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ThePhilosophicalFoundationsofTortLawDavidG.Owen

Printpublicationdate:1997PrintISBN-13:9780198265795PublishedtoOxfordScholarshipOnline:March2012DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198265795.001.0001

PhilosophicalFoundationsofFaultinTortLawDAVIDG.OWEN

DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198265795.003.0010

AbstractandKeywords

Inthischapter,theinquiryintothenatureoffaultintortlawinvolvesanexaminationofthephilosophicalfoundationsofchoice,action,andharmfulconduct.Firsttobeexploredarethebroadidealsthatgivemoralcharactertoapersonsactions:freedom,equality,andcommunityorcommongood.Freedom(orautonomy),equality(inaweakform),andcommunity(inthehardformofutility)areseencollectivelytoshapesignificantlythemoralqualityofhumanbehavior.Afterthesefundamentalvaluesareexaminedgenerally,theirrelativepriorityisnextconsidered,followedbyadiscussionofthenatureandorderingofthebasicinterestsatstakeintortlaw.Finally,thechapterfocusesbrieflyonthemorespecificquestionsofhowtheunderlyingvalueshelpdefinethewrongfulness,first,ofintentionallyharmfulconduct;andsecond,ofconductthataccidentallycausesharm.

Keywords:fault,tortlaw,choice,action,harmfulconduct,freedom,equality,community,commongood,wrongfulness

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Faultisthebasiccementofthelawoftorts.Faultpermeatesthestructureoftortlawdoctrine,providingbothdefinitionandjustificationforthegreatmajorityofrulesgoverningprivateresponsibilityforcausingharm.Whatfaultis,therefore,andhowinmoraltheoryitmayclaimtodominatethisareaofthelaw,arequestionsoffundamentalimportancetoanunderstandingoftortlaw.Fault,incommonparlance,isoftenaddressedintermsofblameorwrong:faultyconductisblameworthyorwrongfulconduct;awrongdoerissubjecttoblameorisatfault.Yet,regardlessofthenomenclature,thebasicissuesremainthesame:whyandhowthelawoftortsshoulddeterminewhetheraparticularpersonsconduct(moreprecisely,aparticularpersonsharmfulconduct)wasblameworthyorwrongful,whetherthepersonwasatfault.1

InBrownv.Kendall,2decidedin1850,amanaccidentallystruckanotherwithastickwhiletryingtobreakuptwofightingdogs.Holdingthatnegligencewasnecessarytoliability,ChiefJudgeShawofMassachusettsofficiallyproclaimedthecentralroleoffaultinaccidentlaw,openingacenturyoflargelyunchallengeddominanceoffaultinthelawoftorts.WithinthreedecadesofBrownv.KendalUOliverWendellHolmeswasabletoassertauthoritativelythatthelawdoes,ingeneral,determineliabilitybyblameworthiness.3Andasthetwentiethcenturyopeneditsdoors,theexplicitlyfault-basedstandardofresponsibilityforaccidentswassolidlyendorsedbythelegalscholarsoftheperiod.HarvardLawSchooldeanJamesBarrAmes,forexample,notedwithapprovalthat[t]heethicalstandardofreasonableconducthasreplacedtheunmoralstandardofactingatonesperil.4

(p.202) Afteraboutacenturyofvirtuallyunchallengeddominance,5asmallnumberofcommentatorsinthe1950sbegantoquestionthelegitimacyoffaultasthebasisofliabilityincertainareasofAmericantortlaw.6Andbythelate1960s,thedominanceoffaultintortlawwasbeingchallengedonavarietyoffronts,asno-faultautomobileinsuranceschemesandstrictproductsliabilityrapidlygainedlegislative,judicial,andscholarlysupport.Asthetwentiethcenturydrawstoaclose,however,faultappearstohavereasserteditsdominanceastheguidingprincipleofthelawoftortsintheUnitedStates.7Tounderstandjustwhytheconceptoffaulthasprovedsodurable,andwhyitsconversestrictliabilityhasprovedsofrail,soincapableofmakinglastinginroadsintotheheartoftortlawdoctrine,onemustinquireintotheconceptofwrongdoingthatunderliesthelawoftorts.

Theinquiryhereintothenatureoffaultintortlawinvolvesanexaminationofthephilosophicalfoundationsofchoice,action,andharmfulconduct.Firsttobeexploredarethebroadidealsthatgivemoralcharactertoapersonsactions:freedom,equality,andcommunityorcommongood.Freedom(orautonomy),equality(inaweakform),andcommunity(inthehardformofutility)areseencollectivelytoshapesignificantlythemoralqualityofhumanbehavior.Afterthesefundamentalvaluesareexaminedgenerally,theirrelativepriorityisnextconsidered,followedbyaconsiderationofthenatureandorderingofthebasicinterestsatstakeintortlaw.Finally,theessayfocusesbrieflyonthemorespecificquestionsofhowtheunderlyingvalueshelpdefinethewrongfulness,first,ofintentionallyharmfulconduct,and,second,ofconductthataccidentallycausesharm.

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I.Freedom

A.TheConceptofFreedomFreedom,onemaypostulatewithconfidence,isthemostfundamental,andmostimportant,moralandpoliticalvalue.8Amongmodernphilosophers,theonemostcreditedwithpropoundingthisidealisImmanuelKant,whoconsideredfreedomtobetheonesoleandoriginalrightthatbelongsto(p.203) everyhumanbeingbyvirtueofhishumanity.9Whilephilosophersandgovernmentsofcoursemustconcernthemselvestoalargeextentwithnotionsofgroupwelfare,andwhileselfishnessiswidelyregardedasaviceratherthanavirtue,freedomshouldbeviewedasthefirstandmostessentialidealwithinabroadphilosophyofgovernmentandjustice.10

Thefreedomconceptrestsuponthenotionoffreewill11thecapacityofpersonsrationallytoselectpersonalgoalsandplansforlife,andtheirpossessionofmeanstoachievethoseends.Thisconcept,sometimescalledautonomy,12thusentailsatleasttwoconditions:choiceandpower.Thedesignoflifeplansandtheselectionofspecificgoalstoachievethoseplansimpliesarangeofoptionsandopportunities,alternativesfromwhichtochoose.Asapersonschoicesareenhanced,sotooisthatpersonsfreedom.Freedomalsorequirespower,foronemusthavetheabilitytobringoneschosengoalstofruitioninordertocontrolonesdestiny,inordertobefree.Tobeautonomous,onethereforemustpossessrequisitementalandphysicalprowessandadequatephysicalgoodsandmonetaryresourcestoachievetheobjectivesoneselects.13

Freedomaccordspersonsdignity,foritpermitseachhumantodesignandthentofollowhisownlifeplan,distinctfromanyother.Theconceptalsoforcespersonstoshoulderaburden,foritplacesresponsibilityuponeachpersontoplanandlivealifethatisgoodforthatindividual.Whilephilosophersandtheologiansmaydebateforeverthenotionofwhat,intheabstract,constitutestheultimategoodlifeanditscomponentvirtues,itiseachhumansmoralprivilegeandhisorhermoralresponsibilityto(p.204) choosetheparticularlifegoalsthatheorshedeemsmostworthwhile,14andtoseektoachievethemthroughpersonalchoiceandaction.

Viewedinthisway,freedomistheprimarymoralandpoliticalideal.Itisthefirstconditiontoprotectingoradvancingothervalues,suchasequality,altruism,andcommunalwelfare.Thus,whethertheultimategoaloflawisthoughttobethepromotionofindividualwell-beingorthewelfareofthegroup,thefirstandmostimportantfunctionofthelawistoprotectandpromotefreedomorautonomy.

B.TruthSubsumedinfreedomistheidealoftruth,aconceptcloselyrelatedtoknowledge.FromthetimeofPlato,knowledgeclassicallyhasbeendefinedasjustifiedtruebelief.15Knowledge,justification,truth,andbeliefthusareallfunctionallyrelated.Amongtheseconcepts,however,truthistheonlyonethatisabsolute,theonlytrueideal.16Knowledge,forexample,onlydescribesthestateofpossessingtheidealoftruth.17Forhelpinresolvingmoralquestionsarisingoutofharmfulhumaninteractions,truthmaybe

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viewedasthecorrespondenceofapersonsbeliefswithreality.18

Theintelligentandeffectiveselectionandpursuitofgoalsimpliesanabilitytoperceiveandcomprehendthingsintheworldandhowthosethingsinterrelateaccordingtotheprinciplesofcauseandeffect.Noperson,ofcourse,canabsolutelyknowthetruth,whichisoneimportantreasonwhynooneevercanbeabsolutelyfree.Humans,hamperedbybothphysicalandcerebralimperfection,canseetheworldbutdimly,andsotheirchoices(p.205) ofbothendsandmeansarealwaysfrustratedbytheirlackofknowledge.Autonomythereforeisfacilitatedbythepromotionoftruthimprovingthecorrespondencebetweenpeoplesbeliefsorexpectations,ontheonehand,andthetrueworldasitexistsandchanges,ontheother.

Intentionallyinflictedharmisgenerallybaseduponasubversionoftruth.Apersoncausingsuchharmisthereforeatfault,asapreliminarymatter,notbecausehehascausedharmtothevictim,butbecauseofthetruth-falsificationmeansbywhichhehasconvertedthevictimfromanautonomouspersonunwittinglyintoanobjectofharm.Fraudanddefamationbotharewidelyunderstoodtobegroundedinthedeliberatefalsificationoftheworld,astheactorknowsittoexist,tothedetrimentofthevictim.Yetmostotherintentionalharmsarebasedontruthsubversion,too.Whethertheactorbeapoisonerofcandy,aburglarwhocloakshimselfinthemantleofthenight,oranassailantwhoconcealsahandguninhispocketorhimselfbehindatree,thesuccessofeachsuchintentionallyharmfulventureandits(preliminary)wrongfulnessrestssubstantiallyuponthepriortheftoftruthfromthevictim,asfromotherswhomightotherwiseacttolendprotectiontothevictim.

Truth,ortheabsenceofit,alsoplaysapowerfulrolebothincausingaccidentsandindeterminingblametherefor.Indeed,theverywordaccidentisdefinedintermsofunexpectedharm.19Accidentalharm,then,isharmattributabletothefailureofatleastoneperson,theactororthevictim,toexpecttheharm,topossessthetruthconcerningthethingsthatcausedtheharm.Asaneverydayexample,imagineasimpleintersectionalcollisionbetweentwocars:A,drivingtowardanintersection,seesthetrafficlightchangefromgreentoyellowandmistakenlybelievesthathecanenterandcleartheintersectionbeforethelightturnsred.B,waitingontheintersectingstreet,enterstheintersectionassoonasherlightturnsgreen,mistakenlybelievingthatitwillbeclearoftraffic.AandBentertheintersectionsimultaneously,atrightangles,andtheircarscollide.Here,thecollisionisattributabletothefailureofbothAandBtopossessthetruthaboutthestatusoftheintersectionatthetimeofthecollision.Byconventioninthissituation,asreflectedinpre-establishedrulesoftheroad,responsibilityfordeterminingthetruthand,accordingly,faultinfailingtoobtainitisallocatedtothepersonenteringtheintersectionasthelightchangesfromgreentoyellow.Here,asinmyriadothercontextsinvolvingaccidentalharm,bothcausationandfaultarerootedinthefailureofoneorbothofthepartiestopossessthetruth.

