Post on 26-Mar-2018
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The Safe Loading of Cement Tankers (and prevention of silo contamination)
IQA-CCAA
Construction Materials Industry Conference11-14 October 2006
Contents
• Background
• CCAA Working party formation
• Alternatives considered
• Tanker safety platform guideline
• Contamination and silo design
• Contamination survey
• What’s next?
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• Coloured cements (eg offwhite, brightonlight)• Type GP Portland (normal)• Type GB Flyash Blend• Lime• Flyash• Type LH Low Heat• Type GP Portland (2nd Silo)• Type GB Slag Blend• Type HE High Early Strength• Type SR Sulphate Resistant
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Traditional cement tanker loading process
The phone call that you don’t want - 28 August 2005
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Some examples of tanker ladders
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Some examples of tanker ladders
Some examples of tanker ladders
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Some examples of tanker ladders
Some examples of tanker ladders
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Some examples of tanker ladders
Typical driver safety risk
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Formation of the CCAA working party –Dec 2005
Objectives
1. Safe loading of cement road (and rail) tankers
2. Preventing cross contamination during unloading operations
3. Standardisation of cement silos and tanker operation and design to improve the interface between tanker fleets and silos
Working party membership
• Bob Reid Cement Australia• Ron Bull Cement Australia• Greg Davis Blue Circle Southern Cement Ltd
(seconded from SKM)• Nick White Blue Circle Southern Cement Ltd• John Derrin Blue Circle Southern Cement Ltd• Chris Parsons Hanson Construction Materials• Guy Martin Adelaide Brighton Cement Ltd• Ken Slattery CCAA• Tom Glasby CCAA• Neil Taylor Intec Services Pty Ltd (Cement Operations
Consultant)
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1. Safe loading of tankers
a) Elimination
– use of remotely activated hatches
b) Prevention
– stable and secure work platform
c) Restraint
– guards and/or barriers
d) Arrest
– harness/cable systems
Reducing effectiveness
a) Elimination – use of Remotely Operated Hatches
• US technology through Convair
• operate using compressed air
• installed on 25 Kandos – Clyde railwagons (3 per wagon)
• teething problems –– Pins bending– Erratic closing/opening– Closure security– Dust susceptibility
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Knappco automated hatches
Advantages+ used at ground level so
driver fall risk eliminated
+ reduces risks associated with manual handling
+ quick operation (in principle)
+ readily used at any facility
+ relatively mature technology
+ quickfit to existing Convairhatches
Disadvantages─ will require high level access
at some time (eg spillage clean up)
─ specialist support and materials needed
─ must be fitted to every tanker (up to 3 hatches)
─ longer retrofit for some
─ doesn’t allow tank checks
b) Prevention (loading platforms)
• Providing stable and secure work platforms– most already heading this way
– few installations comply totally with AS1657
– various solutions have been tried to cope with:• variable tanker configurations and dimensions
• variable prime mover configurations
• available space and headroom restrictions
• loading technology – telescopic vs sock
• travelling socks
• weighbridge access limitations - height
• range of work practices, etc
• different hatches used for loading dependent on axle loads
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Some examples of loading platforms
Some examples of loading platforms
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Some examples of loading platforms
Some examples of loading platforms
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There is a wide range of tanker heights to consider
c) Restraint
• TRAM system
Not desirable due to safety and compliance risks
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c) Restraint • Collapsible handrails
Not desirable due to safety and compliance risks
d) Arrest – harness/cable systems
• Eliminated early in process due to unacceptable safety and compliance risks
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Comparing caged platforms and remote hatches
Platforms and safety cagesplatforms will (always) be required at most locationsproper platform design will facilitate safe loading and access to equipmentimproved oversight of loading processuses robust, simple and familiar technologybetter QA implicationsdoesn’t absolutely eliminate fall risk
Remote hatchesused at ground level so driver fall risk eliminatedspecialist support & materials will be neededdoesn’t obviate need for high level accessmust be fitted to each tanker (up to 4? hatches)reduces risks associated with manual handlingdoesn’t allow tank checkswill require development of (auto) sampling system
Design guideline for bulk cement tanker safety platforms
• Location – preferably integrated with loading spout, roofed, may need to be separate
• Height – optimised for 3.9 m high tankers, accommodate 3.5–4.3 m
• Headroom – minimum 2.1 m above highest tanker
• Standards – comply with AS 1657, 4100,1664, 4024
• Access – stairs, ramp preferable to variable pitch stairs, slope <=20 degrees
• Safety - caged platform with handrails all sides
• Security - access controls, drive-off control risks
• Tanker alignment – graduated distance scale for correct alignment
• Dust proof cabin where possible – safety from major spillage incident
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Suggested platform configuration for typical tanker
Elements of a typical platform
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Possible ramp and cage configurations
Configuration for ramps above and parallel to tankers
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Safety cage with floor sections
Safety cage without floor sections
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Road tanker guideline to complement platform design
• Involvement of tanker manufacturers
• Height 3.8 – 3.9 m
• Maximum height, including prime mover 4.1m
• Hatches of 510mm diameter, open to rear
• End hatches at least 1.2m from tanker top end
• Non-slip tank top surface with no trip hazards between toe/kick rails, or at least 900mm wide
• On-board access equipment not recommended (guideline incorporates provision if needed )
Good examples of loading platforms
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Good examples of loading platforms
Good examples of loading platforms
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Good examples of loading platforms
Good examples of loading platforms
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Good examples of loading platforms
2. Preventing cross contamination during unloading
• Various contamination prevention systems in use
• Contamination survey to ascertain extent of problem
• Data from cement producers and major premix customers
• Most events recorded by cement producers
• 2003 – 2005 period
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Silo contamination events for each State (2003-2005 inc)
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Qld NSW Vic SA WA Tas NTState / Territory
Ann
ual s
ilo c
onta
min
atio
n ev
ents Reported by Cement suppliers
Reported by Premix Majors
Silo contamination events by Company (2003 - 2005)
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2
4
6
8
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2003 2004 2005Year
Annu
al s
ilo c
onta
min
atio
n ev
ents Company X Company Y Company Z
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Number of 25 tonnes deliveries per event (8 Miot/yr)
0
10,000
20,000
30,000
40,000
50,000
60,000
70,000
80,000
2003 2004 2005Year
25 t
deliv
erie
s pe
r eve
nt Supplier X Supplier Y Supplier Z
Contamination prevention methods in use
• Lock and key
• Fill pipe colour coding
• Tanker anti-contamination plates
• Electronic systems –– Online back to terminal
– Swipe cards
– Dallas key systems (Siloguard)
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Issues with the existing anti-contamination systems
• Fill point colour coding systems differ – NRMCA standard not used consistently
• Different use of locks and keys – between states, within companies, different times
• Broad range of colours with anti-contamination plates
• Anti-contamination plates not always used• Different electronic systems used• Overall – no clear industry standards,
unacceptable levels of contamination incidents
Anti-contamination systems – next steps
• Development of industry basic standard for use of locks and keys, colour coding (fill pipes and anti-contamination plates)
• Use of more sophisticated or electronic systems at discretion of individual companies
• To be incorporated into “draft guideline for unloading bulk tankers and silo operations at premix concrete plants”
• Working party formed and commenced in October 2006, to be completed mid 2007.
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Thank you.
Questions?