Transcript of Living with God. Thomas Aquinas on the Relation between Life on Earth and Life after Death (Thomas...
New Series, Volume V
Editorial Board
Prof. dr. H.A.G. Braakhuis (Catholic University, Nijmegen) Prof.
dr. K.-W. Merks (Tilburg Faculty of Theology) Prof. dr. H.W.M.
Rikhof (Catholic Theological University at Utrecht) Dr. R.A. te
Velde (Tilburg Faculty of Theology)
Managing Editor
Previously published in this Series:
Vol. I
Vol. II
Vol. ill
Vol. IV
Henk J.M. Schoot, Christ the 'Name' of God: Thomas Aquinas on
Naming Christ, 1993 Jan G-J. van den Eijnden ofm, Poverty on the
Way to God: Thomas Aquinas on Evangelical Poverty, 1994 Henk J.M.
Schoot (ed.), Tibi soli peccavi: Thomas Aquinas on Guilt and
Forgiveness, 1996 Harm J.M.J. Goris, Free Creatures of an Eternal
God: Thomas Aquinas on God's Infallible Foreknowledge and
Irresistible Will, 1996
© Stichting Thornasfonds - Nijrnegen ISBN 90-6831-966-3
D.1997/0602n5
AND 'LIFE' AFTER DEATH
1997
To Mieke, .- nihil enim est ita proprium amicitiae quam convivere
amico (SIb TI-TI 25.3.co)
This publication is published with the financial support of (a.o.)
the Stichting Thomasfonds, the Radboudstichting, the J.E.
Jurriaanse Stichting and the Catholic Theological University at
Utrecht.
1""uNiV£rAim . "1
TABLE OF CONTENTS
AQun-jAS ON GOD AND LIFE 8
1. S~int Thomas Aquinas ............................. " 8 1.1 The
incomprehensible God as the core of theology ....... 9 1.2 God's
revelation as the source of theology. . . . . . . . . . . . .. 13
1.3 The unity of theological science •..........•.......•. 17
2. God, life and death ..........•...................... 20 2.1 The
meaning and use of the words 'life' and 'death' ......• 20 2.2
'Life' as a name for God's essence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . .. 25
2.2.1 Summa Theologiae I 18.1-3 .................... 25 2.2.1.1
God's essence: the metaphysical order ..•.. 30 2.2.1.2 God's
essence: the logical order .......... 35
2.2.2 Summa Theologiae I 18.3-4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
.• 41 2.2.3 The life of God and the life of man . . . . . . . . . .
. . •. 46
2.3 Divine life and the divine Persons . . . . . . • . . . . . . .
. . . . •. 48 2.3.1 Distinguishing the divine Persons ....•
,......... 49 2.3.2 The divine Persons and life . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . .. 54
3. The relation between life on earth and 'life' after death
....... 61 3.1 Rephrasing the question .............. . . . . . . .
. . . .. 62 3.2 The framework of this study ....................•..
63
CHAPTER II FOUNDATIONS OF LIFE WITH GOD 67
1. The human condition and the tradition of living with God. . . •.
68 1.1 Creation and the place of man ...................... 68 1.2
Death as evil: the separation of body and soul . . . . . . . . . .•
77 1.3 Death as punishment: Original Sin and its effects . . . . .
. . .. 82
1.3.1 The harmony in the state of integrity .•.......... 83 1.3.2
Original Sin and the meaning of death .. • . • . . . . . .. 88
1.3.3 The human condition, evil and punishment ......... 91
2. Christ, revelation of God and source of grace .............. 95
2.1 Life, death and the (first) coming of Christ ..........•.. 96
2.2 Christ as veiled revelation of God .................... 104 2.3
The suffering and dying of Christ: revelation and grace ....
109
2.3.1 The passion and death of Christ as restoration of a rela-
tionship ................................ 110
2.3.2 The passion and death of Christ as example ........ 119 2.4
The resurrection of Christ and the perspective of life .. ; • . .
121
3. The participation in the work of Christ through the sacraments .
125 3.1 The partial sharing in the fruits of Christ'S passion
.•..... 126 3.2 The effectuating .and disclosing power of the
sacraments . . . . 130 3.3 The sacraments as foundation and
framework of life with God132
CHAPTERll DYNAMISM OF LIFE WITH GOD 141
1. Living with God and acting as a human being .............. 141
1.1 The moral order and practical science ................. 142 1.2
God, happiness and the ultimate end of human life ....... 145 1.3
The virtues and life with God ........•............. 150
2. The augmentation of grace and the attitude towards one's own
death ....•.•.................................... 155 2.1
Theological virtUes and their augmentation ............. 156 2.2 De
ordine caritatis: charity and the hierarchy of objects .... 167 2.3
The Evangelical Counsels ..................•....... 171 2.4
Manyrdom ........•.......•............. ; . . . . . 176
3. Living with God and dealing with life and death ............ 180
3.1 The social order and killing people ......•............
181
3.1.1 Killing guilty people ....•.................... 183 3.1.2
Killing heretics •..•..•...................... 188 3.1.3 Killing
innocent people .........•............. 192 3.1.4 Killing and
Christian perfection ................. 194 3.1.5 Killing oneself
...•......................... 198
3.2 God and homicide ............•.....•.•.....•.... 202
TABLE OF CONTENTS
CHAPTER IV PERFECTION OF LIFE WIlli GOD 207
1. The nature of the reflection on the consummated life with God .
207 1.1 Eternal life •...............•.........•.......... 208 1.2
Ultimate end ................................... 209
1.2.1 The order of execution .........•......•••.... 210 1.2.2 The
order of intention ...................•... 212
1.3 God's glorifying work: the tract of ~schatology .......... 213
2. Living with God in the mode of perfection .••......••.....
217
2.1 Eternal life .........................•.......... 217 2.1.1 The
glorified ,soul ........................... 217 2.1.2 The glorified
body ........................•. 225
2 1 3 The glorified creation .............••......... 230 . .
232
2.2 Eternal death ......•...................•....... 2.2.1 The
'logic' of hell ..... : ..............•...... 233 2.2.2 The limits
of reflection .....................•. 238
3. The impact of eternal life on ~arthly l.ife .•................
244 3 1 Eternal life as consummation of life of grace ............
244 3:2 The communication between the living and the dead ...•..
247
CHAPTER v CONCLUDING OUR STUDY:
LIVING WIlli GOD AS MEANING OF LIFE 254
1. The meaning oflife ............ , .......•......•..... 255 1.1
Life and ends ..............•......•.......•.... 257 1.2 Life and
signification ........................•.... 259 1.3 Living with God
as meaning of life ................... ;~;
2. The' meaning' of death .•.....•...................•..
A d · . I .....••. 269 ppen IX
•••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••
Appendix II ........................................ 272
Bibliography ....•.......................•........... 275 Indices
.•..•..•...........•.•....................•. 290
INTRODUCTION
From its very beginning human life, in its inexhaustible beauty and
riches, is accompanied by the dreadful perspective of death. We
know that one day all of us will die; we know that one day we will
be separated from our beloved ones - insofar as this is not already
the case; we know that we cannot pass on life to our children
without, at one and the same time, condemning them to the same
fate. This inescapable cruelty makes us players in a tragedy from
the moment we are born.
In the Christian traqition the evil of death is interpreted from
the perspective of the 'Good News'. In Holy Scripture we are told
about the Living God, who is a God of Life, wanting us to live and
be happy. We are told about God The Father, Son and Holy Spirit,
working in history and revealing Himself in order to communicate
life, Eternal Life. We are told about the Son Incarnate, Jesus
Christ, who lived among us and gave His life for the sake of our
well-being. We are told that Christ resurrected from the dead in
order to enjoy a blessed life eternally and that we may hope to
share this Eternal Life.
Nevertheless, the perspective of death remains a daily reality. The
many ways in which Death shows its horrible face display a cruelty
one never becomes inured to; a cruelty which raises serious
questions for the believer who searches for the understanding of
his or her faith. One of the most widespread of these is the
question as to how God's goodness is compatible with all the
suffering in the world - since the 17th century known as the
problem of theodicee. Closely related to this, though deliberately
put in different terms, is the question which is central to this
study. Given the suffering entailed in human life on earth; given
the promise of Eternal Life; and given the insights that both are
related to God, the question is: what is this all good for? If we
are created for happiness in Eternal Life, what is the sense of
this earthly mixture of happiness and misery? Why the cruelty and
the pain? Why earthly life anyway? In other words: what is the
meaning of human life and how does it relate to the promise of
another 'life' after death?
In order to deal with this last question, the work of one of the
great Teachers of the Church: Saint Thomas Aquinas (1224/5-1274)
has been studied. Special attention is paid to the way he
approaches the matter at hand; the perspective he adopts when
dealing with life and death in relation to the incomprehensible
triune God. To a large extent this specific interest is due to the
context within which this study was written: the research group
'Thomas Aquinas' of the Catholic
INTRODUCTION
Theological University at Utrecht. By this group special
consideration is given to the profound theological character of the
work of the Angelic Doctor and his attention for the use of
language, in particular in divinis.' In the first chapter both the
appropriateness of the theological perspective and what I wish to
accentuate will be indicated.
Considering the secondary literature on Aquinas' view on life and
death, this study makes a contribution as regards both its central
question and the broadness by which the matter is approached. Until
our day the only monograph on life in Aquinas' theology dates from
more than seventy years ago'; there is no book exclusively
dedicated to Aquinas' view on death. As far as the various articles
are concerned which have been written on Aquinas' account of life
and death: they all approach the subject from limited viewpoints
and are restricted to certain aspects.' In the study at hand the
attempt is made to integrate the'various viewpoints and bring the
different aspects with regard to Aquinas' view on life and death
into relation with one another. This task could only be set to
right from a particular (theological) perspective and within
certain limits.
The limits of this study are due to the fact that 'life' is a
key-word in Aquinas' theology. For this reason it was clear from
the outset, that selections had to be made, lest this study would
end in recovering and rephrasing Aquinas' entire theology from the
perspective of the concept 'life'. At the same time, however, it
was also clear from the very fact that 'life' is a key-word that
the whole of Aquinas' theology had to be taken into account so that
none of its overtones would be missed. It was apparent that this is
of special importance because of the variety of not integrated
perspectives of study mentioned before and the fact that an
This group includes the following authors quoted in this study: J.
van den Eijnden, H. Goris, F. de Grijs, H. Rikhof, H. Schoot, W.
