Post on 20-Aug-2020
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Paying for Nature: Incentives and the Future of Private Land Stewardship
C. Paxton Ramsdell
Thesis submitted to the faculty of the Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University in
partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of
Master of Science
In
Forestry
Michael G. Sorice, Chair
Max O. Stephenson Jr.
Marc J. Stern
December 4, 2013
Blacksburg, VA
Keywords:
Stewardship, incentives, private lands, biodiversity, intrinsic motivation
Copyright © 2013, C. Paxton Ramsdell
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Paying for Nature: Incentives and the Future of Private Land Stewardship
C. Paxton Ramsdell
ABSTRACT
Privately owned lands provide a number of benefits to humans, including food, clean air
and water, and building materials. Private lands are also home to a host of wildlife species and
the habitats that they rely upon for survival. As such, balancing human and ecological needs on
private lands is of critical importance. Stewardship is a term popularly used to refer to this
balanced approach of managing land for a host of benefits. When landowners lack the interest,
ability, or willingness to incorporate stewardship into their management strategies, incentives are
often provided to spur greater conservation outcomes. This two-part case study is focused on
private land stewardship. Using qualitative data analysis, I first examined the behaviors that a
sample of production-oriented ranchers defined as stewardship. I then explored the
environmental values underlying their behaviors. Utilitarian values dominated the four broad
themes that emerged from respondents’ operationalization of stewardship, including: maintaining
economically productive rangelands, protecting water resources, maintaining an aesthetically
pleasing property, and providing for wildlife. Next, I sought to better understand the impact of
incentives on durable conservation behaviors. As incentives can reduce intrinsic motivation, I
used Self-Determination Theory as a framework for surveying participants in an existing
conservation incentive program. The results suggest that landowners maintained their
willingness to continue protecting a threatened bird species following the removal of an
incentive. Each paper concludes with an analysis of findings within the context of the empirical
literature, and present potential practical implications for future conservation efforts.
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Acknowledgements
There are a number of people I would like to acknowledge for their guidance and support
throughout this process. First, I would like to express my sincere gratitude to my advisor, Dr.
Michael Sorice for his support and reinforcement over the past two years. I would also like to
express my genuine appreciation to my committee members Dr. Marc Stern and Dr. Max
Stephenson. Their support, assistance, and good ideas throughout this process is greatly
appreciated. I would also like to thank the Rocky Mountain Bird Observatory for their openness
to this project, and for providing me with virtually open access to all aspects of the Mountain
Plover Program. Additionally, I would like to acknowledge Kate Donlon, whose support and
encouragement was invaluable to my graduate school experience.
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Table of Contents
List of Tables...…………………………………………………………………………………....v
List of Figures……………………………………………………………..……………………...vi
Chapter 1 - Introduction……………………………………………………..………………….1
Chapter 2 - Operationalizing Stewardship: Capturing Production-Oriented
Landowner Perceptions of Stewardship Behaviors …………………………………………...5
Abstract……………………………………………………………………………………………6
Introduction………………………………………………………………………………………..7
Previous Research…………………………………………………………………………………9
Methods...…………………………………………….…………………………………………..15
Data Collection…………………………………………………………………………..15
Data Analysis…………………………………………………………………………….15
Results……………………………………………………………………………………………16
Maintaining Economically Productive Rangelands...…………………………………...17
Capturing and Protecting Water Resources.……………………………………………..21
Maintaining an Aesthetically-Pleasing Property………………………………………...24
Providing for Wildlife……………………………………………………………………25
Discussion………………………………………………………………………………………..27
Conclusion……………………………………………………………………………………….31
Chapter 3 - Incentivizing Durable Behaviors:
Landowner Willingness to Protect Biodiversity without an Incentive…….…….….………33
Abstract…………………………………………………………………………………………..34
Introduction………………………………………………………………………………………35
Background………………………………………………………………………………………37
Theoretical Framework…………………………………………………………………………..39
Previous Research………………..……………………………………………………………....43
Hypotheses……………………………………………………………………………………….47
Methods…………………………………………………………………………………………..48
Data Collection…………………………………………………………………………..48
Survey Design……………………………………………………………………………49
Measures…………………………………………………………………………………………49
Data Analysis…………………………………………………………………………………….53
Results…………………………………………………………………………………………....54
Discussion………………………………………………………………………………………..64
Conclusion……………………………………………………………………………………….71
Chapter 4 - Conclusion and Recommendations………………………………………………73
References………………………………………………………………………………………..79
Appendix A – IRB Approval Letter……………………………………………………………...98
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List of Tables
Table 2.1 Kellert’s (1995) typology of nine environmental values……………………………...12
Table 2.2 Overview of interviewees’ stewardship behaviors and related values………………..16
Table 3.1 Summary of plover nests found in previous years…………………………………….38
Table 3.2 Means, standard deviations, and medians of respondents views of the financial
incentive……………………………………………………………………………………….....55
Table 3.3 Means, standard deviations, and medians of respondents’ perceptions of autonomy,
competence, and relatedness……………………………………………………………………..56
Table 3.4 Means, standard deviations, and medians of respondents motivation for continuing in
the MPP…………………………………………………………………………………………..58
Table 3.5 Spearman correlations relating motivation and basic needs n= 32……………………59
Table 3.6 Means, standard deviations, and medians of respondents’ indications of current
effort……………………………………………………………………………………………...60
Table 3.7 Means, standard deviations and medians of respondents’ intention to participate in the
MPP without an incentive………………………………………………………………………..62
Table 3.8 Exact chi-square of respondents’ indication of current effort and their indication of
future effort………………………………………………………………………………………63
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List of Figures
Figure 3.1 Ryan and Deci’s (2000) Self-Determination Theory………………………………...39
Figure 3.2 Ryan and Deci’s (2000) taxonomy of motivation, moving from extrinsic motivation at
the left, to intrinsic motivation at right……………………………………………………….….41
Figure 3.3 Self-Determination Theory and the Mountain Plover Program. Conceptual model
based on Ryan and Deci’s (2000) Self-Determination Theory, and study hypotheses. Model
moves from left to right beginning with “Basic Needs” and “Financial Incentive.”…………….47
Figure 3.4 Self-Determination Theory and the Mountain Plover Program. Conceptual model
based on Ryan and Deci’s (2000) Self-Determination Theory…………………………………..64
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Chapter 1: Introduction
Civil society was constructed using natural resources, and today, the responsible use and
protection of these resources remains one of humanity’s central challenges (Diaz, Fargione,
Chapin III & Tilman 2006; Freyfogle 2003). Biodiversity, broadly defined as the diversity of
Earth’s plant and animal life, provides humans with a number of benefits (e.g. medicine, food,
and shelter), though its critical importance is often under-recognized and undervalued
(Millennium Ecosystem Assessment 2005). Indeed, many of the activities that provide the
comfort and prosperity of modern life degrade the ecosystems upon which society depends. For
instance, modern agricultural systems provide food to a growing global population, but also
degrades land, water, and wildlife habitat (Foley et al. 2011). These negative impacts are likely
to worsen as a growing global population, increased rates of consumption, and climate change
further stress natural resources (Millennium Ecosystem Assessment 2005).
During the twentieth century, as economic security in the United States increased, citizen
demands to reduce pollution, conserve biodiversity, and protect human health spurred
governmental action to address environmental degradation (Freyfogle 2003). Today,
governments protect the environment through a combination of land use compulsion
(regulation), direction (planning mechanisms), and inducement (incentives) (Worrell & Appleby
1999). Yet the large number and geographic dispersion of private landowners makes regulation
an ineffective tool for promoting the ecologically sensitive management of private lands
(Gunningham & Young 1997). Further, the social and political deference to protecting individual
property rights further hinders domestic efforts to ensure that land ownership entails a
conservation ethic (Freyfogle 2011). The general lack of affirmative societal expectations of land
ownership has largely relegated private land conservation to a voluntary pursuit.
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The term stewardship is used colloquially to refer to the environmentally-sensitive
management of private land by landowners (Worrell & Appleby 1999). In the conservation
literature, stewardship often refers to sustainability, the protection of environmental quality, or
responsible land management (Gill, Klepeis & Chisholm 2010). Although many property owners
consider their role as land stewards integral to their sense of identity, it is unclear how they
define stewardship (Kilgore, Snyder, Schertz & Taff 2008; Peterson, Peterson, Lopez & Liu
2010). As a result, it remains uncertain what, precisely, stewardship describes, or to whom or to
what land stewards are responsible. In the absence of government action, and a broadly
understood definition of stewardship, conservationists are tasked with identifying effective
strategies to encourage, limit, or prohibit the use and management of land (Fairfax, Gwin, King,
Raymond & Watt 2005)
When proactive stewardship of private land is not valued or possible (e.g. disinterest, lack
of knowledge/education, financial constraints etc.), conservationists often incentivize landowners
to adopt conservation practices (Stern 2006). Incentives can include technical assistance in
creating or improving wildlife habitat, protection from regulation, or the provision of other
material benefits to landowners (Sorice, Haider, Conner & Ditton, 2011; Wilcove & Lee 2003;
Wolfe Hays, Farrell & Baggett 2012). Most often, however, environmental organizations
incentivize landowners by providing direct financial benefits, such as tax deductions or
subsidies, for improving the management of their land (Stern 2006).
While incentives can rapidly change behavior, that change is often not maintained
following the removal of an incentive (De Young 1993). As a result, organizations must
continuously provide incentives for a behavior to endure. As such, Frey and Jegen (2001),
Winter and Koger (2004), and Farley and Costanza (2010) are skeptical of the use of monetary
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incentives due to their potential to reduce landowners’ intrinsic motivation to protect the
environment. Incentives that pressure, are perceived as controlling, or are tied to measurable
outcomes, such as payments for ecosystem services arrangements, may further harm intrinsic
motivation (Ryan & Deci 2000; Wunder, Engel & Pagiola 2008). Thus, incentives may pose
greater risks than benefits if they reduce landowners’ intrinsic motivation to protect the
environment, or fail to foster durable conservation behaviors commonly associated with
stewardship (De Young 2000; Worrell & Appleby 1999).
My two-part study centers on the notion of stewardship, and specifically whether
incentives serve to induce and maintain land stewardship behaviors or if their use reduces
landowners intrinsic motivation. To explore these ideas, I first examined landowners’ behavioral
definitions of stewardship and the values that are reflected in those land management activities.
Specifically, if stewardship is an ethic, as argued by Aldo Leopold (1949), what values are
evident in landowner’s definitions of stewardship? By attempting to operationalize stewardship I
expected to call attention to how landowners may view stewardship in a different manner than
the conservation literature. I used a case study of livestock producers in central Texas to examine
landowner’s stewardship behaviors and values.
Second, I sought to understand the role of incentives in sustaining or hindering the
stewardship behavior of protecting biodiversity. Biodiversity is operationalized as at-risk species,
since the Endangered Species Act serves as the U.S.’s primary means of protecting plants and
animals (Sorice 2012). First, a fundamental understanding of what motivates landowners to
protect biodiversity is needed. Second, what are the implications of using financial incentives to
reward the protection of biodiversity now and into the future? By answering these questions I
expected to call attention to wildlife habitat on working lands, as well as uncover critical
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information about the long-term implications of financial incentives as a conservation strategy.
To address the second part of this study, I evaluated an existing conservation incentive program.
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Operationalizing Stewardship:
Capturing Production-Oriented Landowner Perceptions of Stewardship Behaviors
C. Paxton Ramsdell
Virginia Tech
Department of Forest Resources & Environmental Conservation
Michael G. Sorice, Chair
Max O. Stephenson Jr.
Marc J. Stern
December 4, 2013
Blacksburg, VA
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ABSTRACT
Stewardship is often used in both the conservation literature and colloquially to refer to
the environmentally-sensitive management of privately property. Despite the frequency with
which the term is used, it is rarely and inconsistently defined. Many suggested definitions are
conceptual and rarely relate the term to specific management activities. As such, it remains
unclear to whom land stewards are responsible, or what, specifically, stewardship entails. As
many property owners view their role as land stewards as integral to their sense of identity, the
present study sought to explore landowner perceptions of stewardship behaviors and the
environmental value orientations evidenced by their descriptions of these behaviors. Twelve
land-owning ranchers from the Brazos River Valley in Texas were interviewed. Qualitative data
analyses revealed four broad themes from respondents’ operationalization of stewardship,
including: maintaining economically productive rangelands, protecting water resources,
maintaining an aesthetically pleasing property, and providing for wildlife. Overall, ranchers
prioritized meeting their economic needs, and utilitarian values emerged as the dominant value
orientation driving these land stewardship behaviors. The results suggest that stewardship is
largely understood based upon personal motivations for owning land and the ecological
characteristics of one’s property. As such, stewardship concerns rarely included the larger
community. Conservation practitioners seeking to induce stewardship on private lands may
benefit from the use of marketing techniques to directly appeal to landowner’s personal interests.
Keywords: Stewardship, private lands, biodiversity, social marketing, environmental values
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Chapter 2: Operationalizing Stewardship:
Capturing Production-Oriented Landowner Perceptions of Stewardship Behaviors
2.1 Introduction
Privately-owned lands play a critical role in protecting the structure and function of
ecosystems and landscapes (Wilcox, Sorice & Young 2011). In the United States, 60% of land is
privately owned, and until recently working farms, ranches, and timberlands were perceived as
ecologically insignificant due to their cultivated, human-dominated form (Rickenbach, Schulte,
Kittredge, Labich, & Shinneman 2011; Nickerson, Ebel, Borchers & Carriazo 2011; Daily,
Ehrlich & Arturo Sánchez-Azofeifa 2001; Crossman & Bryan 2009; Lubchenco et al. 1991).
Instead, environmental conservationists sought to protect parks, nature reserves, and areas of
“pristine” wilderness (Kareiva, Watts, McDonald, & Boucher 2007).
In recent decades, scientists have confirmed the critical role private lands play in
protecting plant and animal communities (Daily et al. 2001). In the United States, these
properties are home to three-quarters of all threatened or endangered species and the myriad
habitats they rely upon for survival. Privately owned lands also provide vital connectivity
between habitats and protected areas (Freyfogle 2003; Firbank 2005). Though studies have
confirmed that landowners generally value landscape-scale conservation outcomes, cooperative,
large-scale management of private properties can be difficult to achieve (Rickenbach et al.
2011).
To realize the benefits of functional ecosystems, it is important for landowners to
recognize the impact of their management decisions on the larger social and ecological landscape
(Ciuzio et al. 2013; Chapin III, Pickett, Power, Jackson, Carter, Duke 2011; Karp 1993).
However, awareness alone is not sufficient. Large-scale conservation is most successful when it
actively includes landowners, encourages their coordination, and promotes understanding of the
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ways in which individual landholdings contribute to the larger social, economic and ecological
landscape (Firbank 2005; Rickenbach et al. 2011).
Existing social and political respect for property rights in the United States makes
reframing landowner expectations to contribute to the common good at the landscape scale an
ongoing challenge (Freyfogle 2011). Nonetheless, such rights are socially constructed and
therefore, have varied greatly over time (Freyfogle 2003). For instance colonial-era land use law
imposed affirmative duties on private landowners to implement societal goals. Today, with the
exception of the Endangered Species Act, property rights are primarily framed as avoiding harm
to others (Freyfogle 2003; Sorice, Haider, Conner & Ditton 2010). The general lack of
affirmative social expectations of land ownership has relegated private land conservation to a
voluntary pursuit. Accordingly, many conservation organizations rely on private landowners to
implement sustainable land-use practices voluntarily. Others, meanwhile, reward such initiatives
with financial incentives (Freyfogle 2003; Chan et al., 2007). However, compensating
landowners for their conservation efforts reinforces the public perception of such projects as
voluntary activities that require a reward, not as an expected component of landownership.
