Post on 24-Jan-2016
description
Inequality, networks and distributive decisions: A field experiment
Ben D’ExelleUniversity of Antwerp - IOBMaastricht University
Arno RiedlMaastricht University
ESA – World Meeting
Rome, June 30, 2007
What determines “giving” in small-scale (“face-to-face”) societies :
Social networks: social distance, network structure, individual position within networks
Individual characteristics of community members (economic variables, sex, age, education, etc.)
Correlation between both dimensions? Use of a dictator game experiment,
complemented with survey data on individual characteristics and social networks
Research questions
Literature references
Social networks and dictator game giving: Leider, Mobius, Rosenblat & Do (2006): dictators
give 50% more to friends than to strangers
Goeree, McConnell, Mitchell, Tromp & Yariv (2006): Distance in networks lowers giving
Brañas-Garza, Cobo-Reyes, Paz Espinosa, Jiménez & Ponti (2006): Social integration (betweenness) increases giving.
Experimental design & procedures
What is new about our experiment:1. Large heterogeneity: rural village where
poverty and inequality are highly present (economic inequality; sex; education; age)
2. Multiple relations: details on the type of relation (15 types)
Dictator game (divide 20 coins of 1 c$) with 1 stranger and 5 different (randomly selected) village members; max. earnings = two days income (6.7$) Minimizing reciprocity by one-way anonymity: only
dictator knows the identity of the recipient Decentralized setup: individual visits (lower self-
selection; lower public exposure; no communication) Reduce experimenter-effect: use of rings (to maintain
weight of boxes) + sealing of boxes + recording of decisions by supervisor
First, the networks (trust-building with participants); then, the experiment in one day (to limit contagion)
Experimental design & procedures
Experimental design & procedures
Results
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Median
1 285 9.6 4.58 0 20 102 285 0.4 4.63 -15 16 0
21
0
10
20
30
Pe
rcen
t
0 5 10 15 20
Coins to recipient
0
10
20
30
-20 -10 0 10 20
Pe
rce
nt
Coins to recipient - coins to stranger
Economic resources (between subject analysis)
No YesThe household of the dictator has land?
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
Co
ins
to s
tran
ger
(m
ean
)
N = 38 N = 19
Sign. = 0.297
No YesThe household of the dictator has cattle?
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
Co
ins
to s
tran
ger
(m
ean
)
N = 31 N = 26
Sign. = 0.064*
Procedure to study social relations
Measuring social networks: Use of small cards, each representing a
household (on each card the names of both husband and wife)
Do you know the household? (93.5% of all possible dyads)
Do you have a social relation with one of its members?
Give details on the type of relation (e.g. land, labor, mutual support, family, religion, neighbor, etc.).
Completeness of networks: 100 out of 123 adults (81.3%)
Analyzing social networks: Only household heads. Other members were rarely
mentioned. Members of the same household are always linked
whatever the type of relation we are looking at. OR-networks: we symmetrized the adjacency
matrix. We took the maximum value and missing values were eliminated by the non-missing value in the other direction.
Few missing values remained (3.5%); conversion into zeros.
Procedure to study social relations
Mutual support network in the village (N = 123)
density = 0.0321 (matrix average);
mean degree = 3.919 (3.754);
freeman’s graph centralization measure = 21.73%
Social distance (general relation)
distance 1 distance 2General relation (distance)
-0,25
0
0,25
0,5
0,75
1
1,25
Co
ins
to r
ecip
ien
t -
coin
s to
str
ang
er (
mea
n)
N = 114 N = 170
Sign. = 0.031**
Coef. S.E.
Sex of the dictator (1 = male; 0 = female)
Land: dictator yes; recipient yes (dummy)
Land: dictator yes; recipient no (dummy)
Land: dictator no; recipient yes (dummy)
Distance
Size of ego-network (dictator)
Number of ties in ego-network (dictator)
Power (Bonacich; neg. beta)
Number of decision (min. = 1; max. = 5)
Constant
Dep. var. = coins to recipient
General relation
Coef. S.E.