Valkenberg, F. Vosman and J. Wissink. For a short characterisation
and determination of the position of this approach in the
'landscape' of research on Aquinas, cf. H. Rikhof, 1995[a].
, M. Grabmann, 1922. , On death, cf. A- lippi, 1965 and 1966; A-
Pegis, 1974; T. Janez Barrio, 1978; M.
Rousseau, 1978 and 1979; B. de Margerie, 1983; L. Dewan, 1988j A.
Zimmermann, 1992; The most comprehensive are the studies of L.F.
Mateo-Seeo, 1974, 1975, 1978, 1982[a] and [b], who, however, is
never quoted (whieh is probably due to the fact that he writes in
Spanish). On Aquinas and life, the only articles I found are those
of G. Kreiing, 1928 and I. Yarza, 1987. Apan from these StUdies,
which explicitly deal with life and death, a lot of material can be
found in Studies on Aquinas' anthropology, esehatology, Christology
and other tracts and themes.
INTRODUCTION 3
answer to the central question cannot be found in one of the tracts
of Thomas' theology when considered separately. Thus the choice was
made to concentrate on the systematic coherence of Aquinas' account
of life and death from an explicitly theological perspective. As a
conse quence certain limits and characteristic features were
entailed: * Since not every reader will be at home in Aquinas'
entire systematic
theology, each chapter opens with an introduction into the specific
field at issue, written from the perspective of t\le key-word
'life'.
* In order to safeguard systematic coherence and clarity, the
various discussions on details in tracts of Aquinas' theology are
not exhaustively listed add scrutinized. They are treated only
insofar as they directly concern our central theme.
* For the same reason this study is less explicitly focused on
historical and doctrinal discussions in which Aquinas was involved,
or developments in his thinking. As point of departure the Summa·
1beologiae is taken, accompanied by other works from the last years
of Aquinas' life.
Having presented the limits and characteristic features of this
study, I cannot but express the hope that the book may be helpful
as a guide to
the texts of Aquinas himself and - via these texts - to Holy
Scripture and to the One who was the centre of his life.
This study was completed on March 7, 1997.
CONVENTIONS
Works of Thomas Aquinas
The classification and enumeration is based on the brief catalogue
of authentic works of J. Weisheipl, 1974, p. 355-405. In brackets
the suppo sed year(s) of writing are indicated, following
Weisheipl. After the year of writing, the edition used is
mentioned. If available, the edition of the Commissio Leonina, S.
Thomae Aquinatis doctoris angelici Opera Omnia iussu impensaque
Leonis XlII P.M edita, Romae 1882-, is used. If not, the text is
adopted from R. Busa, Sancti Thomae Aquinatis Opera Omnia ut sunt
in Indice Thomistico, (Indicis Thomistici Supplementum), Stuttgart/
Bad Cannstatt 1980, apart from Aquinas' commentary on the Sentences
(see below). Leonina is the standard edition and still incomplete.
Busa has the advantage of being a complete edition, to be consulted
in print or on CD-Rom. For the sake of clarity the spelling of all
editions is made uniform, following Busa.
Theological syntheses In Sent Scriptum super libras Sententiarum
Magistri Petri Lombar
di (1252-1256), ed. P. Mandonnet (vol. 1 - 2, Paris 1929) and M.F.
Moos (vol. 3 - 4.22, Paris 1933, 1947); the rest of vol. 4
according to Busa.
ScG Summa contra gentiles (1259-1264), Leonina. The second Arabic
number (in Latin quotes sometimes in between brackets) refers to
the paragraph as indicated in Busa.
STh Summa Theologiae (1266-1273), Leonina.
Academic disputations De ver Quaestiones disputatae De veritate
(1256-1259), Leonina. De pot Quaestiones disputatae De potentia
(1265-1266), Busa. De malo Quaestiones disputatae De malo
(1266-1267), Leonina. QD De anima Quaestio disputata De anima
(1269), Busa. De virt Quaestio disputata De virtutibus in communi
(1269-1272),
De car De corr
Busa [18.1]. Quaestio disputata De caritate (1269-1272), Busa
[18.2]. Quaestio disputata De correctione fraterna (1269-1272),
Busa [18.3] Quaestio disputata De spe (1269-1272), Busa
[18.4].
CONVENTIONS 5
De virt card Quaestio disputata De virtutibus cardinalibus
(1269-1272), Busa [18.5].
Quodl Quaestiones quodlibetales (7 to 11: 1256-1259, the rest:
1269-1272), Busa.
Expositions of Holy Scripture In Job bcpositio in Job ad litteram
(1261-1264), Leonina. In Psalm Postilla super Psalmos (1272-1273),
Busa. Catena Glossa continua super Evangelia {Catena Aurea}
(1262-
In Mat In Joan In Rom In I Cor
In II Cor
1267), Busa. Lectura 'super Matthaeum. Reportatio (1256-1259),
Busa. Lectura super Johannem. Reportatio (1269-1272), Busa.
Expositio super Epistolam ad Romanos (1270-1272?), Busa. Lectura
super Epistolam I ad Corinthios (1259-1265?), Busa. Leetura super
Epistolam II ad Corinthios. Reportatio (1259- 1265?), Busa. Leetura
super Epistolam ad Hebraeos. Reportatio (1259- 1265?), Busa.
Expositions on Aristotle In De anima Sententia super De anima
(1269-1270), Leonina. In Eth Sententia libri Ethieorum (1271),
Leonina. In Met Sententia super Metaphysicam (1269-1272),
Busa.
Other expositions In De Trin Expositio super librum Boethii De
Trinitate (1258-1259),
Leonina. In Div Nom Expositio super Dionysium De divinis nominibus
(1265-
1267), Busa. In De causis Expositio super librum De causis
(1271-1272), Busa.
Other writings De per! De perfectione spiritualis vitae
(1269-1270), Leonina. CImp Contra impugnantes Dei cultum et
religionum (1256),
CompTh De sub
Leonina. Compendium Theologiae (1269-1273), Leonina. De substantiis
separatis (1271-1273), Leonina.
De reg princ De regno (or De regimine principum) ad regem Cypri
(1265-1267), Leonina,
6
Deform
In Symb
De fonna absolutionis sacramentalis ad generalem magis trum
Ordinis (1269), Leonina_ De articulis fidei et Ecclesiae
sacramentis (1261-1265), Busa_ Collationes super Pater Noster
(1273), BU,sa. Collationes de Decem Praeceptis (or De duobus
praeceptis caritatis et decem legis praeceptis) (1273), Busa.
Collationes super Credo in Deum (1273), Busa.
Abbreviations of Biblical books
All abbreviations, even those in the Latin texts quoted, are
following the ,j New Jerusalem Bible:!
Co Corinthians Lk Luke Col Colossians Lv Leviticus Dt Deuteronomy
Ml Malachi Ep Ephesians Mt Matthew Ex Exodus P Peter Ezk Ezekiel Ph
Philippians Ga Galatians Ps Psalms Gn Genesis Rm Romans Hab
Habakkuk Rv Revelation to John Heb Hebrews Sg Song of Songs Is
Isaiah Si Ben SiralEcclesiasticus Jb Job Th Thessalonians Jm James
Tt Titus Jn John (lJn= 1" letter) Ws Wisdom K Kings
Other conventions
[ 1 [Busa: 1
Patrologia cursus completus, series latina, J.-P. Migne (ed), Paris
1844-1890. Enchiridion symbolorum definitionum et declarationum de
rebus fidei et marum, H. Denzinger/P. Hiinermann, Freiburg i.
Br'!Basei/RomalWien 1991". Word(s) or numbers added by me for the
sake of clarity. Number of a line according to the Busa
edition.
~ ij , li
~ il >J
CONVENTIONS
Number of a line according to the Leonina edition. Article
Objection Counter-argument Response Answer to an objection Prologue
Quaestio
7
CHAPTER I
IN SEARCH OF AN APPROPRlA TE PERSPECTIVE: . AQUINAS ON GOD AND
LIFE
In this chapter we will establish the foundations on which the rest
of this book is based. Firstly, our interpretation of Thomas
Aquinas is sketched (1). This may be helpful in locating our
approach from within the variety of interpretations the work of
Aquinas has witnessed since th~ thirteenth century. Having done
this, a first investigation in the field thiS stU?y covers ~ollows
(2). Our aim is to find an appropriate perspective from which the
theological question of the relation between life .on earth and
'life' ~er de.ath can be dealt with. Once this perspecti ve IS
settled, our question wdl be rephrased in terms of the concepts
that are relevant for Aquinas and a framework is proposed within
which the various aspects of the question can be examined
(3).
1. Saint Thomas Aquinas
The .impact o~ Tho~as Aquinas on the tradition of Western theology
and phllo~ophy IS coOS/derable. The Saint (since 1323), Teacher· of
the Church (since 15~7) and Patron of all Roman Catholic schools
(since 18~0) has been Interpreted, followed and criticized by all
kinds of thinkers over the past 700 years. During the first
centuries after his death his wor~s were used as manuals for
students of theology, from the 19th century till only a few decades
ago his teaching was the inspiration for the N eo-Thomist!c manuals
and moreover, he still challenges the t~oughts of many, ~ IS shown
by the hundreds of papers and studies on him tha; are pu~l~shed
every year'. The doctor communis is 'public p;operty and writing
about hiS theology one will almost inevitably dlscov~r oneself to
be one in a long line of interpreters. This study is no
exceptIOn.
The interpretation of Aquinas presented here IS a theological
one.
Cf. the Bulletin Thomi". (1940-1965), continued in lWsegna di
letteralura Tomistica (1966- ).
CHAPTER! 9
The portrait which inspired our investigation is not that of the
thinker who wrote the definitive "tourist guide to the highways and
byways of divinity".' It is the portrait of a Dominican Mendicant
Friar whose theological activities should be seen within the
framework of his life dedicated to God.' The relationship with the
triune God was the centre of Aquinas' life of prayer and study and
this is reflected in his theology. How this influences the
perspective from which the questions concerning God, life and death
are asked, will become clear as we proceed by sketching the
features of Aquinas' theology.'