Apersonsabilitytocontrolhislife,toliveeffectivelywithintheworld,ishighlydependentupontheextenttowhichthatpersonsvisionofthe(p.206) worldistrue.Without

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possessingthetruthinsubstantialmeasure,personsbecomevulnerabletobothintentionallyandaccidentallyinflictedharm.Thus,truthisafundamentallyimportantcomponentoffreedomthathumansneedtoprotectthemselvesfromharm,andfaultforharmisoftenrootedinhowandwhythetruthisusedorabusedbytheactorandthevictim.

II.Equality

A.TheConceptofEqualityAthresholdproblemthelawconfrontsinthepromotionofindividualfreedomisthemultiplicityofseparatepersonswhosefreedomsfrequentlycollide.Inacrowdedworld,eachpersonspursuitoflifegoalsoftenconflictswithotherpersonspursuitoftheirownlifegoals.Thelawthereforemustdrawboundariesaroundindividuals,definingwhereonepersonsfreedomsendandwhereanotherpersonsfreedomsbegin.20Themostelementallyhelpfulcriterionfordrawingsuchfreedomboundariesinajustandenduringsocietyisequality.21

Howequalityhelpsdefinethescopeofeachpersonsfreedomsdependsuponthetypeandstrengthofonesviewofequality.AssumethatAand(p.207) Bstartoffequallyinallrespectstopursuetheirrespectivegoals,andthattheyinteractinsomemannerthatharmsB.Astrongversionofequality-onethatemphasizesthesecurityofresourcesmightrequireAtotransferenoughofhisgoodstoBtorestorethestateofequalitybetweenAand5,basedonlyuponthechangeintheirrespectiveholdingsofgoodsfromastatusofequalitytooneofinequality.22Averystrongversionofequality,basedonequalityintheholdingsofgoods,couldrequirethisresultevenif2?,notA,weremorallyresponsiblefortheaccident.Adifferent,weakerversionofequality,basedonanequalrightofaction,mightleavethelossentirelywithfi,ifneitherAnorBwereotherwiseresponsiblefortheloss.Thus,theversionofequalityselectediscrucialindefininglimitstoindividualfreedom.

B.ThreePrinciplesofChoiceForassistanceindetermininghowstrongorweakaversionofequalityisappropriateintortlawtohelpascertainmoralresponsibilityandfaultforharmfulconducttheroleofhumanchoicemayusefullybeexaminedintherecurringcontextsofharmfulinteractions.Whentwopeopleinteract,thetransactionoftenbenefitsthemboth,23sothatactorsfrequentlyenhancetheinterestsofotherpersons.Someinteractions,however,areharmfultooneorbothaffectedpersons.Whentheinteractionisaharmfulone,thepriorchoicesofbothpersonsgivemoralcharactertotheiractionsandomissionsthatcombinedtocausetheharm.Atleastthreeseparateprinciplesofchoice,eachboundinseparatefashiontotheequalityideal,maybederivedfromfreedomprinciplestohelpdefinethewrongfulnessofharmfulconduct.24

Thefirstprincipleofchoice,basedupontheequalabstractrightofeverypersontopursuehisowninterestswithoutundueinterferencefromothers,bearsmostsignificantlyonharmswhichareintentional.Thisprincipleholdsquitesimplythataperson

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shouldnotchoosetoharmotherssolelytoadvanceinterestsofhisown.Forexample,oneshouldnotdeliveranunprovokedpunchinthenose,merelytoshowoffonespugilisticskills,allayonesanger,orwinabet.Sinceonepersonsabstractautonomyrightsareequaltoeveryotherpersonssimilarrights,anactorshouldnotinfringeanotherpersonsautonomymerelytoenhancehisown.Forthepurposeof(p.208)achievingonesownchosenends,inotherwords,onegenerallymaynotfairlychoosetofrustratethevestedinterestsharmthevestedgoodsofotherpersons.25Harmfulconductmaythusbeviewedasunjustorwrongful,inequalityterms,iftheactorchosetocausetheharm,knowingittoviolatethevictimsequalrighttofreedom,forthepurposeofachievingtheactorsends.26Thisbasicconcept,whichmaybecalledthechoice-endprinciple,underliesthelawofintentionallyinflictedharm.

Whenhumaninteractionsaccidentallyresultinharm,ratherthanwhenharmispurposefullycausedbyanactor,verydifferentchoicesareinvolved.Thesecondprincipleofchoicereflectsthelimitationsofspaceinacrowdedsociety,andtheinevitabilityofcollisionsbetweenseparatepersonspursuingtheirrespectiveendsandpossessinglimitedpower,skills,andaccesstothetruth.Moralresponsibilityandblameforsuchaccidentshingeuponthenatureofthepriorchoicesofbothpartiestoacollision.Helpingframethemoralcharacterofsuchchoices,theabstractnotionofequalityhelpsrevealthefallacyofacommonintuitionthatblameforaccidentsgenerallyshouldlieupontheactorratherthanthepassivevictim.

Theworldinwhichweliveisadynamicone,whereactionisnecessarytoachieveonesgoals,bothtoprotectandtoenhanceonespropertyandsatisfaction.Onemustdrive(orwalk)tothestoretobuyonesbread.Thisinterestmightbedesignatedapersonsactioninterest.Eachpersonalsohasanother,passiveformofinterest,whichmightbecalledonessecurityinterest.Thislatterformofinterestisapersonsinterestinmaintaininghispresentstockofpropertyandsatisfactionagainstdepletion.

Abstractequalitysuggeststhatactionandsecurityinterestsinsuchaworldareofequalorder,thattheinterestsofanaccidentvictimhavenoinherentpriorityovertheinterestsoftheactor.Despiteanundeniablecounter-intuition,anaccidentvictimspassivesecurityinterestinmaintaininghisstockofgoodslogicallyshouldhavenohigherintrinsicvaluethantheactorsaffirmativeactioninterestinprotecting(andaugmenting)hisstockofgoods.27Indeed,freedomofactionisespeciallydeservingofprotectioninadynamicworldbecausepersonsregularlymustreadjustthrough(p.209) actiontoever-changingconditions,eveniftheironlygoalistoprotecttheirownsecurity.28

Autonomyentailsthenotionthatapersonmayindeed,mustmakechoicesandthenactuponthosechoices.Itisasimpletruismthateachsuchactionalwaysrestrictsinsomemeasurethechoicesavailabletoothers.IfAchoosestomovefrompointxtopointz,anddoesso,hedeprives5,standingatpointy,oftheopportunitytomovetoz.Thisalsoistrueconcerningdecisionsnottoact:IfAystandingatpointx,decidesnottomoveatall,helimitstheopportunityofB,standingatpointy,tomovetox.Thus,whetherofactionorinaction,allchoicesofallpersonsdiminishinsomemannertheavailablechoices(andhencethefreedom)ofotherpersons,whoareharmedtothatextent.Thechoicesand

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actioninherentintheverynotionofindividualautonomy,therefore,implyharmtootherpersons.Thisimportantconcept,thatfreedomentailsharmtootherpersons,maybecalledthechoice-harmprinciple.Inasocietydevotedtoautonomyandequality,thechoice-harmprinciplesuggeststhatnoinitialpreferenceshouldbegiventosecurityoveraction.29Andthissecondprincipleofchoiceunderminessubstantiallythenotionthatmerelycausingharmiswrong.

Thethirdandfinalprincipleofchoiceoutlinedhere,drawingfromimplicationsofthepriortwo,normativelypredicatesfaultorblameuponwhethertheactorschoicesrespectedordeniedthevictimsequalstatureasahuman.Thislastperspectiveonhowchoiceandequalityfittogethermaybecalledthechoice-blameprinciple.Thedual-facetedideahere,rootedintheabstractequalworthofeveryperson,isthatactorsareatfaultforchoosingwithoutgoodreasontoharmotherpersons,orchoosingtoexposethemtoariskofharm.Asmorefullyexploredbelow,onefacetofthisprinciple,thebad-harmfacet,holdsthatchoosingtoharm(orriskharmto)anotherpersonsvestedinterestswithoutgoodreasonviolatestheotherpersonsdignityasafreeandequalhumanand,hence,iswrong.Thisprinciplesgood-harmfacetisjustasimportant:actorsregularlymustasapracticalnecessity,choosetoharm(orriskharmto)othersforreasonsthataregood,andsuchconductaccordinglyisproper.

C.WeakEqualityTogether,thethreeprinciplesofchoicesketchedoutherehelpframeaformofequalityusefulinexplainingfaultforcausingharm.Baseduponthefirst(p.210) twoprinciples,thethirdandnormativeprincipleofchoiceexplicitlyconditionsfaultupontheabsenceofgoodreasonforharming(orriskingharmto)otherpersons.Centraltothechoice-blameprinciplesgood-harmfacetisthepowerfulnotionthatitissometimesproperforonepersontoharmanother.Thisconclusionsuggeststheproprietyofsomeweakformulationofequality,onewhichallowseachpersonthemaximumamountoffreedom(forbothsecurityandaction)consistentwithanequalrightofothers.Thisformofweakequalityhasbeenaptlytermedanequalityofconcernandrespect.30Philosophersacrosstheages,fromPlato31andAristotle32toKant,33toNozick,34andeventoRawlsandDworkin,35generallyhaveaccordedsomesuchnotionofweakequalityacentralpositionamongmoralvalues.

Whenequalityisdefinedweakly,intermsofequalityofconcernandrespect,itbecomessubjecttothecriticismthatitisempty,devoidofanalyticalcontent36and,so,incapableofhelpingtodefinefreedomoranyotherideal.37Yettheconceptoffreedomitselfcanbesubjectedtosuchacharge,38albeitlesspersuasively,andthechargeofemptinessmissesthefundamentalpointofequalfreedomthatproclaimstheintrinsicandineffableworthofeveryhuman.39Thevalueofthisabstractnotionofequality(p.211) liesnotinitssubstance,foritpossesseslittleifanysubstantivecontent,butinitsstructure,whichprovidesaprincipledbasisforinterpersonalcomparisonsthatoffersapowerful,initialframeworkforevaluatingmoralquestionssuchasblameforharmfulinteractionswhenfreedomsclash.40

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D.DistributiveandCorrectiveJusticeAristotlesconceptionsofdistributiveandcorrectivejustice,groundedindifferingnotionsofequality,provideahelpfulinitialframeworkofjustthistype.41Distributivejusticeconcernsthemannerbywhichgoodsaredistributedamongpersonsacrosssociety,priortoindividualtransactionsamongthosepersons.Ratherthanbasingsuchdistributionsuponstrictequality,Aristotlearguedthatdistributivejusticerequiresonlypropor-tionalityadistributionofgoodsproportionatetoapersonsdesertorworth.42Thecontentofdesertorworth,inAristotlesview,variesaccordingtotheparticularpoliticalregimeandsocialcontext.Intechnologicallyadvancedsocieties,apersonsworthismeasuredtoalargeextentbyhisproductivitywhich,inturn,isconveniently(ifimperfectly)measuredbythemarket.Variationsamongpersonsinproductivity,accidents,andotherfactorsresultinvariationsovertimebetweenpersonsintheirstocksofwealth.UnderAristotlesproportionalityconceptionofequality,therefore,variationsinholdingsofwealtharenotonlyproper,butinevitableandevennecessary.

