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TORTS ENDTERMS REVIEWER
Compiled By: Someone you know
I. Defenses in Negligence Cases: Partial or
Complete Defenses
Art. 2179 of the Civil Code:
A. Contributory Negligence
2179 When the plaintiff's own negligence
was the immediate and proximate
causeof his injury, he cannotrecover damages. But if his
negligence was only contributory,
the immediate and proximate causeof the injury being the defendant's
lack of due care, the plaintiff may
recover damages, but the courts shall
mitigatethe damages to be awarded.
1. People vs. San Gabriel (NONE)
2. Rakes v. Atlantic, Gulf and Pacific Co.FACTS
Plaintiff Rakes was one of the laborers of defendant, transporting iron rails fromthe barge in the harbor to defendants yard. Piled lengthwise on 2 handcars were7 rails such that the ends of the rails protruded beyond the cars.
The rails lay upon 2 crosspieces or sills secured to the cars but without sideguards to prevent them from slipping off.
Near the waters edge, the tracks sagged, thetie broke, the rails slid off andcaught plaintiff, resulting in a broken leg which was subsequently amputated.
Plaintiff alleges that defendant was negligent in not provided side guards on thecars, and that the tracks had no fishplates.
Defendant admitted absence of side guards and failed to effectively overcomethe plaintiffs proof that no fishplatesexisted.
The sagging of the tracks was found to have been caused by the water of the bayraised by a recent typhoon.
It wasnt proved that the company inspected the track after the typhoon or thatit had any proper system of inspecting.
ISSUE & ARGUMENTS
W/N plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence to exonerate defendant fromliability.
HOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDINo.
The allegation that plaintiff was at fault for continuing his work despite noticeof the sagging of the track constituted contributory negligence that exoneratedefendant is untenable. Nothing in the evidence shows that plaintiff did or couldsee the displaced timber underneath. Plaintiff had worked on the job for less
than two days.
Where plaintiff contributed to the principal occurrence, as one of thedetermining factors, he cannot recover. Where, in conjunction with theoccurrence, he contributes only to his own injury, he may recover the amountthat the defendant responsible for the event should pay for such injury, less thesum deemed a suitable equivalent for his own imprudence.
3. BPI vs. CA, 216 SCRA 51
FACTS
In the afternoon of October 9, 1981, a person purporting to be Eligia G.Fernando, who had a money market placement as evidenced by a
promissory note with a maturity date of November 11, 1981 and a
maturity value of P2,462,243.19, called BPI's Money MarkeDepartment. The caller wanted to preterminate the placement, but
Reginaldo Eustaquio, Dealer Trainee in BPI's Money Marke
Department, told her "trading time" was over for the day, which was a
Friday, and suggested that she call again the following week. The
promissory note the caller wanted to preterminate was a roll-over of an
earlier 50-day money market placement that had matured on September24, 1981.
Later that afternoon, Eustaquio conveyed the request for preterminationto the officer who before had handled Eligia G. Fernando's account
Penelope Bulan, but Eustaquio was left to attend to the pretermination
process. On October 12, 1981, the caller of the previous Friday followed up with
Eustaquio, merely by phone again, on the pretermination of theplacement. Although not familiar with the voice of the real Eligia G
Fernando, Eustaquio "made certain" that the caller was the real Eligia G
Fernando by "verifying" that the details the caller gave about theplacement tallied with the details in "the ledger/folder" of the account
Eustaquio knew the real Eligia G. Fernando to be the Treasurer o
Philippine American Life Insurance Company (Philamlife) since he was
handling Philamlife's corporate money market account. But neither
Eustaquio nor Bulan who originally handled Fernando's account, nor
anybody else at BPI, bothered to call up Fernando at her Philamlifeoffice to verify the request for pretermination.
Informed that the placement would yield less than the maturity valuebecause of its pretermination, the caller insisted on the preterminationjust the same and asked that two checks be issued for the proceeds, one
for P1,800,000.00 and the second for the balance, and that the checks be
delivered to her office at Philamlife. Eustaquio, thus, proceeded toprepare the "purchase order slip" for the requested pretermination a
required by office procedure, and from his desk, the papers, following
the processing route, passed through the position analyst, securitie
clerk, verifier clerk and documentation clerk, before the two cashier's
checks, nos. 021759 and 021760 for P1,800,000.00 and P613,215.16respectively, both payable to Eligia G. Fernando, covering the
preterminated placement, were prepared. The two cashier's checks
together with the papers consisting of the money market placement wasto be preterminated and the promissory note (No. 35623) to be
preterminated, were sent to Gerlanda E. de Castro and Celestino
Sampiton, Jr., Manager and Administrative Assistant, respectively, inBPI's Treasury Operations Department, both authorized signatories fo
BPI, who signed the two checks that very morning. Thereafter, the
checks went to the dispatcher for delivery.
Later in the same morning, however, the same caller changed the
delivery instructions; instead of the checks being delivered to her officeat Philamlife, she would herself pick up the checks or send her niece,Rosemarie Fernando, to pick them up. Eustaquio then told her that if it
were her niece who was going to get the checks, her niece would have tobeing a written authorization from her to pick up the checks. Thi
telephone conversation ended with the caller's statement that "definitely
it would be her niece, Rosemarie Fernando, who would pick up thechecks. Thus, Eustaquio had to hurriedly go to the dispatcher, Bernardo
Laderas, to tell him of the new delivery instructions for the checks; in
fact, he changed the delivery instruction on the purchase order slipwriting thereon "Rosemarie Fernando release only with authority to pick
up.
It was, in fact Rosemarie Fernando who got the two checks from thedispatcher, as shown by the delivery receipt. As it turned out, the same
person impersonated both Eligia G. Fernando and Rosemarie Fernando
Although the checks represented the termination proceeds of Eligia G
Fernando's placement, not just a roll-over of the placement, the
dispatcher failed to get or to require the surrender of the promissory noteevidencing the placement. There is also no showing that Eligia GFernando's purported signature on the letter requesting the
pretermination and the latter authorizing Rosemarie Fernando to pick upthe two checks, both of which letters were presumably handed to the
dispatcher by Rosemarie Fernando, was compared or verified with
Eligia G. Fernando's signature in BPI's file. Such purported signature habeen established to be forged although it has a "close similarity" to the
real signature of Eligia G. Fernando. In the afternoon of October 13
1981, a woman who represented herself to be Eligia G. Fernando appliedat China Banking Corporation's Head Office for the opening of a curren
account. She was accompanied and introduced to Emily Sylianco Cuaso
Cash Supervisor, by Antonio Concepcion whom Cuaso knew to have
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opened, earlier that year, an account upon the introduction of Valentin
Co, a long-standing "valued client" of CBC. What Cuaso indicated in theapplication form, however, was that the new client was introduced by
Valentin Co, and with her initials on the form signifying her approval,
she referred the application to the New Accounts Section for processing.
As finally proceeds, the application form shows the signature of "Eligia
G. Fernando", "her" date of birth, sex, civil status, nationality,
occupation ("business woman"), tax account number, and initial depositof P10,000.00. This final approval of the new current account is
indicated on the application form by the initials of Regina G. Dy,
Cashier, who did not interview the new client but affixed her initials onthe application form after reviewing it.
On October 14, 1981, the woman holding herself out as Eligia G.Fernando deposited the two checks in controversy with Current Account
No. 126310-3. Her endorsement on the two checks was found to
conform with the depositor's specimen signature. CBC's guaranty ofprior endorsements and/or lack of endorsement was then stamped on the
two checks, which CBC forthwith sent to clearing and which BPI
cleared on the same day.
Two days after, withdrawals began on Current Account No. 26310-3:On October 16, 1981, by means of Check No. 240005 dated the same
day for P1,000,000.00, payable to "cash", which the woman holding
herself out as Eligia G. Fernando encashed over the counter, and Check
No. 240003 dated October 15, 1981 for P48,500.00, payable to "cash"which was received through clearing from PNB Pasay Branch; on
October 19, 1981, by means of Check No. 240006 dated the same day
for P1,000,000.00, payable to "cash," which the woman identifying
herself as Eligia G. Fernando encashed over the counter; on October 22,
1981, by means of Check No. 240007 dated the same day for
P370,000.00, payable to "cash" which the woman herself also encashedover the counter; and on November 4, 1981, by means of Check No.
240001 dated November 3, 1981 for P4,100.00, payable to "cash,"
which was received through clearing from Far East Bank. The lastwithdrawal on November 4, 1981 left Current Account No. 26310-3
with a balance of only P571.61.