1.1 The incomprehensihle God as the core of theology
Theology for Aquinas is what the word already says: God-talk, sermo
de Deo.' More precisely: theology is about God and everything else
insofar as it is related to God.' The same ardour we perceive in
Aquinas' tracing every possible question in theology back to its
relation with God, can, however, be observed in his allegiance to a
second principle: the fundamental impossibility of knowing, in this
mortal life, what God is. This sounds strange for a theologian who
is famous for his penetrating philosophical reflections and
systematic rigour. To what degree is Aquinas clinging to this
principle? How can he proceed as a theologian on this basis? What
kind of incomprehensibility is at stake here?'
2 B. Davies, 1992, p. 193. , Friar Thomas d'Aquino J. Weisheipl
significantly entitled his biographical staitdard
work. The works of Thomas Aquinas cover a period of two decades of
writing (1252·1274). This study does not concentrate on doctrmal
developments in his teaching, although imponant shifts will be
reponed when relevant. Point of depanure is the Summa Theologiae,
taken as his most original, mature and extended systematical
work.
S STh I 1.7.sc: Olud est subiectum scientiae. de quo est sermo in
scientia. Sed in hac scientia fit sermo de Dea; dicitur enim
theologia, quasi sermo de Deo. Ergo Deus est subiectum huius
scientiae.
6 STh I 1.7.co: Omnia autem pertractantur in sacra'doctrina sub
ratione Dei, vel quia sunt . ipse Deus,' vel quia habent ordinem ad
Deum, ut ad primipium et finem. Unde sequitur quod Deus 'Om sit
subiectum huius scientiae. Quod etiam manifestum sit ex principiis
huius scientiae, quae sunt articuli,fidei, quae est de Deo. Cf.
also STh I 1.3.ral: sacra doctrina non determinat de Deo et de
creaturis ex aequo, sed de Deo principaliter, et de creatu:ris
secundum quod referuntur ad Deum, ut ad principium vel finem.
7 Cf. 1. Oeing-Hanhoff, 1974; W. Hoye, 1988, with suggestions for
more literature on the subject.
10 AQUINAS ON GOD AND LIFE
In the first place, it is imponant to see that the
incomprehensibility of God. refers to knowledge of God which
creatures have. It is not a property of God as such, but a feature
which should be considered within the relation of God and creature.
God quoad se is supremely knowable, incomprehensibility is at stake
only quoad nos.'
In the second place, one should notice that the awareness of this
incomprehensibility is considered as the highest and most perfect
knowledge of God a creature can obtain.' Thus a number of possible
misinterpretations are ruled out. Aquinas' sayings are not the
dramatic result of a failed effort; they are not an obligatory
pious remark before the real reflections start; they should not be
interpreted within the context of a measure of secularisation in
which God has 'evaporated' after an ongoing process of criticism of
and distrust in the possibility of human reason", neither is it the
result of a fundamental option for agnosticism.
In the third place, it should be kept in mind that God's incompre
hensibility is not nullified by grace: revelation intensifies
rather than softens the incomprehensibility." The supreme knowledge
of God's nature attainable in this life has the character of a
learned ignorance (docta ignorantia): the more perfect we know God
in this life, the more we understand how He surpasses all that can
be comprehended by the created intellect. This 'ignorance' remains,
no matter how much we are joined with Him by grace (quasi ignoto
coniungamur). And still we can learn to know Him more fully as we
learn to appreciate more how everything is connected with God and
how things can be attributed to
• Aquinas compares the rdation betWeen the human mind and God with
a bat blinded by the light of the sun: S7b I.12.1.co: dieendum
quod, cum un~ue sit cognoscibi/e secundum 'ql«Xi est in actu, Deus,
qui est actus purus absque omni permixlione potentiae, quantum in
se est, maxime cognoscibilis est. Sed quod est maxime cognoscibile
in se, aiieui intellectui cognoscibile non est, propter excessum
intel/igibilis supra intellectum, skut soi, qui est maxime
visibilis, videri non potest a vespertilione propter excessum
luminis. Cf. also S7b I 2.1.
, This statement is made by Aquinas throughout his works: Cf. S7b
II-II 87 .CO: elSi non videamm de Deo quid est, videmus tamen quid
non est, et tanto in hac vita Deum perfoctius cognoscimus quanta
magis intelligimus eum excedere quidquid intellectu com·
prehenditur; De pot 7.S.rat4: iIlud est ultimum cognitionis humanae
de Deo quod seiat se Deum nescire, in quantum cognoscit, iI/ud quod
Deus est, omne ipsum quod de eo intelligimus, excedere; Cf. also In
De Trin 1.2.ra1; seC I 30.5; ScG ill 49.8; In De causis 6; De 'VeT
2.1.ra9.
" J. WLSSink, 1992, p. 46-48 and 1994, p. 32-33. " W. Hoye, 1988,
p. 121-122.
I
CHAPTER I 11
Him which can only be known by divine revelation." The reason for
underscoring the incomprehensibility of God follows
from Aquinas' account of God as a free Creator. This account is
based on the revelation of Scripture where God has made Himself
known as the One who is the first cause and the final end of
creation. As such God cannot be a part of creation. This means that
He cannot be adequately thought of in terms of distinctions that
can be made within the created world. Thus the distinction between
Creator and creatures becomes more fundamental and of a different
nature than all other possible distinctions betwee? creatures: "God
differs. differently"." .
Since the incomprehensIble God IS no deus OtlOSUS, but the trlUne
God who ultimately founds, sustains and perfects the dynamism of
.all creation up to the achievements of human reason, one of the
major tasks of theology is to respect God's otherness during the
process of clarifying God's concern with the world. Aquinas found a
way of respecting God's incomprehensibility by placing major
attention on the deficiency of our language in representing what
God is. Even the most sophisticated philosophical distinctions, in
his view, s?f~er f:om a mode of signifying which is apt for
creatures only. The dIstInctIOn between God and creature can be
expre seer at best by showing how and why our language fails to
represe God." Aquinas' God-talk has a .radical negative strain: it
is deep marked by a respect for God's Incom prehensibility
."
12 5Th I 12.13.ral: licet p reve1ationem gratiae in hac vita non
cogtWscamus de Deo quid est, et sic ei quaSi igoo coniungamur;
tamen plenius ipsum cognoscinuls, inquantum plures et
excellentiores ectus eius nobis demonstrantur; et inquantum ei
aliqua attribui· mus ex revelatione div' dt/ quae ratio naturalis
non pertingit, ut Deum esse trinum et unum.
13 H. Schoot, 1993, p. 2 2. The distinction between God and
creation as a fundamental insight determiniug uinas' procedure has
been stressed by J. Pieper, 1953. Recendy it has been Iy expouuded
by R. Sokolowski, 1982, whose book has been a great inspiratio for
this study. Cf. also 2.2.1.1 in this chapter, p. 30ff.
,. In this respect I am uch debted to the interpretation of Aquinas
proposed by D. Burrell, 1979 and 198 . What Burrell works out with
regard to God's essence is adopted and applied the manner in which
God actS by K. Tanner, 1988 and M. Dodds, 1993. The sam is worked
out with regard to Aquinas' Christology by H. Schoot, 1993. .
" Cf. F. de Grijs, 1988, . 35: "The incomprehensibility of the
living God should, therefore, not be underst od as one of God's
many attributes or propenies. Rather when speaking of God's
comprehensibility one gives a characteristic feature of all
attributes and thus of all od-talk." [translation c.!..] Cf. also
K. Rahner, 1974, p.
AQUlNAS ON GOD AND LIFE
thus, with regard to our knowledge of God two aspects are to be
',"owledged simultaneously. On the one hand God is sought in
and
aC"'·. b . d (b be10nd creatIon, He can e recogruze ut not
comprehended) by the pings He effects", He can be the object of
one's devotion and - as in ~quinas' case - the centre of one's
life. Being capax Deiv, man is desig-
d to know and love God as we will see in the next chapter. On the
peper hand, the triune God remains the incomprehensible God the
~dden One: The. combin~ti?n of ~hese two aspects is characteristic
of Ipe process I~ which m~ IS Increasl~gly united with the
incomprehensi ble God. T~'s process IS so c~ntral In Aquinas'
theology that he uses it
characterISe the mortal hfe of human beings. Our life with the ~o
cOJIlprehensible God is a life on the way, in via, never reaching
its
f'~ al destination as long as we live. The life in via is a
restless life III 'h d ' ided by the perspectlve t at Go may be
seen as He is, according to
fr;e promise of lJn 3,2: Videbimus eum sicuti est and leo 13,12:
Videmus
----43 and 1975, p. 306·319. , STh I 12.12.00: Respondeo dicendum
quod natura/is nostra cognitio a sensu principium
1 stpnit, unde tantum se nostra natura/is cognitio exiendere
potest, inquantum manuduci pteSt per sensibilia: . Ex sensibil~bus
a~tem non potest usque ad hoc intel/eetus noster ptingere, quod
dZ'fJmam essentzam videat, qu~ .c:eaturae s~~ibiles sunt eJfoctus
Dei (ljrmtem causa: non adaequantes. Und~ ex senstbiltum cogmtume
non potest tota Dei llirtus cogoosct, et per consequens nee euts
essentia videri. Sed quia sunt eius efJectus a causa dependentes,
ex eis in hoc perdue; POssumus, ut cognoscamus de Deo an est, et ut
cognoscamus de ipso ~ quae neeesse est ei eonvenire secundum quod
est prima o~nium c~ excedem O~~ltt sua ~ausata. Unde cognoseimus de
ipso habitudinem ipsius ad (ftdturd!' quod s~~et omntum est edUSt;·
et differentiam creaturarum ab ipso. quod scilicet non est alzquid
eorum quae ab eo causantur,' et quod haec non reJnOventur ab eo
prop~er eOO defectum, sed qu~ superexeedit. .
