Religious
Guidance
Model
1
Model
2
Mo
b
z-value b
z-value
b
Denomination&
Religiosity
Fundamentalist
0.207
0.50
-1.152
-0.87
0.179
Nontraditional
undamentalist
0.337
0.74
-2.230
-1.71
0.250
Pentecostal
0.364
0.93
-2.824
-2.23**
0.309
Evangelical
0.131
0.58
-0.601
-1.00
0.104
Black
Protestant
0.160
0.37
-0.348
-0.31
0.137
Catholic
0.215
1.11
0.256
0.51
0.182
Jewish
-0.129
-0.28
-0.681
-0.73
-0.107
Other
religion
-0.241
-0.49
0.434
0.34
-0.207
None 0.004 0.01 0.448 0.89 0.068
Religious
guidance
0.046
0.72
-0.020
-0.16
Attendance
0.070
Religiosity
Interactionwith
Denomination
Fundamentalist
0.431
1.11
Nontraditional
undamentalist
0.793
2.11*
Pentecostal
0.972
2.62**
Evangelical
0.253
1.24
Black
Protestant
0.194
2.62**
Catholic
-0.017
-0.10
Jewish
0.256
0.67
Other -0.239 -0.57
None
0.333
-1.56
Constant
10.510
10.835
10.583
Probability
0.000
0.000
0.000
Adj.
R2
0.126
0.134
0.128
*p
<
0.05;
**p
<
0.01;***p
<
0.001.
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336 JOURNAL
FOR THE
SCIENTIFIC TUDY OF RELIGION
FIGURE
7
NEIGHBOR TRUST-BLACK PROTESTANT
BY
ATTENDANCE
'-
L
o
n
c
z
1
2
3 4
5
6
Attendance
|*
kMainline
Black
Protestant
effects on social trust.The
particular heology
and lower boundariesbetween these
groups
and
the broader
society
and
culture make
religion
less
likely
to
promote
suspicion
about
humanity,
co-workers,orneighbors.We do not find evidence consistent with Wuthnow's 1999) thesis that
most
conservative Protestants ocus
on
bonding
social
capital
to such
an
extent that
bridging
social
capital,
at least as
expressed
in
social trust of
outsiders,
s
compromised.
In
fact,
we
find no
evidence thatconservativeProtestants
e.g.,
fundamentalists r
evangelicals)
are
uniquely
unwilling
to extend trust o those outside their
religious
community-to neighbors
and
colleagues
with
whom
they
work.
Contrary
o
many
social commentators
nd
democratic
heorists,
we would
FIGURE
8
NEIGHBOR TRUST-NONTRADITIONAL CONSERVATIVE
BY
ATTENDANCE
cn
:3
I-
0
.0
z
dr
2
3
4
5
6
Attendance
'Mainline
Nontrad.Conservative
- e ?, 9
1
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RELIGION'S
AMBIVALENT
ROLE
IN
SOCIALTRUST
have
to conclude
that,
on the
whole,
conservativeProtestant
religious
beliefs do not
appear
to
threaten he healthof
democracyby reducing
social trustand
producingdangerous
evels of
social
fragmentation.
n most
conservative
religious
traditions,
he beliefs
in
human
sinfulness and the
normof separation rom a secular world do not reduceappreciably he levels of social trust
affiliates
display.
Further
questioning
the view that conservative
religion
hinders
democracy,
we
find no evidence that more involved or committed
religious
conservativesexhibit
any
less social
trust than the noncommittedor
noninvolved adherent.Nor do we find
that true
believers
in
conservative
religion,
as measured
by
the
importance
of
their
religion
in
their
daily
lives,
are
any
less
trusting
hantheir
nominallyreligious counterparts.
We do find
evidence, however,
suggesting
that the vividness of
the Pentecostal
worldview
provides
a
religious
crucible
in
which the
unsaved an be more
easily denigrated
or,
at the
very
least,
viewed less
charitably.
This
worldview,
which
tends
to
characterize
good
and evil in
personal
ermsand
repeatedly
onnects
daily
events
to an
overarching, early
Manichean
truggle
between SatanandJesusChrist,createsapowerfuldynamic hatseemslikelyto inhibit hegrowth
of social trust. But even this
effect,
as we
argue
below,
appears
much less
threatening
o
social
capital
and the health
of our
democracy
when considered
within
congregational
ettings.
Whatcan we conclude
aboutthe effect of
religiosity
on social
trust?Given
past expectations
(see
Leege
1988),
it seems
surprising
hat
neitherof the
measuresof
personal
religiosity display
statistically significant
main effects.
We do not find
support
or
the common
assumption
n
the
literature hat
religiosity,
especially
church
attendance,
would
indicatea
socially trusting
person-
ality type.
Also,
we do
not find evidence
that
religious
involvement tself
provides
a
mechanism
through
which
individualAmericans are
prepared
or
democratic
participation.
This
may
still
hold for civic
participation
Verba,
Schlozman,
and
Brady
1995),
but it
does not extend
to social
trust.
However,
when we
consider he
patterning
f
significant
nteractions
etween
these measures
andcertain
dummy
variables
epresenting
n
individual's
affiliation,
we are
able to
provide
a more
nuanced
picture