On November 11, 1981, the maturity date of Eligia G. Fernado's moneymarket placement with BPI, the real Eligia G. Fernando went to BPI for
the roll-over of her placement. She disclaimed having preterminated herplacement on October 12, 1981. She executed an affidavit stating that
while she was the payee of the two checks in controversy, she never
received nor endorsed them and that her purported signature on the backof the checks was not hers but forged. With her surrender of the original
of the promissory note (No. 35623 with maturity value of
P2,462,243.19) evidencing the placement which matured that day, BPIissued her a new promissory note (No. 40314 with maturity date of
December 23, 1981 and maturity value of P2,500.266.77) to evidence aroll-over of the placement.
On November 12, 1981, supported by Eligia G. Fernando's affidavit,BPI returned the two checks in controversy to CBC for the reason"Payee's endorsement forged". CBC, in turn, returned the checks for
reason "Beyond Clearing Time". These incidents led to the filing of this
case with the Arbitration Committee.
The Arbitration Committee ruled in favor of BPI and ordered CBC topay the former the amount of P1,206,607.58 with interest thereon at
12%per annumfrom August 12, 1983.
However, upon CBCs motion for reconsideration, the Board ofDirectors of the PCHC reversed the Arbitration Committee's decisionand dismissed the complaint of BPI while ordering it to pay CBC the
sum of P1,206,607.58.
BPI then filed a petition for review with the Regional Trial Court ofMakati who dismissed said petition but modified the award by including
a provision for attorneys fees in favor of CBC, among others.
The court of appeals affirmed the trial courts decision.ISSUES
1. WON the collecting bank has absolute liability on a warranty of the
validity of all prior endorsements stamped at the back of the checks
2. In the event that the payee's signature is forged, WON the drawer/drawee
bank (in this case BPI) may claim reimbursement from the collecting bankwhich earlier paid the proceeds of the checks after the same checks were
cleared
HELD
1. NO
BPI contends that respondent CBC's clear warranty that "all priorendorsements and/or lack of endorsements guaranteed" stamped at the
back of the checks was an unrestrictive clearing guaranty that all prio
endorsements in the checks are genuine. Under this premise petitionerBPI asserts that the presenting or collecting bank, respondent CBC, had
an unquestioned liability when it turned out that the payee's signature on
the checks were forged. With these circumstances, petitioner BP
maintains that considerations of relative negligence become totally
irrelevant.
In presenting the checks for clearing and for payment, the collectingbank made an express guarantee on the validity of "all prio
endorsements." Thus, stamped at the back of the checks are the clear
warranty: ALL PRIOR ENDORSEMENTS AND/OR LACK OFENDORSEMENTS GUARANTEED. Without such warranty, the
drawee bank would not have paid on the checks. No amount of legajargon can reverse the clear meaning of the warranty. As the warranty
has proven to be false and inaccurate, the defendant is liable for any
damage arising out of the falsity of its representation.
Apropos the matter of forgery in endorsements, this Court hasemphasized that the collecting bank or last endorser generally suffers the
loss because it has the duty to ascertain the genuineness of all prio
endorsements considering that the act of presenting the check fopayment to the drawee is an assertion that the party making th
presentment has done its duty to ascertain the genuineness of the
endorsements. If the drawee-bank discovers that the signature of thepayee was forged after it has paid the amount of the check to the holde
thereof, it can recover the amount paid from the collecting bank
However, the point that comes uppermost is whether the drawee bankwas negligent in failing to discover the alteration or the forgery.
The general rule under Section 23 of the Negotiable Instruments Law ito the effect that a forged signature is "wholly inoperative", and payment
made "through or under such signature" is ineffectual or does nodischarge the instrument. The exception to this rule is when the partyrelying in the forgery is "precluded from setting up the forgery or wan
of authority. In this jurisdiction we recognize negligence of the party
invoking forgery as an exception to the general rule.
In the present petition the payee's names in the checks were forgedFollowing the general rule, the checks are "wholly inoperative" and of
no effect. However, the underlying circumstances of the case show thatthe general rule on forgery is not applicable. The issue as to who
between the parties should bear the loss in the payment of the forged
checks necessities the determination of the rights and liabilities of theparties involved in the controversy in relation to the forged checks.
The records show that petitioner BPI as drawee bank and respondenCBC as representing or collecting bank were both negligent resulting inthe encashment of the forged checks.
The Arbitration Committee in its decision analyzed the negligence of the
employees of petitioner BPI involved in the processing of the pretermination of Eligia G. Fernando's money market placement and in the
issuance and delivery of the subject checks in this wise: a) The impostor
could have been readily unmasked by a mere telephone call, which
nobody in BPI bothered to make to Eligia G. Fernando, a vice-presiden
of Philamlife; b) The officer who used to handle Eligia G. Fernando's
account did not do anything about the account's pre-termination; c)Again no verification appears to have been made on Eligia G
Fernando's purported signature on the letter requesting the pre
termination and the letter authorizing her niece to pick-up the checksyet, her signature was in BPI's file; and d) Another step that could have
foiled the fraud, but which BPI neglected to take, was requiring before
the two checks in controversy were delivered, the surrender of thepromissory note evidencing the money market placement that wa
supposedly pre-terminated. The Arbitration Committee, however
belittled petitioner BPI's negligence compared to that of respondenCBC which it declared as graver and the proximate cause of the loss o
the subject checks to the impostor who impersonated Eligia GFernando.
The PCHC Board of Directors, however, stated that these withdrawalswithout any further showing that the CBC employees had actua
knowledge of the infirmity or defect, or knowledge of such facts (Sec56, Negotiable Instruments Law) that their action in accepting their
checks for deposit and allowing the withdrawals against the same
amounted to bad faith cannot be considered as basis for holding CBC
liable.
Banks handle daily transactions involving millions of pesos. By the verynature of their work the degree of responsibility, care andtrustworthiness expected of their employees and officials is far greater
than those of ordinary clerks and employees. For obvious reasons, the
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banks are expected to exercise the highest degree of diligence in the
selection and supervision of their employees.
In the present case, there is no question that the banks were negligent inthe selection and supervision of their employees. The Arbitration
Committee, the PCHC Board of Directors and the lower court, however
disagree in the evaluation of the degree of negligence of the banks.
While the Arbitration Committee declared the negligence of respondent
CBC graver, the PCHC Board of Directors and the lower courts declaredthat petitioner BPI's negligence was graver. To the extent that the degree
of negligence is equated to the proximate cause of the loss, we rule that
the issue as to whose negligence is graver is relevant. No matter howmany justifications both banks present to avoid responsibility, they
cannot erase the fact that they were both guilty in not exercisingextraordinary diligence in the selection and supervision of their
employees.
2. NO
The next issue hinges on whose negligence was the proximate cause ofthe payment of the forged checks by an impostor. Petitioner BPI insists
that the doctrine of last clear chance should have been applied
considering the circumstances of this case. Under this doctrine, whereboth parties were negligent and such negligence were not
contemporaneous, the person who has the last fair chance to avoid the
impending harm and fails to do so is chargeable with the consequences,without reference to the prior negligence of the other party.
Applying these principles, petitioner BPI's reliance on the doctrine oflast clear chance to clear it from liability is not well-taken. CBC had no
prior notice of the fraud perpetrated by BPI's employees on the
pretermination of Eligia G. Fernando's money market placement.Moreover, Fernando is not a depositor of CBC. Hence, a comparison of
the signature of Eligia G. Fernando with that of the impostor Eligia G.Fernando, which respondent CBC did, could not have resulted in thediscovery of the fraud. Hence, respondent CBC had no way to discover
the fraud at all. In fact the records fail to show that respondent CBC had
knowledge, actual or implied, of the fraud perpetrated by the impostor
and the employees of BPI.
BPI further argues that the acts and omissions of respondent CBC arethe cause "that set into motion the actual and continuous sequence ofevents that produced the injury and without which the result would not
have occurred." Petitioner BPI anchors its argument on its stance that
there was "a gap, a hiatus, an interval between the issuance and deliveryof said checks by petitioner BPI to the impostor and their actual payment
of CBC to the impostor. Petitioner BPI points out that the gap of one (1)
day that elapsed from its issuance and delivery of the checks to theimpostor is material on the issue of proximate cause. At this stage,
according to petitioner BPI, there was yet no loss and the impostor could
have decided to desist from completing the same plan and could haveheld to the checks without negotiating them.