17 j\.qutnaS adopts the ex?~on froa; Augustme's XIV De Trinitate 8
[pL 42,1044]; eo ip!O quod focta est ad ,:",:~",em Det, .'~pax est
Dei per gratiam. Cf. 5Th I·II 113.10.co 3l1d S'lb m . 4.1:~:
~unilltud~ l11l4gmlS att~nditur in natura humana secundum quod est
capax Det, scilKet IpSum attmgendo propna operatione eognitionis et
amoris. Cf. also S'fh . ~ .23.1.00: Deus IlUtem est in/inita.e.
bonitatis. ex qua contingit quod ad par&telpatronem bonoru:n
su:u crea~as admutlt et praecipue rationales creaturas, quae,
i"quantum ~u~t .ad ~gmem .Del jactae. sunt capaces beatitudinis
divinae. Quae quit/em, COnslStlt In f:t!itrone. Det, p~ quam etiam
ipse Deus beatus est et per seipsum Jives, mquant«m s'.ilKet selpSO
Jruttur. On the history of the capacitas Dei in the theo10!lY of
AugustIlle and Peter Lombard as well as the reception by Aquinas,
d. F. de Gn~, 1967, p. 222·252 (the capacrty for God, grounded in
the belief that man is created after God's image, is a key·word in
this study on the image of God in In sent).
CHAPTER I 13
nunc in speculum et in aenigmate; tunc autem focie ad faciem.18
This vision of God is like a home-coming (in pat:ria): a beatific
vision that fulfills all our desires. Nevertheless, even then God
will not be known insofar as He is knowable. Even the visio beata
does not entail that we will be able to 'comprehend' God, in the
sense of grasping God's essence intellectually."
Getting to know the incomprehensible God takes a lifetime and
concerns all the intellectual capacities we have, both volitional
and cognitive. It transforms these capacities and changes our view
on reality. It even changes our approach to reality and our
appreciation of the different kinds of knowledge we can obtain.
Theology is also a form of knowledge. Therefore, what impact the
principle of God's incomprehen sibility has on Aquinas' account of
theology, is the subject of the next paragraph.
1.2 God's revelation as the source of theology
The impact of God's incomprehensibility on Aquinas' account of
theology becomes apparent as soon as we begin to examine the word
he chooses for what we call theology. In the first question of the
Summa Tbeologiae, Thomas asks "whether another doctrine is required
apart from philosophical studies".'o The necessity for such a
doctrine is evident, for man is directed at the incomprehensible
God as his ultimate destination. This final end of man should be
known by him so he can direct his intentions and actions towards
this end.21 With the help of
18 Both verses play an imponant role in Aquinas' reflection on the
perspective of life, and are often quoted in 5Th I 12. We will come
back to this in chapter N, p. 217f!.
19 In 5Th I 12.7.ral Aquinas points out that the word comprehernio
may be used in two ways: Uno modo. striete et proprie. secundum
quod aliquid includitur in comprehenden Ie. Et sic nullo modo Deus
comprehenditur, nee intellectu nee aliquo alia, quia, cum sit
infinitus, nullo finito includi potest, ut aliquid /initum eum
infinite capiat, skut ipse infinite est. Et sic de comprehensione
nunc quaeritur. Alio modo comprehensio largius sumitur, secundum
quod comprehensio insecutioni opponitur. Cf. also STh I·n 4.3.ral
and 5cG m 55.
20 5Th I 1.1: Utrum sit necessarium praeter philosophicas
disciplinas aliam doctrinam haber;.
" 5Th I 1.1.co: Resporuleo dicendum quod necessarium foi' ad
humanam salurem, esse doctrinam quandam secundum reveiatronem
divinam, praeter philosophicas discipfinas. quae ratione humana
investigantur. Primo quidem, quia homo ordinatur ad Deum skut ad
quendam finem qui comprehensionem rationis excedit. secundum ii/tid
Js 64,4: "Oculus non vidit Deus absque te, quae praepariasti
diligentibus te." Finem autem
AQUINAS ON GOD AND LIFE
natural reason, cultivated and brought to perfection in the
philosophical disciplines, some truth about God may be found, but
only by a few thinkers and after a long time, mixed with a
multitude of errors. For the sake of the welfare of man, which is
dependent on this knowledge of God, another kind of knowledge is
needed, in which God Himself teaches the truth. So by divine
revelation man is more appropriately and securely brought to his
own destination."
This doctrine, based on divine revelation, is called a sacred
doctrine. Aquinas discerns sacra doctrina from theologia. The
latter can be the name of the philosophical procedure which is
aimed at the knowledge of God insofar as this can be obtained by
the light of natural reason. But it can also be the name of a part
of the sacred doctrine." 1beologia in the second meaning can be
compared with what we understand by theology nowadays. Because of
its relation with sacra doctrina, it is, however, important to take
a closer look at both concepts and the connection between
them.24
Sacra doctrina is a body of knowledge which is founded in God's
revelation, or, as Aquinas puts it, which proceeds from principles
which are known by the light of a higher science, which is the
science of God
oportet esse praecognieum hominibus, qui SUdS intentiones et
actiones debent ordinare in jinem.
" S7b I I.l.co: Unde necessarium foil homini ad salutem, qund ei
nota /ierint quaedam per revelationem divittatn, quae rationem
humanam excedunt. Ad ea etiam quae de Deo ratkme humana investigm
possunt, necessarium foit hominem instrui revelatione divina quia
veritds de Dea, per rationem investigata, a paucis, et per longum
tempus, et cum admixtione multorum erro~ homini proveniret, a (uius
tamen 'fJeritatis cognitione dependet tota hominis salus, quae in
Deo est.
" S7b I 1.!.ra2: Unde nihil prohibet de eitdem rebus, de quibus
philosophicae disciplinae tradam secundum quod Junt cognoscibilia
tumine natura/is ratum~ et aliam scientiam tractare secundum quod
cognoscuntur lumine Jivinae revelationis. Unde theologia quae ad
sacram doctrinam peninet, differt secundum genus ab ilIa theologia
quae pars phi· losophia< ponitur.
Z4 M. C;:orbin, 1974, has ~ollowed the shifts in Aquinas' account
of theology and its rdatlon to philosophy m four stages (In Sent,
In De 7nn, ScG, S7b). The book has met some serious critique (lv.!.
Jordan, 1981) but for the character of theology as intellectus
fidei its analy';' remains valid; Cf. also T. Gilby, 1964, p.
58-66; J. Wa1grave, 1982/1976, p. 3·15; B. Davies, 1992, p. 10·14;
M. Jordan, 1993, p. 232.251; J. Wissink, 1993, p. 15·36; H. Rikhof,
1995[b], p. 435-439.
CHAPTER I 15
and the beatified." By putting it this way, Thomas underlines that
the divine subject of theology is also the source and the centre of
theology.
In the first place this is shown by the relation bet:",ee? sacra
doctri~ and sacra scriptura. The content of the sacred doc~rlOe IS
what ~d. IS teaching us through Scripture. The sacred doctrIne IS
first and pn.marlly handed down to us in Scripture, which makes
this book normative for all that is part of or springs from the
sacred doctrine. Th~ connection between the two is so close, that
Thomas uses sacra doctrtna and sacra scriptura side by side,
sometimes using the one when the reader would expect the other."
.
In the Christian traClition, the sacred doctrine has been
summarized in the Articles of Faith, since the knowledge of the
content of Sc~ipture is too important to remain reserved for only
those who have time to occupy themselves with the difficult study.
of Script~re.~ But sa::ra doctrina is broader than Scripture and
the ArtIcles of FaIth: It comprISes all manner of instructive
communication from God to man, directly or indirectly." . .,
.
1beologia, as a part of the sacra doctrina, IS the sClentI~c
reflection. on the content of faith. Drawing an analogy between the
SCIences, AqulOas considers the Articles of Faith as the principles
of theology. Since these articles are nothing more than the summary
of the content of ~cripture, the eminent position of Scripture in
the process of theology IS beyond
25 5Th I 1.2.co: Et hoc modo sacra doetrina est screntia, quia
proeedit ex principiis notis lumine superioris scientiae, quae
scilicet est sCientia. Dei et beatorum. J. WlSSu:.k, 1994, p. 18,
paraphrases sacra doctrina as "the doct:rmal content of Holy
SCrJpture as taught by the Church and in university classes by
magistri".
" Cf. J. Wissink, 1994, p. 17, footnote 4. 27 5Th IT-IT 1.9.ral:
veritas fidei in sacra Scriptura di}fose continetur et variis
modis. et in
quibusdam obscure,· ita quod ad eliciendum fidei veritatem ex ~a
5criptura. ~uir~tur longum studium et exercitium, ad quod non
possunt pervenn-e omnes illt qutbus necessarium est cognoscere
fidei writatetn, quorum plerique. aliis negotiis occupatio studio
'Vacare non possunt. Et ideo foit necessarium ut ex sententiis
sacrae 5cripturae aliquid manifestum surnmarie co//igeretUT quod
proponeretur omnibus ad credendum. Quod quidem non est additum
sacrae Scripturae, sed podro ex sacra Scriptura assumptum.
28 Cf. T. Gilby, 1964, p. 63: nSacra doctrina, then, is expressive
in all manner of w~ys, and should not be restricted to the rational
exposition of a system of widely·rangmg yet consistent
propositions, on which score alone the Summa has been sometimes
admired, by those, however, who have not gone beyond its outward
appearance."
16 AQUINAS ON GOD AND LIFE
any doubt." In Aquinas' days this was reflected in the official
title of the professor of theology at the university: Magister in
Sacra Pagina. The first task of the Magister was reading and
explaining Holy Scripture, guided by the tradition centered around
the Anicles of Faith and with the help of the finest tools natural
reason (i.e. philosophy) can offer. The entire undenaking of
theology is centered around the bener understanding of the revealed
sacred doctrine. The' fact that the first principles of this
doctrine are revealed, deeply influences its mode of procedure. The
principles - the Anicles of Faith - can not be proved, since they
are directly related to the incomprehensible God." They can only be
approved of, defended and clarified in their interrelation, their
unity and their connection with God."
This leads us to a second manner in which God is at the centre of
theology. For Aquinas, theology is the understanding of faith
(intellectus fidei) and God is also the source and core of faith."
Faith is a gift from God, by which the intellect is illuminated by
a light of a quality differing from the light of natural reason.
Thus the mystery of God, once again, appears at the core of
theology: this time not as the formal subject of theology, but as
guiding and helping those whose faith searches for
understanding.
