RUMOURS & RIOTS IN MYANMAR (BURMA)

Policy and Program Frameworks to Address Escalating Communal Polarisation

Gerard McCarthy, ANUPresentation to TechChange course, ‘Tech for Conflict Management & Peacebuilding’ (January 28th 2014)

About me• Program Director (Asia-Pacific) at

TechChange.• PhD Candidate at Australian National

University: researching intersection of democratization, social polarisation and information communication technologies.

• Previously worked for NGOs, CSOs in Sri Lanka, Myanmar, South Sudan, US and Aus.

• Spent a month in Myanmar (Nov-Dec 2013) conducting initial research (now working on a related policy paper).

Myanmar: Fast facts• Population: C. 65 million• Economy: GDP $52B USD in 2011

(Thailand $365B in 2011)• Religion: Around 80% Buddhist, 8%

Christian, 3% Muslim.• Military rule (1962-2010), semi-

democratic rule (2010-present). Elections set for Nov 2015.

• Electricity: 13% (2011)• Mobile coverage: <10% (2011)• Internet: <2% (2011)

What’s the problem?• Communal violence is spreading across the country from

Rakhine State (west) to Meiktila (central) to Lashio (China border). Issue is metastasizing from a communal to a broader religious conflict, led by anti-Muslim ‘969’ movement.

• Rumours and images of violence are spreading through social media (online and word-of-mouth), cultivating localised social polarisation.

Why does it matter?• Democratic threat: Communal violence between Muslims & Buddhists

could impact democratisation process (elections Nov 2015) & justify military role in politics.

• Refugee crisis: Muslims are planning to flee Myanmar to other SE Asian nations (Indonesia and Malaysia) - potential regional refugee crisis akin to Partition.

• Stoking terrorism: Religious element of the violence has become pronounced, creating fears that regional jihadi terrorist networks such as Jemaah Islamiyah could become involved in Myanmar.

Legacies of censorship• Trust of rumour: There is little trust in official news

sources (a legacy of censorship), so rumours and word-of-mouth are how most people hear of current affairs.

• Insular social networks: BBC Media Action study found that people are extremely reluctant to discuss political opinions with outsiders. This means highly insular information sources, which compounds polarisation.

What’s the role of technology? (1)• No filtering of information or imagery shared online: the

suppression of expression and information during censorship has resulted in limited personal self-censorship.

• “Internet and Facebook have effectively merged in the eyes of most Burmese” (InterNews). Twice as many people have a Facebook account (600,000 in 2012, >1M 2014) than read the most popular weekly newspaper (300,000).

• With new mobile network operators commencing in April 2014, projection of 80% mobile ownership by Nov 2015.

What’s the role of technology? (2)• Social media has become a platform to spread

nefarious rumour. As information was such a commodity during censorship, malicious hate speech spreads rapidly online (especially once it leaves initial outlet pages).

• Exposure online to external frames (eg. religious warfare) and info/images from West Myanmar may be exacerbating pessimism about religious conflict during the transition.

Questions (practical & ethical)• How is info consumption impacting pessimism? (Catie

Bailard)• How should rumour and hate speech be dealt with in this

context? (Moderation, takedowns?)• How can extremism or false rumours be mediated within

social networks? (Local CSOs?)

• What potential role is there for alternative narratives eg non-violence?

• How could potential patterns in regime involvement in violence be detected? (Mapping?)

8 Potential Policy & Program Responses

1. Research info consumption habits (old, new media, rumour) and their effect on political behaviours.

2. Support conflict-sensitive media training, especially in monitoring and take-downs of hate-speech (USIP).

3. Work with local CSOs to disconfirm or mediate rumours with messages of peace (USIP radio initiative; online?).

4. Support groups disseminating on alternative narratives to extremism (eg. pacifism)

5. Train police in crisis response and riot control (EU).

6. Ensure media access in conflict areas (Rakhine).

7. End impunity for perpetrators and condemn 969 movement.

8. Clarify the place of minorities in Myanmar through high-level Presidential speech.