Petitioner BPI's contention that CBC alone should bear the loss mustfail. The gap of one (1) day between the issuance and delivery of the
checks bearing the impostor's name as payee and the impostor's
negotiating the said forged checks by opening an account and depositing
the same with respondent CBC is not controlling. It is not unnatural orunexpectedthat after taking the risk of impersonating Eligia G. Fernando
with the connivance of BPI's employees, the impostor would complete
her deception by encashing the forged checks. There is therefore, greaterreason to rule that the proximate cause of the payment of the forged
checks by an impostor was due to the negligence of petitioner BPI. This
finding, notwithstanding, we are not inclined to rule that petitioner BPImust solelybear the loss of P2,413,215.16, the total amount of the two
(2) forged checks. Due care on the part of CBC could have prevented
any loss.
The Court cannot ignore the fact that the CBC employees closed their
eyes to the suspicious circumstances of huge over-the-counterwithdrawals made immediately after the account was opened. Theopening of the account itself was accompanied by inexplicable acts
clearly showing negligence. And while we do not apply the last clear
chance doctrine as controlling in this case, still the CBC employees hadample opportunity to avoid the harm which befell both CBC and BPI.
They let the opportunity slip by when the ordinary prudence expected of
bank employees would have sufficed to seize it.
Both banks were negligent in the selection and supervision of theiremployees resulting in the encashment of the forged checks by an
impostor. Both banks were not able to overcome the presumption ofnegligence in the selection and supervision of their employees. It was
the gross negligence of the employees of both banks which resulted in
the fraud and the subsequent loss While it is true that petitioner BPI'
negligence may have been the proximate cause of the loss, respondentCBC's negligence contributed equally to the success of the impostor in
encashing the proceeds of the forged checks. Under these circumstances
we apply Article 2179 of the Civil Code to the effect that while
respondent CBC may recover its losses, such losses are subject to
mitigation by the courts.
Disposition The questioned Decision and Resolution are MODIFIED. BPI
shall be responsible for 60% while CBC shall share 40% of the loss oP2,413,215.16
4. Valenzuela vs. CA
FACTS:
June 24, 1990 2 am: While driving from her restaurant at Araneta avenue
towards the direction of Manila, Ma. Lourdes Valenzuela noticed that she had
a flat tire so she parked along the sidewalk about 1 1/2 feet away, place her
emergency lights and seeked help
She was with her companion Cecilia Ramon
While she was pointing her tools to the man who will help her fixed the tires,
she was suddenly hit by another Mitsubishi Lancer driven by Richard Li who
was intoxicated and she slammed accross his windshield and fell to the ground
She was sent to UERM where she stayed for 20 days and her leg was
amputated and was replaced with an artificial one.
Her expenses totalled 147, 000 [120,000 php (confinement) + 27, 000
(aritificial leg)]
RTC: Richard Li guilty of gross negligence and liable for damages under
Article 2176 of the Civil Code. Alexander Commercial, Inc., Lis employer,
jointly and severally liable for damages pursuant to Article 2180 P41,840
actual damages, P37,500 unrealized profits because of the stoppage of
plaintiffs Bistro La Conga restaurant 3 weeks after the accident on June 24,
1990, P20,000 a month as unrealized profits of Bistro La Conga restaurant,
from August, 1990 until the date of this judgment, P30,000.00, a month, for
unrealized profits in 2 Beauty salons, P1,000,000 in moral damages, P50,000,
as exemplary damages, P60,000, as reasonable attorneys fees and costs.
CA: there was ample evidence that the car was parked at the side but absolved
Li's employer
Li: 55 kph - self serving and uncorraborated
Rogelio Rodriguez, the owner-operator of an establishment located just across
the scene of the accident: Valenzuelas car parked parallel and very near the
sidewalk and Li was driving on a very fast speed and there was only a drizzle(NOT heavy rain)
ISSUE:
1. W/N Li was driving at 55 kph - NO
2. W/N Valenzuela was guilty of contributory negligence - NO
3. W/N Alexander Commercial, Inc. as Li's employer should be held liable -
YES
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4. W/N the awarding of damages is proper. - YES.
HELD: CA modified with reinstating the RTC decision
1. NO
If Li was running at only about 55 kph then despite the wet and slippery road,
he could have avoided hitting the Valenzuela by the mere expedient orapplying his brakes at the proper time and distance
it was not even necessary for him to swerve a little to the right in order to
safely avoid a collision with the on-coming car since there is plenty of space
for both cars, since Valenzuela car was running at the right lane going towards
Manila and the on-coming car was also on its right lane going to Cubao
2. NO.
Contributory negligence is conduct on the part of the injured party,
contributing as a legal cause to the harm he has suffered, which falls below
the standard to which he is required to conform for his own protection
Emergency rule
An individual who suddenly finds himself in a situation of danger and is
required to act without much time to consider the best means that may be
adopted to avoid the impending danger, is not guilty of negligence if he fails
to undertake what subsequently and upon reflection may appear to be a better
solution, unless the emergency was brought by his own negligence
She is not expected to run the entire boulevard in search for a parking zone or
turn on a dark Street or alley where she would likely find no one to help her
She stopped at a lighted place where there were people, to verify whether she
had a flat tire and to solicit help if needed
she parked along the sidewalk, about 1 feet away, behind a Toyota Corona
Car
3. YES.
Not the principle of respondeat superior, which holds the master liable for acts
of the servant (must be in the course of business), but that of pater familias, in
which the liability ultimately falls upon the employer, for his failure to
exercise the diligence of a good father of the family in the selection and
supervision of his employees
Ordinarily, evidence demonstrating that the employer has exercised diligent
supervision of its employee during the performance of the latters assigned
tasks would be enough to relieve him of the liability imposed by Article 2180
in relation to Article 2176 of the Civil Code.
situation is of a different character, involving a practice utilized by large
companies with either their employees of managerial rank or their
representatives.
Moreover, Lis claim that he happened to be on the road on the night of the
accident because he was coming from a social visit with an officemate in
Paraaque was a bare allegation which was never corroborated in the court
below. It was obviously self-serving. Assuming he really came from his
officemates place, the same could give rise to speculation that he and his
officemate had just been from a work-related function, or they were together
to discuss sales and other work related strategies.
Alexander Commercial, Inc. has not demonstrated, to our satisfaction, that it
exercised the care and diligence of a good father of the family in entrusting its
company car to Li
4. YES.
As the amount of moral damages is subject to this Courts discretion, we are
of the opinion that the amount of P1, 000,000.00 granted by the trial court is
in greater accord with the extent and nature of the injury -. Physical and
psychological - suffered by Valenzuela as a result of Lis grossly negligent
driving of his Mitsubishi Lancer in the early morning hours of the accident.
the damage done to her would not only be permanent and lasting, i t would
also be permanently changing and adjusting to the physiologic changes which
her body would normally undergo through the years. The replacements,
changes, and adjustments will require corresponding adjustive physical and
occupational therapy. All of these adjustments, it has been documented, are
painful.
B. Imputed Contributory Negligence
5. Philippine Commercial Intl. Bank vs. CA, Jan. 29, 2001 (FORD
PHILIPPINES INC.)
FACTS:
These consolidated petitions involve several fraudulently negotiated
checks
October 19, 1977: Ford drew and issued its Citibank Check of
P4,746,114.41, in favor of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue (CIR)
as payment of percentage or manufacturer's sales taxes for the third
quarter of 1977
Check was deposited with the IBAA (now PCIBank) and wassubsequently cleared at the Central Bank
Ford, with leave of court, filed a third-party complaint before the trial
court impleading Pacific Banking Corporation (PBC) and Godofredo
Rivera, as third party defendants dismissed the complaint against PBC for
lack of cause of action
dismissed the third-party complaint against Godofredo Rivera because hecould not be served with summons as a "fugitive from justice"
Trial court: Citibank and IBAA (now PCI Bank), jointly and
severally, to pay the Ford
April 20, 1979, Ford drew another Citibank Check of P6,311,591.73,representing the payment of percentage tax for the first quarter of 1979
payable to the CIR
Both checks were "crossed checks" and contain two diagonal lines on its
upper corner between, which were written the words "payable to the
payee's account only."
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building were regularly undertaken. Petitioner was even willing to present its
maintenance supervisor to attest to the extent of such regular inspection but
private respondents agreed to dispense with his testimony and simply
stipulated that it would be corroborative of the vice presidents narration.
Besides, no complaint regarding any defect on the same structure has ever
been lodged before his office prior to the institution of the case at bench.
It is a matter of judicial notice that typhoons are common occurrences in this
country. If subject school buildings roofing was not firmly anchored to its
trusses, obviously, it could not have withstood long years and several
typhoons even stronger than Saling.
Petitioner has not been shown negligent or at fault regarding the construction
and maintenance of its school building in question and that typhoon Saling
was the proximate cause of the damage suffered by private respondents
house.
8. Napocor vs. CA
FACTS:
In the early morning hours of October 27, 1978, at the height oftyphoon "Kading", a massive flood covered the towns near Angat Dam,causing several deaths and the loss and destruction of properties ofthe people residing near the Angat River.