Sex of the dictator (1 = male; 0 = female) 2.049 0.046**
Land: dictator yes; recipient yes (dummy) 1.719 0.130
Land: dictator yes; recipient no (dummy) 1.501 0.170
Land: dictator no; recipient yes (dummy) -0.289 0.503
Distance
Size of ego-network (dictator)
Number of ties in ego-network (dictator)
Power (Bonacich; neg. beta)
Number of decision (min. = 1; max. = 5) -0.182 0.097
Constant 8.760 0.000***
R-squared 0.070
Number of observations 280
Dep. var. = coins to recipient
General relation
Coef. S.E.
Sex of the dictator (1 = male; 0 = female) 3.147 1.028***
Land: dictator yes; recipient yes (dummy) 2.200 1.098**
Land: dictator yes; recipient no (dummy) 2.185 1.056**
Land: dictator no; recipient yes (dummy) -0.240 0.431
Distance -1.000 0.364***
Size of ego-network (dictator) -10.309 4.382**
Number of ties in ego-network (dictator) 0.001 0.004
Power (Bonacich; neg. beta) 10.731 4.584**
Number of decision (min. = 1; max. = 5) -0.173 0.107
Constant 13.820 3.344***
R-squared 0.1512
Number of observations 280
Dep. var. = coins to recipient
General relation Mutual support
Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E.
Sex of the dictator (1 = male; 0 = female) 3.147 1.028*** 2.427 1.026**
Land: dictator yes; recipient yes (dummy) 2.200 1.098** 0.803 1.218
Land: dictator yes; recipient no (dummy) 2.185 1.056** 0.595 1.150
Land: dictator no; recipient yes (dummy) -0.240 0.431 -0.287 0.435
Distance -1.000 0.364*** 0.408 0.801
Size of ego-network (dictator) -10.309 4.382** -0.094 0.803
Number of ties in ego-network (dictator) 0.001 0.004 0.295 0.118**
Power (Bonacich; neg. beta) 10.731 4.584** -0.336 0.853
Number of decision (min. = 1; max. = 5) -0.173 0.107 -0.184 0.111*
Constant 13.820 3.344*** 9.270 1.058***
R-squared 0.1512 0.1426
Number of observations 280 280
Dep. var. = coins to recipient
Conclusions
Networks matter for dictator giving But, it depends on the networks you look at General relation:
Distance and Bocanich centrality Mutual support:
Ties within the ego-network (norm-based behaviour)
Sex and economic variables remain important, when controlling for networks
Multivariate analysisRegression on coins left to recipient
Sex of the dictator (1 = male; 0 = female) 2.049 1.025** 2.395 1.023** 3.186 0.994***
Land: dictator yes; recipient yes (dummy) 1.719 1.136 0.872 1.168 2.197 1.093**
Land: dictator yes; recipient no (dummy) 1.501 1.093 0.670 1.106 2.183 1.048**
Land: dictator no; recipient yes (dummy) -0.289 0.431 -0.296 0.434 -0.236 0.429
Size of ego-network (mutual support; dictator) -0.392 0.208*
Number of ties in ego-network (mutual support; dictator) 0.311 0.110***
Relation (whatever type; distance) -1.001 0.364***
Power (whatever type; Bonacich; Beta > 0) -4.849 2.131**
Power (whatever type; Bonacich; Beta < 0) 5.294 2.320**
Number of decision (min. = 1; max. = 5) -0.182 0.110* -0.181 0.110 -0.173 0.107
Constant 8.760 0.896*** 9.441 1.030*** 13.359 2.314***
R-squared 0.0704 0.1395 0.1504
Number of observations 280 280 280
Wald chi2 9.19 27.04 30.86
Prob > chi2 0.1018 0.0003 0.0001
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Random effects (panel model); robust standard errors
Mutual support networks
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 inf.
Mutual support (distance)
0
20
40
60
80
100
Cu
mu
lati
ve P
erce
nt
Both cattle
One cattle
None cattle
Cattle and mutual support
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
120%
0 1 2 3-4 ≥ 5
Degree centrality
HH has cattle HH does not have cattle
Distance Centrality
Coef. S.E Sig. Coef. S.E Sig.
