Region 8 RRT Tabletop Exercise

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Role and Responsibilities of RRT Membership During an Incident. Region 8 RRT Tabletop Exercise. Steven Merritt & Craig Myers June 30, 2010. National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan (NCP). Promulgated in the 1970s - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

Transcript of Region 8 RRT Tabletop Exercise

Region 8 RRTTabletop Exercise

Steven Merritt & Craig Myers

June 30, 2010

Role and Responsibilities of RRT Membership During an Incident

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National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan (NCP)

Promulgated in the 1970s Guides EPA and Coast Guard response to

releases/discharges of hazardous substances/oil

Used for Emergency Response, Removal Actions and Remedial Actions

Establishes the National Response Team, consisting of numerous Federal Agencies

Can be superseded by the National Response Plan (NRP)

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Regional Response Team (RRT)

The regional counterpart to the National Response Team

Composed of 16 Federal Agencies and additional State/Tribal Agencies

Convenes semiannually to review regional issues and plan for responses

Chaired by the EPA and the Coast Guard

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Exercise Objective

The Goals of this Exercise are to: – Understand the roles and capabilities of the various

RRT Member Agencies

– Generate discussion about RRT support and input to response actions involving oil and hazardous substances

– Familiarize RRT Members with response tools available to OSCs

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Ground Rules

This is NOT a test There are no wrong answers or questions Participants are encouraged to speak from

their institutional knowledge Not a game of stump the chump; it is

acceptable to say “Let me get back to you…” The goal is to encourage an ongoing dialogue Be open-minded, suspend disbelief, and have

fun; this time the incidents are only on paper

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Initial Notification

At 7:50 PM on June 29, 2010, a man walking his dog along the river reports a series of “loud booms” coming from the vicinity of a railroad bridge

The caller states that he thinks a train may have collided with something near the bridge, but he is unable to ascertain whether any cars are derailed

He reports seeing a dust or smoke cloud in the area, but cannot see any flames from his vantage point

Utah Scenario

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Incident Location

North Dakota Scenario

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Incident Location

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Weather Conditions

Severe thunderstorm with hail and extremely heavy rain just passed through the area

Temperature is 76°F

Wind is out of the northwest at 5 to 10 mph

Humidity is 92%

Sky is cloudy, but clearing

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Subsequent 9-1-1 Reports

Drivers along the interstate report limited visibility on the highway near the incident due to an acrid smoke plume that appears to be originating near the railroad bridge

One driver, stopped and taking pictures on the shoulder, indicates that the bridge appears to be partially collapsed at one end and that a locomotive is derailed within that section

Another caller reports a “dark colored liquid” in the river, flowing downstream from the bridge

Utah Scenario

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Crude Pipeline

Collapsed Bridge

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Collapsed Bridge

North Dakota Scenario

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Crude Pipeline

Collapsed Bridge

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Collapsed Bridge

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Immediate Local Actions

Which agencies would be dispatched to the scene upon initial notification?

What are the immediate critical issues that must be addressed?

Who would 9-1-1 dispatch center be calling at this point for assistance?

Evacuations or shelter in place orders issued?

Utah Scenario

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Incident Location

Green River State Park & Recreation

Area

KOA Campground

ICP Location

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Acrolein Tank

North Dakota Scenario

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Incident Location

Bismarck State College Stadium

Tesoro Refinery

ICP Location

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Anhydrous Ammonia Tank

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State Government Actions

Who (which department/division) would be notified of the incident within state government?

What resources would be dispatched by state government?

What actions would be taken by these resources? Would R8 RRT member agencies be notified? Would notified state government departments/divisions

reach out to members of the R8 RRT initially? Could notified entities facilitate communication

between the local responders and external agencies?

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Actions by UDEQ and NDDES

How would you be alerted to the incident? How would you respond? Who within the agency would be notified? What resources could/would the agency

dispatch? Are there other RRT members you would

contact?

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On-Scene Report – 8:30 PM

One train involved; one confirmed fatality in first locomotive on bridge

Track blocked and bridge partially collapsed at the first section encountered in direction of travel

UP train has derailed and stacked up behind locomotive on collapsed section of bridge

Fire associated with breach of fuel tank on second locomotive is spreading

A pipeline has been severed in bridge collapse and contents are spilling into the creek

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Department of Homeland Security

With limited information, the State of UT/ND requests FEMA declare a this incident a disaster.