Imbalancesintheproportionalholdingsofpersonsthusdevelopovertimefromvariouseventsandtransactions,bothvoluntaryandinvoluntary.Whilethedevelopmentofsuchimbalancesisaconcernofdistributive(p.212) justice,theinternalfairnessoftheindividualtransactionsthemselves,andwhetherthelawshouldrectifytheirconsequences,aremattersinvolvingtheentirelyseparatenotionofcorrectivejustice.43Aristotlebelievedthatthisformofjusticerequiredadifferent(onemightsaystronger),mathemati-calratherthanproportionalformofequality.44Thus,athiefshouldberequiredtodisgorgehisbootyandreturnthegoods(orequalvalue)tohisvictiminordertorestorethepriorproportionalequalityoftheparties.So,too,apersonwrongfullycausinganothertosufferaccidentallossshouldberequiredtorectifytheloss,andsorestorethepriorproportionalrelationshipbetweentheparties.Thisweakformofequality,whichisconsistentwiththedominantroleoffreedom,thusrequirescompensationforlossescausedbywrongfulaction,butnotforotherlossesnecessarilycausedbyeveryaction.45

III.CommonGood

A.TheConceptofCommonGoodIncontrasttothefreedomethic,whichidealizestheinterestsoftheindividual,theethicofthecommongoodorcommunity46idealizesthecollectiveinterestsofthegroup.47Althoughindividualscomprisesociety,sothatthepromotionofcommunalwelfareadvancestheinterestsof(atleastsomeof)itsindividualmembers,andviceversa,48thecommunityidealofcommon(p.213) goodsubordinatestheseparatewelfareofmembersindividuallytothebroadercollectivewelfareofthegroup.Autonomyhasnointrinsicvaluewithinthecommunityideal,butisvaluableonlyinstrumentallytoadvancethecommunalinterestsofsociety.

Althoughthecommunalethichasbeenwaningaroundtheglobeinrecentyearsincertainformulationsasapoliticalandeconomicideal,49itinevitablymustremainacentralvalueinanyorganizedsocietywherepeoplelivecloselywiththeirneighbors.Mostpersons

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understandthatasingleindividualcannotbeallowedtoholdtheentireworldhostagetothesatisfactionofhispersonalwants,thatindividualsoftenmustmakepersonalsacrificesforthegreatergoodofothers.50Whetheronelabelsthisethicaltruism,51communalwelfare,orsomethingelse,52ithasbeenacentralmoralandpoliticalvalueindifferingsocieties,religions,andphilosophiesthroughoutthehistoryoftheworld.ThecommunityidealwasimportanteventoAristotle,thefatherofcorrectivejustice,andtoKant,thefatherofmodernliberaltheoriesofphilosophybasedonthefreedomoftheindi-vidual.Aristotleconsideredhumanstobebynaturesocial,53andKantdirectedindividualstoharmonizetheirpersonalendswiththeendsofotherswithinthecommunity54freethoughpersonsmayallbe,freewithincommunity.55

Theidealofcommongoodisexaminedherefromtheperspectivesofutilityandefficiency,theharderformulationsofgroupwelfare.56Althoughclassicalutilitariantheoryonanumberofgroundsisflawed,andeven(p.214) arguablyirrationalorincoherentasauniversalmoraltheory,57ageneralandnon-rigorousnotionofutilityservesasausefulmodelforvaluesthatseektomaximizetheaggregatewelfareorpreferencesofthegroup.58Theeconomicnotionofefficiency,whichreststoalargeextentuponutility,isconsideredalsowithinthiscontext.Althoughincompleteasgeneraltheoriesofmoralresponsibility,principlesofutilityandefficiencywillbeseentoprovidehelpfulguidanceintheresolutionofcertaintortlawproblems.

B.UtilityandEfficiencyUtilitarianismmaybethemostprominenttheoryofthecommongoodintherecenthistoryofWesternpoliticalphilosophy.59Consequentialinnature,thisethicevaluatesthemoralqualityofactions,andsometimesrules,60bytheextenttowhichtheymaximizetheaverage(oraggregate)welfareofallmembersofsociety.Sinceeveryactionalwaysproducessomemeasureofharmaswellasgood,theutilitariangoalistoproducethegreatestproportionofbenefitstoharms,thegreatestnetbenefittosociety.Theprincipleofeconomicefficiency,whichbroadlyseekstomaximizecommunalwealth,isavariantoftheutilitarianideal,61withphilosophicalrootsinhypotheticalconsent.62

Conductcausingharmisjustified,accordingtoboththesetheories,ifthesocialharmreasonablyexpectedtoresultfromtheconductisexceededbytheexpectedsocialbenefit.Theconverseisalsotrue:conductiswrongful(p.215) ifitreasonablymaybeexpectedtoproducemoreharmthangood.Theseprinciplesworkequallyaswellinjustifyingintentionalaswellasaccidentalharm,butonlythepuristutilitarianoreconomictheoristwouldinsistuponthegeneralandexclusiveapplicationofsuchprinciplestoresolveintentionalharmproblemswheresuchaggregativeprinciplesare(potentially,atleast)destructiveofcertainvitalrights.Inaccidentlaw,however,utilityandefficiencyarewidelyandproperlyviewedascentralconsiderationsinascertainingresponsibilityandassessingblame.

ThemostrenownedformulationoftheutilityconceptinaccidentlawistheLearnedHandstandardfordeterminingnegligence,bywhichanactorsfailuretoincuralesserburdentopreventagreaterriskofharmimpliestheactorsnegligence.63TheHandstandard

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maybeviewedasdefiningnegligenceineconomicterms:64ifthecostsofpreventinganaccidentarelessthanthecostsofpermittingit,thefailuretoincurthepreventioncostsisinefficientand,hence,improper.GuidoCalabresisCheapestcostavoiderstandard,whichseekstominimizethesumofthecostsofaccidentsandthecostsofaccidentprevention,65restssimilarlyuponthegoalofmaximizingcommunalwealthor,themirrorimage,minimizingcommunalwaste.Byplacingliabilityuponthosepersonswhomostefficientlycanpreventaccidents,thelawmayhelpachieveanefficientlevelofexpendituresonbothaccidentsandprecautionarymeasures.66Thus,principlesofbothutilityandefficiencyseektodeteraccident-producingconductthatisonbalancewastefulforsociety.Conversely,bothprinciplesencourageaccident-producingconductthatproducesgreaterbenefitsthanharm.Yet,theimportantpointhereisthepreliminarymoralwrongfulnessofbehaviorthatforeseeablycausesmoreharmthangood,67whichwastescommunalresources,andthepreliminarymoralpropriety68ofbehaviorthatappearslikelytogenerateanetincreaseinthetotalstockofgoods.69

(p.216) IV.OrderingValuesandInterests

A.OrderingValuesAlthoughtheidealsofequalfreedomandthecommongood(community)arebothpowerfultouchstonesforascertainingfaultintortlaw,onemustsometimeschoosebetweenthetwovaluesinjudgingthemoralqualityofharmfulconduct.Indeed,freedomandcommunitymaybecontrastedtooneanotheraspolaropposites,asnotedearlier.Whetheroneviewstheiroppositionaspartialorcomplete,theirapplicationtotortlawproblemssometimesproducesconflictswhichmustberesolved.

Supposeastarvingbeggardecidestotakewithoutpermissionandeataloafofbreadlyinginsidetheopenkitchenwindowofawealthyandwell-fedbakershouse.Becausetheabstractautonomyofthebeggarisnogreaterthantheautonomyofthebakerwhoownsthebread,thebeggarschoicetotake(convert)thebreadwouldviolatethebakersequalabstractrighttofreedomandhencebewrongfulwhenjudgedaccordingtothatstandard.Yet,whenjudgedbyanystandardofcommongoodorcommunity,whetherutilityorsomesofterversion,thestarvingbeggarsmuchgreaterneedwouldseemtojustifyhischoiceandact.Suchvariancesinresultarisebecauseoftheverydifferentunderlyingmoralconcepts:freedomcelebratestheseparatevalueofeachindependentperson,anddependsuponastrongconceptionofownership,oftheexclusiverighttoproperty,whereasallnotionsofcommunity,softorstrong,arebasedatsomelevelonaggregatingnotseparatinghumangoods.Atbottom,therefore,thevaluesoffreedom(andweakequality)aredirectlyopposedtothoseofcommunity,softorstrong.

Becausesuchconflictsdoarise,itshouldbehelpfultohaveageneralprincipleofpreferencebetweenthetwo.Atleastbecauseofthelogicalpriorityoffreedomtocommunity,mentionedearlier,butalsobecauseofthegreateressentialmoralpoweroffreedom(anditscounterpart,weakequality),itmaybepostulatedthatfreedomshouldtakeprecedencetocommunityasageneralprinciplewhenthetwovaluessignificantlyconflict.70

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Notwithstandingfreedomsgeneralclaimtopriormoralvalue,utilityremainsanessentialmoralvaluetorespect.Indeed,ratherthanbeingshuntedtotherearasaninferiormoralprinciple,utility(anditseconomicsurrogate,efficiency)shouldbepromotedtoacontrollingstatusinmany(p.217) instancesthoseinwhichtheguidanceitcanprovideisstrongandthatoffreedomweak.Theguidanceprovidedbythefreedomidealmaybeweakbecausethevaluesitsustainsareimplicatedonlyslightly,orbecausethisabstractvalue(morefrequentlythanefficiency)simplycannotprovideaprincipled,determinatesolutiontoaparticularproblem.Incasessuchasthese,whereutility(orefficiency)bycontrastisabletoprovideguidancethatisclearandstrong,freedomshouldgivewaytothecommunityideals.Thissecondary,butveryimportant,roleforutilityandefficiencyinprovidingmoralsubstancetotortlawproblemswhenfreedomfailstoprovideananswermightaptlybecalledadefaultrole.71

Conflictsbetweenfreedomandcommongoodoftenturnouttobeminor,orindeterminate,onbothsides(andsometimesturnoutuponcloseinspectiontobemirages).Whenthisoccurs,whenneitheridealisimplicatedsignificantlyorcoherently,thelawjustifiablymayturninsteadtopracticality,whichisbasedonbothfreedomandutility.Whenthesignificanceofmoralreasoningofanytypeishardtoascertain,thelawshouldseektworesults:first,toprovidepersonswithfreedomtoadjusttheirownaffairsastheydeembest,ongroundsofpersonalinterestandpracticality,withoutfearofunduelegalintervention;and,second,todevisesimplerulesthatareeasyforpersonstounderstandandapply.Moraltheorizingontortlawproblems,includingtheascertainmentoffaultforcausingharm,maybeorderedinthismanner.

B.OrderingInterestsWhetheroneexaminesproblemsoffaultintortlawintermsoffreedomorthecommongood,comparisonsbetweenvariousgoodsorinterestsinevitablyarise.Oftenactors(andthelaw,injudgingthewrongfulnessofanactorsconduct)willhavetochoosebetweenlifeandproperty,orbetweenariskofinjurytopersonsandthepossibilityofeconomicgainormaybemereconvenience.Inmakingandjudgingsuchchoices,therefore,actors(andevaluatorsoftheirconduct)frequentlymustcompareandevaluateharms(andrisksofharms)tosuchdifferentformsofgoodsorinterests.Andsothelawhassometimesrankedsuchinterests.