Sex of the dictator (1 = male; 0 = female) 4.273 1.012 0.000*** 4.272 0.900 0.000***
Relation (whatever type; distance) -0.998 0.451 0.031** -0.963 0.361 0.008***
Centrality (whatever type of relation; Bonacich) -6.383 2.055 0.003*** -6.373 2.030 0.002***
Power (whatever type of relation; Bonacich) 6.945 2.253 0.003*** 6.935 2.214 0.002***
Size of ego-network (mutual support; dictator) -0.405 0.179 0.027** -0.405 0.178 0.023**
Number of ties in ego-network (mutual support; dictator) 0.311 0.096 0.002*** 0.311 0.092 0.001***
Number of aid projects the hh of the dictator works with 1.534 0.517 0.004*** 1.534 0.465 0.001***
Number of decision (min. = 1; max. = 5) -0.165 0.104 0.117 -0.165 0.105 0.115
Constant 14.757 1.883 0.000*** 14.684 2.049 0.000***
R-squared 0.2929 0.2929
Number of observations 285 285
F 6.81 Wald chi2 663.17
Prob > F 0.0000 Prob > chi2 0.0000
OLS (robust st.errors) Panel model (rob. s.e.)
Multivariate analysis
Regression on number of coins left to recipient
Correlation between networks and individual characteristics
Possible correlation between networks and individual characteristics (economic assets, sex, age, etc.)
Most important networks that may be influenced by individual characteristics are mutual support relations, economic relations (any kind of economic transaction) and friendship relations
Procedure to analyze individual social relations: We only took account of the household heads. People only
very occasionally mentioned other household members. Second, members of the same households are always
linked whatever the type of relation we are looking at. We symmetrized the resulting adjacency matrix. For each
dyad in each of both directions, we took the maximum value and missing values were eliminated by the non-missing value in the other direction.
After this only a limited number of missing values remained, which we converted into zeros.
Most important networks that may be influenced by individual characteristics are friendship relations and mutual support relations
Network formation:
Multivariate analysis
Coef. S.E Sig. Coef. S.E Sig.
Sex of the dictator (1 = male; 0 = female) 3.528 1.001 0.000*** 3.186 0.994 0.001***
Relation (whatever type; distance) -1.010 0.362 0.005*** -1.001 0.364 0.006***
Centrality (whatever type of relation; Bonacich) -4.547 2.098 0.030** -4.849 2.131 0.023**
Power (whatever type of relation; Bonacich) 4.957 2.287 0.030** 5.294 2.32 0.023**
Size of ego-network (mutual support; dictator) -0.435 0.203 0.032** -- -- --
Number of ties in ego-network (mutual support; dictator) 0.309 0.108 0.004*** -- -- --
Land: dictator yes; recipient yes (dummy) 1.381 1.143 0.227 2.197 1.092 0.044**
Land: dictator yes; recipient no (dummy) 1.378 1.077 0.201 2.183 1.048 0.037**
Land: dictator no; recipient yes (dummy) -0.248 0.429 0.563 -0.236 0.429 0.582
Number of decision (min. = 1; max. = 5) -0.172 0.108 0.109 -0.173 0.107 0.106
Constant 14.347 2.249 0.000*** 13.359 2.314 0.000***
R-squared 0.2104 0.1504
Number of observations 280 280
Wald chi2 51.33 30.86
Prob > chi2 0.0000 0.0001
Model 1 Model 2
Regression on number of coins left to recipient
Individual network position
Centrality: degree centrality But, the links other people have are important too:
The links other people have: Control of access and benefits (structural holes; Burt,
1992) Leadership position (responsibility) Searching costs (Coleman, 1990)
The links other people have in the ego-network: Reputation effects (Burt, 1992) Norm-based behavior (reputation effects, indirect
reciprocity): importance of mutual support networks Distinguish between mutual support relations and
general (whatever type) relations; the first are more specific and may be related with social norms
Wealth ranking of recipient
poor middle richest
wealth ranking of recipient by dictator
0
5
10
15
20
Nu
mb
er o
f co
ins
left
fo
r th
e re
cip
ien
t
971
952920 823811
669
N = 168
N = 71 N = 37
poor middle richest
wealth ranking of recipient by dictator
-10
0
10
20
Co
ins
left
to
rec
ipie
nt
- co
ins
left
to
str
ang
er
962
733
723
704
937715
854
974
885
791763
917
873 858
802
911927795
708
760751
817
N = 168 N = 71 N = 37
Economic resources (within subject analysis)
No Yes
The household of the recipient has cattle?