2' All. elaborate study of the place and function of Scripture in
the theology of Aquinas is: w. Valkenberg, 1990. In his concluding
reflections Valkenberg states: "In its primary function, Scripture
functions as the source aod framework of theology. As the Word of
God, it is received and interpreted in theology; as presupposition
of Christian theology it determines the theological horizon." (p.
300).
:JO On 'the clear-cut role of natural reason in theology, d. 5Th I
1.8.ra2: Utitur tamen sacra doctrina etiam ratione humana, non
quidem ad probandum fidm; quia per hoc tollere_ meritum fide~ sed
ad mani/estandum aliqua alia quae <raduntur in hac doctrina. Cum
enim gratia non tolla: naturam, sed perficiat, aportet quod
natura/is ratio subserviat fide~' SKut et natumlis inclinatio
wluntatis obsequitur caritati; Cf. ]. Walgrave, 1982/1976: 11.
Jordao, 1993.
" In the still valid words of Vancao ! (DH 3016): Ac ratio quidem,
fide iIIus<rata, cum sedldo, pie et sobrie quaerit, aliquam Deo
dante mysteriorum intelligentittm eamque fructuosissimdm assequitur
tum ex eorum, quae natura/iter cognoscit, analogia, tum e
mysteriorum ipsorum nexu inter se et cum fine hominis ultima,·
numquam tamen idonea redditur ad ea perspicienda instar veritatum,
quae proprmm ipsiu,s obiectum ~onstituunt. Divina enim mysteria sua
pte natura intelle~tum creatum sic excedunt, ut etiam revelatione
tradita et [tde sus~epta ipsius tamen }idei velamine contecta et
quadam quasi caligine obvoluta maneant, quamdiu in hac mortal;
vita. ·peregrinamur.4 Domino: per fidem enim ambuiamus et non per
speciem" (2Co 5,6). Cf. also J. Wissink, 1994, p. 24.
" Cf. J. Walgrave, 1982/1974[.]. We will come back to this in
chapter m, 2.1, p. 156ff.
CHAPTER! 17
Completing the picture, it should be kept in mind that the. direct
context of theology is the community of faithful who are searchmg
for understanding of their faith. It is a context in which the
'object' whic~ is studied is already part of the investigator's
life. The One sought, IS
the One addressed in daily prayer, met in the sacraments of the
Church and, in the case of Aquinas, the One on whom life is
orientated, even to be seen in determining his daily
timetable.
For Aquinas, therefore, theology has its p.oint ?f ~eparture and
destination in a lively relationship with God. It IS a sClentlfi.c
endeavour in which God is sough~ with the double help of God.
Studymg theol~gy has the character of a reaction, it is part' of an
answer to a call which precedes and, ultimately, escapes the
undenaking."
1.3 The unity of theological science
In the light of what has been said the third aspect of Aquinas'
theolo gy which deserves our attention can: quit~ easilr, be
~resented. As Thomas explains, the unity of theological sCience IS
70nstltuted ~y t~e unity of its formal subject. In the sacred
doctrme everythmg IS
considered under the formal consideration of being revealed by
God." This formal consideration grants a unity which covers
different philosophical disciplines. In philosophy a distinction is
made between speculative and practical science. The?logy covers
bot~ areas. It has a practical side which is concerned WIth human
acts msofar as these prepare man for the perfect knowledge of God
(eternal beatitude). Mainly, however, it is speculative and
concerned with God."
" As 11. Corbin puts it (1980, p. 14): "En bref, Ie croyant n'~ ni
a fonder ni a j~tifier un appel dont il n'est point Ie maltre et
qu'il ne peut jamatS se, donn~ deter~e et revendique, dans toUS les
domaines de sa vie, .par la Parole de I Autre, il ~olt s~~ ment
permission et commendement de se Sltuer et rec:onnrut.re comme un
temaln
parmi d'autres." . . . )4 5Th I Ij.co: Quia igitur sacra Scriptura
consU/erat aliqua secundum quod sunt d~v~n~tus
Yevelata, secundum quod dictum est [STh I 1.2fi omnia quaecumque
sunt dzvtnttus reveJabi/ia, communicant in una ratione formali
obiecti hums scientiae. Et ideo compre henduntur sub sacra
doctrina sieut sub scientia una.
35 5Th I 1.4.co: Respondeo dicendum quod sacra doctrina, ut dictum
est, una exist~, se extendit ad ea quae pertinent ad diversas
scientias philo~0f"icas, f1!Opter ratt~~~ formalem qUtfnJ- in
diversis attendit, scilie~t prout ~unt dwt~o lumlr:e cognosCtbilza.
Unde licet in scientiis philosophicis ali4 Stt speculattva et al~
J7r.actzc~ sacra. &amen doctrina comprehendit sub se utTamque;
sicut et neu: eaden: scu:nt~ s~ cogn?sctt, et ea quae facit. Magis
tamen est speculativa quam practtctt, quta pnnctpaltus aglt de
rebus
18 AQUJNAS ON GOD AND LIFE
With regard to the hermeneutical distance which separates us from
Aquinas, it may be appropriate to examine this idea of unity. In
contrast to a lot of contemporary theology, the unity of
theological science appears at three levels.
In the first place, there is, what I would like to call, a unity of
tracts. Aquinas is famous for his rigour in making distinctions and
with the expression 'unity of tracts' I do not mean that he mixes
up the questions he deals with. The general structure of the Summa
Tbe%giae, for instance, is very much refined and its lucidity and
elegance has been compared to a Gothic cathedral." What I mean by
the 'unity of tracts' is the extraordinary coherence of Aquinas'
theology. 37 The greater one's acquaintance with Aquinas' theology,
the more one discovers how, in the Summa, every article has the
nature of a hologram in which the rest of the work is reflected.
Studying moral theology, one cannot pass over the sacraments which
are the context of Christian life. Studying the sacraments, one
cannot omit paying attention to Christ who founds them. Studying
Christ, one has to take a look at Thomas' God·talk and so on. In
every key Aquinas strikes the resonance can be heard of the whole
of his theology. Therefore one can hardly speak of his Christology,
eschatology or moral theology: they are all different aspects of
the one science of theology the centre of which is the incomprehen.
sible God. For our study on Aquinas' account of the relation of
life on earth and 'life' after death this entails that we cannot
limit ourselves to a single tract of his theology.
A second form of unity is realized in the unity of theological sub·
disciplines. In the past seven centuries the scientific landscape
has undergone some profound changes and Christian theology has
become a collection of specialized disciplines. Nowadays the
book-shelf of the average Biblical scholar will hardly show any
overlapping with that of the moral theologian specialized in
medical ethics .. In the thirteenth
divinis quam de actibus humanis,· de quibus agit secundum quod per
eos ordinatur homo ad perflCt4ln Dei cognitionem, in qua aeterna
beatitudo consistit.
" The discussion about the piau only confirms its brilliant
architecrure. Cf. H. Schoot, 1993, p. 4-5, with an overview of the
relevant literature.
'7 With this observation I do not mean to state that Aquinas should
have constructed a closed system of thinking in which everything.
our Creator included, is controlled. Nor do I mean that he has made
no developments in his thinking, even in the years he was working
on the Summa Theologiae. I want to place emphasis on Aquiuas'
central intuition of the incomprchensible God of love which
pervades his entire theological work.
CHAPTER I 19
century the situation was different. Due to the relatively
orlglflative phase of medieval theology, Aquinas could approach his
subjects as a theological uomo universale. Philosophy, Biblical
science, psychology, moral theology, dogmatics, ascetical and
mystical theology: they all can be traced in the Summa and they all
are pointed towards the central mystery of faith, at the service of
which they were developed." Thus Aquinas' systematic rigour and
formal approach should not be played off against his Biblical
inspiration. In fact we should bear in mind that Aquinas, in his
systematical works, tries to be as close to the Biblical
inspiration as in his commentaries on Holy Scripture."
In the third place, as was already examined in the last paragraph,
a unity can be perceived with regard to the life of the theologian
and the way of proceeding in this science. Both are pervaded with
God's activity and find their coherence in this divine activity.
For Aquinas studying theology properly cannot be confined to
intellectual virtues alone. As we have seen, theology is faith
searching for understanding !fides quaerens intelleaum) and the
theological virtues (faith,. hope and charity) are intrinsically
connected with moral and intellectual virtues.'" Theology is
performed at the service and within the context of the union of man
with God. Moreover, an important aspect of theology is
38 This, as well as the 'unity of tracts', has a direct bearing on
the limits of this study which covers, roughly the whole field of
theology Aquinas knew: the secondary literature on the varied
subjects, tracts and sub-disciplines has become highly specia·
lized and comprehensive. In this respect we do not mean to be
exhaustive.
" As L. Sentis (1992, p. 286) puts it, "Ie but de la theologie est
de donuer accOs aux Ecritures Saintes, et non de proposer un
ensemble doctrinal qui les remplace". The kind of
misinterpretations Senrls warns us against is obvious in our days
in which a widespread aversicn for and suspicicn of toralitarian
systems of thinking can be observed. Aquiuas' theology is easily
identified with such a s)"tem, and played off against a more
Biblical narrative theology in which the sense of mystery is
claimed to be safeguarded in a better manner. M. Corbin (1974) has
urged, rightly, that most wanting in our days, is a speculative
theology in which the various results of the different specialties
are confronted with each other and brought into relation with one
another.
" On the connection of the virtues cf. STh 1·11 65.1·5; In STh I
1.6.co and raJ Aquinas explains that judgement in matters of faith
may be the result of either the wisdom (sapientia) which is a gift
from the Holy. Spirit or the wisdom which is the result of studying
the sacred doctrine. The former is higher, like the judgement, with
regard to moral affairs, of the vinuous person is higher than that
of the moral philosopher who knows everything about virtues but
possesses none of them. Cf. J. Walgrave, 1982/1974(a1, p. 119; Cf.
also 5Th 11·11 45.2.co.
20 AQUINAS ON GOD AND LIFE
its reflection on the dynamism of this union."
Summarizing these three features of Aquinas' theology, we can say
that in this study Aquinas' theology is interpreted as based on the
interpretation of Scripture, centered around the incomprehensible
God and, in more than one respect, concerned with the unity of the
theological discipline. The interpretation thus carried out, has
the character of following Aquinas in his attempt to show the nexus
mysteriorum with regard to God, life and death.