Itmaybehelpful,inbeginninganinquiryintointerestranking,toscrutinizethecommonassertionthatthesafetyinterestsofpotentialvictimsareinherentlyofahigherorderthantheinterestsofactorsinmereproperty,money,orconvenience.72Interestorderingalongtheselines,wherebythe(p.218) bodilyintegrityinterest73isaccordedahigherabstractvaluethanpropertyandeconomicinterests,hasalonganddeeptraditioninthelawoftorts.74Thisethicisrootedgenerallyinthecontextoftrulyintentionaltakings,ofdeliberateinvasionsofpalpablyidentifiablepropertyinterestsknowntobelongtospecificpersonstargetedbytheactorwherethecertaintyofharmtovestedpropertyrightsisclear.Withinthiscontextofintentionallyinflictedharm,thelexicalordering75ofmajorinterestcategoriesprovidesasystemofusefulmarkersthatserveatoncetoidentify,define,order,andprovideabulwarkofprotectionforsocietys

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mostfundamentalvestedrights.Andsothelawdeclaresthatonemaynotintentionallykillormaimahumantoprotectsomejellyjars.76

Injudgingactionscausingonlyaccidentalharm,however,lexicalinterestorderingfitsmuchlesscomfortably,foratissuehereisthemoralqualityofchoicesinvolvingmereriskstointerests,oftenofunknownpersons,thatarebynatureremote,contingent,andspeculative.Whilepotentialvictimsinsuchacontextnodoubthaveautonomyinterestsinthesecurityoftheirpropertyandbodies,theactorhasanequallysignificantautonomyinterestinbeingabletomoveaboutintheworld,inevitablyriskingharmtootherpersonsasdiscussedabove.Apersonsautonomydependsaswelluponhiswealth77ofholdingsofmoneyandotherpropertywhichgenerallymaybeacquiredonlybyactionsriskingharmtoothers.Theimportanceofproperty(wealth)toapersonssenseofidentity,andoverallautonomy,hasbeenemphasizedbyphilosophersacrossthecenturies.78(p.219) Andconveniencelogicallymaynotbeconsideredtrivial,foritisbydefinitionwhatfacilitatestheachievementofapersonschosengoals.Asseenabove,thechoice-harmprincipleitselfisbasedontheequalfreedompremisethatonepersonsinterestinsecurityfromaccidentalharm(whethertopropertyorbodilyintegrity)hasnogreaterfundamentalimportancethananotherpersonsfreedomofactiontopromotehischosengoalsgoalswhichoftendependonconvenience,requiretheuseofproperty,andwhichmaybestoredinmonetaryform.Ofcoursethisconceptofequalityappliesonlytointerestsintheabstract,sothatapersonssecurityinterests(ofanytype)shouldbeprotectedagainsttheactioninterestsofanotherwhentheactioninterests(inconvenienceorothergoods)areoflesservaluebysomefairmeasure.Buttheconverseisalsotrue,andanaccidentvictimhasnoinherentmoralrighttoderogatetheactorsgreaterinterestsofanytype.

Anactor,therefore,inmoraltheorymustalwaysaccordequal(due)respecttotherightsofothers.Thisgeneralobligationentails,first,thatactorsmustrefrainfromchoosingintentionallytoharm,withoutasuperiorprotectiveright,otherpersonsrightsthatarevestedinanytypeofgoodwhetherhumanlife,orproperty,orsometimesmerelyeconomicinterests.79Inadditiontothisgeneralprohibitionofintentionalharms,anactormovingaboutinacrowdedworldmustshowequalrespectforthesecurityinterestsofothersinremainingfreefromaccidentalharm.Inthiscontext,however,inwhichharmstootherpersonsinterestsarenotdesiredbutonlyriskedincidentallyandabstractlyasremotecontingencies,substantiallydependentoneventsbeyondtheactorscontrol,anactorhasnochoicebuttoreduceallsuchintereststoacommondenominatorandvaluetheminacalculusthatalsofairlyvalueshisowninterestsinmoneyandconvenience,aswellasotherinterestsnecessarytotheachievementofhischosengoals.

Actorsmustmakethousandsofchoiceseveryday,inwhichnumerouspotentialabstractinterestsofknownandunknownpersonstoonumeroustocountmustbeidentified,valued(intermsofworthandrisk),andbalancedagainstasimilarlyvastsetofoutcomesdesired,expectedandforeseenfromacontemplatedcourseofaction.Oftensuchrisk-benefitdecisionsmustbemadeinstantlyonthespot,withoutopportunityforsignificant

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reflection.Therecanbenosafetyabsolutesinsucharugged,real-worldcontextwherechoicesmustbemadeandacteduponrapidly,oneafteranother,alldaylong.Thegreatergoodofallrequiresthatpersonsbepermittedto(p.220) makereasonableandgoodfaithdecisionsthatcreatemererisksofharmtootherswithoutpenaltyiftheyturnoutwrong.Interestordering,basedontheabsolutepriorityofcertaininterests,isoutofplaceinsuchacontextofroughandtumblechoicesinanimperfectworld,wherelifeandlimb(asvaluableastheysurelyare)simplymustbetossedintothesamedecisionalscalesasmereproperty,money,andconvenience.Thus,inthecaseofaccidentalharm,theequalabstractfreedominterestsofeveryperson(inbothactionandsecurity)areusuallybestaccommodatedandfaultisusuallybestdeterminedbyprinciplesofutility.80

V.FaultandIntentionallyInflictedHarmSupportedbytheidealofequalfreedom,thechoice-endprinciplepositsthatanactorispreliminarilyblameworthyifhechoosestoharmanother,asdiscussedabove.Thelawofintentionaltortsembracesthisprincipleintheprimafaciecasethatconductisfaulty,asapreliminarymatter,ifitreflectsachoicetocauseharmtoanother.Thegood-harmfacetofthechoice-blameprincipleofchoicesupportsthevariousprivilegesthatmaydefeattheprimafaciecase.

A.ThePrimaFacieCaseWhenanactor(fornogoodreason)choosestointrudeintotheautonomyrealmsofanotherperson,heinfringestheothersrightstofreedomandequalityinafundamentalway.81Ifanactortakeswithoutpermission(converts)atelevisionbelongingtoanotherperson,solelybecausetheactordoesnotownbutwantsone,theactorisbutathief.Stealingpropertydeniesitsownerthefreedomtoenjoythefruitsofhispriorlabor(orgoodfortune),whichtheownerhadearlierchosentotransformfromlabortomonetarytotangibleformintheobjectthatwasstolen.Suchtrespassestothepropertyrightsofotherstheftsareparadigmaticviolationsofthe(p.221) equalworthofothers,thetypeofwrongdescribedbyAristotleinexplainingtherestorativepurposeofcorrectivejusticeapplicabletoinvoluntarytransactions.82

Inthestolen(converted)televisionexample,theownerdeservescompensationfromthethief(converter)becausethelatterdeliberatelychosetotakeandappropriateforhisownusesomethingthatheknewwasownedbysomeoneelse.Whenanactorchoosestoactfortheverypurposeofconsumingpropertyrightsingoods83thatheknowsareownedby,andhenceinpartdefine,anotherperson,hetherebyconsumesandmergesinpartthewill(andhencepersonhood)oftheownerwithhisown.Inthisway,theactorjoinstogetherinakindofjointventurewiththevictim,draggingthelatter(inpart)alongthroughtheuniverseforatimeandpurposedefinedbythewilloftheactorandinviolationofthevictimsselfhood.

Thispartialmergerofwills,chosenonlybytheactor,resultsinaformofcommunionbetweentheactorandthevictim,whoaretothisextentconjoinedintoakindofunityorsuperperson.84Inasmuchashehaschosentomakehimselfpartofthisunified

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superperson,theactormaybeseenashavinginflictedtheharmuntohimself.Yettheresultingsuperpersonisanillegitimatecreation,foritisbornasaresultofaunionagainstthevictimswill.Byforcingacommunalintegrationuponthevictimwithoutconsent,theactorhasviolatedtheseparate,equal,andautonomousstatusofthevictim,andinjusticemustacttorestorethevictimsseparateness,theconditionwhichgavehimdignityasahumanbeing.Toachievetheseparation,toundotheillicitlinkbetweenthetwo,correctivejusticeandthelawoftortsrequirestheactortoreturnthetakenproperty(oritsmonetaryequivalent)tothevictim,therebyrestoringthevictimstakenwill,andtoretrieveuntohimselftheharmhewilleduponthevictim.85

B.PrivilegesThechoice-blameprinciple,itwillberecalled,conditionsthewrongfulnessofchoicesandresultingconductontheabsenceofgoodreasonsforthe(p.222) harmfulconduct.Tobegood,reasonsforintentionallyinflictingharmuponanothergenerallymustbebaseduponsomepriorprotectiverightsomepriorentitlementtopersonorpropertybelongingtotheactororanother,threatenedbyinvasionfromtheaggressorwhomtheactorharms.Byperverselychoosingtothreatenanothersvestedrights,theaggressorlosesintheprocesswhateverprotectiverightsofhistheactorneedstosacrificeinordertorepelthethreatenedinvasiontotheactors(orthirdpersons)rights.86Inasense,theaggressorslossofrightsbecomestheactorsgain,sincetheactortherebyacquiresaprivilegetoharmtheaggressorintheexerciseoftheprotectiveprivilege.Suchprotectiverightstoharmanotherasinthedefenseofoneself,ofanother,orofonespropertyfundamentallyinhereinfreedomandhenceingeneralaremorallysuperiortoutilityincaseofconflict,aspostulatedearlier.

Theprivilegeofnecessityinvolvesaminordeviationfromthegeneralpriorityoffreedomtoutility,butitbasicallysupportstheprinciple.Thus,whereutilitysuggeststheproprietyofconsumingthelessergoodsofonesneighbortosavethegreatergoodsofonesown,aswherethestarvingbeggarstealsthebakersbreadintheexamplediscussedabove,thenecessityprivilegeinitiallyreflectsthecommunitysinterestinutilitybypermittingtheintentionalinvasion(andbarringtheusualprotectiverights),87butonlywithrespecttolower-orderpropertyinvasions.Yettheultimatetriumphishadbyfreedom,fortheprivilegedoesnotpermitthetakingofhigher-ordergoodsoflifeorlimb,andtheprivilegetotakeevenlower-ordergoodsisatbestpartialandincomplete,forthetakermustpaytheownerfortheloss.88Andsothelawoftortsprovidesthestarvingbeggarwithaninitialprivilegetotakethebakersbread,butitholdsaswellthatthebeggarultimatelymustrespectthebakersrightsofownership(notwithstandingthenetutil-ity89ofthetheft)bypayingforthebread.Andwithrespecttootherprivilegestoharmintentionally,utilityisaccordedscantrespect;evenanunproductivebeggarhastherighttoshootandkillaproductivebakerwhoaccoststhebeggarinthestreetandappearstothreatenhimwithdeath.

Privilegestointentionaltorts,therefore,intheirveryexistencereflectthegeneralsuperiorityoffreedomtoutilitywhenthetwovaluescomeinconflict,althoughprinciplesofutilitymayplayaroleindefiningtheir(p.223) properscope.90Andthebasicpointof

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privileges,oftherightintentionallytoharmanotherforgoodreason,remainsunchallenged,whethertherationaleforsuchright-protectiveharmisviewedasoneoffreedomorutility.

VI.FaultandAccidentalHarmWhythecommon-lawrulesofresponsibilityforaccidentalharmalsoaresosolidlysetinfaultisexplainableintermsoffreedom,equality,andutility,asreflectedinthesecondandthirdprinciplesofchoice.Althoughfreedomintheaccidentcontextretainsitsgeneralprioritytoprinciplesofthecommongood,especiallywhenthevictimandtheactoraretiedtogetherbeforetheaccidentinsomerelationship,utilityoftenoperatesasthecontrollingprinciple(evenifonlybydefault),especiallywhenthepartiestotheaccidentarestrangers.