The term stewardship is used colloquially to refer to environmentally-sensitive
management of private land (Worrell & Appleby 1999). In the conservation literature,
stewardship is regularly associated with sustainability, environmental protection, or responsible
land management (Gill, Klepeis & Chisholm 2010). Despite its widespread use, a broadly
accepted definition of the concept has yet to emerge, and it is unclear how landowners
understand the term. As a result, it remains uncertain what, precisely, stewardship describes, or
to whom or to what land stewards are responsible. Many property owners view their role as land
stewards as integral to their sense of identity and the dearth of information regarding these
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individuals’ perceptions and conceptions of stewardship is all the more conspicuous (Kilgore,
Snyder, Schertz & Taff 2008; Peterson, Peterson, Lopez & Liu 2010).
This study defines stewardship from the emic perspective of landowners by qualitatively
examining the activities they report as representative of stewardship. In short, I seek to define the
concept behaviorally. Although this paper focuses principally on identifying stewardship
behaviors, values are also important in this analysis. As individuals’ value orientations influence
beliefs and ultimately affect behavior, I also investigate the values reflected in respondents’
specific stewardship activities (Stern & Dietz 1994). I did not set out to test a hypothesis,
disprove any perceived landowner attitudes, or challenge the conceptual foundation of land
stewardship. Instead, I designed this study to allow landowners to share their conceptions of
stewardship in their own words.
2.2 Previous Research
Although land stewardship has been discussed in nature-society studies for more than a
century, the contemporary understanding of the term evolved from biblical references of caring
for the property of another (Worster 1993). In this view, the earth is God’s creation and humans
are charged with its care (Wunderlich 2004). For example, the American Country Life
Association (ACLA), an organization focused on advancing rural affairs during the early 20th
century, employed this definition of stewardship: “Land is a very special kind of property.
Ownership of land does not give an absolute right to use or abuse, nor is it devoid of social
responsibilities…the land steward has a duty to enrich the soil he tills and to hand it down to
future generations as a thanks offering to God…” (American Country Life Association 1945 pp.
147-149). Advocates of a theological-based respect for nature believe that human beings are
stewards responsible for overseeing and managing God’s creation. Critics, however, contend that
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viewing stewardship through the lens of human needs has resulted in a domineering, exploitive
relationship with nature (White 1967). In response, religious leaders argue that dominion
specifically includes the responsibility to care for the well-being of humans and other species.
Nonetheless, detractors remain convinced that valuing the earth solely as a means of meeting
human needs sets a dangerous precedent (Worster 1993).
To change humanity’s role from conqueror to ethically driven caretaker, thinkers,
including Aldo Leopold, sought to place nature on an equal footing with humans. In The Land
Ethic, Leopold (1949) opposed the prevailing, utilitarian view of land as a commodity to be used
and discarded at will. Instead, he argued that land-use decisions should be ethically grounded in
the premise that humans are members of a community of interdependent parts including the soil,
water, plants and animals. Leopold urged landowners to view their property as part of a larger
cycle of life that surrounds and includes them, altering human’s role from ruler to member of the
land community.
Today, stewardship often refers to the responsible and moral use of land that meets both
the needs of landowners and of society (Gill, Klepeis & Chisholm 2010). Similarly, some
researcher have defined the concept as a set of values that engenders a respect for the land and
the natural resources that provide for human prosperity (Curtis & de Lacy 1998). As a result,
these scholars no longer value human dominated landscapes, such as farms or managed
forestlands simply instrumentally as sources of food or fiber, but now argue they play important
multifunctional roles (Crossman & Bryan 2009; Zavaleta, Pasari, Hulvey, & Tilman 2010;
Pasari, Levi, Zavaleta & Tilman 2012; Maestre et al. 2012). As such, Vanclay (1992) has
suggested that stewardship requires landowners to care for their land for future generations, even
if doing so implies incurring financial costs.
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Many property owners suggest they believe their land is an important resource for
themselves and for the benefit of the larger community in which they live, but what that means in
practice may vary among individuals (Miller, Bastian, McLeod, Keske & Hoag 2010). While not
every landowner will adopt an ethical land-management ethos, those who do may exhibit a broad
respect for their land, natural resources, and the larger human and natural community in which
they live. In the late 1990’s, Worrell and Appleby (1999) surveyed the various definitions of
stewardship and suggested that, “Stewardship is the responsible use (including conservation) of
natural resources in a way that takes full and balanced account of the interests of society, future
generations, and other species, as well as of private needs, and accepts significant answerability
to society” (pp. 269). Landowners who have adopted this stewardship ideal are more likely to
reflect an ecocentric worldview than those solely focused on maximizing outputs from their
property.
Individuals’ environmental views are often defined as either ecocentric or
anthropocentric (Gagnon-Thompson & Barton 1994). Although individuals holding either set of
beliefs may exhibit positive attitudes toward the environment, their reasons for conservation
differ. Ecocentric individuals believe that nature is worth protecting even if it does not directly
benefit to humans. Thus, ecocentric individuals favor the protection of nature for its intrinsic
value (Wilkinson 2013). Conversely, anthropocentric individuals may only support conservation
that maintains or enhances human quality of life (Gagnon-Thompson & Barton 1994). Property
owners are rarely exclusively ecocentric or anthropocentric in their orientation, rather
landowners’ reasons for valuing nature are often multi-faceted (Wilkinson 2013).
Individuals may hold a number of differing orientations toward the natural environment,
and nine basic values are frequently used to examine these viewpoints (Kellert 1995). These
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Table 2.1
Kellert’s (1995) typology of environmental values
beliefs, like others, are not mutually exclusive, and landowners may concurrently hold a mix of
several stewardship orientations (Stern & Dietz, 1994; Kellert 1995). This study employs
Kellert’s (1995) nine environmental values to examine the beliefs evident in a sample of
landowner stewardship behaviors (Table 2.1). With the exception of dominionistic and
Value Definition Example
Aesthetic Physical appeal and beauty of
nature
Individuals holding an aesthetic value toward
their stewardship activities may seek to ensure
visually appealing rangelands, waterways, and
mature stands of trees.
Dominionistic Physical control, mastery and
dominance of nature
Individuals emphasizing the need to
overpower or control their land may hold
dominionistic values toward stewardship.
Ecologistic-
Scientific
Urge to precisely study and
understand the systematic
structure, function, and
interrelatedness of nature
Individuals defining stewardship with
ecologistic values may note the importance of
studying rangeland function to know more
about this unique ecosystem.
Humanistic Strong emotional attachment and
“love” for aspects of nature
Love of certain landscapes or actively
protecting a favored species of wildlife may be
indicative of a humanistic value toward nature.
Moralistic
Spiritual reverence and ethical
responsibility for the right and
wrong treatment of nature
Individuals who define stewardship in terms of
the “proper” way to manage land, such as
through protecting wildlife or water, may hold
moralistic values.
Naturalistic Direct experience and exploration
of nature
Individuals who utilize their land to provide
recreational opportunities such as wildlife
viewing, swimming, or stargazing may hold
naturalistic values.
Negativistic Fear, aversion, or dislike of nature
Individuals who define stewardship in terms of
direct hostility toward wildlife may hold
negativistic stewardship values.
Symbolic Use of nature for language and
thought
Individuals who note the importance of
stewardship activities as a form of expression
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negativistic values, the remaining values are representative, to some degree, of the stewardship
ideal as expressed by Worrell and Appleby (1999).
Inducing Stewardship
In light of the important role of private lands for conservation, education and financial
incentives are often used to foster active stewardship of such properties (Stern 2000; Daily et al.
2001). While both strategies can be effective, rarely does either account for the specific barriers
to the adoption of the behavior, such as the socio-cultural environment within which individuals
operate. For instance, education is appropriate when there is a strong and consistent self-interest
among individuals to contribute to societal goals, but a lack of information often prevents this
from occurring (Rothschild 1999). Incentives appeal to individuals’ economic rationalism, but
the requirement to comply with a program to receive an incentive can crowd out intrinsic
motivation (Frey & Jegen 2001). In light of the known shortcomings of other efforts and to foster
greater landowner stewardship, conservation practitioners may wish to explore the utility of
other behavior changing techniques.
Land management strategies often reflect long-standing, socio-cultural knowledge that is
transferred over time (Vanclay 2004). Conservation practitioners interested in influencing
landowner behavior to better reflect the stewardship ideal could utilize social marketing
techniques. Social marketing is particularly useful when individuals lack the self-interest to
engage in a behavior and when mandating behavior change is inappropriate (McKenzie-Mohr
2000; Andreasen 2002; Kotler, Roberto & Lee 2002). Behavior changing strategies can be non-
or as an artistic endeavor may hold a symbolic
appreciation for nature.
Utilitarian Practical and material exploitation
of nature to meet human needs
A utilitarian individual may prioritize
management strategies that provide financially
for his or her family.
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transparent or even unethical, and caution should be taken when employing these strategies to
ensure that participants are involved in the process and aware of the desired outcome of the
campaign (Brenkert 2002). With these cautions in mind, attaining a stewardship ideal that
protects sensitive landscapes may be more effectively achieved through directly targeting
landowner behavior and using marketing techniques to influence them.
In addition to social marketing, working to establish social norms can further catalyze
land management behaviors that better reflect a stewardship ideal (Kinzig et al. 2013). As the
perception of others behaviors is a powerful influencer, individuals and groups have used norms
to induce pro-environmental behaviors such as recycling, preventing litter, and conserving
natural resources (Heberlein 2012; De Young 1993; Oskamp & Schultz 2006; Nickerson 2002).
Norms are not implemented easily or quickly, but by fostering norms, conservation practitioners
may bring about greater adoption of environmentally sensitive land management. In order to
develop efficient strategies to protect the environment, conservation professionals need to
identify the variables that influence behaviors and produce unwanted environmental impact. By
examining the motivations and values that maintain such behaviors, conservation practitioners
may be able to create effective marketing strategies that result in improved land management
behaviors (Foxall, Oliveira-Castro, James, Yani-de-Soriano & Sigurdsson 2006).
I investigate the on-the-ground activities that landowners in Brazos County, Texas
associate with stewardship. Further, employing Kellert’s framework (1995), I examine whether
the behaviors these individuals evidenced when interviewed were driven by ecocentric or
anthropocentric values. As stewardship is often understood conceptually, this study seeks to
develop a behavioral definition of stewardship (Paterson 2008; Brown & Mitchell 1998).
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2.3: Methods
Data Collection
Dr. Michael Sorice conducted a total of twelve face-to-face, in-depth, semi-structured
interviews with adult, land-owning residents from Texas’, Brazos River Valley during the
summer of 2009. Dr. Sorice used a purposeful snowball sampling technique to identify and
recruit participants who were members of an agricultural producer’s cooperative in Bryan, Texas
(Babbie 2010). The interviews captured the specific activities in which landowners engaged that
they believed constitute stewardship, their history on the land, the centrality of ranching to their
livelihoods, their natural resource concerns, and their viewpoints concerning wildlife. Although
all of the respondents relied upon their ranches for income, a number held jobs in other fields,
including education, communications, and managing rangelands for other ranchers. To maintain
confidentiality, I report interviewee observations below as arising from Participants 1 through
12, and identify them as P1 through P12 when quoting them.
Data Analysis
Dr. Sorice digitally recorded each interview, and they were transcribed in their entirety at
Texas A&M University. The analytical focus of this paper is on the landowner’s responses to
questions designed to capture their behavioral definitions of stewardship, and the value
orientations evidenced by those behaviors. I used NVivo 8 software as a data analysis and
management tool, and I analyzed the data by inductively coding all of the interviews to first
uncover categories of behaviors (Spradley 1979). Once I had categorized the interview results, I
conducted a taxonomic analysis by identifying the parts of a larger theme, in this case
landowners’ stewardship behaviors. I then established the relationship between behaviors and
their connections to the larger definition of stewardship. For instance, I grouped weed control
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Table 2.2
Overview of interviewees’ stewardship behaviors and related values
and ensuring healthy grasses under the larger theme of “economic productivity” when they were
focused on cattle grazing. I then recoded the resulting themes and behaviors using Kellert’s
(1995) environmental values to identify the values reflected in these activities.
2.4: Results
I present my findings based upon the aggregate pervasiveness of the activities that
respondents described as indicative of their involvement with stewardship. I discerned four broad
themes in respondents’ operationalization of stewardship, maintaining economically productive
rangelands, protecting water resources, maintaining an aesthetically pleasing property, and
providing for wildlife. Table 2.2 presents those themes and their associated behaviors and values.
Overall, ranchers ranked meeting their economic needs as their highest priority. In general,
utilitarian values toward land management framed their stewardship behaviors. As a result, none
of the interviewees articulated their activities in light of a stewardship ideal, or spoke of the
concept as Leopold, Worrell and Appleby or as other published thinkers have framed it.
Theme Behaviors Values
Maintaining
Economically
Productive Rangelands
Eliminating weeds and woody brush, ensuring
healthy grasses, and fortifying soils Utilitarian
Protecting Water
Resources
Conserving vegetation along waterways and
erosion-prone areas, replanting disturbed areas,
reshaping the land using heavy machinery,
building dams and water catchment ponds,
avoiding pollution
Moralistic
Utilitarian
Maintaining an
Aesthetically-Pleasing
Property
Beautification of homes and gardens, maintaining
gates/fences, controlling weeds, and
removing/preventing trash from pastures.
Aesthetic
Symbolic
Utilitarian
Providing for Wildlife Providing access to food, water, and shelter Negativistic
Utilitarian
17
Maintaining Economically Productive Rangelands
Eliminating Weeds and Woody Brush.
All of the ranchers discussed clearing brush and eliminating weeds as critical stewardship
activities. Respondents worked hard to provide grass for their cattle, and eliminating weeds
decreased competition for water and nutrients. Interviewees described weeds as a “perennial
bother” and criticized owners of “unproductive” rangelands that are “growed up in mesquites,
[and] Wasatch” (P12; P6). As a result, as one rancher interviewed observed, a good land steward
is one who “loves to kill every weed that comes along” (P6).
Most of the respondents’ efforts to control weeds and foster healthy grasses were driven
by utilitarian values arising from their effort to earn a living. Participant 10 offered this
perspective,
“It [weeds] takes a lot of nutrition away from the grass that could be growing; it takes a lot of moisture
away from the grass that could be getting the moisture… We’ll start spraying weeds in February, late
January, early February, and we try to get on these weeds early, before they develop, and we’ve really got
a good handle on that. We’re constantly, constantly spraying weeds when we see them pop up, and the
only way to do that, especially with us, with as much country as we’ve got, we’ve got to stay on it almost
all year long.”
Although respondents reported eliminating weeds as a stewardship behavior, clearing vegetation
solely because it does not contribute to cattle grazing seems antithetical to the stewardship ideal,
especially if that ground cover provides other ecosystem functions.
Respondents’ utilitarian stewardship values also drove efforts to clear brush. Specifically,
a number of interviewees discussed the use of heavy machinery to remove encroaching woody
vegetation on their land. For instance, Participant 4 spoke of his desire to acquire a brush
mulcher. He reasoned that this tool would allow him simultaneously to eliminate brush and
incorporate the cut vegetation into the soil as fertilizer. He could then replant the cleared area
with grass to increase his grazing potential. Another respondent noted that he put the stumps
18
from cleared vegetation into waterways to slow erosion (P10). Though the ranchers primarily
cleared brush to boost grazing potential, their use of that same material to control erosion or
fertilize their soil is an interesting use of undesired vegetation.