Private respondents are residents of such area. They were awakenedby the sound of rampaging water all around them. The water cameswiftly and strongly that before they could do anything to save theirbelongings, their houses had submerged, some even swept away bythe strong current.
Private respondents blamed the sudden rush of water to the recklessand imprudent opening of all the three (3) floodgates of the Angat Damspillway, without prior warning to the people living near or within thevicinity of the dam.
Petitioners denied private respondents' allegations and contended that
they have maintained the water in the Angat Dam at a safe level andthat the opening of the spillways was done gradually and after allprecautionary measures had been taken.
Petitioner NPC further contended that it had always exercised thediligence of a good father in the selection of its officials and employeesand in their supervision.
It also claimed that written warnings were earlier sent to the townsconcerned. At the time typhoon "Kading" hit Bulacan with its torrentialrain, a great volume of flood water flowed into the dam's reservoirnecessitating the release of the water therein in order to prevent thedam from collapsing and causing the loss of lives and tremendousdamage to livestock and properties.
Petitioners further contended that there was no direct causalrelationship between the alleged damages suffered by the respondents
and the acts and omissions attributed to the former. That it was therespondents who assumed the risk of residing near the Angat River,and even assuming that respondents suffered damages, the causewas due to a fortuitous event and such damages are of the nature andcharacter of damnum absque injuria, hence, respondents have nocause of action against them.
The Trial Court awarded damages, interest, and attorneys fees. TheCA affirmed such ruling.
ISSUE W/N the injury caused to private respondents was due tofortuitous event.
HOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDI
No. Act of God or force majeure, by definition, are extraordinaryevents not foreseeable or avoidable, events that could not be foreseenor which, though foreseen, are inevitable. It is not enough that theevent should not have been foreseen or anticipated, as is commonlybelieved, but it must be one impossible to foresee or to avoid.
As a general rule, no person shall be responsible for those eventswhich could not be foreseen or which though foreseen, were inevitable
The act of God doctrine strictly requires that the act must be
occasioned solely by the violence of nature. Human intervention is tobe excluded from creating or entering into the cause of the mischief.When the effect is found to be in part the result of the participation ofman, whether due to his active intervention or neglect or failure to act,the whole occurrence is then humanized and removed from the rulesapplicable to the acts of God.
o Rainfall was classified only as moderate and couldnt have causedflooding.
o Despite announcements of the coming of a powerful typhoon, thewater level was maintained at its maximum.
When the negligence of a person concurs with an act of Godproducing a loss, such person is not exempt from liability by showingthat the immediate cause of the damage was the act of God.To be exempt he must be free from any previous negligence or
misconduct by which the loss or damage may have been occasioned.
D. Doctrine of Assumption of Risk
9. Ilocos Norte Electric Company vs. CA
Facts:
1. On June 29, 1967 a strong typhoon by the code name "Gening"buffeted the province of Ilocos Norte, bringing heavy rains andconsequent flooding in its wake. Between 5:30 and 6:00 A.M. on
June 29, 1967, after the typhoon had abated and when the
floodwaters were beginning to recede the deceased Isabel Lao
Juan, fondly called Nana Belen, ventured out of the house of her
son-in-law, Antonio Yabes, on No. 19 Guerrero Street, LaoagCity, and proceeded northward towards the direction of the FiveSisters Emporium, of which she was the owner and proprietress, to
look after the merchandise therein that might have been damaged.
2. Wading in waist-deep flood on Guerrero, the deceased wasfollowed by Aida Bulong, a Salesgirl at the Five Sisters Grocery
also owned by the deceased, and by Linda Alonzo Estavillo, ticket seller at the YJ Cinema, which was partly owned by the
deceased. Aida and Linda walked side by side at a distance of
between 5 and 6 meters behind the deceased,
3. Suddenly, the deceased screamed "Ay" and quickly sank intothe water. The two girls attempted to help, but fear dissuaded
them from doing so because on the spot where the deceased
sank they saw an electric wire dangling from a post and
moving in snake-like fashion in the water. Upon their shoutsfor help, Ernesto dela Cruz came out of the house of Antonio
Yabes. Ernesto tried to go to the deceased, but at four meters
away from her he turned back shouting that the water was
grounded. Aida and Linda prodded Ernesto to seek help from
Antonio Yabes at the YJ Cinema building which was four or
five blocks away.
4. When Antonio Yabes was informed by Ernesto that his mother-inlaw had been electrocuted, he acted immediately. With his wife
Jane, together with Ernesto and one Joe Ros, Yabes passed by the
City Hall of Laoag to request the police to ask the people o
defendant I locos Norte Electric Company or I NEL CO to cut of
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the electric current. Then the party waded to the house on
Guerrero Street. The floodwater was receding and the lights insidethe house were out indicating that the electric current had been cut
off in Guerrero. Yabes instructed his boys to fish for the body of
the deceased. The body was recovered about two meters from an
electric post.
5. In another place, at about 4:00 A.M. on that fateful date, June 29,1967, Engineer Antonio Juan, Power Plant Engineer of the
National Power Corporation at the Laoag Diesel-Electric Plant,
noticed certain fluctuations in their electric meter which indicatedsuch abnormalities as grounded or short-circuited lines. Between
6:00 and 6:30 A.M., he set out of the Laoag NPC Compound on aninspection. On the way, he saw grounded and disconnected lines.
Electric lines were hanging from the posts to the ground. Since he
could not see any INELCO lineman, he decided to go to the
INELCO Office at the Life Theatre on Rizal Street by way ofGuerrero. As he turned right at the intersection of Guerrero and
Rizal, he saw an electric wire about 30 meters long strung across
the street "and the other end was seeming to play with the currentof the water." (p. 64, TSN, Oct. 24, 1972) Finding the Office of the
INELCO still closed, and seeing no lineman therein, he returned to
the NPC Compound.
6. At about 8:10 A.M., Engr. Juan went out of the compound againon another inspection trip. Having learned of the death of IsabelLao Juan, he passed by the house of the deceased at the corner of
Guerrero and M.H. del Pilar streets to which the body had beentaken. Using the resuscitator which was a standard equipment in
his jeep and employing the skill he acquired from an in servicetraining on resuscitation, he tried to revive the deceased. Hisefforts proved futile. Rigor mortis was setting in. On the left palm
of the deceased, Engr. Juan noticed a hollow wound. Proceeding to
the INELCO Office, he met two linemen on the way. He told them
about the grounded lines of the INELCO In the afternoon of the
same day, he went on a third inspection trip preparatory to the
restoration of power. The dangling wire he saw on Guerrero earlyin the morning of June 29, 1967 was no longer there.
7. Many people came to the house at the corner of Guerrero and M.H.del Pilar after learning that the deceased had been electrocuted.
Among the sympathizers was Dr. Jovencio Castro, Municipal
Health Officer of Sarrat, Ilocos Norte. Upon the request of therelatives of the deceased, Dr. Castro examined the body at about
8:00 A.M. on June 29, 1967. The skin was grayish or, in medical
parlance, cyanotic, which indicated death by electrocution. On theleft palm, the doctor found an "electrically charged wound" (Exh.
C-1: p. 101, TSN, Nov. 28, 1972) or a first degree burn. About the
base of the thumb on the left hand was a burned wound. (Exh. C-2,
pp. 102-103, Ibid.) The certificate of death prepared by Dr. Castro
stated the cause of' death as ,'circulatory shock electrocution"
(Exh. I; p. 103, Ibid.).
8. In defense and exculpation, defendant presented the testimonies ofits officers and employees, namely, Conrado Asis, electricengineer; Loreto Abijero, collector-inspector; Fabico Abijero,
lineman; and Julio Agcaoili, president-manager of INELCO
Through the testimonies of these witnesses, defendant sought toprove that on and even before June 29, 1967 the electric service
system of the INELCO in the whole franchise area, including Area
No. 9 which covered the residence of Antonio Yabes at No. 18Guerrero Street, did not suffer from any defect that might
constitute a hazard to life and property. The service lines, devicesand other INELCO equipment in Area No. 9 had been newly-installed prior to the date in question. As a public service operator
and in line with its business of supplying electric current to the
public, defendant had installed safety devices to prevent and avoidinjuries to persons and damage to property in case of natural
calamities such as floods, typhoons, fire and others. Defendant had
12 linesmen charged with the duty of making a round-the-clock
check-up of the areas respectively assigned to them.