Beforethetheoryoffaultinaccidentlawisexaminedfurther,theintuitivecorrectnessofaliabilityprincipleholdingactorsresponsibleforcausingharmonlywhentheyareatfault,evenwhentheyareartificiallymuchmorepowerfulthantheirweakandvulnerablehumanvictims,maybedemonstratedbyanexample.Supposethatadriver,D,approachesanintersectionwithagreenlightinhisfavor.Ablindperson,BatthemomentDbeginstoentertheintersection,stepsoutintothecrosswalkfrombehindanambulance,parkedatthecurbbesidethecrosswalk,thathashiddenBfromDsview,DscarhitsandinjuresB.TheambulancewasparkedlegallyforanemergencycallinaNoParkingzonebesidethecrosswalk.Dwasdrivingwithallduecareandhadnoreasontobelievethatablindpersonmightbeinthevicinity.Bsdecisiontotraversetheintersectionwasreasonable:Bhadagoodreasontocrosstheroad,andnoonewasaroundforBtoaskforassistance.Bpressedthecontrolbuttononthecrosswalkpoletochangethelighttored,listenedforandheardtheusualelectronicsoundsfromthecontrolboxindicatingthatthelightwaschangingfromgreentored,andhadnoreasontosuspectthatthecontrolmechanismcouldmalfunctionandemitchangingnoiseswithoutactuallychangingthelight,whichinfactitdid.Therewasnowaythatthecontrolmechanismmalfunctioncouldhavebeenanticipatedorpreventedbythecity,themanufacturer,oranyoneelse.

Onfactslikethese,whereDwastrulyactingwithreasonablerespectfortherightsofothers,anintuitivesenseofjusticewouldseemtoshieldD(p.224) fromlegalresponsibilityforcausingharmtoB.91Thisisso,first,becausetheonlyrisksDchosetoinflictonBwerereasonableand,second,becauseBasmuchasDchosetoriskandhencecausedthecollision.ProtectingDfromlegalresponsibilityforBsharmseemsfairtoD,andnotunfairtoB,whomaychoosetoinsureagainsttherisksofsuchreasonablycausedaccidentsashemightinsureagainstallotherrisksofinjurynotattributabletothefaultofothers,suchasfromtrippingonacurb.

Moraltheoryaswellasintuitionsupportstheconclusionthatresponsibilityforaccidentalharmgenerallyshouldbebasedonfault.Insearchingforanelementaltheoryofaccidentlaw,onemightneverthelessbeinclinedinitiallytowardaruleofstrictliability,92ratherthanonebasedonwrongfulness.Undersucharule,AgenerallywouldbeliableforcausingharmtoB,whetherintentionallyoraccidentally.Equalitymightappeartodemand

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thatAcorrectsuchharminordertorestoretoBwhatAeffectivelyappropriatedtohimselfbychoosingtoexposeBtoariskofharm.93Indeed,ifthelawhadassignedapriorpropertyright94toBssecurityfromharm,95asinthecontextofintentionalharmsdiscussedabove,thenprinciplesofbothfreedomandequalitywouldargueforcorrectivejusticestrictlytobe(p.225) appliedtosuchacase.YetthistypeofappropriationtheoryislogicallydependentuponsuchapriorassignmentofapropertyrighttoB,thevictim,anduponAschoicetoharmthatrightwhichtherebyinjectswrong-fulness(underthechoice-endprinciple)intoAstaking.ButthisbegstheunderlyingquestionofwhetherAisatfaultandshouldbeliableforaccidentallycausingharmtoB,whereBsinterestsinavoidingsuchharmhavebeenassignednopriorprotectiveright,andwhereAhasnotchosentocausetheharm.

Insuchcasesinvolvingmerelyaccidentalharm,whereneithertheactornorthevictimhasapriorrightsuperiortotheother,96theequalityidealmayhelpresolvethismoralconundrum.ThekeytoresolvingtheconflictliesinevaluatingandcomparingtheapparentworthoftherelevantintereststhoselikelytobepromotedbyAsactionandthoselikelytobepro-tectedbyBssecurity.IfAshouldknowthatBssecurityfromriskismorevaluablethantheinterests(Asownandthoseofothers)thatAsactionlikelywillpromote,AschoicetosacrificeBsgreaterinterestsdeniesBsequalworth,andsoiswrongfulinmoraltheory.97If,tothecontrary,A(p.226) reasonablybelievesthattheintereststobepromotedbyhisactionaremorevaluablethantheinterestsforeseeablyrisked98thereby,thenAschoiceofactionisproperunderprinciplesofequality.99Correspondingly,BsinsistenceinthelattercasethatthelawrequireAtocompensateBforhisloss,underaprincipleofstrictliability,wouldbetodemandthatBsinterestsbeaccordedmorethanequalworthand,hence,wouldbeimproper.ThemoralfoundationinequalityforrestingresponsibilityforaccidentsuponthistypeofevaluativeinterestcomparisonderivesfromAristotelianprinciplesofvirtue.100Thisconceptionofresponsibility,ofcourse,embracesalsothebasiccalculusofriskorHand-formulaapproachtofault,rootedinutilityaswellasequality,thathaslongdefinedresponsibilityforaccidentalharminthelawoftorts.Thus,thebasicethicrevealedtoliebehindresponsibilityforaccidentalharmiscapturedinthedual-facetedchoice-blameprinciple,thatchoosingtoriskharmtootherswithoutgoodreasonisblameworthy,butthatsochoosingforgoodreasonisproper.

BmightarguethatastrictliabilityrulewouldnotpreventAfrompromotingthegreatergoodbutwouldonlyrequireAtopayfor,andhenceinternalize,the(lesser)costsofpromotingthegreatergoodjustasthestarvingbeggarmustpaytheownerforthestolenloafasintheintentionalharmcontextdiscussedabove.Buttheintentionaltakingsituationinvolvesverydifferentchoicesbytheactorwithrespecttoverydifferentinterestsofthevictimwhomtheactortargetsforparticularharm.Nosimilarforcedcommunalnexusbetweenthewillsofactorsandvictimsoccursincasesofmereaccidents.Incontrasttothesituationwheretheactorintentionallyconsumesgoodsknowntobelongtosomeoneelse,apersonactingforapurposeunrelatedtoanotherpersonis,byhypothesis,notwillingacommunionwiththatperson.Instead,harmcausedbyaccidentalencounteringwithotherpersonsisbydefinitionunwilled.Creatingmere

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riskstotheinterestsofothersisaninherentandunavoidableconsequenceofeveryaction,foreveryactionentailsharm(atleastcontingently)toothers.Totheextentthatrisksofharmfromactionmaybedeemedanecessarypartofproperchoicesofactioninanuncertainworld,andhencereasonableaccordingtosomefairstandard,theyshouldbeviewedasbackgroundrisksoflife(p.227) forvictimstoprotectagainstandbear.101Thus,Bstakingargument,forimposingstrictresponsibilityonA,isunpersuasiveincasesofaccidentalharm.

BscompensationclaimforaccidentalharmreasonablycausedbyAfailsfinallyoncausationgrounds.Asexplainedbythechoice-harmprinciplediscussedabove,everychoicetoactorrefrainfromactingcausesharm,atleasttheoreticallyandpotentially,tootherpersonswhocommensuratelyaredeprivedofrelatedopportunities.102Thus,unlessthewrongfulnessissuehasalreadybeenresolvedbyapreassignmentofpropertyrightstothevictimofanaccident,evenapassiveaccidentvictimmaybeconsideredtheresponsiblecauseoftheharmhesuffered.103Thisisbecausethevictim,evenifcompletelymotionlessatthetimeoftheaccident,madeaseriesofdeliberativechoices(andresultingactions)atsometimepriortotheaccidentthatwerenecessaryantecedentstoitseventuality.104Nothinginherentinthevictimsmerepassivityattheprecisemomentoftheaccidentisashieldfrombearingmoralresponsibilityfortheintendedorforeseeableconsequencesofsuchpriorchoices.105

(p.228) Consequently,ifthelawistotreatactorsandvictims106asequals,thereappearstobenomoralbasisinfreedom,equality,orcommongoodforageneralruleofliabilitythatholdsactorsstrictlyaccountableforaccidentalharm.107Instead,theidealsoffreedom,equality,andutilityallsupportaschemeofresponsibilityforaccidentalharm,withonlysmallpocketsofstrictliability,108thatbasicallyisbuiltonfault.

VII.ConclusionThelawoftortsbydefinitionconcernsthelawofwrongs.Withfewexceptions,faultdefinesthecoreandbordersofresponsibilitythroughoutthisentireareaofthelaw.Whileharmaloneinsomeabstractsensemaybeviewedasawrongtothepersonsufferingit,inmostcasesanactorfairlymaybeheldaccountableformakinggoodtheharmonlyifhewasatfaultincausingit,onlyifhischoicesthatresultedintheharmfairlymaybeblamed.Choosingtodenyanotherpersonsequalrighttofreedomisthemostfundamentalreasonforsuchblame.Whileintentionalharmsgener-allyarewrongful,anactormayproperlychoosetoharmanotherintheexerciseofhispriorprotectiverights.Inanimperfectanddynamicworld,accidentalharmisinevitablyentailedinhumanfreedom,suchthatconductresultinginaccidentalharmmaybeconsideredfaultyonlyifitresultsfromachoicetoviolateanotherpersonsvestedrightsorthecommunitysinterestsinutility.Basedonphilosophicalfoundationsofthistype,thelawoftortsrestscomfortablyonelementalnotionsofrightandwrong,onprinciplesoffault.

Notes:(1)Tort,fromtheFrenchwordforinjuryorwrong,derivedoriginallyfromtheLatintortus,meaningtwistedorcrooked:W.PAGEKEETON,DANB.DOBBS,ROBERTE.

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KEETON&DAVIDG.OWEN,PROSSERANDKEETONONTHELAWOFTORTS(5thedn.,1984),1[hereinafterPROSSER&KEETON];PeterBirks,TheConceptofaCivilWrong,thisvolume.

(2)60Mass.(6Cush.)292(1850).

(3)OLIVERWENDELLHOLMES,JR.,THECOMMONLAW(1881),108.

(4)JamesBarrAmes,LawandMorals,22HARV.L.REV.97,99(1908)

(5)Apartfromwork-placeinjuries,statutorilycutoutoftortlawandplacedinworkerscompensationschemesinthefirstfewdecadesofthiscentury.

(6)See,e.g.,ALBERTA.EHRENZWEIG,NEGLIGENCEWITHOUTFAULT(1951),reprintedin54CAL.L.REV.1422(1966);FlemingJames,Jr.,GeneralProductsShouldManufacturersBeLiableWithoutNegligence?,24TENN.L.REV.923(1957);CharlesO.Gregory,TrespasstoNegligencetoAbsoluteLiability,37VA.L.REV.359(1951).

(7)SeegenerallyDavidG.Owen,TheFaultPit,26GA.L.REV.703(1992)[hereinafterTheFaultPit].

(8)MuchofthefollowingisadaptedfromDavidG.Owen,TheMoralFoundationsofProductsLiabilityLaw:TowardFirstPrinciples,68NOTREDAMEL.REV.427(1993)[hereinafterMoralFoundations].

(9)IMMANUELKANT,THEMETAPHYSICALELEMENTSOFJUSTICE(Rechtslehre)(JohnLaddtrans.,1965)(1797),*237(hereinafterELEMENTSOFJUSTICE].Freedom,autonomy,andmoralityinKantsviewareallinseparablyboundtogether:IMMANUELKANT,FOUNDATIONSOFTHEMETAPHYSICSOFMORALS(L.Becktrans.,1959)(1785)*452453[hereinafterMETAPHYSICSOFMORALS].Autonomyisthusthebasisofthedignityofbothhumannatureandeveryrationalnature:id.at*436.Kantviewedautonomy,freedomofthewill,asthesupremeprincipleofmorality:id.at*440.