Does FEMA make such a declaration? Would it cover both counties? How would this affect the Federal response to

the incident?

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NRC Report NRC notifies EPA Duty Officer

UPRR train carries anhydrous ammonia and acrolein in tank cars; derailed but unknown if breached

Utah (Low-Level Radioactive Waste) North Dakota (Phorate Pesticide)

Locomotive leaking diesel and on fire

Utah Scenario

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 NARAC Plume Model of Acute (Short-Term) Effects of 10 gallons of Released Acrolein

  Description    Level (ppm)    Extent    Area    Population   

 >60-min AEGL-3: Death or irreversible

health effects possible.>1.4    0.6km   

0.08km2   

0   

 >60-min AEGL-2: Serious health effects or

impaired ability to take protective action.>0.10    3.7km    2.5km2    10   

 >60-min AEGL-1: Minor reversible health

effects. Possible odor.>0.03    7.6km    8.7km2    20  

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NARAC Plume Model of Acute (Short-Term) Effects of 1000 gallons of Released Ammonia

  Description    Level (ppm)    Extent    Area    Population   

 >PAC-3: Death or irreversible health

effects possible.>15    1,664m    891,116m2  10   

 >PAC-2: Serious health effects or

impaired ability to take protective action.>15    1,664m    891,116m2  10   

 >PAC-1: Minor reversible health effects.

Possible odor.>15    1,664m    891,116m2  10  

North Dakota Scenario

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  NARAC Plume Model of Acute (Short-Term) Effects of 10 gallons of Released Acrolein

  Description    Level (ppm)    Extent    Area    Population   

 >60-min AEGL-3: Death or irreversible

health effects possible.>1.4    0.6km    0.08km2 0   

 >60-min AEGL-2: Serious health effects or

impaired ability to take protective action.>0.10    3.7km    2.5km2  10   

 >60-min AEGL-1: Minor reversible health

effects. Possible odor.>0.03    7.6km    8.7km2 20  

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NARAC Plume Model of Acute (Short-Term) Effects of 1000 gallons of Released Ammonia

  Description    Level (ppm)    Extent    Area    Population   

 >PAC-3: Death or irreversible health

effects possible.>15    1.1km    1.1km2   490 

 >PAC-2: Serious health effects or

impaired ability to take protective action.>15    1.1km    1.1km2   490 

 >PAC-1: Minor reversible health effects.

Possible odor.>15    1.1km    1.1km2   490 

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Issues for EPA OSC

Who does the duty officer contact? Would a responder be sent?What actions should the responding

OSC take?How would responding OSC

coordinate with other responders?How long would it take to respond to

the scene of the incident?

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ERT & Strike Team Involvement

Technical skills?

Communications?

Accounting?

Would they be needed?

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Issues for EPA RRT Co-Chair

Do you call other RRT members at this point? What is the USCG Co-Chair role at this point? Would EPA staff the Regional Emergency

Operations Center? Would a second EPA OSC be dispatched for

this incident? Under what circumstances?

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General Issues For EPA

How does the OSC communicate with EPA management?

How does the EPA OSC integrate into the unified command structure?

Do other RRT members join command structure?

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Bismarck State University Stadium

10,000 fans in the stadium, threatened by release of ammonia and potential release of phorate pesticide

Managing evacuations and preventing people from transiting through plume

Conditions deteriorating outside the stadium and traffic at standstill

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Issues from EPA OSC

Unable to reach the pipeline operator and stop the flow of oil into the river?

Leaking ammonia tank and public/responder health/safety concerns related to fire/plumes?

How/where would EPA, UDEQ, NDDES perform air monitoring?

What other agencies will respond?

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Radioactive Low-Level Waste

What capabilities/authorities does DOE have to respond to a radioactive materials transportation incident/accident?

What capabilities/authorities does NRC have to investigate and enforce against parties responsible for radioactive materials transportation incidents/accidents?