During the course of conversations related to clearing brush, a few of the respondents
suggested that they also protect “desirable” vegetation. Participant 10 mentioned, for example,
the importance of leaving trees and brush throughout his pastures to provide his cattle with shade
in the summer and protection from winter weather. Participant 6 grazes more than 1,500 acres of
land. He expressed regret concerning the fact that he had cleared so much of his land in the past,
“like it is now there’s no cover for no wild game, no deer, because there’s no trees, there’s no
brush, no yaupon…we didn’t think we could do it [make a living] without clearing all of it
because we didn’t have enough land, you know, so we cleared all of it.” This reflection
represents an infrequently-cited acknowledgement of the need to balance grazing with protecting
vegetation for wildlife. As remnant vegetation can provide important environmental benefits,
conserving trees is an important stewardship behavior providing ecological benefits (Costanza et
al. 1997).
Ensuring Healthy Grasses.
The individuals interviewed also readily discussed the stewardship behavior of
maintaining and improving grasses in their pastures. Again utilitarian values drove ranchers’
efforts to sustain healthy stands of grass. Participant 9 offered his view of healthy land, stating
that while some people may prefer wildlife on their land, ranchers like to see “green grass
growing.” Participant 4 was more direct, arguing that ranchers need to fundamentally change
their identity from that of ranchers who graze cattle, to that of farmers who grow grass. He
reasoned, “That’s the only way you can survive in the livestock business. Get it [forage] off the
19
ground, and not out of the feed sack, or out of the bale.” Notably, respondents’ discussion of
grasses rarely referenced to overgrazing, just the importance of growing as much grass as
possible.
To sustain their cattle, participants discussed both improved and native grasses. As
improved grasses offer production benefits, such as increased nutrition, lower fertilizing
requirements, and increased drought tolerance, most of the ranchers favored and utilized those
grasses. Specifically, most cited the capability of improved grasses to allow them to graze more
cattle. For instance, Participant 12’s utilitarian values drove his effort to replace his native
grasses with improved grasses: “With that basically improved pasture that we have now, we’re
running 630 cows on this place…if we were running straight native grass pasture, we wouldn’t
have 200. We try to make this thing make money, you know, it’s here to make money, so it’s,
you got to push it, but at the same time not abuse it.” The use of improved grasses to run a
greater number of cattle than might be possible with native grasses raises questions about
whether this accords with the spirit of the stewardship ideal, or if instead landowners should rely
on native grasses and work within the land’s natural carrying capacity.
Respondents who favored native grasses also expressed utilitarian values. These
individuals often favorably cited the capacity of native grasses to thrive in their region of Texas.
Indeed, participant 7 began replacing his improved grasses with native grasses solely because the
non-native varietals had not proven as hardy. Participant 4 offered one of the group’s most
unique opinions on use of native grasses when discussing his efforts as a land steward. He
argued that native grasses not only allow cattle to graze, but they are better suited to provide
wildlife habitat and food. He noted, “I think wildlife and livestock go hand in hand, and I think
one complements the other, quite honestly.” Despite Participant 4’s interest in balancing grazing
20
with wildlife conservation, a majority of respondents were solely focused on identifying the best
possible grass for their cattle’s grazing needs. In most cases, ranchers saw improved grasses as
meeting their needs.
Fortifying Soils.
Fertilizing the land was another regularly-cited component of utilitarian land stewardship.
When discussing fertilization, most interviewees called upon their knowledge of soil health and
nutrients to identify inexpensive, reliable fertilizers. This strategy was becoming more important,
respondents noted, as the cost of commercial fertilizers had risen in recent years. Many
respondents cited phosphorus-rich chicken litter as an ideal, effective, low-cost fertilizing
solution. Participant 4, a seventh generation rancher described how the chicken litter biodegrades
to its elemental form and adds high levels of phosphorus to the soil. Participant 12 described
himself as focused on the “bottom line”, and he favored using poultry litter because he believed
that it was “better for the land” than commercial fertilizers. To ensure healthy soils and grasses
for their cattle, chicken waste served as an excellent use of a by-product that fits well with the
stewardship ideal.
Some of the respondents also used legumes to fertilize their land. Although Participant 4
used chicken litter, he had also used alfalfas and clovers to sustain his soils. He described relying
on legumes because, in addition to returning nitrogen to the soil, they provided excellent grazing
for his livestock. “All of those [legumes] are nitrogen producing forages that work very well in
grazing programs. Very high quality forage. You’re not going to find any Bermuda grasses or
summer forages that will produce the quality that your legumes will.” Participant 10 also had an
appreciation for the production benefits of legumes. He reasoned that “clover will resupply the
ground with nitrogen, so that’s kind of a two-fold deal, you’re putting nitrogen back in the
21
ground by growing clover, plus it’s good grazing for cattle.” The ranchers’ selection of legumes
and chicken litter as fertilizer was typically couched in their utilitarian values toward protecting
soil health in order to raise cattle.
Capturing and Protecting Water Resources
Preventing Soil Erosion.
Operating within this semi-arid region of Texas, the ranchers’ livelihoods are inextricably
tied to water. As such, avoiding erosion and capturing and protecting water for livestock were
another set of regularly-cited stewardship activities. When discussing erosion, respondents
frequently used language such as “tend to it right away, don’t let it get bad” and “try to slow the
water down as much as you can” (P10; P12). This language suggests that addressing erosion is
an important component of their perceptions of land stewardship. All of the ranchers employed
similar erosion control strategies, and most often conserved vegetation, replanted disturbed areas,
and reshaped the land.
The most common strategies respondents used to minimize erosion relied on nature. For
instance, despite eliminating brush and other woody vegetation from their pastures, respondents
protected vegetation along hillsides and waterways, as “nothing but forest will keep it from
eroding” (P3). When discussing whether he used his land for any other agricultural purpose aside
from grazing cattle, Participant 4 argued that he was unable to farm his land because he had
some of the most highly erodible land in Brazos County, and “you don’t dare strip those gullies
and things of vegetation unless you’ve got a pretty serious plan, because what little topsoil you
have…will end up in the Brazos river in a pretty short period of time.” Participant 12 defined
good land stewardship as working to keep the land productive for raising cattle. However, when
asked if he considers forestland “productive” he reasoned that you need “wooded land just to
22
hold it all together, your erosion would be terrible here if you didn’t have some wood belts to
hold the dirt, keep from washing it off or blowing away.”
When ranchers removed vegetation or operated in erosion-prone areas, they emphasized
the importance of quickly replanting those areas. For instance, Participant 2’s response to a
question about activities that a good land steward does to address erosion included a story about
how he and his father planted Coastal Bermuda grass to reduce erosion along a creeks banks.
Participant 12 was even more direct during a conversation concerning preventing erosion along
waterways. “We try to get grass growing, I mean cover on everything. Seasonal creeks have
grass growing across them…I don’t want any bare ground if I can at all help it.” Notably, none
of the respondents replanted areas with trees or other larger vegetation despite how frequently
they praised the effectiveness of trees and brush to slow erosion.
An infrequently discussed erosion control strategy was the use of heavy machinery to
reshape the land. The cost associated with purchasing, maintaining, and running equipment
limited the adoption of this method to only a few of the respondents. Those who did discussed
the benefits of building terraces, and shaping, smoothing and filling gullies with dredged soil
from their ponds (P3; P10; P6). Participant 12 argued that using heavy machinery to reshape the
land was absolutely necessary if you are going to clear large amounts of your property, due to the
potential for cleared slopes to cause erosion. The utilitarian values that emerged from
respondents’ use of heavy machinery to literally change the shape of the land to address erosion
challenges differed from other, more passive, erosion control methods, such as preserving
vegetation. Perhaps the most important finding from respondents’ discussion of this concern was
their exclusive focus on addressing erosion on their own property. This differs significantly from
23
the stewardship ideal as expressed by Worrell and Appleby (1999), which advocates for adopting
a landscape-scale stewardship ethos.
Protecting Water Resources.
Though respondents struggled to minimize water erosion, the ranchers were also
challenged to provide sufficient water for their cattle. Typifying this approach, Participant 7
shared a story about how he worked to establish water sources for his cattle during the first few
years after he purchased his ranch. As his land initially did not have any standing water, he stated
that, “every gulley, creek and everything I dammed up. And so unless I get a flood, all the water
that falls on my place stays.” Similarly, to avoid erosion and provide water, Participant 6 dug a
pond at the end of each of his gullies, and then built terraces to direct water into the ponds.
Though the most common use of dams and ponds was for water provision and limiting erosion,
some ranchers also noted ancillary benefits such as fishing and swimming opportunities (P2; P7).
Although most respondents articulated utilitarian values related to protecting water
resources, moralistic values occasionally emerged. One rancher noted that after reading studies
suggesting the impact to ground water from improperly discarded chemicals, he no longer
discards used motor oil onto the ground (P2). Discarding oil onto the ground poses a direct
impact to the public representing a lack of respect for the land. Participant 3 described how he
cuts vegetation along waterways instead of employing herbicides, noting that spraying along the
stream would be cheaper on his “pocket,” but that polluting the water would ultimately harm
downstream users, his children, and society at large. With the exception of these two ranchers,
the most striking aspect of interviewee discussions related to water was their focus on their
individual properties to the exclusion of the larger watershed, other landowners, or downstream
users.
24
Maintaining an Aesthetically-Pleasing Property
Interviewees also noted an interest in maintaining an aesthetically appealing property as a
stewardship behavior. Aesthetics often emerged within the context of discussing other
stewardship behaviors such as avoiding erosion or maintaining healthy grasses. However, for
these ranchers, aesthetics did not include efforts to preserve beautiful vistas or habitat for large
wildlife, as operationalized by Kellert (1995). Instead, respondents most often maintained the
visual appearance of their ranches for its tangible reflection of their capabilities as ranchers.
Indeed, respondents openly criticized those who failed to manage their natural resources in an
aesthetically pleasing manner.
Interviewees undertook aesthetically focused activities less out of concern for the
ecological health of their land than as a reflection of their pride, satisfaction, or feelings of
competence as land managers. Participant 3 evidenced symbolic and utilitarian values related to
maintaining his property’s visual appearance when he noted that spraying for weeds near his
corrals and painting the entrance fence are some of the activities that may not contribute to his
land’s profitability, but are “the right thing to do.” He continued, “When you come up and you
see it all tidy and everything, you think, ‘Maybe this guy is doing something right, maybe I want
to purchase something from him.’” Similarly, when asked to describe someone who is a good
steward of the land, Participant 10 described a neighboring landowner who maintained an
impeccably clean ranch. “Anytime you can go to a place and you can see the people take pride in
what they’ve got, they’re good stewards of the land, to me. You go into a place that’s trashy and
you can tell right away that they don’t really care.” Thus, aesthetics were not solely about the
visual appearance of the land, but they also served as an indication of the owner’s pride and
capability as a rancher.
25
Providing for Wildlife
During the course of the interviews, Dr. Sorice asked each of the ranchers to describe any
actions they had taken or were undertaking to provide for wildlife. Only a few ranchers did
anything for wildlife, and those who did provided food, shelter, and water. Participant 5 offered a
broad overview of his approach, remarking, “When you manage it (the land) as a stewardship
type thing, then you manage it not only for the cattle, but you have to leave something for the
wildlife.” Although some of the landowners sought to provide all types of wildlife with food,
most prioritized game species.
Many respondents were hunters or leased their land to other hunters to supplement their
income. Participant 7 noted that he allows hunting on his land and reflecting a utilitarian
orientation, provides food specifically for deer. In addition to planting plots of cow peas and
other crops for the deer, he noted that since both the deer and cattle like to eat certain forbs, he
has a dedicated deer pasture from which he excludes cattle. Other respondents simply left areas
uncut or unmanaged as wildlife forage with the assumption that wildlife would or could eat that
vegetation.
Setting aside habitat for wildlife was another stewardship behavior driven by utilitarian
and naturalistic values. When asked whether he managed his land for wildlife or any particular
species, Participant 11 noted that he has “probably 200 acres that’s fenced off, [where] cattle
don’t go, as kind of a wildlife refuge.” Participant 3 responded to a similar question by stating
“we have a wildlife area that is behind my house all the way down to the river; we don’t cut
brush in there…we just leave it, so deer can travel in there and squirrels hang there.” Notably,
only Participant 4 acknowledged the fact that the excess brush on his land is actually detrimental
to wildlife.
26
Ensuring wildlife had access to water was an ancillary benefit resulting from efforts to
build ponds for cattle or to control erosion. For instance, participant 7 described his water
provision strategy as digging “little gullies here and there for the deer, wildlife, cows.” He
continued, “You’re doing three things at one time, kill three birds with one stone, so you do
things that will not only benefit wildlife, cattle, you, everything.” Participant 11 was primarily
interested in hunting and his description of damming up waterways to provide for deer and
waterfowl was similar to other respondents with utilitarian values toward ensuring hunting
opportunities.
Although the ranchers’ behavioral definition of stewardship included protecting wildlife,
an examination of their values toward non-game wildlife portrays a different view. Instead of
speaking about the pleasure they receive from hosting or viewing wildlife on their land, many of
the ranchers described “pest” species. For instance, despite Participant 3 setting aside land as a
wildlife area, he clarified that he was “not trying to preserve snakes.” Participant 5 sought to
limit the number of coyotes near his land due to the threat he believed they posed to his cattle.
Participant 7 lamented an influx of beavers that had cut down trees along a waterway on his
ranch. The resulting beaver dam attracted river otters that ate all of his fish. Feral hogs are a
major problem throughout the south, damaging waterways and pastures, and Participants 2 and
10 expressed their frustration with the necessity of dealing with these animals on their land.
Among the interviewees, Participant 3 expressed the strongest negativistic values toward
wildlife. “Some people come around talking about endangered species, but who in the heck
wants to save a diamondback or a timber rattler? Who cares?! That’s the way we feel about it in
the south. Who wants to save a coyote?” Participant 12 was also uninterested in wildlife. “I’m
not much of a wildlife person…but this place is 4,800 acres and about half of it is wooded and
27
we probably have as many deer and as much wildlife on this place as there is. I mean there may
be too much wildlife. If I was being a really good steward of the wildlife, I probably would
manage, spend more of my time managing wildlife, but that doesn’t float my boat.”
2.5 Discussion
The dominance of the ranchers’ utilitarian stewardship values accords with their focus on
maintaining the economic productivity of their land. Landowners’ stewardship activities
primarily served to sustain and enhance their cattle operation by eliminating weeds and woody
brush, fostering healthy grasses and soil, minimizing erosion, and capturing and protecting water.
Maintaining the aesthetic appearance of rangelands, homes, and yards was of secondary interest,
and most often reflected the ranchers’ symbolic values. Interviewees indicated that visually
appealing homes and rangelands served as evidence of their competence in managing their land,
and the pride they took in their operation. Lastly, when the interviewees offered wildlife food,
water, and habitat they did so most often for game species that offered hunting opportunities.
When respondents discussed wildlife more broadly, they tended to express negativistic values
toward species they considered to be pests. In short, respondents’ discussions of stewardship
rarely aligned with Worrell and Appleby’s (1999) definition, providing valuable insights into
landowner perceptions of stewardship.