(10)See,e.g.,RobertB.Thigpen&LyleA.Downing,LiberalismandtheCommunatarianCritique,31AM.J.POL.SCI.637(1987).Equalityandcommunityidealslogicallypresupposethepriorityoffreedom.Libertyiscrucialtopoliticaljusticebecauseacommunitythatdoesnotprotectthelibertyofitsmembersdoesnotcannottreatthemwithequalconcern:RonaldW.Dworkin,WhatisEquality?Part3:ThePlaceofLiberty,73IOWAL.REV.1,53(1987)(hereinafterWhatisEquality?](explaining[t]hepriorityofliberty,underequalityofresources).

(11)Thewillisfree,sothatfreedomisboththesubstanceofrightanditsgoal:GEORGEW.E.HEGEL,PHILOSOPHYOFRIOHT(T.M.Knox(trans.),1965)(1821),20,para4.

(12)Iusethetwotermsinterchangeably,althoughforsomepurposestheremaybevalueindistinguishingbetweenthem.SeeJOSEPHRAZ,THEMORALITYOFFREEDOM(1986),ch.15.

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(13)Id.at371373.Conceptionsoffreedomvaryconsiderablyamongphilosophers.Havingthemeanstobeonesownmasterhasbeencharacterizedaspositivefreedom,asdistinguishedfromfreedominitsnegativeform,consistingintheabsenceofinterferencewithonesactivitiesbyothers.Fortheclassicalformulationofthisdistinction,seeIsaiahBerlin,TwoConceptsofLiberty,inFOURESSAYSONLIBERTY(1969),121,reprintedinLIBERTY33(DavidMiller(ed.),1991).

(14)Foradiscussionoffreedomasrequiringgoodchoices,seeRAZ,supra,note12,at378385.

(15)PAULK.MOSER&ARNOLDVANDERNAT,HUMANKNOWLEDGE:CLASSICALANDCONTEMPORARYAPPROACHES(1987),3.

(16)Aristotleapparentlyviewedtruthasmoreself-evidentlyandfundamentallygoodthanlife:J.M.Finnis,Scepticism,Self-Refutation,andtheGoodofTruth,inLAW,MORALITY,ANDSOCIETYESSAYSINHONOUROFH.L.A.HART(P.M.S.Hacker&J.Raz(eds.),1977),247,249.

(17)Thenotionsofknowledgeandtrutharesocloselyrelated,however,thattheymaybesubstitutedforoneanotherinmostcontexts.See,e.g.,JOHNFINNIS,NATURALLAWANDNATURALRIGHTS(1980),59(interchangingthetermsknowledgeandtruth,andreferringtotruthasthebasicgood).

(18)Perhapsthemostancientandcertainlyinallerasthemostwidelyacceptedtheoryoftruthisthecorrespondencetheory,accordingtowhichtruthiscorrespondencetofact:NICHOLASRESCHER,THECOHERENCETHEORYOFTRUTH(1973),5.Thetraditionalcorrespondencetheory[oftruth]holdsthatpistrueif,andonlyif,itcorrespondstoreality:D.M.ARMSTRONG,BELIEF,TRUTHANDKNOWLEDGE(1973),113.Becausethecorrespondencetheoryoftruthprovidesepistemologistswithonlypartialhelpinresolvingabstractquestionsofknowledge,particularlyinrespecttothetruthofpropositions,itholdslittleinterestformanymodernphilosophers.SeegenerallyTHOMASMORAWETZ,WITTGENSTEIN&KNOWLEDGE(1978),ch.3;RESCHER,supra,ch.I.Forhelpinanalyzingtheempiricalandmoralproblemsofharmfulconduct,however,whichinvolvetruthsoffactratherthantruthsofreason,anontechnicaldefinitionoftruthincorrespondencetermsappearsmostusefulhere.

(19)See,e.g.,WEBSTERSNEWWORLDDICTIONARYOFTHEAMERICANLANGUAGE(1964),9(ahappeningthatisnotexpected).SeegenerallyH.L.A.HART&TONYHONORE,CAUSATIONINTHELAW(2dedn.,1985),151.

(20)ThisfundamentalconceptisnicelycapturedinNozicksbordercrossingmetaphor:ROBERTNOZICK,ANARCHY,STATE,ANDUTOPIA(1974),ch.4.

(21)Theequalityidealhasbeenaprofoundlyimportantethicinmoralandpoliticalphilosophythroughouttheages.ItwasperhapsthecentralethicinAristotlestheoryofcorrectivejustice.[T]helawtreatsthepartiesasequal,andasksonlyifoneisthe

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authorandtheotherthevictimofinjusticeoriftheoneinflictedandtheotherhassustainedaninjury.Injusticetheninthissenseisunfairorunequal,andtheendeavourofthejudgeistoequalizeit:ARISTOTLE,THENICOMACHEANETHICS(J.E.C.Welldon(trans.),1987)(bk.5,ch,7),154.EqualitywascentraltothephilosophyofKant,whoconsideredittobecontainedwithintheprincipleoffreedom.KANT,ELEMENTSOFJUSTICE,supra,note9,at*237238;seeinfra,note33.Anditselementalpowerremainsattheheartofmuchcontemporaryjurisprudence.SeegenerallyGERALDDWORKIN,THETHEORYANDPRACTICEOFAUTONOMY(1988),110(Everymoraltheoryhassomeconceptionofequalityamongmoralagents);RONALDM.DWORKIN,LAWSEMPIRE(1986),295301[hereinafterLAWSEMPIRE];ERICRAKOWSKI,EQUALJUSTICE(1991);JOHNRAWLS,ATHEORYOFJUSTICE(1971),11,3240,77;PETERWESTEN,SPEAKINGOFEQUALITY(1990)(examiningtheparadoxes,rhetoricalforce,andvariousconceptionsofequality);JeremyWaldron,ParticularValuesandCriticalMorality,77CAL,L.REV.561,577(1989)([O]necannotgoanywhereinseriousmoralthoughtexceptonthebasisofsomeassumptionaboutthefundamentalequalityofhumanworth.).

Theinnatelinkbetweenfreedomandequality,definedbyKant,ELEMENTSOFJUSTICE,supra,note9,at*237238,iscapturedsuccinctlybyHart:[I]fthereareanymoralrightsatall,itfollowsthatthereisatleastonenaturalright,theequalrightofallmentobefree:H.L.A.Hart,AreThereAnyNaturalRights?,64PHIL.REV.175(1955),reprintedinTHEORIESOFRIGHTS(JeremyWaldron(ed.),1984),77.TheconstitutivelinkbetweenequalityofresourcesandfreedomisexplainedinR.Dworkin,WhatisEquality?,supra,note10,at54(arguingthatlibertyandequalityarenotindependentvirtuesbutaspectsofthesameidealofpoliticalasso-ciation,whichstrategyuseslibertytohelpdefineequalityand,atamoreabstractlevel,equalitytohelpdefineliberty).Seealsoinfra,note40.

(22)Torestoreequalitybetweenthetwo,AwouldhavetogivetoBanamountofgoodsequaltohalfofallBslosses.Alternatively,thestateoraprivateinsurermighttransferfromaloss-poolenoughcommunalgoodstoBtorectifytheloss.

(23)EconomictheoristsrefertosuchtransactionsasParetomaximizing.SeegenerallyJulesL.Coleman,Efficiency,Utility,andWealthMaximization,8HOFSTRAL.REV.509,512518(1980).

(24)Whetheractiveorpassive.

(25)Thisprincipleisframedingeneralterms,andlimitedtovestedgoods,toallowforfairbutharmful(totheloser)competitionforlimitedeconomicorsocialgoodsasyetunvestedandsoavailableforcompetitiveacquisition.

(26)Ifapersonhurtsanotherfromdeliberatemoralpurpose,heactsunjustly:ARISTOTLE,supra,note21,at172.

(27)[T]hepublicgenerallyprofitsbyindividualactivity.Asactioncannotbeavoided,

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andtendstothepublicgood,thereisobviouslyno[sound]policyinthrowingthehazardofwhatisatoncedesirableandinevitableupontheactor:HOLMES,supra,note3,at95;ErnestJ.Weinrib,CausationandWrongdoing,63CHI.-KENTL.REV.407,428(1987)(apropertyholdermaynotinsistthathissecurityinterestsaremorevaluablethananactorsfreedom).Whenanaccidentvictimsufferspersonalinjuryordeath,theoneobviousdifferencebetweenthevaluesoftherespectiveinterestsoftheactorandthevictimconcernsthenatureofthoseinterests.Theoft-notedpreferencefortheinterestinbodilyintegrityisexaminedinpartIVB,below.

(28)SeeG.DWORKIN,supra,note21,at112(Ingeneral,autonomyislinkedtoactivity,tomakingratherthanbeing,tothosehigherformsofconsciousnessthataredistinctiveofhumanpotential.).

(29)Thechoice-harmprinciple,therefore,isfundamentallydifferentfromJohnStuartMillsharmprinciple,whichaccordsahigherprioritytosecuritybyprovidingthatonepersonmaynotinterferewiththefreedomofanotherexcepttopreventharmtoothers:seeJOHNSTUARTMILL,ONLIBERTY(G.Himmelfarb(ed.),1974)(1859),6869.

(30)Althoughtheconceptderives,throughRawls,fromKant(aswellasfromAquinas,Christ,andothers),itsstatementinthisformisDworkins.See,e.g.,RONALDDWORKIN,TAKINGRIGHTSSERIOUSLY(1977),182(notingthatRawlsjusticeasfairnessrestsontheassumptionofanaturalrightofallmenandwomento[an]equalityofconcernandrespect[possessed]simplyashumanbeingswiththecapacitytomakeplansandgivejustice).

(31)SeePLATO,LAWSVI.757(Taylortrans.),at143quotedinWESTEN,supra,note21,at5253.

(32)SeeARISTOTLE,supra,note21,bk.V,especiallyat150160.

(33)Hencetheuniversallawofjusticeis:actexternallyinsuchawaythatthefreeuseofyourwilliscompatiblewiththefreedomofeveryoneaccordingtoauniversallaw:KANT,ELEMENTSOFJUSTICE,supra,note9,at*231.

(34)Nozickmayfindtheleastuseforequalityamongmajorcontemporaryphilosophers:seeNOZICK,supra,note20,at222224.Heisnotalone,ofcourse,inthisposition.See,e.g.,PeterWesten,TheEmptyIdeaofEquality,95HARV.L.REV.537(1982).ForavaluablecritiqueofequalityfromaleadingEnglishlegalphilosopher,seeRAZ,supra,note12,ch.9.

(35)ItmayseemoddforRawlsandDworkintobeincludedamongproponentsofweakequality,fortheybothviewequalityascentraltotheirsystems.SeegenerallyRAWLS,supra,note21,at222224,453504;RonaldDworkin,InDefenseofEquality,1Soc.PHIL.&POLY24(1983).Yettheybothsubscribetothenotionofequalconcernandrespect,seesupra,note23,whichdefinestheconceptweakly.AlthoughRawlssdifferenceprinciple,asexpressedinhissecondprincipleofjustice,isthoroughlyrootedin

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equality,hisfirstandpriorprincipleofjusticeechoesKantsdominantconcernforfreedomandautonomy:eachpersonistohaveanequalrighttothemostextensivebasiclibertycompatiblewithasimilarlibertyforothers:RAWLS,supra,note21,at60.

(36)Itisatleastambiguous:WESTEN,supra,note21,at7374.

(37)Westen,supra,note34.Byempty,ProfessorWestenmeantthatnormativeequalityclaimsarederivative,notmeaningless:WESTEN,supra,note21,atxixxx.

(38)R.DWORKIN,supra,note30,atxiii&ch.12.