2. God, life and death
Having sketched our interpretation of Aquinas, we will proceed with
a first orientation in the field this study covers. Our aim is to
find an appropriate perspective from which the theological question
of the relation between life on earth and 'life' after death can be
dealt with. In order to find this perspective we will, first, take
a look at Aquinas' use of the words 'life' and 'death' (2.1). We
will discover a network of meanings and contexts in which 'life'
and 'death' are used. This variety raises questions concerning the
connection of the words and the realities th.ey . refer .to. In
order to discover the way the network is organized, we wIll
InvestIgate Aquinas' explanation of 'life' as a name of God's
essence (2.2) and as a name which can be attributed to each of the
divine Persons (2.3). This will give us insight into the connection
of life and death with the incomprehensible God and provide us with
a perspective from which the theological question can be
rephrased.
2.1 The meaning and use of the words 'life' and 'death'
In various instances in his works Aquinas accounts for the
different
" Which Aquinas practices in his account of the theological vinues
and the gifts of the _ Holy Spirit. Cf. M. Corbin (1974, p. 901)
who remarks as a conclusion of his reading of STh I·II 68.2: "ces
trois modes mltapbysique, the%gique, mystique devien. ~t les troIS
degres d'une echelle unique qui trouve son point culminant dans la
VlSlon de Dieu face a face qui' rejouit- les bienheureux. La faute
de l'interpretation couran~e est d'oublier ~u·une. distinction
n'est point une separation figee mais une dyn~l9.ue, q~'une
~l&archre n'est point une repanition statique de diverses
posslbilites maIS une ligne ascendante dialectique qui maintient a
la fois la consistence de la niveau inferieur et sa tendence a se
depasser pour s'egaIer au niveau superieur."
CHAPTER I 21
meanings the words 'life' and 'death' can have. Throughout his
works Thomas consequently discerns three meanings of vita which can
all be traced back to distinctions Aristotle makes."
In a first meaning of the word, vita refers to the existence of a
being which possesses the ability to move itself in a certain
manner. In this first meaning vita is a substantial predicate,
referring to the being of the subject, as is reflected in
Aristotle's definition vivere viventibus esse est.43
In a second- meaning, which is less familiar to us than the first
and the third, vita refers to a specific act of a living substance
which is characteristic for its mode of being. Thus the volitional
and cognitive acts of human beings can be called their 'life':
these acts are characteristic for the human mode of being regarded
as self movement.44
In a third meaning, with the word vita the chief occupation or
direction of man is signified. Thus one can lead a honorable life,
a contemplative life, etc."
" Cf. R. Defecrari, 1948, p. 1170·1172. 4) n De anima 7 (415b13):
vivere autem vivemibus est esse, causa autem et principium
horum anima (quoted in 5Th I 18.2.sc). In this study, focusing
primarily on Aquinas' reception of Aristode, I will quote the
latter in Latin. Aquinas did not know Greek and studied the works
of Aristode in translations, mosdy provided by William of Moerbeke
(d. J. Weisheipl, 1983', p. 374-381). The text of Aristode is
adopted from the edition of Aquinas' commentary which was
consulted.
« IX Eth 11 (1170a16): Yivere autem determinant anima/ibm-potentia
sensus, hominibus autem sensus vel intel/eetus. Potentia autem. ad
operationem reducitur; principaJe autem in operatione. Vuietur
autem vivere esse principalieer sentire vel intelligere. Aquinas
comments (In IX Eth 11 [Leon: 30D: in omnibus animdJibus communiter
determinatur vivere secundum potentiam sensus, in hominibus autem
determinatur secundum potentiam sensus, quantum ad itt quod habet
commune cum aliis animalibus, vel secundum potentiam inte/lecms,
quantum ad id quod est proprium sibL Omnis autem in potentia
reducitur ad operationem skut ad propriam peifectionem: uOOe id
quod est principale consistit in operatione et non in potentia
nuda, actus enim est potior quam potentia, ut probatur in IX
M£taphysicae. Et ex hoc patet quod principaliter Viflert anima/is
vel hominis est sentire vel intellig~.
" I Eth 5 (1095bl4-19): Bonum enim et felicitatem non
irrationabiJiter videntur ex his quae huius 'Vitae sunt
"existimare. Multi quidem et gravissimi voluptatem. Ideo et vitam
diJigunt voluptuosam. Tres enim sunt maxime excellentes. et quae
nunc dicta est et quae civilis est et tertia quae contemplativa
est. Aquinas comments (!n I Eth 5 [Leon: 62]: unusquisque id ad
quod maxim< aflicitur reputat vitam suam, sicut phiJosophus
phiJosophar~ "venator venari et sic de allis. Et quia homo maxime
afficitur ad ultimum finen; necesse est quod vitae diversificentur
secundum diversitatem ultimi finis.
22 AQUINAS ON GOD AND LIFE
These three meanings in which the word vita is used are closely
connected by the notion of 'self-movement'. Since the human mode of
being is an intelligent mode of being, one could even say that, in
the case of human beings, these meanings of the word 'life' imply
each other. The species homo is differentiated from the genus
animal by the predicate rationale which refers to the intellectual
operations; the nature of these operations determine the specific
nature of human existence. In other words: the life (in the third
meaning) we lead follows from our free deliberate choices flife' in
the second meaning) which follow from our mode of being ('life' in
the first meaning)."
Generally speaking, Aquinas considers mors as the opposite of vita.
The logical definition of death is privatio vitae. Taken as a
privation mors is called a malum and like any malum can only be
known insofar as the bonum in which it inheres is known, mors can
only be known insofar as vita is known. Therefore, in these
paragraphs we will mainly concentrate on Aquinas' use of
life.
The three meanings of vita just mentioned may serve as a first
orientation in the matter. When we turn to Aquinas' actual use of
the word, however, a somewhat more complicated picture takes shape.
The word vita, taken in each of the meanings, functions in a
variety of contexts, with a variety of applications."
With regard to vita in the first meaning, Aquinas speaks of vita
animae or spiritualis on the one hand and vita corporis or
corporalis on the other hand. He distinguishes vita temporalis from
vita aeterna. Theologically he makes a distinction between vita
naturae or naturalis, vita gratiae and vita gloriae or gloriosa.
With regard to the human soul he discerns vita nutritiva, vita
sensibilis and vita intellectiva or rationalis. He speaks of vita
angeli and vita Dei, of vita praesens and vita !utura,
46 In In IX Eth 7 the connection of the different meanings can be
detected [Leon: 74]: Esse autem nostrum consistit in quodam actu,
esse enim nostrum est vivere et per consequens operari (non enim
est vita absque vitae operatione quacwnque), unde unimi que est
amabiJe operari opera vitae,' {adem autem in actu est quodam modo
ipsum opus facientis. actus enim moventis et agentis est in moto et
patiente; ideo itaque diJigunt opus mum et -artifices et poetae et
bene/aclores, quia diligunt suum esse.
" For an introductory overview the lists of R. Deferrari, 1948, p.
117()'1172 (vita) and p. 703 (mays) are a useful guide. On these
pages the references to the works of Aquinas can be found as well.
For a full consideration of the matter one should also take intO
account words like vivus, vi'lJijicare, mortalis (culpa morta/is,
peccatum martdeO and monifer. Since aile these words are derived
from the meanings of vita and t1WYS as they are introduced here,
they will be discussed later in this study.
CHAPTER 1 23
vita corruptibilis or mortalis and vita incorrupu.bil~ or.
immortalis . and many more kinds of life. An entire network of
slg~ficatlOns comes I?to perspective and it becomes clear that the
question of the relation between our life on earth and 'life' after
dea~ in Aqu~nas' the~l0!l! cannot be dealt with unless the
connection of different kInds of VIta IS taken into account and
their order and hierarchy is revealed. . . .
Vita in the second meaning is less frequently used by AqUInas: m
thIS meaning he only distinguishes vita secundum actum from vita
secundum potentiam. . .
With regard to vita in the m~aning of the ch~ef. Occup~tlOn ~f man,
however we can again ,find a Wide array of variations: VIta actt'Va
and vita con;emplativa, vita practica and vita speculativa, vita
bestialis and vita spiritualis, vita laboriosa, vita luxuriosa,
VIta monasttca and many more.
As we have already noticed, mors as a privation shares the 'para·
sytical' nature Aquinas attributes to ~l kinds of evil. T~e vari~ty
~f combinations is less elaborate than In the case of VIta (which
IS theologically appropriate, of course), but some. i~teresting
dis~inctions should be mentioned: mors carnalis or corporalts In
contrast With mors spiritualis, mors temporalis as against mors
aeterna and mors naturalis opposed to mors violenta. ...
From this first impression of the VarIOUS ways In which the words
vita and mors occur in Aquinas' works, we can justly draw the
conclusion that 'life' and 'death' are words which are found
throughout the entire field of theological reflection: referring to
the lowest vegetative creatures as well as to th~~ supreme ~r~ator.
Moreover, b! the fact that vita is also one of the dIVIne names, It
IS suggested that thiS 'omnipresent' aspect of the word in Aquinas'
theology has a special theological importance. This suggestion is
confirmed when we take a closer look at how Aquinas attributes
'life' to God: in his view vita is maxime proprie referring to
God." This means that, looking at the signification of vita, God is
the subject wh~ch most ap~r.o~ri~tely may be called 'living'. God
is even more appropnately called IIvmg than are human beings.
Looking for insight into what 'life' is, this would mean that we
should take a look at God first, in order to determine what all the
other kinds of life essentially are. In a way this is appropriate
since
.. SIb 1 18.3.co: Respondeo dicendum quod vita maxime proprie inDeo
'7'. Cf. also ScG I 97.3: Sed Deus maxime non ab alio. sed a seipso
operatur: cum SIt pnma causa agens. Maxime igitur ei compet;t
vivere.
24 AQUINAS ON GOD AND LIFE
God is the formal subject of theology. But how does this relate to
God's incomprehensibility which we noticed at the centre of
Aquinas' theological reflection?
In order to proceed, we will have to take a closer look at the way
in which Aquinas attributes 'life' to God, what this reveals
regarding his perception of God's mode of being and what this
entails for the human mode of being. Before we take a closer look,
however, at the procedure Aquinas follows two observations are of
importance.