9. Defendant asserts that although a strong typhoon struck theprovince of Ilocos Norte on June 29, 1967, putting to streets of
Laoag City under water, only a few known places in Laoag were
reported to have suffered damaged electric lines, namely, at the
southern approach of the Marcos Bridge which was washed awayand where the INELCO lines and posts collapsed; in the eastern
part near the residence of the late Governor Simeon Mandac; in the
far north near the defendant's power plant at the corner of Segundo
and Castro Streets, Laoag City and at the far northwest side, near
the premises of the Ilocos Norte National High School. Fabico
Abijero, testified that in the early morning before 6 o'clock on June29, 1967 he passed by the intersection of Rizal and Guerrero
Streets to switch off the street lights in Area No. 9. He did not see
any cut or broken wires in or near the vicinity. What he saw weremany people fishing out the body of Isabel Lao Juan.
Issue:WON Ilocos Norte Electric Corporation was liable
Held: In this case, it was held that while it is true that typhoons and
storms are considered as Acts of God for which no person may be heldresponsible, it was not said eventuality which directly causes the
victims death. It was through the intervention of petitioners negligence
that death took place. Indeed, under the circumstances of the casepetitioner was negligent in seeing to it that no harm is done to the public
The negligence of petitioner shown, it may not now absolve itself from
liability by arguing that the victims death was solely due to a fortuitousevent.
E. Prescription for quasi-delict
Article 1146
1146 The following actions must beinstituted within four years:
(1) Upon an injury to the rights ofthe plaintiff;(2) Upon a quasi-delict;
However, when the action arisesfrom or out of any act, activity, orconduct of any public officerinvolving the exercise of powersor authority arising from MartialLaw including the arrest,detention and/or trial of the
plaintiff, the same must bebrought within one (1) year. (Asamended by PD No. 1755, Dec.24, 1980.)
10. Kramer Jr. vs. C.A
FACTS:
On April 8, 1976, F/B Marjolea, a fishing boat owned by petitioners Ernest
Kramer,
Jr. and Marta Kramer were navigating its way from Marinduque to Manila.
Somewhere near the Maricabon Island and Cape Santiago, the boat figured
in a collision with an inter-island vessel (M/V Asia Philippines) owned by
Trans-Asia Shipping Lines, Inc.
Due to the collision, F/B Marjolea sank, taking along its fish catch.
The captains of both vessels filed a protest with the Board of Marine Inquiryof the
Philippine Coast Guardfor the purpose of determining the proximate cause of
the maritimeCollision
On October 19, 1981, the Board concluded that the collision was due to thenegligence of the employees of private respondent (Trans-Asia).
On the basis of such decision, the Philippine Coast Guard, on April 29,
1982,
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suspended M/V Asia Philippines from pursuing his profession as a marine
officer. On May 30,1985, petitioners filed a complaint for damages in the RTC,
Pasay City.
Private respondent filed a MTD on the ground of prescription based on Art.
1146 of the Civil Code which provides, An action based upon quasi-delict
must be instituted within 4 years from the day the quasi-delict was committed.
The RTC denied the MTD on the basis of the Boards resolution that there
was a need to rely on highly technical aspects attendant to such collision,hence, the prescriptive period under the law should begin to run only from
April 29, 1982, the date when the negligence of the crew of M/V AsiaPhilippines had been finally ascertained.
On appeal to the CA, the said court reversed the RTCs decision and granted
theMTD, hence the present petition for certiorari and prohibition.
ISSUES & ARGUMENTSW/N a complaint for damages instituted by the petitioners against the private
respondent arising from a marine collision is barred by the statute of
limitations
HOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDI
YES. The right of action accrues when there exists a cause of action, which
consists of 3 elements, namely:o A right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever means and under
whatever law it arises or is createdo An obligation on the part of defendant to respect such righto An act or omission on the part of such defendant violative of the right
of the plaintiff
The occurrence of the last element is the time when the cause of action arise
Aggrieved party need not wait for a determination by an administrative body
that the collision was caused by fault or negligence of the other party before
he can file action for damages
1. Petition is DISMISSED.
II. CAUSATION
a. Proximate Cause
11. Bataclan vs. Medina
FACTS
Shortly after midnight, on September 13, 1952 bus no. 30 of the MedinaTransportation, operated by its owner defendant Mariano Medina under a
certificate of public convenience, left the town of Amadeo, Cavite, on its way
to Pasay City, driven by its regular chauffeur, Conrado Saylon.
There were about eighteen passengers, including the driver and conductor.
Among the passengers were Juan Bataclan, seated beside and to the right ofthe driver, Felipe Lara, sated to the right of Bataclan, another passenger
apparently from the Visayan Islands whom the witnesses just called Visaya,
apparently not knowing his name, seated in the left side of the driver, and awoman named Natalia Villanueva, seated just behind the four last mentioned.
At about 2:00 o'clock that same morning, while the bus was running withinthe jurisdiction of Imus, Cavite, one of the front tires burst and the vehicle
began to zig-zag until it fell into a canal or ditch on the right side of the road
and turned turtle. Some of the passengers managed to leave the bus the best
way they could, others had to be helped or pulled out, while the three
passengers seated beside the driver, named Bataclan, Lara and the Visayan
and the woman behind them named Natalia Villanueva, could not get out ofthe overturned bus.
Some of the passengers, after they had clambered up to the road, heard groans
and moans from inside the bus, particularly, shouts for help from Bataclan andLara, who said they could not get out of the bus.
There is nothing in the evidence to show whether or not the passengers
already free from the wreck, including the driver and the conductor, made any
attempt to pull out or extricate and rescue the four passengers trapped inside
the vehicle, but calls or shouts for help were made to the houses in theneighborhood.
After half an hour, came about ten men, one of them carrying a lighted torchmade of bamboo with a wick on one end, evidently fueled with petroleum.
These men presumably approached the overturned bus, and almostimmediately, a fierce fire started, burning and all but consuming the bus,
including the four passengers trapped inside it.
It would appear that as the bus overturned, gasoline began to leak and escapefrom the gasoline tank on the side of the chassis, spreading over and
permeating the body of the bus and the ground under and around it, and that
the lighted torch brought by one of the men who answered the call for help setit on fire.
That same day, the charred bodies of the four deemed passengers inside thebus were removed and duly identified that of Juan Bataclan.
The widow instituted a suit to recover damages from Medina. The trial courtruled in favor of the widow of Bataclan. But the trial court contends that the
overturning of the bus was not the proximate cause of Bataclans death.
ISSUES & ARGUMENTS Whether the overturning of the bus was the proximate cause of Bataclans
death or
the fire that burned the bus
HOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDI
In the present case under the circumstances obtaining in the same, we do not
hesitate to hold that the proximate cause was the overturning of the bus, this
for the reason that when the vehicle turned not only on its side but completelyon its back, the leaking of the gasoline from the tank was not unnatural or
unexpected; that the coming of the men with a lighted torch was in response to
the call for help, made not only by the passengers, but most probably, by thedriver and the conductor themselves, and that because it was dark (about 2:30
in the morning), the rescuers had to carry a light with them, and coming as
they did from a rural area where lanterns and flashlights were not available;and what was more natural than that said rescuers should innocently approach
the vehicle to extend the aid and effect the rescue requested from them.
In other words, the coming of the men with a torch was to be expected and
was a natural sequence of the overturning of the bus, the trapping of some of
its passengers and the call for outside help. What is more, the burning of thebus can also in part be attributed to the negligence of the carrier, through is
driver and its conductor.
According to the witness, the driver and the conductor were on the road
walking back and forth. They, or at least, the driver should and must have
known that in the position in which the overturned bus was, gasoline couldand must have leaked from the gasoline tank and soaked the area in and
around the bus, this aside from the fact that gasoline when spilled, specially
over a large area, can be smelt and directed even from a distance, and yetneither the driver nor the conductor would appear to have cautioned or taken
steps to warn the rescuers not to bring the lighted torch too near the bus. Saidnegligence on the part of the agents of the carrier come under the codal
provisions above-reproduced, particularly, Articles 1733,
1759 1763.
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12. Pilipinas Bank vs. CA
Facts:
As payments for the purchased shoe materials and rubber shoes,
Florencio Reyes issued post-dated checks to Winner Industrial
Corporation and Vicente Tui with due dates on October 10 and 12, 1979,
respectively.
To cover the face value of the checks, plaintiff, on October 10, 1979,
requested PCIB Money Shop's manager Mike Potenciano to effect the
withdrawal of P32, 000.00 from his savings account therein and have it
deposited with his current account with Pilipinas Bank (then Filman
Bank), Bian Branch. Roberto Santos was requested to make the
deposit.
In depositing in the name of FLORENCIO REYES, he inquired from the
teller the current account number of Florencio Reyes to complete the
deposit slip he was accomplishing.