(39)SeeErwinChemerinsky,InDefenseofEquality:AReplytoProfessorWesten,81MICH.L.REV.575(1983);KentGreenawalt,HowEmptyistheIdeaofEquality?,83COLUM.L.REV.1167(1983).SeegenerallyRAZ,supra,note12,at228.

(40)ConsiderthebreadthandpoweroftheKantianidealofequalfreedomaslucidlyexpressedbyRogerPilon:weproceedfroma[naturallaw]premiseofmoralequalitydefinedbyrights,notvalueswhichmeansthatnoonehasrightssuperiortothoseofanyoneelse.Sofar-reachingisthatpremiseastoenableustoderivefromitthewholeoftheworldofrights.Callitfreedom,callitliveandletlive,thepremisecontainsitsownwarrantanditsownlimitations.Itimpliestherighttopursuewhatevervalueswewishprovidedonlythatindoingsowerespectthesamerightofothers.Anditimpliesthatwealoneareresponsibleforourselves,formakingasmuchoraslittleofourlivesaswewishandcan.Whatelsecoulditmeantobefree?:RogerPilon,Freedom,Responsibility,andtheConstitution:OnRecoveringOurFoundingPrinciples,68NOTREDAMEL.REV.507,509510(1993)(footnotesomitted).

(41)ARISTOTLE,supra,note21,at140149.SeegenerallyFINNIS,supra,note17,at161184;W.VONLEYDEN,ARISTOTLEONEQUALITYANDJUSTICE:HISPOLITICALARGUMENT(1985),13;PeterBenson,TheBasisofCorrectiveJusticeandItsRelationtoDistributiveJustice,77IOWAL.REV.515(1992);StevenJ.Heyman,AristotleonPoliticalJustice,77IOWAL.REV.851(1992);ErnestJ.Weinrib,CorrectiveJustice,77IOWAL.REV.403(1992);RichardW.Wright,SubstantiveCorrectiveJustice,77IOWAL.REV.625(1992)[hereinafterSubstantiveCorrectiveJustice];RichardW.Wright,Right,Justice,andTortLaw,thisvolume.

(42)AristotleappearstohaveborrowedtheideafromPlato,whoreasonedthatthetrueandbestequality,inthedistributionofgoods,suchashonor,dealsproportionatelywitheitherparty,everawardingagreatersharetothoseofgreaterworth,andtotheiroppositessuchshareasisfit:PLATO,supra,note31,atVI.757.SeeWESTEN,supra,note21,at5257.

(43)JohnFinnisarguespersuasivelyforreplacingAristotlescorrectivejusticephraseologywithThomasAquinasCommutativejusticeterm,ongroundsthatthelattertermmorecomfortablyembracesthevarietyofrelevantconsiderationsseeminglyexcludedbythenarrower,formalconceptionofcorrectivejusticedescribedby

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Aristotle:FINNIS,supra,note17,at178179.After2500years,however,acertainpresumptionofcorrectnessmightbedeemedtoattachtoaconceptsname,suchthatitmaysimplybetoolate,asapracticalmatter,tochangeitsname.

(44)Platoreferredtothisformofequalityasnumerical,distinguishingitfromtheproportionalorgeometrickind:WESTEN,supra,note21,at5253.

(45)Recallthechoice-harmprinciplethateveryactionharmsotherpersonstotheextentthatsuchpersonsaredeprived,atleasthypothetically,ofopportunitiesdisplacedthereby.

(46)Iusethetermcommunityhereinabroadsense,meaningbasicallythesamethingascommongoodandsociety.Thiscontrastssharplywiththemeaninggiventothewordbymostcommunitariantheorists,whoconsidercommunitiestobesmallergroupswhoseverypurposeistomediatebetweenindividualsandsociety.

(47)Freedomandcommunity,orsomethinglikethem,areperhapsthemostfundamentalandoftenopposingidealsincontemporaryAmericanjurisprudence.See,e.g.,RONALDDWORKIN,AMATTEROFPRINCIPLE(1985),71RobertA.BaruchBush,BetweenTwoWorlds:TheShiftFromIndividualtoGroupResponsibilityintheLawofCausationofInjury,33UCLAL.REV.1473,15191529(1986)(contrastingliberalandsocialwelfareideals).ButseeVALERIEKERRUISH,JURISPRUDENCEASIDEOLOGY(1991),19(challengingtheindividual-societydichotomy).

(48)[T]hecommongoodisthegoodofindividuals,livingtogetheranddependingupononeanotherinwaysthatfavourthewell-beingofeach:FINNIS,supra,note17,at305,Aristotleviewedthecommongoodasnothingmorenorlessthanthegoodofeachandeverycitizen:Wright,supra,note41,at685.Thisisanimportantpremiseoftheliberalwingofcommunitariantheory:seeBush,supra,note47,at1553(referringtothisphenomenonas[t]heparadoxofthecommunitarianvision).

(49)AsdemonstratedbythespectacularcollapseofMarxismandCommunismintheformerSovietblocknations,andwiththewidespreaddeclineofsocialismaroundtheworld.

(50)SeeCassR.Sunstein,InterestGroupsinAmericanPublicLaw,38STAN.L.REV.29,31(1985).

(51)SeeDuncanKennedy,DistributiveandPaternalistMotivesinContractandTortLaw,WithSpecialReferencetoCompulsoryTermsandUnequalBargainingPower,41MD.L.REV.563,584(1982).

(52)Thisethichasbeenreferredtoasaggregate-social-welfare(e.g,utilitarian),asdistinguishedfromafreedom-typeethicwhichisrights-based(e.g.,Kantian):Wright,SubstantiveCorrectiveJustice,supra,note41,at631.

(53)SeeARISTOTLE,POLITICS(E.Barker(trans.),1958),5;ARISTOTLE,supra,note

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21,at321(whateveritisthatpeopleregardasconstitutingexistence,whateveritisthatistheirobjectindesiringlife,itisinthisthattheywishtolivewiththeirfriends).

(54)KANT,METAPHYSICSOFMORALS,supra,note9,at*433,436;seeJOHNFINNIS,FUNDAMENTALSOFETHICS(1983),121(referencingKantsthirdcategoricalimperative).

(55)Morerecently,JohnStuartMillcelebratedtheidealsofbothfreedomandcommunity.JOHNSTUARTMILL,UTILITARIANISM,LIBERTY,ANDREPRESENTATIVEGOVERNMENT(1863).

(56)Softervariationsonthecommunityideal,sometimesviewedbycommunitariansintermsofsharing,areoflittlehelpinfashioningaschemeofresponsibilitybasedonpersonalaccountabilityandfault.Forabriefdiscussionofthelimitedroleofsharingconceptsinaccidentlaw,seeMoralFoundations,supra,note8,at457.

(57)Itisparticularlyflawed,asauniversaltheory,indisregardingtheseparatenessofpersons.See,e.g.,RAWLS,supra,note21,at29;RAZ,supra,note12,ch.11.SeegenerallyFINNIS,supra,note17,at111118,176177;J.J.C.SMART&BERNARDWILLIAMS,UTILITARIANISM:FORANDAGAINST(1973).Onitsarguableincoherenceasauniversaltheory,seeFINNIS,supra,note17,at112115,177.

(58)Overawiderangeofpreferencesandwants,itisreasonableforanindividualorsocietytoseektomaximizethesatisfactionofthosepreferencesorwants:id.at111112.

(59)SeeRonaldM.Dworkin,RightsasTrump,inTHEORIESOFRIGHTS(JeremyWaldron(ed.)1984),153(postulatingthatsomeformofutilitarianismisthemostinfluentialbackground[political]justificationintheWesterndemocracies).Forclassicalstatementsofutilitarianism,seeJEREMYBENTHAM,ANINTRODUCTIONTOTHEPRINCIPLESOFMORALSANDLEGISLATION(1789);MILL,supra,note55.Foramodernexaminationofitsstrengthsandweaknesses,seeSMART&WILLIAMS,supra,note57.Forasensitivecomparisonofutilitarianandegalitarianjustificationsofaccidentlaw,seeR.DWORKIN,LAWSEMPIRE,supra,note21,at288301(findingtheegalitarianaccountsuperior).

(60)Althoughtheapplicationofrulesmaygeneratedisutilityinparticularcases,thebroaderprinciplesofruleutilitarianismseektopromotethegeneralwelfareovertime.SeegenerallyJohnRawls,TwoConceptsofRules,64PHIL.REV.3(1955);J.O.Urmson,TheInterpretationoftheMoralPhilosophyofJ.S.Mill,3PHIL.Q.33(1953).Sinceruleutilitarianismhaslittlerelevancetopersonalmoralaccountability,itisaccordedonlyslightconsiderationinthisessay.

(61)ExplainedinR.DWORKIN,LAWSEMPIRE,supra,note21,at288.

(62)SeegenerallyRichardA.Posner,TheEthicalandPoliticalBasisoftheEfficiencyNorminCommonLawAdjudication,8HOFSTRAL.REV.487(1980);AlanSchwartz,

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ProposalsforProductsLiabilityReform:ATheoreticalSynthesis,97YALEL.J.353,357360(1988).

(63)SeeUnitedStatesv.CarrollTowingCo.,159F.2d169,173(2dCir.1947)(L.Hand,J.)(expressingtheconceptalgebraicallyasBPLimpliesnegligence,whereBistheburdenorcostofavoidingaccidentalloss,PistheincreaseinprobabilityoflossifBisnotundertaken,andListheprobablemagnitudeorcostofsuchloss).

(64)Handwasadumbrating,perhapsunwittingly,aneconomicmeaningofnegligence:RichardA.Posner,ATheoryofNegligence,1J.LEGALSTUD.29,32(1972).Note,however,thattheprincipalrelevanceoftheHandstandardtoamoralinquiryofthistypeliesinitsdemonstrationofrespectfortheequalityofotherpersonsandforcommunalinterests,notforanyutilityorefficiencythatthetortlawrulesassodefinedmaythemselvesproduce.

(65)SeeGUIDOCALABRESI,THECOSTSOFACCIDENTS(1970),135;GuidoCalabresi&JonT.Hirschoff,TowardaTestforStrictLiabilityinTorts,81YALEL.J.1055,1084(1972).

(66)SeegenerallyCALABRESI,supra,note65;WILLIAMM.LANDES&RICHARDA.POSNER,THEECONOMICSTRUCTUREOFTORTLAW(1987).

(67)Doingviolencetoprinciplesofequalityandthevirtueofprudence,asdiscussedbelow.Seeinfra,notes96100andaccompanyingtext.

(68)Themoralproprietyofsuchbehaviorispreliminarybecauseitissubjecttoestablishedrights,asdiscussedinpartIVA,below.

(69)Recallthattherelevanceofthesesocialgoalsislimitedinthepresententerprisetoascertainingmoralaccountabilityforapersonschoicesandreflectedactionsand,morespecifically,todeterminingwhensuchchoicesandactionsharmingotherpersonsmaybeviewedaswrongful.Thesearchhere,therefore,isnotforprinciplesoftortlawthatthemselvespromoteutilityandefficiency,butforprinciplesoftortlawwhichreflectthemoralqualityofanactorschoices.Thus,thekindofutilityofinteresthereisact,notrule,utility.

(70)SeegenerallyCALABRESI,supra,note65,at2426;R.DWORKIN,supra,note30,atxi(rightsastrumps);KANT,ELEMENTSOFJUSTICE,supra,note9,at331;RAWLS,supra,note21,at243248.ButseeRAZ,supra,note12.