The largely utilitarian findings should not overshadow the fact that stewardship is
occurring on respondent’s lands. Ranches and rangelands are home to sensitive ecosystems that
provide important services such as wildlife habitat, food production, and public benefits such as
the protection of rural view sheds, livelihoods, and sense of place (Olenick, Kreuter, & Conner
2005; Goldstein et al. 2011; Swinton, Lupi, Robertson, & Hamilton 2007; Skaggs 2008). While
28
the interviewees favored activities that improved cattle grazing, their collective stewardship
behaviors are nevertheless providing important environmental and cultural services.
As a result of their focus on cattle production, most interviewees’ land stewardship
concerns rarely extended beyond the boundaries of their fence lines. Respondents expressed
limited concern about the larger region in which they operate, which may suggest a lack of
communitarian values related to identifying with, belonging to, or seeking to sustain one’s
community (Bozeman 2002; Stern 2000; Van Vugt 2002). This differs from the more holistic
approach to managing natural resources as multifunctional landscapes often espoused by an
ecosystem-based perspective, and reflected in Worrell and Appleby’s references to social
accountability as land stewards (Layzer 2008; Worrell & Appleby 1999; Maestre et al. 2012;
Chazdon et al. 2009). The production-oriented, anthropocentric, and geographically limited
behaviors and values identified in this analysis suggest that the pro-social, ecocentric
stewardship ideal lacks salience among these particular landowners.
For decades, conservationists and ecological thinkers such as Aldo Leopold (1949) have
sought to align landowner’s management techniques and values with an ecocentric land
stewardship ethic. These efforts have most often relied on education and awareness campaigns,
reflecting the belief that individuals will change their behavior if they are informed of the
deleterious impacts of their land management activities (Heberlein 2012). This strategy,
however, has rarely proven successful due to the time needed for landowners to understand,
accept, and adopt a new behavior. Further, changes in knowledge alone do not typically spur
behavior change, as meeting humans’ immediate needs and desires often takes precedence over
the long-term conservation of natural resources (Heberlein 2012; Schultz 2011 Villacorta,
Koestner, & Lekes 2003; De Young 1993). For example, despite decades of education, financial
29
incentives, and other efforts, soil erosion from agricultural activities remains an ongoing
challenge (Heathcote, Filstrup & Downing 2013; Wu 2000; Goodwin & Smith 2003). The
limited success and time needed for educational campaigns to change landowner perspectives
suggests that other strategies should be pursued if landowners are to be expected to adopt the
stewardship ideal (Heberlein 2012; Tilman 2012; Ciuzio et al. 2013; Chapin III et al. 2011).
A critical mass of landowners and properties are necessary to provide landscape scale
conservation (Sorice et al. 2013); however, these benefits can only be realized by reaching and
influencing individuals’ at the property level (e.g. Klein & Wolf 2007: Erickson, Lovell &
Méndez 2011). Indeed, the predominance of ranchers’ stewardship activities and concerns that
center solely on their own property suggests that focusing on landowners and their specific needs
is critical to bringing about greater conservation outcomes. This study’s identification of
production-oriented stewardship initiatives, and the utilitarian values that drive those activities
presents an opportunity for conservation practitioners to implement a social marketing campaign
to induce landowner adoption of a pro-social, ecocentric stewardship ethic.
Social marketing is one of a number of strategies used to adjust individuals’ behaviors. A
strength of social marketing is its application of traditional marketing techniques that target and
influence individuals to voluntarily accept, abandon, or modify a behavior for the benefit of
themselves, others, or society at larger (Kotler, Roberto & Lee 2002). This individualized
approach identifies existing barriers to behavior change, as well as individuals’ viewpoints and
attitudes, such as the values and stewardship behaviors identified in this study, to design
effective programs (Rothschild 1999). By respecting and incorporating landowner needs, a social
marketing campaign may present conservationists with an opportunity to create programs that
bring about increased adoption of a behavior, and greater environmental protection.
30
The utilitarian values and production-oriented stewardship behaviors expressed by the
ranchers offer conservation practitioners an opportunity to utilize a social marketing approach to
spur greater natural resource conservation. For instance, despite acknowledging the importance
of water, the ranchers rarely discussed the health of the larger watershed. Conservation
practitioners seeking to improve watershed health could tap into the ranchers’ utilitarian values
for water quality. For instance, instead of presenting watershed protection as an environmental
concern, a social marketing campaign could position watershed health as a way for the ranchers
to sustain a reliable and clean supply of water for their cattle now and into the future. Another
opportunity emerging from the data is to capitalize on the ranchers’ interest in hunting and
fishing. Marketing watershed protection as a way to sustain healthy populations of deer, ducks,
and fish may further influence behavior change. This strategy may also foster the moralistic
values related to protecting water quality for human benefits as expressed by Participant’s 2 and
3. Though social marketing is not a panacea to address land and water degradation, the values
and behaviors discussed by the ranchers in this study offer an important starting point to increase
voluntary adoption of the stewardship ideal.
Social Marketing also capitalizes on norms to influence behavior. Norms are another
means by which conservationists can imbue a stewardship ideal by positioning this type of
stewardship as an expectation of land ownership (Kinzig et al. 2013). As individuals are often
influenced by their perception of others’ behaviors, social approval and disapproval can be
important drivers of behavior by adding accountability to actions (e.g. feelings of personal
obligation to complete an activity, sanctions for violating norms) (De Young 1993; Oskamp &
Schultz 2006; Hamilton, Nickerson & Owan 2003). For instance, the Leliefontein herders of
South Africa have shared and grazed the same area of land for more than 200 years, and the
31
community’s norms governing the use of their rangelands has deterred virtually all violations of
established rules (Allsopp, Laurent, Debeaudoin, & Igshaan Samuels 2007). This example is not
to suggest that norms are implemented easily or quickly, but by positioning stewardship
behaviors that account for other species and other individuals as an accepted and expected norm
of managing one’s land, akin to clearing brush or addressing erosion, more landowners may
change their land management decisions.
As with any effort to influence or change individuals’ behaviors, caution should be taken
by marketers to ensure that the process is transparent, ethical and moral (Brenkert 2002). As
curtailing self-expression through behavior change can harm individual freedoms as well as the
democratic process, awareness of the power and scope of these methods is critical (Rothschild &
Stephenson 2009). Assuring that any organization or individual employing a behavior change
strategy is accountable to the public and their organization may help assuage concerns of societal
harm from misuse of such tools (Stephenson 2007). Although social marketing is not a panacea
to the global challenge of conserving sensitive landscapes, it represents an additional tool to
align land management behaviors with the stewardship ideal. If successfully implemented, a
social marketing campaign may result in a changed worldview among ranchers who equate a
pro-social, ecocentric stewardship ethic as a norm of owning land.
2.6: Conclusion
The ecological impact of global agriculture, economic development, and natural resource
use requires landscape-scale conservation (Tallis & Kareiva 2006). This study adds to the
literature on land conservation, and provides useful information on landowner perceptions of the
meaning of stewardship. Nonetheless, several limitations of the study should be noted. This case
study solely involved landowning ranchers in Texas, limiting the generalizability of the results.
32
This study was also limited to production-oriented ranchers enrolled in an agricultural
cooperative. Nonetheless, the findings from this study provide rich opportunities for future
research on landowners’ understanding of stewardship. In particular, future research into whether
landowners with different ownership motivations or those in other regions of the United States
and abroad view land stewardship differently or conduct different land stewardship behaviors
would add to this study’s findings.
In light of increasing political partisanship, economic deregulation, increased self-
interest, and limited faith in the effectiveness of government, social marketing offers a balance
between protecting the rights of the individual and the rights of society (Rothschild 1999). By
offering free choice, as well as an incentive to adopt socially desirable behaviors, social
marketing is an intriguing option to further imbue the stewardship ethic in landowners, which
otherwise develops slowly over many generations. As private lands remain crucial to conserving
the earth’s natural resources, using a proven behavior changing tool with existing landowner data
may enable the adoption of a stewardship ideal where other interventions have fallen short
(Heberlein 2012; De Young 1993; McKenzie-Mohr 2000).
33
Incentivizing Durable Behaviors:
Landowner Willingness to Protect Biodiversity without an Incentive
C. Paxton Ramsdell
Virginia Tech
Department of Forest Resources & Environmental Conservation
Michael G. Sorice, Chair
Max O. Stephenson Jr.
Marc J. Stern
December 4, 2013
Blacksburg, VA
34
ABSTRACT
Self-Determination Theory (SDT) posits that individuals are driven by intrinsic and
extrinsic motivation. Intrinsically motivated individuals complete an activity for the fun that it
entails, or due to its alignment with their values, whereas extrinsically motivated individuals
complete an activity in order to attain a separable outcome, such as earning praise or avoiding
criticism. Financial incentives can change behavior to implement societal goals such as
environmental conservation, but existing literature suggests that their use often harms intrinsic
motivation. To sustain intrinsic motivation, or to make extrinsically driven behaviors more self-
driven, SDT postulates that individuals require autonomy, competence, and relatedness. Based
on the principles of SDT, I designed a survey and distributed it to all (n = 77) members of an
existing wildlife conservation incentive program focused on protecting the threatened mountain
plover (Charadrius montanus). Information regarding landowner perceptions of the incentive
program, their intrinsic motivation for protecting wildlife, and their willingness to continue
protecting wildlife without an incentive was included in the survey. A total of 41 respondents
completed the survey. Overall, the respondents indicated the program allowed for a high degree
of autonomy, a moderate degree of competence, a low degree of inter-personal relatedness, and a
moderate degree of organizational relatedness. The majority of landowners (65%) indicated a
low current level of effort in protecting the plover, while 71% indicated they would be willing to
continue to protect the plover without an incentive. Results of the present study support previous
findings that under certain circumstances financial incentives may not harm intrinsic motivation
and in some instances may actually increase individuals’ willingness to complete a behavior.
Keywords: Stewardship, incentives, private lands, biodiversity, intrinsic motivation
35
Chapter3: Incentivizing Durable Behaviors:
Landowner Willingness to Protect Biodiversity without an Incentive
3.1: Introduction
Private property, especially large contiguous farms, ranches, and timberlands, host a
variety of ecosystems and provide habitat to three-quarters of all threatened or endangered
species (Freyfogle 2003). In the United States 60% of land is privately owned, and until recently,
working farms, ranches, and timberlands, were perceived as ecologically insignificant due to
their cultivated, human-dominated state (Rickenbach, Schulte, Kittredge, Labich, & Shinneman
2011; Nickerson, Ebel, Borchers & Carriazo, 2011; Daily, Ehrlich & Arturo Sánchez-Azofeifa
2001; Crossman & Bryan 2009; Lubchenco et al. 1991). Yet, the remarkable amount of plant and
animal life found on privately owned lands makes conserving these areas critical to ensure the
ongoing provision of a multitude of ecosystem services (Daily, Ehrlich, & Sanchez-Azofeifa
2001).
In the United States, societal respect for individual property rights has relegated private
land conservation to a largely voluntary pursuit (Freyfogle 2003). This was not always the case,
as American’s property rights have varied greatly over the course of time and geographic
location. For instance many colonial-era land use regulations imposed affirmative duties on
landowners to help implement societal goals such as the provision of natural resources. Today,
the Endangered Species Act (ESA) is a rare instance where property rights may be curtailed for
the benefit of wildlife (Sorice 2012; Norris 2004). Thus, modern day property rights are
primarily framed though avoiding harm to others, with less emphasis on the protection of the
larger social and ecological landscape.
The United States’ limited use of regulation, and strong property rights, positions
incentives as a favorable strategy to induce private land conservation (Key & Roberts 2006;
36
Kilgore, Snyder, Schertz, & Taff 2008; Claassena, Cattaneo & Johansson 2007). Payments for
protecting natural resources on privately owned lands began with dustbowl-era soil conservation
efforts, and expanded during the property rights movement and subsequent shift away from
environmental regulation during the 1980’s (Echeverria 2005). Today, incentives remain a
popular tool among conservation practitioners as they can effectively result in the provision of
desired ecosystem services, such as wildlife habitat or watershed protection, from willing
landowners (Derissen & Quaas 2013). Though incentives induce and reward conservation
activities on private lands, their use further positions conservation as a voluntary pursuit that
necessitates compensation, instead of an inherent component of land ownership.
While incentives rapidly change behavior, there can be unforeseen consequences to their
use (De Young 1993). Of primary concern is the failure of incentives to ensure landowners
sustain a behavior over time. For instance, Dwyer, Leeming, Cobern, Porter & Jackson (1993)
reviewed a number of studies since 1980, and found that after the introduction of an incentive the
behavior in question returned to its baseline status when the incentive was removed. Moreover,
the type of activity being incentivized had no impact on the durability of the behaviors without
the incentive. As a result, a consequence stemming from the use of incentives to adjust behavior
is that they must be continuously provided for that behavior to last (De Young 1993). Notably
intrinsic motivation, or the completion of a behavior for its inherent satisfaction, can protect
against this from occurring (Deci & Ryan 2002).
This study examines the role of incentives in sustaining or hindering conservation
behaviors, objectives are to: 1) understand incentive program participant’s opinions of their
conservation program; and 2) understand whether existing conservation incentive program
participants intend to continue with program activities should the incentive no longer be
37
provided. This research may provide valuable information to both academics and conservation
practitioners into the design, use, and wisdom of employing financial incentives to reward
conservation.
3.2: Background
In the United States, the loss of grassland habitat is one of the greatest threats to ground
nesting bird populations (Green, Cornell, Scharlemann & Balmford 2005). As the majority of
native grasslands have been converted to agricultural uses, ground-nesting birds have adapted to
use these fields for habitat (Siegel & Lockwood 2010). An outcome from this adaptation is the
accidental tillage of ground nesting bird nests. For instance, in Nebraska, the destruction of
mountain plover nests in farm fields has contributed to the plover’s State-threatened status,
warranting further consideration for protection under the U.S. Endangered Species Act
(Schneider, Stoner, Steinaure, Panella & Humpert 2011).
I am collaborated with The Rocky Mountain Bird Observatory (RMBO), a non-profit
organization that protects birds through monitoring, research, education and habitat conservation
(Hanni, White, Sparks, Blakesley, Levandoski & Birek 2010). Since 2003, RMBO has recruited
and incentivized farmers in western Nebraska to protect the nests of the mountain plover
(Charadrius montanus).
When RMBO staff or the landowner discovers plover nests in their fields, they mark
them with brightly colored wooden stakes and avoid them during farm activities (Schneider et al.
2011). Despite the brightly colored stakes, mechanized farm activities often stir up dust, reducing
visibility, and increasing the potential for accidental tillage. Nonetheless, program participation
minimally impacts farm activities as nesting sites need only a limited amount of space, and once
hatched, chicks leave their nest within three hours allowing agricultural activities to resume.
38
As payment is conditional upon finding, marking and protecting the plover’s nest until
the eggs hatch, this type of incentive program is commonly referred to as completion-contingent
(Deci, Koestner & Ryan 1999). When staff from RMBO identifies and marks nests, landowners
are paid $100 per nest. Farmers who identify and mark nests themselves receive $200 per nest.
As such, motivated program participants are free to search for nests themselves, while those who
may not feel as confident in their capabilities, or have less interest, can call upon RMBO’s staff
biologists to search for nests. Table 3.1 illustrates that historically, staff from RMBO have found
most of the plover nests. However, these data does not account for landowners who were
unsuccessful in their efforts to find nests.
Table 3.1
Summary of plover nests found in previous years
Year Nests Found Nests Found by
Landowner
Total Landowners in
Program
Percentage of Nests
Found by Landowner
2006 86 13 63 15%
2007 111 2 68 2%
2008 69 14 58 20%
2009 80 16 61 20%
2010 103 18 72 18%
2011 65 22 76 34%
2012 66 27 77 41%
2013 65 6 77 9%
Source: Rocky Mountain Bird Observatory.