He was informed that it was "815" and so this was the same current
account number he placed on the deposit slip below the depositor's name
FLORENCIO REYES.
Nothing that the account number coincided with the name Florencio,
Efren Alagasi, then Current Account Bookkeeper of Pilipinas Bank,thought it was for Florencio Amador who owned the listed account
number. He, thus, posted the deposit in the latter's account not noticing
that the depositor's surname in the deposit slip was REYES.
On October 11, 1979, the October 10, check in favor of Winner
Industrial Corporation was presented for payment. Since the ledger of
Florencio Reyes indicated that his account had only a balance of P4,
078.43, it was dishonoured and the payee was advised to try it for next
clearing. On October 15, 1979, the October 10, 1979 check was
redeposited but was again dishonoured.
Likewise, the October 12, 1979 check in favor of Vicente Tui when
presented for payment on that same date met the same fate but was
advised to try the next clearing.
Two days after the October 10 check was again dishonoured, the payee
returned the same to Florencio Reyes and demanded a cash payment of
its face value which he did if only to save his name. The October 12,
1979 check was redeposited on October 18, 1979, but again dishonoured
for the reason that the check was drawn against insufficient fund.
Furious over the incident, he immediately proceeded to the bank and
urged an immediate verification of his account. Upon verification, the
bank noticed the error.
The P32,000.00 deposit posted in the account of Florencio Amador was
immediately transferred to the account of Reyes upon being cleared by
Florencio Amador that he did not effect a deposit in the amount of
P32,000.00. The transfer having been effected, the bank then honored
the October 12, 1979, check.
Issue: WON the proximate cause of the mis-posting of deposit was due
to the error of the representative of Reyes
Held:
No. For Article 2179 of the Civil Code to apply, it must be established
that private respondent's own negligence was the immediate and
proximate cause of his injury. The concept of proximate cause is well
defined in our corpus of jurisprudence as "any cause which, in natural
and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause,
produces the result complained of and without which would not have
occurred and from which it ought to have been foreseen or reasonably
anticipated by a person of ordinary case that the injury complained of or
some similar injury, would result there from as a natural and probable
consequence."
In the case at bench, the proximate cause of the injury is the negligence
of petitioner's employee in erroneously posting the cash deposit of
private respondent in the name of another depositor who had a similar
first name. As held by the trial court:
Applying the test, the bank employee is, on that basis, deemed to have
failed to exercise the degree of care required in the performance of his
duties. As earlier stated, the bank employee posted the cash deposit in
the account of Florencio Amador from his assumption that the name
Florencio appearing on the ledger without, however, going through the
full name, is the same Florencio stated in the deposit slip.
He should have continuously gone beyond mere assumption, which was
proven to be erroneous, and proceeded with clear certainty, considering
the amount involved and the repercussions it would create on the totality
of the person notable of which is the credit standing of the person
involved should a mistake happen. The checks issued by the plaintiff in
the course of his business were dishonored by the bank because the
ledger of Florencio Reyes indicated a balance insufficient to cover the
face value of checks.
b. Remote Cause, Nearest Cause, Concurrent Cause (Art. 2194, Art.
2202 of the Civil Code)
2194 The responsibility of two or more
persons who are liable for quasi-
delict is solidary.
2202 In crimes and quasi-delicts, the
defendantshall be liable for all
damages which are the natural andprobable consequences of the act or
omission complained of. It is not
necessary that such damages have
been foreseen or could havereasonably been foreseen by the
defendant.
13.The Atlantic Gulf and Pacific Company vs. The Govt of the Phil.
Islands (Warning: Incomplete)
FACTS
Atlantic Gulf commenced construction of a steel fabrication plant in Bauan,
Batangas which necessitated dredging operations at the Batangas Bay, in an
area adjacent to the property of private respondents.
Two actions for damages were filed by different respondents and were
consolidated as the plaintiffs therein intended to present common evidence
against defendant, by reason of the virtual identity of the issues involved in
both cases.
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Private respondents alleged that petitioners personnel and heavy equipment
trespassed, damaged, and made into depots and parking lots without payment
of rent the land owned by the respondents.
Moreover, the sea silt and water overflowed and were deposited upon their
land. Consequently, the said property which used to be agricultural lands
principally devoted to rice production and each averaging an annual net
harvest of 75 Cavans, could no longer be planted with Palay as the soil
became infertile, salty, unproductive and unsuitable for agriculture.
Petitioner denied allegations about its personnel and heavy equipment. And
it further contended that the sea silt and water was due to the floods and heavy
rains of typhoon Ruping
Trial court ruled in favor of respondents ordering Atlantic to pay damages.
Upon appeal to the CA, judgment was affirmed with modifications increasing
the amount of damages.
Petitioner is now asking for nullification or at least partial modificat ion on
the grounds of double recovery.
ISSUES & ARGUMENTS
W/N the awards to the respondents constitute double recovery and thus,
prohibited by the NCC.
Petitioners: Article 2177 of the Civil Code states that: "the plaintiff cannot
recover damages twice for the same act or omission of the defendant"
W/N the CA committed grave abuse in discretion by granting excessive
damages
HOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDI
SC may not reverse a judgment on a Certiorari case under Rule 45. But CA
committed grave abuse of discretion when it increased the damages
Evidence on record support findings of trial and appellate courts that
petitioner was liable. The fact that the appellate court adopted the findings of
the trial court, as in this case, makes the same binding upon the SupremeCourt, for the factual findings of said appellate court are generally binding on
the latter. For that matter the findings of the Court of Appeals by itself, and
which are supported by substantial evidence, are almost beyond the power of
review by the Supreme Court.
Only questions of law may be raised on certiorari under Rule 45. It is not the
function of the SC to analyze or weigh evidence all over again. Its jurisdiction
is limited to reviewing errors of law that might have been committed by the
lower court. Unless the findings are glaringly erroneous.
However, CA committed reversible error when it increased damages. Only
the petitioner appealed and the respondents are presumed to be satisfied with
the judgment.
The entrenched procedural rule in this jurisdiction is that a party who has not
himself appealed cannot obtain from the appellate court any affirmative relief
other than those granted in the decision of the lower court.
Judgment modified.
14. Rodrigueza vs. Manila Railroad Company
Facts:
Defendant Railroad Company operates a line through the district of Daraga in
the municipality of Albay; as one of its trains passed over said line, a great
quantity of sparks were emitted from the smokestack of the locomotive, and
fire was thereby communicated to four houses nearby belonging to the four
plaintiffs respectively, and the same were entirely consumed. All of these
houses were of light construction with the exception of the house of Remigio
Rodrigueza, which was of strong materials, though the roof was covered with
nipa and cogon. The fire occurred immediately after the passage of the train,
and a strong wind was blowing at the time. It does not appear either in the
complaint or in the agreed statement whose house caught fire first, though it is
stated in the appellant's brief that the fire was first communicated to the house
of Remigio Rodrigueza, from whence it spread to the others.
In its defense Respondent alleged that it is not liable since petitioner is also
negligent. It appeared that the house of Remigio Rodriguez stood partly within
the limits of the land owned by the defendant company. It further appears that
after the railroad track was laid, the company notified Rodriguez to get his
house off the land of the company and to remove it from its exposed position.
Rodriguez did not comply with this suggestion, though he promised to put an
iron roof on his house, which he never did. Instead, he changed the materials
of the main roof to nipa, leaving the kitchen and media-aguas covered with
cogon.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioner's negligence absolves respondent, despite also its
negligence, from liability.
Ruling:
No.
Explained the court, with respect to the case of Remegio Rodrigueza it is to
be inferred that his house stood upon this ground before the Railroad
Company laid its line over this course; and at any rate there is no proof that
this plaintiff had unlawfully intruded upon the railroad's property in the act of
building his house. What really occurred undoubtedly is that the company,
upon making this extension, had acquired the land only, leaving the owner of
the house free to remove it. Hence he cannot be considered to have been a
trespasser in the beginning. Rather, he was there at the sufferance of the
defendant company, and so long as his house remained in this exposed
position, he undoubtedly assumed the risk of any loss that might have resulted
from fires occasioned by the defendant's locomotives if operated and managed
with ordinary care. But he cannot be held to have assumed the risk of any
damage that might result from the unlawful negligence acts of the defendant.
Nobody is bound to anticipate and defend himself against the possible
negligence of another. Rather he has a right to assume that the other will use
the care of the ordinary prudent man.