In the first place we must bear in mind the context of Thomas'
work: the exposition of Holy Scripture. The variety of meanings in
which vita and mars occur in the writings of Aquinas are the result
of his close reading of Scripture. At first sight this may seem
strange, since we started our orientation on the use of the word
'life' with the observation that the distinctions Aquinas makes are
all to be traced back to Aristotle. As we will see later in this
study, however, Aristotle does nothing more than provide an
instrument which helps Aquinas to make a meticulous analysis of
what is told in Holy Scripture.
One of the main sources of Aquinas' theological reflections on life
is the gospel of Saint John" in which the word 'life' is one of the
key words. so In this gospel Christ Himself is called vita as well
as panis vitae, knowing God is called vita aeterna, Christ is said
to be giving aqua viva and the Father is said to have vita in
semetipso. In the gospel of Saint John questions arise as to what
exactly is meant by 'life' and how it is related to God: Father,
Son and Spirit. Apart from the fourth Gospel the word vita as a
divine name is found in various places in
., Apart from Scripture, Aquinas' attention for 'life' as a name of
God, seems to be raised also by the fact that pseudo-Dionysius
dedicates a chapter to vita in his famous De divinis nominibus;
which was a highly esteemed work with authority close to Holy
Scripture in Aquinas' days. Cf. G. Rocca, 1993, p. 642-649.
" The most important passages are in the words of the vulgata: (Tn
1,4) in Ipso "ita era., (Tn 1,4-5) et "ita erat lux Imminum; et lux
in tenebris luret. .. ; (Tn 3,16) sic enin> duexit Deus mundum.
.. ut omnis •... habeat vitam aeternaTnj an 3,36) qui credit in
Pi/ium habet vitam aeternatnj (In 4,10) tu forsitan petisses ab Eo
et dedisset tim aquam vi'lJd.mj an 5,21) sicut enim Pater suscitat
mortuos et vivificat ... ; ern 5,26) sicut enim Pater habet "itam
in semet Ipso; (Tn 6,35) Ego sum panis "itae ... ; (Tn 6,52) panis
quem ego dabo earo mea est pro mundi vita; an 6.58) skUI mis;t Me
vivens Pater et Ego vivo propter Patrem. .. ; (Tn 11,25) Ego sum
resurrectio et "ita; (Tn 12,24) nisi granum frumenti eadens in
terram mortuum fomt; an 14,6} Ego sum via et veritas et vita; an
17,3} haec est autem vita aeterna ut cognoscant Te solum verum
Deum.
CHAPTER! 25
Holy Scripture.'1 In the second place, since we aim to give an
interpretation of
Aquinas as a theologian and a thinker close to Scripture, our
intention is to take into account, from the outset, that the God he
speaks about is the triune God: Father, Son and Spirit. For the
sake of clarity, however, Aquinas often treats first the one nature
of the triune God and later the three Persons in the one God." We
will do the same by focusing on 'life' as a name for the divine
nature in the first place.
2.2 'Life' as a name for God's essence
In Summa 1beologide I 18 Aquinas devotes an entire quaestio to the
inquiry as to whether God can be called 'living' or 'life'. We will
present an analysis of this question" because it offers an
excellent opportunity for picturing Thomas' approach with regard to
'life' as a name for both creatures and Creator.
2.2.1 Summa Theologiae I 18.1-3
The question of the life of God is treated within the context of
the knowledge of God, since Aquinas considers knowing to be a kind
of living. This knowledge of God is situated within the larger
framework
" Cf. e.g. p, 35,10: apud Te fons 'Vitae, a verse which Aquinas
often quotes as referring to Christ who is with the Father; and Ps
83,3: cor meum et earo mea exultavit in Deum vivum, quoted in 5Th I
18.3.sc.
52 According to K. Rahner, this distinction of two perspectives on
the triune God is found for the first time in Aquinas' work. In the
history of theology it was a major factor for the development of a
division of the doctrine of God into twO treatises: de deo uno and
de deo trino. This separate treatment, with negative side-effects,
became common practise aher the Summa Theologiae had ousted Peter
Lombard's IV Libri Sententiarnm (K. Rahner, 1967, p. 323-324). In
contemporary theology the observati on and warning of Rahnec have
been acknowledged and taken to heart. Cf. N. Lash, 1993.
53 Other places of interest are: SeC I 97-99, I~ XII Met 8, In Joan
14.2, In Div Nom 6. We have chosen for S'Ih I 18 because it is
Aquinas' most mature work, here he treats the subject more
extensively than in other places and he is not bound by any texts
on which he has to comment. In Div Nom 6 would be a good
alternative because of the unique condense enumeration of the
various kinds of life which God bestows. The text of
pseudo-Dionysius. however. forces Aquinas to place all emphasis on
the causality and pre-existence of God's life: a position which
Thomas corrects in his own systematic works.
26 AQUINAS ON GOD AND LIFE
of the consideration of God's operations: His knowledge (STh I
14-18), His will (STh I 19-24) and His power (STh I 25)."
In the first two articles of STh I 18, Aquinas' intention is to
specify what we are talking about when we call a substance
'living'. In the first article (utrum omnium rerum naturalium sit
vivere) it immediately becomes apparent that the one word 'life' is
used to signify different substances in reality; plants and animals
as well as a natural element like water. In order to distinguish
between living and non-living things, Aquinas takes as point of
departure a substance of which it is clear that it is living: an
anima!." He observes that in our common use of language we begin to
call an animal 'living' from the moment that it moves itself and we
call it 'dead' from the moment this ability of self movement has
disappeared. Thomas concludes that we call a substance 'living' in
the proper meaning when it moves itself according to a certain sort
of motion. Motion may be taken in the proper meaning as referring
to the act of something existing in potentiality of existence (in
this case 'life' regards the being of the substance) or it may be
taken in the wider meaning as regarding the act (c.q. operation) of
a substance which already possesses the first perfection of being.
Thus vita in the proper meaning refers to the first perfection
(esse) or second perfection (operatio) of a substance in which
motion in the proper or wider
54 5Th I 14.prol: Quia vero inte/ligere quoddam vivere est, post
comider4tionem divinae scientiae, considerandum erit de vita
divina. Thomas reflects on the operations of God after he has taken
God's substance into consideration (STh ! 2-13). In these first
questions of the Summa Tbeologiae, after an inquiry about the
nature of me sacred doctrine, Aqoinas asks whether God is (STh !
2), how God is (or rather, how He is not, since we cannot know
God's essence) (5Th I 3-11), how God is known to us (STh ! 12) and
how God can be named by us (STh ! 13). In the questions regarding
God's substance (STh ! 2-13), the mOst fundamental decisions about
our knowing and speaking of God are made; decisions which heavily
influence the rest of the Summa Theologiae. We will therefore
return to these initial questions in our inter pretation of STh!
18 when necessary.
S5 5Th I 18.1.eo: Respondeo dicendum quod ex his quae manifoste
vivum, accipere possumus quorum sit 'Oivere, et quorum non sit
vivere. Vivere autem manifeste anima/ibus convenit ... Primo autem
dicimus animal vivere, quando ineipit ex se motum habere... Ex quo
patet quod ilia proprie sunt viventia, quae seipsa secundum aliquam
speciem motus movent,' sive accipiatur motus proprie, situt matus
dicitur actus imper fecti, idest existentis in potentia; sive
motus accipiatur communiter, prout motus dicitur actus perfect~
prout intelligere et sentire dicitur nu)'Ver~ ut dicitur in III De
anima 7 {431a6} ut sic viventia dicantur quaecumque se agunt ad
motum vel ,operationem aliquam ...
CHAPTER! 27
meaning can be detected. Not all natural things, however, exist in
this way. Water, for instance, does not have the ability to move
itself. It can be moved by something else, and thus be called
'living': not in the proper meaning but having a similitude with
life. . . .
In this approach we see how one word, VLta, may be applied In lts
proper meaning to different realities on the basis of a common
ratio of self-movement." When the element of 'movement' in the
ratio of vita is taken in a wider meaning (as in the case of the
operatio) we still speak of 'life' in the proper meaning, but when
the element of 'self is taken away, there can only be talk of
'life' by means of similitude.
One may observe tfrat Aquinas, in this article, moves between the
logical and the (meta)physical order in his analysis of what life
is. He gains insight by scrutinizing the implicit rules we adopt in
our common sense language and by testing these rules with the help
of metaphysical distinctions. The reason why Aquinas proceeds in
this way is that in his view our naming of things is determined by
our mode of knowing. Thomas explicitly brings this into discussion
in the second article of the question (utrum vita sit quaedam
operatio). In this article the question posed is whether life is an
activity (secunda perfectio) or a mode of being (prima perfectio)-
In his reply Aquinas states that our intellect is apt to know the
essence of things, but that it can do so only after having received
information from the senses." The information the senses provide is
restricted to the external, accidental qualities of the object. We
name things as we know them: with regard to life this becomes
apparent by our use of the word 'life'. Sometimes the word refers
to
S6 STh I 13.4.co: Ratio enim quam significat nomen, est conceptio
intellectus de re significata per nomen. Cf. R. McInerny. 1961, p.
61·64 who underscores that the ratio or definition is produced by
the intellect.
57 5Th I 18.2.co: Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut ex dietis patet,
intel/ectus noster, qui proprie est cognoscitivus quidditatis rei
ut proprii obiect~ accipit a sensu, cuius propria obiecta sunt
accidentia exteriora. Et inde est quod ex his qU4e exterius
apparent de re, devenimus ad cognoseendam essentiam reL Sic ergo
dicendum est et de vita. Nam 'vitae' nomen sumitur ex quodam
exterius apparenti circa rem, quod est movere seipsum, non tamen
est impositum hoc nomen ad hoc signifzcandum, sed ad significandam
substantiam cui convenit secundum suam naturam movere seipsam, vel
agere se quocumque modo ad operationem. Et secundum hoc, 'vivere'
nihil aliud est quod esse in tali natura. et 'vita' significat hoc
ipsum, sed in abstracto; sicut hoc nomen 'CW'sus' significat ipsum
CurTere in abstracto. Unde 'vivum' non est praedicazum accidentale,
sed substantiale. Quandoque tamen 'vita' sumitur minus proprie pro
operationibus vitae, a quibus nomen 'Vitae assumitur,' situt dicit
Philosophus, in IX Ethicorum 9 [1170a18], quod vivere principaliter
est sentire, vel inteJligere.