Today, participants continue to receive compensation for successfully protecting nests;
however, RMBO’s ability to fund the Mountain Plover Program (MPP) into the future is
uncertain. RMBO is concerned that without the financial incentive, their program participants
will no longer protect the mountain plover.
39
3.3: Theoretical Framework
Ryan and Deci’s (2000) Self-Determination Theory (SDT) is an appealing lens with
which to investigate landowners intention to protect the mountain plover without an incentive, as
it helps clarify individuals motivation to complete an activity. SDT asserts that individuals are
driven by both intrinsic and extrinsic motivation. Intrinsically motivated individuals complete an
activity for the fun or challenge that it entails, or due to the behaviors alignment with their
values. Conversely, extrinsically motivated
individuals complete an activity in order to
attain a separable outcome, such as praise,
avoiding criticism, or obtaining a financial
incentive. Completion-contingent incentive
programs, such as the MPP, can be
perceived as controlling due to the need for
RMBO to confirm that nests have hatched
for landowners to obtain payment (Ryan,
Mims & Koestner 1983; Deci, Koestner &
Ryan 1999).
For individuals to sustain intrinsically driven behaviors, they require a sense of
autonomy, experiencing choice and feeling like the initiator of one’s own action; competency,
the capability to achieve desired outcomes and to succeed at challenging tasks; and relatedness, a
sense of community, mutual respect, and reliance on others (See Figure 3.1; Ryan & Deci 2000;
Baard, Deci, & Ryan 2004). The provision of these needs has proven successful in empowering
individuals to adopt environmentally responsible behaviors such as recycling, conserving energy,
Autonomy
Competence
Relatedness
Self-Determined
Behavior
Fig. 3.1. Ryan and Deci’s (2000) Self-
Determination Theory
40
and maintaining a small ecological footprint (Osbaldiston & Sheldon 2003; Pelletier & Bellier
1999; Dwyer et al. 1993; Sheldon, Nichols & Kasser 2011). Moreover, individuals may require
differing quantities of each of the basic needs depending on their own unique characteristics or
the sociocultural climate in which the behavior is taking place (Ryan & Deci 2000). Although all
three needs are posited to be necessary to sustain intrinsic motivation, autonomy and competence
are often considered most important, as many intrinsically interesting or rewarding activities are
completed in isolation. Nonetheless, a secure relational base is important for protecting intrinsic
motivation.
Because my study is situated within an organizational setting, I broadened the conceptual
scope of relatedness to include organizational affinity. This form of relatedness includes
organizational commitment, affective commitment, organizational identity, and organization-
based self-esteem. Organizational commitment is the strength of an individual’s identification
with, and level of involvement with, a particular organization (Porter, Steers, Mowday &
Boulian. 1974). Affective commitment is an individual’s emotional attachment to, identification
with, and involvement with an organization (Meyer & Allen 1991). Organization-based self-
esteem (OBSE) is the degree to which organizational members believe that they can satisfy the
requirements associated with membership (Pierce, Gardner, Cummings & Randall 1989).
Organizational identity is the “ways in which individuals define themselves in terms of their
membership in a particular organization” (Cole & Bruch 2006, Pg. 588).
A strong relationship with an organization can help meet individuals’ needs for approval,
esteem, affiliation, and emotional support (Eisenberger et al. 2010). The provision of this form of
relatedness also results in higher task completion, increased satisfaction, and commitment to an
organization, and reduces the likelihood of leaving an organization (Ferris, Brown & Heller
41
Fig. 3.2. Ryan and Deci’s (2000) taxonomy of motivation, moving from extrinsic motivation at the
left, to intrinsic motivation at right
2009; Griffin, Hogan, Lambert, Tucker-Gail & Baker 2010; Li, Liang & Crant 2010; Bowling,
Eschleman, Wang, Kirkendall & Alarcon 2010). As RMBO seeks to sustain participant
involvement with the MPP, the field of organizational studies provides a valuable element to my
study.
The Organismic Integration Theory
Motivation is influenced by varying levels of self-direction, and the Organismic
Integration Theory (OIT) is Deci and Ryan’s (1985) sub-theory used to identify individual’s
levels of intrinsic and extrinsic motivation. The OIT describes the conditions considered
necessary for an extrinsically motivated behavior to be a) internalized, which Deci and Ryan
(1985) define as an individual’s acceptance that completing an initially undesirable activity is
beneficial to their goals; b) integrated, the process by which an individual’s level of self-
determination increases; and c) self-determined, completing an activity out of choice rather than
Behavior Not Self-
Determined
Self-
Determined
Perceived
Locus of
Causality
Impersonal External Somewhat External Somewhat Internal Internal Internal
Relevant
Regulatory
Processes
Non-intentional,
Non-valuing,
Incompetence,
Lack of Control
Compliance,
External
Rewards and
Punishments
Self-Control, Ego-
Involvement, Internal
Rewards and
Punishments
Personal
Importance,
Conscious Valuing
Congruence,
Awareness,
Synthesis with
Self
Interest,
Enjoyment
Inherent
Satisfaction
Motivation
Regulatory
Styles
Extrinsic Motivation
External Regulation
Introjected Regulation
Identified Regulation
Integrated Regulation
Amotivation
Non-Regulation
Intrinsic Motivation
Intrinsic Regulation
42
obligation or coercion.
Ryan and Deci’s (2000) continuum of motivations range from amotivation and
exclusively externally-driven behavior to completely intrinsic behavior (Figure 3.2). There is no
predictable progression between orientations, and individuals can move forward or backward
along the continuum.
Amotivation occurs when one does not value, does not feel capable, and/or does not
believe that completing an activity will yield a desired outcome.
External Regulation is the least autonomous state, and occurs when behaviors are
performed to satisfy an external demand or to receive a reward.
Introjected Regulation is a less autonomous form of behavior and occurs when an
individual completes an activity solely to avoid feelings of guilt or anxiety, or to maintain
self-esteem, pride, or sense of worth.
Identified Regulation is a more autonomous form of motivation, and occurs when an
individual identifies with, accepts, and values a behavior as personally important.
Integrated Regulation is the most autonomous form of extrinsic motivation, and occurs
when an action is fully integrated with one’s values. Although integrated motivation
shares qualities with intrinsic motivation, behaviors are completed to attain a separable
outcome rather than for its inherent enjoyment.
Intrinsic Motivation is the most self-determined type of behavior, and is characterized
by completing an activity for the inherent satisfaction it provides.
The OIT positions an individual’s internalization of a behavior as a process, not as a
dichotomy (Deci & Ryan 2002). As a behavior or external requirement becomes internalized, it
becomes part of an individual’s sense of self, and completing the behavior becomes
characterized by increased self-direction. Within the OIT, amotivation, external regulation, and
introjected regulation all involve completing an activity solely to obtain an external reward or
avoid a consequence. That is, without the threat of a consequence, or the promise of a reward,
individuals would not complete those activities. Conversely, identified regulation represents the
transition from external regulation into self-regulation, when an individual completes an activity
because it is personally valued.
43
Other studies have divided the OIT into three groups, autonomous motivation, controlled
motivation and amotivation (Ratelle, Guay, Vallerand, Larose & Senecal 2007). Autonomous
motivation includes intrinsic, integrated, and identified motivations, and reflects the importance,
and relevance of a behavior to an individual’s core values and interests. Individuals possessing
these motivations will complete a behavior willingly, even if it is done to obtain an external
outcome such as personal satisfaction or to achieve a desired future goal. Controlled motivation,
includes introjected and external regulation, and occurs when individuals complete an activity
due to pressure or a self-imposed sense of responsibility to complete a task. The difference is that
identified, integrated, and intrinsic motivations all emerge from identification with the behavior,
and the personal importance ascribed to completing that behavior (Deci & Ryan 2002).
SDT posits that payments, such as the one offered by RMBO, fail to foster the type of
self-directed motivation that will allow individuals to protect the plover without an incentive
(Osbaldiston & Sheldon 2003). Conversely, individuals with a greater degree of autonomous
motivation (intrinsic motivation, integrated regulation, and identified regulation) are more likely
to willingly take action to care for the environment (Seguin, Pelletier & Hunsley 1998). As
individuals are more likely to continue an activity when the motivation to complete that behavior
is self-directed rather than externally imposed, my study solely investigates identified, integrated
and intrinsic motivations. As the most self-determined motivations, they are the most likely to
sustain durable behaviors without an incentive (Pelletier, Tuson, Green‐Demers, Noels & Beaton
1998; Ryan & Deci 2000).
3.4: Previous Research
Conservation incentives reward landowners who protect, actively manage, and restore
private lands and waters (Casey, Vickerman, Hummon & Taylor 2006). Moreover, incentives
44
represent an appealing solution to influence individuals’ behavior when regulation is too
forceful, inefficient, or opposed by landowners (Stern 2006). For instance, Poudyal and Hodges
(2009) argue that incentives can change landowner management practices to better incorporate
soil protection and the provision of wildlife habitat. Incentives may include technical assistance,
such as habitat restoration advice, regulatory protection, such as the Endangered Species Act’s
Safe Harbor Program, or other material benefits to landowners (Sorice, Haider, Conner & Ditton
2011; Wilcove & Lee 2003; Wolfe, Hays, Farrell & Baggett 2012). But most often, incentives
are tax deductions or direct subsidies to landowners (Stern 2006).
While incentives may increase a desired behavior, pursuit of financial rewards may also
result in noncompliance, cheating, and falsification of data. For instance, Kirwan, Lubowski and
Roberts (2005) found that landowners adjusted environmental quality reporting to increase the
likelihood of enrolling in an incentive program. In 2006, investigators uncovered evidence that
up to fifteen farmers may have altered soil samples and improperly received over $280,000 in
conservation payments from Washington State (Stucke 2006 cited in Stern 2006). Similarly,
Jack, Kousky and Sims (2008) caution that incentives can cause landowners to adopt ransom
behaviors by threatening undesirable action (e.g. creating land development plans on property
targeted for conservation) to obtain greater compensation. Key and Roberts (2006), and Lennox,
Dallimer and Armsworth (2010) found similar behaviors among landowners who leveraged their
willingness to accept a payment for conservation activities or land protection. In some instances
landowners were able to obtain a 200% increase in compensation for providing a conservation
agreement on their property.
Analysts have also raised concerns that incentive programs, such as the Conservation
Reserve Program (CRP), are failing to ensure the ecological gains and public benefits that the
45
program compensates landowners to provide (Norris & Batie 1987; Cattaneo, Claassen,
Johansson & Weinberg 2005). The CRP, established in 1985 as a part of the Farm Bill,
compensates landowners who voluntarily cease cultivation on environmentally-sensitive
cropland (Kirwan, Lubowski & Roberts 2005). The U.S. spends over $1 billion per year on CRP
payments, and given the programs cost and scope it is concerning that it may not be providing its
intended environmental benefits (Armsworth, Acs, Dallimer, Gaston, Hanley & Wilson 2012).
The reliance on incentives to drive private land conservation warrants additional attention
to the psychological impact of their use. Winter and Koger (2004), Farley and Costanza (2010),
and De Young (1993) all argue that incentives can reduce landowners intrinsic motivation and
sense of responsibility to care for the land. Incentives that pressure or coerce landowners into
desired actions may further harm intrinsic motivation (Ryan & Deci 2000). Vohs, Mead, and
Goode (2006) found that in all nine of their multi-person experiments, participants who were
prompted with money exhibited more individualistic behaviors, such as a decreased likelihood of
helping others, donating less money when asked, and a reduced willingness to engage with peers.
Similarly, Frank, Gilovich and Regan (1993) found that university students studying economics
behaved in a more self-interested manner in social dilemma games than students in other areas of
study. Murayama, Matsumoto, Izuma and Matsumto (2010), found that prior to completing an
incentivized behavior the parts of the brain associated with reward and motivation, became
activated in study subjects. When the incentive was removed these areas were no longer
activated suggesting that the removal of an incentive also poses neurobiological implications.
While, non-monetary or unexpected rewards may not be as problematic as cash incentives, care
should be taken anytime individuals use money to change behavior (Frey & Jegen 2001).
46
Researchers argue that financial incentives are harmful as they fundamentally change the
nature of a request (Frey & Jegen 2001). That is, completing a behavior to obtain an incentive
changes the nature of the requested task from one potentially done willingly, to one done out of
necessity to obtain the reward, an event Frey and Jegen (2001) term “crowding out” (Pg. 590).
For instance, Frey and Oberholzer-Ghee (1997) found that individuals’ willingness to site a
nuclear waste storage area decreased by 25% when a financial incentive was offered. In this
instance compensation fundamentally changed the nature of the request or behavior, and resulted
in less undesirable outcome.
Despite these challenges, Frey and Jegen (2001) also note that financial incentives can
have the opposite effect. Incentives can boost an individual’s motivation to perform a task,
support their intrinsic motivation, and ultimately increase an individual’s willingness to complete
a behavior. They refer to this phenomenon as “crowding in,” and suggest that under the right
circumstances, incentives may prove beneficial to long term behaviors (Pg. 593). For instance,
conservation incentives expose individuals to the benefits of new management techniques, which
can ultimately spur greater willingness to protect the environment (Van Herzele et al. 2013).
Bandura (1986) argues that as most of the activities people intrinsically enjoy were not of initial
interest, rewards can help establish interest in these behaviors. Further, verbal rewards, non-
material rewards, and small payments are all posited to be less harmful to intrinsic motivation
(Deci, Koestner & Ryan 1999; Cameron, Banko & Pierce 2001). Thus, under the right
conditions, rewards may not always prove as harmful as commonly believed.
A considerable body of research has already investigated the adoption of pro-
environmental behaviors, landowner motivations for conducting conservation activities, and the
demographic and landowner characteristics of existing or likely conservation program
47
Fig. 3.3. Self-Determination Theory and the Mountain Plover Program.
Conceptual model based on Ryan and Deci’s (2000) Self-Determination Theory,
and study hypotheses. Model moves from left to right beginning with “Basic
Needs” and “Financial Incentive.”
+ = Positively support next variable
- = Harm next variable
participants (e.g. Sullivan, Amacher & Chapman 2005; Kaetzel Hodges, Houston & Fly 2009).
However, less is known about the conditions necessary to transition landowners away from
existing incentives while maintaining desired behaviors. This research gap warrants greater
investigation by examining an existing conservation organization, incentive program, and
enrolled participants.
3.5: Hypotheses
The MPP is a completion-contingent reward program, where compensation is solely
provided when a marked nest is protected and subsequently hatches (Deci, Koestner & Ryan
1999; Ryan, Mims & Koestner 1983). This reward structure is posited to be highly controlling as
48
organizations must rely on greater levels of surveillance and evaluation, both of which
undermines intrinsic motivation (Deci & Ryan 1985). Building off of Ryan and Deci’s (2000)
SDT, I investigated the perceived impact of the cessation of existing incentive payments on
landowners’ future intention to protect plover nests. Specifically, I was interested in whether
program participants believe that they will continue protecting the plover if they no longer
receive an incentive to do so. Autonomy, competence and relatedness were the independent
variables for this study. Current effort and future effort are the dependent variables.