-10
0
10
20
Co
ins
left
to
rec
ipie
nt
- co
ins
left
to
str
ang
er
885
763 760
723751
873
858817
802
715
708
974
791
733
704
937
911
927
854 795
N = 140 N = 140
No Yes
The household of the recipient has land?
-10
0
10
20
Co
ins
left
to
rec
ipie
nt
- co
ins
left
to
str
ang
er
763 760
723751
873
858
715854
974
885
791
733
704
937
911
927
795
708
N = 185 N = 95
Male - Male
Male - Female
Female - Male
Female - Female
Mann-Whitney U
x x 2265.5 (.955)
x x 1550.0 (.000***)
x x 1644.0 (.001***)
x x 2276.0 (.109)
x x 2328.0 (.124)
x x 2333.0 (.075*)
Male - male Male - female Female - male Female - female
Sex of dictator and recipient
0
5
10
15
20
Nu
mb
er o
f co
ins
left
fo
r th
e re
cip
ien
t
897
847
710
699
849
808
875
777
741
879
954
724
867 972
740
931
919
851
815
920
708
N = 67 N = 68
N = 70 N = 80
Sex of dictator and recipient
Mutual support networks
Land and mutual support
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
120%
0 1 2 3-4 ≥ 5
Degree centrality
HH has land HH has not land
2. Centrality
Cattle and mutual support
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
120%
0 1 2 3-4 ≥ 5
Degree centrality
HH has cattle HH does not have cattle
Mutual support networks
2. Centrality
Sex and mutual support
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
0 1 2 3 4-5 > 5
Degree centrality
Female Male
Coef. Rob. S.E Sig. Coef. Rob. S.E Sig.
Neighbour (dummy) 2.096 0.300 0.000*** 1.241 0.249 0.000***
Family relation (first degree) 0.925 0.275 0.001*** -1.197 0.376 0.001***
Sex: ego female; alter male (dummy) -0.043 0.330 0.896 0.406 0.240 0.091*
Sex: ego male; alter female (dummy) -1.013 0.534 0.058* 0.126 0.330 0.702
Sex: ego male; alter male (dummy) 0.121 0.395 0.760 1.738 0.224 0.000***
Land: ego yes; alter yes (dummy) 0.421 0.584 0.472 -0.224 0.326 0.492
Land: ego yes; alter no (dummy) -0.041 0.515 0.936 -0.047 0.285 0.868
Land: ego no; alter yes (dummy) 0.474 0.212 0.026** -0.078 0.114 0.492
Cattle: ego yes; alter yes (dummy) 0.622 0.576 0.281 0.587 0.261 0.025**
Cattle: ego yes; alter no (dummy) 0.376 0.524 0.473 0.241 0.282 0.394
Cattle: ego no; alter yes (dummy) 0.885 0.255 0.001*** 0.115 0.118 0.329
Education of ego -0.012 0.046 0.789 0.032 0.035 0.366
Education of alter 0.001 0.029 0.984 0.050 0.010 0.000***
Age of ego -0.007 0.010 0.516 -0.006 0.008 0.431
Age of alter -0.006 0.010 0.528 0.013 0.003 0.000***
Constant -4.441 0.875 0.000*** -3.637 0.501 0.000***
Number of observations 8114 8114
Log pseudolikelihood -580.544 -2586.8
Pseudo R2 0.095 0.104
Wald chi2 136.15 287.39
Prob > chi2 0.0000 0.0000
Mutual support relations Friendship relations
Logit regression on directed relations
Research questions
Our interest comes from the current debate in development economics on decentralization : Decentralization: delegation to the local level of any
type of decision-making
In our case: the task to distribute aid resources → less costly but also less control on distributive outcomes
Two ways for the policymaker to maintain certain influence on distribution
One focus: monitoring mechanisms Other focus (= our focus): influencing local
determinants behind local distributive processes
Experimental design
First, mapping of social networks; confidence is built with local participants; support of local leaders
Then, experiment in one-day; contagion is limited
Payments to recipients are made the day after; recipients are likely to have played as dictator too (acceptance of payments!)