In the situation now under consideration the proximate and only cause of
the damage that occurred was the negligent act of the defendant in causing
this fire. The circumstance that Remigio Rodrigueza's house was partly on the
property of the defendant company and therefore in dangerous proximity to
passing locomotives was an antecedent condition that may in fact have made
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the disaster possible, but that circumstance cannot be imputed to him as
contributory negligence destructive of his right of action, because, first, that
condition was not created by himself; secondly, because his house remained
on this ground by the toleration, and therefore with the consent of the Railroad
Company; and thirdly, because even supposing the house to be improperly
there, this fact would not justify the defendant in negligently destroying it.
[The destruction must be via lawful means and not via negligence!]
Moreover, the circumstance that the defendant company, upon planting its
line near Remigio Rodrigueza's house, had requested or directed him to
remove it, did not convert his occupancy into a trespass, or impose upon him
any additional responsibility over and above what the law itself imposes in
such situation. In this connection it must be remembered that the company
could at any time have removed said house in the exercise of the power of
eminent domain, but it elected not to do so.
Petitioner's negligence is the nearest cause of the fire that destroys the
house of the three others, since without his house that is built near the rail line
which absorbs the spark, there have been no fire. However, it must be noted
that even if the the negligence of the person is the nearest cause; it does not
absolved a party if he is also negligent.
15. Caltex vs. Africa
Facts:
A fire broke out at the Caltex service station at the corner of Antipolo Street
and Rizal Avenue, Manila. It started while gasoline was being hosed from a
tank truck into the underground storage, right at the opening of the receiving
tank where the nozzle of the hose was inserted, when an unknown bystander
threw a matchstick into the nozzle after lighting a cigarette.
The fire spread to and burned several neighbouring houses, including the
personal properties and effects inside them. Their owners, among them
petitioners here, sued respondents Caltex (Phil.), Inc. and Mateo Boquiren, the
first as alleged owner of the station and the second as its agent in charge of
operation.
Negligence on the part of both of them was attributed as the cause of the fire.
The trial court and the Court of Appeals found that petitioners fai led to prove
negligence and that respondents had exercised due care in the premises and
with respect to the supervision of their employees.
Issue:
Whether or not, without proof as to the cause and origin of the fire, the
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur should apply so as to presume negligence on the
part of appellees.
Held:
Reversed.
The gasoline station, with all its appliances, equipment and employees, was
under the control of appellees. A fire occurred therein and spread to and
burned the neighboring houses. The persons who knew or could have known
how the fire started were appellees and their employees, but they gave no
explanation thereof whatsoever. It is a fair and reasonable inference that the
incident happened because of want of care.
The report submitted by a police officer in the performance of his duties on
the basis of his own personal observation that the gasoline station being
located on a thickly populated area, a person lighting a cigarette cannot be
excluded and poses as a secondary hazard, may properly be considered as an
exception to the hearsay rule.
These facts, descriptive of the location and objective circumstances
surrounding the operation of the gasoline station in question, strengthen the
presumption of negligence under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, since on
their face they called for more stringent measures of caution than those which
would satisfy the standard of due diligence under ordinary circumstances.
Even then, the fire possibly would not have spread to the neighboring houses
were it not for another negligent omission on the part of defendants, namely,
their failure to provide a concrete wall high enough to prevent the flames from
leaping over it. As it was the concrete wall was only 2-1/2 meters high, and
beyond that height it consisted merely of galvanized iron sheets, which would
predictably crumple and melt when subjected to intense heat.
Defendants' negligence, therefore, was not only with respect to the cause of
the fire but also with respect to the spread thereof to the neighboring houses.
16. Sabido vs. Custodio, 124 Phil. 516
NATURE
Petition for review by certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals
FACTS
In Barrio Halang, , two trucks, one driven by Mudales and belonging to
Laguna-Tayabas Bus Company, and the other driven by Lagunda and owned
by Prospero Sabido, going in opposite directions met each other in a road
curve. Custodia, LTB bus passenger who was riding on the running board
astruck was full of passengers, was sideswiped by the truck driven by
Lagunda.
As a result, Custodio was injured and died.
To avoid any liability, Lagunda and Sabido throw all the blame on Mudales.
However, Makabuhay, widoy of Custodio, testified that the 6 x 6 truck was
running fast when it met the LTB Bus. And Lagunda had time and opportunityto avoid the mishap if he had been sufficiently careful and cautious becausethe
two trucks never collided with each other. By simply swerving to the right
side of the road, the 6 x 6 truck could have avoided hitting Custodio.
The sideswiping of the deceased and his two fellow passengers took place on
broad daylight at about 9:30 in the morning of June 9, 1955 when the LTB bu
with full load to passengers was negotiating a sharp curve of a bumpy and
sliding downward a slope, whereas the six by six truck was climbing up with
no cargoes or passengers on board but for three helpers, owner Sabido and
driver Lagunda (tsn. 308-309, Mendoza). LTB passengers had testified to the
effect that the 6 x 6 cargo truck was running at a fast rate of speed.
Driver Lagunda admitted that three passengers rode on the running board of
the bus when his vehicle was still at a distance of 5 or 7 meters from the bus.
Despite the presence of a shallow canal on the right side of the road which he
could pass over with ease, Lagunda did not avert the accident simply because
to use his own language the canal "is not a passage of trucks.
Based upon these facts, the Court of First Instance of Laguna and the Court of
Appeals concluded that the Laguna-Tayabas Bus Co.hereinafter referred
to as the carrierand its driver Mudales (none of whom has appealed), had
violated the contract of carriage with Agripino Custodio, whereas petitioners
Sabido and Lagunda were guilty of a quasi delict, by reason of which all of
them were held solidarity liable.
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ISSUES
1. WON petitioners were guilty of negligence
2. WON petitioners should be held solidarily liable with the carrier and its
driver
HELD
1. YES. The views of the Court of Appeals on the speed of the truck and its
location at the time of the accident are in the nature of findings of fact, which
we cannot disturb in a petition for review by certiorari, such as the one at bar.
At any rate, the correctness of said findings is borne out by the very testimony
of petitioner Lagunda to the effect that he saw the passengers riding on the
running board of the bus while the same was still five or seven meters away
from the truck driven by him. Indeed, the distance between the two vehicles
was such that he could have avoided sideswiping said passengers if his truck
were not running at a great speed.
Although the negligence of the carrier and its driver is independent, in its
execution, of the negligence of the truck driver and its owner, both acts of
negligence are the proximate cause of the death of Agripino Custodio.
In fact, the negligence of the first two would not have produced this result
without the negligence of petitioners' herein. What is more, petitioners'
negligence was the last, in point of time, for Custodio was on the running
board of the carrier's bus sometime before petitioners' truck came from the
opposite direction, so that, in this sense, petitioners' truck had the last clear
chance.
2. YES. Where the carrier bus and its driver were clearly guilty of
contributory negligence for having allowed a passenger to ride on the running
board of the bus, and where the driver of the other vehicle was also guilty of
contributory negligence, because that vehicle was running at a considerable
speed despite the fact that it was negotiating a sharp curve, and, instead of
being close to its right side of the road, it was driven on its middle portion
thereof and so near the passenger bus coming from the opposite as to
sideswipe a passenger on its running board, the owners of the two vehicles are
liable solidarily for the death of the passenger, although the liability of one
arises from a breach of contract, whereas that of the other springs from a quasidelict.
Where the concurrent or successive negligent acts or omission of two or more
persons, although acting independently of each other, are, in combination, the
direct and proximate cause of a single injury to a third person, and it is
impossible to determine in what proportion each contributed to the injury,
either is responsible for the whole injury, even though his act alone might not
have caused the entire injury, or the same damage might have resulted from
the acts of the other tort-feasor.
c. Doctrine of Last Clear Chance
17. Picart vs. Smith (Taken up Already)
18. Del Prado vs. Manila Electric Co
FACTS:
The Manila Electric Company, is engaged in operating street cars in the City
of Manila for the conveyance of passengers; and on the morning of 18
November 1925, one Teodorico Florenciano, as Meralcos motorman, was in
charge of car 74 running from east to west on R. Hidalgo Street, the scene of
the accident being at a point near the intersection of said street and Mendoza
Street.
After the car had stopped at its appointed place for taking on and letting off
passengers, just east of the intersection, it resumed its course at a moderate
speed under the guidance of the motorman. The car had proceeded only a
short distance, however, when Ignacio del Prado ran across the street to catch
the car, his approach being made from the left. - The car was of the kind
having entrance and exit at either end, and the movement of del Prado was so
timed that he arrived at the front entrance of the car at the moment when the
car was passing. Del Prado, upon approaching the car, raised his hand as an
indication to the motorman of his desire to board the car, in response to which
the motorman eased up a little, without stopping.
Upon this, del Prado seized, with his left hand, the front perpendicular
handpost, at the same time placing his left foot upon the platform. However,
before del Prados position had become secure, and even before his raised
right foot had reached the platform, the motorman applied the power, with the
result that the car gave a slight lurch forward.
