Post on 09-Mar-2016
description
1Lysine cartel
1996: Archer Daniels Midland (ADM) pleaded guilty to price fixing
ADM admitted to price fixing in lysine (used in livestock feed) and citric acid (used in soft drinks and detergents)
2Lysine market
perfectly homogeneous product share of global production of 4 largest
manufacturers of lysine in early 1990s > 97% in U.S. > 95% world
purchases of four largest buyers < 30% large infrequent purchases cost of a new plant $150+ million (over 3
years to build)
3Lysine agreement
felt they needed everyones agreement allocated sales quotas across firms used industry organization to meet and
collect data shared cost data had a punishment scheme in place
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7(rubava allazienda)
(anche minacciato)
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Video 1 Cartel Meeting in Atlanta, Georgia --The Lysine Cartel Members Show Disdain For Customers And Antitrust Enforcement
meeting with executives from the world's five dominant lysine producers.
took steps to conceal their meeting, staggering their arrival and departure times for the meeting careful because the meeting coincided with the largest poultry
industry trade association convention, so all of their customerswere in town for the trade show.
But, executives laughed at the thought of being observed by their customers or by law enforcement there are some empty seats around the table because of the
staggered arrival times. The cartel members are captured on tape jokingly discussing who
will fill those empty
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Video 2 Telephone Call From ADM Headquarters -- Foreign Co-Conspirator
Expresses Reluctance To Meet In The United States
The conversation between an ADM executive, who also was a cooperating witness, and an executive at the Japanese firm, Ajinomoto.
discussing the location for the next cartel meeting. Ajinimoto executive is reluctant to have a cartel
meeting in Hawaii, but ultimately agrees to consider it because Hawaii is a
convenient location for everyone and because of the lure of the golf courses located near the meeting site.
However, next video of the meeting
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Video 4 Fixing Prices Globally (in Hawaii)
members agree upon the prices to be set for the United States and Canada.
used the U.S. price as the primary benchmark for the world price then specific prices were fixed on a country-by-country
basis at the meetings. the cartel became very efficient in fixing prices,
and it did not take them long to agree sitting in a room in Hawaii decided that the
truckload price US and Canada would be $1.16; not $1.10, not $1.20, but $1.16.
All prices to be effective the very next day. Later in the meeting, they did the same thing for
other countries.
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Video 5 Worldwie Volume-Allocation Agreements
two high-ranking ADM executives. Representing all of the Japanese and Korean cartel members two senior executives from Ajinimoto.
Earlier in the meeting, they determined how much each producer had sold in the prior year used those figures to determine the total market size.
Next, estimated what they believed the sales growth would be in the coming year. All of these figures were written down on the board
Next decide how to allocate sales growth among the five cartel members. growth estimated 14,000 tons, the question posed by the senior
ADM executive: how do we divide this market growth?
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Video 6 Retaliation Threats -- Policing The Agreement
there is no honor among thieves retaliating through temporary price cuts or
increases in sales volumes to take business away from or financially harm a cheating co-conspirator.
Sometimes, the mere threat of such retaliation is enough to keep would-be cheaters in line.
You will see one of the ADM conspirators pose such a threat in order to get his co-conspirators to agree to his proposed volume-allocation scheme.
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Video 7 Compensation Schemes Any firm that sold more than its allocated share of
the market at the end of the calendar year: compensate firms that were under budget by purchasing that quantity of lysine from any under-budget firms.
This agreement reduced the incentive to cheat on the sales volume-allocation agreement by selling additional product which, of course, also reduced the incentive to cheat on
the price-fixing agreement. One of conspirators from ADM explains the
importance of a compensation scheme to the cartel and gives the other cartel members a motivational speech that has to be one of the best pieces of evidence ever obtained in a cartel investigation.
Lysine cartelLysine marketLysine agreementVideo 1 Cartel Meeting in Atlanta, Georgia -- The Lysine Cartel Members Show Disdain For Customers And Antitrust EnforcementVideo 2 Telephone Call From ADM Headquarters -- Foreign Co-Conspirator Expresses Reluctance To Meet In The United StatesVideo 4 Fixing Prices Globally (in Hawaii)Video 5 Worldwie Volume-Allocation AgreementsVideo 6 Retaliation Threats -- Policing The AgreementVideo 7 Compensation Schemes