Following Ryan and Deci’s (2000) SDT, my theoretical hypotheses include autonomy,
competence, relatedness, and organizational relatedness supporting individuals’ self-directed
motivation to protect plover nests (Figure 3.3). Self-directed motivation was expected to support
individuals’ level of current effort in identifying and protecting nesting sites, as well as their
intention to continue once the program ends. Given the unknown impact of the existing financial
incentive, and the degree to which MPP members are self-directed, it was unclear whether
current effort will indicate a likelihood of protecting the plover without an incentive (future
effort). However, I expected that respondents with higher levels of current effort would result in
an increased likelihood of future effort.
3.6: Methods
Data Collection
I used a modified version of the drop off-pick up distribution method along with the
multiple-phase reminder method using the U.S. Postal Service (USPS) (Dillman 2009; Allred &
Ross-Davis 2010). Staff from RMBO mailed all program participants (n = 77) a pre-survey letter
outlining the purpose of the study. After approximately two weeks, a staff member from RMBO
distributed surveys to all possible respondents at their homes. For those who were unreachable at
49
home, or whose primary residence was outside of the study area, a staff member from RMBO
mailed a copy of the survey via USPS and followed up with a personalized telephone call
explaining the study. Included with all surveys was a small incentive as a thank you (RMBO
magnetic calendar), and information directing participants to return the completed survey, or a
blank survey to indicate disinterest in participating, using the provided pre-paid envelope.
RMBO sent reminder postcards roughly two weeks after initial survey distribution. Three weeks
after mailing postcards, RMBO sent individuals who had still not responded a reminder letter
and duplicate survey before sending final postcard reminders to non-respondents two weeks after
that date (Dillman 2009).
Survey Design
To develop the study instrument I adapted existing, validated survey measures whenever
possible. I received assistance from RMBO in the creation of the unique measures of current
effort and future effort.
Measures.
Demographics.
I collected basic demographic information to understand the participants’ identities as
farmers. I asked questions related to generating income on their farm, including how much land
respondents owned or leased, and the percentage of their overall income that comes from
farming. To gauge their tenure as farmers, I asked respondents how many generations farming
has been in their family, how much of their childhood was spent on a farm, as well as the total
number of years that they have personally operated their farm. I also collected information on
whether individuals live on their farm or live elsewhere, and if respondents are enrolled in other
conservation incentive programs.
50
Mountain Plover Program Participation
I also created questions to capture information on how the respondents participate in the
MPP. I asked how participants first learned about the program (e.g. finding the program on a
website, or a personal invitation from an RMBO staff member), and the program characteristics
that they felt were most influential in their decision to enroll in the program (e.g. the money
offered for each successfully protected nest, or their personal interest in helping wildlife). I also
asked how many years MPP members had been enrolled in the program.
Autonomy.
I used three questions adapted from The Work Climate Questionnaire, and the Basic
Need Satisfaction at Work Questionnaire to gauge respondents’ perception of autonomy as
Mountain Plover Program members (See Table 3.3) (Baard, Deci & Ryan 2004). These questions
were evaluated to ensure internal consistency and combined to create a general measure of
autonomy. Respondents were instructed to respond on a seven-point scale from 1 = Not at all
true, to 4 = Somewhat True, to 7 = Very True.
Competence.
I also adapted The Basic Psychological Needs Scale to measure respondents’ perception
of competence in protecting wildlife, including the plover (Table 3.3). I instructed respondents to
provide their answer using the same scale, selecting either 1 = Not at all true, 4 = Somewhat
True, or 7 = Very True (Baard, Deci, & Ryan 2004). For analysis, questions measuring
competence were evaluated for internal consistency before being combined.
Relatedness.
To measure respondents’ perception of relatedness, I adapted Kim, Scott, Thigpen, and
Kim’s (1998) behavioral commitment scale (Table 3.3). I also adapted the Intrinsic Motivation
51
Inventory and the Basic Psychological Needs scales (Baard, Deci & Ryan 2004; Plant & Ryan
1985). All measures were evaluated for internal consistency and combined for analysis.
Participants responded on the same 7-point scale, indicating either 1 = Not at all true, 4 =
Somewhat True, or 7 = Very True.
Organizational Affinity.
To measure respondents’ sense of relatedness to RMBO, I adapted a number of measures
from organizational management, including Porter et al.’s (1974) measure of organizational
commitment, Meyer and Allen’s (1991) measure of affective commitment, and Pierce et al.’s
(1989) measure of organizational based self-esteem (Table 3.3). I also measured respondents’
perception of organizational identity using statements such as, “I feel that the plover program’s
successes are my successes.” I refer to this grouping of variables as organizational affinity.
Respondents were asked to indicate their degree of agreement with each of the organizational
affinity measures using a 7-point scale beginning with 1 = Strongly Disagree, 2 = Moderately
Disagree, 3 = Slightly Disagree, 4 = Neutral, 5 = Slightly Agree, 6 = Moderately Agree, and
ending with 7 = Strongly Agree.
Self-Directed Motivation.
I adapted the Motivation Toward the Environment Scale (MTE) to examine respondents’
motivation for protecting plovers (Villacorta, Koestner & Lakes 2003). As I was solely interested
in the effect of the financial incentive on self-determined motivation, I combined identified,
integrated, and intrinsic motivations. I tested for internal consistency before combining these
measures (Table 3.3). Ryan and Deci (2000) note that other studies have combined these
measures to form an autonomous motivation composite, and I refer to this composite as Self-
Directed Motivation.
52
I reduced the original MTE scale from 23 items to 17 items, presented the questions in a
randomized order, and adapted the questions to focus on the Mountain Plover Program.
Questions instructed respondents to indicate the extent to which each item corresponded to their
personal motives for continuing to participate in the plover program on a 7-point scale, ranging
from 1 (Does not correspond at all) to 4 (Corresponds moderately) to 7 (Corresponds exactly).
Evaluation of the Financial Incentive.
I created six questions to capture baseline information on the respondents’ opinions of the
existing financial incentive. Each question included a uniquely corresponding seven point scale
with individualized ratings (See Table 3.2).
Current Effort.
To evaluate current effort, staff from RMBO assisted me in creating nine activities
indicative of actively participating in the plover program (Table 3.6). Respondents evaluated
each activity using the same 5-point scale, beginning with 1 = Almost Never, 2 = Rarely, 3 =
Occasionally, 4 = Often, and ending with 5 = Almost Always.
To understand the ways in which individuals are currently participating in the plover
program, I conducted a hierarchical cluster analysis using Ward’s linkage (Hair Jr., Black, Babin
& Anderson 2009; Ward 1963). This method groups respondents into subsets on the basis of
their similarity to the nine current effort items, while also minimizing the variance within each
cluster (Punj & Stewart 1993). I selected the number of clusters that allowed me to effectively
discriminate between the groupings of farmers, and to make the most meaning out of the results.
Indication of Future Effort.
With input from RMBO, I created seven questions to examine respondents intention to
continue certain MPP activities should the financial incentive no longer be provided (Table 3.7).
This measure is based upon respondents stated intention to continue marking and avoiding
53
plover nests without an incentive (Fishbein & Ajzen 2010). Respondents indicated the likelihood
of future effort without an incentive on a 7-point scale ranging from 1 = Extremely Unlikely, 2 =
Moderately Disagree, 3 = Slightly Disagree, 4 = Neutral, 5 = Slightly Agree, 6 = Strongly Agree,
and ending with 7 = Extremely Likely.
I again grouped farmers using a hierarchical cluster analysis using Ward’s linkage to
understand whether individuals anticipate protecting the plover should the incentive no longer be
provided (Hair Jr., Black, Babin & Anderson 2009; Ward 1963). I used participants’ responses to
the seven measures of future effort as the source of this classification, and selected the number of
clusters that were most effective in differentiating the results.
Data Analysis
I used descriptive statistics to investigate respondents’ perception of the financial
incentive, autonomy, competence, and relatedness as participants within the MPP. I also used
descriptive statistics to explore respondents’ perceptions of their level of current effort, and their
likelihood of protecting the plover and its nests without an incentive. Given this study’s small
sample size, I employed non-parametric statistics for analyses. Non-parametric statistical
analyses are ideal when working with smaller samples as they make fewer assumptions about the
population distribution (Pallant 2007). When combining measures I used Cronbach’s alpha to
examine internal consistency. The number of observations reported in the statistical analysis
varies due to item nonresponse.
To examine the strength of relationships between two variables, I used Spearman’s rho,
the non-parametric alternative to Pearson correlation. The strength of the relationship is
presented using the following criteria: small = 0.10 to 0.29; medium = 0.30 to 0.49; and large =
0.50 to 1.0 (Pallant 2007).
54
To test for differences between groups, I used Mann-Whitney U tests. This test is the
non-parametric alternative to t-tests for independent samples. The Mann-Whitney U test ranks
responses from lowest to highest, and then identifies differences in the ranked scores of the two
groups. When I conducted Mann-Whitney U tests, I calculated and reported the effect size using
Cohen’s (1988) criteria of 0.1 = small effect, 0.3 = medium effect, 0.5 = large effect. I report
effect sizes as ŕ.
To examine whether two categorical variables were related, I used an exact Chi-square
test. The standard Chi-square test assumes that the minimum expected cell frequency is five or
greater, but due to my small sample size this assumption was not met (Pallant 2007). The exact
Chi-square uses an exact distribution to calculate the p value, instead of approximating the p
value. This helps protect the findings against the influence of the smaller sample size.
3.7: Results
Participant Information
Of the 77 surveys that were initially distributed to my target population, 41 were
returned, and two individuals indicated that they were not enrolled in the program, for an
effective response rate of 55%. Respondents were primarily male (94%), and ranged in age from
26 to 86 with a mean age of 60.3 years. Many of the respondents (83%) had spent most or all of
their childhood on a farm, and most (77%) came from families who had been farming for three
or four generations. Respondents personally operated their farm for as few as 2 years, and as
many as 63 years. The majority (83%) of respondents resided on their farm, and most (77%)
farmed 2,000 or more acres of land. As such, the majority (79%) of the respondents earned at
least half of their annual income from their farm.
55
Most (89%) of the respondents first learned about the MPP through an RMBO employee,
and 71% of respondents indicated that that their reasoning for enrolling in the program was to a
large or very large extent influenced by their interaction with RMBO staff. Respondents’ time in
the MPP ranged from less than a year to the full ten years of the program’s existence, with a
mean enrollment period of 5.4 years. Notably, 81% of respondents also participate in at least one
other conservation incentive program, with the Conservation Reserve Program (CRP) among the
most popular (60%).
Evaluation of the Financial Incentive
The farmers were generally supportive of the financial incentive, though 91% of
respondents felt that the financial incentive was “A Bit Too Low” (Table 3.2).
Table 3.2
Means, standard deviations, and medians of respondents views of the financial incentive
Financial Incentive:
Would you say the financial incentive offered
in this program is: Mean SD Median
Undesirable or Desirable? 5.94 1.32 6
Bad or Good? 5.70 1.60 6
Unnecessary or Necessary? 5.06 1.66 5
Ineffective or Effective? 5.03 1.90 6
Unimportant or Important? 5.03 2.13 6
Too Low or Too High? 3.34 1.10 3
Note: All variables were measured on a scale specific to each question. (E.g. 1 = Extremely
Undesirable to 7 = Extremely Desirable; 1 = Very Ineffective to 7 = Very Effective 1 = Much
Too Low to 7 = Much Too High).
Autonomy, Competence, & Relatedness
On average the respondents in this study felt that the MPP fostered a feeling of
autonomy, which allowed them to participate in the program freely (mean = 6, SD = 1.20,
median = 6.67). While respondents indicated that it was somewhat true that they had the
necessary competence to protect the plover (mean = 4.46, SD = 1.44, median = 4.40), they did
56
not feel that it was true that the MPP provided a sense of relatedness among program participants
(mean = 2.78, SD = 1.18, median = 2.83) (Table 3.3).
Respondents indicated a greater feeling of organizational affinity, slightly agreeing that
they were committed to RMBO (mean = 5.41, SD = 1.64, median = 5.75). The MPP members
rated the remaining measures of organizational affinity similarly, suggesting a neutral to slight
agreement with affective commitment (mean = 4.84 SD = 1.52, Median = 5), organizational
identity (mean = 4.84, SD = 1.62, median = 5), and organization-based self-esteem (mean = 4.47,
SD = 1.84, median = 5). These findings further illustrate respondents’ greater sense of
relatedness to RMBO than their fellow program participants.
Table 3.3
Means, standard deviations, and medians of respondents’ perceptions of autonomy, competence,
and relatedness.
We would like to know the extent to which each item
corresponds to your experience with the Mountain
Plover nest protection program.
Mean SD Median
Autonomy (α = 0.86) 6.00 1.20 6.67
I am free to express my ideas and opinions about the
plover program to the staff 5.90 1.37 7
How I participate in the plover program is completely
up to me 6.12 1.39 7
The plover program provides me with choices and
options 6.00 1.34 7
Competence (α = 0.93) 4.46 1.44 4.40
I have been able to learn interesting new skills as a
part of the plover program 4.16 1.67 4
In general, I feel a sense of accomplishment from my
participation in the plover program 4.45 1.75 4
As part of the plover program I am able to achieve my
goals of protecting nongame wildlife on my land 4.58 1.50 4
I am confident in my ability to protect nongame
wildlife on my land 4.61 1.41 4
57
After working with the plover program, I feel
confident in my ability to identify and protect plover
nests 4.52 1.80 4
Relatedness (α = 0.69) 2.77 1.18 2.83
Since I began the program, I’ve gotten to know many
of the other participants 3.19 1.62 3
I consider plover program participants to be a close-
knit group of landowners 3.52 1.50 4
If I stopped participating in the plover program I
would probably lose touch with a lot of my friends 1.66 0.97 1
Organizational Affinity
Organizational Commitment (α = 0.92) 5.41 1.64 5.75
I am proud to tell others that I am a part of the plover
program 5.38 1.64 6
I really care about the fate of the plover program 5.48 1.79 6
Affective Commitment (α = 0.81) 4.82 1.52 5
When someone praises RMBO’s plover program, it
feels like a personal compliment 4.47 1.85 5
I enjoy discussing the plover program with people
outside of it 5.16 1.81 5
I feel that the plover program’s successes are my
success 4.97 1.74 5
Organizational Identity 4.82 1.63 5
Being part of the plover program is an important
reflection of who I am
Organization-Based Self Esteem
(α = 0.95) 4.47 1.84 5
I am a valuable part of the plover program 4.47 1.87 5
I am an important part of the plover program 4.48 1.95 5
Note: Numbers next to bolded terms are descriptive statistics specific to the combined measures.
Autonomy, competence, and relatedness questions were measured using this 7 point scale (1 =
Not at all true, 4 = Somewhat true, 7 = Very true).
Organizational Relatedness was measured using this 7-point scale (1 = Strongly Disagree 2 =
Moderately Disagree 3 = Slightly Disagree 4 = Neutral 5 = Slightly Agree 6 = Moderately Agree
7 = Strongly Agree).
58
Table 3.4
Means, standard deviations, and medians of respondents motivation for continuing in the MPP.
Note: All responses provided on a 7-point scale from 1 (does not correspond at all) to 7
(corresponds exactly).
Self-Directed Motivation
I combined identified regulation, integrated regulation, and intrinsic motivation to create
a larger measure of self-directed motivation. I uncovered a good internal consistency (α = 0.91)
of the combined measure of self-directed motivation (Table 3.4). On average respondents’
agreed to a moderate extent that their reason for continuing to participate in the MPP was due to
self-directed motivation.
Please indication the extent to which each item
corresponds to your personal motives for protecting
the plover using a 7-point scale from 1 (does not
correspond at all) to 7 (corresponds exactly).