28 AQUlNAS ON GOD AND LIFE
activities such as willing and knowing (by which the essence of a
living substance is made known) and sometimes to the essence of the
substance itself. Both meanings of the word 'life' are proper, but
the second is the more proper meaning, being the term of our
knowledg~.
In the third article, Aquinas arrives at the central Issue of SIb I
18: whether life can be attributed to God (utrum Deo conveniat
vita). He begins the article with three arguments that seem to
contradict the view that life can be attributed to God. All the
arguments are based on the seeming discord between the simplicity
of God and .certain eleme.nts that are to be found in all living
substances mentioned m the precedmg two articles (movement, a soul
as principle of life and corp orality). As an argument in favour
only Psalm 83,3 is quoted: Cor meum et cr:ro mea exultavit in Deum
vivum.
Thomas begins his reply with the statement th~t 'life', in t~e most
proper meaning, is in God. The explanation of this statement ~s
based on an analysis of the shifts in signification that take place
m both elements that form the ratio of 'life' ('self' and
'movement'), when the word is attributed to living substances at
different ontological levels. At the lowest level of living
substances we perceive self-movement (growth and decrease) which is
restricted to carrying a movement into effect, the end and form of
which are determined by nature: the life of plants. 58
At a second level of animated substances both the nature of motion
as well as the degree of self-determination are modified. The
degree ~f self-determination is higher, since those beings acquire
the form of theIr self-movement for themselves through their
senses. The more complete their senses are, the more elaborate
their self-movement is. In the case of the oyster, equipped with
the sense of touch only, the self-movement is restricted to
dilation and contraction. In the case of animals endowed with more
senses, the self-movement can be elaborated up to ~ocal movement.
Thus an increase in self-determination is combined WIth a change in
the nature of motion. The amount of self-determination in animals,
however, is considerably restricted: the objective of their
move-
51 5Th I 18.3.co: Respondeo dicendum quod vita rnaxime proprie in
Deo est. Ad tuius e'Uidentiam, considerandum est quodJ cum vivere
dicantur aliqua secundum quod operantur ex seipsis, et non quasi ab
diu mota,' quanta perfectius com petit hoc alicui, tanto perfectius
in eo in-venitur vita ... lnveniuntur igitur quaedam, quae movent
seipsa, non habita respectu ad formam vel fin~ quae inest eis a
natura, sed solum ad executionem motus, sed forma per quam agunt,
et finis propter quem agunt, determinantur eis a natura. Et
huiusmcdi sunt plantae ...
CHAPTER I 29
ment is implanted in them by nature. Their instinct moves them by
means of the form conceived by the senses. 59
At a third level self-movement embodies the substance choosing the
end of the movement as well. At this level human beings are
situated, endowed with an intellect which is able to control the
senses and
. produce external movement. Here not only self-determination is
still greater, the nature of motion is changed as welL Movement in
the wider meaning, as referring to intellectual and volitional
activities, is the cause for greater self-determination.60
Aquinas leaves no doubt that, however free the self-movement of
human beings might be; metaphysically man is bound by nature. The
intellect can only be actuated according to the first principles
and the will can only be moved by virtue of the ultimate end which
it cannot refuse. Thus, he concludes, a substance whose nature is
not determined by anything else, but whose nature is its very act
of knowing, obtains self-movement in the highest possible degree.
Such a being would have life in the highest degree. Since God is
such a Being, He must possess life in the highest degree."
This final conclusion seems to contradict the negative start of SIb
I 3.prol (quia de Deo non possumus scire quid sit). God's nature is
identified as His very act of knowing and thus we seem to know what
God's nature is: ipsum eius intelligere. Did Aquinas change his
mind and does he admit that God's essence can be properly named by
us with the help of the same words we use for the naming of created
substances? Can knowledge of divine life be gained by simply
investigating the subse-
s' STh I 18.3.co: Quaedam vera utterius movent seipsa. non solum
hahito respectu ad executionem matus, sed etiam quantum ad fonnam
quae est principium TTWtus, quam per se acquirunt. Et huOOmodi sunt
animalia ...
60 STh I 18.3.00: Unde supra talia animalia sum ilia quae movent
seipsa, etiam habito respectu ad finem, quem sibi praestituunt.
Quod quidem non fit nisi per rationem et intellectum, cuOO est
cognoscere proportionem finis et eOO quod est ad finem, et unum
ordinare in alterum.
'1 STh I 18.3.co: Sed quamvis intellectus noster ad a/iqua se agat,
tamen aliqua sunt ei praestituta a natura,. sicut sunt prima
principia, circa quae non potest aliter se habere. et ultimus
finis, quem non potest non velie. Unde. licet quantum ad aliquid
moveat se, tamen oportet quod quantum ad a/iqua ab alia moveatur.
Illud igitur cuius sua natura est ipsum intelligere. et cui id quod
natura/iter habet non determinatur ab alia, hoc est quod obtinet
summum gradum vitae. Tale autem est Deus. Unde in Deo maxinie est
vita. Urule PhiloSfJphus. in XlI Metaphysicorum 11 [1072b27J,
ostenso quod Deus sit intelligens. eoncludit quod habeat vitam
peifeetissimam et sempiternam, quia intelleetus eius est
perfectissimus. et semper in actu.
30 AQUINAS ON GOD AND LIFE
quent levels of created life? In order to appreciate more precisely
what Aquinas says here, we
should interpret this article of STh I 18 in the light of what has
been said before in the Summa Theologiae. Both orders, according to
which Aquinas works in STh I 18, the metaphysical and the logical,
are scruti· nized with regard to God in the first 13 questions of
the Summa. In order to appreciate more precisely how to interpret
quaestio 18, we will therefore take a look at both.
2.2.1.1 God's essence: the metaphysical order
Vivere viventibus esse est, Thomas learns from Aristotle and he
says that 'life', in its proper meaning, refers to the act of
being. Asking for the nature of God's life, therefore, is
inevitably connected with the question of God's mode of being.
Thinking in terms of being, in all the objects we come to know
through our senses the 'being' is determined by the essence.62 The
distinction between the esse of a substance and its essentia is,
ontologically, the most fundamental distinction one can make.
Therefore, asking for God Thomas begins to ask for the being or
existence of God (STh I 2) followed by an investigation into His
essence (STh I 3-11).
The triune God who revealed Himself through Holy Scripture,
however, is not exactly an object which we come to know directly by
our senses. Though Thomas builds up his argument according to the
distinction between God's being and His essence, in q.3 he blurs
that distinction by saying that in God, being and essence cannot be
separated. How is this to be interpreted? Beginning with q.2,
interpreting the five ways as proofs of God's existence and reading
the following questions as providing information about the object,
the existence of which has just been proved, Aquinas' claim about
the iden· tification of being and essence in God could be
interpreted as a confirmation of having the possibility to know
God's essence.
At the very beginning of STh I 3, however, Aquinas explicitly
states that we cannot know God's nature or essence and that we
should rather
62 Here we touch upon a long discussion about the relation between
esse and essence in Aquinas' thinking. For literature d. R. te
Velde, 1995.
CHAPTER! 31
investigate how God is not." Taking this remark seriously, the
identi fication of God's being with His essence takes the shape of
a prohibition sign. Moreover, after this identification of being
and essence, q.2 should be read again, in order to see what exactly
Aquinas is up to here.
Thus, in order to gain insight into Thomas' view on God's life we
will, firstly, ask what he intends with the identification of being
and essence in God and, secondly, ask how this identification
affects the reading of Aquinas' remarks on God's being.
It has been argued, and I hold this to be the most elucidating and
theologically coherent i(lterpretation of Aquinas that, with the
identifi cation of God's existence and His essence he articulates
the most fundamental insight that determines his entire theological
undertaking: the distinction between creatures and Creator." Thus,
by blurring the most basic distinction in the ontological order
Aquinas intends to make· a new distinction, one between God and
creatures. What is at stake here for Thomas is the possibility for
maintaining the Biblical idea that God is at one and the same time
Creator of all creatures (which implies that He cannot be part of
creation and has to be radically distinguished from it) as well as
the One who is intimately linked with all creatures as their final
goal (which implies that He is present in creation as its
sustainer, redeemer and the One who perfects it). In fact it is the
reflection on the triune God, Father, Son and Spirit, articulated
by the Councils and recognized in Holy Scripture, that causes
Aquinas to modify the use of Aristotle's philosophical instruments.
How the life of God is articulated in the doctrine of the three
Persons of God will be treated in the next paragraph. For the
moment we are concerned with showing the
63 STb I 3.prol: Cognito de a1iquo an sit, inquirendum restat
quomodo sit. ut sciatur de eo quid sit. Sed quia de Deo scire non
possumus quid sit, sed quid non sit, non possumus considerare de
Deo quomodo sit, sed poems quomodo non sit. Primo ergo
considerandum est quomodo non sit; secundo, quomodo a nobis
cognoscatur [q.12],· tertia quomodo nominetur [q.13j..
.. 10 a compact and penetrating book D. Burrell (1986) shom the
history of development of this distinction by thinkers of the three
great monotheistic religions: "The candidate proposed Mthe
distinction between essence and existence- finds its roots in
Alfarabi, its firSt aniculation in IbnMSina, is approved by
Maimonides, and brought to a refined status by Aquinas." (po 35)
With this interpretation Burrell is in line with J. Pieper's
observation of creation as the hidden key in Aquinas' philosophy
(quoted by Burrell on p. 34, the note on p. 119 fails however).
Pieper makes his observation in: J. Pieper, 1953, 1974 and 1978,
among other places. Pieper's position is also adopted by O.H. Pesch
(1988), and worked out by R. Sokolowski (1982) in what he C3lls
'the Christian distinction'.
32 AQUINAS ON GOD AND LIFE
rightfulness and meaning of the attribution of 'life' to God. Can
we be more precise about what Thomas tries to establish? In
order to do so, as a first step, it may be helpful to take into
account which positio