EPA OSC has requested DOE RAP Team support through RRT

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USCG Issues

What is USCG capability in UT/ND? Are boats available in either area? Role for local/federal agencies with boats? On-water role for EPA, UDEQ, NDDES and

local Fire Departments? Who controls activity on the water? Do we want boats on the water?

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ATSDR

How would you be alerted to the incident? How would you respond? Who within the agency would be notified? What resources could/would the agency

dispatch? Are there other RRT members you would

contact?

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Public Health Concerns

Does HHS have role in protecting downstream water users?

Who determines levels of concern in water? Can HHS provide count of hospital beds? Any pharmaceutical in storage to treat

acrolein? Who/where is POC for HHS & locals?

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OSHA

How would you be alerted to the incident? How would you respond? Who within the agency would be notified? What resources could/would the agency

dispatch? Are there other RRT members you would

contact?

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USDA

How would you be alerted to the incident? How would you respond? Who within the agency would be notified? What resources could/would the agency

dispatch? Are there other RRT members you would

contact?

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DOI

How would you be alerted to the incident? How would you respond? Who within the agency would be notified? What resources could/would the agency

dispatch? Are there other RRT members you would

contact?

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Water Issues for Natural Resource Trustees

What would the DOI do about wildlife?

Is UDEQ or NDDES the trustee for UT/ND?

How would they respond respond?

Who is alerting downstream water users?

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FEMA

How would you be alerted to the incident? How would you respond? Who within the agency would be notified? What resources could/would the agency

dispatch? Are there other RRT members you would

contact?

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GSA

How would you be alerted to the incident? How would you respond? Who within the agency would be notified? What resources could/would the agency

dispatch? Are there other RRT members you would

contact?

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Utah Scenario

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Incident Location

Utah Scenario

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Crude Pipeline

Collapsed Bridge

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Collapsed Bridge

Utah Scenario

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Incident Location

Green River State Park & Recreation

Area

KOA Campground

ICP Location

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Acrolein Tank

Utah Scenario

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 NARAC Plume Model of Acute (Short-Term) Effects of 10 gallons of Released Acrolein

  Description    Level (ppm)    Extent    Area    Population   

 >60-min AEGL-3: Death or irreversible

health effects possible.>1.4    0.6km   

0.08km2   

0   

 >60-min AEGL-2: Serious health effects or

impaired ability to take protective action.>0.10    3.7km    2.5km2    10   

 >60-min AEGL-1: Minor reversible health

effects. Possible odor.>0.03    7.6km    8.7km2    20  

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NARAC Plume Model of Acute (Short-Term) Effects of 1000 gallons of Released Ammonia

  Description    Level (ppm)    Extent    Area    Population   

 >PAC-3: Death or irreversible health

effects possible.>15    1,664m    891,116m2  10   

 >PAC-2: Serious health effects or

impaired ability to take protective action.>15    1,664m    891,116m2  10   

 >PAC-1: Minor reversible health effects.

Possible odor.>15    1,664m    891,116m2  10  

North Dakota Scenario

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Incident Location

North Dakota Scenario

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Crude Pipeline

Collapsed Bridge

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Collapsed Bridge

North Dakota Scenario

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Incident Location

Bismarck State College Stadium

Tesoro Refinery

ICP Location

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Anhydrous Ammonia Tank

North Dakota Scenario

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  NARAC Plume Model of Acute (Short-Term) Effects of 10 gallons of Released Acrolein

  Description    Level (ppm)    Extent    Area    Population   

 >60-min AEGL-3: Death or irreversible

health effects possible.>1.4    0.6km    0.08km2 0   

 >60-min AEGL-2: Serious health effects or

impaired ability to take protective action.>0.10    3.7km    2.5km2  10   

 >60-min AEGL-1: Minor reversible health

effects. Possible odor.>0.03    7.6km    8.7km2 20  

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NARAC Plume Model of Acute (Short-Term) Effects of 1000 gallons of Released Ammonia

  Description    Level (ppm)    Extent    Area    Population   

 >PAC-3: Death or irreversible health

effects possible.>15    1.1km    1.1km2   490 

 >PAC-2: Serious health effects or

impaired ability to take protective action.>15    1.1km    1.1km2   490 

 >PAC-1: Minor reversible health effects.

Possible odor.>15    1.1km    1.1km2   490