Mean SD Median
Self-Directed Motivation (α = 0.91) 4.71 1.47 4.83
Identified Regulation -- -- --
Because it is a reasonable thing to do. 4.85 1.89 5
Integrated Regulation (α = 0.86) 4.68 1.56 5
A fundamental part of who I am involves protecting
wildlife species, like the Mountain Plover. 4.74 1.68 5
Because caring for wildlife like the Mountain Plover is
part of the way I’ve chosen to live my life. 4.58 2.00 5
Because it’s a way I’ve chosen to contribute to
wildlife protection. 4.74 1.68 4.5
Intrinsic Motivation (α = 0.83) 4.67 1.55 4.83
For the satisfaction I experience while I am mastering
new ways of helping wildlife, like Mountain Plovers. 4.68 1.53 5
Because I like the feeling I have when I’ve
successfully helped a plover nest. 5.06 1.84 5
For the pleasure I experience while helping Mountain
Plovers 4.42 1.85 5
59
* p = <0.05
* * p = <0.01
Basic Needs and Self-Directed Motivation
The results from the Spearman’s correlations of autonomy, competence, and relatedness
revealed that two of the three broad measures of basic needs were positively correlated with self-
directed motivation (Table 3.5). I uncovered a strong, positive, correlation between competence
and self-directed motivation (rs = 0.66, n = 32, p = <0.01), and a medium, positive correlation
between relatedness and self-directed motivation (rs = 0.43, n = 31, p = 0.02). Autonomy,
however, was not correlated with self-directed motivation (rs = 0.25, n = 32, p = 0.17).
In addition, every measure of organizational affinity was strongly and positively related
to self-directed motivation. The strongest correlation was between organizational commitment
and self-directed motivation (rs = 0.74, n = 31, p = <0.01), followed by organization based self-
esteem (rs = 0.58, n = 31, p = <0.01), organizational identity (rs = 0.58, n = 31, p = <0.01), and
affective commitment (rs = 0.55, n = 31, p = <0.01). The strong, positive relationships between
the organizational affinity items and self-directed motivation suggest that an increased sense of
Variable 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7.
1. Self-Directed
Motivation
2.Autonomy 0.25
3. Competence 0.66** 0.32
4. Relatedness 0.43* 0.02 0.68**
5. Org. Self-Esteem 0.58** 0.16 0.63** 0.59**
6. Affective
Commitment 0.55** <-0.01 0.73** 0.63** 0.74**
7. Org. Identity 0.58** 0.12 0 .68** 0.48** 0.61** 0.69**
8. Org. Commitment 0.74** 0.27 0.77** 0.46** 0.70** 0.80** 0.74**
Table 3.5
Spearman correlations relating motivation and basic needs n= 32.
60
Table 3.6
Means, standard deviations, and medians of respondents’ indications of current effort.
affiliation with RMBO is associated with a greater degree of self-directed motivation for
protecting the plover. Together my findings from the correlation suggest that three of the four
basic needs were satisfied. Thus, respondents in my study with greater levels of competence and
both measures of relatedness were associated with a greater sense of self-directed motivation.
Current Effort
I used a hierarchical cluster analysis with Ward’s linkage to create two meaningful and
interpretable clusters of current effort. In examining the responses, the farmers in the first cluster
Current Effort ( α = 0.86) Overall
Current Effort
Low Effort
Group
High Effort
Group
Please tell us how frequently or
infrequently you engage in each
action below. M (SD) Median M (SD) Median M (SD) Median
I avoid marked nests until the nest
hatches 4.54
(0.95) 5
4.53
(0.72) 5
4.56
(1.33) 5
When I see a nest, I mark it myself 3.12
(1.61) 3
2.65
(1.46) 3
4.00
(1.58) 5
When I see a plover, I stop my
tractor and watch for it to return to
its nest
3.08
(1.55) 3
2.47
(1.33) 3
4.22
(1.30) 5
I wait for an RMBO biologist to
call me to schedule a time to search
for plover nests
2.50
(1.61) 2
1.82
(1.24) 1
3.78
(1.48) 4
I call an RMBO biologist before I
till to have them search for plover
nests
2.46
(1.42) 2.5
2.00
(1.17) 2
3.33
(1.50) 4
Each nesting season, I purposely
create habitat for plovers to nest in 2.23
(1.11) 2
2.06
(1.25) 2
2.56
(0.73) 3
When I’m in my fields and see a
plover, I call an RMBO biologist 2.19
(1.50) 1.5
1.41
(0.71) 1
3.67
(1.50) 4
I assist RMBO biologists with
plover nest searching 1.89
(1.24) 1
1.41
(0.87) 1
2.78
(1.39) 2
I drive the fields looking for plover
nests before I till 1.65
(0.94) 1
1.35
(0.70) 1
2.22
(1.10) 2
Note: Current effort measured using the following scale (1 = Almost never, 2 = Rarely, 3 =
Occasionally, 4 = Often, 5 = Almost Always).
61
(n = 17) were characterized by lower scores, while the second group (n = 9) had higher scores
(Table 3.6). For instance, when asked how frequently respondents who see a plover stop their
tractor and watch for it to return to its nest, respondents in the first group indicated that they
rarely stopped their tractor (mean = 2.47, SD = 1.33, median = 3). Conversely, respondents in the
second group indicated that they often stop their tractor to watch the plover return to its nest
(mean = 4.22, SD = 1.30, median = 5). As the other current effort activities had similar results, I
labeled the first group as the low effort group and the second group as the high effort group.
Overall, most (65%) of the MPP members fell into the lower current effort category, while 35%
were in the higher current effort category. Avoiding marked nests until they hatched represented
the only behavior that respondents in both the higher current effort group (mean = 4.56, SD =
1.33, median = 5) and the lower current effort group (mean = 4.53, SD = 0.72, median = 5) often
completed.
Self-Directed Motivation & Current Effort
The Mann-Whitney U test comparing self-directed motivation by current effort revealed
a large, significant difference between the lower current effort group (median = 4.11), when
compared with the respondents who had higher levels of current effort (median = 5.89; z = -3.20,
p = <0.01, ŕ = 0.64). Thus, when asked for their reasons for participating in the MPP, individuals
with a lower level of current effort also had a lower rating of self-directed motivation, (median =
4.11). Conversely, respondents with a higher level of current effort had a higher rating of self-
directed motivation as participants in the MPP (median = 5.89).
Future Effort
I used the seven measures of future effort as the basis for a second hierarchical cluster
analysis to group farmers. Two clusters were determined to be sufficiently meaningful and
interpretable when examining respondents’ likelihood of continuing with the program without an
62
incentive. Respondents in the first cluster (n = 9) were characterized by lower scores on the
future effort measures, while the second cluster (n = 22) represented the respondents with higher
scores (Table 3.7). For instance, respondents in the first cluster were uncertain if they would
report sightings of plover nests to RMBO without an incentive (mean = 2.78, SD =1.40, median
= 3). The farmers in the second cluster were moderately likely to report plover nest sightings
without an incentive (mean = 6.10, SD = 0.81, median = 6). In light of these findings, I labeled
the first group as having a lower level of future effort, and labeled the second group as having a
higher level of future effort. Overall, a majority (71%) of the survey respondents were willing to
continue with the program without an incentive.
Table 3.7.
Means, standard deviations and medians of respondents’ intention to participate in the MPP
without an incentive
Future Effort (α = 0.88)
For the following questions,
indicate how likely or unlikely
each statement is. If the
financial incentive ends in
2014:
Overall
Future Effort Lower Likelihood
of Future Effort
Higher Likelihood
of Future Effort
M (SD) Median M (SD) Median M (SD) Median
I will allow RMBO volunteers
to mark nests on my land 6.32
(1.38) 7
5.44
(2.30) 6
6.68
(0.48) 7
I will allow RMBO biologists to
continue marking nests on my
land
6.00
(1.78) 7
5.22
(2.78) 6 6.32
(1.46) 7
I will watch for and avoid
plover nests on my own 5.48
(1.90) 6
3.22
(1.99) 4
6.41
(0.73) 7
I will report sightings of plover
nests to RMBO 5.13
(1.82) 6
2.78
(1.39) 3
6.10
(0.81) 6
I will report sightings of plovers
to RMBO 5.00
(1.81) 5
2.67
(1.41) 2
5.95
(0.79) 6
I will actively search for plover
nests on my own 4.13
(1.86) 5
1.78
(1.10) 1
5.10
(1.06) 5
I will end my involvement with
the program 2.74
(1.93) 2
4.22
(1.92) 4
2.14
(1.61) 2
Scale: 1 = Extremely Unlikely, 2 = Moderately Unlikely, 3 = Slightly Unlikely, 4 = Unsure, 5 =
Slightly Likely, 6 = Moderately Likely, 7 = Extremely Likely.
63
Self-Directed Motivation & Future Effort
The results from the Mann-Whitney U test did not uncover a significant difference in
self-directed motivation among the respondents who indicated a lower likelihood of participating
in the plover program without an incentive (median = 4.06), and those who indicated a greater
likelihood of protecting the plover without an incentive (median = 5.33; z = 1.71, p = 0.09, ŕ =
0.32). Both groups indicated moderate agreement with self-directed motivation regardless of
their likelihood of continuing with the program.
Current Effort & Future Effort
Finally, I investigated whether there was a relationship between current effort and future
effort. Approximately 65% (n = 17) of respondents indicated a lower level of current effort;
however, approximately 71% (n = 22) indicated a greater likelihood of future effort without an
incentive. The exact chi-square test failed to reveal a significant relationship between current
effort and future effort (X2
1 = 0.19, p = 0.15, phi = 0.10, n = 24). Thus, the likelihood of
continuing with the plover program without an incentive was independent of respondents’
indication of current effort. The results in Table 3.8 suggest that individuals with both a higher
and lower level of current effort are likely to remain involved in the MPP without an incentive.
Table 3.8
Exact chi-square of respondents’ indication of current effort and their indication of
future effort.
Current Effort
Higher Level
of Future Effort
Lower Level
of Future Effort Total
Lower Level of
Current Effort 60% (n = 9) 40% (n = 6) 100% (n = 15)
Higher Level of
Current Effort 89% (n = 8) 11% (n = 1) 100% (n = 9)
Total 71% (n = 17) 29% (n = 7) 100% (n = 24)
64
Fig. 3.4. Self-Determination Theory and the Mountain Plover Program.
Conceptual model based on Ryan and Deci’s (2000) Self-Determination
Theory.
+ = Positively support next variable
- = Harm next variable
3.8: Discussion
Researchers have used Self-Determination Theory (SDT) to explore environmental
concerns, but this work has most often investigated the more general subject matter of adoption
of pro-environmental behaviors (e.g. Pelletier, Tuson, Green-Demers, Noels, & Beaton 1998;
Sheldon, Nichols, & Kasser 2011). My study represents a novel use of SDT to investigate the
impact of an existing financial incentive on future behavior. I explored the degree to which
participants in the Mountain Plover Program (MPP) believed that the program sustained or
hindered their sense of
autonomy, competence,
relatedness, and
organizational affinity.
Further, I examined
participants’ level of
current effort, and
whether their
participation in the
program would change
should Rocky Mountain
Bird Observatory
(RMBO) no longer
provide payments to farmers to protect plover nests (Figure 3.4). My use of SDT as a lens to
investigate an existing organization and financial incentive may offer conservation practitioners
and academics practical information on the implications of incentivizing conservation.
65
On average, the farmers participating in the MPP had a high level of autonomy, a
moderate degree of competence, a low level of inter-personal relatedness, and a moderate degree
of organizational affinity (See Table 3.3). These findings are similar to other studies that have
found differing levels of each of the basic needs depending on situational and individual
characteristics (Deci, Koestner & Ryan 1999). Among the basic needs, I found that competence,
relatedness, and organizational affinity were significantly correlated with self-directed
motivation. Autonomy was not significantly related to self-directed motivation, and the MPP
members’ overwhelming perception of autonomy may explain this finding. I also found that
most of the farmers were characterized by a lower level of current effort. This sample of
respondents indicated a lower sense of self-directed motivation, while those with higher levels of
current effort indicated greater sense of self-directed motivation. Regardless of current effort, a
majority (71%) of respondents intend to continue to protect the plover without an incentive (See
Table 3.8).
Respondents’ indication of a higher level of future effort, and the lack of statistical
significance between self-directed motivation and future effort, as well as current effort and
future effort warrants further discussion. A few factors may help explain these results. First, the
findings could reflect a social desirability bias among participants (e.g. Klassen, Hornstra &
Anderson 1975; Nederhof 1985) who want to remain in good standing with RMBO. That is,
people’s responses may be positively biased to be viewed favorably by RMBO. The second point
is related to this bias-- I only collected information on respondents’ future intention to act.
Although behavioral intentions tend to be the best predictor of behavior (Bamberg & Moser
2007), intentions do not always correspond to overt behavior (Bagozzi 1992; McCleery 2006).
Variables outside the scope of this project, such as the perceived effectiveness of the program,
66
could influence the results. As Chouinard, Paterson, Wandschneider & Ohler (2008) argue, the
literature on agricultural conservation often assumes that a “rational” farmer accepts
conservation practices when they do not harm profits. They note, however, that this may not hold
if other factors trump profit-maximizing behavior. As the majority of farmers’ intended to
remain involved in the program without an incentive, this finding suggests that other factors are
at play in this study. My study, however, found that landowners’ basic needs are being met to a
large degree.
Third, many investigations of conservation incentive programs focus on landowner
characteristics (e.g. Sullivan, Amacher & Chapman 2005; Kaetzel Hodges, Houston & Fly
2009), with less focus on how the design of the program influences and sustains landowner
enrollment (Sorice et al. 2013). As the design of conservation programs can facilitate or hinder
efforts to induce landowner commitment to protect biodiversity, the design of the MPP may shed
light on the farmers’ willingness to continue to protect the plover. The MPP is landowner-
centric, has no enrollment criteria that farmers must satisfy (e.g. habitat characteristics), and has
few participation requirements. Further, once nests are found, marked, and RMBO confirms that
the nest hatched landowners face no further restrictions.
The MPPs limited requirements compare favorably to other, more restrictive
conservation programs such as the Conservation Reserve Program (CRP), which many of the
MPP members are also enrolled. For instance, enrollment in the CRP is a competitive process by
which landowners with specific land features (e.g. marginal cropland) submit conservation plans
that are ranked on six factors including benefits to wildlife habitat, water quality, farmland
improvement (e.g. erosion control), air quality, and cost (points are detracted for higher cost
proposals) (Kirwan, Lubowski & Roberts 2005; USDA Farm Service Agency 2013). If accepted,
67
those areas need to be maintained for the length of the contract agreement. Conversely, the MPPs
ease of participation and limited management requirements is likely of critical importance in
sustaining future effort among the participants.
The farmers’ overall agreement that the MPP allows for a sense of autonomy,
competence, and organizational affinity, may offer additional insights into the role of program
design in sustaining behavior (Ryan & Deci 2000). For instance autonomy is of primary
importance to many working landowners and to SDT, and the degree to which conservation
programs allow for autonomy can influence landowner willingness to enroll in a program, as
well as complete a behavior willingly (Ryan & Deci 2000; Sorice et al. 2013; Peterson & Horton
1995; Bergmann & Bliss 2004). The MPPs ease of enrollment and minimal participation
requirements is a feature of the program that actively allows for landowner freedom. Farmers
have the option to participate at various levels. At the most passive level, farmers wait for
RMBO to contact them, RMBO marks the nests, and all farmers have to do is avoid the marked
nest until it hatches. At the most involved level, a farmer can search the fields and mark the nests
before calling RMBO to monitor them.