(71)Forananalogoususeofthedefaultnotion,seeMartinA.Kotler,CompetingConceptionsofAutonomy:AReappraisaloftheBasisofTortLaw,67TUL.L.REV.347(1992).

(72)See,e.g.,DeryckBeyleveld&RogerBrownsword,Impossibility,IrrationalityandStrictProductLiability,20ANGLO-AM.L.REV.257(1991)(utilizingAlanGewirthslexicalrankingofgoodsintothreetiers,wherebyapersonsphysicalintegrityisrankedasa

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first-tierbasicgood,whereaswealthandconveniencewouldberankedasthird-tieradditivegoods).

(73)Onemustcautiouslybearinmindtheimportantandoftensubtledistinctionsbetweennotionsofapersonsinterestsinsafety,bodilyintegrity,andsecurity;apersons(imperfect)propertyrightsinhisbody;anddifferingconceptionsofabstractrightsandpropertyrightsvariouslyemployedbycommentatorsontortlawtheory.

(74)SeegenerallyRESTATEMENT(SECOND)OFTORTS(1963),7786;PROSSER&KEETON,supra,note1,at132(thelawhasalwaysplacedahighervalueonhumansafetythanuponmererightsinproperty).Thispremiseoftortlawiswidelysharedbythegeneralpublic.Ifasked,mostpeoplewouldprobablysaythatthethingofultimatevalueintheworldishumanlife:PATRICKF.MCMANUS,HowIGOTTHISWAY(1994),36.

(75)Thisisanorderwhichrequiresustosatisfythefirstprincipleintheorderingbeforewecanmoveontothesecond,thesecondbeforeweconsiderthethird,andsoon:Rawls,supra,note21,at43.

(76)Katkov.Briney,183N.W.2d657(Iowa1971)(springshotguninvacanthouseinjuredjellyjarthief).

(77)Togetherwithliberty,opportunity,andself-respect,Rawlsclassifieswealthasaprimarygood,sinceitisnecessaryfortheframingandtheexecutionofarationalplanoflife:RAWLS,supra,note21,at433.Viewingpropertyasaformofwealth,philosophersfromthetimeofAristotlehaverecognizeditsfundamentalimportancetothepursuitofgoalsbyhumanbeings.Seeinfra,note78andaccompanyingtext.Somephilosophers,suchasAlanGewirthandJosephRaz,accordpropertyandotherformsofwealthalowervalue.Seesupra,notes72and12.

(78)Thepointofpropertyistoprovideanexternalspherefortheoperationofthefreewill:ErnestJ.Weinrib,RightandAdvantageinPrivateLaw,10CARDOZOL.REV.1283,1291(1989).Thepoint,injustice,ofprivatepropertyistogivetheownerfirstuseandenjoymentofitanditsfruits(includingrentsandprofits),[which]enhanceshisreasonableautonomyandstimulateshisproductivityandcare:FINNIS,supra,note17,at173.SeegenerallyARISTOTLE,supra,note21(bk.4,chs.16)at106119;HEGEL,supra,note11,paras.41,44,44A;JEREMYWALDRON,THERIGHTTOPRIVATEPROPERTY(1988).

(79)Theroleoftortlawinprotectingeconomicinterestsisexploredin,e.g.,PETERCANE,TORTLAWANDECONOMICINTERESTS(1991),andPeterBenson,TheBasisforExcludingLiabilityforEconomicLossinTortLaw,thisvolume.

(80)Accidentalharminsuchacontext,wheretheactoraccordeddueconsiderationtothesecurityinterestsofpotentialvictims,thusgenerallyshouldbeconsiderednecessaryharmwithintheinherentlimitationsofknowledge,skill,andthesocialcalculus:

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seegenerallyPeterHuber,SafetyandtheSecondBest:TheHazardsofPublicRiskManagementintheCourts,85COLUM.L.REV.277(1985);ChristopherH.Schroeder,RightsAgainstRisks,86COLUM.L.REV.495(1985).Onemustremember,however,thatfreedomgenerallyhasprioritytoutilityevenintheaccidentcontextwhensuchfreedominterestsarevestedandspecific,aswhenderivingfromapre-existingrelationshipofthepartiesbasedontrust.

(81)SeeARISTOTLE,supra,note21.Inintendingharm,onepreciselymakes[lossestootherpersons]onesgain;onetothatextentusesthemup,treatsthemasmaterial,asaresourceforagoodthatnolongerincludestheirown:JohnFinnis,AllocatingRisksandSuffering:SomeHiddenTraps,38CLEV.ST.L.REV.193,203(1990).Tochooseharmistheparadigmaticwrong,theexemplaryinstanceofdenialofright:id.at205.SeegenerallyJohnFinnis,IntentioninTortLaw,thisvolume.

(82)SeeARISTOTLE,supra,note21,at150.Seealsosupra,note26.

(83)Goodsinthegeneralsenseofinterestsofvalue.

(84)SeegenerallyRichardA.Epstein,CausationandCorrectiveJustice:AReplytoTwoCritics,8J.LEGALSTUD.477(1979);Weinrib,supra,note27.Incontrasttoclassicalutilitarianismseffectofconflatingallpersonsintoone,criticizedbyRawls(seeRAWLS,supra,note21,at27),theverypurposeofthesuperpersonconceptemployedhereistoprotectandenforcedistinctionsbetweenpersons.

(85)Moreover,intheftaswithmanyotherformsofintentionalwrongdoing,notionsofbothretributiveandcorrectivejusticesuggesttheproprietyofpunitiveontopofcompensatorydamagesinorderfullytocorrectthewrong.SeegenerallyBruceChapman&MichaelTrebilcock,PunitiveDamages:DivergenceinSearchofaRationale,40ALA.L.REV.741(1989);BaileyKuklin,Punishment:TheCivilPerspectiveofPunitiveDamages,37CLEV.ST.L.REV.1(1989);DavidG.Owen,TheMoralFoundationsofPunitiveDamages,40ALA.L.REV.705,718722(1989).

(86)ThisistheideaofprotectivejusticeinherentintheKantiannotionoftherighttofreedom.SeeRichardW.Wright,Right,Justice,andTortLaw,thisvolume,at164.

(87)Ploofv.Putnam,71A.188(Vt.1908)(boatownermaytrespassonanothersdockincaseofstorm;dockownermaynotrepeltrespassbycastingboatadriftinLakeChamplainshighseas);ProtectusAlphaNavigationCo.v.NorthPac.GrainGrowers,Inc.,767F.2d1379(9thCir.1985)(dockownercouldnotproperlycastoffburningship,preventingfirefightersaccess).

(88)Vincentv.LakeErieTransp.Co.,124N.W.221(Minn.1910).SeegenerallyPROSSER&KEETON,supra,note1,at24.

(89)Intermsofactutility.Ruleutilitymightopposethetheftinordertopromotethesecurityofprivatepropertyholdings.

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(90)Aspossiblyinjustifyingtheprinciplethatanactormaynotchoosetoharmaninterestofahigherordertoprotectaloweronethatonemaynotkillormaimapoachertoprotectsomejellyjars,asnotedearlier.Yetthisprinciplealsomaybeviewedsimplyasoneofrankingrights,andhenceoffreedomratherthanutility.

(91)Legalresponsibility,thatis,intortlawtopayBforhisresultingdamages.Suchresponsibilityintortisastrongerandotherwisequitedifferentobligationfromtheformofresponsibilityarisingfromtheaccident,linkingtheactorandthevictim,thatmaygenerateotherweakerrightsandduties,suchastheactorsdutytostopandministertothevictimsspecialneedsforimmediateaid.Variationsonthislatterformofweakresponsibility,aptlydubbedagent-regretbyBernardWilliams,MoralLuck,inMORALLUCK(1981),20andoutcomeresponsibilitybyTonyHonore,ResponsibilityandLuck:TheMoralBasisofStrictLiability,104LAWQ.REV.530(1988),areexaminedbybothProfessorHonoreandStephenPerryintheiressaysinthisvolume.SeealsoArthurRipstein,Equality,Luck,andResponsibility,23PHIL.&PUB.AFF.3(1994).

(92)ThiswastheapproachtakenbyTonyHonor,supra,note88,andbyRichardEpstein,subjecttodefensivepleas.SeeRichardA.Epstein,ATheoryofStrictLiability,2J.LEGALSTUD.151(1973);RichardA.Epstein,DefensesandSubsequentPleasinaSystemofStrictLiability,3J.LEGALSTUD.165(1974).AmongthenumerouscritiquesofEpsteinsstrictliabilitytheory,themostphilosophicallyilluminatingisStephenPerrys.SeeStephenR.Perry,TheImpossibilityofGeneralStrictLiability,1CAN.J.L.&JURISPRUDENCE147(1988).

(93)Thatis,thesecurityinterestsofBthatAchosetoputatrisk.

(94)Philosophicalproblemsconcerningliabilityforharmmayultimatelyreducetoaquestionoftheallocationofpropertyrights.See,e.g.,RICHARDA.EPSTEIN,TAKINGS:PRIVATEPROPERTYANDTHEPOWEROFEMINENTDOMAIN(1985),9698(arguingthatpropertyrightsandtortliabilityrightsareoppositesidesofthesamecoin);Epstein,supra,note92;Weinrib,supra,note27.SeegenerallyGuidoCalabresi&A.DouglasMelamed,PropertyRules,LiabilityRules,andInalienability:OneViewoftheCathedral,85HARV.L.REV.1089(1972).Inthecontextofintentionaltakings,tortliabilityrulesandpropertyrightsmayindeedbeseenasoppositesidesofthesamecoin,asinthestarvingbeggarexamplediscussedabove.Yetthepropertyrightsnotiondoesnotappeartohelpexplainthemoralorlegalqualityofchoicestoactforpurposesunrelatedtoavictimspropertyholdingsthatproduceariskofharmtosuchholdingsonlycontingentlyandincidentallytotheactorschosengoals.Inconsideringtheproblemofresponsibilityforsuchsecondaryrisksofharm,therefore,propertyrightsprobablyneedtoberegardedasaseparateandpriornotiontotheconceptofliabilityrights.

(95)AsbypositingthatB,standingatpointy,ownsyor,moreprecisely,thatBownsatthetimeanexclusivepossessoryrightiny.

(96)Effortstounderstandthephilosophicalaspectsofcorrectivejusticetendtorunintoimpenetrablebedrocklocatedatthebottomoftheinquiry,framedintermsof

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fairnessintheinitialdistributionofpropertyrights.Theinquiryatthispointthustransformsintomuchbroaderquestionsofdistributivejustice,involvingthemostfundamentalissuesofpropertyandpoliticalphilosophy.Foranintroductiontotheseissues,see,e.g.,DAVIDMILLER,MARKET,STATE,ANDCOMMUNITY(1989),ch.2.Thismaywellbethepointatwhichphilosophicalinquiryintoprinciplesoftortlawends,andpureethicsandpoliticalphilosophybegins.Ihavereachedbedrockandthisiswheremyspadeisturned:LUDWIGWITTGENSTEIN,PHILOSOPHICALINVESTIGATIONS(1953),217quotedinCatherinePierceWells,TortLawasCorrectiveJustice:APragmaticJustificationforJuryAdjudication,88MICH.L.REV.2348,2363(1990).

(97)Anunremittingprinciplerequiringactorsalwaystoaccordtheinterestsofothersequalconcernandrespecttotheirownmaybetoostrongforapractical,generalmoralorlegaltheory.SeegenerallyR.DWORKIN,LAWSEMPIRE,supra,note21,at291301;Finnis,supra,note17,at304.YettheprincipleunremittedisarguablywhattheclassicGoldenRuleconceptcontemplatesinabstract