This sudden impulse to the car caused del Prados foot toslip, and his hand
was jerked loose from the handpost. He therefore fell to the ground, and his
right foot was caught and crushed by the moving car.
The next day the member had to be amputated in the hospital (ouch). - An
action was instituted in the CFI of Manila by Ignacio del Prado to recoverdamages in the amount of P50,000 for personal injuries alleged to have been
caused by the negligence of Meralco in the operation of one of its street cars
in the City of Manila. Upon hearing the cause the trial court awarded to del
Prado the sum of P10,000, as damages, with costs of suit. Meralco appealed. -
The Supreme Court affirmed the appealed judgment with the modification tha
the sum to be recoveredreduced to P2,500; with costs against Meralco.
ISSUES AND RATIO:
1. No obligation on the part of a street railway company to stop cars at
points other than appointed for stoppage
There is no obligation on the part of a street railway company to stop its cars
to let on intending passengers at other points than those appointed for
stoppage. It would be impossible to operate a system of street cars if acompany engaged in this business were required to stop any and everywhere
to take on people who are too indolent, or who imagine themselves to be in
too great a hurry, to go to the proper places for boarding the cars.
2. Duty of the motorman of the car
Although the motorman of the car was not bound to stop to let the passenger
on, it was his duty to do no act that would have the effect of increasing the
passengers peril while he was attempting to board the car. The premature
acceleration of the car was a breach of this duty.
3. Nature of relation between a carrier of passengers for hire and its
patrons; Duty of the carrier
The relation between a carrier of passengers for hire and its patrons is of a
contractual nature; and a failure on the part of the carrier to use due care in
carrying its passengers safely is a breach of duty (culpa contractual) under
articles 1101, 1103, and 1104 of the Civil Code. Furthermore, the duty that the
carrier of passengers owes to its patrons extends to persons boarding the cars
as well as to those alighting therefrom.
4. Cangco v. Manila Railroad; Culpa Contractual
The case of Cangco v. Manila Railroad Co. supplies an instance of the
violation of the duty with respect to a passenger who was getting off of a train
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In that case, the plaintiff stepped off of a moving train, while it was slowing
down in a station, and at a time when it was too dark for him to see clearly
where he was putting his feet. The employees of the company had carelessly
left watermelons on the platform at the place where the plaintiff alighted, with
the result that his feet slipped and he fell under the car, where his right arm
was badly injured. This court held that the railroad company was liable for
breach of positive duty (culpa contractual), and the plaintiff was awarded
damages in the amount of P2,500 for the loss of his arm. In the opinion in that
case the distinction is clearly drawn between a liability for negligence arising
from breach of contractual duty and that arising under articles 1902 and 1903
of the Civil Code (culpa aquiliana).
5. Relevance of distinction between Culpa Contractual and Culpa
Aquiliana as to defenses available
The distinction between the two sorts of negligence is important in this
jurisdiction, for the reason that where liability arises from a mere tort (culpa
aquiliana), not involving a breach of positive obligation, an employer, or
master, may exculpate himself, under the last paragraph of article 1903 of the
Civil Code, by proving that he had exercised due diligence to prevent the
damage; whereas this defense is not available if the liability of the master
arises from a breach of contractual duty (culpa contractual).
6. Training of motorman irrelevant in breach of obligation under Article
1101 of the Civil Code
Herein, the company pleaded as a special defense that it had used all the
diligence of a good father of a family to prevent the damage suffered by del
Prado; and to establish this contention the company introduced testimony
showing that due care had been used in training and instructing the motorman
in charge of this car in his art. This proof is irrelevant in view of the fact that
the liability involved was derived from a breach of obligation under article
1101 of the Civil Code and related provisions.
7. Relevance of distinction between negligence arising under Article 1902
and 1101 as to mitigation of liability
Another practical difference between liability for negligence arising under
article 1902 of the Civil Code and liability arising from negligence in the
performance of a positive duty, under article 1101 and related provisions of
the Civil Code, is that, in dealing with the latter form of negligence, the court
is given a discretion to mitigate liability according to the circumstances of the
case (art 1103). No such general discretion is given by the Code in dealing
with liability arising under article 1902; though possibly the same end is
reached by courts in dealing with the latter form of liability because of the
latitude of the considerations pertinent to cases arising under this article.
8. Contributory negligence a mitigating circumstance under Article 1103
Civil Code
As to the contributory negligence of del Prado, as in Rakes vs. Atlantic, Gulf
and Pacific Co. (7 Phil., 359), it is treated as a mitigating circumstance under
article 1103 of the Civil Code. Herein, the negligence of del Prado was
contributory to the accident and must be considered as a mitigating
circumstance.
9. Proximate cause of the accident
Del Prados negligence in attempting to board the moving car wasnot the
proximate cause of the injury. The direct and proximate cause of the injury
was the act of Meralcos motorman in putting on thepower prematurely. A
person boarding a moving car must be taken to assume the risk of injury from
boarding the car under the conditions open to his view, but he cannot fairly be
held to assume the risk that the motorman, having the situation in view, will
increase his peril by accelerating the speed of the car before he is planted
safely on the platform. Again, the situation is one where the negligent act of
the companys servant succeeded the negligent act of the passenger, and the
negligence of the company must be considered the proximate cause of the
injury.
10.Rule analogous to the doctrine of the last clear chance
The rule applicable seems to be analogous to, if not identical with that which
is sometimes referred to as the doctrine of the last clear chance. In
accordance with this doctrine, the contributory negligence of the party injured
will not defeat the action if it be shown that the defendant might, by the
exercise of reasonable care and prudence, have avoided the consequences of
the negligence of the injured party.
11. Award of damage
With respect to the effect of this injury upon del Prados earning power,
although he lost his foot, he
is able to use an artificial member without great inconvenience and his
earning capacity has probably not been reduced by more than 30%. In view of
the precedents found in the Courts decisions with respect to
the damages that ought to be awarded for the loss of a limb, and more
particularly Rakes vs. Atlantic, Gulf and Pacific Co. (7 Phil., 359); Cangco vs
Manila Railroad Co. (38 Phil., 768); and Borromeo vs. Manila Electric
Railroad and Light Co. (44 Phil., 165), and in view of all the circumstancesconnected with the case, the Court is of the opinion that del Prado will be
adequately compensated by an award of P2,500.
19. Pantranco North Express Inc. vs. Maricar Baesa G.R. Nos. 79050-51
November 14, 1989
FACTS:
At about 7:00 am of June 12, 1981, the spouses Ceasar and Marilyn Baesa and
their children Harold Jim, Marcelino and Maricar, together with spouses
David Ico and Fe O. Ico with their son Erwin Ico and seven persons, were
aboard a passenger jeepney on the way to a picnic at Malalam River, Ilagan,
Isabela, to celebrate the fifth wedding anniversary of the spouses Baesa.
The group in the jeepney proceeded to a barrio to deliver some viands whichthey drove along San Felipe, taking the highway going to Malamlam River.
Upon reaching the highway, the jeepney turned right and proceeded
Malamlam river at a speed of 20kph. While they were proceeding Malmlam
River, a speeding PANTRANCO bus from Aparri, on its regular rout to
Manila, encroached the jeepneys lane while negotiating a curve, and collided
with it.
As a result of the accident David Ico, spouses Baesa and their children died
except Maricar and the rest of the passengers suffered injuries. The jeepney
was extensively damaged. After the accident the driver of the PANTRANCO
Bus, Ambrosio Ramirez, boarded a car and proceeded to Santiago, Isabella.
From that time on up to the present, Ramirez has never been seen and has
apparently remained hiding. Maricar Baesa, through ther guardian Francisca
O. Bascos and Fe. O. Ico for herself and for her minor children, filed separate
actions for damages from quasi delict against PANTRANCO.
The petitioner contented that the respondent court did not apply the doctrine
of last clear chance against the jeepney driver. Also, under the circumstance o
the case, it was the driver of the jeepney who had the last clear chance to
avoid the collision and was therefore negligent in failing to utilize with
reasonable care and competence his then existing opportunity to avoid the
harm.
ISSUE:Whether or not the doctrine of last clear chance may be applied to
the case at bar to absolve the petitioner from liabilities?
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HELD:No, the court held that the doctrine of last clear chance applies only in
a situation where the defendant, having the last fair chance to avoid the
impending harm and failed to do so, becomes liable for all the consequences
of the accident notwithstanding the prior negligence of the plaintiff.
Generally, the last clear chance doctrine is invoked for the purpose of making
a defendant liable to a plaintiff who was guilty o