As completion-based rewards, like the MPP, necessitate a certain degree of competence
to complete the incentivized task, the moderate degree of competence expressed by the farmers
is perhaps unsurprising (Frey & Jegen 2001; Ryan & Deci 2000). Again the MPPs design may
have contributed to respondents’ perceived capability in protecting the plover. This is
particularly important as competence and autonomy are necessary to sustain behaviors as self-
determined (Ryan & Deci 2000). Although it is clear that the population of farmers who find
nests without RMBOs assistance have the capability to do so, the requirement of avoiding
marked nests until they hatch may further educate the farmers on the amount of space necessary
68
for nest survival, encourage farmers to monitor the status of nests, and provide a sense of
accomplishment when the nest successfully hatches. Certainly these behaviors require an
element of landowner interest or curiosity, but the personalized interaction with RMBO staff
may contribute to respondents’ competence in protecting the plover. Moreover, the tangible
nature of avoiding marked nests until the chicks hatch further differentiates the MPP from other
more passive conservation efforts such as reforestation, where habitat provision is the outcome.
Thus, the farmers’ willingness to protect the plover into the future may be a function of the
programs design, which increased awareness of the imperiled plover, adjusted their management
techniques to account for its protection, and provided landowners with a sense of autonomy, and
competence, as well as staff support to ensure its future protection.
Although inter-personal relatedness was low—farmers do not feel attached to other
farmers in the program—organizational affinity may also help explain why the self-determined
motivation was not related to future effort. The MPP is primarily focused on each member and
protecting the nests found on their property. This individualized approach may explain farmers’
lower indication of relatedness with other members. Relatedness is an important component of
sustaining behaviors, and this is a clear opportunity for improving the MPP (Ryan & Deci 2000).
Nonetheless, Ryan and Deci (2000) also note that many self-directed activities are completed
independently, and that proximal relationships can be equally important. As such, respondents’
greater indication of organizational affinity, may serve to supplant or satisfy farmers’ need for
relatedness. This finding suggests that the relatedness concept can be expanded to include
feelings of attachment to the organization itself. Indeed, the field of organizational sciences has
long accepted that commitment to an organization is critical to workplace happiness, employee
satisfaction, reduced turnover, and intrinsic motivation (Deci and Ryan 2000; Wright,
69
Cropanzano & Bonett 2007; Paulin, Ferguson & Bergeron 2006; Porter, Steers, Mowday, &
Boulian 1974; Meyer, Paunonen, Gellatly, Goffin, & Douglas 1989).
One reason for the strength of organizational affinity with self-determined behavior may
be because of local ties. Although RMBO is based in Colorado, the MPP is managed by a local
staff member in Kimball, Nebraska. This individual recruits MPP members, coordinates plover
nest searches, confirms that nests have been protected, and serves as the “face” of RMBO. In this
role he has an important influence on MPP members, and may help ensure that participants feel
valued as MPP members, care about the program, and feel committed to RMBO. Indeed Shore
and Wayne (1993) found that employees who receive greater organizational support are more
likely to hold positive feelings toward their organization, and are more likely to go beyond the
requirements of their specific job. This may help shed light on respondents’ willingness to
remain involved in the program without compensation. By fostering organizational affinity
through boundary spanners, such as the MPPs manager, with the trust necessary to work with
scientists, public policy leaders, and private landowners (See Williams 2002), organizations may
find an effective means of sustaining behaviors. Greater research into whether differing, or
multiple types of relatedness can serve as a substitute or a complement to existing perceptions of
autonomy and competence would advance efforts to sustain durable conservation behaviors (e.g.
Klassen, Perry & Frenzel 2012).
The availability of RMBO staff members to search for nests in farmers’ fields is perhaps
the most important feature of the MPP’s design. Four of the top five-ranked future effort
activities (Table 3.7) rely on RMBO or its volunteers to protect the plover. Though assistance
from RMBO may promote farmers’ sense of competence and provide other benefits, it might
become a liability should the incentive end. If respondents are willing to remain in the program
70
given that RMBO completes most of the work searching for and marking nests, RMBO would
need to boost expenditures on staff time. Thus, RMBOs concern about a sustained funding
source is important to their future conservation efforts (e.g. Froelich 1999; Blery, Katseli &
Tsara 2010; Rentschler & Potter 1996); however, instead of seeking to sustain funding to reward
conservation, RMBO may need to focus on their sustaining their organizational funding.
Despite the potential harm to durable behavior, conservation practitioners rely on
financial incentives to induce private land conservation (Deci & Ryan 2000; Freyfogle 2003).
My findings related to future effort suggest that when designed to allow for autonomy,
competence and organizational affinity, completion-contingent reward programs, such as the
MPP, may not necessarily harm future effort (Deci, Koestner & Ryan 1999; Deci & Ryan 1985).
Program managers and designers who are able to provide a greater sense of inter-personal
relatedness may yield even greater outcomes. This calls attention to the importance of program
design, instead of payment levels to ensure conservation on private lands.
Future Research
Ryan and Deci (2000) maintain that autonomy, competence, and relatedness are innate,
essential, and universal needs that foster motivations to engage in behavior for their inherent
satisfaction. However, they caution that the degree to which individuals require each of these
basic needs is dependent upon the sociocultural context within which the behaviors exist.
Recommendations to RMBO can be made based upon my findings, but less is known about the
unique or collective degree to which working landowners require autonomy, competence and
relatedness to internalize a behavior. Greater research should prioritize identifying and
quantifying the role of each basic need in sustaining self-directed motivation among farmers
asked to incorporate conservation into their land management techniques. By better
71
understanding landowner needs for autonomy, competence and relatedness, conservation
program designers may be able to efficiently foster greater adoption of incentive-free
environmental protection.
Identifying the criteria necessary for a behavior to be crowded in by financial incentives
is another opportunity for future research (Frey & Jegen 2001). Although there is a wealth of
information available on how financial incentives crowd out (or undermine) intrinsic motivation,
less is known about crowding in and how to manage it with the goal of promoting positive
outcomes. Supporting basic needs through program design and implementation is likely one way
to crowd in self-determine behavior. The frequency with which financial incentives are used to
reward environmental conservation warrants further research into this positive externality
stemming from the use of incentives. As landowners are a primary component of successful
conservation programs, it is critical to address these issues.
3.9: Conclusion
My study examined the degree to which autonomy, competence and relatedness were
related to self-directed motivation, and how motivation was related to both current and future
effort to protect the mountain plover. The farmers enrolled in the Mountain Plover Program are a
part of RMBO’s historic successes and are critical to its future efforts to protect the plover. The
findings from the present study suggest a willingness to continue with the program provided that
RMBO continues to offer assistance in searching for nests. The results further suggest that due to
the landowner-focused design of the program, the incentive offered by RMBO may not have
been as detrimental to the farmers’ level of future effort (Ryan & Deci 2000).
Despite the contribution of this study to RMBO’s mission and the literature on
conservation incentives more generally, several limitations of the study should be noted. This is a
72
case study, and as such it is bounded by the geographic location of the study area, and context of
the incentive program. This limits the generalizability of the results. Further, this study solely
investigated respondents’ stated intention to continue with the program. It is unclear whether the
farmers will follow through on their stated intentions. Nonetheless, the findings from this study
provide rich opportunities for future research on the use of financial incentives to spur private
land conservation.
73
Chapter 4: Conclusion and Recommendations
While previous conservation efforts primarily targeted nature reserves and other areas of
“pristine” wilderness, purchasing and protecting landscapes is neither economically feasible nor
effective on a global level (Kareiva, Watts, McDonald, & Boucher 2007; Fairfax et al. 2005).
Today, there is increased public awareness of the important role that human-dominated
landscapes, particularly working lands, provide in sustaining human, plant, and animal
communities (Daily et al. 2001; Foley et al. 2007). My research investigated private land
stewardship, incentives, and the important role of landowners in conserving natural resources.
Together, the findings call attention to the critical role of individuals in implementing
conservation actions.
The ranchers’ self-described stewardship behaviors differed significantly from the
stewardship ideal as expressed by Worrell and Appleby (1999). The ranchers’ held
overwhelmingly utilitarian values and their production-oriented stewardship behaviors illustrate
that meeting immediate economic needs may take priority over concerns for the larger ecosystem
or community in which one lives and operates. Indeed, the majority of the interviewees focused
their stewardship behaviors on their own lands with minimal references to coordinating with
other landowners to address stated concerns such as erosion, pest wildlife, or woody brush
encroachment. Thus, should conservation practitioners desire to boost landowner adoption of an
ecocentric stewardship ideal, they might benefit from implementing a targeted social marketing
campaign. By directly appealing and marketing to landowners, obstacles to behavior change may
be identified and overcome, resulting in greater conservation outcomes (Heberlein 2012).
The second part of my study emerged from RMBO’s expressed concern about the future
funding of the Mountain Plover Program (MPP). RMBO was uncertain whether MPP members
74
would protect the plover without a financial incentive. Indeed, the finding that the majority of
MPP members would continue to protect the plover was unexpected given the literature on
motivation and incentives (Ryan & Deci 2000). Further, the potential that the design of the MPP,
and provision of staff support in finding plover nests may have affirmed landowner motivation to
protect the plover into the future. Though it remains unclear how MPP members’ indications of
high future effort will ultimately manifest on the ground, the fact that so many MPP members are
willing to protect the plover is valuable for RMBO’s future conservation efforts (e.g. Fishbein &
Ajzen 2010). RMBO should continue to monitor operational expenses to ensure that the farmers’
reliance on RMBO staff or volunteers does not strain the organizations financial security.
Nonetheless, the results suggest cause for optimism in sustaining plover populations into the
future.
Contribution to the Literature
Most of the existing research on stewardship focuses largely on the conceptual
foundations of the term (See Chapter 2). As a result, it is less common for researchers to take a
behavioral approach and examine how landowners operationalize stewardship. By exploring the
values underlying those stewardship behaviors, my study offers additional information on how
landowner’s view the management of their land and natural resources. Overall, my study offers
an important starting point to further examine landowner perceptions of stewardship. As
illustrated through my case study, landowners’ interpretations of stewardship are discrepant from
the definition of stewardship outlined by Worrell and Appleby (1999). If landowners and
conservation practitioners do not share a similar language, then collaborations to achieve desired
conservation outcomes are unlikely to be successful. By seeking to continuously understand how
75
landowners define, and implement stewardship activities on their land, conservation practitioners
may achieve more effective collaborations with landowners.
Most studies of incentive programs tend to investigate program metrics (e.g. Gibbons,
Nicholson, Milner, Gulland, & Jones 2011), or participant demographics (e.g. Onianwa et al.
2004) with less emphasis placed on the long-term implications of relying upon incentives.
Moreover, despite Self-Determination Theory’s (SDT) apprehension about the implications of
using incentives, rarely does SDT investigate an existing financial incentive program. By
exploring the psychological impacts from the use of an existing financial incentive, my study
provides an important, real-world setting to support the SDT literature. Perhaps most importantly
is the potential that under the right circumstances, individuals will remain involved in
conservation programs without an incentive.
As the design of the MPP may have sustained participants’ willingness to protect the
plover without an incentive, the MPP model may serve as a useful template for other
conservation organizations to adopt. This finding is all the more important as other program
designs may not foster the same degree long-term behavior maintenance. As a result,
conservation organizations should be cognizant of the need to balance measurable outcomes with
protecting landowner motivation when seeking conservation on private lands.
Future Research
My study presents a number of opportunities for future investigation using my existing
data. In particular, there are a number of variables included in the survey that fell outside of the
scope of my study that would benefit from further analysis. As explored in Chapter 3, the
majority of landowners heard about and enrolled in the MPP after interacting with an RMBO
staff member. One opportunity for future research is to examine how the farmers’ perceived
76
value similarities with RMBO’s staff members might influence their current levels of effort, and
their intention to continue the program without an incentive. Another opportunity is to explore
the survey variables examining the role of trust. As trust is an important component in fostering
productive relationships between groups (e.g. Stern 2008), it would be worthwhile to examine
the trust data as it relates to respondents’ future effort to protect the plover without an incentive.
Finally, greater research is warranted in investigating the role of organizational affinity, and
whether it can serve as a substitute or complement to other forms of relatedness in SDT. By
examining these and other collected measures I may be able to further explore the characteristics
of landowners willing to remain involved in a program without an incentive.
Another opportunity for future research in the stewardship realm is to examine potential
differences in stewardship behaviors among landowners from various geographic areas, as well
as those with varying motivations for purchasing and maintaining land. The ranchers in my study
were primarily focused on sustaining their income from raising cattle, which may have uniquely
affected their land stewardship behaviors and values. Investigating how other landowners (e.g.
absentee, amenity, wildlife focused) define stewardship behaviors, and their related values,
would considerably advance the conservation literature.
Stewardship is often presented as an implied responsibility of landownership, suggesting
that incentives could be incongruous with stewardship (Worrell & Appleby 1999). I would be
interested in combining the themes underlying my two studies, to examine whether incentive
program participants’ definition of stewardship includes the conservation behavior they are
incentivized to provide. For instance, do MPP members consider protecting the plover to be a
stewardship behavior, or do they view it as an external requirement separate from their
77
stewardship efforts? Further research should be conducted to investigate possible discrepancies
in the role of incentives in contributing to, or harming landowner understanding of stewardship.
Implications
My study offers a number of important lessons for both conservation organizations and
researchers. First, it remains important to acknowledge the important role landowners play in the
process of enacting conservation practices and improving environmental quality (Sorice, Oh,
Gartner, Snieckus, Johnson & Donlan 2013). Arguably the most important outcome from the
stewardship chapter for conservation practitioners is to work to ensure that landowners and
conservationists have a shared vocabulary and spatial scale of environmental foci. If
conservation practitioners are working to instill a landscape scale stewardship ethic that includes
plants, animals, and resource users within the larger community, while landowners primarily
understand the concept as working to maintain their land’s productivity, improved conservation
outcomes are unlikely. Properly understanding stewardship from the landowner perspective is a
worthy step for conservationists to promote future conservation outcomes.
Given the motivation literature (Ryan & Deci 2000; Frey & Jegen 2001), and findings
from the RMBO chapter, conservation organizations would be wise to continue to evaluate the
design of incentive programs, and examine the potential impact to motivation from proposed or
existing incentives. By ensuring that program designs allows respondents to feel a sense of
autonomy, competence, and relatedness in carrying out the program activities, durable
conservation behaviors may be more likely to result. Additionally, ensuring that program
participants’ feel a strong sense of affinity to the conservation organization may also sustain
behaviors. Thus, conservation outcomes are most likely to occur when programs are able to
78
successfully balance the need to achieve measurable conservation outcomes while providing for
the needs of the individuals carrying out the conservation behaviors.
Conclusion
I found that landowners generally view stewardship in a different light than conservation
practitioners. In the absence of a shared understanding of stewardship, incentive programs may
serve to induce greater protection of select conservation targets (e.g. wildlife, soil, etc.). While
incentives often harm motivation for completing an activity, especially when they are perceived
as controlling, my study suggests that this may not occur in all circumstances (Ryan & Deci
2000). Looking forward, it is important to determine how to best appeal to landowners, and
encourage the on-going protection of sensitive habitats and wildlife. This may require a
combination of strategies including incentivizing the protection of certain species, or working
within landowners’ existing understandings of stewardship, or implementing a social marketing
campaign. Despite the unique or collective efforts taken, it is important to acknowledge and
respect landowners unique viewpoints and land ownership priorities.
79
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Appendix A: IRB Letter